R v Den Ouden, 2023 ABKB 85
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Den Ouden, 2023 ABKB 85 Date: 20230111 Docket: 210445581Q1 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - Willem Den Ouden Accused Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Criminal Code ,
section 486.4 . By Court Order, information that could identify the victim must not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way. NOTE: Identifying information has been removed from this judgment to comply with the ban so that it may be published. _______________________________________________________ Ruling on Voluntariness Voir Dire of the Honourable Justice M.A. Marion _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction
[ 1 ] The Accused is charged with one count of sexual assault pursuant to
section 271 of the Criminal Code . The alleged incident took place at the Accused’s 20th birthday party, in the basement of the home of the Accused’s parents, where the Accused lived. The trial is scheduled to be heard from January 30, 2023, to February 3, 2023. [ 2 ] As the designate of Chief Justice Moreau, on September 28, 2022, Justice de Wit appointed me as the Case Management Judge pursuant to
section 551.1 of the Criminal Code . [ 3 ] The pre-trial application voir dire was held to determine whether certain audio and audio/video recorded statements ( Statements ) made by the Accused to the Calgary Police Service ( CPS ) were voluntary and can be relied upon by the Crown in its case in chief or for the purposes of cross-examining the Accused should he elect to testify at trial. The Accused denies that his statements made to CPS were voluntary.
He does not separately seek to exclude them pursuant to a breach of the Charter and has not filed a Charter notice. [ 4 ] For the reasons set out below, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether certain parts of the Statements were voluntary and those parts are inadmissible at trial. II. Background [ 5 ] On Thursday, April 22, 2021, Constable Kathy Bowman ( Bowman ) of the CPS left a message with the Accused to call her. They connected that day.
Bowman advised the Accused that she was hoping to have a chat with him, that a complaint had been made against him, and that she needed to speak to him to hear his side of the story. They made arrangements for him to attend at the CPS headquarters in northeast Calgary at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, April 26, 2021. [ 6 ] The Accused spoke to a lawyer over the weekend and then attended CPS headquarters with his father on April 26, 2021. [ 7 ] The Accused was met at the door by Detective Tim Fitzgibbon ( Fitzgibbon ). Fitzgibbon was not in uniform.
Fitzgibbon did not have any material interaction with the Accused (less than 10 seconds) and handed the Accused over to Bowman. Fitzgibbon then had a discussion with the Accused’s father about an alleged incident on February 27, 2021. Then, by video link outside the room, Fitzgibbon watched Bowman interview the Accused in an interview room. [ 8 ] Upon meeting the Accused, Bowman immediately advised him that he was under arrest. She asked him if he knew why he was there, and he indicated he did not. They made small talk as they went to the booking area.
Bowman advised him that she was arresting him for sexual assault and of his right to counsel. The Accused confirmed he understood that right. Bowman advised the Accused that “you may be charged with sexual assault”and that he was not obliged to say anything unless he wished to do so, but that whatever he said may be given in evidence. The Accused confirmed he understood and indicated he wanted to speak to a lawyer. [ 9 ] Bowman patted the Accused down and put his hat, phone and other personal belongings into a locker.
The Accused was put in a private room to contact legal counsel, where he remained for approximately five minutes. He was able to contact legal counsel during this time. [ 10 ] Bowman then took the Accused’s shoes and belt, and put them in the locker, which she explained was for safety reasons. [ 11 ] At 9:23 a.m., Bowman placed the Accused in an interview room, asked him if he wanted water (he did), asked if he needed to use the bathroom (he didn’t), and advised him she would be back in five minutes. [ 12 ] The Accused was then left alone in the interview room for just over 20 minutes.
Bowman returned at 9:44 a.m. with the water and interviewed the Accused for approximately 38 minutes. She then left again at approximately 10:22 a.m. and told the Accused she would be back in 5–10 minutes, indicating she may have some follow-up questions for him. [ 13 ] This time, the Accused was left alone in the interview room for approximately 18 minutes. Bowman returned at approximately10:41 a.m. and asked the Accused some follow-up questions for approximately 2–3 minutes. Bowman then advised the Accused she was going to get some paperwork “so we can release you today”.
The Accused was then allowed to use the bathroom and was placed back into the interview room at 10:46 a.m. Bowman left and returned about 8–9 minutes later, at 10:54 a.m., with release paperwork. Bowman then confirmed the Accused was being charged with sexual assault and spent the next few minutes explaining his release conditions. The interview ended at about 11:03 a.m. [ 14 ] These interactions between the Accused and CPS, which are discussed in further detail below in these Reasons, were recorded by audio or video, or both, and include 8 audio files and 6 audio/video files.
During the interviews, the Accused denied that he had done anything bad, or that he had committed sexual assault. He did not “confess” to the crime. However, despite the Accused having asserted his right to silence or otherwise communicating his desire not to speak to the police at least 18 times during the interview, he nonetheless told the police significant information about himself, who was at the party, what was happening at the party before the alleged incident, his relationship with the Complainant, and significant details about the alleged incident. III.
Issue [ 15 ] The issue on this application is whether the Accused’s Statements on April 22, 2021 and April 26, 2021 were made voluntarily and can be used by the Crown at trial. IV. Analysis
A. General Principles [ 16 ] In R v Beaver , 2022 SCC 54 at paras 45–58 , the Supreme Court of Canada very recently summarized the general principles of the common law “confessions rule”: [45] The common law confessions rule provides that a confession to a person in authority is presumptively inadmissible, unless the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary (Oickle, at paras. 30 and 68; R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11 , [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 11 ; Tessier (SCC), at paras. 39, 68 and 89).
Under the confessions rule, an involuntary confession “always warrants exclusion” (Oickle, at para. 30; see also R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48 , [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, at para. 38 ). But a voluntary confession need not always be admitted into evidence.
If a voluntary confession was obtained in a manner that breached the Charter, it can still potentially be excluded under s. 24(2) (Oickle, at para. 30; Singh, at para. 38). [46] At the heart of the confessions rule is the delicate balance between individual rights and collective interests in the criminal justice system ( Singh , at paras. 1, 21, 27-28, 31 and 34; Tessier (SCC) , at paras. 4 and 69; Oickle , at para. 33). The “twin goals” of the rule involve “protecting the rights of the accused without unduly limiting society’s need to investigate and solve crimes” ( Oickle , at para. 33).
On the one hand, the common law recognizes an individual’s right against self-incrimination and right to remain silent, such that an individual need not give information to the police or answer their questions absent statutory or other legal compulsion; on the other hand, the police often need to speak to people when discharging their important public responsibility to investigate and solve crime. [47] Voluntariness, broadly defined, is the “touchstone” of the confessions rule ( Oickle , at paras. 27, 32 and 69; Spencer , at para. 11 ; Singh , at para. 31).
Voluntariness is a shorthand for a complex of values engaging policy concerns related to not only the reliability of confessions, but also to respect for individual free will, the need for the police to obey the law, and the fairness and repute of the criminal justice system. Involuntary confessions can be unreliable, unfair, and harmful to the reputation of the criminal justice system ( Oickle , at paras. 32 and 70; Singh , at paras. 30 and 34; Tessier (SCC) , at paras. 70 and 72).
A statement may be involuntary “because it is unreliable and raises the possibility of a false confession, or because it was unfairly obtained and ran afoul of the principle against self- incrimination and the right to silence” ( Tessier (SCC) , at para. 70). [48] The application of the confessions rule is necessarily flexible and contextual.
When assessing the voluntariness of a confession, the “trial judge must determine, based on the whole context of the case, whether the statements made by an accused were reliable and whether the conduct of the state served in any way to unfairly deprive the accused of their free choice to speak to a person in authority” ( Tessier ( SCC ), at para. 68).
The trial judge must consider all relevant factors, including the presence of threats or promises, the existence of oppressive conditions, whether the accused had an operating mind, any police trickery that would “shock the community”, and the presence or absence of a police caution. These factors are not a checklist that supplants a contextual inquiry (see Oickle , at paras. 47, 66- 67 and 71; Spencer , at paras. 11-12 ; Singh , at para. 35; Tessier (SCC) , at paras. 5, 68, 76 and 87). 1.
Presence of a Charter Caution [ 17 ] The presence of a Charter caution is an important factor in assessing the statement made by a person under arrest or detention; however, it is not determinative of voluntariness: R v Singh , 2007 SCC 48 at para 31 ; R v Tessier , 2022 SCC 35 at para 5 [ Tessier 2022 ]. “While a proper caution will not guarantee that statements given thereafter are voluntary, it stands to reason that proving the accused made a free choice to speak to the authorities will be easier for the Crown if a caution is given”: Tessier 2022 at para 5. 2.
Oppression [ 18 ] Oppression has the potential to create false confessions where conditions are distasteful enough that an accused makes a stress-compliant confession to escape those conditions, or where the oppressive circumstances could overbear the suspect’s will to the point that he or she comes to doubt his or her own memory, believes the relentless accusations of the police, and gives an induced confession: Oickle at para 58.
Factors that can create an atmosphere of oppression include depriving the suspect of food, clothing, water, sleep, or medical attention; denying access to counsel; and excessively aggressive, intimidating questioning for a prolonged period of time: Oickle at para 60. Another source of oppressive conditions can involve the use of non-existent evidence: Oickle at para 61. 3. Threats or Promises [ 19 ] Statements may be inadmissible if they were the result of “fear or prejudice or hope of advantage”: Oickle at para 49.
The most important consideration in all cases is to look for a quid pro quo offer by interrogators, regardless of whether it comes in the form of a threat or a promise: Oickle at para 57. [ 20 ] The classic hope of advantage is the prospect of leniency from courts.
It is improper for a person in authority to suggest to a suspect that he or she will take steps to procure a reduced charge or sentence if the suspect confesses — an explicit offer by police to procure lenient treatment in return for a confession is clearly a very strong inducement, and will warrant exclusion in all but exceptional circumstances: Oickle at para 49. [ 21 ] Express threats of violence are uncommon. More common, and more challenging judicially, are the more subtle, veiled threats that can be used against suspects: Oickle at para 53.
For example, statements that “it would be better” to give a statement may in some circumstances imply that dire consequences might flow from the refusal to talk ( Oickle at para 53), whereas statements that “it would be better if you told the truth” do not automatically require exclusion: Oickle at para 54. [ 22 ] Police inducements can involve both promises and threats at the same time: R v Wabason , 2018 ONCA 187 at para 14 ; R v Othman , 2018 ONCA 1073 at para 16 ; R v Roberts , 2022 ABKB 748 at paras 182–185 . [ 23 ] An inducement can relate to leniency or benefits prior to trial, or even before charges have been laid.
Upon arrest and detention, inducements can relate to potential release, whether charges might be laid, or what type of charges might be laid. As noted in
R v JM, 2017 ONSC 7260 at paras 34–35 (cited in R v Favel, 2022 ABQB 570 at para 438): [34] An arrestee’s uppermost concerns are: first, will I be detained in custody and not get bail?; and second, will I be prosecuted for theaccusation and face the drastic consequences of stigmatization and jail? [35] The prospect that a detainee could talk his way out of a charge and the ensuing prosecution must be sweet music to his ears. It ishard to imagine a more tantalizing offer for the police to dangle in front of the accused.
And it is clearly improper particularly, as here,where the offer was manifestly false: see R. v. Dupuis, 2014 ONSC 2751, 11 C.R. (7th) 278 at paras. 76; R. v. Alexis, 2002 BCCA 103(2002), 163 C.C.C. (3d) 387. [24] Inducements need not be express offers of quid pro quo: Wabason at paras 15–18; Roberts at para 185.
While an implicitoffer of lenient treatment and the possibility of a reduced charge may not have the same impact as an express offer, it may still besignificant: R v Coaster, 2014 MBCA 108 at paras 27–30; R v Tessier, 2001 NBCA 34 at para 40–41, affirmed 2002 SCC 6 at para 2; Rv Monk, 2002 BCCA 103 at para 26. Each case will depend on its facts.
A mere explanation that the police are trying to find the truthand that, “if the matter got resolved it would end there”, or that the information the accused provides will be considered in makingrecommendations, may not be an inducement: R v Dixon, 2018 BCCA 181 at paras 23–25; R v Heatley, 2015 BCCA 350 at para 52; R vBJ, 2020 BCSC 2251 at para 54.
But a suggestion that everything could be cleared up by admitting to having consensual sex, with thecorollary threat that if the accused fails to say what happened the situation will “spiral out of control”, can be an inducement: R v GF,2016 ONSC 2510 at paras 9–11. [25] The mere hope of not being prosecuted, while not as powerful as an iron clad promise, can be “very seductive” to a desperateaccused person just arrested for a serious crime: JM at para 40; R v Brown, 2015 ONSC 3305 at para 121; R v Dupuis, 2014 ONSC2751 at para 76.
A hope expressed by the police that information from the accused may “change the focus” or “simplify” things, or, inthe face of a lack of information from the accused, that the police “cannot predict” what will happen, can be a veiled threat andinducement: R v Rhodes, 2002 BCSC 667 at para 85.
An implication that the officer has decision-making power as to what will happennext, or could influence the investigation, may contribute to or be an inducement: R v Armishaw, 2011 ONSC 5624 at paras 79–80 and123; R v Camille, 2018 BCSC 301 at paras 48–53; Roberts at para 136. [26] The hope of being released from detention sooner can also be the result of an inducement: R v McLeod, 2005 ABQB 864 atpara 26; R v Gyles, 2015 MBQB 21 at paras 25, 32 and 55; R v Cleveland, 2019 MBQB 58 at paras 28–33; R v Anderson, 2019 ONSC2739 at para 99.
But it also may not be: Dixon at para 24; R v Oxley, 2017 ONSC 4546 at para 16; R v Lewis, 2015 ONSC 6957 at paras21–25. An inducement to end a very long, or anticipated very long, interview may also lead to an involuntary confession or statement: Rv Felker, 2009 BCSC 408, [2009] BCJ No 746 (SC) at para 71; R v Mohamad, 2014 ONSC 1348 at paras 16–17; R v McGregor, 2020ONSC 4802 at para 218. [27] In any event, the mere fact of a hope, or even an inducement, is not enough — Oickle at para 57.
There must be at least somecausal connection or nexus between the inducement and the statement: Oickle, paras 54–55 and 84; R v Fernandes, 2016 ONCA 772 atparas 26–29; Favel at para 277. Often, the independent motives of an accused to speak to police to procure earlier release or favourabletreatment, or to gain information about the investigation, may be self-driven: Oickle at para 57; R v ARM, 2011 ABCA 98 at para 41;Mohamad at para 15; R v Stewart, 2016 BCSC 2509 at para 16; Favel at para 419.
An inducement that, standing alone, would notrender statements involuntary, can nevertheless contribute to a reasonable doubt as to whether an accused ultimately spoke as a result ofhis own free choice: Camille at paras 50–52. The inducement need not be the sole contributing factor: Othman at para 24. [28] It is also not necessarily enough that the accused believes that there is an advantage to speaking: R v Sawchyn (DavidLawrence), 1981 ABCA 173 at paras 15–18 (leave to appeal to the SCC denied 33 AR 98).
As per Oickle at para 57 (citing R v Rennie(1981), 74 Crown App R 207 (CA) at page 212): Very few confessions are inspired solely by remorse. Often the motives of an accused are mixed and include a hope that an earlyadmission may lead to an earlier release or a lighter sentence. If it were the law that the mere presence of such a motive, even ifpromoted by something said or done by a person in authority, led inexorably to the exclusion of a confession, nearly everyconfession would be rendered inadmissible. This is not the law. In some cases the hope may be self-generated.
If so, it is irrelevant,even if it provides the dominant motive for making the confession. In such a case the confession will not have been obtained by anythingsaid or done by a person in authority. More commonly the presence of such a hope will, in part at least, owe its origin to something saidor done by such a person.
There can be few prisoners who are being firmly but fairly questioned in a police station to whom it does notoccur that they might be able to bring both their interrogation and their detention to an earlier end by confession. [Emphasis added] [29] Another factor is whether the alleged inducement or offer is a legally or factually accurate appraisal of the circumstances, oran accurate description of the police’s intended course of action: Beaver at para 66; Brown at paras 96 and 124–125; Favel at paras 420and 442–443; Roberts at paras 140–141; R v Backhouse, (ONCA) at para 121; Fernandes at para 30.
Inducementsbased on true information tend to be treated more favourably than inducements based on false information: R v Osborne, 2019 ONSC230 at para 83. Police revealing accurate information to a detainee will rarely lead to an inducement on its own: JM at para 37; Favel atpara 273; R v PT, (ONCA) at para 75–77. [30] In all cases, the trial judge must examine the entire context of the confession and ask whether there is a reasonable doubt thatthe resulting confession was involuntary: Oickle at para 54.
For example, where the suspect is treated properly, it will take a strongerinducement to render the statement involuntary: Oickle at para 71. The strength of the alleged inducement must be considered in theoverall contextual inquiry into voluntariness: R v Spencer, 2007 SCC 11 at para 13. As noted in Oickle, at para 57, police conductbecomes improper only when the inducements “whether standing alone or in combination with other factors, are strong enough to raise areasonable doubt about whether the will of the subject has been overborne”. 4.
Operating Mind [31] Generally, the operating mind doctrine requires the Crown to show that the accused possessed the minimum cognitive ability
to understand what they were saying and to comprehend that the statement might be used as evidence in criminal proceedings: Tessier2022 at para 8, citing R v Whittle, (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 914 at 939. [32] The default assumption is that, absent a cognitive impairment, an operating mind exists: Tessier 2022 at para 52. However,the burden always rests with the Crown to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statement was voluntary in light of the broadercontextual analysis as proposed in Oickle: Tessier 2022 at para 52.
That is, as part of its persuasive burden beyond a reasonable doubt,the Crown must show that the police did not “undermine the suspect’s free choice to speak to the police as part of the contextualexamination of voluntariness”: Tessier 2022 at para 52. In Tessier 2022, the Supreme Court of Canada was addressing the specificfailure of the police to give a Charter caution. In my view, the above statements on the operating mind doctrine also have generalapplication. 5.
Right to Silence and Undermining of Legal Advice to Remain Silent [33] In R v Hebert, (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 151, McLachlin J. considered the confessions rule in relation to theright to silence under
section 7 of the Charter, at 177–178 and 180: This suggests that the drafters of the Charter viewed the ambit of the right to silence embodied in s. 7 as extending beyond the narrowformulation of the confessions rule, comprehending not only the negative right to be free of coercion induced by threats, promises orviolence, but a positive right to make a free choice as to whether to remain silent or speak to authorities. [...] I conclude that the consideration of other rights under the Charter suggests that the right to silence of a detained person under s. 7 of theCharter must be broad enough to accord to the detained person a free choice on the matter of whether to speak to the authorities or toremain silent. [...] The right to silence conferred by s. 7 reflects these values.
The suspect, although placed in the superior power of the state upon detention,retains the right to choose whether or not he will make a statement to the police. To this end, the Charter requires that the suspect beinformed of his or her right to counsel and be permitted to consult counsel without delay. If a suspect chooses to make a statement, thesuspect may do so.
But if the suspect chooses not to, the state is not entitled to use its superior power to override the suspect's will andnegate his or her choice. [Emphasis added] [34] The common law right to silence reflects the general principle that, absent statutory or other legal compulsion, no one isobligated to provide information to the police or respond to questioning: Singh at para 27. In Singh, the Supreme Court of Canadadiscussed the scope of an accused’s right to silence as protected under
section 7 of the Charter.
The majority confirmed that the conceptof voluntariness and the protection of the right to silence overlap and co-exist, and that if an accused is able to show, on a balance ofprobabilities, a breach of his or her right to silence, the Crown will not be in a position to meet the voluntariness test: Singh at para 37.Further, the majority held that “the confessions rule effectively subsumes the constitutional right to silence in circumstances where anobvious person in authority is interrogating a person who is in detention because, in such circumstances, the two tests are functionallyequivalent”: Singh at para 39. [35] On the question of voluntariness, the focus is on the conduct of the police and its effect on the suspect’s ability to exercise hisor her free will; it requires that the court scrutinize whether the accused was denied his or her right to silence: Singh at para 37.
The rightto silence does not include a right not to be spoken to: Hebert at 177; Singh at para 28. Further, even when an accused asserts a desire toremain silent, the police are not required to automatically retreat or simply walk away: R v Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 at para 63. Continuedpolice questioning after the suspect has received legal advice does not offend
section 7 of the Charter unless it is overbearing to the pointwhere it overrides the suspect’s right to choose whether to answer or not or deprives him of an operating mind: R v Briscoe, 2015 ABCA2 at para 59, citing R v Bruso and McKinnon, 2007 ABCA 382 at paras 139–142 (and cases cited therein, including Hebert); R vWillier, 2008 ABCA 126 at para 52. [36] Where police have advised an accused of his or her rights, and the accused has exercised the right to counsel, the police arenot obligated to protect an accused from making a statement (Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 at para 25; Hebert at 176–177; Willier at para 56)unless it is objectively apparent that the accused may not have understood the legal advice or such advice was otherwise inadequate:Sinclair at paras 50–52; R v Lafrance, 2022 SCC 32 at paras 74–75.
In fact, the police are entitled to attempt to persuade an accused tospeak, and can even “out manoeuvre” them: R v Anderson, 2009 ABCA 67 at para 32. As noted in Hebert at 184: First, there is nothing in the rule to prohibit the police from questioning the accused in the absence of counsel after the accused hasretained counsel. Presumably, counsel will inform the accused of the right to remain silent. If the police are not posing as undercoverofficers and the accused chooses to volunteer information, there will be no violation of the Charter.
Police persuasion, short of denyingthe suspect the right to choose or depriving him of an operating mind, does not breach the right to silence. [37] However, the state cannot unfairly use its superior power to ignore the will of the suspect and deny or override his choice:Hebert at page 180; Tessier 2022 at paras 69–70.
For example, the police are not entitled to do indirectly what they cannot do directly —they cannot trick the accused in a way which would effectively deprive the accused of this choice: Hebert at 180–181. [38] The repeated assertion by a detained person that he does not want to speak to the police any further may well provideevidence that any subsequent statement was not the product of the free exercise of the detainee’s right to choose whether to speak: R vManninen, (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 1233 at 1244; Singh at para 47; R v Roy, (ONCA) at para 13.However, as noted in Singh at para 53, the number of times an accused asserts his or her right to silence is not determinative: It must again be emphasized that such situations are highly fact-specific and trial judges must take into account all the relevant factors in
determining whether or not the Crown has established that the accused’s confession is voluntary. In some circumstances, the evidencewill support a finding that continued questioning by the police in the face of the accused’s repeated assertions of the right to silencedenied the accused a meaningful choice whether to speak or to remain silent: see Otis. The number of times the accused asserts his orher right to silence is part of the assessment of all of the circumstances, but is not in itself determinative.
The ultimate question is whetherthe accused exercised free will by choosing to make a statement: Otis, at paras. 50 and 54. [39] While I acknowledge that each case is highly fact specific, I have found it helpful to review other cases involving situationswhere police persist in questioning against the repeated assertions by a detainee of his or her right to silence after obtaining legal advice.These cases illustrate the highly contextual nature of the analysis, but they also provide some examples of circumstances where courtshave held that the police have crossed the line and overborne the will and choice of an accused. [40] On one side, some courts have found statements to be voluntary notwithstanding repeated assertions of the right to silence, incases where there were no other material factors at play that would suggest the statements were involuntary: R v Ekman, 2000 BCCA atpara 31; PT at para 65; R v Powder, 2018 ABQB 948 at paras 120–121; R v Marshall, 2019 ONSC 7002 at paras 38–46; R v Pettitt,2021 ABQB 124 at para 80; R v Holt, 2022 BCSC 1278 at paras 125–128 [Holt 2022]; R v Holt, 2012 BCSC 1121 at paras 120–124.Further, where the accused appears to be following a strategy of selectively answering some questions and not others, or using the rightto silence as a “flag of convenience” to obtain information about the investigation, statements have been held to be voluntary: Roy atpara 12; R v Pena, (BCSC) at para 59; R v Singh, 2003 BCSC 2013 at paras 35–36; Mohamad at para 15; R vJongbloets, 2017 BCSC 740 at para 93; Powder at paras 120–121; R v Vu, 2014 BCSC 456 at paras 58–60; R v Gormley, (PE SCAD) at paras 49and 59–60.
The law does not protect suspects from a disingenuous attempt to exercise the right to silence, oran unwise but voluntary decision not to listen to their counsels’ advice. [41] On the other side, where an accused repeatedly asserts a right to silence and other relevant factors are in play, a reasonabledoubt as to voluntariness sometimes arises. For example, courts have held statements made in the context of assertions of the right tosilence to be involuntary, or in breach of the Charter right to silence, where: (
a) the police conduct suggested that the police would not take no for an answer, that resistance was futile, that the police werepaying “lip service” to the right to silence, or that the interview was not going to stop until the accused gave them something: R vFerguson, [1996] OJ No 3837 at para 48; R v Fitzgerald, 2009 BCSC 1599 at para 28; Felker at para 69; Armishaw at paras 62–63, 78and 87; R v Chapple, 2012 ABPC 229 at para 88; R v Davis, 2011 ONSC 5564 at para 32; R v Monckton, 2012 ONSC 5870 at paras84–87; Mohamad at para 8; McGregor at para 218; Pettitt at para 79; R c Otis, 2000 CarswellQue 3702, leave to appeal refused, [2001]1 SCR xvii, at paras 46 and 53–54; (
b) the accused was of low cognitive ability or may have been suffering from a mental illness: Otis at paras 53–54; R vCiliberto, 2005 BCSC 1859 at paras 19, 21 and 25; Roberts at paras 218–221; (
c) the accused was subject to excessively aggressive and intimidating questioning, badgering, pressure or bullying: R vTammie, 2001 BCSC 366 at paras 61–62; Chapple at para 130; Gyles at para 56; (
d) the police made highly inflammatory or untrue allegations against the accused, made untrue statements of fact, or referencedfalse or overstated evidence: R v Smith, 2011 BCSC 1695 at paras 152–158; Armishaw at paras 124–128; Camille at para 87; GF atparas 8–9; (
e) the police suggested that the accused’s credibility would be enhanced if the accused spoke to police then, or that the accusedwould be less credible if he or she did not speak to the police or told the story later: R v Elkadri, (ONSC) (SCJ) atpages 13, and 23–24; R v Hankey, (ONSC) at para 36; Armishaw at para 123; Othman at para 16; Cleveland atparas 25 and 37; R v Agotic, 2020 ABQB 609 at paras 142 and 168; Roberts at paras 144 and 146; (
f) the police suggested that the interview might be the accused’s last chance, or only or best opportunity, to tell the accused’sstory: Elkadri at page 22; Fitzgerald at para 23; Smith at para 155; Gyles at para 32; R v Davidson, 2017 BCSC 2497 at para 37;Ciliberto at paras 78 and 87; Roberts at para 184; (
g) the police suggested that it would be important to have the accused’s side of the story to contradict another side of the storythey already had: Smith at para 150; Roberts at paras 144 and 184; (
h) the police implied that, if the accused spoke to the police, the accused (Smith at para 150) or the police had the ability tobenefit the accused, by potentially avoiding charges altogether (GF at para 10, Cleveland at paras 31–33), getting an earlier release(Cleveland at paras 31–33; Gyles at paras 25, 32 and 55), reducing the charges (Davidson at paras 50–53 and 58–84), influencing theinvestigation to the accused’s benefit (Camille at paras 50–52; Rhodes at para 85; Armishaw at para 116; Roberts at para 185), beingthe accused’s “voice in the community” (R v Dhaliwal, 2016 BCSC 1966 at paras 246–249), or otherwise helping the accused (R vKoivisto, 2011 ONCJ 307 at para 81; R v Gilbertson, 2012 BCSC 625 at paras 117–118).
In some of these cases, the police also impliedthat the accused could also help themselves by speaking, including by “clearing things up” or by taking the opportunity to “dig yourselfout a little bit”: GF at 10; R v White, 2019 ONSC 32 at paras 46 and 54. [42] The undermining of the accused’s relationship with counsel or the legal advice received is also often a factor in cases wherean accused has repeatedly raised or asserted the right to silence. Undermining legal advice may have the effect of distorting or nullifyingthe advice: Sinclair at para 52; R v Dussault, 2022 SCC 16 at para 44.
It is pointless to attempt to catalogue the various types of policeconduct that could undermine legal advice; the focus remains on the objectively observable effects of the police conduct rather than theconduct itself: Dussault at para 44.
However, several of the cases referred to above illustrate that, where an accused has received legaladvice to remain silent, and the accused has attempted to follow that advice, police conduct, whether intentional or unintentional, mayhave the effect of undermining the accused’s relationship with his or her legal counsel or the legal advice received. [43] Legal advice may also be more directly undermined, intentionally or unintentionally, when police choose to “tread ondangerous ground” and comment on the legal advice received by detainees to persuade an accused to speak in the face of repeated
assertions of the right to silence: R v Mujku , 2011 ONCA 64 at para 36 ; Dussault at para 43 . For example, legal advice can be undermined where police have: (
a) belittled the lawyer, including suggesting that the accused’s lawyer didn’t care what happened to the accused: R v Daley , 2015 ONSC 7145 at para 42 ; Dussault at paras 43–44 ; R v Taylor , 2016 BCSC 1956 at para 54 ; Armishaw at para 111 ; (
b) suggested they were “past” the assertion of the right to silence which was based on legal advice: Rhodes at para 91 ; Davis at para 32 ; (
c) provided an incorrect
summary of the right to silence: R v Azonwanna , 2020 ONSC 5416 at paras 122 and 148–149 (cited in Dussault at para 44 ); Davidson at paras 45–48 ; (
d) suggested that the accused’s lawyer did not know all the information that the police knew: Armishaw at para 95 ; Cleveland at para 23 ; (
e) told the accused he was the only person that could help himself: Elkadri at page 20; and (
f) expressed or implied that exercising a right to silence was somehow wrong, childish, or that the accused can or should be able to make the decision themselves: Ciliberto at para 82 ; Davidson at para 123 ; Othman at para 18 . The latter strategy may be particularly powerful, and tread in “dangerous territory”, where the accused is a young adult with limited experience in the criminal justice system: Othman at para 18 ; McGregor at para 194 ; Armishaw at para 111 . 6. Police Trickery [ 44 ] In Oickle , at para 65, the Supreme Court of Canada held that police trickery is a distinct inquiry.
The Court said that, “while it is still related to voluntariness, its more specific objective is maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system” and that “there may be situations in which police trickery, though neither violating the right to silence nor undermining voluntariness per se , is so appalling as to shock the community”: Oickle at para 67.
The Court endorsed examples of police trickery that would shock the community involving an officer pretending to be a chaplain, or a legal aid lawyer, or injecting truth serum into a diabetic under the pretense it was insulin. [ 45 ] Although police trickery that would shock the community is a distinct inquiry that alone might justify an exclusion of statements as involuntary, police trickery is also relevant to the contextual inquiry on voluntariness: Tessier 2022 , at para 87; Favel at paras 303–310 ; Davidson at paras 107–109 . B.
Were the Accused’s Statements Voluntary, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? [ 46 ] In this case, there is no dispute that the Statements made were made to persons in authority — they were made at the CPS headquarters and Bowman, although not uniformed, clearly identified herself as a police officer. [ 47 ] I have considered all the circumstances of this matter, and the relevant factors set out by the Supreme Court of Canada, in assessing voluntariness. Key factors are addressed below. 1.
The Accused’s Characteristics [ 48 ] The Crown asserts that the Accused is a functioning adult and his personal characteristics are “irrelevant to the voluntariness analysis”. I disagree. The court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements: Oickle at paras 54 and 71. The test for voluntariness is an objective one; however, the individual characteristics of the accused are relevant considerations in applying the objective test: Singh at para 36; Oickle at para 42; Heatley at paras 23–24 .
The character and personality of the suspect, and any experience with the criminal justice system, has relevance: R v Engel , 2016 ABCA 48 at para 17 ; R v Barwis , 2022 ABQB 581 at para 68 .
That an accused’s personal characteristics bear on the objective analysis of whether statements to police were voluntary is also in keeping with the Supreme Court’s direction that an accused’s vulnerabilities must be considered in the analysis of whether there were objectively observable indications he or she may not have understood the legal advice in the context of a police interview ( Lafrance at paras 75 and 79 ). [ 49 ] As Bowman reminded the Accused early in the interview, the Accused was “super young still”. He was 20 and living in his childhood home, in his parents’ basement.
He graduated high school and was taking a “gap year” that was impacted by COVID. The Accused was a successful athlete and high-level rugby player, which he discussed at some length with Bowman. He respected people in authority, like coaches — he wanted to have their respect too and not betray them. [ 50 ] The Accused had no prior experience with the police, other than a speeding ticket. He had no experience with the court system, other than a traffic incident, let alone the criminal justice system. He described himself as a well-behaved kid. He had never been to the CPS headquarters before.
He had never been interviewed by a police officer. He had no legal experience. His understanding of police and police interviews was based on what he had seen in movies and television shows. He was effectively a neophyte in respect of the process he was entering. Bowman was aware that the process was “all new” to the Accused.
She went so far as to correct his misconception about the right to have a lawyer present during the interview in an exchange that captured the Accused’s inexperience with the criminal justice system: WILLEM DEN OUDEN: No, I get what you're saying, but I still would like to have a lawyer here. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: Okay. WILLEM DEN OUDEN: You know what I'm saying?
DET. BOWMAN, #5074: Yeah, like, here in the room. ... DET. BOWMAN, #5074: Right. I mean, it's funny 'cause TV kind of does a misconception about that. In Canada, lawyers aren't allowed in the room -- WILLEM DEN OUDEN: Yeah. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: -- so even if your lawyer did show up here with you today -- WILLEM DEN OUDEN: Yeah. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: -- he wouldn't be allowed in here. [ 51 ] The Accused testified that he is normally pretty confident in his general demeanour, but when he attended CPS headquarters, he was anxious and scared.
The Accused’s discussion with Bowman to arrange the meeting at the police station was four days before he met with the police. The Accused did not know specifically why he had been asked to meet with the police. He spent the weekend with his father trying to figure out why he was being asked to attend and what would happen at the police station. He was uncertain about what was going to happen or unfold. 2. Oppression [ 52 ] The Accused was arrested and detained and could not leave, which alone can have a significant impact on a suspect and cause him or her to feel compelled to give a statement: Singh at para 32.
After detention, the state authorities are in control and the detainee, who cannot simply walk away, is in a vulnerable position such that there is greater risk of abuse of power by the police: Singh at para 32. [ 53 ] However, there are no indications of any other physically oppressive conditions. The Accused was given access to his legal counsel. He was offered and accepted water. The interview room was well lit and comfortable.
The interview was relatively short, and the Accused was allowed to use the bathroom. [ 54 ] I also find that there was no inappropriate use of non-existent evidence, and no police behaviour that contributed to a physically oppressive situation. Fitzgibbon and Bowman were polite and were not aggressive, hostile or intimidating.
The interview was conducted in a friendly, non-adversarial, professional and conversational manner. [ 55 ] Once he was arrested, patted down, had his personal belongings, shoes and belt put in a locker, and put in the interview room, the Accused testified that he was experiencing new feelings, was shaken up, was scared, his back was tingly, and he felt paralyzed. He described it as “all new and a foreign feeling for me the whole time”; “unparalleled to anything I have felt in my life”. The Accused felt that the room was what being in jail would be like.
He had no idea what was going to come out of the process, felt like he was going to be there for longer than he had originally expected, and was scared that he was “there to stay”. [ 56 ] The Accused testified that he was fidgeting the whole time during the interview. The police officers both testified that he did not appear overly nervous, he was not fidgeting, and was fairly calm. My observation is that, while he was left alone in the room, he was swiveling his chair back and forth and twiddling his fingers, and appeared deep in thought. He was not outwardly distraught.
During the interview, he appeared outwardly calm. At one point, he ripped off one of his fingernails, but stated he was just cleaning it. He was respectful and polite. He was not emotional. He listened carefully to Bowman, and at times was inquisitive. He appeared at times to want to be agreeable with her, but at the same time he was confident enough to attempt to stand his ground with her on numerous occasions. [ 57 ] I find that the Accused was likely anxious, scared, stressed and experiencing a wave of new emotions and feelings having been arrested and living through his first police interview.
That is quite understandable and expected. These are normal feelings experienced by many who are arrested, and they do not necessarily mean that statements made in those circumstances are involuntary; sometimes these feelings are internally generated and not caused by any oppressive circumstances: Pettitt at paras 42–45 , citing Otis at para 54. [ 58 ] I find that the Accused’s subjective feelings were not caused by objectively oppressive circumstances but were internally generated. They are not a basis to cast a reasonable doubt on the voluntariness of his statements. 3.
Operating Mind [ 59 ] In this case, there is no evidence the Accused suffered a cognitive impairment or mental illness. The Accused did reasonably well at school. While he seemed reserved and somewhat flat in the interview and in his cross-examination at the voir dire , I am satisfied that he was fully capable of understanding his rights and the consequences of speaking to the police. [ 60 ] Further, the Accused was properly cautioned and advised of his Charter rights to silence and counsel.
He exercised his right to counsel, received legal advice about his right to silence, and then asserted that right numerous times. [ 61 ] I find that the Accused, at least heading into the interview, had an operating mind as contemplated in Whittle and Tessier 2022 at para 8. 4. Threats or Promises [ 62 ] In this case, Bowman made no express quid pro quo promise or threat to the Accused. However, Bowman’s conduct included
two implied inducements; namely, that speaking to the police could result in (1) the Accused being released, or released more quickly; and (2) the Accused being in less jeopardy because the Accused or Bowman had some control over the process. a. Release Inducement [ 63 ] Early in the interview, the Accused advised Bowman that his father was in the lobby and asked: “am I going to be here for a long, long time...”. Bowman advised “it depends, you might be”. Objectively, this ambiguous statement was unclear as to how long the Accused was going to remain in custody.
For an accused with no prior experience with the criminal justice system, the statement could reasonably be interpreted to have implied that the length of his detention was somehow connected to how he performed in the interview. [ 64 ] Also early in the interview, Bowman confirmed that the Accused was in police custody, and that she needed to “get some details from you...just so that I know who I am talking to, and so at the end of the day, I can release you ” (emphasis added).
This statement is also objectively ambiguous as it could mean literally at the end of the day, or at the end of an unexplained process dependent on the “details” the Accused provided. The ambiguity is amplified given the uncertainty as to whether the Accused would be there “for a long, long time”. In my view, this statement objectively implied that, for the Accused to be released, he needed to provide some details to Bowman, although it was unclear whether it meant details to identify the Accused for the purposes of release paperwork, or details surrounding the complaint.
I believe that Bowman intended it to be the former, as that is more consistent with what Fitzgibbon told the Accused’s father. Also, there is no evidence to suggest Bowman did not intend to release the Accused that day after the interview. However, this was not made clear. [ 65 ] Given the Accused’s complete lack of experience with the criminal justice system, in my view, a reasonable person in the Accused’s position could have reasonably assumed that they were required to provide some other details to the police before they could be released.
The lack of clarity here could reasonably have created confusion in the Accused’s mind as to what type of information he needed to provide in order to be released. The Accused testified that, subjectively, he had trouble understanding what was going on and whether or when he would be released. [ 66 ] In conclusion, I am satisfied that, objectively, Bowman unintentionally provided an inducement that providing details to the police would lead to the Accused’s release.
Even if I am wrong and it was not an inducement with the sufficient quid pro quo , I find Bowman’s unclear use of words was objectively confusing and subjectively confused the Accused. b. Degree of Jeopardy/Best Interests Inducement [ 67 ] When Bowman arrested the Accused and advised him of his rights, she told him that he “might” be charged.
While she later advised the Accused that “these are serious charges” (transcript page 14), she did not actually inform the Accused that he was being charged until the end of the interview. [ 68 ] It would have been reasonable for the Accused to have been uncertain during the interview as to whether or not he was going to be charged, notwithstanding the reference to “serious charges”. However, the Accused testified at the voir dire that he subjectively (and incorrectly) thought that Bowman was charging him when she brought him to the interview room.
It is unclear whether the Accused had an understanding of any difference between being arrested and being charged, what “charges” meant, or any of the processes involved given his lack of knowledge of or experience with the criminal process. [ 69 ] Bowman advised the Accused that she didn’t know the other side of the story, and that when someone makes an allegation, she has to investigate it (transcript, page 16). She used an example of when the police get called to a bar fight, that it would not be fair if the police arrested someone just because someone accused the person of assaulting them.
The details provided to police by the suspect in the bar fight example purportedly lessened the seriousness of the alleged offence. A similar hypothetical was used and was a concern in Cleveland at para 28–29 . In my view, the purpose of Bowman’s hypothetical was to show the Accused the potential benefit of speaking to the police. Bowman did not make any express promises, but it was implied that if he could provide exonerating details, he may not be charged (since he was already arrested), or it may otherwise decrease his jeopardy or the seriousness of the alleged offence.
Offering an Accused an opportunity to provide exculpatory information or the Accused’s side of the story is not necessarily problematic, especially when the description of the police’s plans is truthful, provided that the offer does not create the impression that failing to speak will adversely affect the Accused’s position or appearance at trial: Jongbloets , at para 83 ; R v Salehi , 2019 BCSC 197 at para 50 ; Holt 2022 at para 112. [ 70 ] Bowman acknowledged in her cross-examination in the voir dire that, prior to the interview, she already had a theory of the case, and a version of events based on other evidence (some of which she believed was truthful or credible).
In the circumstances, it is unlikely that Bowman believed that the Accused “might” be charged, or that the Accused could extricate himself from further criminal processes based on what he might say in the interview. She testified that her goal was to get the Accused’s version of events. [ 71 ] During the interview, Bowman also made several statements which, taken together, implied that speaking to the police may reduce his jeopardy, or subtly threatened adverse consequences if he did not speak. For example: (
a) Bowman advised the Accused that, if she doesn’t have his side of the story, “I can only go, well, this must have happened, right? And sometimes there are two sides... There’s a whole other set of facts, and right now I’ve only got evidence that supports that this happened. I don’t have any evidence that supports it didn’t. So why don’t we just start off with easy questions that could maybe support, okay?” (transcript pages 19–20). In my view, this objectively implied that Bowman was attempting to help exonerate the Accused, or “support” a better outcome for him, if he chose to provide her supporting details.
In Roberts , police similarly gave the impression that they were trying to advocate for the accused in the face of his attempts to assert his right to silence, which had the effect of undermining the role of his lawyer and his legal advice (para 145); (
b) Bowman advised the Accused that there were little gaps of information that could “change the direction of what I know” and “without your side of the story I have to go with what I’ve got, okay”? (transcript pages 23–24). Both of these statements implied that the Accused could influence the outcome of the proceedings in his favour by providing a statement, and also that Bowman had some control
over the Accused and the outcome of the process; (
c) in response to the Accused’s desire to remain silent, Bowman said “because my hands are tied otherwise” and that “otherwise, all I have to believe is that a sexual assault did occur” (transcript page 23). This again implied Bowman had a significant measure of control over the situation and could influence the course of the proceedings in favour of the Accused if he told her something to rebut the Complainant’s statement. It was a subtle threat of adverse consequences of not telling her his side of the story.
The Accused testified that this made him feel that he could speak to Bowman, that he would be able to leave if he did so, and that if he did not say anything, he would be “stuck there”. Following Bowman’s statement, the Accused immediately answered a question, denied that sexual assault had occurred, and went on to provide specific details about the alleged incident; and (
d) Bowman later said, at page 38 of the transcript: Because you have a bright future ahead of you, with the rugby and your career and school. And I just -- I just want to get the truth, right? I'm not here to pigeonhole you, I'm not here to try and quote, unquote, Make charges stick, that's not what my job is, okay? My job as a police officer is to get a set of facts and then to do a thorough investigation. And that includes talking to people, collecting evidence, all that kind of stuff, right? And then getting to the point where we are now, where I have arrested you.
Going -- I want to hear what this fellow has to say because I have a set of facts, and I have evidence that tells me a sexual assault occurred, right? And I have to -- I just want the truth. I'm not looking for you to say something that's necessarily gonna incriminate you or anything of that matter, right? Like, that's not what my goal is. That's what - not what my job is as the police, because I just want the truth. And that's what -- that's what my job is, is finding out all sides of the story and finding out just what the truth is.
Because sometimes the truth is different than what I think I know – [ 72 ] I am satisfied that, in the totality of the circumstances, Bowman objectively provided a subtle, but real, implied inducement to the Accused that, if he provided information to the police, charges may not be pursued, that Bowman would influence the course of the proceedings in his favour, or that he would otherwise reduce his jeopardy in some unexplained way. The corollary was an “or else” implied threat to the opposite effect if he did not provide information to Bowman’s satisfaction. c.
Conclusion re Inducements [ 73 ] I am satisfied that Bowman objectively provided implied inducements to the Accused to persuade him to engage in a conversation with her. However, as noted earlier, it is not enough that there be an inducement. There must be some causal connection or nexus between the inducement and the statement: Oickle , paras 54–55 and 84. I will revisit the causal nexus in my conclusion. 5. Right to Silence and Undermining the Accused’s Legal Advice [ 74 ] The Accused raised or asserted his right to silence at least 18 times.
Bowman acknowledged on several occasions in cross- examination that she understood that the Accused was asserting his right to silence, and that she sometimes ignored it and continued to ask questions. Based on my review of the transcript and watching the video, it is readily apparent that, on some occasions when the Accused exercised his right to silence, Bowman left the question alone, but deflected and then usually returned to the topic of the question after employing other strategies to persuade him to talk.
On other occasions, she either ignored the assertion outright and pressed on with her next question as if he did not assert his right at all, or subtly undermined the Accused’s legal advice before mining for further details about the alleged incident. [ 75 ] The Accused testified that he subjectively understood he had the right or option not to speak, but that Bowman brushed this off and did not respect his rights. He testified that this made him feel powerless and that he had no rights, made him question his legal advice, and made him skeptical about what to say or not to say.
He testified that he felt that that Bowman did not care about his rights and “was trying to squeeze something out of me”. [ 76 ] Sometimes, the persistent refusal to acknowledge the asserted right to silence can be enough on its own to vitiate the will of an accused and render statements involuntary. In this case, the interview was short, cordial and professionally conducted. There were no overt threats or bullying. Bowman did not use false evidence to persuade the Accused. The Accused did not appear to be intimidated by Bowman and asserted his right to silence frequently.
Although he was likely scared and nervous, he had no cognitive deficiency. In my view, the Accused clearly understood his rights, at least initially. The Accused appeared at times to be making a conscious choice to answer questions that he perceived were peripheral or unharmful to his position, and then asserted his right to silence when he sensed that it might be dangerous. In this respect, there is at least some evidence that the Accused was making a voluntary decision to speak to the police about certain matters, or even had a desire to do so.
However, I am concerned that Bowman’s conduct may have confused him as to his legal rights as the interview proceeded and eventually overbore his choice not to speak. [ 77 ] I cannot ignore these concerns. There is some evidence that Bowman would not take no for an answer, although this was not strong given that the Accused, in certain instances, did not have to be pressed vigorously to provide information, and on at least one occasion he provided more information immediately after asserting his right to silence.
However, given the Accused’s complete lack of experience with the criminal justice system — and police interviews in particular — I find Bowman’s approach likely left him with the impression that his right had little to no effect and that he would have to provide Bowman some information ( Manninen at 1244). [ 78 ] Further, although Bowman did not suggest that the interview was his only opportunity to tell his story, or that his evidence would be less credible if he decided to defer giving his story until later, there were implied inducements or suggestions in the form of threats or promises discussed earlier in these Reasons.
These implied that the Accused, through providing a statement to Bowman, could positively influence the course of the investigation and potential criminal proceedings, and that the Accused might be released earlier or may be in less overall jeopardy if he spoke to Bowman and told his side of the story. [ 79 ] There are also factors which may have undermined, distorted or confused the Accused’s legal advice to remain silent. In order to persuade the Accused to speak, Bowman made the conscious decision to tread on “dangerous ground” and comment on the Accused’s legal advice.
On two occasions, Bowman told the Accused that the advice he received was great, but these comments appeared to be a
front, as they were immediately followed up with comments that objectively undermined or cast doubt on the quality of the advice. [ 80 ] At page 19 of the transcript, Bowman said that the advice to remain silent was “great advice”, but then immediately said: And I'm -- and I get it. The problem I'm faced with here, right, is that someone has alleged that you sexually assaulted them and I have evidence to support that. I don't have any evidence to the contrary. That is you, right? So if I only have one set of facts, I can only go, Well, this must have happened, right?
And sometimes there are two sides, like I just mentioned, like, with the bar fight -- right? There's a whole other set of facts, and right now I've only got evidence that supports that this happened. I don't have any evidence that supports it didn't. So why don't we just start off with easy questions that could maybe support, okay? Who -- who was at your birthday? [ 81 ] By bringing this comment back to the bar fight example, Bowman left the impression that the Accused could reduce his potential jeopardy — or perhaps avoid it altogether — if he spoke to Bowman and provided supporting information.
This implied that it was in the Accused’s best interests to speak to her and not to remain silent as per his legal advice. Again, this passage also incorrectly leaves the impression that Bowman was there to help the Accused if he spoke, which was also inconsistent with his legal advice. [ 82 ] At pages 23–25 of the transcript, Bowman again said that the advice to remain silent was “great advice”, but then undermined it by suggesting he should make his own decision as to whether to provide a statement because he was an adult, and also suggested that if he did not speak then her hands would be tied: DET.
BOWMAN, #5074: Okay. And what kind of stuff did you guys do at your party? WILLEM DEN OUDEN: I'm just going to be quiet. Stay silent, that's what he said. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: Okay, and like I said that --that's great advice. WILLEM DEN OUDEN: Yeah. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: It takes the control away from you, right? So you have an opportunity to tell me, right, like, this -- whatever's being alleged did or didn't happen, right? Like, I already know some things, but I don't -- there's little gaps that are missing that could -- that could change the direction of what I know, right?
And, like, I get it, I'm not saying that you received bad advice. You did not. But you ultimately are an adult and get to make your own decisions about it, right? Because my hands are tied otherwise, right? Otherwise, all I have is to believe that a sexual assault did occur. Are you saying -- are you saying it did not? WILLEM DEN OUDEN: No. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: No, it didn't or no --- WILLEM DEN OUDEN: It didn't happen. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: Okay. Well, I'm just going to ask you outright. Did you have intercourse that night? WILLEM DEN OUDEN: Yeah, we did. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: Okay.
Okay, great, tell me about that. (LONG PAUSE) WILLEM DEN OUDEN: I'm not –- just –- I'm just gonna be (inaudible) quiet 'cause he said to say (inaudible), I don't know. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: Okay. So you've told me that you had intercourse that night. WILLEM DEN OUDEN: Yeah. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: But -- with a woman? WILLEM DEN OUDEN: Yeah. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: Okay. I know you had intercourse that night. WILLEM DEN OUDEN: Yeah. DET. BOWMAN, #5074: But I -- but so there's some details in there that lead me to believe that a sexual assault happened. WILLEM DEN OUDEN: Yeah. DET.
BOWMAN, #5074: And I can see by the look on your face that you're wanting to explain what happened to the contrary. And so I know that -- I know that you had sex. But I don't know what happened. I know that --- WILLEM DEN OUDEN: It was consensual.... [ 83 ] Again, while Bowman superficially purported to endorse the Accused’s legal advice by calling it “great advice”, the substance of what she said immediately afterward puts it in a different context.
In reality, Bowman undermined the Accused’s legal advice by implying or suggesting that she or the Accused had some control over the process and that it was in the Accused’s best interest to provide her details. It suggests that the legal advice he received was taking the control away from him. In this respect, there are some
similarities to GF , at paras 9–15, where the police led the Accused to believe that if he did not clear things up by addressing the allegations of non-consensual sex, the situation would spiral out of control. [ 84 ] Further, Bowman played on the Accused’s youth and inexperience by suggesting that he was an adult capable of making his own decisions contrary to his lawyer’s advice.
In the latter above-quoted passage, after telling the Accused that her hands would be tied if he did not provide his side of the story, the Accused immediately denied the sexual assault but admitted to having intercourse with the Complainant. The Accused testified that Bowman’s references to her hands being tied left him subjectively feeling that if he did not answer her, he was going to be “stuck there” or go to jail, and that the reference to taking control away from him made him question his legal advice. [ 85 ] Bowman then immediately pressed for more details about the incident.
The Accused paused for approximately 15 seconds (noted as “LONG PAUSE” at page 24 of the transcript), during which the video shows he was visibly uncertain about what to do. He then again attempted to exercise his right to silence, but waffled about the advice he had been given: “I'm not -- just -- I'm just gonna be (inaudible) quiet 'cause he said to say (inaudible), I don't know. (emphasis added).” At this moment when the Accused was visibly uncertain about his advice, Bowman ignored the Accused’s clear attempt to exercise his right to silence and continued asking questions.
The Accused then proceeded to give significant details about the alleged incident. [ 86 ] In my view, in all the circumstances, and on the balance of probabilities, Bowman objectively undermined, distorted and confused the Accused’s legal advice and the Accused’s choice to remain silent. 6. Police Trickery [ 87 ] Bowman did not engage in police trickery of the nature contemplated by the Supreme Court of Canada that would “shock the community”, as a distinct or separate inquiry as contemplated in Oickle at para 67. I have already addressed her conduct in my overall analysis of the circumstances. V.
Conclusion [ 88 ] I find that the Accused’s statements to CPS, up to page 19, line 11 of the transcript, were voluntary. As previously noted, the Accused had an operating mind, obtained legal advice, initially understood his rights, and made a voluntary decision to speak to the police. [ 89 ] However, in my view, starting with his answer on page 20, line 12 of the transcript, it is unclear to me whether the Accused continued to exercise his free will to choose to answer questions, or whether his will was overborne by Bowman.
Based on my review of all the relevant evidence and factors, and the legal principles set out in the cases, I find that there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the Accused’s Statements to CPS, starting at page 20, line 12 of the transcript, were voluntary.
This is the result of a combination of several factors discussed above, including: (1) the ambiguous references to the timing of his release and whether or what charges would be pursued; (2) the inducements discussed earlier which implied, among other things, that he or Bowman had some control of the process and that speaking to the police would lessen his jeopardy, improve his situation or hasten his release; (3) the subtle threat that failing to speak to police would have adverse consequences;
(4) Bowman’s suggestion or implication that she was trying to help the Accused improve his situation or find support;
(5) Bowman’s persistent dismissal of the Accused’s repeated attempts to assert his right to silence, including immediately after commenting on the Accused’s legal advice; and (6) the undermining and distortion of the Accused’s legal advice as described above. [ 90 ] Accordingly, the Crown has failed to discharge its burden that the Statements made, starting at page 20, line 12, were voluntary. These statements are inadmissible at trial. [ 91 ] The electronic audio files included a discussion between Fitzgibbon and the Accused’s father.
This aspect of the audio files was not addressed by the parties in argument and I do not consider that portion of the file to be before me for decision on its use at trial. I believe that this audio file was provided for completeness and context to the Accused’s Statements. Other than a very brief interaction as the Accused was greeted by Fitzgibbon and handed over to Bowman, the Fitzgibbon audio file does not include any statements from the Accused.
I make no ruling on how or whether the Accused’s father’s statements to the police may be used at the trial — that is a matter to be dealt with at trial, if necessary. Heard on the 21 st day of November, 2022. Written submissions received on November 28 th , 2022, December 7 th , 2022, and December 16 th , 2022. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 11 th day of January 2023. M.A. Marion J.C.K.B.A.
Appearances: Gianna Argento for the Crown Cameron J. G. Bally and Tamara Harasen for the Accused
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