Terrigno v Fox, 2023 ABKB 89
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Terrigno v Fox, 2023 ABKB 89 Date: 20230217 Docket: 1701 14128 Registry: Calgary Between: Mike Terrigno Applicant - and - Brian Fox and Uta Fox Respondents _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice C.M. Jones _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] The Applicant, Mr. Terrigno, appeals a decision of an Applications Judge prohibiting him from using certain evidence in an upcoming
summary judgment application and finding him in breach of the implied undertaking rule codified in rule 5.33 of the Alberta Rules of Court (“ Rules” ). [ 2 ] The Applications Judge imposed consequences on Mr. Terrigno for breach of his obligation to provide a compliant Affidavit of Records in accordance with the provisions of
Part 5 of the Rules and of the implied undertaking rule. Both Mr. Terrigno and the Respondent Mr. Fox acknowledge that the learned Applications Judge erred in one important factual aspect of the case before him. [ 3 ] Notwithstanding that error, I find that the Applications Judge was correct in his conclusions, and I reaffirm the sanctions he imposed upon Mr. Terrigno. II. Background [ 4 ] In the present Action, Mr. Terrigno asserts that Mr. Fox and Ms. Fox defamed him. Mr. Terrigno and Mr. Fox are immersed in litigation on a number of fronts.
The extent to which those actions share a common purpose and therefore may be considered related has implications for Mr. Terrigno’s assertion of litigation privilege over a key piece of evidence he wishes to rely on in the present Action. [ 5 ] Mr. Terrigno and Mr. Fox crossed paths in respect of the Base Finance/Arnold Breitkreutz matter. Mr. Terrigno and a
corporation with which he is associated had invested funds in a scheme that later was determined to be fraudulent: R v Breitkreutz , 2022 ABQB 449 . Mr. Terrigno has commenced various actions against the corporate entities and individuals allegedly involved, including Mr. Fox, who is alleged to have profited from the scheme. [ 6 ] On April 22, 2016, Mr. Terrigno and Mr. Fox both attended a proceeding at the Calgary Courts Centre. At the end of those proceedings, Mr. Terrigno and Mr. Fox encountered each other in the hallway outside the courtroom. A heated conversion ensued. [ 7 ] Mr. Fox alleges that Mr.
Terrigno threatened to kill him and his family. Mr. Terrigno denies making any such threat. Unbeknownst to Mr. Fox, Mr. Terrigno recorded their conversation on his cell phone (the “Audio Recording”). [ 8 ] Mr. Fox contacted police to inform them of the alleged threat. He also described it on his Facebook page and sent correspondence about it to two Justices of this Court. [ 9 ] On October 20, 2017, Mr. Terrigno filed the statement of claim in this Action. He filed an amended statement of claim on October 24, 2019. Mr. and Ms. Fox have defended. [ 10 ] Mr.
Terrigno produced four Affidavits of Records (collectively, the “AORs”) in this Action. They were dated February 21, 2018 (the “1 st AOR”), March 2, 2018 (the “Amended AOR”), September 18, 2018 (the “Amended Amended AOR”) (collectively, the “2018 AORs”) and October 23, 2019 (the “Supplemental AOR”). [ 11 ] None of the AORs disclosed the Audio Recording on
Schedule 1 to Form 26. The 1 st AOR and Amended AOR did, however, include a reference in
Schedule 2 to “Audio Recordings of Susan Way, Arnold Breitkreutz, John Manolescu, and Brian Fox”. No particulars were provided regarding date, time or other parties, if any, to the conversation in these recordings. Nor was the basis for Mr. Terrigno’s objection to produce clearly set out. Rather, the reference to the Audio Recording was simply set forth in a box entitled “Description” following paragraph (
f) of
Schedule 2, which reads “records that fall into 2 or more of the categories described above”. [ 12 ] In contrast, the Amended Amended AOR contained no reference to any records whatsoever under
Schedule 2. The Supplemental AOR contained the following reference under
Schedule 2: (
d) records made or created for the dominant purpose of litigation, existing or anticipated: recording of conversations between Mike Terrigno and Brian Fox. [ 13 ] Mr. Terrigno claims to have retained Mr. Jonathan Denis, KC to assist him in preparing for his
summary judgment application. Mr. Denis swore an Affidavit on May 3, 2022 (the “Denis Affidavit”) in which he outlined the circumstances surrounding his engagement on behalf of Mr. Terrigno. Mr. Denis deposes that he advised Mr. Terrigno that the Audio Recording was privileged and did not need to be disclosed in this Action. Mr. Denis apparently believed that the disclosure of the Audio Recording in the 1 st AOR and the Amended AOR was sufficient. However, he advised Mr. Terrigno to provide additional detail in
Schedule 2 of the Supplemental AOR to permit Mr. Fox to challenge the claim to privilege. [ 14 ] The Supplemental AOR post-dated Mr. Terrigno’s Questioning of Mr. Fox, which took place on March 26, 2019 (“Fox Questioning”). At the Fox Questioning, Mr. Fox maintained that Mr. Terrigno had threatened to kill him and his family. Mr. Fox claims he was ambushed because the Amended Amended AOR served upon him prior to the Fox Questioning did not alert him to this important record. [ 15 ] This prompted Mr. Fox to bring an application pursuant to Rule 5.16 for an Order preventing Mr. Terrigno using from the Audio Recording in his pending
summary judgment application. Mr. Terrigno believes that the Audio Recording is key to his case as it purports to demonstrate that he did not threaten to kill Mr. Fox and his family. [ 16 ] In addition, Mr. Terrigno provided the Calgary Police Service with approximately 45 of the more than 200 pages of transcript from the Fox Questioning. He claims he did this to assist police in resolving the criminal complaint Mr. Fox had laid against him in connection with the alleged death threats.
At paragraph 40 of his Affidavit sworn May 9, 2022 (the “Terrigno Affidavit”), he states: My sole interest was to have justice served for the wrongdoing thrusted upon me by Brian Fox in filing a false police complaint coupled with blatantly lying under oath. Furthermore, Uta Fox in abusing her position within the City of Calgary Police force by circumventing formal police procedure to provide her husband’s false criminal complaint against me directly to her boss, who was the superintendent of police. [ 17 ] On the basis of his disclosure to police of excerpts from the Fox Questioning transcripts, Mr.
Fox sought to have Mr. Terrigno found in breach of the implied undertaking rule, as articulated in Rule 5.33. III. The Applications Judge’s Decision [ 18 ] The parties appeared before the Applications Judge on February 28, 2022. His decision was published on March 3, 2022: Terrigno v Fox , 2022 ABQB 199 (the “Decision”). [ 19 ] In the Decision, the Applications Judge found that the 2018 AORs were “false affidavits” because Mr. Terrigno had the Audio Recording when each of them was sworn, the Audio Recording is acknowledged by both parties to be relevant and material and Mr.
Terrigno did not disclose it in any of the 2018 AORs. The Applications Judge stated at para 1 that Mr. Terrigno swore false AORs in order to catch Mr. Fox in a lie under oath. He went on to say this at para 8: Mr. Terrigno swore three Affidavits of Records (AORs), none of which mentioned his possession of recording of the courthouse conversation. Each contained a statement that, other than the listed records “the plaintiff does not have and never had any other relevant
and material records under the plaintiff’s control”. In fact, Mr. Terrigno did have the audio recording of the courthouse conversation in his possession. Accordingly, these were false affidavits. [ 20 ] The Applications Judge appears to have been mistaken in his understanding on this point. As acknowledged before me by Mr. Fox, the 1 st AOR and the Amended AOR did mention the Audio Recording. Whether the degree of disclosure was sufficient to comply with the Rules is a central issue in this case. [ 21 ] Mr.
Terrigno drew the Applications Judge’s attention to the fact that two of the three 2018 AORs did, in fact, refer to the Audio Recording. Mr. Terrigno objected to the Applications Judge publicly admonishing him in the Decision for having sworn three false affidavits and sought to have the Applications Judge recuse himself from further involvement on the grounds of bias. The Applications Judge did not concede that his oversight, viewed in light of his pejorative comments about Mr. Terrigno, manifested bias. Nevertheless, he recused himself. [ 22 ] In the Decision, the Applications Judge found that Mr.
Terrigno’s failure to produce an accurate Affidavit of Records was grounds for striking his Statement of Claim pursuant to Rule 3.68(4)(b)(i), but stopped short of doing so, stating at paras 13-17: I do not suggest that striking an action is an appropriate sanction where an inaccurate affidavit of records is produced through accident, inattention, neglect, lack of due diligence etc. This happens all the time. Filing supplemental affidavits of records, to include records that could have been referenced in the initial affidavit of records is commonplace. But this situation is different.
It is clear that the failure of Mr. Terrigno to provide an accurate affidavit of records was deliberately done for a collateral purpose i.e. to attempt to have Mr. Fox perjure himself. Counsel for Mr. and Ms. Fox did not ask for the Action to be struck, but rather for an order precluding Mr. Terrigno from referring to the tape recording in this Action. I think it is appropriate to grant that order. Rule 1.5 deals with rule contravention. Mr. Terrigno’s deliberate provision of a false affidavit of records is a contravention of the Rules of Court. I am imposing the suitable sanction pursuant to rule 1.5(4)(
c) of banning Mr. Terrigno from making use of the recording in this Action. [ 23 ] In addition, the Applications Judge found that Mr. Terrigno had breached the implied undertaking rule codified in Rule 5.33, which states, in part, as follows: The information and records described in subrule (2) must be treated as confidential and may only be used by the recipient of the information or record for the purpose of carrying on the action in which the information or record was provided or disclosed… [ 24 ] This Rule is subject to three exceptions, the operative one in this case being if the Court otherwise orders. Mr.
Terrigno sought no such order. Instead, Mr. Terrigno took the position before the Applications Judge that, having been attached to an affidavit filed in support of his
summary judgment application, the Fox Questioning transcript became a public document no longer subject to the limitations on disclosure in Rule 5.33. The Applications Judge did not accept this. [ 25 ] In the decision, the Applications Judge cited Rule 5.32, which prohibits material such as questioning transcripts being filed and put before the Court except during an application, proceeding or trial. He expressed the view that if Mr. Terrigno’s
summary judgment application came on for a hearing in chambers, he then could refer to answers from the Fox Questioning transcript. He noted at para 23 that, “One reads admissions from discovery into the record at a hearing or trial. One does not submit the whole transcript in advance.” [ 26 ] The Applications Judge imposed a costs award of $5000 against Mr. Terrigno in respect of these two breaches. IV. Issues [ 27 ] There are three issues I must resolve on this appeal. First, Mr. Terrigno seeks to introduce new evidence.
Second, he appeals the Applications Judge’s decision preventing him from using the Audio Recording as evidence in this Action. Third, he appeals the Applications Judge’s finding that he is in breach of the implied undertaking rule in Rule 5.33. V. Analysis A. New Evidence [ 28 ] Mr. Terrigno argues that the hearing before me is de novo and that, therefore, he is entitled to bring additional evidence. He seeks to file three affidavits (collectively, the “New Evidence”). The first is the Terrigno Affidavit. The second is an affidavit of Christopher Souster sworn April 4, 2022 (the “Souster Affidavit”).
The third is the Denis Affidavit. Both Mr. Souster and Mr. Denis have, at one time or another, acted as legal counsel to Mr. Terrigno. [ 29 ] Mr. Terrigno argues that the New Evidence may be admissible if it is relevant and material. In Boyd v Cook , 2013 ABCA 266 , the Court of Appeal held that the admission of additional evidence on this kind of appeal is subject to a “very lax test” and stated that “lack of due diligence is not one of the tests”. [ 30 ] Mr. Fox disputes that the appeal before me is entirely de novo, citing Justice Hollins’ decision in Sewak Gill Enterprises v
Bedaux Real Estate Inc , 2018 ABQB 823 at paras 15-19 . He recognizes that Rule 6.14(3) allows for new evidence to be filed in support of an appeal from an Application Judge’s decision if, in the opinion of the Justice hearing the appeal, it is relevant and material but argues that the New Evidence does not meet that standard. While he acknowledges that late disclosure arising from accident, inattention, neglect or lack of due diligence is not reprimanded, he asserts that “the new evidence is nothing more than self-serving evidence in an effort to fit himself under one these exceptions.” 1.
Terrigno Affidavit [ 31 ] Mr. Terrigno claims that the Terrigno Affidavit was filed to provide further hard evidence and more details in the hopes of clarifying what he alleges are the Application Judge’s misunderstandings. [ 32 ] Mr. Fox challenges the relevance and materiality of the Terrigno Affidavit on various grounds. Primarily, he asserts that it conflicts with other evidence Mr. Terrigno has given. [ 33 ] First, Mr. Fox claims that there is a conflict between paragraph 15 of the Terrigno Affidavit, wherein Mr.
Terrigno states that he had “no reason to be dishonest about detailing the subject surreptitious audio recording” and his submissions before the Applications Judge. Before the Applications Judge, Mr. Terrigno stated that there was an obvious and grave risk that Mr. Fox would tailor his evidence to avoid the contents of the Audio Recording. He took the position that it was proper for him not to waive privilege in respect of the Audio Recording until he had completed the collection of all evidence. He acknowledged that the Audio Recording was withheld on the basis that it would be used to impeach Mr.
Fox. [ 34 ] Mr. Fox also argues that the Terrigno Affidavit conflicts with the evidence in an affidavit Mr. Terrigno swore in June 2021. Based on the Terrigno Affidavit, Mr. Terrigno asks the Court to accept that the omission of the Audio Recording from
Schedule 2 to the Amended Amended AOR was innocent and inadvertent. However, at paragraph 4 of his June 2021 affidavit, he stated: …I had an audio recording of the exact incident that forms the basis for my claim in this Action that may have warned the Defendant, Brian Fox, not to be dishonest in his questioning in this Action. [ 35 ] Similarly, Mr. Fox points to paragraph 40 of the Terrigno Affidavit where Mr.
Terrigno indicates that his sole interest in disclosing portions of the Fox Questioning transcripts to police was: to have justice served for the wrongdoing thrusted upon me by Brian Fox in filing a false police complaint coupled with blatantly lying under oath. Further Uta Fox in abusing her position with the City of Calgary Police force by circumventing formal police procedure to provide her husband’s false criminal complaint against me directly to her boss, who was the superintendent of police. [ 36 ] This would suggest a collateral purpose. [ 37 ] The inference Mr.
Fox would have this Court draw is that the Terrigno Affidavit contradicts earlier evidence and is an attempt to rewrite history. [ 38 ] I am concerned that the Terrigno Affidavit represents nothing more than Mr. Terrigno’s attempt at a “redo” of his appearance before the Applications Judge. It is really an attempt to introduce argument that Mr. Terrigno apparently did not see fit to make before the Applications Judge. It that respect it seems somewhat self-serving. [ 39 ] All things considered, I exclude it as not relevant and material. 2. The Souster and Denis Affidavits [ 40 ] Mr.
Terrigno argues that the Souster Affidavit confirms he was advised that filing the entire Fox Questioning transcript was bona fide . [ 41 ] Mr. Fox argues that the Souster Affidavit sheds no light on Mr. Terrigno’s intentions. What he may have done with the Fox Questioning transcript on the advice of counsel and the fact that he disclosed it to police without, it would appear, discussing the matter with his counsel, does not assist in determining if Mr. Terrigno was in breach of the implied undertaking rule and what consequences should flow from that breach. [ 42 ] Mr.
Terrigno argues that the Denis Affidavit confirms that he was acting under legal advice when he asserted litigation privilege in respect of the Audio Recording and elected to withhold disclosure of it. [ 43 ] Mr. Fox takes the position that it is irrelevant what assistance or instructions Mr. Denis gave to Mr. Terrigno. What matters is that the Amended Amended AOR was a false affidavit. He argues that Mr.
Terrigno cannot, on the one hand, justify his actions by claiming to be ignorant of the rules of civil procedure and, on the other, engage the services of a lawyer when convenient to do so. [ 44 ] I conclude that this portion of the New Evidence has a measure of relevance and materiality. The Souster Affidavit addresses circumstances surrounding the filing of the Fox Questioning transcript. The Denis Affidavit addresses some of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Terrigno’s assertion of litigation privilege over the Audio Recording.
Therefore, I conclude that both the Souster Affidavit and the Denis Affidavit are admissible. [ 45 ] Mr. Terrigno argues that Mr. Fox’s application before the Applications Judge is now a fresh application before this Court and that Mr. Fox once again has the onus of justifying the relief he seeks. It is not clear to me that this is the case.
A similar argument was made before the Court of Appeal in HOOPP Realty Inc v Emery Jamieson LLP , 2020 ABCA 159 at paras 36-38 : On HOOPP’s appeal of the master’s decision dismissing the claims against the Emery Jamieson defendants, HOOPP asserted that the onus lay upon the Emery Jamieson defendants to satisfy the chambers judge that
summary dismissal was the correct decision. The
burdens were such because the appeal was de novo . The chambers judge rejected this approach concluding the HOOPP, as the appellant, bore the burden to satisfy the court that the master’s decision was incorrect in fact and/or law. The master’s order stood as a valid court order until overturned on appeal. HOOPP argues that the chambers judge failed to treat the appeal before him as a de novo hearing. In its view, a de novo hearing is not a true appeal but a rehearing of the original application.
The chambers judge was required to consider the matter afresh and come to a decision independent of the master’s fact findings and legal reasoning.
As a result, HOOPP argues it was an error for the chambers judge to adopt portions of the master’s reasons as his own. [ 46 ] The Court of Appeal responded as follows at para 41: Where an appeal from a master’s decision to a chambers judge involves the same record and the same submissions , it is not an error for a chambers judge to summarily describe his or her analysis and conclusions with reference to the master’s decision if he or she otherwise finds that it was correct in fact and law.
In taking this approach, the chambers judge here did not defer to the master’s decision or apply any other standard of review. [Emphasis added.] [ 47 ] This situation is different because I am admitting the Souster Affidavit and the Denis Affidavit into evidence. As I read it, the Court of Appeal’s decision in HOOPP does not make clear where the onus lies on an appeal such as this where the record before the chambers judge is different from that before the Applications Judge. However, I need not resolve this question. As set out below, I find that, even if the onus is on Mr.
Fox in these circumstances, he has discharged that onus. B. The Audio Recording [ 48 ] Mr. Terrigno argues, first, that he did properly disclose the Audio Recording in his AORs. Because he takes the position that the Audio Recording is privileged, the fact that he did not formally disclose it to Mr. Fox until March 2021 was not improper. He cites authority for the proposition that privileged records may be disclosed late in the litigation process: Laube v Juchli , 1998 ABCA 319 at para 14 . [ 49 ] If I find that the Audio Recording was not properly disclosed, Mr.
Terrigno seeks to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction under Rule 5.16, which permits a party who failed to make proper disclosure in an affidavit of records to use that record as evidence in the action if “the court otherwise orders on the basis that there was sufficient reason for the failure to disclose”. [ 50 ] Mr. Fox disputes all of these arguments and asserts that Mr. Terrigno did not disclose the Audio Recording because he wanted to impeach Mr. Fox in “trial by ambush”. 1. Proper Disclosure [ 51 ] Mr. Fox acknowledges that the Audio Recording is relevant and material. He argues that the reference to it in Mr.
Terrigno’s Supplemental AOR is insufficient for purposes of the disclosure requirements set out in the Rules . He does not accept Mr. Terrigno’s explanation for his failure to refer to the Audio Recording in the Amended Amended AOR. Nor does he give credence to Mr. Terrigno’s explanation that he did not know the difference between an amended affidavit of records and a supplementary affidavit of records. [ 52 ] Mr. Terrigno argues that late disclosure was perfectly acceptable given his position that the Audio Recording is privileged.
In my view, this position fails to account for the distinction under the Rules between disclosure of records and production thereof. [ 53 ] Rule 5.6 requires that all records be disclosed, regardless of whether the party objects to producing them: Kaddoura v Hanson , 2015 ABCA 154 at para 21 . Records that are relevant, material and under a party’s control are prima facie producible and must be disclosed: Canadian Natural Resources Ltd v ShawCor Ltd , 2014 ABCA 289 at paras 40-41 . Accordingly, Mr.
Terrigno had an obligation to disclose the Audio Recording in the AORs, even though he objected to producing it. [ 54 ] Under Rule 5.8, Mr. Terrigno was required not only to state his specific objection to producing the Audio Recording, but also to describe how it fit within the claimed objection: ShawCor at paras 42-43. His description did not need to reveal privileged information, but had to be detailed enough to allow Mr. Fox to assess the validity of the claimed privilege: ShawCor at para 42. It is insufficient merely to copy the various privileges listed in
Schedule 2 in Form 26: ShawCor at para 46. [ 55 ] Because he claims litigation privilege over it, Mr. Terrigno is required to state that the Audio Recording was created when this Action existed or was contemplated: Dorchak at para 68. [ 56 ] The 1 st AOR and the Amended AOR do not comply with these requirements. They do not indicate what specific class of privilege is claimed over the Audio Recording. There is no mention of the other party, if any, to the Audio Recording, yet Mr. Terrigno’s participation in that conversation is pivotal.
There was no mention of place, time or date or any other information that might have allowed Mr. Fox to assess the validity of the claimed privilege. Moreover, there was no disclosure whatsoever of the Audio Recording in the Amended Amended AOR. This could reasonably have lead Mr. Fox to conclude that Mr. Terrigno had decided not to use the Audio Recording and may have informed his litigation strategy. [ 57 ] I accept that the Applications Judge erred in finding that none of the 2018 AORs made reference to the Audio Recording.
It might have been better to describe the 2018 AORs as non-compliant rather than as false affidavits. [ 58 ] That said, approaching this appeal as a de novo hearing, I come to the same conclusion as the Applications Judge that Mr. Terrigno did not produce compliant AORs and therefore failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of
Part 5 of the Rules . [ 59 ] I do not accept his explanations that his failure adequately to disclose the Audio Recording in the Amended Amended AOR
was a matter of inadvertence. I find there are compelling reasons to conclude that he intentionally omitted reference to the Audio Recording in furtherance of his acknowledged plan to impeach Mr. Fox. Even if that was not Mr. Terrigno’s intention, he could have and should have detected the omission of the Audio Recording in the Amended Amended AOR. Even if Mr. Fox could be said to have been alerted to the Audio Recording by the 1 st AOR and the Amended AOR, its omission from the Amended Amended AOR could reasonably have lead him to conclude that it was no longer an issue. [ 60 ] Therefore, I find Mr.
Terrigno in breach of the requirement to serve a satisfactory AOR. 2. Litigation Privilege [ 61 ] Mr. Terrigno argues that the Applications Judge did not refute his claim to litigation privilege in respect of the Audio Recording. In my view, it was not necessary for him to do so because Mr. Terrigno’s reliance on privilege to justify non-compliance with the Rules is misplaced. Whether the Audio Recording did or did not enjoy privilege is not determinative of Mr. Terrigno’s disclosure obligations. It needed to be disclosed in the AORs with a proper objection to production set forth in
Schedule 2. That did not happen. [ 62 ] I am mindful of these comments from the Court of Appeal in Pfeifer v Westfair Foods Ltd , 2004 ABCA 422 at para 31 : While an opposing party cannot seek to introduce a privileged document at trial, there is nothing in the ARC which expressly prevents the admission of a privileged record withheld before trial. That does not necessarily mean that a privileged record can invariably be introduced at trial if not disclosed prior to then in accordance with the applicable disclosure rules.
Certainly, where, as here, the document has been withheld on the basis that it is to be used for impeachment of a witness, that has been treated as a permissible basis for admissibility of the evidence at trial notwithstanding its non-disclosure prior to trial: Laube v. Juchli (1998), 228 A.R. 81, 1998 ABCA 319 . [ 63 ] The comments in Westfair Foods and Juchli validate a party’s decision to withhold production of documents properly disclosed under
Schedule 2 of Form 26 until as late as the trial. They do not validate a decision to omit or insufficiently disclose a record based on an assertion of privilege. [ 64 ] Mr. Fox asserts that even when the Audio Recording was disclosed, it was not described sufficiently to allow him to assess the claim of privilege. He argues that the description of the Audio Recording should have included the date and the time it was made. He notes that Mr.
Terrigno cites Dorchak v Krupka , 1997 ABCA 89 , in which the Court of Appeal stated that the description of privileged documents need not include dates, contents or parties to them. Mr. Fox argues that the Court of Appeal expressly overruled that decision in ShawCor . [ 65 ] The Court of Appeal in ShawCor noted that Dorchak was decided under a previous version of the Rules , though they noted at para 55 that “much of what was said in Dorchak still has resonance.” I accept that the current Rules require a greater degree of disclosure than was provided in the 2018 AORs. [ 66 ] Mr.
Fox disputes the assertion that he should have questioned Mr. Terrigno on the AORs if he was not clear on the extent of the claim of privilege. He notes, first, that there was no mention whatever of the Audio Recording in the Amended Amended AOR and takes the position that he cannot be expected to question on something that is undisclosed. Second, Mr. Fox notes that records listed as privileged are not discoverable, so Mr. Terrigno could not have been questioned on the Audio Recording even if it had been properly disclosed. Third, Mr.
Fox argues that since he was questioned first, the argument that he could have questioned Mr. Terrigno on the Audio Recording is moot. [ 67 ] In any event, Mr. Fox disputes Mr. Terrigno’s claim that the Audio Recording was subject to litigation privilege, noting that immunity from disclosure under litigation privilege is reserved for those records whose dominant purpose is preparation for litigation. Mr. Fox’s position is that the Audio Recording could not have been made for the purpose of pursuing this defamation Action as it was created before the allegedly defamatory comments had been made. [ 68 ] Mr.
Terrigno claims that the Audio Recording was created for use in other actions, some of which involve Mr. Fox, and argues that a record covered by litigation privilege in respect of one action enjoys that same privilege in connection with future “related” actions. Mr. Fox rejects this argument, noting that he and Ms. Fox are not parties to all of the Actions in question and that the issues in dispute and relevancy of the Audio Recording are not the same in all cases. [ 69 ] Other actions involving Mr. Terrigno and Mr.
Fox (“Potentially Related Actions”) include: 1501-11817 - a clawback application seeking repayment from Mr. Fox of funds he allegedly received from the Ponzi scheme. 1701-03606 - Base Ponzi scheme application in which Mr. Fox is named as a defendant. [ 70 ] There are additional actions arising out of the Ponzi Scheme that do not name Mr. Fox as a party.
I believe it is unnecessary to consider their degree of “relation”. [ 71 ] In Blank v Canada (Minister of Justice) , 2006 SCC 39 at para 39 , the Supreme Court of Canada enumerated certain factors to consider in determining whether separate proceedings are closely related: • Whether the parties are the same or related; • Whether the issues arise from the same or a related cause of action (or juridical source); • Whether the issues are common in both actions; and • Whether the proceedings share the same essential purpose.
[ 72 ] In Pederson v Allstate Insurance, 2019 ABQB 531 , Justice Henderson examined the notion of relationship and stated as follows at para 52: What is Meant by “Closely Related Proceedings?” Allstate argues that when considering whether the litigation privilege continues after the conclusion of the first litigation, it is necessary to take a very broad approach when assessing the relationship between the two actions. Relying on Alberta (Treasury Branches) v Ghermezian , 1999 ABQB 407 at para 28 , Allstate argues that if the two actions are “even remotely connected” then the litigation privilege continues.
While not stated precisely in these terms, Allstate argues that when the Supreme Court used the phrase “closely related proceedings” in Blank , it was effectively adopting the phrase “even remotely connected” in Ghermezian . [ 73 ] Justice Henderson went on at para 53 to state this: A careful reading of Blank demonstrates that the Supreme Court did not adopt all of the reasoning of Chief Justice Moore in Ghermezian . Blank does, at para 32 , adopt the reasoning in Ghermezian , but only for the proposition that litigation privilege can arise even in circumstances where no lawyer is present.
The Supreme Court in Blank did not endorse or comment upon the statement in Ghermezian with respect to the continuation of litigation privilege where the second litigation was “even remotely connected”. [Emphasis in original.] [ 74 ] In my view, the Potentially Related Actions and the present Action are not sufficiently similar in purpose to allow the present Action to appropriate any litigation privilege that might be validly claimed in the Potentially Related Actions. There are no issues in common between the Action and the Potentially Related Actions. They do not share the same essential purpose. [ 75 ] Mr.
Terrigno argues that Mr. Fox gives no cogent evidence to dispute his claim that the Audio Recording is privileged. He does not need to. The onus is on Mr. Terrigno to establish privilege and he has failed to do so. That Mr. Terrigno may have acted on the advice of counsel in claiming privilege does not relieve him of the consequences of misplaced reliance. [ 76 ] I find that the Audio Recording is not covered by litigation privilege. 3. Rule 5.16 [ 77 ] Because I have concluded that Mr. Terrigno failed to serve a satisfactory AOR, I must consider the application of the relieving provisions of Rule 5.16.
That Rule provides that a party who fails to disclose a relevant and material record in an affidavit of records may not use that record in evidence in the action unless “the court otherwise orders on the basis that there was a sufficient reason for the failure to disclose”. [ 78 ] Both Mr. Terrigno and Mr. Fox referred to Signalta Resources Limited v Canadian Natural Resources Limited , 2022 ABQB 89 , in which this Court set out the following test for the application of Rule 5.16 (the “Four-Part Test”): (
i) The other party would suffer prejudice if the use of the record was permitted; (ii) There was a reasonable explanation for the non-disclosing party’s failure to disclose the record; (iii) Excluding the record would prevent the determination of the issue on the merits; and (iv) In the circumstances of the case, the ends of justice require that the record be admitted. [ 79 ] Both Mr. Terrigno and Mr. Fox accept Signalta as the proper application of Rule 5.16. The Court in Signalta expressly cited the Four-Part Test, as articulated in Stone v Ellerman , 2009 BCCA 294 .
I queried the parties on whether Signalta may have been premised on an inappropriate adoption of the reasoning in Stone , which is based on a British Columbia Rule of Court that is similar to Rule 5.16, but in my view also materially different from it. The relevant portion of British Columbia Rule 26 provides as follows:
(14) Unless the court otherwise orders, where a party fails to make discovery of or produce for inspection or copying a document as required by this rule, the party may not put the document in evidence in the proceeding or use it for the purpose of examination or cross- examination. [ 80 ] The British Columbia Rule does not expressly require a Court to determine if there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to disclose, though the Court of Appeal in Stone incorporated that requirement as part of its overall assessment of how the Court should exercise its discretion. [ 81 ] Thus, whether there is a reasonable excuse for non-disclosure is a consideration in both jurisdictions.
In Alberta, that requirement is incorporated in Rule 5.16. In British Columbia, it has been incorporated as a requirement by virtue of the reasoning in Stone . I consider this an important distinction. [ 82 ] In my view, it follows that, in Alberta, the reasonableness of the explanation for non-disclosure should be viewed as the first line of inquiry, the “basis” for the Court’s exercise of discretion. That would suggest that if the Court finds there is no reasonable explanation for non-disclosure, it need not consider the other elements of the Four-Part Test.
I will proceed in that manner though, as will become clear, the same result would obtain in either event. a. Reasonable Excuse [ 83 ] The question here is whether Mr. Terrigno has a reasonable excuse for his failure to comply with the requirements relating to AORs set forth in the Rules . Based on my understanding of Rule 5.16, if I conclude that Mr. Terrigno has no reasonable explanation for non-compliance, the analysis stops there and the Audio Recording may not be used.
[84] The Applications Judge found it “clear [that] the failure of Mr. Terrigno to provide an accurate affidavit of records wasdeliberately done for a collateral purpose i.e. to attempt to have Mr. Fox perjure himself”.
But the Applications Judge’s analysis seems tohave been premised on a misunderstanding of what was contained in the 2018 AORs because, in fact, two the three 2018 AORs didmention the Audio Recording. [85] There are two issues to be resolved here: first, the brevity of the description of the Audio Recording in the 1st AOR and theAmended AOR and second, the absence of any reference to it in the Amended Amended AOR. [86] Mr. Terrigno notes that only the Amended Amended AOR was devoid of any mention of the Audio Recording. That,however, is the AOR served immediately before the Fox Questioning. Mr.
Fox can be heard to argue that, on the basis of that omission,he should not have been expected to anticipate questioning on the Audio Recording. [87] Mr. Terrigno counters by saying that the Audio Recording is referred to in affidavit of records served on Mr. Fox in “related”actions before the Fox Questioning, such that Mr. Fox cannot be said to have been unaware of its existence. Even if I accept thatproposition, it does not follow that Mr. Fox had a meaningful and reasonable opportunity to assess the significance of the AudioRecording and to prepare for Questioning in respect thereof on an informed basis.
I do not believe that the nature and sufficiency ofdisclosure in an affidavit of records in one action should have implications, positive or negative, for the nature and sufficiency ofdisclosure in an affidavit of records in another action. [88] Mr. Fox emphasizes that Mr. Terrigno expressed this concern to the Applications Judge: …an obvious and grave risk that Brian Fox, a notorious fraudster, who is obviously not telling the truth, would tailor his evidence tosnake around the audio recording. [89] As noted above, the Applications Judge found that Mr.
Terrigno omitted reference to the Audio Recording in the 2018 AORsfor a collateral purpose. While he was mistaken to some extent, it is by no means a stretch to say that Mr. Terrigno took a minimalist approach to the description of the Audio Recording in the 1st AOR and the Amended AOR. He then made no mention of it whatever inthe Amended Amended AOR. [90] All things considered, I reject Mr. Terrigno’s explanation for omitting the Audio Recording from the Amended AmendedAOR. Given his acknowledgement that he did not want Mr.
Fox to be on notice of the Audio Recording for fear that he might tailor hisevidence, I am deeply suspicious, as was the Applications Judge, about Mr. Terrigno’s motives. In any event, as discussed above, I reject Mr. Terrigno’s assertion that the move from cursory reference to the Audio Recording in the 1st AOR and Amended AOR to noreference whatever in the Amended Amended AOR was merely an innocent oversight resulting from his efforts to reduce the number ofrecords referred to. The Audio Recording was clearly important to Mr.
Terrigno and a modestly diligent attempt at proofreading theAmended Amended AOR would have revealed this glaring deficiency. [91] Mr. Terrigno also takes the position that the lack of fulsome disclosure of the Audio Recording in the 2018 AORs is justifiedbecause, at the time, he considered it to be privileged. He cites M (
A) v Ryan, (SCC), [1997] 1 SCR 157 for theproposition that failure to cite a privileged document in an affidavit of records does not obviate the litigation privilege. He also assertsthat a record created for multiple proceedings, as he claims is the case with the Audio Recording, is privileged in all related proceedings.He notes that the Applications Judge did not expressly state that the Audio Recording was not subject to litigation privilege. I, however,have found that it was not. [92] Moreover, even if the Audio Recording was privileged, that does not excuse non-compliance with the disclosure requirementsof
Part 5 of the Rules. Mr. Terrigno confuses a legitimate decision to not waive privilege in respect of the Audio Recording until hisevidentiary foundation was complete with failure to disclose it in an affidavit of records. If the Audio Recording had been covered bylitigation privilege, Mr. Terrigno might have been entitled to withhold production of it, but he was required to disclose it and to do so insufficient detail to permit Mr. Fox to make a meaningful assessment of the claimed privilege. [93] The Supplemental AOR did disclose the Audio Recording in more detail.
The Denis Affidavit suggests that the SupplementalAOR was prepared on his advice to correct the omission in the Amended Amended AOR and the scant description in the 1st AOR andthe Amended AOR. Nevertheless, Mr. Terrigno claims that the Audio Recording was withheld pursuant to Mr. Denis’ advice that theAudio Recording was subject to litigation privilege. In my view, that advice was erroneous. [94] In any event, I do not think it reasonable to excuse the deficiencies in the 2018 AORs simply because Mr. Terrignosubsequently decided to consult counsel.
The time to consult counsel regarding the sufficiency of disclosure is not after that disclosurehas been made and others have suffered consequences as a result of its deficiencies. [95] Additionally, Mr. Terrigno cannot claim to have a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the Rules because he was self-represented when he served the 2018 AORs. Mr. Terrigno has a law degree and experience as a litigator.
Having reviewed the brief andaffidavits he prepared in this matter as a self-represented litigant, I have little sympathy for his claim that he did not know what he wasdoing. [96] Taking all of the foregoing into account, I find that Mr. Terrigno has offered no reasonable explanation for his non-compliance with the Rules. [97] If I am correct in my understanding that the absence of a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with disclosure requirementsis sufficient to exclude the evidence in question, it is unnecessary to consider the other three elements of the Four-Part Test.
However, inthe event that I am incorrect and either (1) all four elements must be considered simultaneously or
(2) Mr. Terrigno does have areasonable excuse for non-compliance, I now turn to an examination of the other components of the Four-Part Test. b. Prejudice
[ 98 ] Mr. Terrigno argues that no prejudice will arise if he is permitted to utilize the Audio Recording. He notes that Mr. Fox claims it is a complete fabrication and contends that Mr. Fox’s evidence would not have changed if the Audio Recording had been disclosed in the 2018 AORs. [ 99 ] I am not convinced that this is a correct articulation of the test for prejudice. Even if Mr. Fox’s evidence would have been the same had the Audio Recording been disclosed, that does not entitle Mr. Terrigno to fail to comply with the Rules. [ 100 ] In any event, had there been proper disclosure of the Audio Recording, Mr.
Fox may well have adjusted his litigation strategy at an earlier stage in these proceedings. Indeed, he states that he may well have changed his litigation strategy had the Audio Recording been disclosed. Having been denied that opportunity, he has incurred additional expense getting to this point in the litigation and will continue to incur additional expense in responding to the Audio Recording if it is admitted. [ 101 ] Mr. Terrigno argues that any prejudice Mr.
Fox may have suffered was his own fault because he did not challenge the sufficiency of disclosure in the 1 st AOR, the Amended AOR or the Supplemental AOR. I do not accept that argument.
Part 5 of the Rules imposes an obligation on the party disclosing to provide sufficient information to allow the Court to determine that each record in respect of which there is an objection to produce is disclosed in the affidavit of records: Rule 5.8(2). There must be sufficient description to allow the receiving party to decide whether to make application under Rule 5.11 to require the delivering party to substantiate the claim of privilege. The Rules do not impose an obligation on the receiving party to request further particulars. In my view, that would effectively shift the burden. Instead of requiring Mr.
Terrigno to make adequate disclosure, Mr. Fox would have the burden of making inquiry regarding the scope of disclosure. I have been provided with no authority to support that
interpretation. [ 102 ] Accordingly, I find that Mr. Fox will suffer prejudice if the Audio Recording is admitted into evidence in this Action. c. Determination on the Merits [ 103 ] Mr. Terrigno argues that excluding the Audio Recording would prevent the determination of this Action on its merits. He argues that, without the Audio Recording, the trial judge could make a finding contrary to the facts. This would bring the administration of justice into disrepute by permitting Mr. Fox to grossly mislead the Court. [ 104 ] Mr.
Fox argues that the absence of the Audio Recording would not prevent a determination based on the parties’ respective evidence. He also notes that he and his wife have plead absolute or qualified privilege in respect of the police compliant. If that defence is successful, the content of the Audio Recording is irrelevant. [ 105 ] I find that excluding the Audio Recording from further proceedings may make it more difficult for Mr. Terrigno to prove his case but will not bar a determination on the merits. Both parties will still be able to give viva voce evidence. d. Ends of Justice [ 106 ] Mr.
Fox argues that the ends of justice require that the Audio Recording not be admitted because it is clear that Mr. Terrigno deliberately failed to disclose it in hopes of catching Mr. Fox in a lie. [ 107 ] In my view, it would not be unjust to exclude the Audio Recording. Indeed, for the reasons outlined above, including the object and purpose of the disclosure provisions of
Part 5 of the Rules and the implications of non-disclosure for Mr. Fox’s litigation strategy, it would be unjust to include it. It is not unjust to exclude it merely because Mr. Terrigno allegedly learned about its deficiencies only once he engaged Mr. Denis. [ 108 ] That the Audio Recording may be a key piece of evidence in this Action does not alter my conclusion that it should be excluded. I do not accept Mr. Terrigno’s explanation for its omission from the Amended Amended AOR or for the deficiencies in its description in the 1 st AOR and Amended AOR.
Even if I did, I would not find them sufficient to overlook his failure to follow appropriate procedure. Accordingly, I am not sufficiently moved by the potential significance of the Audio Recording to allow it to be used. C. Use of Transcripts and Breach of Implied Undertaking [ 109 ] Mr. Fox asserts that Mr. Terrigno sought his consent to file the transcript of the Fox Questioning. When he refused, Mr. Terrigno attached that transcript as an exhibit to an affidavit he filed on November 21, 2019. [ 110 ] Subsequent to filing his Notice of Appeal, Mr.
Terrigno filed partial transcripts of the Fox Questioning as part of the New Evidence. Mr. Fox brought an application to strike the offending material, which then occurred pursuant to a consent order. Mr. Terrigno claimed that this was an inadvertent error. [ 111 ] Mr. Terrigno admits that he disclosed portions of the Fox Questioning transcripts and the Audio Recording to the Calgary Police and the RCMP. As a consequence, Mr. Fox was investigated by the RCMP and Ms. Fox by the Calgary Police. [ 112 ] Mr. Fox contends that Mr.
Terrigno is in breach of the implied undertaking rule codified in Rule 5.33 and is trying to circumvent that Rule by claiming that the Fox Questioning transcript, having been exhibited to an affidavit, is now part of the public record. He argues that while Rule 5.31 allows for questioning transcripts to be attached as exhibits to affidavits, their use is still restricted to the specific proceedings for which the affidavit was filed. [ 113 ] Mr. Terrigno’s main argument is that the implied undertaking rule was extinguished when he attached the Fox Questioning transcript to his affidavit filed in support of his
summary judgment application. At that point, he argues, the transcript became a public document and the open court principle trumped any requirement that he not use it outside of this Action. His position seems to have some
support in the authorities: Gill v 735458 Alberta Inc , 2003 ABQB 501 at para 32 and Dreco Energy Services Ltd v Wenzel , 2007 ABQB 635 , at paras 31-34 . [ 114 ] However, a more careful review of those cases exposes the fallacy in Mr. Terrigno’s argument. In both cases, the Court draws a sharp distinction between a transcript of cross-examination on affidavit and a transcript of questioning (previously called discovery). The former is part of the public record, as is the underlying affidavit. The latter is not.
As Master Funduk pointed out in Gill at para 32 , “… evidence given at examinations for discovery loses its confidentiality once it becomes part of the court record .” (Emphasis added.) That is not what occurred here and those cases provide no support for the proposition that merely filing an affidavit with a questioning transcript exhibited to it vitiates the confidentiality of the questioning or obviates the implied undertaking. [ 115 ] Simply stated, it would be inconsistent with the implied undertaking rule set out in Rule 5.33 to allow its purpose and objective to be so neatly circumvented by the simple expedient of attaching otherwise confidential questioning transcripts to an affidavit. [ 116 ] Mr.
Terrigno might have been entitled to use the Fox Questioning transcript in connection with legal proceedings before the Court. But that is not what he did. Instead, he gave portions of that transcript to police in respect of a potential criminal proceeding. [ 117 ] Mr. Terrigno argues in his brief that while he gave this material to the police, he did not “use” it. I agree with Mr. Fox that this argument makes no sense and is no answer to the breach of the implied undertaking rule. [ 118 ] Mr. Terrigno asserts that he received legal advice from Mr.
Souster that he could file the Fox Questioning transcript in connection with the
summary judgment application. My review of the Souster Affidavit indicates that Mr. Souster did give that advice. However, Mr. Souster expressly disclaims advising Mr. Terrigno about using the transcript outside of this Action. [ 119 ] Mr. Fox argues that intent is important in examining alleged breaches of the implied undertaking rule.
In Kang v MB , 2019 ABQB 246 at para 149 , the Court stated: Relief from the implied undertaking should be denied where a party, who is seeking relief from an implied undertaking in order to disclose illegal or improper conduct to the applicable authorities, does so for a collateral purpose. [ 120 ] The Applications Judge held that Mr. Terrigno disclosed portions of the Fox Questioning transcripts to authorities both to try to get Mr. Fox criminally charged and Ms. Fox fired or reprimanded and also to gain an advantage in this Action. [ 121 ] Mr. Fox points to Mr. Terrigno’s February 13, 2020, email to Mr.
Fox’s counsel after the latter raised the implied undertaking rule as it pertains to the Fox Questioning transcript: It is a public record that can be retrieved from the court file by anyone. You should learn the law if you want to practice it. Anyway, it matters little, your client will be charged with perjury and public mischief and Uta Fox will be fired from her role at CPS. Have you seen the audio/video yet? If not then I will forward. I played you like the fool that you are. [ 122 ] I agree with the Applications Judge’s finding that Mr. Terrigno breached the implied undertaking rule. I reject Mr.
Terrigno’s argument that attaching the entire Fox Questioning transcript to an affidavit filed in support of the
summary judgment application negated its confidentiality and made it public record. Moreover, even if that were the case, Mr. Terrigno was not entitled to use it for a collateral purpose by providing portions of it to police. [ 123 ] Mr. Terrigno argues that if the resolution of this issue depends upon an assessment of his motives and intentions, it should be set for an oral hearing or be decided by the trial judge with the benefit of viva voce evidence. [ 124 ] I do not consider that necessary. I find that Mr. Terrigno has acted in breach of clear and unambiguous Rules relating to disclosure and confidentiality.
The legal opinions he received are not of assistance to him. They do not speak to his motivations for failing to give adequate disclosure of the Audio Recording in the 2018 AORs or for providing portions of the Fox Questioning transcript to police. VI. Conclusion [ 125 ] Mr. Fox seeks dismissal of Mr. Terrigno’s appeal. Further, he seeks to strike this Action with costs against Mr. Terrigno on a solicitor client basis. He takes the position that the Applications Judge could and should have struck Mr. Terrigno’s Statement of Claim. Mr.
Fox notes that the Applications Judge found there were two separate bases upon which to strike Mr. Terrigno’s claim. The first, under Rule 3.68(4)(b)(i), was a failure to produce an accurate and truthful affidavit of records. The second was breach of Rule 5.33. [ 126 ] In the alternative, Mr. Fox seeks an order prohibiting Mr. Terrigno from making use of the Audio Recording in this Action, with a corresponding order for costs. He argues that non-disclosure of the Audio Recording has lengthened proceedings in this Action and made them more expensive and complex.
He cites Zhang v 328633 BC Ltd , 2021 BCSC 650 for the proposition that delayed disclosure and material non-disclosure that has this effect is reprehensible and may result in a special costs award. [ 127 ] The Applications Judge did not strike this Action because Mr. Fox did not ask him to. Nevertheless, Mr. Fox argues that the Applications Judge had jurisdiction to do so pursuant to Rule 1.3 and
section 8 of the Judicature Act , RSA 200, c J -2, which provides: General jurisdiction 8. T he Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction in every proceeding pending before it has power to grant and shall grant, either absolutely or on any reasonable terms and conditions that seem just to the Court, all remedies whatsoever to which any of the parties to the proceeding may appear to be entitled in respect of any and every legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them in the proceeding, so that as far as possible all matters in controversy between the parties can be completely determined and all multiplicity of
legal proceedings concerning those matters avoided. [ 128 ] Mr. Fox put Mr. Terrigno on notice that he would seek to have this Action struck on appeal before this Court. [ 129 ] I do not think it appropriate to strike the Statement of Claim in this Action. I believe an award of costs may be tailored to address adequately the issues that have arisen in connection with Mr. Terrigno’s conduct of this litigation. I believe the sanctions imposed by the Applications Judge to be reasonable in the circumstances. [ 130 ] In light of the above, Mr.
Terrigno’s appeal is dismissed. [ 131 ] If the parties are unable to agree on costs in respect of this appeal, they may provide me with written submissions not to exceed five pages within 30 days of the date of these Reasons. Heard on the 9 th day of December, 2022. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 17 th day of February 2023. C.M. Jones J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Mike Terrigno, for Applicant (self-represented) for the Applicant Brad Findlater for the Respondents
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