Boelman v Boelman, 2024 ABKB 30

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Boelman v Boelman, 2024 ABKB 30 Date: 20240116 Docket: 4803 169501 Registry: Edmonton Between: Kelly Lynn Boelman Plaintiff - and - Luke Aeisso Boelman and Carmen Mittelstadt Defendants _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice S. Leonard _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] This is an application for costs by Mrs. Boelman, who now goes by Ms. Nickerson, following a 16-day trial held to determine spousal support and the division of matrimonial property in a divorce Action. Ms.

Nickerson and Mr. Boelman were married in November 1997, and separated on September 28, 2013. Ms. Nickerson filed a Statement of Claim for Divorce and Division of Matrimonial Property on September 25, 2014. Ms. Mittelstadt is a party to this Action, by virtue of a claim made by Ms. Nickerson against Ms. Mittelstadt pursuant to s 10 of the Matrimonial Property Act , RSA 2000, c M-8 . I. Position of the Parties

[ 2 ] Ms. Nickerson’s position is that she was substantially successful in the trial and should be awarded costs pursuant to

Schedule C, Column 4, of Division 2 of the Tariff of Recoverable Fees in the amount of $93,785. [ 3 ] Mr. Boelman’s position is that each party should bear their own costs. His position is that while costs are generally awarded to the successful party, it is important to ensure any costs award is not oppressive. [ 4 ] Ms. Mittelstadt’s position is that she does not owe Ms. Nickerson any costs. She argues her involvement was limited to one court application that occurred in August 2017 and two days of trial time. Further, in considering any award of costs, she urges the Court to consider the effect of Mr.

Boelman’s brain injury. Ms. Mittelstadt says Mr. Boelman’s brain injury has impeded his ability take the steps necessary to pay the amounts owing to Ms. Nickerson as a result of the Court’s judgment. She fears a significant costs award will impede Mr. Boelman’s ability to bring this matter to a close and may cause him to suffer further mental health difficulties. [ 5 ] The parties agree that they will bear the costs of their own disbursements. II.

Law and Analysis [ 6 ] Costs in family law matters normally follow the same principles applicable to other litigation: Shaw v Shaw , 2014 ABQB 165 at para 14 ; Cador [Chichak] v Chichak , 1998 ABQB 881 at para 9 , aff’d 2000 ABCA 10 . [ 7 ] Rule 10.29 of the Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010 confirms the general rule that a successful party is entitled to costs against the unsuccessful party, subject to the Court’s general discretion. (See also: MacPhail v Karasek , 2006 ABCA 354 at para 9 and Metz v Weisgerber , 2004 ABCA 151 at para 25 ). [ 8 ] A trial judge’s discretion must be exercised judicially and in accordance with established principles: Lameman v Alberta , 2011 ABQB 532 at para 6 , leave to appeal refused, 2011 ABCA 724 .

The trial judge must apply the correct law to the applicable facts and must not be unreasonable in the exercise of their discretion. [ 9 ] In McAllister v Calgary (City of) , 2021 ABCA 25 , the Court of Appeal clarifies and provides a framework for the assessment of costs. The starting point in making a costs award is to look at the factors outlined in r 10.33(1) and (2) of the Rules . After the factors under r 10.33 are considered, the Court is directed to r 10.31, which provides options for making costs awards.

A successful party is entitled either to reasonable and proper costs, as set out in r 10.31(1)(a), or to any other amount the Court considers appropriate in the circumstances, as set out in r 10.31(1)(b). [ 10 ] I will begin with an analysis of the factors set out in r 10.33(1) and have considered the first two listed factors together. A. The results of the Action including the degree of success of each party; the amount claimed, and the amount recovered [ 11 ] Ms.

Nickerson’s position is that she was the substantially successful party because the ultimate property division was set at approximately $1.55 million, versus $1.8 million, which was her trial position. [ 12 ] Mr. Boelman’s position is that the results of this matter were mixed. He did not deny that an equalization payment should be paid to Ms. Nickerson, but he disputed the amount.

Although spousal support was a question in issue in this matter, the division of matrimonial property carried with it the greatest monetary value, with the land value representing approximately 85% of the total matrimonial property in issue. Mr. Boelman argues Ms. Nickerson was not clearly successful because the Court split the land values as between the two experts that were proffered. [ 13 ] Mr. Boelman says he was successful with respect to issues of Guideline income and spousal support. Ms. Nickerson’s argument that the Court should set Mr. Boelman’s income at $250,000 was rejected.

The Court ultimately set Mr. Boelman’s income much lower, finding his income ranged from zero to a high of $88,057, depending on the year. Considering the amounts of spousal support previously paid, and Ms. Nickerson’s income, the Court concluded that Mr. Boelman had overpaid spousal support. I accept that Mr. Boelman was more successful on the spousal support issue. [ 14 ] Success in legal proceedings is determined objectively: Herman v Delong , 1999 ABQB 745 at para 16 .

Moreover, substantial success does not require success on every issue or argument: Mahe v Boulianne , 2010 ABCA 74 at para 6 ; Johannson v Haaranen , 2019 ABCA 197 at para 4 . [ 15 ] Mr. Boelman offered to settle this matter with an equalization payment of $640,000, inclusive of all matrimonial property, spousal support, and costs. While Ms. Nickerson failed in her arguments regarding Mr. Boelman’s income and the amount of spousal support owing, she nonetheless received an award of approximately $1.55 million, more than double Mr. Boelman’s offer.

Further, the award she received is only $250,000 less than her trial position of $1.8 million. [ 16 ] The results in this Action were also significantly impacted by my finding that the arrangement between Mr. Boelman and Ms. Mittelstadt intentionally deprived Ms. Nickerson of a fair distribution of matrimonial property. As a result of this finding, I treated the property transferred to Ms. Mittelstadt as part of the property owned by Mr. Boelman at the date of trial. [ 17 ] Although Mr. Boelman was the more successful party on the spousal support issue, I conclude that Ms.

Nickerson was the substantially successful party in this matter overall and is entitled to costs. This is primarily because the matrimonial property claim had greater monetary value than the spousal support claim, the property issues were more complex, the matrimonial property claim took up more trial time, and it occupied more of my trial decision than the spousal support issue.

B. The importance of the issues [ 18 ] This matter was the culmination of almost 10 years of litigation. The parties were not able to resolve this matter without judicial involvement. By the time this matter proceeded to trial, child support was no longer in issue because the children were adults. The division of matrimonial property, however, remained an important issue. [ 19 ] Ms. Mittelstadt’s position is that the s 10 Matrimonial Property Act claim was a side-issue because it was not the subject of any applications until the actual trial.

While there may not have been pre-trial applications touching on this issue, Ms. Mittelstadt participated in questioning and was required to disclose relevant documents. Ultimately, the s 10 issue proved important in the division of matrimonial property because it impacted the division of the farm’s cattle inventory. [ 20 ] I conclude that it was essential that this matter be resolved by way of trial. The matters before the Court were important to the parties. C. The complexity of the Action [ 21 ] Three issues made this matter complex. The first issue is that following the separation, Ms.

Nickerson received the proceeds of cattle sales pursuant to two Court Orders (the “Court Orders”). The Court was asked to determine whether these funds should be characterized as spousal support or an advance of property. I determined that the payments Ms. Nickerson received on account of cattle sales should be characterized as an advance against the division of the parties’ matrimonial property. [ 22 ] Further, Ms. Nickerson incurred a large tax debt associated with her receipt of these funds because she reported them as farm revenue on her Income Tax Returns without deducting the farm’s liabilities.

In the circumstances, only Mr. Boelman could claim the farm expenses because he was the only one that incurred them. I concluded that in these unique circumstances, Ms. Nickerson and Mr. Boelman should equally share the remaining tax burden associated with the cattle proceeds received by Ms. Nickerson. [ 23 ] The second issue involved Ms. Mittlestadt and a claim under s 10 of the Matrimonial Property Act . The issue was whether a business arrangement between Mr. Boelman and Ms. Mittelstadt deprived Ms. Nickerson of her share of the matrimonial property such that property now owned by Ms.

Mittelstadt should be treated as matrimonial property owned by Mr. Boelman. I found that the arrangement between Mr. Boelman and Ms. Mittelstadt was contrived to defeat the Court Orders through which Ms. Nickerson was receiving the proceeds of cattle sales. As such, for the purpose of the division of matrimonial property, I treated the property transferred to Ms. Mittelstadt as part of the property owned by Mr. Boelman at the date of trial. [ 24 ] Finally, it was extremely difficult to determine the cattle inventory over the periods in question. Ms.

Mittelstadt argues the complexity of the Action is because farming is a complex business. I agree with Ms. Mittelstadt to some extent. However, both Mr. Boelman and Ms. Mittelstadt produced handmade spreadsheets in which they tried to express head of cattle on the farm. In Mr. Boelman’s case, he categorized them as “marital” and “exempt” cows. He did not include bulls, nor were the calves included because the calves were transferred to Ms. Mittelstadt’s company.

To make sense of the parties’ materials, the Court went through Farmbooks and, in many cases, manually added the number of cattle on the farm at various points in time. To determine the value of the pre-marital herd, the Court performed calculations and made assumptions based on the amount of interest being paid for cattle loans. Proper presentation of the evidence could have reduced the complexity of the analysis and the examinations that occurred at trial. [ 25 ] I conclude this was a complex Action. D. The apportionment of liability [ 26 ] Mr.

Boelman’s position is that none of the parties were unequivocally successful and that all should bear their own costs. I disagree. As already explained, Ms. Nickerson was substantially successful in this Action and is entitled to costs. [ 27 ] The real question is what proportion of the costs should Ms. Mittelstadt be responsible for? She was an active participant in the arrangement to defeat the Court Orders. The s 10 Matrimonial Property Act issue was an important part of the matters in issue at trial. Although her evidence only spanned two trial days, Mr. Boelman and Ms.

Nickerson were also questioned on matters related to the s 10 issues. In addition, Ms. Mittelstadt was questioned in advance of trial and also questioned Ms. Nickerson. [ 28 ] In my decision, I noted that on numerous occasions during the trial, Ms. Mittelstadt interjected to voice concerns or viewpoints that were timely and of assistance to the Court. As well, the materials she prepared were thorough. [ 29 ] In the circumstances, Ms. Mittelstadt shall be responsible for the following: (

a) One third of the cost of reviewing disclosure; (

b) One third of the cost of preparing for questioning; (

c) The two half days of questioning that occurred on September 10, 2018 and June 26, 2020; (

d) One third of the cost of the August 2017 application; (

e) One third of the cost of preparation for trial; (

f) Three days of trial time, to account for the time she gave evidence, made argument and conducted cross-examinations; and (

g) One third of the costs of preparing written argument.

[ 30 ] This represents 21% of the total costs claimed by Ms. Nickerson. E. The conduct of the party that tended to shorten the Action [ 31 ] Ms. Nickerson argues Mr. Boelman’s decision to involve Ms. Mittelstadt unduly lengthened the trial time required to achieve a property resolution. I agree that her involvement lengthened the trial time and also made the matter more complex. She does not bear responsibility for this on her own. Mr. Boelman was a willing participant in their arrangement, which was intended to defeat the Court Orders. As previously concluded, Ms.

Mittelstadt shall be liable for 21% of the final costs award. [ 32 ] Ms. Nickerson also argues Mr. Boelman sought and obtained an adjournment of the trial of this matter on July 13, 2018. This allowed Mr. Boelman and Ms. Mittelstadt’s arrangement to continue for another several years before the matter came to trial. [ 33 ] Ms. Mittelstadt’s position is that it was Mr. Boelman’s lawyer (referring to a lawyer that came off the record prior to Ms. Lindberg’s involvement), that wanted the adjournment, not Mr. Boelman. She points out that Mr.

Boelman’s former lawyer came on the record in August 2017, and was not able to prepare for the September 2018 trial. She contends Mr. Boelman’s lawyer took advantage of him. Ms. Mittelstadt also asserts Ms. Nickerson is responsible for some of the delays following this adjournment because she failed to show up for case management meetings. [ 34 ] While I am sympathetic to Mr. Boelman’s situation, the adjournment of the 2018 trial dates falls at his feet. There were subsequent delays that Ms. Nickerson is also responsible for.

This matter also spans the COVID-19 pandemic which undoubtedly affected the parties’ ability to obtain an earlier rescheduled trial date. I take all these factors into account in determining a costs award that is appropriate in this case. [ 35 ] Mr. Boelman argues Ms. Nickerson’s application in January 2020 to have Mr. Boelman’s income set at $250,000, with an interim advance of $100,000 was wholly unreasonable, particularly since she had already received the cattle proceeds. While I agree Ms. Nickerson’s position regarding income may have been inordinately high, I am unable to comment on the advance.

Despite the interim cattle payments, Ms. Nickerson was ultimately awarded a sizeable equalization payment. [ 36 ] Mr. Boelman also argues that the way Ms. Nickerson dealt with her income taxes complicated and lengthened the Action. As discussed in my trial decision, I found the Court Orders were the result of contentious family litigation where Ms. Nickerson was left without access to her share of the matrimonial property. I found that both Ms. Nickerson and Mr. Boelman should share equally the tax burden associated with the cattle proceeds received by Ms. Nickerson.

The analysis applies equally to this costs analysis. Both are responsible for the consequences of the complex tax situation Ms. Nickerson found herself in. [ 37 ] Finally, Mr. Boelman argues Ms. Nickerson’s claims of ill-health at the start of the trial lengthened the total trial time. Counsel argues the claims were not supported by medical evidence and appeared unfounded. I am not prepared to make this finding on the evidentiary record before me. F. Any other matter related to the question of reasonable and proper costs that the Court considers appropriate [ 38 ] Counsel for Mr. Boelman argues Mr.

Boelman has experienced significant challenges in obtaining financing to cover the costs of the equalization payment. Any costs award will increase Mr. Boelman’s challenges in respect of covering the payment. In my trial decision, I found that the importance of maintaining a viable cattle farm operation was a relevant factor in the division of matrimonial property. This factor is similarly relevant to the issue of costs. [ 39 ] Additionally, counsel for Mr. Boelman argues Mr. Boelman’s neurological condition impairs his executive functioning. Counsel for Mr. Boelman argues Mr.

Boelman’s disability should be considered in the overall trial process. While this was not a matter in issue at trial, this neurological condition is not in dispute. [ 40 ] In her written materials, Ms. Mittelstadt echoes the concerns raised by counsel for Mr. Boelman. [ 41 ] I agree that some of the difficulties that arose during the trial were likely affected by Mr. Boelman’s neurological disorder. For example, I take notice that Mr. Boelman appeared to struggle in Court with his admissions regarding exempt property. Similarly, there were occasions when Mr. Boelman was not able to control his emotions.

On one occasion, he stormed out of the courtroom and sheriffs were called. I accept that some of the challenges faced in the years leading up to the trial and in the trial itself, were likely exacerbated by Mr. Boelman’s neurological disorder. [ 42 ] In deciding whether to impose, deny or vary an amount in a costs award, the Court should next consider the factors described in r 10.33(2). I consider a number of these factors below. G. A party’s denial of or refusal to admit anything that should have been admitted [ 43 ] Ms. Nickerson argues Mr.

Boelman added considerable delay to the matter by delaying making admissions on the exemption value of the real property. I note that this remained an issue throughout the trial, with Mr. Boelman at one point considering whether he would recant on his admissions, mid-trial. Although his application was eventually abandoned, his uncertainty, in this regard, was evident to the Court. However, Mr. Boelman’s equivocation did not ultimately affect the trial time. [ 44 ] Ms. Nickerson also argues Mr.

Boelman did not provide the Court with a Matrimonial Property Statement (“MPS”) for the Court’s consideration at the start of the trial. Her position is that this added to the complexity of the matters because all entries on her proposed MPS required evidence.

[45] In response, Mr. Boelman says he cooperated with the Court’s request that a single MPS be provided to the Court, showingareas of agreement and disagreement between the parties. This increased the efficiency of the trial process. [46] I agree that both parties should have provided a MPS at the start of trial. It was difficult for the Court to determine what wasin issue and what was not. Ms. Pisko testified regarding the placement of assets on the MPS. Throughout Ms. Pisko’s testimony, Mr.Boelman was asked whether he was taking issue with the values assigned in the MPS. In many instances, Mr.

Boelman agreed to theassigned values. This was work that could have been done in advance of trial. [47] I directed the parties to provide a single MPS, because I was unsure of what was in issue and what was not. To ensure clarityof the issues, Mr. Boelman should have provided his proposed MPS at the start of trial or at least indicated what was in issue and whatwas not. His failure to do this resulted in the requirement that Ms. Nickerson lead evidence that later proved to be unnecessary. Thisfactor weighs in favour of a higher costs award against Mr. Boelman. [48] Mr. Boelman argues Ms.

Nickerson’s failure to admit certain facts surrounding the total amount of monies the parties receivedfrom Livestock Identification Services or the amount of money she received, as a result of the Court Orders, extended the Action. Thisissue did not affect the way the trial was ultimately run. The sums received by the parties pursuant to the Court Orders were admitted, asevidenced by the Agreed Statement of Facts that was tendered on the first day of trial. While it may have taken time to come to thisagreement, this issue was not dealt with during the trial and did not in any way affect the course of the trial.

H. Whether a party engaged in misconduct [49] Mr. Nickerson’s position is that the conduct of Mr. Boelman and Ms. Mittelstadt was morally blameworthy and that theirconduct militates in favour of ordering an increased level of costs by either or both parties. [50] Mr. Boelman claims he does not understand what conduct Ms. Nickerson says is morally blameworthy. To be clear, myunderstanding is that the conduct averred to by Ms. Nickerson is the arrangement that Mr. Boelman and Ms.

Mittelstadt came up with todefeat the Court Orders. [51] Generally, an award of enhanced or solicitor-client costs is based on misconduct that occurs during the course of litigation.However, that is not an invariable rule: FIC Real Estate Fund Ltd v Phoenix Land Ventures Ltd, 2016 ABCA 303 at para 4. InJackson v Trimac Industries Ltd, (1993), (AB KB), 138 AR 161 at 172 (QB), the Court suggested a list of examples,which has been endorsed by the Alberta Court of Appeal, where a greater costs award may be appropriate. This includes the followingrelevant examples: (

a) in circumstances constituting blameworthiness in the conduct of the litigation; and (

b) an attempt to deceive the court and defeat justice. [52] I agree with Ms. Nickerson that Mr. Boelman’s and Ms. Mittelstadt’s conduct was morally blameworthy. In JS v CGR, 2018ABQB 247 one of the factors that Hopkins J took into consideration in awarding indemnity costs to the mother was “the father’s blatant,willful and deliberate disregard of court orders” (para 25). [53] However, I am also troubled by the fact that Ms.

Nickerson was convicted of theft under $5,000 in relation to her entry ontothe farm property in 2018, after this litigation had commenced. [54] I take this misconduct into consideration in determining the costs award. I. Settlement offers [55] Ms. Nickerson’s position is that she substantially beat the settlement offers of Mr. Boelman, and when the interim paymentsfrom LIS are factored in, she also beat the settlement offers that were advanced on her behalf. [56] Counsel for Ms.

Nickerson does not suggest that r 4.29(1), which mandates double costs consequences of a formal offer,applies, nor does he suggest the judgment granted in Ms. Nickerson’s favour exceeds the settlement offers advanced on her behalf, so asto satisfy the Calderbank regime. [57] Nonetheless, Ms. Nickerson’s settlement offers provide context for the litigation. It is certainly possible this matter could haveresolved earlier or that the issues at trial could have been narrowed. However, in the circumstances of this case, including Mr. Boelman’sneurological disorder, this factor does not increase the costs award. III.

Conclusion: what amount of costs are payable by Mr.Boelman and Ms. Mittelstadt? [58] Having considered the factors under r 10.33 of the Rules, it is now necessary to consider the amount of costs that should bepaid by Mr. Boelman and Ms. Mittelstadt to Ms. Nickerson pursuant to r 10.31. As stated previously, Ms. Nickerson takes the positionthat

Schedule C, Column 4 is appropriate in the circumstances. [59] The arrangement between Ms. Mittelstadt and Mr. Boleman has factored into the analysis at several points in this decision. Imust be cautious not to place too much emphasis on the arrangement in my overall determination of costs. As previously stated, inaddition to resolving the s 10 Matrimonial Property Act claim, the trial also focussed on the division of real property, a matter that was

not affected by the s 10 issue. [ 60 ] Ms. Nickerson’s position is that costs should be payable in accordance with

Schedule C, Column 4. It is reasonable for Ms. Nickerson to seek costs under this column because she received a judgment award in the approximate amount of $1.55 million. The value of the land was a significant factor in the overall determination of the equalization payment owed by Mr. Boelman to Ms. Nickerson. [ 61 ] However, it is important that the costs awarded in this case be balanced. While the award must reflect Ms.

Nickerson’s substantial success, the complexity of the claim, the importance of the issues, the apportionment of liability, the conduct of the parties, as well as the misconduct as evidenced by the s 10 claim, it must also not overly penalize Mr. Boelman. [ 62 ] Mr. Boelman is an intergenerational cattle farmer. He was engaged in farming prior to marrying Ms. Nickerson and continues to farm cattle to this day. I am cognizant that the property judgment, as well as this costs decision, will have a serious impact on his financial situation. In addition, Mr.

Boelman suffers from a neurological condition that affects his executive functioning. This is an important factor in the overall assessment of this Action. [ 63 ] To strike an appropriate balance, I direct Mr. Boelman and Ms. Mittelstadt to pay costs under Column 3 in the total amount of $72,350.00, as shown in Appendix A. Ms. Mittelstadt shall be responsible for 21% of the overall costs award. As such, the total amount of costs payable by Mr. Boelman is $57,050.00 and the total amount of costs payable by Ms. Mittelstadt is $15,300.00.

Written submissions provided on the 29 th day of September, 12 th , 13 th , 24 th , 25 th days of October, and 5 th day of December, 2023. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 16 th day of January, 2024. S. Leonard J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Jordan Lefaivre TC Family Law Group for the Plaintiff Amanda Lindberg Bruyer & MacKay LLP for Mr. Boelman, the Defendant Ms. Mittelstadt Self-Represented, the Defendant APPENDIX A COMMENCEMENT DOCUMENTS, PLEADINGS, RELATED DOCUMENTS Column 3 Mittelstadt Costs payable pursuant to Rule 1(1) $ 2,700.00 $ -

DISCLOSURE Provision of Disclosure Costs payable pursuant to Rule 3(1) $ 1,350.00 $ - Review of Disclosure Costs payable pursuant to Rule 3(2) $ 1,350.00 $ 450.00 QUESTIONING Preparation Costs payable pursuant to Rule 5(1) $ 1,350.00 $ 450.00 Questioning of Luke Boelman 24 Apr 15 ½ day Costs payable pursuant to Rule 5(2) $ 1,350.00 $ - Questioning on Affidavit of Luke Boelman 20 Jan 17 ½ day Costs payable pursuant to Rule 5(2) $ 1,350.00 $ - Questioning of Kelly Lynn Boelman 17 Apr 18 ½ day Costs payable pursuant to Rule 5(2) $ 1,350.00 $ - Continued Questioning of Kelly Lynn Boelman 06 Jul 18 ½ day Costs payable pursuant to Rule 5(2) $ 1,350.00 $ - Questioning of Carmen Mittelstadt 10 Sept 18 ½ day Costs payable pursuant to Rule 5(2) $ 1,350.00 $ 1,350.00 Questioning of Ms.

Nickerson by Ms.

Mittelstadt 26 Jun 20 ½ day Costs payable pursuant to Rule 5(2) $ 1,350.00 $ 1,350.00 CONTESTED APPLICATIONS Costs payable pursuant to Rule 7(1): 12 Nov 14 $ 1,350.00 $ - Costs payable pursuant to Rule 7(1): 12 Feb 15 $ 1,350.00 $ - Costs payable pursuant to Rule 7(1): 12 Dec 16 $ 1,350.00 $ - Costs payable pursuant to Rule 7(1): 08 Feb 17 $ 1,350.00 $ - Costs payable pursuant to Rule 8(1)(a): 24 Apr 17 $ 2,025.00 $ - Costs payable pursuant to Rule 7(1): 18 Aug 17 $ 1,350.00 $ 450.00 Costs payable pursuant to Rule 7(1): 13 Jul 18 $ 1,350.00 $ - TRIAL READINESS Pre-Trial Conference: 13 Dec 18 Costs Payable pursuant to Rule 9(1) $ 800.00 $ - Case Management Costs Payable pursuant to Rule 9(1): 21 Jan 20 $ 800.00 $ - Costs Payable pursuant to Rule 9(1): 02 Feb 22 $ 800.00 $ - Costs Payable pursuant to Rule 9(1): 28 Apr 22 $ 800.00 $ - TRIAL AND

SUMMARY TRIAL Preparation for Trial Costs Payable pursuant to Rule 10(1) $ 8,100.00 $ 2,700.00 First Half Day of Trial $ 2,025.00 $ - 25 Additional 1/2 Days ($1200 *25) $ 30,000.00 $ 7,200.00 Written Argument pursuant to Rule 12 $ 4,050.00 $ 1,350.00 TOTAL $ 72,350.00 $ 15,300.00