Parmar v Parmar, 2024 ABKB 6

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Parmar v Parmar, 2024 ABKB 6 Date: 20240104 Docket: 4803 179672 Registry: Edmonton Between: Linnette Tammie Parmar Plaintiff - and - Sarabjit Singh Parmar Defendant _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Justice G.S. Dunlop _______________________________________________________ 1. Introduction [ 1 ] Linnette and Sarabjit Parmar were married and commenced cohabitation in August 1992. They separated in January 2013 and were divorced in July 2014.

They have two children together who are now adults, Chava Parmar born in December 1997 and Aliya Parmar born in October 2000. The plaintiff has remarried and now goes by Linnette Peeters. I use her current name in these reasons. [ 2 ] The parties seek a division of family property. They agree on the value of their home in Wetaskiwin and the proceeds of the

sale of their Arizona property. The valuation of other assets is in issue. However, they agree that the values of their bank accounts, investment accounts and debts as of the date of their divorce provide a useful benchmark, because they have each dealt with their joint accounts and opened new accounts in their sole names since their divorce.

Given the general absence of evidence regarding the financial assets the parties own now that can be traced to what they owned at the time of their divorce, I agree that basing a property valuation on the values of financial assets each party had control of at the time of the divorce is the only way to arrive at a just and equitable property distribution. There is one exception, being a GIC owned by the parties through a corporation at the time of their divorce for which a current valuation is in evidence. [ 3 ] Ms.

Peeters also claims arrears of child support. [ 4 ] The parties had four corporations and dozens of bank accounts and investment accounts. They put incomplete records into evidence including hundreds of pages to which no reference was made during testimony or argument, leaving me to sift through the morass searching for evidence to make the findings necessary for a division of family property. A list of the parties’ accounts cross- referenced to the

section number of these reasons where each account is addressed is attached as an appendix to these reasons. [ 5 ] References in square brackets in these reasons are mostly to production numbers in the lower right corner of the pages of Exhibit 4. Those production numbers start with “SParmar”. There are also a few references in square brackets to other exhibits and to page numbers of Exhibit 1. 2. Pleadings [ 6 ] Ms. Peeters filed a statement of claim for divorce on May 10, 2013 which included a claim for child support pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines and a division of matrimonial property. Mr.

Parmar was noted in default on July 14, 2014. Divorce was severed from corollary relief on May 6, 2014 and a divorce was granted on July 22, 2014, with no corollary relief. [ 7 ] Mr. Parmar filed a statement of defence as to the division of matrimonial property on May 13, 2016. On January 12, 2021 Kiss, J granted a procedural order which included a provision that each party would notify the other of any amendments they propose to the pleadings within one week and that Mr. Parmar file any amended Statement of Defence within two weeks. On January 26, 2021 Mr.

Parmar filed a counterclaim for division of matrimonial property which includes a claim for occupation rent. [ 8 ] Mr. Parmar has not filed a pleading disputing Ms. Peeters’ claim for child support. 3. Wetaskiwin home [ 9 ] The parties agree that their former family home in Wetaskiwin, where Ms. Peeters and her current husband live, has a current value of $395,000. Although Ms. Peeters testified that she made improvements to the home after July 22, 2014, I have no evidence of the extent to which those improvements increased the value of the Wetaskiwin home.

Both parties in their closing submissions used the value of $395,000 for that home for property division purposes. 4. Arizona home [SParmar 311- 314] [ 10 ] At the time of separation in January 2013 the parties were in the process of acquiring a home in Arizona. They purchased it for $195,000 in US funds by agreement reached with the vendor in December 2012 and took possession on January 6, 2013. Ms. Peeters testified that she does not know where the money for the purchase came from. Mr.

Parmar testified that much of the money for the purchase of the Arizona home came from Parmar Holdings Ltd. (defined later in these reasons as “Holdco”).The Arizona home was sold in March 2014 for $327,172.97 in US funds, part of which was held by the United States Internal Revenue Service until March 2015. The total proceeds from the sale of the Arizona home were deposited into an Investors Group account with a total value of $365,000 in Canadian funds. Both parties used that figure in their closing submissions and attributed it to Ms. Peeters because those funds are in an Investors Group account in her name. 5.

Vehicles [ 11 ] The parties each own a Mercedes vehicle. They agree that Ms. Peeters’ Mercedes 350 Diesel is worth $500. Ms. Peeters submits that Mr. Parmar’s 2000 or 2001 Mercedes is worth $8,000 based on the value attributed to that vehicle on a TD Canada Trust document dated March 28, 2017 entitled “Your Personal Assessment” [SParmar 295]. However, I also have Mr. Parmar’s April 8, 2019 statement of income assets and liabilities in which he values his Mercedes at $2,750 [SParmar 435] and an appraisal dated January 19, 2021from LA Mazda setting the value of Mr. Parmar’s Mercedes at $500 [SParmar 80].

I accept the most recent valuation and find Mr. Parmar’s Mercedes vehicle is worth $500. [ 12 ] At the time of the divorce Ms. Peeters owned a 2013 or 2014 Audi vehicle. She transferred it to Newco (as defined in the next

section of these reasons), with an assigned value of $30,000. Both parties used $30,000 as the value of the Audi in their closing submissions. 6. Corporations [ 13 ] Mr. Parmar had a corporation, Parmar Holdings Ltd. before he married Ms. Peeters. When they married in August 1992, he

transferred 50% of the shares to Ms. Peeters. They remained 50/50 shareholders in Parmar Holdings until it was struck from the corporate registry sometime before February 2017. In these reasons I refer to Parmar Holdings as Holdco. [ 14 ] On June 23, 2017 Mr. Parmar incorporated Parmar Management Consultant Ltd. He has always been the sole director and shareholder of that corporation. In these reasons I refer to that corporation as Manageco. [ 15 ] In 1998 the parties incorporated Peace Hills Real Estate and Developments Ltd. They were 50/50 shareholders. Ms.

Peeters conducted her real estate business through that corporation. Mr. Parmar did the books. This corporation was dissolved in September 2016. In these reasons I refer to Peace Hills Real Estate and Developments Ltd. as Oldco. [ 16 ] On March 12, 2014 Ms. Peeters incorporated Peace Hills Realty Estates Inc. She has always been the sole director and shareholder. She moved her real estate business into that corporation. Mr. Parmar had no involvement in Peace Hills Realty Estates.

In these reasons I refer to Peace Hills Realty Estates as Newco. [ 17 ] Holdco and Oldco were matrimonial property, the value of which was reduced to zero after the parties separated. Mr. Parmar transferred funds from Holdco and Ms. Peeters transferred funds from both Holdco and Oldco. 6.1. Holdco [SParmar 321 – 340, 1461] [ 18 ] Holdco had RBC bank accounts #9615 (US and Canadian) in its own name from which Mr. Parmar transferred $118,935.32 to RBC Direct Investing Account #8318 in February 2017 [SParmar 1474]. Account #8318 was a joint account held by Mr. Parmar and Ms. Peeters. Mr.

Parmar reduced the balance in account #8318 to nil in February 2017. The transfers reducing account #8318 to nil are accounted for under the heading of account #8318 below. [ 19 ] Bank and investment account statements for Holdco (RBC #7947, 1079, and 3469) are in evidence but they all pre-date the purchase of the Arizona property. Given Ms. Peeters’ evidence that she does not know where the funds came from to purchase the Arizona property and Mr. Parmar’s evidence that much of the purchase price came from Holdco, I am not prepared to infer, as Ms. Peeters invites me, that Mr.

Parmar took additional funds from Holdco, beyond what he admits to taking in his flowchart [SParmar 1474]. Similarly, I am not prepared to infer, as Mr. Parmar invites me, that the funds in RBC accounts #7947, 1079 and 3469 as of October 2012 should be attributed to Ms. Peeters. [ 20 ] Ms. Peeters withdrew $5,056.27 from Manulife account #7812 on June 26, 2013. She submitted in closing argument that this was Holdco’s account. At the same time (June 2013) both parties withdrew funds from Oldco’s accounts. As I will explain in the next

section of these reasons, I find that the withdrawals from corporate accounts in 2013 went to living expenses and consequently were no longer family assets by the time the parties divorced. [ 21 ] Holdco’s financial statements for the years ending March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2014 indicate that Holdco had long term investments totalling $174,152 on March 31, 2013 but no long-term investments at all on March 31, 2014. Ms. Peeters invites me to infer that Mr. Parmar transferred to himself the value of Holdco’s long-term investments (less payment of a few expenses).

I am not prepared to draw that inference for several reasons. First, there is no direct evidence of what happened to Holdco’s long-term investments after March 31, 2013. Second, both parties were shareholders and directors and had equal ability to deal with Holdco’s assets. Third, the accountant who prepared Holdco’s March 31, 2014 financial statements is the same accountant who prepared Oldco’s financial statements and Mr. Parmar later reported that accountant to the accountant’s governing body which resulted in a sanction against that accountant.

The accountant did not testify in this trial. [ 22 ] One asset of Holdco continues to exist: a GIC with a December 17, 2023 maturity value of $25,057.62 [SParmar 1455]. Mr. Parmar acknowledged in closing argument that this asset is family property in his possession, and he requested an order that it be released to him. [ 23 ] Ms. Peeters testified in cross-examination that she received a tax refund in the amount of $2,800 payable to Holdco in 2017 and used those funds to pay her legal fees. The tax refund is family property in Ms. Peeters’ hands. 6.2.

Oldco [SParmar 341 – 388] & Exhibit 9 [ 24 ] Oldco’s financial statements are in evidence for the years ending December 31, 2013, December 31, 2014, December 31, 2015 and September 7, 2016. Ms. Peeters was questioned on these financial statements, but she was unable to answer any questions about dividends and other amounts shown on them. She testified that her accountant prepared the financial statements. The accountant did not testify in this trial. Ms. Peeters testified that some of the agent commissions shown as expenses were paid to her.

She did not know whether any of the management salaries were paid to her. [ 25 ] The general ledger for the shareholders’ loan account is in evidence covering the period January 1, 2013 – January 1, 2016, from which it appears that the shareholders (Mr. Parmar and Ms. Peeters) used funds from Oldco to pay their personal expenses resulting in them always owing Oldco money. It also appears from the general ledger that from time to time personal funds, such as child tax credits would be paid to Oldco, thus reducing the amount of the shareholders’ loan.

There is no direct evidence what portion of the shareholders’ loan each party owed. [ 26 ] In June 2013 each of the parties withdrew funds from Oldco’s accounts. On June 10, 2013 Mr. Parmar withdrew $20,843.26 from Oldco’s RBC account #9459 and Ms. Peeters transferred $30,264.47 from RBC #9459 to her personal account RBC #3504. On June 26, 2013 Ms. Peeters withdrew $5,056.27 from Manulife account #7823, which was owned by Oldco. There is insufficient evidence to trace those withdrawals, but given the parties’ recent separation, with Ms. Peeters trying to move her business to Newco and Mr.

Parmar depressed and not working, I find that the funds withdrawn from Oldco in 2013 were spent on living expenses for the two parents and their two children, and consequently those withdrawals are not available for or relevant to property division. While Ms. Peeters

withdrew more from Holdco and Oldco in 2013 than Mr. Parmar did, she also had primary care of the children and consequently more expenses. [ 27 ] There are a few bank statements in evidence covering the period June – September 2013 for an Oldco account with RBC #4407. The statements show deposits and withdrawals often in identical amounts. The statements provide no evidence regarding the source of the deposits or recipients of the withdrawals. Even if the withdrawals went to Ms. Peeters or Mr.

Parmar, I conclude that those funds went to living expenses and are therefore not relevant to property division. [ 28 ] According to its financial statements Oldco had no revenue in 2015 or 2016. I conclude from this that by December 31, 2014 Ms. Peeters was conducting her real estate business entirely out of Newco. Based on the financial statements, on December 31, 2014 Oldco had cash of $72,460 with payables (excluding dividends) totalling $19,443, so net free cash of $53,017. [ 29 ] The financial statements show expenses in 2015 totalling $3,552.

For the partial year ending September 7, 2016 the financial statements show expenses of $25,610. The largest expense in 2016 was directors’ fees of $22,778. Oldco’s financial statements for previous years did not show an expense called directors fees. I find that the directors fee expense was manufactured to reduce retained earnings to nil in 2016. Based on the evidence that Mr. Parmar had no involvement in Oldco at this point, I conclude that the directors fee of $22,778 was paid to Ms.

Peeters and is family property subject to division in this action. [ 30 ] The general ledger shows large entries around the December 31, 2014 year end which reduced the shareholders’ loan payable as of January 1, 2015 to $2,663.73. There are numerous additions and subtractions from the shareholders’ loan account in 2015, resulting in the closing balance on December 31, 2015 being $76,096.55. The largest entries in 2015 are described as “Cash, Personal Transactions” on February 28, 2015 in the amount of $20,633.82 and “Cash, ASI Mutual Funds” on March 3, 2015 in the amount of $45,000. [ 31 ] Mr.

Parmar had no involvement with Oldco in 2015. I conclude that the increase in the shareholders’ loan account from $2,663.73 to $76,096.55 in 2015 was entirely the result of payments to Ms. Peeters or for her personal benefit, in the net amount of $73,432.82. This is family property in Ms. Peeters’ hands and subject to division in this action. [ 32 ] There was no change in the shareholders’ loan account in 2016. [ 33 ] Ms. Peeters’ 2013 income tax return records a dividend of $56,250 from Oldco [SParmar 556] but Oldco’s 2013 financial statements show no dividends declared in 2013.

For 2014 Oldco’s financial statements show dividends of $44,000 which, based on the general ledger, may have been entirely payable to Ms. Peeters to reduce the shareholders’ loan account, but Ms. Peeters’ 2014 tax return [SParmar 572] shows only small dividends from her RBC accounts and none from Oldco. There is also a dividend of $67,650 shown on Oldco’s 2015 financial statements. This corresponds to a general ledger entry dated January 1, 2016 described as “To clear Sarabjit SHL YE adj” and a T5 issued to Mr. Parmar for a dividend of $67,650 in 2016. I doubt Mr.

Parmar received any funds from Oldco in 2015 or 2016. It appears to me that dividends were recorded in Oldco’s records to reduce the shareholders’ loan account, which from January 1, 2015 on were the result of amounts paid to Ms. Peeters or for her benefit. Furthermore, I note that in 2018 the Canada Revenue Agency acknowledged that the T5 had been issued to Mr. Parmar in error and adjusted his taxable income for 2016 accordingly [SParmar 448 – 457]. [ 34 ] While Mr. Parmar submits I should attribute all of the dividends described above to Ms.

Peeters, I find that it would be unfair to do so because, on the evidence before me, the dividends were recorded to reduce the shareholders’ loans and the shareholders’ loan account in the general ledger is a better basis for calculating the amounts taken by Ms. Peeters from Oldco. It would be double counting to include both the shareholders’ loans and the dividends. [ 35 ] The big picture is that Oldco was an operating business both parties built and owned together, through which Ms. Peeters conducted her real estate brokerage. It had positive shareholders’ equity. In 2014 Ms.

Peeters created a new corporation, Newco, with a nearly identical name and continued her business through Newco operating out of the same premises, the former matrimonial home in Wetaskiwin. Both parties drew funds from Oldco for their living expenses in 2013, but in 2015 and 2016 Ms. Peeters completely drained Oldco of all its free cash. Ms. Peeters’ withdrawals from Oldco in 2015 and 2016 are family property subject to division in this action. 6.3. Manageco and Newco [ 36 ] The parties agree that Manageco and Newco are not family property subject to division in this action. 7. Bank Accounts 7.1.

TD chequing account #9028 [SParmar 81 – 91] [ 37 ] This is one of several bank accounts Mr. Parmar opened after the divorce. He submits that no value should be attributed to this account because, while he transferred family property into this account, he also transferred it out again. I accept his testimony, supported by his flow chart [SParmar 1474] that approximately $144,500 which originated in Holdco’s RBC US and Canadian accounts #9615 flowed into and out of this TD account #9028 in 2017. That amount is accounted for in RBC account #8318, discussed below. However, Mr.

Parmar has not provided evidence regarding the other sources of funds in this account. For example, when Mr. Parmar opened this account in January 2016, he made initial deposits totalling $116,951.96 [SParmar 1103]. I have no evidence regarding the source of those funds. Given Mr. Parmar’s failure to provide evidence on this point, I accept Ms. Peeters’ position that the balance in this account on December 27, 2018 of $63,734.01 should be attributed to Mr. Parmar as family property subject to division. 7.2. ATB account #0600 [SParmar 92]

[ 38 ] There is one statement for this account in evidence [SParmar 92] showing small balances in 2019. Neither party submits that I should attribute any value to this account. 7.3. RBC account #6952 [SParmar 93] [ 39 ] Neither party submits that I should attribute any value to this account. 7.4. RBC USD account #8321 [SParmar 94 – 194] [ 40 ] This was a joint chequing account. Based on the statements in evidence it appears that the account was depleted from a balance of $1,301.19 on December 19, 2013 to zero on September 13, 2017 through bank charges and a transfer of $392.24 on September 12, 2017.

There is no evidence who received the transfer. Neither party submits that I should attribute any value to this account. 7.5. RBC account #3504 [SParmar 195 – 206] [ 41 ] This account is in Ms. Peeters’ name. She testified that she opened this account in April 2013, shortly after the parties separated. From the statements in evidence, covering the period April 18, 2016 to October 18, 2016, it appears that child tax benefits were deposited to this account. According to Ms. Peeters’ testimony all other deposits to this account came from Oldco.

The balance in this account in the period for which statements are in evidence ranged from a high of $11,326 on August 2, 2016 to a low of $640.06 on August 12, 2016. Ms. Peeters submits I should apply of value of $686.51 to this account in her hands being the balance on April 18, 2016. Mr. Parmar submits I should attribute no value to it. The statement with the date closest to the date of the divorce shows a balance of $686.51 as of April 18, 2016. I find that was the value of this account on the date of the divorce and that amount is family property in Ms. Peeters’ hands. 7.6.

RBC account #7456 [SParmar 207 – 213] [ 42 ] There are statements in evidence for this account covering the period June 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016, with balances ranging from $14,930.98 to $100,331.94. The statements do not indicate who owned this account. Neither party submitted that this account should be subject to property division. 7.7. Alliance Bank USD #7441 [SParmar 214 – 225] [ 43 ] The parties agree that this account was used to purchase the Arizona property. The statements show the account to be in Ms. Peeters’ name. Both parties agree it should be retained by Ms. Peeters in this property division.

Ms. Peeters suggests a value of $5,405.77 being the balance as of February 29, 2016. Mr. Parmar suggests a value of $5,407.00 being the balance at various times in 2016. I value this asset at $5,407.00. There is no evidence of the exchange rate at the time, so I find this account had that value in Canadian funds. 7.8. RBC New Sole USD #0567 [SParmar 226 – 231] [ 44 ] The account statements in evidence show balances between $39,238.64 and $39,423.12 between July 1, 2016 and December 1, 2016. The statements do not indicate who owned the account, but Ms.

Peeters testified that this was her account and that it held $35,000 that was proceeds from the sale of the Arizona property which was held by the IRS for a year following the sale. Mr. Parmar testified he did not recognize this account. Ms. Peeters testified that $35,000 of the funds from this account were transferred into the Investors Group account which holds the proceeds of the sale of the Arizona home. Curiously Ms. Peeters proposes that this RBC account #0567 be valued at $39,403.25, being the balance as of July 4, 2016 and that it be included in the property division as an asset in her hands. Mr.

Parmar does not propose that this account be included in the property division. I find that most of this account was transferred into the Investors Group account which holds the funds being recognized as the proceeds of the sale of the Arizona property and that the balance was not in existence at the time of the divorce so is not subject to division in this action. 7.9. RBC account #6661 [SParmar 234 – 236, and 1474] [ 45 ] Neither party submitted that this account should be subject to a property division order. Mr. Parmar testified that he moved funds through this account to and from other accounts. 7.10.

ATB account #6166 [SParmar 92] [ 46 ] Neither party referred to this account in their property statements submitted as part of their closing statements. I conclude that they agree it is not property subject to division. 7.11. RBC #0483, #3846, & #9998 [Exhibit 9] [ 47 ] Mr. Parmar asserts that Ms. Peeters closed these accounts in June 2013 and transferred the funds into new RBC accounts.

As these closed accounts (#0483, #3846 and #9998) were not assets as of the date of divorce, there is no matrimonial property to divide with respect to these accounts, except what is including in the new RBC accounts, addressed elsewhere in these reasons.

7.12. Manulife Advantage #6033 [SParmar 377 – 379] [ 48 ] On June 26, 2013 Ms. Peeters closed this joint account, receiving a cheque in the amount of $10,696.29. She testified that she deposited those funds into her RBC TFSA #0759, which is addressed below. 7.13. TD account #8317 [SParmar 83] [ 49 ] Mr. Parmar opened this account in December 2018 with a deposit of $50,000. As of April 8, 2019 the balance was $38,113.47. Mr. Parmar did not testify as to the source of the funds in this account. Ms. Peeters submits that $38,113.47 should be attributed to Mr. Parmar as family property for division. Mr.

Parmar’s failure to explain the source of these funds is troubling. However, because the account was opened more than four years after the divorce, I find that this is not family property subject to division. 8. Investments 8.1. RBC LIRA #5314 [SParmar 237 – 245] [ 50 ] The parties agree that this is an asset held by Mr. Parmar which is subject to property division. They agree that the Canadian Dollar portion of the account has a value of $26,678.81. There is a small disagreement regarding the US dollar potion of the account, with Mr. Parmar valuing it at $4,053.51 and Ms. Peeters valuing it at $3,943.51.

I accept Mr. Parmar’s valuation because he controls this account. I find the total value of this asset to be $30,732.32. 8.2. Olympia Trust RRSP #3205 [SParmar 246 – 258] [ 51 ] Mr. Parmar submits this is his asset which should be valued at $249,148, being the sum of the three deposits he made into this account from family property. This is supported by the statement in evidence which shows an opening balance of zero on January 1, 2017, following which assets are transferred into this account. The three deposits which Mr.

Parmar acknowledges are family property are a transfer from RBC account #8787 on February 16, 2017 in the amount of $158,159.73, a transfer from the same RBC account on February 24, 2017 in the amount of $55,037.22 and a transfer from a Manulife Securities account on March 12, 2019 in the amount of $35,951.31. [ 52 ] Mr. Parmar testified that $35,951.31 transferred into this account on March 12, 2019 came from a Manulife account which pre-existed the parties’ separation and the property statement provided by Mr. Parmar’s counsel in closing argument suggests that the transfer came from Manulife #20000526.

The only statement for Manulife #20000526 in evidence states that it is Ms. Peeters’ account. [ 53 ] Ms. Peeters submits Olympia Trust #3205 should be valued at zero because the funds are accounted for in other accounts prior to being transferred into Olympia Trust, with the exception of $55,037.22 which was transferred in on February 24, 2017. [ 54 ] The balance in Olympia Trust #3205 was $325,152.90 as of December 2021. [ 55 ] The evidence regarding this account is irreconcilable. I accept Mr. Parmar’s evidence that this is his asset and that it includes what was in Ms. Peeters’ Manulife account #20000526.

I also accept Mr. Parmar’s value for this asset in his hands of $249,148. 8.3. TD RRSP #6935 [SParmar 259 and 295] [ 56 ] Mr. Parmar gave conflicting testimony about this account. In direct examination he testified that he set up this account after he and Ms. Peeters separated or divorced and that it contained no funds from prior to their separation or divorce. On cross-examination he testified that he was not sure about this. I find that it is family property subject to division. It had a value of $23,931.19 on March 28, 2017 and $28,276.33 on April 5, 2019.

I find the value of $23,931.19 is subject to property division because that value is closer to the date of the divorce. 8.4. Great West Life RPP #9123 [SParmar 260 – 264] [ 57 ] Mr. Parmar testified that he started earning this pension after the parties divorced. He submits that it is therefore not subject to division in this action. I accept his evidence on this point and I agree this should not be subject to division in this action. 8.5. Manulife RRSP #501CS [SParmar 265 – 266] [ 58 ] The parties agree that this RRSP held by Ms. Peeters is subject to division and that its value is $33,272.30. 8.6.

Manulife RRSP #20000526 [SParmar 267 and 1410] [ 59 ] Ms. Peeters’ testimony about this RRSP was unclear. She appeared to suggest that it is the same account as #501CS, but the statements in evidence show different account numbers and different holdings in the accounts. In the matrimonial property statement provided by her counsel in closing argument, Ms. Peeters describes this as Mr. Parmar’s property with a value of $35,951.51, which is the amount transferred into Mr. Parmar’s Olympia Trust RRSP #3205 in March 2019.

[ 60 ] Based on the limited evidence before me, I conclude that the entirety of Ms. Peeters’ Manulife RRSP #20000526 was transferred into Mr. Parmar’s Olympia Trust RRSP #3205 in March 2019. Consequently, although the only statement in evidence for the Manulife RRSP #20000526 shows a value of $31,670.29 as of January 3, 2017, I conclude that the entire value of this account was transferred into Olympia Trust #3205 and is accounted for under that heading. 8.7. Olympia Trust TFSA #7406 [SParmar 268 – 271] [ 61 ] Mr.

Parmar provided confusing testimony accompanied by a nearly impenetrable flow chart [SParmar 1474] regarding the flow of funds among his accounts. Nevertheless, I accept his testimony that the source of funds in this account, which he opened in June 2017, was not family property subject to division in this action. 8.8. RBC Direct Investing #8318 [SParmar 272 – 289] [ 62 ] The parties agree that although this was a joint account, Mr. Parmar controlled it.

He transferred funds from Holdco’s RBC accounts # 9615 (US and Canadian dollars) into #8318 and he transferred funds out of #8318 to his personal RBC account #6661. Ms. Peeters submits that the amounts transferred by Mr. Parmar from #8318 in February 2017, totalling $144,582.26 should be subject to property division as property held by Mr. Parmar. Mr. Parmar submits that only $24,582.26 should be treated as property in his hands under the heading of this account and the other $120,000 should be addressed elsewhere. I prefer Ms. Peeters’ position as the simpler approach. 8.9.

RBC Direct Investing RRSP #8787 [SParmar 290 – 294] [ 63 ] In February 2017 all of the investments in this account were converted to cash and the cash was transferred to Olympia Trust RRSP #3205. Mr. Parmar submits that no value should be attributed to this RBC account #8787 and that the division of this property should be done under the heading of the Olympia Trust RRSP #3205. I agree. The value of RBC #8787 is accounted for under the heading of Olympia Trust #3205. 8.10. Manulife TFSA #5381 [SParmar 296] [ 64 ] Ms. Peeters testified that the funds from this TFSA were transferred to her RBC TFSA. Mr.

Parmar submitted that no value should be attributed to this asset under the Manulife TFSA heading. I agree. 8.11. RBC Direct Investing #9415 [SParmar 297 – 302] [ 65 ] This was a joint account which Mr. Parmar controlled. Mr. Parmar’s counsel submitted that Mr. Parmar testified that this was an account for the benefit of one of his children. That is not how I understood Mr. Parmar’s testimony about this account.

I understood his testimony about accounts of his children to relate to RBC Direct Investing #6857, which I address later in these reasons. [ 66 ] RBC #9415 was reduced to zero through transfers out up to September 2018. I accept Ms. Peeters’ submission that the value of this account as of August 31, 2017 should be attributed to Mr. Parmar as property subject to division. The value as of that date was $11,130.06 in Canadian funds. There is also a statement for account #9415 in US funds showing balances as of June 29 and September 28, 2018.

The evidence does not establish whether this account had any balance in US funds as of August 31, 2017. Consequently, I find the value of this asset in Mr. Parmar’s hands to be $11,130.06, being the value in evidence closest to the date of the divorce. [ 67 ] This account shows up three times on the matrimonial property statement submitted by Ms. Peeters’ counsel during closing submissions: first on page 2 as #5294-1-5; then on page 4 as #9415 USD; and lastly on page 8 as #9415. There is only one account, and it should only be included once in the division of family property. 8.12.

CIBC RRSP #8690 [SParmar 303 - 306] [ 68 ] Neither party submitted that this RRSP held by Ms. Peeters is subject to property division in this action. 8.13. ATB Portfolio (account numbers illegible) [SParmar 307 – 310] [ 69 ] Neither party submitted that this investment account held by Ms. Peeters is subject to property division in this action. 8.14. RBC TFSA #0759 [SParmar 1475 – 1476] [ 70 ] Ms. Peeters set up this account in her name and transferred funds into this RBC account from the Manulife Advantage account #6033. Both parties agree that the current balance of this TFSA is family property.

The most recent balance in evidence is $25,623.20 as of December 31, 2013. 8.15. RBC RRSP #8788 [SParmar 1459 – 1461] [ 71 ] Ms. Peeters testified that this is her account. Both parties agree that it is subject to division in this action. The value as of two dates is in evidence: June 15, 2012, 25 months before the divorce and November 22, 2016, 28 months after the divorce. The earlier

valuation is closer to the date of the divorce. That value is $41,595 in Canadian funds and $11,193 in US funds. In the absence of any evidence of the exchange rate in June 2012, I find the total value of this asset in Ms. Peeters’ hands is $52,788. 8.16. TD #9F4A and MM9A [SParmar 295 and 1474] [ 72 ] I accept Mr. Parmar’s evidence, supported by his flow chart, that the only family property to flow into TD #9F4A was $150,000 transferred from TD #9028 on March 16, 2017, and that the only family property he transferred into TD #9028 was $144,582.26 transferred from RBC #8318 through RBC #6661.

That amount ($144,582.26) is accounted for by attributing it to Mr. Parmar under the heading of RBC #8318. It would be double-counting to attribute an additional $150,000 to Mr. Parmar under the heading of TD #9F4A. [ 73 ] For the same reason nothing should be attributed to Mr. Parmar under the heading of TD #MM9A, to which Mr. Parmar transferred $61,428.97 from TD #9F4A. I note that neither party submitted that TD #MM9A is subject to property division. 8.17. Manulife # 40000526 [SParmar 1413] [ 74 ] The parties agree that this is an asset in Mr. Parmar’s hands subject to division and valued at $7,634.78. 8.18.

RBC Direct Investing #6857 [SParmar 1461] [ 75 ] This account appears on an RBC

summary dated June 12, 2012, with a value of $12,683 in Canadian Funds and $4,815 in US funds. The statement does not indicate who owns this account. Ms. Peeters testified this was not her account. Mr. Parmar testified that the account belonged to one of their children. Given the uncertainty regarding who owns this account, I find it is not family property subject to division in this action. 9. Accounts listed on TD personal assessment [SParmar 295] [ 76 ] Ms. Peeters submits that values for investments listed on a TD Canada Trust document dated March 28, 2017 should be added as property in Mr.

Parmar’s hands subject to division in this action. I disagree. The document has round figures for all assets not held in TD accounts, for example, $240,000 for a “royal action direct” RSP/RIF. These appear to be figures Mr. Parmar provided to TD. I doubt they are accurate and I find they overlap other parts of these reasons dealing with specific investments based on statements from the financial institutions holding the investments. 10. RESPs [SParmar 315 – 320] [ 77 ] The RESPs are not subject to property division in this action: VLG v WAJ , 2020 ABQB 105 at para 34 – 41 . 11. Other Assets 11.1.

Pearls [ 78 ] Mr. Parmar testified that there were 50 strings of pearls in the Wetaskiwin home when he left which have not been returned to him. Ms. Peeters testified that all of the jewelry was in a jewelry box in the basement or in a safety deposit box and it was all given to Mr. Parmar in July 2013. She did not say she gave it to him or how it was given to him. She was not asked about stings of pearls specifically. She testified that presently the only jewelry she has is costume jewelry and her wedding ring. [ 79 ] Ms.

Peeters testified that she took some things from the safety deposit box: her belongings that her parents had given her, little necklaces and other things other people had provided to her. She also testified that Mr. Parmar had access to their safety deposit box. [ 80 ] Mr. Parmar was not questioned in direct or cross about whether he was given any jewelry in July 2013 nor about whether he had access to a safety deposit box nor whether he retrieved anything from the safety deposit box. [ 81 ] Mr. Parmar testified that he was excluded from the family home by court orders from January 2013 on.

However, he was allowed to return in April 2013 to retrieve his belongings. He did not explain why he did not retrieve the stings of pearls at that time. [ 82 ] In May 2018 Mr. Parmar emailed Ms. Peeters requesting the return of his Indian passport, his Indian degrees and his family photos [SParmar 444]. He did not request the return of the pearls in that email. [ 83 ] In June 2021 Mr. Parmar asked his daughter Aliya to make a video of the interior of the Wetaskiwin home. The video was played during the trial. It is Exhibit 8.

There are no pearls visible in the video, though the video shows many boxes which are not opened during the video. [ 84 ] On that evidence, I am not satisfied that the pearls have been retained by Ms. Peeters. At the same time, I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Mr. Parmar has the pearls. Given the scant evidence on this issue, I find that there are no pearls to divide as family property.

11.2. Household goods and other contents [ 85 ] Mr. Parmar submits that jewelry, a dollar bill collection and miscellaneous furniture, crockery and décor should be divided in kind. I find that none of this has any significant value and consequently each party should keep whatever of that they have, with no value attributed to it. However, there are some things that have value to Mr. Parmar, specifically his Indian passport, his parents’ passports and his Indian certificates and degrees. I order Ms. Peeters to return those things to Mr. Parmar. 12. Liabilities [ 86 ] Ms.

Peeters listed but did not deduct two credit card debts in the property statement her counsel provided in closing argument. It is unclear what her position is on this point. The two debts listed but not deducted are $652.95 owing on Walmart Mastercard #9890 and $12,324.58 owing on a RBC Visa. Mr. Parmar in his property statement includes the Walmart Mastercard debt in the same amount and an RBC Visa in a different amount, being $8,689. He also includes a debt to Amex #1005 in the amount of $3,351. The total amount credited to Ms. Peeters in Mr. Parmar’s property statement is $12,692.95. I accept Mr.

Parmar’s submission on this point. 13. Equalization Payment [ 87 ] Ms. Peeters shall pay Mr. Parmar an equalization payment of $219,072.32, calculated as follows:

Section of these reasons Description Ms. Peeters Mr.

Parmar 3 Wetaskiwin home $395,000.00 4 Arizona home proceeds $365,000.00 5 Mercedes 350 Diesel $500.00 5 2000 Mercedes $500.00 5 Audi $30,000.00 6.1 Holdco GIC $25,057.62 6.1 Holdco tax refund $2,800.00 6.2 Oldco directors’ fees 2016 $22,778.00 6.2 Oldco shareholders’ loan 2015 $73,432.82 7.1 TD chequing #9028 $63,734.01 7.5 RBC account #3504 $686.51 7.7 Alliance Bank USD #7441 $5,407.00 8.1 RBC LIRA #5314 $30,732.32 8.2 Olympia Trust RRSP #3205 $249,148.00 8.3 TD RRSP #6935 $23,931.19 8.5 Manulife RRSP #501CS $33,272.30 8.8 RBC Direct Investing #8318 $144,582.26 8.11 RBC Direct Investing #9415 $11,130.06 8.14 RBC TFSA #0759 $25,623.20 8.15 RBC RRSP #8788 $52,788.00 8.17 Manulife #40000526 $7,634.78 Total assets $1,007,287.83 $556,450.24 12 Credit card liabilities -$12,692.95 Net assets $994,594.88 $556,450.24 Equalization -$219,072.32 $219,072.32 Totals after equalization $775,522.56 $775,522.56 [ 88 ] Each party shall retain the assets in their column in the table above and as set out in the appendix to these reasons. [ 89 ] For clarity, Mr.

Parmar is free to deal with the RBC GIC account number 00970103469 in the name of “Peace Hills Builders a Div of Parmar Holdings Alberta Ltd.”, which had a maturity value as of December 17, 2023 of $25,057.62. 14. Occupation Rent [ 90 ] Ms. Peeters has had exclusive use of the Wetaskiwin home as her residence and place of business since the parties separated in January 2013. Mr. Parmar seeks occupation rent from Ms. Peeters using the market rents included in the appraisals in evidence. Mr.

Parmar first filed a claim for occupation rent in his January 26, 2021 counterclaim. [ 91 ] It appears from an email exchange between counsel in July 2019 that the parties agreed to list sell the Wetaskiwin home for sale [SParmar 49-50]. I have no evidence what came of that agreement. [ 92 ] The awarding of occupation rent is discretionary and should rarely, if ever be banked and presented in capitalized form years after separation as part of a matrimonial property action: Stojak v Stojak , 2016 ABQB 737 at para 85 , quoting Kazmierczak v

Kazmierczak , 2001 ABQB 610 affirmed 2003 ABCA 227 . [ 93 ] I decline to award occupation rent in this case for the following reasons. First, the claim was not pled until 2021, eight years after the parties separated and six and a half years after Mr. Parmar had been noted in default in Ms. Peeters’ claim which included a claim for division of family property. His statement of defence filed May 13, 2016 did not claim occupation rent. Second, the children Aliya and Chava lived in the Wetaskiwin home most of the time from the parties’ separation until each child ceased to be a child of the marriage.

Third, the equalization payment calculated above can be entirely paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the Arizona property, which suggests that, had the property been divided closer to the time of the divorce the result would be the same is it is today, without any occupation rent being awarded. Fourth, Mr. Parmar’s exclusion from the family home from January 2013 and for several years thereafter was pursuant to court orders which are not subject to review in this action. 15. Child Support [ 94 ] On March 31, 2017 Mah, J granted an interim without prejudice consent child support order that Mr. Parmar pay Ms.

Peeters base child support of $1,304 perm month commencing on April 3, 2017. The order is silent regarding s. 7 expenses. [ 95 ] On August 3, 2021, Richardson, J ordered each party to pay $175 per month in child support directly to their younger child, Aliya, and directed the parties to

schedule a half-day special chambers hearing to determine whether there were any children of the marriage, guideline incomes for each parent, ongoing child support and arrears of child support and special expenses, if any. That order also stayed enforcement of arrears of child support provided Mr. Parmar paid $125 per month to the Maintenance Enforcement Program in satisfaction of any arrears. [ 96 ] On May 24, 2022, Jerke, J granted a consent order staying the enforcement of the child support payable to Ms. Peeters pursuant to the March 31, 2017 order, pending trial of this action.

The May 24, 2022 did not stay payment of $175 per month by each parent directly to Aliya. This order also adjourned sine die a special chambers hearing scheduled for May 18, 2022. [ 97 ] In closing submissions, Ms. Peeters submitted that Chava was no longer a child of the marriage as of April 2020 and Aliya was no longer a child of the marriage as of April 2022. Mr. Parmar took no issue with that in his closing submissions. Based on those submissions I find that Mr. Parmar’s obligation to pay child support for Chava ended on April 30, 2020 and for Aliya ended on April 30, 2022. [ 98 ] In closing submissions Ms.

Peeters submitted that s. 3 child support was overpaid by Mr. Parmar in the amount of $3,300. Her counsel submitted that he did the calculations to arrive that amount going from 2017 forward because child support had been paid prior to the March 31, 2017 by agreement with no order in place. Mr. Parmar’s counsel made no submissions about s. 3 child support. [ 99 ] Ms. Peeters’ counsel submitted that Exhibit 1 contains Ms. Peeters’ calculations of s. 7 expenses for the children.

He further submitted that taking only the amounts for education, extracurricular activities, eye care and dental care he arrived at an amount of approximately $60,000 in s. 7 expenses for both children. The specific amounts Ms. Peeters’ counsel referred to from the

summary pages behind the tab in Exhibit 1 are: Chava University Tuition $6,500.00 Residence / Lister Hall $10,000.00 School 500 X 3yr $1,500.00 Glasses $500.00 Eyecare 120/3mo $2,080.00 Medication 1200/2 yrs $3,600.00 Track & Field $1,200.00 Dental $200.00 Aliya Volleyball, Sports, Equipment 5000/yr $15,000.00 Physiotherapy $500.00 Braces $9,500.00 New Glasses $600.00 Contact Lenses 120x3x4 $1,440.00 Music Lessons $8,000.00 [ 100 ] The total of those amounts is $60,620. Ms. Peeters submits that Mr.

Parmar is liable for half of those expenses, being approximately $30,000, against which his $3,300 overpayment of s. 3 child support may be set-off, leaving an arrears balance of $26,700. [ 101 ] Mr. Parmar submitted that Ms. Peeters has failed to prove that she actually incurred the expenses claimed.

[ 102 ] Ms. Peeters testified that she and her bookkeeper put together the

summary of s. 7 expenses in Exhibit 1 and that she paid those expenses. In addition to the

summary, Ms. Peeters provided 190 pages of supporting cheques (not cancelled cheques), invoices and receipts as part of Exhibit 1. [ 103 ] The documents in Exhibit 1 following the

summary are a repetitive hodgepodge of material in no logical order. The repetition is extreme. Documents numbered 402 – 419 in the lower right-hand corner of the page are duplicated in documents numbered 580 – 597. Documents numbered 420 – 499 are duplicated in documents numbered 500 – 579. Even after putting to one side pages 500 – 579, there remain duplicated documents within pages 402 – 499. For example, a receipt from Wetaskiwin Regional Public Schools for basketball dated January 18, 2013 is included twice as pages 416 and 424. Neither Ms.

Peeters nor her counsel brought the duplicated documents to my attention. I discovered them while preparing these reasons. [ 104 ] An undated spreadsheet is included as page 490. Ms. Peeters did not testify about it, so I give it no weight. [ 105 ] Ignoring the duplicates, the documents introduced by Ms. Peeters in support of her claim for s. 7 expenses, show the following expenses.

Chava University Tuition [p. 493] $75.00 Residence / Lister Hall [pp. 491, 496] $200.00 School [p. 433] $146.00 Glasses [p. 455] $10.00 Eyecare / contact lenses [pp. 450, 451, 454] $430.00 Medication nil Track & Field nil Dental nil Aliya Volleyball, Sports, Equipment $1,952.40 [pp. 416, 420, 419, 415, 427, 486, 495, 498, 481, 469] Physiotherapy nil Braces [p. 449] $8,285.00 New Glasses nil Contact Lenses [pp. 452, 453, 456 – 459] $704.00 Music Lessons $6,567.65 [pp. 413, 418, 425, 426, 435 – 439, 470, 471, 482 – 489] Other (school, camp and university) $1,004.57 [pp. 494, 497, 432, 474, 476, 403, 442, 443] [ 106 ] The total expenses supported by invoices, cancelled cheques or receipts in Exhibit 1 is $19,374.62, far less than the $60,000 Ms.

Peeters seeks to have Mr. Parmar contribute to. [ 107 ] Given Ms. Peeters’ position that child support prior to the first interim order was paid by agreement, I find that there are no arrears of s. 7 child support prior to April 1, 2017. Ms. Peeters has provided supporting documents for the following s. 7 expenses from April 1, 2017 to the present: Chava Eyecare [pp. 450, 451] $284.00 Aliya Contact Lenses [pp. 453, 463] $142.00 Other (school and university) [pp. 403, 42, 443] $172.00 Total $598.00 [ 108 ] Ms. Peeters submitted that the s. 7 expenses should be shared equally by the parties. Mr.

Parmar made no submission on this

[ 108 ] Ms. Peeters submitted that the s. 7 expenses should be shared equally by the parties. Mr. Parmar made no submission on this point. Based on the income tax returns in evidence Mr. Parmar had a larger line 150 income in most but not all years from 2017 – 2020 than Ms. Peeters did but he earned most of his income from employment whereas Ms. Peeters earned her income through Newco. I have no evidence of the benefits Ms. Peeters received from Newco that are not included in her taxable income. In these circumstances I agree with Ms. Peeters’ submission that Mr.

Parmar should pay 50% of the proven s. 7 expenses. [ 109 ] I find that Mr. Parmar owes Ms. Peeters $299 in arrears of s. 7 child support. Given his overpayment of $3,300 in s. 3 child support, Ms. Peeters owes Mr. Parmar a refund of his overpayment in the net amount of $3,001. [ 110 ] Mr. Parmar owes no arrears of child support and he has no ongoing obligation to pay child support. 16. Costs [ 111 ] On June 28, 2022 Kraus, J granted a procedural order which included in paragraph 8 a requirement that the parties submit an agreed-upon exhibit book for filing no later than 15 days prior to the commencement of trial.

They did not do so. [ 112 ] Instead, on the first day of trial, Ms. Peeters’ counsel presented a binder consisting of two sections. The first

section was a selection of pages from Mr. Parmar’s production. The second

section was 4 pages of calculations of Ms. Peeters’ expenses for the Wetaskiwin house and the children, followed by approximately 200 pages of what appeared to be supporting documentation for those expenses. Mr. Parmar’s counsel did not object so that binder became Exhibit 1. As discussed in the previous

section of these reasons the documents in the second

section of Exhibit 1 were disorganized and repetitive and provided support for only a fraction of Ms. Peeters’ claimed s. 7 expenses. [ 113 ] After the lunch break on the first day of trial, Mr. Parmar’s counsel presented two binders consisting of Mr. Parmar’s entire document production, minus a few pages. Ms. Peeters’ counsel did not object, so those two binders became Exhibit 4. [ 114 ] Neither Exhibit 1 nor Exhibit 4 contains a table of contents, an index, or any description of the documents in the binders.

Hundreds of pages of documents were not referred to at all in testimony or argument. [ 115 ] The introduction of a large amount of irrelevant material into evidence is improper. This is particularly so when the parties had been ordered more than a year before trial to submit an agreed-upon exhibit book. [ 116 ] Given that misconduct, each party will bear their own costs of the trial of this action and any costs prior to trial not previously ordered. 17. Conclusion [ 117 ] Ms. Peeters shall pay Mr. Parmar an equalization payment of $219,072.32 and shall deliver to Mr.

Parmar his Indian passport, his parents’ passports and his Indian certificates and degrees. Each party shall retain all other physical property presently in their possession and each shall retain the financial assets as set out in the appendix to these reasons. [ 118 ] Ms. Peeters shall pay Mr. Parmar his overpayment of child support in the amount of $3,001. Aliya and Chava are no longer children of the marriage. Mr. Parmar has no ongoing obligation to pay child support and no arrears. [ 119 ] Each party shall bear their own costs. Heard November 28 – December 1, 2023.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 4 th day of January, 2024. G.S. Dunlop J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Harold Hinz for the Plaintiff

Chudi Onwuaso for the Defendant Appendix institution owner type #

section in reasons to be retained by Alliance Bank Peeters USD 7441 7.7 Peeters ATB Parmar 600 7.2 Parmar ATB Parmar 6166 7.10 Parmar ATB Peeters portfolio illegible 8.13 Peeters CIBC Peeters RRSP 8690 8.12 Peeters Investors Group Peeters USD unknown 4 Peeters Great West Life Parmar RPP 9123 8.4 Parmar Manulife joint 6033 7.12 Peeters Manulife Holdco 7812 6.1 Parmar Manulife Oldco 7823 6.2 Peeters Manulife Peeters RRSP 20000526 8.6 Peeters Manulife Parmar 40000526 8.17 Parmar Manulife Parmar TFSA 5381 8.10 Parmar Manulife Peeters RRSP 501CS 8.5 Peeters Olympia Trust Parmar RRSP 3205 8.2 Parmar Olympia Trust Parmar TFSA 7406 8.7 Parmar RBC joint 0483 7.11 Peeters RBC Peeters 0567 7.8 Peeters RBC Peeters TFSA 0759 8.14 Peeters RBC Holdco 1079 6.1 Parmar RBC Holdco 3469 6.1 Parmar RBC Peeters 3504 7.5 Peeters RBC joint 3846 7.11 Peeters RBC Oldco 4407 6.2 Peeters RBC Parmar LIRA 5314 8.1 Parmar RBC Parmar 6661 7.9 Parmar RBC unknown 6857 8.18 no finding RBC Parmar 6952 7.3 Parmar RBC unknown 7456 7.6 no finding RBC Holdco 7947 6.1 Parmar RBC joint 8318 8.8 Parmar RBC joint 8321 7.4 no finding RBC Parmar RRSP 8787 8.9 Parmar RBC Peeters RRSP 8788 8.15 Peeters RBC joint 9415 8.11 Parmar RBC Oldco 9459 6.2 Peeters RBC Holdco US and Cdn 9615 6.1 Parmar RBC joint US dollar 9998 7.11 Peeters TD Parmar RRSP 6935 8.3 Parmar TD Parmar 8317 7.13 Parmar TD Parmar 9028 7.1 Parmar TD Parmar 9F4A 8.16 Parmar TD Parmar MM9A 8.16 Parmar