R. v. Edwards, 2023 MBKB 111

Date: 20230704 Docket: CR 22-01-39005 (Winnipeg Centre) Indexed as: R. v. Edwards Cited as: 2023 MBKB 111 COURT OF KING’S BENCH OF MANITOBA B E T W E E N: HIS MAJESTY THE KING ) Tim W. Chudy ) Trinda E. de Monye ) for the Crown- and - ) ) ) Andrew J. Synyshynmichael theodorE edwards, ) Myles K. Davis ) for the accusedaccused.) ) ) Judgment Pronounced: ) June 23, 2023 at 10:00 a.m. ) Judgment Delivered: ) July 4, 2023 REMPEL J. Introduction [1] The accused entered a guilty plea to a charge of manslaughter before the Crown closed its case against him at trial, where hestood charged with second-degree murder.

I published reasons in this matter following a voir dire prior to the start of the trial. Iconcluded after the voir dire that a firearm and ammunition that were found in a hotel room occupied by the accused at the time of hisarrest could be admitted into evidence at trial. My reasons on the voir dire can be found at R. v. Edwards, 2022 MBKB 215 . [2] These are my reasons as to the appropriate sentence on the manslaughter charge. Circumstances of the Offence [3] I will not repeat the facts in great detail, as my reasons on the voir dire cover them at considerable length.

It will suffice to saythat the accused shot a complete stranger in the head on a summer night in 2021. The name of the victim was Marlon Chamorro-Gonzales, who came to Winnipeg from Central America many years ago. [4] The shooting took place on a boulevard just outside the main doors of a high-rise apartment complex on Kennedy Street inWinnipeg (the “Building”). At the time Mr.

Chamorro-Gonzales was a person experiencing homelessness and he was congregating onthe boulevard across from the Building with some other people who had no shelter. [5] The surveillance video from the Building showed the accused walking out of the Building around midnight. A Crown witnessand self-described peeping Tom, who lived in the Building many floors above ground level, testified at trial that he was awake that nightscanning adjacent high-rise buildings with his binoculars when he heard a loud argument at street level. Thereafter this witness heard asound like clanging metal and a loud pop.

When he looked down he saw people scattering “like ants” from the boulevard. [6] The witness was drinking at the time and admitted his eyesight was bad. Added to that, the leaves on the trees outside made itimpossible for the witness to determine who was arguing or from where the loud pop was emanating from, so the witness hurried downthe stairs to see what had happened. When he realized that someone had been shot, the witness asked a bystander to call 9-1-1.

Thewitness was unable to identify how many people he had heard during the course of the argument or offer descriptions of any of thepersons who were arguing. [7] A female friend of the accused testified at trial that she left the Building with the accused prior to the shooting and she heard theaccused, who was walking behind her, arguing with someone. When she heard that a shot was fired, this friend did not turn around tosee what had happened. The friend testified she just started to run as fast as she could towards a hotel where she and the accused hadbooked a room for the night.

[ 8 ] The accused and his friend ran together and made no effort to stay at the scene or call for help. Police officers later tracked the accused and his friend to their hotel room where they were arrested and a firearm and ammunition were seized. The accused cooperated fully with police officers during the course of his arrest and subsequent detention. [ 9 ] No one other than the accused knows why he pulled out a gun and fired a shot that night or why he shot Mr. Chamorro- Gonzales in particular. The two men were not known to one another and had no shared history.

Counsel for the accused suggested that the accused felt threatened during the course of the argument that ensued on the boulevard outside the Building and Mr. Chamorro- Gonzales was just in the wrong place at the wrong time. [ 10 ] No firearms or other weapons were found at the scene, apart from a long metal pole and a shopping cart that were lying on the sidewalk. Apparently the metal pole was used by one of the people living on the boulevard to pry open garage bins. Circumstances of the Accused [ 11 ] The accused is an Indigenous person who was 27 years of age at the time of the offence.

The mother of the accused raised him and his siblings as a single parent and she never identified who his birth father was. Due to his mother’s problematic relationship with alcohol and other substances, the accused was taken into custody by Child and Family Services when he was six years old. Not unlike many Indigenous children taken into care, the life of the accused consisted of a revolving door of placements in different group homes, foster care and hotel rooms.

Some of these placements exposed the accused to substance use and physical abuse. [ 12 ] The life of the mother of the accused was marred by alcoholism. As a child the mother of the accused was exposed to her own mother’s excessive drinking, which was a coping mechanism she developed due to her experience as a residential school survivor.

The mother of the accused was also apprehended by Child and Family Services when she was a child. [ 13 ] The inter-generational dysfunction flowing from the residential school experience has clearly manifested itself in the family life of the accused, who does not know who his father is and who has lost all contact with his siblings and his identity as an Indigenous person.

The risk now of course is that the accused will not have any meaningful relationship with his own children due to his incarceration for this crime. [ 14 ] The accused himself has a problematic relationship with alcohol and the emotional scars he developed by witnessing the violence between the intoxicated adults he saw as a child at home. By the time he was 14 years old the accused was drinking regularly and getting into trouble with the criminal justice system.

The drinking became a daily thing for the accused and he was expelled from school. [ 15 ] At the age of 20 the accused was recruited into a gang but he maintains he quit gang life prior to the shooting due to his realization that gang activity was “stupid”. [ 16 ] The Pre-Sentence Report (the “PSR”) indicates the accused was expelled from school in grade 11 due to his use of intoxicants. During a previous penitentiary stay the accused tried to upgrade his education with little positive results.

The accused did manage to find a job as a cook in 2017 and held that job for about a year before he turned to the drug trade in 2018. Dealing drugs was the primary source of income for the accused until his arrest on these charges in 2021. [ 17 ] The PSR lists the accused as a high risk to re-offend. The last paragraph on page 11 of the PSR notes the following: The writer voices concern with the subject’s inability and/or lack of motivation to seek positive changes in his life.

With a federal sentence in 2014 and weapon-related convictions in 2019, the subject continued to lead a dangerous lifestyle where he believed his safety required he carry a firearm. The mindset endangers the community and potentially those around him, including his family. He made no attempts to seek positive outlets or sobriety prior to his arrest.

His acknowledgment of a lifetime weapon ban demonstrates his lack of awareness regarding Court-ordered conditions imposed to increase community safety. [ 18 ] The adult criminal record of the accused is significant and includes an armed robbery conviction in 2014 (30 month’s incarceration and a ten-year weapons prohibition) and a conviction in 2019 for possession of a firearm and multiple counts of failing to comply with recognizance (13 month’s incarceration and a lifetime weapons prohibition). Multiple breaches also form part of his criminal record.

The Principles and Objectives of Sentencing [ 19 ] In order to achieve the objectives of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (the “ Code ”), judges must impose sentences that appropriately balance the seriousness of the circumstances of the offence with the specific circumstances of the individual offender.

The fundamental goals of sentencing are: − To promote respect for the law and peace in society by imposing punishments; − To denounce criminal behaviour and dissuade others from engaging in crime; − To separate offenders from society when necessary by imposing prison sentences; and − To assist in the rehabilitation of offenders and promoting a sense of responsibility on them. [ 20 ] Further, the Code mandates that a judge consider a number of principles, including, but not limited to the following: − s. 718.1: that “ a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender ”; − s. 718.2(a ): that “ a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender ...”;

− s. 718.2(b): that “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similarcircumstances” (parity); and − ss. 718.2(

d) and (e): the restraint principle. In other words, impose incarceration sparingly and only after due consideration of allother sanctions that are reasonable in the circumstances. [21] In R. v.

Parker, 2023 MBCA 51 , the Manitoba Court of Appeal frames the principle of proportionality in the context ofthe use of a firearm in a criminal offence as follows: [15] It is trite to repeat that the fundamental principle of sentencing is proportionality, which requires sentencing judges to impose asentence that reflects the gravity of the offence and the moral culpability of the offender while carefully weighing and balancing theaggravating and mitigating circumstances as they relate to both the offender and the offence.

See R v Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para 12;R v Siwicki, 2019 MBCA 104 at para 44; and R v Hills, 2023 SCC 2 at paras 57-58. The often excruciatingly difficult task for thesentencing judge is to find the correct balance between the competing factors in the particular circumstances of the case. [16] When sentencing offenders who commit firearms offences, denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing principles. SeeR v Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39 at para 54; and R v Kennedy, 2016 MBCA 5 at para 60.

As stated in R v BWP; R v BVN, 2006 SCC 27,“[d]eterrence, as a principle of sentencing, refers to the imposition of a sanction for the purpose of discouraging the offender and othersfrom engaging in criminal conduct.” Even if specific deterrence is not necessary because of rehabilitation or realistic because theoffender is addicted, general deterrence is still a consideration. “General deterrence is intended” to deter “potential criminals” fromengaging “in criminal activity because of the example provided by the punishment imposed on the offender” (at para 2).

The objectiveof denunciation is to “communicate society’s condemnation of that particular offender’s conduct” (R v M (CA), (SCC),[1996] 1 SCR 500 at para 81). [Emphasis in the original] Gladue and Ipeelee [20] The ancestry of the accused requires me to assess any sentence in light of s. 718.2(

e) of the Code, which directs sentencingjudges to pay particular attention to the circumstances of Indigenous offenders. (See R. v. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1S.C.R. 688; R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 , [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433.) [21] These landmark rulings from the Supreme Court of Canada demand that sentencing judges take into account the particularsystemic and background factors that may have contributed to the criminal activity of any given Indigenous offender. Further, judgesare required to consider all types of sentencing procedures and sanctions that may be appropriate in all of the circumstances.

A keycomponent of these considerations is an effort to address the negative effects of colonialism on Indigenous people in Canada, includingthe legacy of residential schools that tore apart the bonds tying many Indigenous people in Canada to the land and to their families andcommunities. [22] The provisions in s. 718.2(

e) do not amount to a “race-based discount on sentencing” or that “artificially reducing incarcerationrates” for Indigenous offenders according to Ipeelee (para. 75). The sentencing process for Indigenous offenders must consider theirindividual circumstances and life experiences while applying all of the relevant sentencing principles set out in the Code, includingdeterrence and denunciation.

An important part of understanding the unique circumstances and life experiences of an Indigenousoffender involves the consideration of how their individual circumstances and life experiences have impacted their moralblameworthiness. [23] The diminishment of moral blameworthiness arising from Gladue factors is explained at para. 42 of R. v.

Smoke, 2014 MBCA91 , as follows: [42] Thus, the factors related to the accused’s circumstances as an Aboriginal offender must be taken into account as mitigating factorsgoing to moral blameworthiness and weighed, together with all of the other mitigating and aggravating factors related to the offender andthe offence, in determining the appropriate sentence for each offence. This applies whether the link is direct or indirect.

This is what thesentencing judge failed to do in this case, resulting in a failure to consider a relevant factor, which is an error in law. [24] Although it is an error not to weigh the Gladue factors in sentencing an Indigenous offender, it has been recognized that in somecases, the seriousness of an offence may outweigh what would otherwise constitute mitigating factors under a Gladue analysis and thismay result in little if any impact on the overall sentence. This principle is set out in R. v.

Dick (K.D.), 2015 MBCA 47 , at para.26, which states in part: [26] Thus, we would agree that the sentencing judge erred in the manner in which she considered the Gladue factors. To be clear, theGladue factors are not to be considered as an automatic race-based deduction from an otherwise fit sentence. Instead, they are to beconsidered as a mitigating circumstance, together with all of the other mitigating circumstances such as youth, a lack of a criminal record,etc., in determining the appropriate sentence for the offence and offender.

The weight to be attached to the Gladue factors will vary,depending on the nature of the Gladue factors, their effect on this accused and the other circumstances of the offence and the offender.Gladue should not be considered after the sentencing judge has determined an otherwise appropriate sentence, to see whether thatsentence should be reduced to take into account the Gladue factors. Position of the Crown [25] The Crown is seeking a sentence of incarceration of 17.5 years (210 months) less a pre-sentence credit for time served.

As at thedate of the sentencing hearing (May 30, 2023), the accused had served 540 days in custody, which when multiplied by a factor of 1.5amounts to 810 days or 27 months. That would leave a sentence of 183 months or 15.25 years on a go-forward basis from the time of thesentencing hearing on May 30, 2023. The Crown is also seeking some ancillary orders which the defence does not contest.

[26] The focus of the Crown’s submission was public safety and the complete disregard the accused showed for the two weaponsprohibitions he was already under at the time of this shooting.

In terms of aggravating circumstances, apart from his criminal record andhis flagrant disregard of the weapons prohibitions he was already under, the Crown pointed to the following: − The accused ran away from the scene without calling for help; − He discharged a firearm in a densely populated urban area; and − Several other people were in the immediate vicinity of the victim when the firearm was discharged. [27] In all of the circumstances the Crown indicated that deterrence and denunciation should be the focus of my attention in crafting asentence for the accused.

Position of the Defence [28] The defence concedes there is a high degree of moral blameworthiness here, but takes the position that a sentence in the range often to twelve years’ incarceration less the pre-sentence credit is appropriate on the facts before me. [29] The mitigating factors highlighted by the defence are: − The mid-trial guilty plea, which saved the Crown from having to call a witness who was in custody and hospitalized as the date oftrial, which saved the witness from the distress of testifying via video; − The mid-trial guilty plea was also offered in circumstances where the Crown candidly admitted there were other problematicfactors it was facing in the pursuit of a successful prosecution for second degree murder; and − The Gladue factors present here.

Case Law [30] Martin J. in R v. Wood, 2021 MBQB 4 (upheld on appeal in R. v. Wood, 2022 MBCA 46 ), offers a neatsummary with respect to the broad discretion open to sentencing judges in manslaughter cases that results in a wide range of sentences inCanadian law: [34] As to manslaughter sentences generally, I start with the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s comments in R. v. Caincsa, (MB CA), [1993] M.J. No. 237 at paras 4 and 5: [4] … D. A. Thomas, in his text Principles of Sentencing, 2d ed. (London: Heinemann, 1979), commented at p. 74: Manslaughter" is a generic term for a group of offences with different

definitions, linked only by the common requirement of a death. [5] In R. v. Cascoe, [1970] 2 All E.R. 833 (C.A.) Salmon L.J. wrote: As for sentence, manslaughter is, of course, a crime which varies very, very greatly in its seriousness. It may sometimes come very closeto inadvertence. That is one end of the scale. At the other end of the scale, it may sometimes come very close to murder. (p 837) Freedman C.J.M., in R. v. Sinclair (1980), (MB CA), 3 Man.

R. (2d) 257 (C.A.) made a similar observation: The offence of manslaughter presents the widest possible range for sentencing among all the offences in the Criminal Code.

A sentenceof life imprisonment may in one set of circumstances not be too much, and a suspension of sentence may in a different set ofcircumstances not be too little. (p. 257) In short, the breadth of the factual circumstances in which the offence of manslaughter may be committed is equalled only by the widediscretion given to the judge on sentencing. [31] The wide range of sentences for manslaughter reflected in the case law unsurprisingly lead counsel in the case before me todisagree as to the length of incarceration.

They are about five years apart in their recommendations. [32] The Crown relies on the following cases in support of its position: − R. v. Caribou, 2022 MBCA 95 ; − R. v. Meilleur, 2022 MBCA 71 ; − R. v. Pruden, 2022 MBKB 240 ; − R. v. Anderson, 2021 ABCA 135 ; − R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 , [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424; − R. v. Warner, 2019 ONCA 1014 ; and

− R. v. Bell (M.A.), (MB CA), 85 Man. R. (2d) 139. [33] The Defence, in turn, relies on other cases in support of its position, namely: − R. v. Robert-Stevens, 2019 ONSC 257 ; − R. v. Chol, 2020 ONSC 6644 ; and − R. v. Ndlovu, 2017 MBQB 157 , (upheld by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Ndlovu, 2018 MBCA 113 ). [34] By way of quick

summary, the cases relied on by the Crown all fall above the 10-to-12-year range proposed by the defence. Thefacts in Caribou (13 years of custody) included a severe beating of a victim over a prolonged period of time by several people. Thatbeating included the victim being whipped with a chain, burned and stabbed.

Apart from the horrific nature of the violence inflicted onthe victim in that case, he was forced to suffer the indignity of dying naked and alone. [35] In the Meilleur decision (13 years of custody) the court noted that two armed gang affiliates forced their way into the home ofthe victim before fatally shooting him and setting the house on fire. The accused in that case had spent 13 of the last 20 years in custody. [36] The Pruden decision involved the victim being attacked from behind and being struck by a metal object on the back of his head.

The accused left the scene and the victim was found by first responders in medical distress. A CT scan showed the victim died ofextensive skull fractures and a brain hemorrhage. A sentence of 12 years was imposed for what the sentencing judge found to be anoffence that fell in the middle of the manslaughter range. [37] Anderson also involved a fatal gunshot to the head that resulted in a 16-year custodial sentence. That case also involved aremorseful offender who offered a guilty plea and who was also under a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The court concluded the offenderhad “one of the most severe, if not the most severe” criminal record of any of the offenders in the sentencing cases relied on by counsel(para. 17). The accused in that case was also operating a vehicle while impaired, with a loaded gun strapped to his shoulder. At the timethe accused was also under a driving prohibition. The sentencing judge concluded that the facts placed the sentence on the “high end ofthe range” for manslaughter (para. 19). [38] The Warner case involved an unprovoked fatal shooting at a house party and the wounding of another victim.

The accused was21 years old at the time of the crime and had a relatively minor record as a youth. Further, the accused expressed remorse for the crime.

In reducing the sentence from 18 years’ custody to 15, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted the following: [7] The aggravating factors included: • Firearms were used in acts of reckless and senseless violence. • The victims were unarmed and targeted. • Two of the victims suffered serious injury and one of them death. • The appellant had been prohibited from carrying a weapon. • The appellant attended the party with a loaded firearm. • The appellant was a knowing party to Chambers’ aggressive behaviour and backed him up in the series of aggressive acts that led tothe shooting. • The appellant’s gun was never found. • The appellant fled from the scene and then to South America. [39] The Crown also placed heavy emphasis on the Bell decision which involved the accused bludgeoning his girlfriend to death witha baseball bat “without apparent provocation” (para. 1).

The accused in that case had a blood alcohol level “well in excess of 240milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood” and a “therapeutic level” of the drug Diazepam (paras. 2-3). In that case the ManitobaCourt of Appeal also noted the accused had three previous convictions for aggravated assault where alcohol was a factor. One of thoseconvictions involved a victim who survived stab wounds to the head and back.

The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence imposed at thetrial level to 12 years’ imprisonment. [40] The defence relied primarily on the decision in Ndlovu where a sentence of 9 year’s incarceration was imposed. In affirming thatsentence the Manitoba Court of Appeal (R. v. Ndlovu, 2018 MBCA 113 ), summarized the key facts of the case as follows: [2] Using his influence as a high-ranking member of a local street gang, the accused caused a 16-year-old, lower-ranking member ofthat gang (the youth) to procure a gun.

He directed the youth to give the gun to an associate of the gang for the purposes of settling a“beef” (at para 1). The associate used the gun to assault another man and, during the course of the assault, the firearm went off, killingthe victim, who was a bystander. The associate fired off a further five more shots at his intended victim while fleeing the scene. Theshooting occurred on the street in front of a busy local nightclub at closing time.

After the shooting, the accused took steps to destroy thegun. [3] The associate was sentenced to 18 years’ incarceration for the offence of manslaughter as a result of a joint recommendation. The

youth was sentenced as an adult to six years’ incarceration. [ 41 ] The sentencing judge made the following observations of Mr. Ndlovu: [3 ] Ndlovu’s criminal background has been summarized by the Court of Appeal in a previous decision ( R. v. I.R.N. , 2011 MBCA 31 , 262 Man. R. (2d) 267 ), noting that it includes gang membership, repeated drug offences, auto thefts and breaches of probation.

In respect of the circumstances of the offence being considered by the Court of Appeal in that matter, Monnin J.A. stated at para. 3 of the decision: The young person was the driver of a stolen vehicle, who, while being chased by police and doing approximately 140 kilometres per hour on a major Winnipeg street, collided with a taxi, killing the driver and injuring the passenger.

At the time, the young person was 14 years of age and was bound by two probation orders, the most recent having been imposed on February 8, 2008, which required that he attend, participate in, and complete the Intensive Support and Supervision Program, amongst other conditions. As part of the Intensive Support and Supervision Program, he was bound by a curfew of 10:00 p.m. daily.

The incident occurred on March 29, 2008, at approximately 3:25 a.m. [4] Monnin J.A. further stated at para. 6 of the decision: I have glossed over the full details of the incident, but to say the least, they are egregious and shook the community. Complete details are to be found in the reasons of the sentencing judge. Those details are not in dispute. [5] Counsel advises that Ndlovu had been in custody for most of the time between 2007 and 2013.

Most recently, in July 2015, Ndlovu was convicted of resisting arrest and a charge under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , S.C. 1996, c. 19 , for which he received a custodial sentence of 30 days. Analysis and Conclusion [ 42 ] The accused came of age in a home environment where violent and abusive behaviour was the norm. It is not surprising that the accused turned to alcohol and drugs to cope with the trauma he experienced at home and his chaotic upbringing through the child welfare system where his ties to his family and identity as an Indigenous person were severed.

In that sense the accused is a victim of colonialism which included various levels of government in Canada imposing policies on Indigenous people that broke down healthy communities and family structures and also deprived them of access to adequate health care, education and economic opportunities that non-Indigenous Canadians take for granted. [ 43 ] Although the Gladue factors do result in a reduction of moral blameworthiness here, the seriousness of this offence and all of the facts of this case cannot lead me to consider them as mitigating circumstances to a significant degree.

There is a high degree of moral blameworthiness attached to the actions of the accused here as the defence candidly admitted. Blatantly ignoring not one, but two weapons prohibitions and then firing a weapon in a crowded urban area makes it impossible to arrive at any other conclusion. As the PSR correctly states, the dangerous lifestyle choices made by the accused brought him to the point where he decided to procure and carry a loaded weapon despite the weapons prohibitions he was under and this decision placed not only the community in danger, but also anyone in his immediate vicinity.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors [ 44 ] In my view the aggravating factors in this case are:

a) The victim was a vulnerable person with no means to defend himself;

b) The accused fled the scene after the shooting and made no effort to contact emergency services;

c) The criminal record of the accused for violent offences including firearms that resulted in significant custodial sentences;

d) The decision of the accused to carry a loaded firearm despite the fact that he was under two separate weapons prohibitions;

e) The extremely dangerous nature of the crime itself, namely the intentional discharge of a firearm in a densely populated urban area and in a place where several people where in close proximity at the time the weapon was fired; and

f) The high risk of the accused to reoffend that is identified in the PSR. [ 45 ] The mitigating factors in this case are the accused’s:

a) Relatively young age (aged 27 at the time of the offence);

b) The guilty plea he offered (albeit at mid-trial);

c) The attack was impulsive and random, as opposed to being planned or

an act of revenge;

d) His expression of remorse at the sentencing hearing;

e) His good record of behaviour while incarcerated; and

f) Reduced level of moral blameworthiness resulting from an analysis of the Gladue factors. Sentence Imposed

[ 46 ] The facts of this case, including the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, cannot lead to a sentence of more than 12 years as the Crown suggests. Although this offence is very serious it cannot fairly be described as moving out of the middle range for manslaughter cases and does not break into the 15-year range as the defence pointed out. The existing case law does not suggest that a sentence of more than 12 years is supported on these facts.

Although starting points and ranges do not strictly bind the discretion of a judge, I can see no principled reason to depart from the middle range for manslaughter on the facts before me. [ 47 ] Overall I am satisfied that a 12 year custodial sentence in this case meets the demand set out in the Code and the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Parker that deterrence and denunciation must be the primary considerations driving my thinking in passing a sentence for Mr. Edwards.

This was an impulsive act of extreme violence that placed not only the victim at risk, but also anyone in close proximity to the accused and the community at large. [ 48 ] I am sentencing the accused to a custodial sentence of 12 years less a pre-sentence credit calculated on 1.5 days for every day served. That amounts to a pre-sentence credit of 846 days. [ 49 ] I am a lso issuing the following ancillary orders:

a) Primary DNA order under s. 487.051 of the Code ;

b) Mandatory life weapons prohibition s. 109 of the Code ; and

c) Forfeiture of the firearm and ammunition seized as evidence. _________________________ REMPEL J.