FRÉDÉRIK JONES Appellant - v. -, 2023 NBKB 71

2023 NBKB 071 BCA/3/2022 IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH OF NEW BRUNSWICK TRIAL DIVISION JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF BATHURST BETWEEN: FRÉDÉRIK JONES Appellant - and - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent BEFORE: The Honourable Justice J. A. Réginald Léger AT: Bathurst, New Brunswick DATE OF HEARING: February 28, 2023 DATE OF DECISION: April 28, 2023 APPEARANCES: Marc Guignard, K.C., for the Appellant Pierre Gionet, for the Respondent [TRANSLATION] DECISION

[ 1 ] The appellant, Frédérik Jones, appeals from his convictions under paragraphs 320.14(1) (

a) and (

b) of the Criminal Code of Canada . For the offence under paragraph 320.14(1) (b), the appellant was sentenced to a $1,000.00 fine plus a $300.00 surcharge and was placed under a 12-month driving prohibition order. Applying the Kienapple principle, the trial judge stayed the proceedings for the offence under paragraph 320.14(1) (a). In his Notice of Appeal, the appellant asks the court to set aside the convictions for each of the two offences for which he was convicted. [ 2 ] In support of his application, the appellant raises the following grounds of appeal: [TRANSLATION]

a) The trial judge erred in law in finding that it had been agreed that the evidence heard during the trial and the “blended” voir dire was to be entered in the trials on each of the counts.

b) The trial judge erred in law in finding that Constable Haché had reasonable grounds to make a demand for breath samples pursuant to subparagraph 320.14(1) (a)(

i) of the Criminal Code of Canada .

c) The trial judge erred in law in finding that the accused’s rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had not been infringed.

d) The trial judge erred in law in finding that all the conditions set out in subsection 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada for the results of the analyses to establish the accused’s blood alcohol concentration at the time when the [samples were taken] had been met.

e) The trial judge erred in law in admitting into evidence a copy of the analyst’s certificate instead of the original.

f) The trial judge erred in law in finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the charge of impaired driving under paragraph 320.14(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code of Canada . THE FACTS [ 3 ] Only one witness was heard at the trial. On September 6, 2020, Constable Serge Haché was on patrol on J.D. Gauthier Boulevard in Shippagan, New Brunswick. At approximately 00:38, he observed a vehicle drive onto J.D. Gauthier Boulevard in the vicinity of Tim Horton’s. He noticed that the vehicle’s lights were not on. Constable Haché followed the vehicle to the traffic lights near to where he first saw the vehicle. [ 4 ] The vehicle turned left at the intersection and the constable decided to continue following it.

He noticed that the vehicle was swerving from left to right and that it was not driving steadily on the road. The constable also noticed that the vehicle was jerking and that it had crossed the white line twice. According to Constable Haché, the driving was not normal. Constable Haché decided to stop the vehicle. He activated his flashing lights, but the vehicle did not stop immediately.

The officer had to drive his vehicle parallel to the appellant’s vehicle in addition to turning on an exterior light on the patrol car to signal his presence before the vehicle pulled off to the side of the road. [ 5 ] At 00:40, Constable Haché went to the driver’s door. The constable explained that the driver first looked towards the police officer without rolling down the vehicle window. Suddenly, the driver, who was completely naked, opened the vehicle door.

The constable immediately made him an active offer of service and asked the driver for the usual documents: driver’s licence, insurance and registration documents. The constable noticed an open can of beer on the console of the car and another drink in a red can. It should be noted that in addition to the appellant, there was a female passenger in the car. [ 6 ] The constable also noticed that the driver’s eyes were watery and his breath smelled of alcohol. He stated that, based on his experience, he considered that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving while impaired.

The driver, identified moments later as Frédérik Jones, was placed under arrest for impaired driving. According to Constable Haché, the appellant was cooperative. Upon exiting the vehicle, the driver asked the constable if he could get dressed. After getting dressed, the driver accompanied Constable Haché to the police vehicle and took a seat in the back of the patrol car. That is when he pulled out his driver’s licence identifying him as Frédérik Jones and showing his date of birth.

Looking at the photo on the driver’s licence, the constable had no doubt that he was indeed dealing with Frédérik Jones, having a residential address in Chiasson Office, a small settlement just outside the town of Shippagan. [ 7 ] Later, the constable determined that the car belonged to the passenger, Eva Bourdon. The appellant was placed under arrest at 00:45. At 00:46, the constable read him his rights to counsel. The appellant indicated that he did not wish to speak with a lawyer

at that time. After reading him the caution, the constable read the demand to provide a breath sample using an approved instrument, at00:48. The appellant agreed to provide the requested samples. The constable testified that he immediately called for help so that aqualified technician could be made available. He also called Savoie Débosselage in Lamèque to arrange for them to come and tow thevehicle. That evening, given the high number of calls, no one could come to the scene immediately.

According to the constable, hiscolleague Constable Blais arrived on the scene at around 1:17 a.m., around the same time as the tow truck. [8] At 1:25 a.m., Constable Haché left for the Lamèque police station to meet qualified technician Jessy McIntee. Theevidence shows that they arrived at the detachment at 1:39 a.m. At 1:41 a.m., the appellant was handed over to the qualified technician.After two valid samples, Constable Haché was given the qualified technician’s documents, which he then served on the appellant, alongwith a summons.

The constable explained the documents to the appellant, who clearly understood them. Mr. Jones was subsequentlyreleased. Later, the constable served the appellant with a copy of the analysts’ certificates, i.e., a certificate signed by Ms. Ming and onesigned by K. Chan. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW [9] With respect to the standard of review, our Court of Appeal clearly explains the scope of an appeal in

summary convictionmatters in R. v. Fowler, [[2006] NBCA 90 ]. At paragraphs 17 and 18, the court states: 17. While the scope of a

summary conviction appeal to the Court of Queen’s Bench is broad enough to allow appeals on questions offact, the function of the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court is nevertheless not to retry a case or to second guess the findings of factsmade by the trial judge. Absent an error of law or a miscarriage of justice, the role of the

summary conviction appeal judge is todetermine whether the findings of the trial judge are unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence... 18. I adopt the following formulation of the scope of review by a

Summary Conviction Appeal Court, articulated by Cromwell J.A. inR. v. Nickerson (W.S.) (1999), 1999 NSCA 168 , 178 N.S.R. (2d) 189 (C.A.) at para. 6, and consistent with the jurisprudence inthis province: The scope of review of the trial court’s findings of fact by the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court is the same as on appeal againstconviction to the Court of Appeal in indictable offences: see sections 822(1) and 686(1)(a)(

i) and R. v. Gillis (1981), (NS CA), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 169 (N.S.S.C.A.D.) per Jones, J.A. at p. 176. Absent an error of law or a miscarriage ofjustice, the test to be applied by the

Summary Conviction Appeal Court is whether the findings of the trial judge are unreasonable orcannot be supported by the evidence. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Burns, (SCC),[1994] 1 S.C.R. 656 at 657, the appeal court is entitled to review the evidence at trial, re-examine and reweigh it, but only for thepurpose of determining whether it is reasonably capable of supporting the trial judge’s conclusions. If it is, the

Summary ConvictionAppeal Court is not entitled to substitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial judge. In short, a

summary conviction appeal on therecord is an appeal; it is neither a simple review to determine whether there was some evidence to support the trial judge’s conclusionsnor a new trial on the transcript. [10] In this case, the [TRANSLATION] “palpable and overriding error” test applies to ground of appeal (f), that is,[TRANSLATION] “the conviction for the offence under paragraph 320.14(1)(a)”.

The [TRANSLATION] “correctness” test applies toeach of the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. [11] In fact, there is no disagreement as to the standards of review applicable to the various grounds of appeal. [12] The appellant abandoned the first ground of appeal. SECOND GROUND OF APPEAL The trial judge erred in law in finding that Constable Haché had reasonable grounds to make a demand for breath samplespursuant to subparagraph 320.28(1)(a)(

i) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

[13] The appellant submits that the trial judge erred in law in finding that Constable Haché had reasonable grounds to make ademand for breath samples pursuant to subparagraph 320.28(1)(a)(i). [14] The appellant argues, inter alia, that the police officer did not conduct a sufficient investigation to establish the grounds ofhis belief. [15] The applicable standard of review regarding whether the police officer had sufficient grounds to warrant a demandpursuant to subparagraph 320.28(1)(a)(

i) is a question of law. See R. v. Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35 , at paragraph 20. [16] In this case, the trial judge found that the officer had sufficient grounds to make a demand pursuantsubparagraph 320.28(1)(a)(

i) of the Criminal Code of Canada. In my view, the judge’s decision on this issue is beyond reproach. Thetrial judge based her decision on a body of evidence that I consider amply sufficient. [17] In this regard, I should note that the appellant was observed driving a vehicle without lights, a vehicle that was swervingfrom left to right. Constable Haché had observed the vehicle driving over the white line twice. When the driver was stopped, theconstable first noticed that he was naked, that his eyes were watery and that his vehicle and breath smelled of alcohol.

The constable alsonoticed open alcohol on the console of the car. It should also be noted that Constable Haché is an experienced police officer who hasbeen an investigating patrol officer for approximately eleven years. In his testimony, the constable stated: [TRANSLATION] “And,based on my experience in these matters, I had – I had reasonable grounds to believe that the driving and everything that I was seeing –that I was observing – that the person was driving while impaired.” [18] I have no hesitation in concluding, as did the trial judge, that Constable Haché subjectively had grounds for making thedemand.

Also, the constable’s grounds are justifiable from an objective viewpoint, that is to say, a reasonable person placed in theposition of the officer could easily conclude that the person, in this case the appellant, has most likely committed a drinking and drivingoffence. I find that the trial judge did not commit an error that would warrant intervention in finding that the constable had sufficientgrounds to make a demand. For these reasons, this ground of appeal is dismissed.

THIRD GROUND OF APPEAL The trial judge erred in law in finding that the accused’s rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights andFreedoms had not been infringed. [19] By this ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the breath samples were not taken “as soon as practicable” as requiredby paragraph 320.28[(1)(a)] of the Criminal Code of Canada. According to the appellant, the 37-minute delay betweenConstable Haché’s reading of the demand and the departure from the scene to the Lamèque detachment meant that the samples were nottaken as soon as practicable.

The evidence shows that the demand to provide breath samples was made at 00:48, and that they left thescene where the interception took place at approximately 1:25 a.m. As the respondent points out, Constable Haché had to call for aqualified technician as well as for assistance in order to await the tow truck. For reasons beyond his control, he had to wait until1:25 a.m. for the tow truck and his colleague to arrive.

The explanation given was that the police had to respond to a considerablenumber of calls. [20] I should note that, while waiting, the constable continued his investigation by taking photographs of the alcoholicbeverage containers inside the vehicle, in addition to speaking with the passenger, who decided to walk home. [21] The trial judge found that the delays were explained and justified. I agree with the trial judge’s finding that the delayswere justified under the circumstances.

The vehicle had to be towed and the constable had no control over the arrival of the tow truck,nor any control over the availability of the other police officers. The trial judge’s decision concerning the delays was founded in fact andlaw. In my view, the constable acted reasonably given the circumstances. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is dismissed.

FOURTH AND FIFTH GROUNDS OF APPEAL The trial judge erred in law in finding that all the conditions set out in subsection 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada forthe results of the analyses to establish the accused’s blood alcohol concentration at the time when the [samples were taken] hadbeen met.

The trial judge erred in law in admitting into evidence a copy of the analyst’s certificate instead of the original. [22] I will first consider the ground of appeal with respect to the admission into evidence of copies of the copies of theanalysts’ certificates. [23] The trial judge found that copies of the analysts’ certificates served on the appellant were admissible in evidence. The factthat the appellant was notified that the certificates would be introduced into evidence is not really at issue.

The real issue raised by theappellant is that the prosecution introduced into evidence a copy of a copy, instead of the original. Both at trial and on appeal, theappellant argued that, under the circumstances, the copy should not be introduced into evidence, especially since Constable Hachéacknowledged that he had never had the original in his possession, nor had he been able to verify the possibility of obtaining an originalof the analysts’ certificates.

According to the appellant, it would be relatively easy to introduce the original into evidence in suchcircumstances. [24] I agree with the trial judge that the copies of the analysts’ certificates were admissible in evidence. In my opinion, thepreconditions for introducing the certificates into evidence have been met. [25] First, it should be noted that subsection 320.32(1) makes no reference to an original. Moreover, the appellant was givenreasonable notice. In the case before us, there was no reason to doubt the reliability of the documents tendered in evidence.

The courtagrees with the respondent’s position on the introduction of copies in the context of this case. I find persuasive the discussion on the use of copies by McWilliams in

chapter 24 of McWilliams Canadian Criminal Evidence, 5th edition, where he writes: [TRADUCTION] La forme la plus courante de preuve documentaire secondaire est une copie (ou un imprimé) du document [TRADUCTION] « original ».Dans certains cas, l’admissibilité est déterminée par la loi. Le régime législatif prévu par la

Loi sur la preuve au Canada régissantl’admissibilité de copies de documents publics (art. 24, 25), de documents du gouvernement (art. 26, 31), de documents bancaires (art. 29,31) et commerciaux (art. 30) est examiné ci-dessous. Pour le reste, c’est la common law qui s’applique. En règle générale, la

partie qui présente une copie est tenue de prouver qu’il s’agit d’une copie conforme à l’original. Cela se faitnormalement par la production d’une copie certifiée ou de la preuve que la copie a été comparée à l’original (c’est-à-dire une copieexaminée). Les règles de droit relatives à la preuve de la conformité des copies étaient autrefois assez détaillées, car avant l’avènementdes photocopieurs et d’autres technologies, les copies étaient faites à la main, ce qui augmentait les risques d’erreur. Les technologies modernes de production de copies sont généralement fiables et les tribunaux sont aujourd’hui moins enclins àexiger rigoureusement d’une

partie qu’elle fournisse la preuve de la fiabilité des copies. Ainsi, lorsqu’une photocopie ou du papiercarbone a été utilisé pour produire une copie, une comparaison entre la copie et l’original n’est pas nécessaire. L’arrêt R. c. Munshi contient un bon résumé des règles de droit dans ce domaine, dans le contexte des certificats d’alcootest.

Le juge Hilly déclare : [TRADUCTION] Au fil du temps, comme le montre la jurisprudence en la matière, les forces policières ont utilisé différentes méthodes pourproduire un certificat original et des copies de celui-ci – copies manuscrites, utilisation de papier carbone, imprimés en liasse,photocopies, formulaires créés à l’aide d’un logiciel de traitement de texte et imprimés. La modernisation du processus de reproductionet l’évolution technologique ont amené à considérer que des doubles originaux peuvent raisonnablement être décrits comme des copies :R. c. Walsh (1980), (ON CA), 6 M.V.R. 125 (C.A.

Ont.), aux p. 132 et 123, le juge d’appel Morden. [...] Aprèsexamen de la copie introduite en preuve devant lui, le tribunal est autorisé à conclure qu’un processus de photocopie a été utilisé pourproduire des copies [...] Le premier document créé peut être considéré comme une [TRADUCTION] « copie originale » [...] Lorsqu’un processus dereproduction à l’identique est utilisé, c’est-à-dire [TRADUCTION] « la photocopie ou le papier carbone », il n’est généralement pasnécessaire de comparer l’original ou la première copie avec les copies [...] Toutefois, si on laisse entendre que la copie a été intentionnellement modifiée ou qu’il manque des pages, la

partie qui présente la

copie devra fournir des preuves étayant la conformité de la copie. En outre, lorsqu’une affaire porte sur des allégations de fraude, de contrefaçon ou de faux semblants, la validité des documents sera probablement en cause et le tribunal sera plus exigeant quant à la preuve à verser relativement à la véracité des copies. [ 26 ] Also, in R. v. Delorme , 2021 ONCJ 569 , the judge admitted copies into evidence at a trial held in the context of the pandemic.

Here is what he wrote on the subject at pages 16 and 17. [TRADUCTION] À mon avis, les règles de droit ont évolué de manière significative depuis les années qui ont suivi 1969, lorsque les avocats de la défense et les procureurs du ministère public se disputaient au sujet de taches sur les copies de documents qui avaient été signifiées. Je me souviens de ces années-là. Je souscris à la prétention du ministère public selon qui l’article 320.32 du Code n’exige pas explicitement la preuve que le certificat était un original au sens traditionnel du terme. C’est-à-dire le document qui a été déposé.

À mon avis, ni la disposition elle-même ni la jurisprudence en évolution constante n’exigent explicitement la preuve qu’il s’agit de l’original, au sens étroit où il s’agit des premiers documents produits ou créés. Il me semble que le juge Hill, de la Cour supérieure de justice, avait anticipé cette question même dans plusieurs décisions qu’il a prononcées il y a près de 20 ans. L’exigence de l’article pertinent du Code criminel requiert la preuve de la signification d’une copie conforme et complète à l’accusé. Telle est la question. Je renvoie aux décisions du juge Hill dans l’arrêt R. c.

Munshi . [...] L’autre arrêt sur lequel je m’appuie et auquel je renvoie est R. c. Naidu , […] 2004 O.J. 2471 . Aux paragraphes 13 et 14 de l’arrêt Munshi , le juge Hill formule des observations sur les changements technologiques. Ses propos semblent prémonitoires en ce qui concerne les changements technologiques auxquels nous avons affaire en 2021.

Au paragraphe 14, le juge Hill s’exprime ainsi : [TRADUCTION] Au fil du temps, comme le montre la jurisprudence en la matière, les forces policières ont utilisé différentes méthodes pour produire un certificat original et des copies de celui-ci –copies manuscrites, utilisation de papier carbone, imprimés en liasse, photocopies, formulaires créés à l’aide d’un logiciel de traitement de texte et imprimés.

La modernisation du processus de reproduction et l’évolution technologique ont amené à considérer qu’il peut y avoir des doubles originaux – et j’insiste sur ses mots – des doubles originaux qui peuvent raisonnablement être décrits comme des copies. En d’autres termes, une fois que les documents sont établis et qu’il est prouvé qu’ils sont complets, identiques et conformes, la distinction entre originaux et copies n’est pas pertinente d’un point de vue juridique. Elle n’est pas non plus juridiquement nécessaire sur le plan de la preuve.

Ainsi, en toute déférence, ce que je dis, c’est qu’il me semble, du moins à ce stade de notre histoire, qu’il s’agit d’un argument portant sur une distinction vide de sens sur le plan juridique. Que sont les pièces à conviction virtuelles électroniques, si ce n’est des [TRADUCTION] « doubles originaux », pour reprendre les mots du juge Hill. À mon avis, le ministère public a satisfait aux exigences juridiques en ce qui concerne l’admission de ces pièces. […] [ 27 ] Considering all the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the trial judge did not commit any error warranting intervention.

For these reasons, the ground of appeal relating to the admissibility of the copies into evidence must be dismissed. [ 28 ] The Court is also asked to rule on the question of how subsection 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code should be interpreted in the context of the evidence tendered at trial. [ 29 ] Since the introduction in 2018 of the amendments to the Criminal Code regarding impaired driving offences, subsection 320.31(1) of the Code has been the subject of several decisions on the question of how its provisions should be interpreted, specifically whether the statement in the qualified technician’s certificate was admissible evidence or inadmissible hearsay.

In other words, are the conditions set out in subsection 320.31(1) of the Code met when the certificate of the qualified technician alleges as a fact that [TRANSLATION] “the target value of an alcohol standard that is certified by an analyst [is] suitable for use with the breathalyzer.” Once the precondition is met, the prosecution can benefit from the presumption of accuracy under subsection 320.31(1). [ 30 ] It is common ground that in order to prove an offence under paragraph 320.14(1)(b), the Crown may rely on the presumption of accuracy as long as it meets the preconditions set out in subsection 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada .

Subsection 320.31(1) reads as follows: • 320.31

(1) If samples of a person’s breath have been received into an approved instrument operated by a qualified technician, the results of the analyses of the samples are conclusive proof of the person’s blood alcohol concentration at the time when the analyses were made if the results of the analyses are the same — or, if the results of the analyses are different, the lowest of the results is conclusive proof of the person’s blood alcohol concentration at the time when the analyses were made — if

a) before each sample was taken, the qualified technician conducted a system blank test the result of which is not more than 10 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood and a system calibration check the result of which is within 10% of the target value of an alcohol standard that is certified by an analyst;

b) there was an interval of at least 15 minutes between the times when the samples were taken; and

c) the results of the analyses, rounded down to the nearest multiple of 10 mg, did not differ by more than 20 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood. [ 31 ] A reading of subsection 320.31(1) shows that Parliament included in the new scheme certain conditions that the prosecution must meet if it wants to take advantage of the shortcuts and thus benefit from the presumption of accuracy. [ 32 ] The appellant claims that the trial judge committed an error of law in finding that, in this case, the prosecution had met the preconditions set out in subsection 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code . It should be noted that in the case under appeal, only the condition set out in paragraph 320.31(1) (

a) is in issue. [ 33 ] In fact, this precondition has been addressed in numerous court decisions. The courts, including New Brunswick courts, are divided as to the proper

interpretation to be given to this part of subsection 320.31(1). [ 34 ] The decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Goldson , 2021 ABCA 193 , and that of the Yukon Court of Appeal in R. v. MacDonald , 2022 YKCA 7 , are at the forefront of the discussions before the courts. There is little point in listing the decisions that have followed the reasoning in Goldson or MacDonald respectively.

In any event, it is relatively easy for those interested to find decisions rendered in connection with this part of subsection 320.31(1) of the Code . [ 35 ] In Goldson , the Court held that a qualified technician’s certificate stating that the alcohol standard used for the samples has been certified by an analyst was inadmissible hearsay. The Court added that a copy of the analyst’s certificate must be tendered in evidence if the prosecution wants to benefit from the presumption of accuracy under subsection 320.31(1) .

Here is what the Court of Appeal said in Goldson , at paragraph 74 : [TRADUCTION] [74] À notre avis, cette interprétation est conforme à l’objet de la loi modificative et à l’intention du législateur. Le fait d’exiger à tout le moins que le ministère public produise le certificat de l’analyste au procès, certificat qu’il doit de toute façon communiquer à la défense en application du paragraphe 320.34(1), n’est guère une obligation onéreuse et s’inscrit dans la foulée de la simplification des règles de droit relatives à la preuve de l’alcoolémie.

Selon notre interprétation, les conditions seront remplies si le ministère public présente ces deux certificats, pour autant qu’ils contiennent les renseignements prévus au paragraphe 320.31(1). Le ministère public dispose ainsi d’un moyen très simple et efficace pour établir la présomption.

Le juge de première instance est parvenu à une conclusion similaire au paragraphe 105 de la décision dans l’affaire Kelly : [TRADUCTION] Il est relativement simple pour la police de produire un certificat indiquant le moment et les résultats des relevés et de s’assurer que l’alcool type a été approuvé par un analyste, notamment. Ces mesures simples facilitent grandement la preuve des infractions de conduite avec facultés affaiblies, soutiennent l’application de ces lois et contribuent ainsi à la protection du public.

Toutefois, l’équité envers les accusés exige que ces mesures soient rigoureusement respectées si le ministère public entend se prévaloir des raccourcis en matière de preuve prévus par la législation. [ 36 ] In MacDonald , Bauman J., after analyzing the provisions of the Criminal Code as they existed prior to the new amendments made in 2018, concluded that a statement in the qualified technician’s certificate to the effect that an analyst has certified the alcohol standard is perfectly admissible.

According to Bauman J., it is not necessary to introduce into evidence the analyst’s certificate as to the alcohol standard used; the qualified technician’s certificate in which he states that the target value of the alcohol

standard has been certified is sufficient. [ 37 ] Here is what Bauman J. wrote in MacDonald , at paragraphs 57 to 65 : [TRADUCTION] [57] À mon avis, l’utilisation d’un alcool type qui « convient pour l’utilisation » et non d’un autre alcool type a toujours été une condition nécessaire à l’admission du certificat du technicien qualifié, ou une condition pratiquement nécessaire lorsqu’on avait recours au témoignage oral d’un technicien qualifié pour étayer la fiabilité des résultats de l’analyse. [58] En ce qui concerne le certificat, le régime antérieur a toujours exigé la déclaration quant au caractère convenable.

S’agissant du témoignage oral d’un technicien qualifié, si ce dernier était interrogé sur le caractère convenable de l’alcool type utilisé, mais ne pouvait pas l’en attester, la preuve de l’analyse ne suffisait pas à fonder la présomption en raison des préoccupations relatives à la fiabilité du témoignage du technicien.

Tout simplement, il n’y aurait aucune garantie qu’il s’agit du résultat provenant d’un instrument approuvé utilisé de manière appropriée. [59] Avant la loi modificative de 2018, il n’était nécessaire d’affirmer que l’échantillon était convenable en première instance que si le ministère public cherchait à établir les conditions préalables à la présomption d’exactitude au moyen du certificat du technicien qualifié.

Depuis la loi modificative de 2018, le fait que le technicien qualifié ait utilisé un alcool type certifié doit être établi dans toutes les affaires dans lesquelles le ministère public cherche à se prévaloir de la présomption d’exactitude prévue au paragraphe 320.31(1) .

La question est de savoir si ce changement structurel a une incidence sur la possibilité pour le technicien qualifié d’affirmer ce fait dans son certificat. [60] Avec égards, le fait que l’utilisation d’un alcool type certifié soit devenue une condition préalable à l’établissement de la présomption d’exactitude semble être une raison spécieuse d’interpréter le nouveau régime comme imposant au ministère public une nouvelle exigence en matière de preuve.

Bien que l’on puisse soutenir qu’il ne serait pas terriblement onéreux pour le ministère public de fournir un certificat de l’analyste dans chaque cas, cela n’a jamais été une caractéristique du régime dans le passé, selon les précédents, et va à l’encontre du but et de l’objet de ce régime et du nouveau régime. [61] L’erreur commise par la Cour dans l’arrêt Goldson a été de considérer que l’ajout de la certification de l’alcool type comme une condition préalable constitue un [TRADUCTION] « changement important ».

Cette interprétation ne tient pas compte du régime (ou du régime précédent) dans son ensemble. [62] Les changements introduits par la loi modificative de 2018 peuvent être compris ainsi. [63] Il n’y a plus de distinction dans le texte de loi entre la production de la preuve au moyen d’un certificat et la production de la preuve par voie testimoniale.

La réorganisation rend les exigences en matière de preuve plus uniformes entre ces deux méthodes — quelle que soit la méthode utilisée par le ministère public pour établir les conditions préalables à la présomption d’exactitude, il doit maintenant toujours établir dans sa preuve que le technicien qualifié a utilisé un alcool type qui a été certifié par un analyste. Je ne dirais pas qu’il s’agit d’un [TRADUCTION] « renforcement » de l’exigence, mais plutôt d’une normalisation de celle-ci.

À mon avis, le fait que le ministère public n’était auparavant tenu de présenter des éléments de preuve concernant le caractère convenable de l’alcool type en première instance que lorsqu’il avait recours au certificat du technicien constituait une anomalie dans la loi. [64] Deuxièmement, les modifications ont simplifié les différents raccourcis en matière de ouï-dire / de certificats. Il y a maintenant une seule autorisation omnibus permettant la présentation de la preuve par ouï-dire / par certificat par les analystes, les médecins et les techniciens.

Texte du paragraphe 320.32(1) : Le certificat de l’analyste, du technicien qualifié ou du médecin qualifié délivré au

titre de la présente

partie fait preuve des faits qui y sont allégués sans qu’il soit nécessaire de prouver l’authenticité de la signature ou la qualité officielle du signataire. [65] L’exigence antérieure que le certificat du technicien qualifié atteste que l’alcool type était convenable a perdu son abri textuel. Le paragraphe 320.32(1) en sa version actuelle ne conviendrait pas, sans compliquer à nouveau le texte désormais simple.

[38] As can be seen, the

interpretations are quite different and have different results. When I consider Parliament’s clearintentions with respect to the 2018 amendments, it is clear that Parliament wanted to simplify the law relating to evidence in prosecutionsfor impaired driving offences, even though, at first glance, it might not be very onerous to meet such evidence. In fact, the

preamble tothe bill clearly sets out its purposes. The

preamble states, inter alia: [...] Whereas it is important to deter persons from driving while impaired by alcohol or drugs; Whereas it is important that law enforcement officers be better equipped to detect instances of alcohol-impaired or drug-impaired driving and exercise investigative powers in a manner that is consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights andFreedoms; Whereas it is important to simplify the law relating to the proof of blood alcohol concentration[.] [...] [39] Considering the statutory scheme as a whole, with respect, it seems to me that the new scheme cannot be interpreted ashaving the effect of imposing additional preconditions relating to the evidence required from the prosecution.

Recall that one of thepurposes of the new provisions was to simplify the law relating to evidence in respect of impaired driving offences. I adopt the words ofBauman J. in McDonald. In other words, I accept the reasoning in MacDonald and find that the certificate of the qualified technician issufficient. See also R. v. Hepfner, 2022 ONSC 6064 . [40] In my view, this

interpretation considers modern approaches to statutory

interpretation, i.e., “the words of

an Act are to beread in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, […] and the intentionof Parliament”. See Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), (SCC). [41] The historical context of the new statutory scheme governing impaired driving prosecutions as well as the wording of thestatute support the idea that the prosecution is not required to introduce the analyst’s certificate into evidence in order to benefit from thepresumption of accuracy provided by the statute. The qualified technician’s certificate containing a statement to that effect is sufficient.This is indeed the case here. Finally, I believe that the

interpretation adopted by the Yukon Court of Appeal is consistent with theteachings of the Supreme Court of Canada on the

interpretation of the Criminal Code. [42] I agree with the position taken by the Crown in this case. In my view, the trial judge was correct in finding that theconditions set out in subsection 320.31(1) had been met in this case and that, accordingly, the prosecution could benefit from thepresumption of accuracy. [43] For these reasons, this ground of appeal is dismissed. SIXTH GROUND OF APPEAL The trial judge erred in law in finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the charge ofimpaired driving under paragraph 320.14(1)(

a) of the Criminal Code of Canada. [44] The appellant also challenges his conviction for the offence under paragraph 320.14(1)(

a) of the Criminal Code ofCanada. He argues that the evidence was simply insufficient to support a conviction. Since a person’s “ability to operate [a conveyance]”is a question of fact, the standard of review is that of palpable and reasonable error. [45] The appellate court need not consider whether it would have convicted the appellant. With respect to findings of fact, as inthis case, the appellate court must give considerable deference to the trial judge’s findings of fact. [46] The trial judge properly instructed herself as to the state of the law in an impaired driving case. At paragraphs 67 and 68 ofher decision, she wrote:

[TRANSLATION] The [Criminal Code of Canada] does not set out any specific test for determining impairment. Impairment is a question of fact to bedetermined by the trial judge based on the evidence. In all criminal matters, the trial judge must be satisfied of the guilt of the accusedbeyond a reasonable doubt before a conviction can be entered. Therefore, before convicting an accused of impaired driving, the trialjudge must be satisfied that the accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol or a drug.

If the evidence ofimpairment is so frail as to leave the trial judge in reasonable doubt as to impairment, the accused must be acquitted. If the evidence ofimpairment establishes any degree of impairment ranging from slight to great, the offence is made out.

See the leading case of R. v.Stellato, (ON CA). [47] After summarizing the parties’ positions, both on the law and the evidence in support of their positions, the trial judgefound that the prosecution had proven to the requisite standard of proof some degree of impairment of the appellant’s ability to drive. [48] I cannot discern any error warranting the court’s intervention. In my view, the trial judge’s finding was sufficientlysupported by the evidence. Accordingly, there is no reason to intervene, and the conviction is affirmed.

This ground of appeal isdismissed. [49] To summarize, each of the grounds of appeal is dismissed. The appellant’s convictions are affirmed. The trial judge didnot err in law in finding the appellant guilty of the offences charged. Under the Kienapple principle, the trial judge’s stay of proceedingswith respect to paragraph 320.14(1)(

a) stands. [50] Finally, the order suspending the prohibition on driving a motor vehicle is set aside. April 28, 2023 ____________________ Bathurst, N.B. Réginald Léger, J.C.K.B.