Mary Lou Hennigar Applicant v. Jacques Doucet, 2023 NBKB 81

Hennigar v. Doucet - 2023 NBKB 81 FDC-71-2017 IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH OF NEW BRUNSWICK FAMILY DIVISION JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF CAMPBELLTON BETWEEN: Mary Lou Hennigar Applicant -and- Jacques Doucet Respondent Topics: Common law spouses – unjust enrichment and entitlement to spousal support Punishment for contempt of court BEFORE: The Honourable Justice Larry Landry AT: Campbellton, N.B. DATES OF HEARING: March 27-30 and April 3, 2023 DATE OF DECISION: May 10, 2023 COUNSEL: Gabrielle Doucet, for the Applicant Rita Godin, K.C., for the Respondent [TRANSLATION]

DECISION Landry, J.: [ 1 ] Jacques Doucet and Mary Lou Hennigar were a couple for almost 25 years, without being married. They have been separated since the summer of 2015. [ 2 ] The division of family and business assets acquired during their cohabitation lies at the heart of this matter. Ms. Hennigar’s entitlement to support is also in dispute. [ 3 ] The parties have agreed that only the issues of entitlement to the division of assets and support should be decided at this time.

After that, they will try to agree on the value of the assets and how a compensatory payment will be made, failing which they will have to return before the Court. [ 4 ] The majority of the assets have always been solely in Mr. Doucet’s name.

In addition to the family home, a cottage, land and vehicles, the parties also argue over the division of the business venture, which includes a fish market and especially fishery-related assets, including a lobster licence. [ 5 ] Mary Lou Hennigar claims half of all the assets based on the principle of unjust enrichment and on the fact that all the property was part of what can be described as a joint family venture.

Jacques Doucet counters that his ex- spouse was compensated for her contributions by a salary and that she is not entitled to a share of the business. [ 6 ] The Court must also address a contempt of court issue. Credibility [ 7 ] Each ex-spouse strongly attacked the credibility of the other, with each citing several examples in support of their claims. [ 8 ] For example, in a case against the Minister of National Revenue, [1] Jacques Doucet was described by a judge of the Tax Court of Canada as a witness who was neither credible nor reliable. This was in the context of allegations that Mr.

Doucet purchased unemployment stamps , as per the words used in court. In other words, he had claimed employment insurance benefits by reporting hours not actually worked in 2010 and 2011. This finding was upheld by the Tax Court in 2017. [ 9 ] As for Mary Lou Hennigar, after the separation, she was charged with operating a vehicle while impaired by alcohol and pleaded guilty to the charge. However, before this Court, she said that she was not the one who was driving.

She said that it was a friend who had fled after an accident and that she had shouldered the blame. [ 10 ] Thus, either she lied when she pleaded guilty to the offence in order to protect the real culprit, or she is lying before this Court by now saying that she was not the one behind the wheel. [ 11 ] I do not have to judge the parties for past offences or mistakes. However, their past behaviour may have a bearing on their credibility today. [ 12 ] I listened carefully to their respective testimonies in addition to assessing them in light of what other witnesses said at the trial.

I have also read and re-read their affidavits which form part of the Record on Application. I found that both tended to downplay the contributions and work of the other or to describe what appeared to be an exaggeration of the other’s

alcoholism or (prescription) drug addiction, with each denying the other’s claims in this regard. [ 13 ] I find that the credibility of each of them is significantly weakened. Despite this, I have arrived at factual determinations based on which I can decide the issues by accepting sometimes the testimony of one party, sometimes that of the other, but, above all, by making findings that strike me as reasonable and probable upon consideration of all the evidence.

Contempt of Court [ 14 ] Before turning to the most contentious issues, it is appropriate to briefly address the contempt of court issue, which was also part of the hearing. The Applicant had filed a motion for contempt on April 27, 2021, which was to be heard at the same time as the application. [ 15 ] First, at the request of Ms. Hennigar, an injunction was granted in December 2017, prohibiting Mr. Doucet from selling the fishing vessel and from disposing in any way of the fishing licences, including the lobster licence.

A first injunction was initially granted ex parte but was then confirmed with the consent of the parties two weeks later. [ 16 ] Despite the injunction, Jacques Doucet mortgaged the fishing licences and the boat in 2019 and 2020 and then attempted to sell the boat in 2021. Ms. Hennigar managed to halt the sale in time. The boat was eventually sold, but Mr. Doucet had to pay Ms. Hennigar $30,000 from the sale. [ 17 ] At the beginning of the hearing, Mr. Doucet admitted to the contempt.

During his testimony, he tried to minimize his actions by saying that he “didn’t really know” that he could not sell or mortgage the assets in question. Yet, I had told him this from the outset, on December 20, 2017, when he appeared in Court with his counsel and consented to the injunction, a copy of which he obtained that same day. He apologized in Court for his contempt, which is fine. But I do not accept the explanations he gave in trying to justify himself. [ 18 ] Mr. Doucet adds that he is not claiming any of the $30,000 he gave Ms. Hennigar and that this should be sufficient as punishment for his contempt.

The Applicant agrees that this amount is sufficient to cover the contempt for attempting to sell the boat. However, she seeks an additional penalty for the contempt related to the prohibited mortgages, which now affect the fishing licences. [ 19 ] I am of the opinion that the $30,000 already paid to Ms. Hennigar by Mr. Doucet is an appropriate punishment for the two contempt offences. This amount will not be considered when comes the time to divide the assets. Unjust Enrichment [ 20 ] As stated at the outset, the most valuable assets belong to Jacques Doucet, at least on paper.

They are the residence where he and Mary Lou Hennigar lived for most of their lives together and the fishing business, including the boat and the lobster licence. [ 21 ] With respect to what would ordinarily be considered marital property, had the couple been married, Mr. Doucet’s counsel argues that Ms. Hennigar may be entitled to half, but that the division has already been made and that she has probably already received more than the share to which she is entitled. [ 22 ] Obviously, the fishing business is the asset most coveted by both parties. Although we are not at the valuation of assets stage, Ms.

Hennigar has already filed on the record an expert report showing that the lobster licence would be worth approximately $2 million, as of May 2022. Mr. Doucet disputes this valuation and has given notice of his intention to obtain his own valuation. In the meantime, he attributes a value of $90,000 to it in his most recent financial statement.

[ 23 ] Thus, Mary Lou Hennigar claims half of the fishing business, while Jacques Doucet submits that she has no right to it and certainly not to half. [ 24 ] When unmarried spouses end their relationship, they usually have to resort to case law to resolve the issue of the division of assets.

Unlike to married couples, New Brunswick legislation does not give them a quasi-automatic right to a certain division of property. [ 25 ] If one spouse leaves with what may appear to be a disproportionate share of the assets accumulated during their cohabitation, particularly where those assets are registered solely in his or her name, then the other party must invoke the principle of unjust enrichment to try to obtain a share to which he or she believes to be entitled.

Added to this principle are concepts such as constructive trust and joint family venture. [ 26 ] The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Kerr v. Baranow [2] explains in detail the law relating to these concepts and the procedure for those who wish to invoke them and for the courts that must rule. [ 27 ] Thus, to show that she has rights in the assets and business in Jacques Doucet’s name, Mary Lou Hennigar must convince the Court to answer yes to each of the following questions:

a) Was Jacques Doucet enriched at the expense of Mary Lou Hennigar?

b) Has Mary Lou Hennigar suffered a corresponding deprivation?

c) Is there an absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment and corresponding deprivation? [ 28 ] From the outset, I consider that Mary Lou Hennigar has discharged this burden and has succeeded in showing that there would be unjust enrichment if she were to be left with virtually nothing following her separation from Jacques Doucet. [ 29 ] In fact, this is a case where unjust enrichment is abundantly clear. This couple started from almost nothing, lived together for almost 25 years and accumulated assets through their joint work.

They poured their heart and soul into this joint family venture, which led to the opening and operation of a fish market and a lucrative lobster fishing business. Both partners were tireless workers who sought by all means to bring in money and benefit from it. [ 30 ] Mary Lou Hennigar is now 64 years old and Jacques Doucet is 58 (56 and 50 at the time of their separation). When they started dating in 1991, they were 33 and 26. [ 31 ] Mr. Doucet soon invited Ms. Hennigar to come and live with him in a dwelling unit he was renting in Dalhousie.

At the time, she was receiving social assistance benefits following a car accident and had custody of her two children, aged 10 and 14. For at least a year, she did not report that she was living with Mr. Doucet in order to continue receiving social assistance benefits. [ 32 ] Both the Applicant and the Respondent had experience in fishing, with all kinds of fish and seafood. During her youth, she lived in various foster homes on the Acadian Peninsula where she was introduced to fishing and products of the sea. He comes from a family where his uncles were in the fishing business.

So, when they started out together, they quickly became what is commonly known in Acadia as “ peddleux ” (or travelling salespeople). [ 33 ] For several years, they went door-to-door, set up shop at various locations, quite often in Lorne,

or welcomed customers into their home where they sold smelts, clams, oysters, shrimps, herring, mussels, etc. Sometimes they fished themselves; otherwise, they bought and sold at a profit. Apparently, none of this was reported for tax purposes. [ 34 ] Moreover, shortly after they began living together, the rented house in Dalhousie was bought and registered solely in Mr. Doucet’s name. The same was true when they moved to another house that they bought in Point La Nim in 1993, where they lived together until they separated. They also bought and sold other properties but did not live in them.

They also did a lot of what they called “ wheeling and dealing,” whether it was with vehicles, land or any other property that would make them a profit. In fact, in addition to fishing clams, Mr. Doucet was involved in these types of activities when he met Ms. Hennigar. [ 35 ] They also harvested and sold firewood, although they both said it was not very profitable. [ 36 ] Both testified that everything they did was not always reported.

There were a lot of transactions in what can be described as the underground economy. [ 37 ] Sometimes property was put in the name of one or the other, alternately, to protect it from potential seizure. For example, a cottage was purchased in Dalhousie Junction. Ms. Hennigar testified that it was actually purchased for her because she was the one who wanted it. However, she had declared bankruptcy in connection with another property located in Dalhousie. To protect the cottage from creditors, it was put in Mr. Doucet’s name. [ 38 ] Following that, it was Mr.

Doucet who had to assume heavy debts with the Canada Revenue Agency. In 2010, the cottage was thus transferred to Ms. Hennigar’s name. A few months after the separation, she moved into the cottage and later sold it. Mr. Doucet testified that he offered to buy it back from her at a higher price than she received. She denied receiving any such offer. [ 39 ] Both at the time of the purchase of the cottage in Mr. Doucet’s name in 2006 and at the time of its sale by Ms. Hennigar in 2016, the actual price was not disclosed to counsel. Mr.

Doucet testified that he paid part of the purchase price “under the table” while Ms. Hennigar indicated that the sale price on paper was different from the actual price and considered a debt she owed to the buyers. [ 40 ] In 1996, they decided together to open a fish market, on the same property as the house in which they lived. They purchased equipment and expanded an existing building so that they could begin operating the fish market in the spring of 1997. The business was named Doucet Fish Market and, like the land and house, was registered in Mr.

Doucet’s name. [ 41 ] In 1995, Mary Lou Hennigar received $35,000 from an out-of-court settlement following her 1990 automobile accident. She claims that she used the money to pay the mortgage [3] on the house as well as to buy the equipment needed to open the fish market, make renovations to the house and the building housing the fish market, and buy an ATV, a snowmobile, and a lawnmower for the family. [ 42 ] In his testimony, Mr. Doucet denied that Ms. Hennigar participated financially in all of those expenses, except for the ATV, snowmobile, and lawnmower.

In cross-examination, he admitted that she put money towards the house, but not towards the expansion of the building housing the fish market. Yet, in his affidavit of January 22, 2018, he had acknowledged that she had contributed financially to the house and to the fish market. [4] As for the equipment purchased for the business, he said that in any event, it was “old stuff”. He added that the insurance settlement money obtained by Ms.

Hennigar for her accident had been spent before she even received it. [ 43 ] When the business finally opened its doors in the spring of 1997, they sold all kinds of fish and seafood. A few years later, they decided to sell almost exclusively lobster.

The fish market is open to the public during the lobster fishing season, for a few months in the spring and during the summer. [ 44 ] Mary Lou Hennigar maintains that she was responsible for all the administration of the business and that she also carried out just about every task there: cooking lobster, sales, catering to chefs and camp owners on the Restigouche River, bookkeeping, etc. She testified that during the high season, she worked from 4 or 5 a.m. until 2 a.m. She also claims that her husband almost never entered the fish market.

[ 45 ] For his part, Jacques Doucet admitted that Ms. Hennigar did a lot of work in the fish market, but that she had help from other employees and was herself paid, meaning that she was compensated for her contribution to the fish market. She explained that she was indeed paid, but for 80 hours a week when she usually worked 100 and more. [ 46 ] I am driven to the conclusion that on this point, as in this entire matter, both parties tend to exaggerate their own contribution or to underestimate that of the other party in order to support the position they have taken in this matter.

I do not think it is true that Mr. Doucet almost never went to the fish market. And when he says that he does not remember that Ms. Hennigar got up at 5 a.m. to work, he is showing a selective memory. Perhaps he was already gone fishing himself? [ 47 ] The evidence further shows that she was considered as an employee in order to be able to receive employment insurance benefits.

In fact, she admitted that she put another address on her employment insurance applications because she believed that she would not be able to receive benefits while working at the same address as her residence. [5] [ 48 ] The parties’ habits also lead me to conclude that the fact that Ms. Hennigar was paid for her work at the fish market does not preclude her from succeeding in her unjust enrichment claim. She was paid in cash, which was then transferred to the family money bag. But in essence, her salary, like the employment insurance benefits, was used for the family, as was Mr.

Doucet’s income or employment insurance benefits. [ 49 ] In any event, I believe that both parties are hard workers who did not count the hours worked in order to succeed in their business activities. Since the fish market opened in 1997, the fishing season has always been the same: while one spent hours on the boat, the other spent as many hours, if not more, in the fish market.

And I am satisfied by the evidence that the fish market and the fishing activities were part of the same business. [ 50 ] Michel Guitard, who takes care of the company’s accounting, testified that for tax purposes, the fishing business and the fish market were considered separately. However, both had the same employer number, and neither was incorporated. Everything was reported in a single tax return, that of Mr. Doucet. [ 51 ] Jacques Doucet began fishing lobster for Layne Godin in the 1990s. When Mr. Godin became ill, Mr. Doucet and Ms. Hennigar considered purchasing the business and the lobster licence.

Both claim to have had the idea and to have negotiated a contract with Mr. Godin. In fact, Ms. Hennigar claims that the fishing licence was to be put in her name, but that she was not eligible because she had not fished within the previous two years. [ 52 ] The business, including a boat and other equipment, as well as the lobster licence were purchased from Layne Godin in 2013, two years before the parties separated. Everything was done in Jacques Doucet’s name. According to Ms.

Hennigar, [6] the agreement provided for a purchase price of $240,000, to be paid in an immediate payment of $35,000, followed by annual payments of $10,000 until full payment or until Mr. Godin’s death. He passed away in 2016. [ 53 ] Mr. Doucet speaks [7] instead of a total amount of $65,000 paid to Mr. Godin in addition to the $35,000 deposit. It could have been as much as $75,000, but Mr. Godin died before that. [ 54 ] Ms.

Hennigar produced as a witness a former employee on the fishing boat, Darrel Lapointe, who came forward to say that Layne Godin had told him that he intended to sell the business and the fishing licence to Mary Lou Hennigar. Jacques Doucet objected to this testimony on the ground that it was hearsay. I agree. That part of Mr. Lapointe’s testimony is excluded and not considered. [8] [ 55 ] That said, in her testimony, Ms. Hennigar said that she herself made payments to Layne Godin, as can be seen in a document [9] which shows various cheques she wrote during the period.

Moreover, it is not known whether she had her own account or whether it came from a joint account. Mr. Doucet testified that she had access to the fish market account. He also said a few times that various payments, including mortgage payments and various monthly payments, came from his own account. However, no documentary evidence was filed regarding the parties’ bank accounts, whether individual, joint or a combination of the two.

[ 56 ] Mr. Doucet states that there was never any question of putting the licence and the fishing business in his spouse’s name. The evidence is therefore contradictory on this point also. If I were to accept Ms. Hennigar’s testimony, it would strengthen her argument that everything they did together amounts to a joint family venture. I have to say that on this particular issue, I am unable to figure out which one of them is telling the truth.

And in any event, it would have negligible impact on the decision I have to make, having regard to all the evidence. [ 57 ] After the boat and licence were bought, Jacques Doucet continued to devote himself to lobster fishing. It became much more lucrative as he was now in business for himself. Mary Lou Hennigar did not fish, but performed all sorts of related tasks, alone or with her spouse: painting the boat and buoys, repairing lobster traps already damaged at the time of purchase, cleaning, bookkeeping, guided boat tours on the Baie des Chaleurs, etc. [ 58 ] Here again, although he admitted that Ms.

Hennigar did some work, he downplayed it. For her part, she described Mr. Doucet as a drunk who did virtually nothing on the boat during fishing season. However, employees came forward to say otherwise. [ 59 ] While they were together, from the beginning to the opening of the fish market and the acquisition of the fishing business, it is clear that Mr. Doucet and Ms. Hennigar operated as a joint family venture. They spoke of a bag or pouch where they put the cash they received from their multiple businesses. The money that Ms.

Hennigar received from employment insurance was used for the family, as was the money that Mr. Doucet also received. He also received employment insurance benefits when he qualified. [ 60 ] On cross-examination, as well as in a 2018 examination for discovery, Mr. Doucet sometimes used “we” [10] to refer to the property and businesses from which they both benefitted and to the work they did together. In fact, on cross-examination, he even said that “ I never said it was not our business “ , adding, however, that his spouse was paid for her work.

Earlier, he had also testified that “ she used to do a lot of things when not sick. “ [ 61 ] As for the money that came in, he said that the profits were shared because “ she was my woman “. [ 62 ] The testimony also dealt somewhat with the household chores. Ms. Hennigar said that she did pretty much everything, particularly in connection with meals and housekeeping, while Mr. Doucet said that he prepared half of the meals, among other things. [ 63 ] When one of them was ill or convalescing, the other took care of him or her.

And one could go on and on dissecting the actions and contributions of one or the other during their 24 years of cohabitation. [ 64 ] But there is only one possible conclusion: for almost 25 years, this couple was strong, united and both worked by the sweat of their brow, almost equally, for the benefit of the family. [ 65 ] Thus, whether in respect of family assets or business assets, if Jacques Doucet were to retain a disproportionate share, including all of the business assets he claims, he would be enriched at the expense of Mary Lou Hennigar.

She would be correspondingly deprived. [ 66 ] All the time, energy, and resources she devoted to the assets and businesses from which they jointly benefitted while living together would be worthless. The parties’ joint efforts contributed to the accumulation of their wealth. [ 67 ] It has also been shown that there was no juristic reason for such enrichment. For example, there is no domestic contract providing that Jacques Doucet would retain all the assets registered in his name. [ 68 ] What must therefore be determined is the remedy to which Mary Lou Hennigar is entitled.

It could be a proprietary remedy, in the sense that one could conclude that a remedial constructive trust has in fact been created and that

Mr. Doucet holds Ms. Hennigar’s share as her trustee. In other words, both are owners, the business can be sold, and the proceeds shared, or one can buy out the other’s share. Alternatively, the remedy could also simply be monetary in order to reflect the true nature of Mr. Doucet’s enrichment and Ms. Hennigar’s corresponding deprivation. [ 69 ] In this case, either method may well produce the same result because when they entered into their relationship, both parties started from roughly the same point.

All valuable assets were acquired, retained, maintained, or improved with roughly equal contributions from both spouses during their cohabitation. [ 70 ] Each case depends on its own circumstances. Here, this is a genuine joint family venture: through their joint efforts, the economic integration of their businesses, and the real intent that can be inferred from their actions, Mr. Doucet and Ms. Hennigar formed a partnership and worked together towards common goals. Ms. Hennigar properly summarized the parties’ common intent in her testimony: “ If we could get a lobster licence, we’ve got it made .” And they did.

Unfortunately, two years later, they broke up. [ 71 ] The evidence produced before the Court raised another issue. This was the mutual benefits that accrued to both spouses. In other words, by claiming unjust enrichment, Ms. Hennigar was able to show that she had put in the same amount of effort and involvement as Mr. Doucet in the accumulation of their wealth and that it would be unfair for Mr. Doucet alone to benefit from it after the separation. However, Ms. Hennigar also benefitted from her relationship with Mr.

Doucet. [ 72 ] Initially, Jacques Doucet owed no obligation to Mary Lou Hennigar’s two children or family. However, it is clear that the money from the parties’ joint income was also used for the children. For example, Mr. Doucet points to the automobile purchased for Ms. Hennigar’s son upon his graduation from high school. [ 73 ] The evidence also shows, in particular through the list of cheques issued by Ms. Hennigar, that money was given to her sister Betty, who was in need. [ 74 ] Moreover, although both Ms. Hennigar and Mr. Doucet benefited from the family and business assets, Mr.

Doucet almost always bore the financial risks alone. He was the sole signatory to the numerous mortgages on the various properties. [ 75 ] Ms. Hennigar did however assume the risks of a convenience store/restaurant in Dalhousie that failed. This was another joint venture but, this time, it was put in Ms. Hennigar’s name. In fact, she had to declare personal bankruptcy due to the failure of this project. [ 76 ] It is difficult to quantify these mutual benefits. However, it seems that this was again the result of the common intention to operate in this way.

It made sense that the children would live with them and that they needed to be fed. It is not clear when they moved out. It is clear, however, that Mr. Doucet nevertheless assumed a significant role in their lives. In fact, he was the one who offered to buy the son a car. [ 77 ] As it appears to be the case with all of the couple’s major expenses, there was prior consultation and agreement on the expenses. Similarly, if Mr. Doucet wanted a snowmobile to use in his spare time, Ms.

Hennigar would agree and say, “ Dig into the money bag. ” [ 78 ] The only property that will be excluded from the division is, with the consent of the Respondent, the land that Ms. Hennigar received from her great-grandfather and the sum of $30,000 received from the sale of the first boat, in breach of the extant injunction, and which is considered a redress for Mr. Doucet’s contempt of court. [ 79 ] For all other assets, whether they form part of the family assets or the business assets, they will have to be divided equally. Spousal support

[ 80 ] Mary Lou Hennigar is also seeking spousal support. She says she can no longer work and has been virtually destitute since the separation. She has had to sell the cottage, obtain financial assistance from family and friends, and receive social assistance. Mr. Doucet was also ordered to pay her interim spousal support of $750 per month from June 1, 2021. [ 81 ] First, when Ms. Hennigar filed her application on August 16, 2017, the one-year limitation period [11] to apply for support following the separation had already expired.

The question of the constitutional validity of this prima facie discriminatory limitation period for unmarried spouses has already been addressed a few times by the courts of our province. However, the law is not yet settled on this matter, as evidenced by Meyer v. Johnston , [12] a 2019 decision of our Court of Appeal. [ 82 ] Since then, the one-year limitation period following separation has been abolished by the Family Law Act , [13] which came into force on March 1, 2021.

Both before and after the entry into force of this Act, the party seeking support must show that while they cohabited continuously for at least three years, he or she was substantially dependent on the other for support. [ 83 ] The duration of the relationship is not in dispute. However, has the Applicant demonstrated that during the period of cohabitation she was substantially dependent on the Respondent? [ 84 ] Her entire argument surrounding the issue of unjust enrichment appears to run counter to the position she takes on spousal support.

The Court has accepted that she worked as much as the Respondent at the various businesses, large and small, that they operated together. They both had incomes that they shared. [ 85 ] It was not a situation where one stayed home with no income to look after the children while the other went out to earn money to support the family. Each of them worked as much as the other, often at the same time. [ 86 ] Ms. Hennigar had worked before she and Mr. Doucet became a couple. When they moved in together, she was off work due to a car accident. She may therefore have been temporarily substantially dependent on Mr.

Doucet in the initial stages of their relationship. However, this was of short duration and for only a small part of the total period of cohabitation. She was therefore not substantially dependent on her spouse during their cohabitation. [ 87 ] After the separation, however, she was involved in further motor vehicle accidents. Her injuries had an impact on her ability to work, as did the depression she suffered as a result of the separation, according to her testimony.

Besides, other than her testimony, there is no current medical evidence regarding her current inability to work. [ 88 ] In fact, the Respondent argues that the medical evidence on the record shows that the inability to work, [14] if any, stems not from their relationship but from accidents that occurred after the separation and that he should not be required to pay spousal support in this context.

Moreover, Mary Lou Hennigar’s application for disability benefits under the Canada Pension Plan was rejected. [ 89 ] For all these reasons, and mainly because she has not shown that she was substantially dependent on Jacques Doucet during their cohabitation, Mary Lou Hennigar is not entitled to spousal support. Disposition [ 90 ] It would be a disproportionate and unfair division if the assets registered solely in Jacques Doucet’s name were to accrue to him in their entirety. [ 91 ] All family assets must be divided equally between Jacques Doucet and Mary Lou Hennigar.

The debts must also be divided in the same manner. The value of the various assets and debts and the date of their valuation remain to be

determined. [ 92 ] This includes, among others, the family home and its contents, the Point La Nim cottage, a woodlot, the vehicles, the mortgage, etc.

These assets and debts, as well as the $92,000 [15] debt owing to Employment Insurance or the Canada Revenue Agency, will have to be negotiated and agreed upon, as required by the procedural order of March 21, 2023. [ 93 ] As for the business assets, Mary Lou Hennigar is also entitled to half of the fishing business, which includes the boat, the fish market and the lobster and other fish and shellfish licences, again with a view to avoiding Jacques Doucet’s unjust enrichment at her expense.

Of course, the business’s debts must also be considered. [ 94 ] Similarly, there are still critical issues to be negotiated or decided by the Court. At this point in time, the asset with the greatest value is certainly the lobster licence. The matter of its valuation date could also have a tangible impact on the outcome of the division. On the other hand, the new boat was purchased and mortgaged after the separation. Its place, if any, in the valuation will have to be determined. It may be that it is excluded from the division.

If no agreement is reached, the parties shall return before the Court to litigate these issues. [ 95 ] Mary Lou Hennigar’s claim for spousal support is denied. The interim support paid by Jacques Doucet since June 1, 2021, will therefore cease immediately. The sums paid to date are not immediately recoverable but may be deducted from the compensatory amount that will eventually be paid to Ms. Hennigar. If these amounts have been deducted and included in the parties’ respective income tax returns, this should be considered in the calculation. [ 96 ] This matter is yet to be concluded.

Costs will be dealt with in the second part of the hearing of this application and may vary depending on the valuation of the various assets. However, Ms. Hennigar nonetheless prevailed on the issue that I believe to be the most important at this stage.

Jacques Doucet must therefore pay her interim costs in the amount of $6,000 forthwith, which will be considered in the final decision on costs. [ 97 ] Of course, until a final decision is rendered, the existing injunctions remain in place, as does the certificate of pending litigation. [ 98 ] In closing, I want to point out that the hearing was held in both official languages. Normally, this means that this decision would be rendered in French and English at the same time. However, this matter concerns a separation that occurred eight years ago, and an application filed in 2017.

The passage of time undoubtedly causes significant harm to both parties, who deserve to move on. That is why this decision is being issued firstly in French, with the English version to be available as soon as possible. May 10, 2023 ____________________ Campbellton, N.B. Larry Landry, J.C.K.B.