R. v. Steele-Young, 2019 NLSC 143

court crest IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR GENERAL DIVISION Citation : R. v. Steele-Young , 2019 NLSC 143 Date : July 26, 2019 Docket : 201701G7528 Her Majesty The Queen v. Joshua Steele-Young Before: Justice Frances J. Knickle Place of Hearing: St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador Dates of Hearing: December 3 - 7, 2018; December 10, 2018 and December 13, 2018; January 14, 2019; February 22, 2019; May 1 and 3, 2019 Appearances: Jennifer E. Lundrigan Appearing on behalf of the Crown Randolph J. Piercey, Q.C. Appearing on behalf of the Accused Authorities Cited:

CASES CONSIDERED: R. v. Lifchus, (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320; R. v. Starr, 2000 2 SCC 40; R. v. W. (D.), (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742; R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17; R. v. K.P., 2019 NLCA 37; R. v. Best, 2016 NLCA 10;. R. v. S.O.,2019 NLCA 42; R. v. M. (R.E.), 2008 SCC 51; R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5; R. v. Romano, 2017 ONCA 837; R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26; R. v.Malkowski, 2015 ONCA 887; R. v. L. (K), 2009 ONCA 141; R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24; R. v. Stapleton (2010), (NLPC), 303 Nfld. & P.E.I.R 284, 941 A.P.R 284 (NL Prov. Ct.); R. v. Pritchard, 2008 SCC 59; R. c.

Tremblay (1997), (QC CA), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 86, 35 W.C.B. (2d) 384 (Qc. C.A.); R. v. S.(K.) 2001, 49 W.C.B. (2d) 268, 2001 CarswellOnt 721 (Ont. Ct.J.); R. v. T(J.G.), 1999 ABQB 981 STATUTES CONSIDERED: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Knickle, J.: INTRODUCTION [1] The Accused, Joshua Steele-Young, is charged with the offences of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and forcibleconfinement, contrary to Sections 249(2) and 279(2), respectively, of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Joshua Steele-Young haspleaded not guilty to both counts. The trial was conducted over several days.

This is the decision on verdict. OVerview of the evidence [2] Much of the evidence was uncontroversial. Joshua Steele-Young was in a relationship with the victim of the accident,Morgan Pardy, and had been for several months. The relationship was discordant. The couple often argued, broke up and then resumedseeing each other. The weekend prior to the alleged offences, the two had argued and ended the relationship. According to both JoshuaSteele-Young and Morgan Pardy, this break up had more of an air of finality than previous break ups.

On the following Monday, themorning of March 20, 2017, after texting back and forth, the two arranged to meet each other to talk. Although there was somedisagreement as to who wanted to talk to whom, it was mutually agreed that Morgan Pardy would go for a drive in Joshua Steele-Young’s vehicle. It was during this drive that an argument ensued and an accident occurred. The route taken by Joshua Steele-Youngwas from near Morgan Pardy’s home to Pitts Memorial Drive (the highway), in St.

John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador to ConceptionBay South (CBS) where he lived. [3] The evidence establishes that Joshua Steele-Young drove at an excessive speed on the highway, given the conditions. It wassnowing, the roads were slippery, and there was traffic. Joshua Steele-Young lost control of his vehicle while driving near 130 km perhour in those less than ideal conditions.

The vehicle left the highway, became airborne, and then rolled multiple times until it came torest several metres from the highway. [4] Morgan Pardy testified, and the physical evidence supported, that she unfastened her seatbelt prior to the accident occurring. According to Morgan Pardy, she was afraid and wanted to be let out of the car because of the manner of Joshua Steele-Young’s driving. Unfortunately, it was only moments after removing her seatbelt that the accident occurred. Either before or as the car came to acomplete stop, Morgan Pardy was ejected.

According to one witness, Morgan Pardy cartwheeled through the air to a height above atelephone line, and then landed on the snow-covered ground several metres from the vehicle. Another witness saw “something” comeout of the window of the car. Another witness described seeing the airborne car like “something from ‘Dukes of Hazard’”. JoshuaSteele-Young, who was wearing a seatbelt, suffered minor injuries.

Morgan Pardy testified she had no opportunity to refasten herseatbelt before the accident occurred. [5] Joshua Steele-Young testified that the reason the accident occurred was because Morgan Pardy pushed his elbow and thiscaused the car to swerve. He could then not correct the car and it went out of control. Morgan Pardy denies any such contact. [6] The parties agreed there was a ‘rollover’ type car accident, on the date in question, and that that rollover accident causedMorgan Pardy’s injuries. Joshua Steele-Young admitted this as a fact under

section 655 of the Criminal Code. By agreement, thefollowing was read into the record during the trial by the prosecutor: Morgan Pardy suffered serious injuries as a result of the rollover and ejection on March 20, 2017. Steele-Young concedes that Pardysuffered bodily harm as a result of being ejected from the vehicle he was driving on March 20, 2017. [7] There is also no dispute that the injuries suffered by Morgan Pardy as a result of this accident were devastating andpermanent.

Morgan Pardy testified that she suffered multiple injuries, including a broken pelvis, many broken ribs, and mostsignificantly, a fracture to her cervical area, which has left her paralyzed from the waist down. She spent several months in hospital, andneeds assistance with much of her day-to-day living. She has recovered the use of her arms to a certain extent, but is still limited in herability to use her hands. THE ISSUES

[8] The issues are threefold, as follows: 1. Firstly, does the evidence prove that Joshua Steele-Young was driving dangerously? 2. Secondly, if Joshua Steele-Young was driving dangerously, was his dangerous driving a significant contributing cause ofMorgan Pardy’s injuries and if so, was there an intervening act, that is the act of Morgan Pardy pushing his elbow, or by the act ofremoving her seatbelt, that severed the causal connection between his driving and her injuries? 3.

Thirdly, did Joshua Steele-Young possess the requisite mens rea for the offence of forcible confinement: that is, did heintentionally refuse to let Morgan Pardy out of the vehicle, and in so doing, intended for Morgan Pardy to remain unlawfully confined inthe car, against her will. THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES [9] Joshua Steele-Young submits his driving did not cause the accident. He submits the cause of the accident was MorganPardy’s act of pushing his right elbow while his hands were on the wheel. It was that push that caused him to lose control of the car; nothis manner of driving.

Joshua Steele-Young submits that even if his driving was “dangerous”, Morgan Pardy’s act of “pushing” hiselbow, was an independent and intervening act, which severed any connection between the manner of his driving and the cause of herinjuries. Her unforeseeable act caused the accident, and in turn, her injuries. Similarly, her decision to remove her seatbelt was anindependent and unforeseeable act that severed any link between his driving and the cause of her injuries. Joshua Steele-Young submitshe had no control over this conduct.

If Morgan Pardy had been wearing a seatbelt, she may not have been ejected from the car, and maynot have suffered the extensive injuries. Given these intervening acts, the Accused submits there is no connection between her injuriesand his driving. At most, he may be guilty of dangerous driving. [10] With respect to the offence of forcible confinement, while there is no dispute that Morgan Pardy was confined in the car, JoshuaSteele-Young denies any unlawful confinement.

Joshua Steele-Young submits Morgan Pardy made no request to be let out of thevehicle or expressed that she was afraid of his manner of driving. [11] In contrast, the Crown submits that Morgan Pardy did not cause her injuries by “pushing” the Accused’s elbow while his handwas on the steering wheel. Morgan Pardy denies doing any such act, and her evidence should be accepted. The accident was causedbecause Joshua Steele-Young was distracted and was driving too fast for the conditions. Even if Morgan Pardy’s act of removing herseatbelt was a contributing cause to her injuries, it is not the sole cause.

The removal of her seatbelt did not cause the Accused to losecontrol of the vehicle and have the accident. The dangerous driving caused the accident. If the Accused had not been drivingdangerously, there likely would have been no accident, and thus no resulting force that would cause Morgan Pardy to be ejected from thecar and suffer the injuries.

The cause of her injuries is necessarily connected to the accident, which was caused by the dangerousdriving. [12] The Crown further submits that the Court should accept Morgan Pardy’s evidence that she became afraid in the car, andrequested and then demanded repeatedly, to be let out of the vehicle.

The Crown submits by refusing to allow Morgan Pardy to leave thecar, after her repeated requests, Joshua Steele-Young confined Morgan Pardy without lawful authority. [13] I will review the evidence as it relates to the issues that need to be decided, and as they relate to my assessment of the credibilityof the witnesses. If I do not mention a particular piece of evidence, it is not because I have not considered it. I have considered all theevidence. [14] However, before discussing the evidence as it relates to the issues, it is helpful to review the principles that govern a criminaltrial.

The Standard of Proof in a criminal Trial [15] In a criminal trial, the onus is on the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offence charged beyond a reasonable doubt. That onus never shifts (R. v. Lifchus, (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320). The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt iscloser to absolute certainty than it is to the balance of probabilities (R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40). It is not enough to be satisfied that Mr.Steele-Young “probably” or “more likely than not” committed the offences.

On the criminal standard, a court must be satisfied wellbeyond this level of certainty. [16] In this case, because Mr. Steele-Young testified, in deciding whether the offences have been proven, the Court must also becognizant of the instruction in R. v. W. (D.), (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. This approach is to ensure that in a casewhere there may be competing versions as to what occurred, the court does not fall into the trap of simply choosing between the twocontested versions of events, but renders its verdict on an assessment of all the evidence.

It is always helpful to review the framework ofW. (D.). [17] Firstly, if the evidence of Mr. Steele-Young is believed and would support a finding of not guilty, the Court must find Mr.Steele-Young not guilty. [18] Secondly, even if Mr. Steele-Young’s evidence is not believed, if the Court is left with a reasonable doubt by the evidence, thenMr. Steele-Young must be acquitted. [19] Finally, even if the evidence of Mr.

Steele-Young does not raise a reasonable doubt, the Court must still assess all the evidencethat it does accept, to determine whether the evidence supports beyond a reasonable doubt that the offences occurred. [20] In this case, there is conflicting evidence, not only between Morgan Pardy and Joshua Steele-Young, as to what happened in thecar, but also more generally between all the witnesses with respect to their observations of the events. It is helpful to review what the lawsays about the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their evidence.

[21] The assessment of the credibility of a witness, as well as the veracity of a witness’ testimony, is not a formulaic process; but theculmination of a number of considerations such as, but not limited to, how the witness responded to questions, were they argumentative,evasive or forthright, how was their recall, what was their opportunity to observe the event, and were there inconsistencies in theirevidence standing alone, or in relation to the other evidence called. [22] In assessing the witnesses, I also keep in mind the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. c.

Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17 atparagraph 20: Assessing credibility is not a science. It is very difficult for a trial judge to articulate with precision the complex intermingling ofimpressions that emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various versions of events. … [23] I also keep in mind the further comments of our Court of Appeal in R. v. K.P., 2019 NLCA 37 at paragraphs 42 and 47. Referring to their previous decision of R. v. Best, 2016 NLCA 10, the court reminds us that as the Trial Judge, I may accept all, some ornone of the evidence of a witness. [24] In R. v.

S.O., 2019 NLCA 42, at paragraph 16, Hoegg, J.A, speaking for a unanimous court, stated that the assessment ofcredibility of the witness is the “province” of trial judges, and “many factors inform the result”. At paragraph 17, Hoegg, J.A. statedfurther: This Court addressed the issue in Stassis v.

Amicus Bank, 2014 NLCA 38 , 356 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 80, wherein White J.A.endorsed the time-tested approach to assessing credibility set out by the British Columbia Court of Appeal at page 357 of Faryna v.Chorny (1951), (BC CA), [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354, (B.C.C.A.): The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether thepersonal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction of the truth.

The test must reasonably subject his story to an examinationof its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions … …The trial judge ought to go further and say that evidence of the witness he believes is in accordance with the preponderance ofprobabilities in the case and, if his view is to command confidence, also state his reasons for that conclusion. The law does not clothethe trial judge with a divining insight into the hearts and minds of the witnesses… [25] As stated by McLachlin, C.J. in R. v.

M. (R.E.), 2008 SCC 51, at paragraph 49, “assessing credibility is a difficult and delicatematter that does not always lend itself to precise and complete verbalization”. [26] I also keep in mind that witnesses may have differing perceptions of the same event. [27] With the above guidance I will review my findings with respect to the assessment of the witness evidence, in particular that ofMorgan Pardy and Joshua Steele-Young. The Evidence of Morgan Pardy [28] I found Morgan Pardy a compelling witness. Her recall was excellent and her responses detailed.

Morgan Pardy listened to thequestions, and took her time before responding, often thinking aloud and then confirming her response. She answered all questions in aforthright manner, and was candid about things she did not remember. At times, she recounted what happened in the present tense, as ifshe was reliving the event. [29] Morgan Pardy recalled small details. For example, she recalled that when she went in to change and get ready to go back andmeet Mr. Steele-Young, she intended to take her dog, Monty, with her.

She did not, because, her sister and her sister’s boyfriend decidedthey were going to take the family dog for a walk with them instead. [30] When asked why the couple frequently argued, Morgan Pardy testified that Joshua Steele-Young would get jealous when shewould associate with her friends and not him; in particular, her friend Courtney, and a former boyfriend, from “long ago” with whom shewas still friends. Morgan Pardy testified there had also been an intense argument about two weeks prior the accident, in which her phonewas broken.

Joshua Steele-Young threw the phone towards a bed but the phone missed and broke. She explained this was why thecommunications to her from Joshua Steele-Young, the Friday before the accident, were on her friend Courtney’s phone. [31] Morgan Pardy did not minimize her own anger during the time inside the vehicle. She readily admitted she said hurtful thingsto Joshua Steele-Young as much as he was saying hurtful things to her. Nor was she hyperbolic in her description of events; or vindictivetowards Joshua Steele-Young.

For example, although she testified that she and Joshua Steele-Young argued from the moment sheentered the car, she was clear that it was not until Joshua Steele-Young struck a pothole on the ramp towards the highway that theargument intensified to the point that she became fearful of his driving. When asked to describe Joshua Steele-Young’s driving before hestruck the pothole, Morgan Pardy testified that at first his driving was normal.

She described that when they were near a dental office,Joshua Steele-Young changed gears and was accelerating fast enough to push her back in her seat, but it was still “normal” speed. [32] Morgan Pardy was detailed not only as to what Joshua Steele-Young said, but how his tone changed during the argument andthen again when she started to ask to be let out of the vehicle. She described that as soon as she entered the car, he started asking whereshe was the night before, what was she doing, if she was “screwing around with Jeremy” and that he could not believe “she had notmessaged him”.

Morgan Pardy testified she could tell he was “pissed” by the tone of his voice and facial expression. [33] He was also saying things like “No wonder why I want to do away with myself” which she interpreted as suicidal or, “You

don’t care about me”. She stated she was trying to calm Mr. Steele-Young down saying things like “You need to calm down”, and “We are broken up” or “Listen to what I am saying”. [ 34 ] Her account of her last recollections before the accident occurred was vivid: that she saw the front of a silver or grey truck in her passenger window, then she heard Joshua Steele-Young said “F—ck”. The next thing she remembered was “being tossed around, briefly seeing treetops”. She remembered people asking her name, her birthday, and cutting off her clothes, her mom’s name, and then nothing until she woke up in the hospital.

She testified she thought she was getting the name wrong, because they kept asking for her name. [ 35 ] Her narrative possessed an internal logic from her account of how she stayed at her friend Courtney’s house, to meeting up with Joshua Steele-Young, to the communications, the progression of the argument, the driving, and the accident.

Her narrative described the argument initially as a “here we go again” and “like every other argument” to the argument becoming more heated, with Joshua Steele- Young calling her names and swearing, and she also getting upset, to ultimately Joshua Steele-Young speeding on the highway and her being “frightened to death” and screaming at Joshua Steele-Young to let her out of the car. Her narrative “rings true”. [ 36 ] Her evidence also accords with the observations of others, and the physical evidence.

For example, while Morgan Pardy testified she did not know how fast Joshua Steele-Young was driving, it was “too fast”, and that was why she was afraid. She testified that she could not be sure, but at one point she thought the speedometer read 130-140 km per hour. The observations of the witnesses were also that the vehicle in which Joshua Steele-Young was driving, was going too fast for the conditions.

The evidence from the accident investigators established that at the time the car left the roadway Joshua Steele-Young was traveling near 130 km per hour. [ 37 ] When pressed on cross-examination as to why she took off her seatbelt, Morgan Pardy stated it was because she wanted to get out of the car, and to make the point to Joshua Steele-Young that she was serious. That she unfastened her seat belt, is corroborated by the evidence of the accident investigators.

Two of the officers who investigated the accident, Constable Robert Brown and Constable Barry Osmond, both testified to their observations of the seatbelt, and confirmed that it had not retracted, as was observed of the driver’s seatbelt. [ 38 ] The device in the vehicle that recorded several events within the vehicle, referred to as the Crash Data Retrieval system, or CDR, also confirmed that the passenger seatbelt did not retract, as the driver’s seatbelt did when the car accident occurred. This in turn was consistent with the seatbelt not having been worn.

The text messages sent by Morgan Pardy after the accident [ 39 ] On cross-examination, Defence counsel pointed out to Morgan Pardy that soon after the accident and while she was still in hospital, she made several text communications to Joshua Steele-Young and others in which she apologized, and wanted to see Joshua Steele-Young. Defence counsel suggested the apologies were for having caused the accident. Copies of the text messages were entered as exhibits MP#1, MP#2 and MP#3. Morgan Pardy acknowledged the texts, but denied she was apologizing for causing the accident.

Morgan Pardy states that at the time she was very upset and was sorry for having fought with Joshua Steele-Young. [ 40 ] While there is no doubt the communications show Morgan Pardy saying she is “sorry” in different conversations, at no point does Morgan Pardy state that she is sorry for pushing Joshua Steele-Young’s elbow, or causing the accident in any way. To the contrary, in one text, it appears that Morgan Pardy apologizes for taking off her seatbelt and is sorry “that it changed” Joshua Steele-Young.

In the second text message, to apparently a different person, Morgan Pardy states “hate my life I’m done” and “I’m literally gonna to kill myself period”. In the third, in which it appears Morgan Pardy requested a friend inquire if Joshua Steele-Young would visit her in hospital, the friend suggests Morgan Pardy “could turn on him in a snap of a finger and fuck him over hard”.

In response, Morgan Pardy states she could, but “she would never say a word” and she would “admit it before fucking him over” and states she wants to give Joshua Steele-Young “the apology he deserves”. [ 41 ] I do not find these messages are an admission by Morgan Pardy that she took responsibility for causing the accident and they do not undermine her credibility. Nor are they inconsistent with her evidence as to what she recalled about the accident. [ 42 ] Firstly, in my view, one has to exercise caution before drawing inferences as to people’s meaning in their communications via texts.

Texting is a shorthand form of communication. It is easy to misinterpret meaning. In this case, it does not help that the copies of the text messages appear to be excerpts of conversations – not – entire conversations. Without knowing the full context, one must be even more cautious before drawing inferences as the intention in the communication.

For example, in relation to the text in which there is concern that Morgan Pardy would betray Joshua Steele-Young, Morgan Pardy testified she thought that communication occurred after Joshua Steele-Young had been charged with the offences and may have been when Joshua Steele-Young was bound by a condition not to speak with her. The potential for “betrayal” by Morgan Pardy was a reference to her texting him having speak to her and then betraying him by turning him in to the police for speaking to her when he was not allowed.

This context is not evident in the text message itself. [ 43 ] Secondly, the texts were sent in the weeks following the accident, when Morgan Pardy was in hospital clearly in a vulnerable state both emotionally and physically. Morgan Pardy testified feeling many emotions in the weeks following the accident, including blaming herself for what had happened to her and wanting to reach out to Joshua Steele-Young.

Having woken up from such a serious accident to find that she was now almost completely paralyzed, I find her explanation credible. [ 44 ] The actual script of the texts themselves suggest that Morgan Pardy was in an emotional state. For example, one text in which Morgan Pardy states “I can’t even explain I haven’t stopped fucking bawling im sorry im fucking sorry” is immediately followed by a plethora of emojii’s and then “fuuuuhcvvjkkkkkkkk”. In my view, this manner of script is cause for caution before drawing any

inference of the meaning behind the communications beyond that they appear to be made while in a emotional state. [ 45 ] I see no basis to find that the text messages constitute an apology by her as indication of her taking responsibility for causing the accident, which in turn undermines her credibility because it conflicts with her testimony at trial that she did not push Joshua Steele- Young’s elbow, or cause the accident. [ 46 ] Morgan Pardy was not otherwise challenged that her evidence was inconsistent with other evidence. [ 47 ] In

summary, upon a review of all of Morgan Pardy’s testimony, and in conjunction with all the evidence, my consideration of her demeanour and her candid testimony, I find her to be credible. I accept her testimony as to what happened; particularly between her and Joshua Steele-Young on the date in question. The Evidence of Joshua Steele-Young [ 48 ] On the other hand, Joshua Steele-Young was not so compelling. On direct examination, his answers were mostly short one worded responses, often answering before counsel had finished asking the question. His responses were brief, “yes” or “no”, even in critical areas.

It was difficult to get a sense of what Joshua Steele-Young truly remembered himself as to the events of the day. Even when Joshua Steele-Young was given the opportunity to elaborate on what he recalled about the events, he provided little detail. For example, when asked to elaborate on the nature of the argument, Joshua Steele-Young states it was “random stuff” or he did not know or did not remember.

He recalled that they were “calling each other down to the dirt”, and that Morgan Pardy called him an “idiot” when his vehicle hit the pot hole. [ 49 ] Under cross-examination, when not answering with a “yes” or “no”, he was often argumentative and evasive. He often responded to a question with another question, or repeating the same response when asked to explain what he meant. For example, there were a series of questions about what road conditions would cause Joshua Steele-Young to slow down his vehicle.

Counsel suggested to him that snowy conditions might be the kind of conditions in which he would slow down or drive less than the speed limit. Joshua Steele-Young either denied that he could not handle snowy conditions, particularly as it related to the date of the accident, or, rather than explain what kinds of conditions might affect how he would drive, repeatedly said, “it depends on the conditions”.

When asked by counsel to agree that the faster the car is traveling the harder the car would be to control, especially in snowy conditions, Joshua Steele- Young’s response again was “it depends on the conditions” and “Well I’ve never had any trouble in my life, so I don’t know what you mean.

I don’t know, I drive the highway all the time”. [ 50 ] When pressed by counsel about his decision to go on the highway where the speed limit was 100 km per hour when he could have stayed on the secondary roads where the speed limit was less, given the conditions and the heated argument, Joshua Steele-Young’s response was a question: “So anytime something is on the go in my car means that I can’t go 100 km on the highway – that don’t make sense”. [ 51 ] When Crown counsel suggested to him that he could have let Ms.

Pardy out of the vehicle at several junctures, including on the highway, his response was another question: “What? On the side of the highway?” [ 52 ] The impression left by his testimony was also that he was not at fault for what happened. Near the time he lost control of the vehicle, when he asserted Morgan Pardy pushed his elbow, he described Morgan Pardy as a “snapcase” and “flippin out”; whereas he was just driving “listening to his music”. It is not that he denied there was any argument during the drive, to the contrary, he admitted that the two argued and the argument was “heated”.

But it was clear that from his perspective, that on the highway in the moments before the accident, the person who was angry and arguing, was Morgan Pardy, not him. [ 53 ] When asked about how he might handle a situation where someone had removed their seatbelt, his response was “not my responsibility”. He repeated this several times. This was troubling testimony from Joshua Steele-Young.

It suggests to me even if he knew that Morgan Pardy unfastened her seatbelt, he would not adjust his driving to account for the risk that might now be posed by that act. [ 54 ] His testimony that he did not know that Morgan Pardy had removed her seatbelt is also not credible and I do not believe him. It is a further indication that he minimized his responsibility as the driver of the vehicle.

While I accept that Joshua Steele-Young may have not seen Morgan Pardy remove her seatbelt, once it was removed, it does not seem credible that he would not become aware of this. [ 55 ] Firstly, the evidence established that his model of vehicle signaled when a seatbelt was unfastened by two methods: a flashing light on the dashboard and an alarm by way of a “beeping”. According to the mechanic, Randy Biddicombe, who examined the vehicle, and who was also very familiar with the model, both the alarm and the flashing would continue until a belt was re-fastened.

Secondly, as discussed earlier, it is also clear from the evidence that Morgan Pardy did remove her seatbelt in the moments prior to the accident. This means that there would have been both a flashing light and an alarm that occurred when she removed the seatbelt. While Mr. Biddicombe could not confirm whether or not the alarms were inoperable, there was no evidence that there was any mechanical issue with such signaling in the vehicle prior to the accident.

Joshua Steele-Young’s own evidence was not that the alarm was not working, but that he could not hear it because of the loud music he was playing. [ 56 ] Given this, it is difficult to reconcile Joshua Steele-Young’s evidence that he did not hear an alarm because he was playing loud music, while at the same time, testify that he could hear what Morgan Pardy was saying while they argued despite the loud music. I do not accept it as credible that he would not have also heard the alarm.

There was no explanation from Joshua Steele-Young for why he did not notice a flashing light on his dashboard. [ 57 ] His evidence is also difficult to reconcile with the evidence of the independent witnesses. For example, while Joshua Steele- Young agreed that his vehicle may have been traveling at a speed of 130 km per hour at the time he lost control of the vehicle, he firmly denied that he was driving too fast for the conditions or that there was anything “unusual” about his speed.

When this response is taken with the evidence of the other witnesses who observed his driving and the conditions, his testimony that his driving was “not unusual” in my view, is an illustration of Joshua Steele-Young’s effort to minimize his conduct.

[ 58 ] Joshua Steele-Young testified that he drove in the passing lane because it was less snow-covered. This is also difficult to reconcile with the other witnesses; particularly the two witnesses who were traveling in his direction, John Scaplen and Karen Pardy. Both observed Joshua Steele-Young’s vehicle pass them on the highway. Both were clear that at the time they were driving, the passing lane was more snow covered than the right hand lane, not less as testified to by Joshua Steele-Young.

John Scaplen testified that when he saw the red car in the passing lane, he thought to himself “what is he doing in that outside lane” and was concerned because the passing lane was snow-covered. [ 59 ] Nor is Joshua Steele-Young’s evidence that the snow was “not sticking” or not “accumulating” on the pavement or that it was snowing “lightly” easy to reconcile with the other evidence. [ 60 ] While two of the other witnesses, Noriza Chaytor and Kent Smallwood did not describe their lanes as being snow-covered, in my view, I note they were traveling from the other direction.

They were also clear they could only speak to their recollection as to their own lanes at the time. A third witness, Grant Hounsell, also traveling in the same direction as Noriza Chaytor and Kent Smallwood testified that the conditions were slippery, and the snow was “accumulating”. [ 61 ] All the civilian witnesses who saw the accident, regardless of the direction they were traveling at the time, testified that when the red car left the road there was a large “puff” or “cloud” of snow.

This suggests to me, that contrary to the evidence of Joshua Steele- Young, there was ample snow at the time, that was “sticking” to and “accumulating” on the pavement. The witnesses used words like “terrible” to describe the conditions at the time. The photographs, albeit taken an hour or more later, still show very snowy conditions. [ 62 ] Likewise, his evidence that he did not recall seeing other vehicles when he was driving on the highway is difficult to reconcile with the other evidence. Clearly, there were other vehicles.

The evidence established at least two vehicles that he passed, that of Karen Pardy and John Scaplen. There was also the truck he passed in the seconds before the accident. As the driver of a vehicle, it is inexplicable that he did not see other vehicles. [ 63 ] The above examples show that Mr. Steele-Young’s testimony was inconsistent with the other evidence: He did not know that Morgan Pardy took off her seatbelt, but it is clear that her seatbelt was removed.

He states he could not hear the alarm of the signal relating to the seatbelt because of the loud music, but the music was not so loud he could not hear Morgan Pardy during the argument. (Morgan Pardy denied there was any music playing.) The roads were not snow-covered, but he used the passing lane because it was less snow-covered than the right lane. He was driving 130 km per hour, but according to him, that was not too fast for the conditions. He did not see other vehicles, but the evidence is that he passed other vehicles.

These are just a few examples, but when I consider all of his evidence in conjunction with the other testimony and all of the other evidence, and when I consider his argumentative responses, and his overall demeanour and poor recall, I do not accept that he was a credible or reliable witness; particularly as it relates to how and why there was an accident. [ 64 ] I do not accept his evidence where it differs with the other witnesses, and in particular, Morgan Pardy as to what occurred inside the car. [ 65 ] I accept the evidence of the civilian witnesses who were candid and detailed about what they did or did not see.

The police officers who testified were also straightforward in their evidence. These witnesses were not seriously challenged as to their observations. [ 66 ] Having explained the evidence that I accept as credible and reliable, it is now necessary to turn to the elements of the offences in order to understand whether or not the evidence that I find credible establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the offences occurred.

The elements of the offence of dangerous driving causing bodily harm [ 67 ] The offence of dangerous driving, under Section 249(1) of the Criminal Code , states: Everyone commits an offence who operates (

a) A motor vehicle in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic at that time is or might be reasonably expected to be at that place;… [ 68 ] The offence of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, under Section 249(3) of the Criminal Code , states: Everyone who commits an offence under subsection (1) and thereby causes bodily harm to any other person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. [ 69 ] In R. v.

Beatty , 2008 SCC 5 , the Supreme Court of Canada stated the determination of whether or not driving is dangerous, the actus reus of the offence, is found in the wording of the offence itself. The court must assess: - the “manner of driving”; - with regard to the “nature, condition and uses of the place at which the motor vehicle was operated”; and - the “amount of traffic at that time or might reasonably be expected”. [ 70 ] In determining whether or not the manner of driving is dangerous, the fact that there was an accident, and Morgan Pardy was seriously injured is not a factor to be considered. In R. v.

Romano , 2017 ONCA 837 , Paciocco, J.A., speaking for a unanimous court, explained why the fact that someone may have been injured by another person’s dangerous driving is not a consideration. At paragraph 68, Paciocco, J.A. explained :

The Supreme Court of Canada has been clear that in examining the actus reus element of dangerous driving, the focus should be on themanner of driving, not the consequences of driving, or the cause of those consequences. This is because it is an offence to dangerousdriving even if no-one is injured; the act or conduct that the offence of dangerous driving addresses driving in a manner that puts thepublic at risk that this may happen: Roy, at para. 34.

As Charron J. stated in Beatty, at para. 46: As the words of the provision make plain, it is the manner in which the motor vehicle was operated that is at issue, not the consequenceof the driving.

The consequence, as here where death was caused, may make the offence a more serious one under s. 294(4), but it has nobearing on the question whether the offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle has been made out or not. [Emphasis in original.] [71] The mens rea of the offence of dangerous driving, that is, what was the intent of Joshua Steele-Young at the time of thedriving, is whether his manner of driving, at a minimum, constitutes a “marked departure from the standard of care that the reasonableperson would observe in the accused’s circumstances”.

Here too, the inquiry does not include an assessment of the consequences. Asstated in Romano, at paragraph 69, “[t]here must be a meaningful inquiry into the manner of driving, not into the degree of departurefrom the norm that the consequence demonstrates.” [72] A “mere” departure from the standard of care is insufficient to establish the necessary mens rea or liability on the criminalstandard. As per Beatty, a “momentary lapse” in attention will not attract criminal liability. The conduct must be a “marked departure”to attract criminal liability (Romano at paragraph 67, citing paragraph 28 of R. v.

Roy, 2012 SCC 26. This is the minimum that must beestablished. Of course, if the Trial Judge is satisfied an accused intentionally drove in a dangerous manner there will be little difficultyin finding that an accused possessed the requisite mens rea (Roy, at paragraph 38, Beatty at paragraph 51). The element of CAusation [73] It is only upon being satisfied that the offence of dangerous driving has been proven, will I then turn to consider whether thatdriving caused the injury in question.

To be satisfied that the offence caused bodily harm, I must be satisfied that the dangerous drivingwas a “significant contributing cause of the injuries suffered” (Romano at paragraph 19). In Romano, on the issue of causation, atparagraphs 26 to 28, Paciocco, J.A., stated: 26 The law of causation is broadly encompassing. The causation test has two inter-related components, often described as “factualcausation,” and “legal” or “imputable” causation. Factual causation focuses exclusively on the connection between the act of the accusedand the prohibited consequence, in a mechanical or physical sense.

Legal causation focuses on the moral or imputable fault of theaccused: see R. v. L. (K.), 2009 ONCA 141, 248 O.A.C. 260 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 14; and R. v. Malkowski, 2015 ONCA 887, 92 M.V.R.(6th) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 14. 27 The factual causation test is “inclusive in scope”: R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.), at para. 15. As theSupreme Court of Canada held in R. v. Smithers (1977), (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 506 (S.C.C.), at p. 519, it is met if the actof the accused is a contributing cause of the prohibited consequence, beyond a de minimis range.

The Latin term means no more thanthat the contribution cannot be minimal. 28 Without changing that standard, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada suggested in R. v. Nette, 2001 SCC 78, [2001] 3 S.C.R.488 (S.C.C.), at para. 71, that the term “significant contributing cause” is a simpler, more familiar way, of communicating the sameconcept. Factual causation therefore exists where the contribution by the accused to the prohibited consequence is significant, in thesense described: R. v. Kippax, 2011 ONCA 766, 286 O.A.C. 144 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 24, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2012]S.C.C.A.

No. 92 (S.C.C.). [74] The above shows that if the conduct of the accused contributed beyond the deminimus range or is a significant contributingcause to the injuries in question, the accused will be liable. The nature of an intervening act [75] A finding against legal causation may occur where the negligent or contributing conduct of the victim (or other person)constitutes an intervening event independent of the accused’s conduct or was unforeseeable (Romano, at paragraphs 34 and 35 citing R.v.

Malkowski, 2015 ONCA 887: Either the independent intervening event is not reasonably foreseeable, and/or the intervening act is an independent cause of theconsequence that is significant enough in relative weight to sever or break the chain of causation between the act of the accused and theconsequence: Malkowski, at para. 14 [76] However, the threshold is high. [77] Generally, once it is established that the Accused’s conduct contributed to causing the injuries, it will not matter if there areother contributing causes.

For example, a victim’s own negligent conduct that contributed to causing her injury will not necessarilyexonerate an accused. As stated in Romano at paragraph 30, citing R. v. L. (K), 2009 ONCA 141 at paragraph 18: The threshold for breaking the chain of factual causation is not generous. This is because, “[t]he criminal law does not recognizecontributory negligence nor is it equipped with any mechanism to apportion responsibility for the harm occasioned by criminal conduct,except as part of sentencing”: L. (K.), at para. 18.

Moreover, if an accused is already engaged in an unlawful act, the intensity of thecausal connection required to furnish moral blame for the consequence can be modest.

[ 78 ] The circumstances in Romano illustrate the onerous threshold before a court will find that an intervening act was not reasonably foreseeable or an independent cause. In Romano , the victim was negligent by jaywalking in the road upon which the accused was speeding. However, the court found that the possibility that someone might jaywalk was a foreseeable risk the accused chose to disregard by speeding. The victim’s decision to enter the roadway was not so significant an intervening act that it caused the dangerous driving of the accused to lose its significance as a contributing cause.

The accused in that case admitted he could not have avoided hitting the victim given the speed he was travelling. Both acts, the speed and the act of jaywalking, contributed “significantly” to the accident ( Romano at paragraph 37 ). [ 79 ] Likewise in R. v. Maybin , 2012 SCC 24 , Karakatsanis, J. described the intervening act by a third party necessary to break the chain of causation as

an act “so independent of the actions of the appellants that his act should be regarded in law as the sole cause….” (at paragraph 53). Although her comments were made in the context of an alleged homicide, the principles regarding the point at which an intervening act will sever the link between the conduct of an accused and causation are equally applicable here.

At paragraph 57, Karakatsanis, J stated: If the intervening act is a direct response or is directly linked to the appellants' actions, and does not by its nature overwhelm the original actions, then the appellants cannot be said to be morally innocent of the death. THE LAW APPLIED TO THE FACTS Issue 1: Does the evidence establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Joshua Steele-Young drove dangerously?

The evidence of the actus reus of dangerous driving [ 80 ] The evidence of Joshua Steele-Young’s manner of driving comes from Morgan Pardy, the eyewitnesses to the accident, and the physical evidence as analyzed by the police who were qualified as experts in accident investigations and collision analysis. The evidence of speed [ 81 ] There was ample evidence that Mr. Young was travelling at a speed well in excess of the legal limit at the time of the accident. The posted speed limit was 100 km per hour. [ 82 ] Morgan Pardy testified that initially Mr. Steele-Young was driving at a normal speed.

However, once he hit the pothole on the access ramp to Pitt’s Memorial Drive, he became very angry and began driving “really fast”. Her evidence was that she thought, although she could not be sure, the speedometer read somewhere between 130 and 140 km. This was shortly before the accident. [ 83 ] Karen Pardy stated because of the snowy conditions, she was driving between 65-80 km per hour when Joshua Steele-Young passed her vehicle. John Scaplen stated he was driving between 70-80 km per hour, again because of the snowy roads.

He was confident the vehicle Joshua Steele-Young was driving was faster than his speed because the vehicle pulled away from his vehicle. [ 84 ] The physical evidence supports that at the time the car left the road, Joshua Steele-Young was driving well over the speed limit.

Constable Brown with the accident investigation division of the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (RNC), calculated from the physical measurements made at the scene of the accident that at the time the vehicle left the road the car was travelling at a speed of 131 km per hour. [ 85 ] This calculation was consistent with the measurements recorded by the CDR, within the vehicle, which registered several events, including the speed of the vehicle. According to the CDR, at approximately 5 secs before the airbags were deployed, the car was travelling at 129 km per hour.

This number included a range of error of plus or minus 10 km per hour meaning that the speed could have been as low as 112 or as high as142 km per hour. [ 86 ] According to Constable Barry Osmond, the fact that the two independent measurements, one from the physical measurements made by the officers, the other from the CDR, indicated a speed of within two kilometers of each other, suggested to him that the likely speed was 129-131 km per hour. [ 87 ] Based on the above evidence, there is no doubt that in the minutes prior to the accident and at the time he lost control of the car, Joshua Steele-Young was travelling at an excessive speed, at or near 130 km per hour, well over the speed limit.

The conditions in light of the time of, and nature and use of the road [ 88 ] There is also ample evidence that the speed was excessive given the conditions, the nature and use of the road, and the time of day. A speed in excess of the limit would have been excessive in perfect road conditions, much less than in snowy and slippery road conditions, as occurred that day. [ 89 ] The testimony of the civilian witnesses is telling. Karen Pardy testified that she saw the Accused pass her and immediately thought to herself that if that car did not slow down it was going to go off the road.

John Scaplen had a similar thought upon seeing the vehicle pass him. John Scaplen could also not understand why the car was traveling in the passing lane as it was snow covered. Both witnesses also observed the car “fishtailing” or moving back and forth shortly before it left the road.

Grant Hounsell, who was traveling in the opposite direction at the time, testified his speed was 70 km per hour because of the conditions. [ 90 ] The several police officers that attended the scene after the accident were consistent that while they tried to drive at a faster speed as they were heading to an accident scene, they had to reduce their speeds well below the speed limit because they could not keep control of their vehicles given the slippery conditions.

All of the police officers testified that they traveled well below the speed they normally would travel in heading to an accident scene because the driving conditions were poor. [ 91 ] While the witnesses had differing recollections as to the state of the weather at the time that Joshua Steele-Young’s driving was

observed, this is not surprising. The witnesses were traveling in different directions at the time they made their observations, and madetheir observations at slightly different times. Each had their own gauge of what was a serious or not serious weather condition. KarenPardy aptly described the weather as being fine in the “downtown” but snowy once on the highway. Other witnesses testified that it wassnowing “on and off”.

The differences in the observations to me suggest no more than the difference of where a particular person wasand when. [92] What is clear is that at the time Joshua Steele-Young was driving on the highway after hitting the pothole, the road conditionswere poor and he was driving too fast for those conditions. [93] I also find that the speed was excessive not only because of the conditions outside the car, but because of the conditions insidethe car. Inside the car, there was a heated and continuing argument between Joshua Steele-Young and Morgan Pardy.

I do not acceptJoshua Steele-Young’s evidence that he was not distracted by this arguing or that it did not impact his ability to maintain control of thevehicle. I accept Morgan Pardy’s evidence that Joshua Steele-Young was gesturing with his right hand and banging the console, whichcaused her to move towards the passenger side of the vehicle.

I accept that she was afraid and I do not accept Joshua Steele-Young’sevidence that he kept his two hands on the wheel continuously. [94] As discussed earlier, I also accept that once Morgan Pardy removed her seatbelt, it would have been apparent to Joshua Steele-Young, yet he took no steps to reduce his speed.

Joshua Steele-Young’s continued manner of driving, in the face of this knowledge, isevidence of driving that was dangerous, given the conditions not only outside the car, but inside the car. [95] Given the above evidence, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the actus reus of the offence of dangerous driving hasbeen proven.

Joshua Steele-Young’s manner of driving, by speeding in snowy conditions and slippery conditions, on a major highway,passing other vehicles while engaged in a heated argument with Morgan Pardy, and continuing to so drive even after her seatbelt wasremoved, and taking his one hand off the wheel to gesture towards Morgan Pardy by banging on the console, was conduct that wasdangerous. The evidence of the mens rea [96] I am also satisfied that the mens rea has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

I am satisfied that the conduct of JoshuaSteele-Young constituted a marked departure from the conduct of the reasonably prudent driver in similar circumstances. In my view,the reasonably prudent driver would not have driven in the manner as did Joshua Steele-Young, and this conduct on his part was morethan a momentary lapse. [97] I accept the testimony of Morgan Pardy as to his demeanour and actions during the period leading up to and including theaccident and that he intentionally drove in the manner as established in the evidence. This is not a situation where a mechanical defectcaused Mr.

Steele-Young to speed and to lose control. Nor was there an issue with the brakes or other mechanical aspects of his vehicle(see for example R. v. Stapleton (2010), (NL PC), 303 Nfld. & P.E.I.R 284, 941 A.P.R 284 (NL Prov. Ct.)). Norwas there any health issue that caused Mr. Steele-Young to lose the ability to make a rational decision as to how he was going to drive. [98] To the contrary, I accept, as described by Morgan Pardy, once Mr. Steele-Young struck the pothole on the ramp to the highwayhe became enraged and began to speed. Upon hitting a pothole on the ramp as described by Morgan Pardy, Mr.

Steele-Young “gave it toher” and pushed hard on the gearshift: “Like he was jamming it as far forward as it could go”, causing the car to speed up. [99] I accept Morgan Pardy’s testimony that Joshua Steele-Young became very angry, calling her a whore and a slut. It was afterthis point that Morgan Pardy wanted to get out of the car. She told him to slow down and to calm down, and if he was not going to slowdown, to let her out of the car. [100] Morgan Pardy became fearful. Morgan Pardy testified that Mr.

Steele-Young refused to slow the car, or to stop and let her out,telling her that he was going to take her to CBS where she could find a ride back. Morgan Pardy testified that Joshua Steele-Youngresponded in a sarcastic tone to her demand to be let out of the car by saying “Are you serious? You want me to pull over on thehighway?” [101] Morgan Pardy described that Joshua Steele-Young was yelling at her, “flipping out” and repeatedly banging his right arm on theconsole. She described that he was driving fast and erratically. She was getting scared.

She told him to calm down and tried to stop himfrom hitting the console by bracing her own arm on the console. Morgan Pardy testified that he continued to call her names. Sherepeatedly demanded she stated, “Let me out of the F—ing car right now”. She testified it progressed to the point that she took off herseatbelt because she just wanted to get out of the car yelling at him to slow down, and let her out of the car. [102] The above shows that Morgan Pardy explicitly brought to Joshua Steele-Young’s attention that she was uncomfortable with hisdriving, yet he would not slow down.

From her evidence, and all the evidence, there is no doubt that he knew he was passing vehicles,he knew at what speed he was driving, he knew the road conditions, that it was snowing, and the roads may become or were becomingslippery. Yet he still continued to speed - and then, he lost control of the car. [103] Apart from the fact that the reasonably prudent driver would not have been driving at a 130 km per hour in poor conditions, uponbecoming aware that a seatbelt was unfastened, the reasonably prudent driver would have taken some steps to address the risk that thisposed.

But Joshua Steele-Young’s response, was that it was “not my responsibility”. [104] Considering the above circumstances, with all of the evidence, I can reach no other conclusion than Joshua Steele-Youngintended to drive in the manner described by the witnesses; including Morgan Pardy. This conduct was a marked departure from theconduct of the reasonably prudent driver. Issue 2 Was the dangerous driving a significant contributing cause of Morgan Pardy’s injuries? [105] There was no dispute between the parties that the injuries Morgan Pardy suffered were the result of the rollover accident and then

having been ejected.

The question is what caused the accident? [ 106 ] Upon review of all the evidence, including the physical evidence from the scene and the technical evidence provided by the investigators, the observations of the witnesses, and the testimony of Morgan Pardy, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the dangerous driving of Joshua Steele-Young is the reason he lost of control of the car, and the accident ensued, and I am satisfied this conduct was a significant contributing cause of Morgan Pardy’s injuries. [ 107 ] The cause of the accident was the excessive speed, in poor conditions, while in a heated argument.

I find Joshua Steele-Young was very angry as testified to by Morgan Pardy, that he was distracted, and it was these circumstances coupled with his speeding that caused him to lose control of the car on the slippery roads. There was no intervening act that severed chain of causation [ 108 ] Joshua Steele-Young submitted two possible intervening acts, that she pushed his elbow, and the removal of the seatbelt. [ 109 ] I do not accept Joshua Steele-Young’s evidence that Morgan Pardy pushed his elbow with her hand; nor that it was this act that caused him to lose control of the car.

I am not left with a reasonable doubt by this evidence. I accept Morgan Pardy’s evidence, and find as a fact, that while she may have made contact with Joshua Steele-Young’s arm because she put her own arm on the console to try and stop him from banging the console, she did not take her hand, and push his elbow while it was on the steering wheel. [ 110 ] Joshua Steele-Young’s assertion does not accord with the balance of the evidence.

Morgan Pardy testified she was afraid in the car precisely because she was concerned with Joshua Steele-Young’s manner of driving and that he was going to lose control of the vehicle. That she was afraid is credible, given the observations of the other witnesses of Joshua Steele-Young’s manner of driving; in particular his speeding. [ 111 ] It is not credible in light of these circumstances, and the other evidence, that Morgan Pardy would then do the very thing that would cause him to swerve and lose control of the vehicle.

Further, there was uncontroversial evidence, that earlier in the morning, Morgan Pardy was nervous about driving her own car on the highway because of the weather and that she did not have snow tires on her car.

It was for this reason, when the two first met in CBS, that Joshua Steele-Young followed Morgan Pardy’s vehicle back to her house, and they took the “Old Topsail Highway”, where the speed limit was lower. [ 112 ] That Morgan Pardy was nervous about driving in the weather, tends to belie that she would have later acted in that manner. [ 113 ] Similarly, while Morgan Pardy’s act of removing her seatbelt may have been a contributing cause of her injuries, I do not find this was

an act so independent of the conduct of Joshua Steele-Young that it is an intervening act or overwhelms his contribution to causing her injuries by his dangerous driving. To the contrary, as per Maybin , her act of removing her seatbelt was directly linked to his conduct. Morgan Pardy removed her seatbelt because she was terrified of the manner of Joshua Steele-Young’s driving and wanted to be let out of the vehicle. As

an act directly linked or arising out of the Accused’s conduct, it is not an intervening act that extinguished the link between the Accused’s conduct and her injuries. [ 114 ] Further, the accident was not caused by Morgan Pardy taking off her seatbelt. Joshua Steele-Young’s dangerous driving: speeding to such a degree in extremely hazardous conditions that he lost control of the car, is the cause of the accident. Prior to the accident, had Morgan Pardy left her seatbelt unfastened she would have not necessarily suffered any injury.

That her seatbelt was unfastened, standing alone, without the accident occurring, could not have caused her injury. [ 115 ] Put another way, if Joshua Steele-Young had not been driving dangerously, he may have never have lost control of the car and have had an accident. The cause of the her injuries was the accident, and the cause of the accident was the dangerous driving by Joshua Steele-Young. While the taking-off of her seatbelt may have contributed, it could not be a contributing cause of injuries, without the accident.

The accident was a necessary link in the chain of causation of her injuries regardless of the extent to which the lack of a seatbelt may have contributed. [ 116 ] I find Joshua Steele-Young guilty of driving dangerously causing bodily harm to Morgan Pardy. The elements of the offence of forcible confinement [ 117 ] Section 279(2), the offence of forcible confinement states: 279. . . .

(2) Every one who, without lawful authority, confines, imprisons or forcibly seizes another person is guilty of (

a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years; or (

b) an offence punishable on

summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen months.

(3) In proceedings under this section, the fact that the person in relation to whom the offence is alleged to have been committed did not resist is not a defence unless the accused proves that the failure to resist was not caused by threats, duress, force or exhibition of force.

[118] The actus reus of the offence is to confine or imprison, or forcibly seize a person, without lawful authority. In R. v. Pritchard,2008 SCC 59, at paragraph 24, the Supreme Court of Canada described the offence as those circumstances where the victim “for anysignificant period of time” is “coercively restrained or directed contrary to her wishes, so that she could not move about according to herown inclination and desire.” [119] In R. c. Tremblay (1997), (QC CA), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 86, 35 W.C.B. (2d) 384 (Qc.

C.A.), the court found thatthe offence will be committed by the “planned and deliberate restriction of a person’s freedom or movement” (paragraph 11) and that aperson is confined as soon as he “is deprived of his liberty to move from one place to another” (paragraph 13). While the period ofconfinement must be something more than transient, a matter of minutes may suffice. [120] The mens rea for the offence is the intention to engage in the above conduct.

That is, in order for the Court to be satisfied that theoffence has been committed, I must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Joshua Steele-Young intended to confine Morgan Pardywithout lawful authority. The Law applied to the facts [121] There is no doubt that Morgan Pardy was confined in Joshua Steele-Young’s vehicle from the moment she stepped inside. Shevoluntarily entered the vehicle and the confinement was with her consent and therefore, lawful. At the point she requested to be let outof the car, the circumstances changed.

Morgan Pardy wanted to exit the car immediately upon requesting to so do; despite that they wereon the highway and the weather was poor. Morgan Pardy testified she would have walked home, it was not far from where the vehiclewas located. [122] I am satisfied that Joshua Steele-Young knew Morgan Pardy wanted to be let out of the car. I accept Morgan Pardy’s evidencethat she made repeated requests.

It is unclear from the evidence for exactly how long Morgan Pardy was confined in the car without herconsent, but I accept it lasted for a few minutes until the car accident occurred. [123] In these circumstances, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Joshua Steele-Young’s refusal to permit Morgan Pardyto exit the vehicle while on the highway in poor conditions was an intentional deprivation of her liberty without lawful authority.

WhileI accept Joshua Steele-Young knew that Morgan Pardy wanted to leave the vehicle, I am left with a reasonable doubt by his evidence andthe circumstances overall, that he intended to confine her without lawful authority. [124] In particular, the brevity of time between Morgan Pardy’s removal of her seatbelt and the accident and requests for him to slowdown or let her exit, leaves me with a reasonable doubt that Joshua Steele-Young possessed the necessary level of blameworthiness toestablish the mens rea (see R. v. S.(K.) 2001, 49 W.C.B. (2d) 268, 2001 CarswellOnt 721 (Ont. Ct.

J.), at paragraph 46). [125] I accept that upon her initial request it was reasonable for Joshua Steele-Young to inquire if Morgan Pardy was certain whetherthis was what she wanted to do, particularly given the weather and location. I also accept the statement in R. v.

T. (J.G.), 1999 ABQB981, at paragraph 113 that it is not “incumbent upon the driver of a vehicle to allow his passengers to hurl themselves out of a movingcar, nor is it reasonable to expect a driver to stop immediately when their passengers requests them to”, but to stop when it is “reasonablyconvenient”. [126] In these circumstances, it is not clear that it was reasonably convenient at that point for Joshua Steele-Young to pull over to theside of the highway or that there were no safety concerns to allow her to exit.

The two were in the middle of a heated argument, andMorgan Pardy testified that if he had slowed down she would not have wanted to exit. I accept there may have been insufficient time forJoshua Steele-Young to actually make the determination of whether or not he could pull over because it was within moments that theaccident occurred.

To allow such circumstances to constitute unlawful confinement, in my view sets the bar too low. [127] When I view all the evidence, whatever confinement occurred without Morgan Pardy’s consent and with Joshua Steele-Young’sknowledge of the lack of consent, that confinement was too simply brief in duration in the particular circumstances to be satisfied beyonda reasonable doubt that Joshua Steele-Young intentionally denied Morgan Pardy the freedom to move as she wished, and confinedMorgan Pardy without lawful authority (See Tremblay at paragraph 25). [128] I find Mr.

Steele-Young not guilty on the charge of forcible confinement. conclusion [129] Joshua Steele-Young is found guilty of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and not guilty of forcible confinement. _____________________________ Frances J. Knickle Justice