World Energy GH2 Inc. Plaintiff And: Sylvia Benoit Ryan, Zita Hinks, Sheila Hinks, Amanda Cornect, PATRICK KERFONT (DISCONTINUED), PAUL SKINNER (DISCONTINUED), Deborah Symonds, Alicia Drake v. Persons Unknown, 2023 NLSC 109

court crest IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR GENERAL DIVISION Citation : World Energy GH2 Inc. v. Benoit Ryan , 2023 NLSC 109 Date : July 28, 2023 Docket : 202304G0023 Between: World Energy GH2 Inc. Plaintiff And: Sylvia Benoit Ryan, Zita Hinks, Sheila Hinks, Amanda Cornect, PATRICK KERFONT (DISCONTINUED), PAUL SKINNER (DISCONTINUED), Deborah Symonds, Alicia Drake and Persons Unknown DEFENDANTs Before: Justice George L. Murphy Place of Hearing: Corner Brook, Newfoundland and Labrador Date of Hearing: July 24, 2023

Summary: The Court denied a request by certain of the Defendants to permit Spirit Warrior to act as their representative in this proceeding. The Court found that it had the authority in any case to permit a person to act as a representative of a party in a proceeding as part of its inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes. The Court also found that it had a responsibility to disallow inappropriate persons from acting as a representative of a party. The Court determined that Spirit Warrior was an inappropriate person to act as a representative of any of the Defendants. Appearances:

Douglas B. Skinner and Andrea N. Williams Appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff Glenn Bogue (a.k.a. Spirit Warrior) Appearing on behalf of the Defendants Mark P. Sheppard Appearing on behalf of the Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador Authorities Cited: CASES CONSIDERED: Daniels v. Canada (Minister of Indigenous Affairs) , 2016 SCC 12 ; Law Society of Upper Canada v. Bogue , 2017 ONLSTH 119 ; Law Society of Upper Canada v. Bogue , 2017 ONLSTH 215 ; Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue , 2019 ONLSTH 107 ; Glenn Patrick Bogue (a.k.a. Spirit Warrior) v. Law Society of Ontario , 2023 ONSC 3654 ; Bogue v.

Bogue , 2023 ONSC 1642 ; Steinkey v. Canada , 2017 FC 124 ; Meads v. Meads , 2012 ABQB 571 ; R. v. Anderson , 2016 BCSC 2170 ; Barreau de Montréal v. Bogue , 2023 QCCQ 3429 ; Barreau de Montréal v. Bogue , 2021 QCCQ 17269 ; Hyrniak v. Mauldin , 2014 SCC 7 ; Pintea v. Johns , 2017 SCC 23 ; Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General) , 2014 SCC 59 ; and Penney v. Newfoundland and Labrador , 2020 NLSC 46 STATUTES CONSIDERED: Law Society Act , R.S.O. 1990, c.

L-8 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Murphy, J. : [ 1 ] Certain of the Defendants, namely Sylvia Benoit Ryan, Sheila Hinks, Amanda Cornect and Alicia Drake (the “Applicants”) have applied to this Court requesting an order that would allow Mr. Glenn Bogue, also known as Spirit Warrior, (hereinafter “Spirit Warrior”), to be their representative and speak on their behalf in this proceeding. At the hearing of the application and at the request of the Applicants, I allowed Spirit Warrior to represent the Applicants and speak on their behalf solely for the purpose of making submissions to the Court on the application.

However, I have decided that their request that he be permitted to be their representative and to speak on their behalf in this proceeding should be denied and will outline the reasons for my decision. [ 2 ] Spirit Warrior argued on behalf of the Applicants that they are unconquered indigenous women and that the laws of Canada and Newfoundland and Labrador do not apply to them because indigenous law is prior and superior to the laws of Canada and Newfoundland and Labrador.

As such, he argued that the Applicants can name their own representative of choice because that is permitted under indigenous law and the Court must accept that choice and allow him to represent them. [ 3 ] Spirit Warrior provided to the Court via the Applicant, Sheila Hinks, what purported to be an Order of an entity identified as the Alliance of Indigenous Nations Tribunal dated July 24, 2023. I will set forth that Order in its entirety: Demand # AIN-1122-23 T.I. Record July 24, 2023 BETWEEN: WORLD ENERGY GH2 Applicant/Respondent

-and- Sheila Hinks Sylvia Benoit Ryan, Zita Hinks On behalf of over 100,000 Non-Status Indigenous Women and Men Moving Parties An ORDER of the Alliance Tribunal WHEREAS the relationship between CANADA and the Un-surrendered Indigenous People is still Nation to Nation per Calder v BC (SCC), [1973] SCR 313 R v Sioui SCC and R v. Cote (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 139; AND WHEREAS the Crown is only the de facto controller of our Land and Resources, pursuant to the SCC in Haida v BC [2004] atpara. [32] ; AND WHEREAS UNDRIP Articles 1 and the OAS ADRIP

Article 1 guarantee the Individual Indigenous People of the World theirRights as Individuals; AND WHEREAS UNDRIP

Article 3, and the OAS ADRIP Articles I and III guarantee the Individual Indigenous People of the Worldtheir Right to self-determine; AND WHEREAS UNDRIP Articles 5, 18, 27, 34 and 40, and the OAS ADRIP Articles XXI and XXII guarantee the IndividualIndigenous People of the World their Right to their own judicial and law systems; AND WHEREAS UNDRIP Articles 4, 20, 26 and 36, and the OAS ADRIP Articles III, VI, XIII, XX, XXI, and XXIX guarantee theIndividual Indigenous People of the World their Right to their own financial systems; AND WHEREAS the SCC in AGNS v AGC (SCC), [1951] S.C.R. 31 clearly stated that governments do not possess “theunlimited capacity of the Individual”.

Justice Murphy issued an Endorsement on July 6, 2023 requiring the Defendants to apply to the Supreme Court regarding Spirit Warriorbeing their Representative of Choice. The Endorsement is pre-mature as the issue of Correct Venue and Jurisdiction are not being addressed until August 1 and 2, 2023. The 14 Crowns that are trespassing on Turtle Island were joined to the proceedings by way of Constitutional Questions, and thereafter aNotice to Produce a true, certified copy of the BNA Act of 1867 (which allegedly became the Constitution Act of 1982 passed only in theUK).

The Notice also requires WORLD ENERGY GH2 to produce said BNA Act of 1867 as the starting point to demonstrate thelegality and lawfulness (pursuant to Indigenous Common Law) of that corporation’s existence. THIS TRIBUNAL ORDERS that:

1. The proceedings in the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador are the incorrect venue, and all proceedings must be transferred to the Alliance of Indigenous Nations Tribunal. 2. The Resources of Turtle Island belong to the Individual Women and Men of Turtle Island and not the corporate artificial entities created via a Statute passed only in the Parliament of the foreign capital of London England, that was thereafter repealed in 1893 by The Statute Law Repeal Act (U.K.). 3. Spirit Warrior, as the Attorney General of the A.I.N. is the Representative of Choice in these proceedings. A.

Leaping Ram For the A.I.N. Tribunal [ 4 ] It was argued that since indigenous law is prior and superior, I am bound by the decision of this Tribunal and must allow Spirit Warrior to be the representative of the Applicants in this proceeding. It was also submitted that because they are unconquered indigenous women, this Court has no jurisdiction over them. In addition, Spirit Warrior argued that this Court has no jurisdiction over any resources in Canada, including ownership of same, and in fact went further and argued that no judge in Canada has jurisdiction over any resources in the Country.

The basis for this argument is that indigenous laws apply and no laws of Canada or a province or territory of Canada have any validity. [ 5 ] It was also argued that the Applicants as indigenous individuals have a right to be represented in this proceeding by an indigenous representative of their choosing, based on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Daniels v.

Canada (Minister of Indigenous Affairs) , 2016 SCC 12 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”) and the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“ADRIP”). [ 6 ] At the hearing of the application, I asked Spirit Warrior to make submissions on the issue of whether the Court should allow him to act as a representative of the Applicants based on the assumption that the Court did have jurisdiction over the Applicants and the subject matter of this proceeding; however, he declined to do so. [ 7 ] I accept for the purpose of this application that the Applicants are indigenous individuals; however, such status does not give them a right to an indigenous or any other representative of choice. [ 8 ] There is no merit whatsoever in the submission of Spirit Warrior that this Court has no jurisdiction over the Applicants or matters involving the resources of this Province.

Further, there is no merit in the argument that neither the laws of Canada nor this Province apply to the Applicants. As well, while the Court is unfamiliar with the Alliance of Indigenous Nations Tribunal, even if I were to assume that such a Tribunal validly and lawfully exists in this Country, it has no authority over this Court under the laws of Canada or this Province.

As will be seen later, Spirit Warrior has made similar arguments previously before courts Canada only to have them dismissed, sometimes summarily, as being frivolous, vexatious or abusive. [ 9 ] In Daniels , one of the issues before the Supreme Court of Canada was whether Metis and non-status Indians have the right to be consulted with, in good faith, by the federal government on a collective basis through representatives of their choice, respecting all their rights, interests and needs as indigenous peoples.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal that such a declaration should not be granted. The reason for the refusal of that declaration was that prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada had already found that such a relationship existed and therefore a declaration to that effect would serve no practical purpose. [ 10 ] In any event, the right asserted in Daniels is of no assistance to the Applicants.

The underlying litigation in this proceeding is a private law dispute in a court of law and not a consultation or negotiation process between indigenous individuals and the Government of Canada or any level of government.

Further, there is no collective right being advanced here by the Applicants on behalf of any recognized indigenous group. [ 11 ] With respect to UNDRIP and ADRIP, I have not been referred to any provision therein which would give the Applicants a right to be represented in this proceeding by an indigenous or any other representative of their choosing. [ 12 ] Notwithstanding that the Applicants do not have a right to be represented by a representative of their choosing, this Court has a residual discretion in any case to permit a person to act as a representative of a party in a proceeding.

I believe that this discretion emanates from the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to control its own processes.

Such discretion, like any discretion, must be exercised judicially and, in my view, will involve a consideration of the interest of all the parties to a particular proceeding and, as well, broader considerations for the administration of justice and the overall proper functioning of courts and the justice system. [ 13 ] I believe that significant weight ought to be given to the choice of a party seeking to have a person act as their representative; however, the choice of the party should not be determinative where the Court finds that the proposed representative is not an appropriate person to act as the representative of a party.

I have determined that Spirit Warrior is not an appropriate person to act as a representative of the Applicants in this case.

[14] Spirit Warrior is no stranger to courts in Canada nor to the Law Society of Ontario, formerly the Law Society of Upper Canada.A search of CanLII revealed 16 reported decisions of a Law Society Tribunal of the Law Society of Upper Canada or the Law Society ofOntario pertaining to Spirit Warrior as follows: a. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Bogue, 2017 ONLSTH 119; b. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 46; c. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Bogue, 2017 ONLSTH 215; d. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 38; e. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 13; f.

Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue, 2019 ONLSTA 19; g. Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 135; h. Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue, 2019 ONLSTH 107; i. Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue, 2019 ONLSTH 53; j. Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue, 2020 ONLSTH 21; k. Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue, 2019 ONLSTA 11; l. Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue, 2019 ONLSTH 52; m. Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue, 2019 ONLSTH 18; n. Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue, 2019 ONLSTH 83; o. Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 159; and p. Law Society of Ontario v.

Bogue, 2021 ONLSTA 2. [15] Among other things, these various decisions reveal that Spirit Warrior is a suspended member of the Law Society of Ontarioand has been since 2017. In the Law Society Tribunal decision – Law Society of Upper Canada v. Bogue, 2017 ONLSTH 119 whichresulted in Spirit Warrior’s suspension, the Tribunal stated at paras. 26 – 31: [26] Mr. Bogue was called to the bar of Ontario in 1985. He was not in active practice status from 1987 until February of 2015. There arecurrently six investigations involving him, stemming from his actions as litigation counsel.

It appears that many of his clients areIndigenous people. [27] On behalf of clients, Mr. Bogue has made submissions that, on their face, are of significant concern because they may hamperthe administration of justice and harm his clients’ interests. For example, he has commenced problematic court proceedings againstseveral judges, the Queen and the Prime Minister personally. In multiple proceedings, the documents suggest, the Lawyer has relied ontheories that deny the authority of the Canadian federal and provincial governments.

He has advised opposing counsel that they cannotact on a judgment from which leave was denied to the Supreme Court of Canada because it was being transferred to an Aboriginaltribunal. He pled in Federal Court that “[o]n July 17, 2013, the Pope issued a Motu Propria dissolving the Corporations of the world”and that Canada is a Crown Corporation “registered as #0000230098 in the corporate capital known as The United States of AmericaInc., operating in Washington, D.C.” There are numerous other examples. [28] The Law Society’s materials suggest harms to clients and the justice system.

On his behalf, an agent obtained an adjournmenton the basis that he was not capable of conducting a trial for which he had been retained, and there were costs awards made against hisclients following unsuccessful use of these concerning strategies that, at least on their face, appear to have little legal foundation. [29] Courts have expressed concerns about the nature of Mr. Bogue’s submissions. In Steinkey v.

Canada, 2017 FC 124,Prothonotary Lafrenière of the Federal Court said at paras. 5 and 8-9: Notwithstanding the Plaintiffs’ protestations to the opposite, they clearly fall within a class of individuals described in Meads v.Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 , 2012 ABQB 571 (Meads) as “OPCA litigants”, who follow a well-known path of illogic,presumption and pseudo-legal rants. The pleading before me is a classic case of a vexatious party seeking to foist on the Crown aunilateral agreement and trust obligations based on nonsensical arguments…

Finally, I note that the Statement of Claim was signed by a lawyer, Glenn P. Bogue, and that Mr. Bogue also filed written representations in opposition to the motion before me. In Meads , Justice Rooke observed in paras. 643-645 that, as an officer of the court, each lawyer has certain duties not only to the client, but also to the justice system as a whole. In particular, it is a lawyer’s duty to not participate in or facilitate OPCA schemes. I am very troubled to see that Mr. Bogue accepted a retainer to draft and file pleadings which ultimately assist in the implementation of a vexatious litigant strategy.

I therefore direct that this Order and Reasons, along with a copy of the Statement of Claim and the parties’ motion materials, be delivered to the Law Society of Upper Canada for review, to determine whether any sanction is warranted against Mr. Bogue. [30] In R. v. Anderson , 2016 BCSC 2170 , a criminal case, Justice Brown stated at para. 155: I was particularly concerned when counsel advised that he and his colleague intended to introduce at trial the matters raised in the Memorandum of Fact and Law, including ‘criminal equity.’ Those matters are immaterial to the case and will not be admissible.

Counsel’s comment left an impression that counsel was motivated by opportunity to pursue the theories and matters he addressed in the memorandum, which, he advised the court, were authorized and guided by the Clan Grandmother, as opposed to meeting the Crown’s case. He will have to satisfy this court clearly in due course where his representational interests lie. [31] It was clear from Mr. Bogue’s submissions before us that he continues to actively work on files. [ 16 ] Later at para. 38, the Tribunal said: [38] In our balancing of public protection and Mr.

Bogue’s interest in having appropriate time to prepare, the following factors were key in tilting the balance in favour of an adjournment on terms: • The allegations are serious and the Law Society’s evidence, considered alone, sets out a strong case for an interlocutory suspension. Based only on the Law Society’s submissions, we accept there is a significant risk of harm to the public and to the public interest in the administration of justice and that an order suspending Mr. Bogue on an interim interlocutory basis would reduce that risk.

There is evidence, including comments from multiple judges, to suggest that Mr. Bogue is using litigation techniques that could harm the administration of justice and cause costs and delay to his clients and others. • On the evidence now before us, the risks are significant and would continue during the period of the adjournment. Nothing short of a suspension could adequately address them, given the evidence we have seen. Mr. Bogue acknowledges he is actively representing clients on litigation files, and there is no indication he has stopped the types of approaches alleged here.

The possible harm to the administration of justice of these types of tactics is well-recognized, including by this Tribunal: see, for example, Meads , above, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Hosein , 2014 ONLSTH 218 at paras. 17-18 , and Law Society of Upper Canada v. Townley-Smith , 2010 ONLSHP 77 , at paras. 34-38 . . . . [ 17 ] In a subsequent Law Society Tribunal decision in Law Society of Upper Canada v.

Bogue , 2017 ONLSTH 215 in which the Tribunal ordered that Spirit Warrior submit to an examination by a forensic psychiatrist to assess whether he was incapacitated, the Tribunal reviewed evidence before it regarding the types of claims or assertions made by Spirit Warrior in proceedings before various courts in Canada.

Some of this evidence is outlined at paras. 19 – 24 of the Tribunal’s decision: [19] The evidence disclosed that the Lawyer has brought a number of proceedings or motions on behalf of individuals before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Divisional Court, the Ontario Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of British Columbia, the Federal Court and Supreme Court of Canada. [20] The defendants or responding parties have included Children’s Aid Societies and their employees, federal and provincial governments, judges and lawyers in their personal capacity, law firms, the Queen personally, the Governor General personally, the Prime Minister personally, Parliament and the Bank of Canada. [21] It is the assertion of the Law Society that these lawsuits are based on bizarre international conspiracy theories.

It was argued that these are articulated in rambling arguments that demonstrate a clear misunderstanding of Canadian law and raise reasonable concerns that the Lawyer may be delusional.

[22] A number of examples of this were offered. In one e-mail to opposing counsel dated February 18, 2016 the Lawyer wrote: In the big picture, the Vatican (bank) pushed its Feidal [sic] system across the English channel in 1066. It then combined with King Philip to kill the Templar Knights and steal their International bank which today is the IMF/BIS World Bank. This is the force behind Canada’s big 5 private banks, who successfully placed Ontario $300 Billion in debt, owed by every lawyer, judge, doctor. Millionaire in Ontario. YOU will pay this debt as the other 99% of Ontarians are buried in debt.

The Vatican bank via Beijing will shortly foreclose on Canada as the Tar Sands are failing and our dollar sinks to U.S. $, 60, and USA defaults, which is a mathematical certainty. Through its Corporate Crown shell (Canada and Ontario), the Bank of England has undertaken the Cultural Genocide of Canadian Aboriginals simply because they still hold Allodial title to our land, as opposed to Fee Simple Feudal Use Title that Ontario lawyers (unwittingly) defend for the Queen. [23] In another e-mail dated May 18, 2016 the Lawyer wrote to opposing counsel: You now have our Amended Motion.

Given its massive scope, I am writing to summarize its content … The Queen’s legitimacy to sit as Monarch is also today questioned by: 1) the illegitimacy of Edward IV, 2) her conviction for murder via Canadian eye witnesses in a Common Law Court, and 3) her Oath to the Pope to obtain Vatican gold to back her illegal, fiat currency banks … You will note we seek to add Justin Trudeau for his secret Oath to a power foreign to our Aboriginal roots. You will also note the Pope has dissolved all corporations which glean their existance [sic] from any insurance bonds backed by Vatican gold.

This may affect your firm’s legitimacy to practice law. [24] The material before us disclosed other examples of similar thinking. The Lawyer: • has claimed that Canada is part of the United States and subject to the U.S. Constitution; • advised opposing counsel that he would be appealing a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to a fictional tribunal; • sought damages in the amount of $30 million against Ontario and Alberta judges and lawyers for crimes against humanity;

• in pleadings filed with Federal Court, alleged that the “HSBC funneled the money that enabled Italy’s criminal syndicate Mdrangheta to run a Ninth Circle Satanic Child Sacrifice Cult between the Vatican and Montreal .

Former Prime Minister Harper and several Cabinet Ministers are alleged to be involved”; • in a reply factum in the same litigation, argued “Our birth certificates are BONDS complete with 2 UPC codes that allow the Crown to pledge the bonds to Private Banks to be traded globally on the bond market, backed by human labor (and the gold of the Private Vatican Bank), which is tantamount to a continuation of the slave trade and feudal system by elite European supremacist families.” • pled that “The Privy Council is the inner Circle of the secret Order of the Garter, headed by The Vatican and The Queen, which controls all secret societies throughout the world ” and sought from the Court a monetary award of $3 quadrillion “ which amount equals the global sub-prime real estate debt ”; and • in a criminal proceeding in British Columbia, argued that Canada is a Crown Corporation registered on the New York Stock exchange and “as such is merely a subsidiary corporation of United States Inc., which in turn is subsequent corporation to the East Indian Trading Company, all of whom have headquarters in Washington, D.C.” [ 18 ] In its analysis, the Tribunal noted at paras. 35 – 41: [35] It is clear from the evidence before us that the Lawyer has acted as counsel in a number of legal proceedings in which he has raised a series of bizarre, irrational and unsupportable arguments.

These seem be focused on a belief in elaborate historical conspiracies involving the Vatican, the Queen, international banks, the Chinese government, drug companies and many others. [36] During the course of this proceeding the Lawyer argued that some of the positions he had advanced had been at the direction of clients, the suggestion being that he did not accept or agree with some of them.

We observe that at no point in his communications with other counsel does the Lawyer make such a distinction or in any way qualify or filter his positions. [37] Even assuming this to be the case, at the end of the day, it makes no practical difference. A lawyer has a duty as an officer of the court not to advance arguments that are out of touch with reality, no matter what a client might wish. [38] The Lawyer asserts that he has taken a clear and cogent approach to his litigation and sought to advance new or novel approaches to his clients’ cases.

However, judges have described this as a vexatious litigation strategy founded on pseudolegal rants and nonsensical arguments. [39] The Lawyer appears to have relied on non-existent laws, treaties and tribunals. His arguments have been repeatedly rejected by judges. This does not appear to have discouraged the Lawyer from continuing to earnestly promote these theories with vigour and obvious conviction.

That includes this motion. [40] It is the Law Society’s position that the Lawyer’s persistent pursuit of patently irrational arguments in the face of multiple adverse rulings raises reasonable concerns with respect to both the Lawyer’s judgment and capacity. We agree. [41] On the face of it, this raises reasonable grounds that the Lawyer may be or may have been incapacitated. Further, in the absence of any existing medical information, it is not possible to make a determination on the evidence gathered to date whether the conduct in question might arise from delusion or something else.

An independent medical examination would provide significant assistance in this regard. [ 19 ] It was ultimately found by a panel of the Law Society of Ontario that Spirit Warrior was incapacitated within the meaning of the Law Society Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. L-8 . At paras. 20 – 28 of the Tribunal’s decision in Law Society of Ontario v. Bogue , 2019 ONLSTH 107 , the Tribunal stated: [ 20 ] The panel accepts the evidence of Dr. Klassen and we find that the respondent has a mental illness and is likely suffering from a delusional disorder of the grandiose and persecutory subtypes.

We also find that for reasons relating to his illness, the respondent has been and continues to be incapable of meeting his obligations as a licensee. [ 21 ] The Lawyer suggested that there is nothing untoward or wrong in passionately putting forward novel arguments. He maintained

that novel arguments can eventually move the law forward and become the law. He offered Einstein as a case study and argued that even if 99 of 100 theories Einstein put forward were disproven, the fact that one of them proved to be valid should give us all pause. He describes what he does as passionate and determined advocacy. [ 22 ] The concern expressed by Dr.

Klassen is that clients may not be well-served if their legal matters intersect with the Lawyer’s areas of delusion, such as the biology or origins of humankind, his understanding of political and banking systems of the world or his understanding of Indigenous issues. Moreover, if a client’s matter intersects with the Lawyer’s delusions, the client’s interests may become subservient to the Lawyer’s overarching interest in replacing legal and political systems. Dr.

Klassen’s concern is that in such a contest of ideas, the Lawyer’s delusions would prevail.’ [ 23 ] We find this concern has been borne out in litigation advanced by the Lawyer on a number of occasions. [ 24 ] For example, the evidence before us establishes that the Lawyer has made wide-ranging and unsubstantiated claims about the lack of jurisdiction of Canadian courts, attempted to overturn a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal by commencing an action in Federal Court and upon being denied leave to appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada, has suggested that he would appeal that decision to an Aboriginal tribunal. [ 25 ] In replying to a communication from opposing counsel, informing him that he had filed his petition at the wrong level of court, the Lawyer wrote back advancing unrelated and irrelevant views about the Canadian government’s alleged participation in a global cartel involving the Vatican Bank and the Chinese government, referenced the Knights Templar and introduced unrelated topics such as HIV, as well as a theory that eating cooked food causes illness. [ 26 ] We also find that as a result of his actions, some of the Lawyer’s clients have found their legal matters unnecessarily delayed, have possibly lost the opportunity to present cogent and clear legal positions and have been left with adverse legal cost consequences. [ 27 ] Even if we accept that the Lawyer’s illness did not, or would not, manifest itself in all cases, the possibility that the Lawyer may be able to meet some of his obligations some of the time is not sufficient reason for us to conclude that the public interest would be protected by determining that he has the capacity to continue to practise law.

This is bolstered by the Lawyer’s conduct during proceedings before this Tribunal, such as: • his pronouncement that he is a Métis individual who is to be “free of the rules”; • his insistence that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction and that the laws of equity and something called the “Law of Ma’at” be applied in proceedings before it; and • his motion seeking that a finding of violation of the “indigenous privacy laws of Kinakwii” be made in respect of investigation counsel for the Law Society and that a finding of “treason” be made against counsel representing the Law Society in these proceedings. [ 28 ] We find that the medical evidence establishes that the Lawyer does not have the capacity to meet his obligations as a licensee.

The actions outlined above are clearly related to his illness. Accordingly, we find that the Lawyer was, and continues to be, incapacitated within the meaning of s. 37(1) of the Act. [20] In terms of decisions of courts dealing with Spirit Warrior, recently in Glenn Patrick Bogue (a.k.a. Spirit Warrior) v. Law Society of Ontario , 2023 ONSC 3654 , Corbett, J. of the Superior Court of Justice issued an Endorsement relating to an appeal filed by Spirit Warrior purporting to appeal certain interlocutory orders of the Law Society Tribunal of the Law Society of Ontario.

The Endorsement arose from a notice issued to the parties under Rule 2.1 advising that the Court was considering dismissing the proceeding as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process on the grounds as set forth in the notice. Spirit Warrior corresponded with the Court regarding the notice. At the direction of Corbett, J., the Court advised Spirit Warrior that one of the arguments he purported to make in his correspondence to the Court, namely that all judges in Ontario were in conflict in dealing with the case because of their membership in the Law Society of Ontario, was patently frivolous and vexatious.

Spirit Warrior was also advised that he would have the time specified by the Court to respond to the Rule 2.1 notice and that he might wish to address in his response the concern the Court had voiced in its communication to him that his conduct as a litigant was frivolous and vexatious. Spirit Warrior subsequently provided submissions in response to the Rule 2.1 notice and thereafter Corbett, J. issued the Endorsement which provides as follows at para. 5: [5] The appellant provided submissions in response to the R.2.1 notice on June 7, 2023. The submissions are inherently vexatious.

The appeal is dismissed, and an order shall issue prohibiting the appellant from commencing or continuing any proceeding in the Divisional Court without prior permission of the administrative judge of the Divisional Court or their designate. [21] Corbett J. went on at paras. 6 – 15 to analyze the submissions of Spirit Warrior in response to the various grounds outlined in

the Rule 2.1 notice on which the Court was considering dismissing the appeal as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process: 1. An appeal to the Law Society Appeal Panel was dismissed for failure to perfect the appeal in a timely way in 2021. [6] The appellant does not address this concern in his submissions. 2. The time to appeal the 2021 dismissal expired about two years ago and no extension in the time in which to bring an appeal has been sought or granted by this court. [7] The appellant does not address this concern in his submissions. 3.

The current proceeding purports to appeal interlocutory orders of the Law Society Tribunal predating the 2021 dismissal by the Appeal Panel, and those appeals are now moot as a consequence of the 2021 dismissal. Further and in any event, interlocutory appeals are not generally available in this court, and these purported appeals are out of time and no extension has been sought or granted to appeal them. [8] The appellant does not address this concern in his submissions. 4.

The 2023 orders put an end to a purported fresh appeal brought by the appellant from the decision the appeal from which was finally dismissed with the 2021 dismissal. On its face, the 2023 appeal is an attempt to re-litigate the appeal that was dismissed in 2021, and is on its face frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. [9] The appellant argues that developments in the law have cast his appeal in a new light, and thus he should be permitted to raise these new developments by way of appeal, even though his appeal was dismissed previously.

This is no answer to the concern that the appellant is relitigating a decided appeal. The appellant's recourse, on this theory of the case, is to request that the Law Society re-open his decided appeal on the basis of the new legal developments he alleges. He is not entitled to bring a fresh appeal in respect to a matter that has been finally decided already. Further, as explained below, the alleged "new developments" in the law are irrelevant to his appeal in any event and are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process in and of themselves. 5.

In the Notice of Appeal, the appellant raises untenable grounds that raise vexatious issues that have been disposed of in other litigation in which such grounds have been sought to be advanced, such as the legality of Canada's constitution, and the jurisdiction of the respondent over the appellant because of the appellant's alleged indigeneity. In this case, the issues concern the respondent's decisions to suspend and to revoke the appellant's membership in the respondent.

Allegations that the respondent does not have jurisdiction over such issues are inherently vexatious on their face. [10] The conclusion of the appellant's submissions summarizes the basis on which he says his appeal is not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process: The issues of:

A) Indigenous Common Law being presumed to continue via Desautel ;

B) the effect of the new law in CANADA of UNDRIP , since 2007;

C) the validity of the BNA after its Enabling Clause was rescinded,

D) the contingency of S. 59 until a second Proclamation;

E) the Proclamation of a mere Corporation in 1982, and that Crown's de facto control vs Indigenous Common Law's de jure control of our Resources have never been properly nor fully litigated in Canadian jurisprudence, at the appellate level. These issues centre around binding SCC in Decisions in St Catharine's Milling , Tsilhqot'in , and Desautel , along with Calder , R v Sioui and R v Cote , and R v Hape . Therefore, these issues cannot be frivolous or vexatious, and must be heard, via the Div.

Court, and from there in an Indigenous Tribunal of [the appellant]'s Choice, per UNDRIP . 1 None of these points is remotely relevant to whether the appellant's membership in the Law Society of Ontario should have been suspended or revoked. [11] Further, the appellant's arguments in respect to the issues he says he wishes to raise are vexatious. For example, he argues as follows in respect to the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly known as the British North America Act ): In 1981, PM Pierre Trudeau knew he had a problem.

The BNA Act of 1867 never received Royal Assent (SW sought a true copy of that Royal Assent from England since Feb., 2020). The BNA Act of 1867 was repealed by Victoria via the Statute Law Revision Act of 1893, which removed the BNA's Enabling Clause. The BNA became a nullity. Pierre Trudeau tried to re-vive the BNA, which was only passed in London, and brought here via a Proclamation of Elizabeth II, who established only Letters Patent of a Corporation called CANADA, a continuation if you will of the Hudson's Bay Corporation.

As a second example, the appellant conflates the rights of First Nations to self-determination to what he conceives of as a personal right of self-determination, for him, as a self-identified member of a First Nation: [The appellant] self-determines as an Individual, and also as a member of the Non-Status Kinakwii Tribe. … [12] Judges are required to be open-minded and to consider novel arguments and claims. But there is a limit.

Judges are also required to focus their efforts on matters of substance, and not to waste judicial resources giving serious consideration to what is utter nonsense. [13] There have been no material legal developments that impact on the Law Society's duty and authority to supervise its membership in the public interest. The appellant's argument to the contrary is without merit. Second, the substance of the appellant's legal argument is pseudo-legal nonsense that has been rejected repeatedly by the courts. This has been going on for years.

In a 2018 decision a panel of the Law Society stated as follows ( 2018 ONLSTH 46 , para. 14 ): The panel lastly notes, in passing, as put forward by Law Society counsel, that Mr. Bogue has made similarly vague and untenable arguments in other Courts, which have been dismissed, namely: The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. A.C ., Endorsement of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dated April 1, 2016; The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v A.C ., Reasons of the Divisional Court dated May 11, 2016; The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. A.C ., 2016 ONCA 512 ; R. v. Anderson , 2016 BCSC 2170 ; R. v.

Anderson , 2017 BCCA 154 . While these cases are not strictly binding on this panel, they are nonetheless worth noting for the fact that they confirm and support this panel's conclusions with respect to Mr. Bogue's similar arguments before us, with respect to issue(

s) before the panel and our jurisdiction. [14] Recently, in Bogue v. Bogue , 2023 ONSC 1642 , per Gilmore J., the court reviewed and rejected pseudo-legal arguments to the effect (among other things) that the Constitution of Canada is invalid, and litigation involving the appellant requires Ontario and/or Canada to consult with First Nations. [15] Excessive judicial resources have already been wasted examining and rejecting the appellant's vexatious arguments respecting the status of Canada's constitution and his argument that there are no valid laws of Canada or Ontario that apply to him.

[22] Paragraph 16 of the Endorsement of Corbett, J. outlines the disposition of the appeal: Disposition [16] The appeal is dismissed as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process, on the basis of the concerns raised at the time the R.2.1 notice was issued, and on the basis that the appellant's response to the R.2.1 notice is, itself, frivolous and vexatious.

Mr Bogue may not commence or continue proceedings in the Divisional Court on his own behalf and may not act as counsel, agent or representative for any person in any proceeding in the Divisional Court without the prior permission of the Divisional Court administrative judge or her designate. Permission may only be sought by letter that is no longer than three pages, supported with attachments no longer than ten pages.

Such materials may be transmitted to the court by email. [23] Certain of the arguments and submissions made by Spirit Warrior in support of the application of the Applicants are similar in nature to the claims which Corbett, J. in the Glenn Patrick Bogue (a.k.a. Spirit Warrior) decision described as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. Corbett, J. also referred to Spirit Warrior’s arguments as “utter nonsense”. He also referred to the decision of Gilmore, J. in Bogue v.

Bogue , 2023 ONSC 1642 and described the arguments made by Spirit Warrior therein as pseudo-legal. [24] In Bogue , Spirit Warrior was a party to the litigation in a private law dispute with his brother. Spirit Warrior brought an application seeking various relief, including: a. transfer of the proceedings to an Indigenous Tribunal; and b. an Order that the Crown consult and protect Indigenous Laws, Customs and Traditions. [25] Gilmore, J. concluded that the arguments made by Spirit Warrior were without legal foundation or had no legal relevance or validity.

He dealt with each argument of Spirit Warrior at paras. 18 – 42 as follows: The Applicant's Motion 18 As already indicated, the Applicant's motion shall be dismissed. I will deal with each of the Applicant's arguments in turn by way of

summary. Argument #1 - Because the Crown never Conquered Turtle Island, the laws of Ontario and Canada, including the Charter and the Rules of Civil Procedure have no Application to the People of Turtle Island. 19 I do not subscribe to this argument.

The Rules of Civil Procedure and specifically Rule 1.02(1) applies to "all civil proceedings in the Court of Appeal and the Superior Court of Justice" subject to three exceptions which do not apply in this case. 20 Because this Application is taking place in the Superior Court of Justice by way of an Application brought by the Applicant, the Rules apply to this proceeding and the Application has attorned to the jurisdiction of this Court.

Argument #2- The Comity Argument 21 The Applicant argues that the Court is bound to enforce, pursuant to the principle of comity, a decision of Tsilhqot'in Universal Supreme Court. 22 Courts in British Columbia have commented on the existence of the Universal Supreme Court as follows. 23 First, in Holland v. British Columbia (Attorney General) , 2021 BCSC 562 , at para. 12 : There are several counts alleging interference with Ms. Holland's performance of her duties as Chief Justice of the Universal Supreme Court. Ms. Holland has for years represented that she holds that title and position.

The Universal Supreme Court, if such an entity exists anywhere other than in the mind of Ms. Holland, has no legal authority nor powers in British Columbia. 24 Second, in R. v. Holland , 2021 BCCA 184 , the Court of Appeal begins, in an appeal brought by Zsuzsanna Holland, at para. 1:

This Court has authority to protect its processes from abuse by litigants who persist in attempting to initiate appeals and applications the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain. On occasion, a litigant's conduct will be so egregious as to require the Court to act on its own motion. This is one of those occasions. 25 At para. 5 the Court explains: "It is convenient to note here that Ms. Holland is subject to vexatious litigant orders in this Court [...]" 26 Finally, the Court notes, at para. 8, that, in their notice of appeal and certiorari, the appellant: [A]ppears to assert that (

a) the Supreme Court of British Columbia does not have jurisdiction over her based on an Aboriginal land claim; and (

b) she holds a judicial office in a tribunal styled as the International Universal Supreme Court of the Tsilhqot'in. 27 Third, in Bryfogle v.

British Columbia (Children and Family Development) , 2016 BCCA 508 , the Court of Appeal addressed an application by Bryfogle for "directions as to whether extensions of time for filing two notices of appeal are required and, if so, orders granting such extensions, together with related relief." The Application was dismissed (at para. 50). 28 At para. 15 the Court of Appeal explains the following with respect to jurisdictional issues in the matter, which in my view, is similar to the present case, and therefore helpful: As to the substance of the jurisdictional issue raised in the proposed notice of civil claim, Associate Chief Justice Cullen observed that Mr.

Bryfogle advanced similar arguments in the CFCSA proceeding. He stated: [33] In relation to those arguments Judge Church held as follows at para. 32: [32] It became apparent during these proceedings that the positions of Ms. Hegedus and Mr. Bryfogle were quite different and so I have dealt with them separately in my reasons for judgment. With regard to the issue of jurisdiction of this Court to determine these issues, I reject entirely [the] submission of Mr.

Bryfogle that this Court lost jurisdiction over these matters on April 1, 2015 as a result of various “orders” and “declarations” the Chilcotin National Congress and the Universal Supreme Court of the [Tsilhqot’in] . The documents relied on by Ms. Hegedus and Mr.

Bryfogle in this regard have no legal relevance or validity. [34] I agree with those observations and conclusions [...] [emphasis added] 29 As a result, with respect to the Applicant's requested order in this case that "the Decision of the Tsilhqot'in Universal Supreme Court be enforced", in my view, the above case law demonstrates that this sort of argument has previously been rejected by the courts - that is, that these "orders" or "decisions" have been held to have no legal relevance or validity.

Argument #3 - Lack of Jurisdiction with Respect to Property and Civil Rights 30 Section 11(2) of the Courts of Justice Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 provides that "The Superior Court of Justice has all the jurisdiction, power and authority historically exercised by courts of common law and equity in England and Ontario." 31 In Canada (Attorney General) v.

TeleZone Inc. , 2010 SCC 62 , the Supreme Court of Canada wrote, at para. 16, that "The Ontario Superior Court, as a court of general and inherent jurisdiction, may entertain any cause of action in the absence of legislation or an arbitration agreement to the contrary."

32 Further, it is clear that the Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91 and 92 distribute legislative power (between Parliament and the provinciallegislatures), and not the authority or jurisdiction of the courts. Argument #4 - Indigenous Right to Deal with Canada and Ontario through Indigenous Representatives of Their Choice 33 It appears that the sources relied on by the Applicant discuss a right to representation in negotiations with the Crown, on a collectivebasis. For example the Applicant cites the following passage from Daniels v.

Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and NorthernDevelopment), 2016 SCC 12, at paras. 54 and 56 on this point: [54] The third declaration sought is that Metis and non-status Indians have the right to be consulted and negotiated with, in good faith, bythe federal government on a collective basis through representatives of their choice, respecting all their rights, interests and needs asAboriginal peoples. [...] [56] However, Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [...], Xeni Gwet'in First Nations v.

British Columbia, [...]and Powley already recognize a context-specific duty to negotiate when Aboriginal rights are engaged. Because it would be a restatementof the existing law, the third declaration too lacks practical utility. 34 As a result, in my view, the Applicant's argument on this point lacks foundation. Argument #5 -

Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 Negates the Rules of Civil Procedure 35 Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides: "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canadaare hereby recognized and affirmed." 36 I am not entirely clear what the Applicant is arguing here. I respectfully do not see how the Rules of Civil Procedure could be negatedby section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, or more particularly, whether the Applicant is attempting to argue that the R. v. Van derPeet, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 test for the identification of an aboriginal right is made out in this case. Argument #6 - The Applicant has a Right Under

Article V of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) toChoose an Indigenous Tribunal 37 A very similar argument was rejected in Guibord v.

National Bank of Canada, 2022 ONSC 1801, at para. 16: With respect to the claims against the government defendants, the style of cause states that the action is brought before the OntarioSuperior Court "In Conjunction with the ASMIN / Kinakwii Indigenous Tribunals, under UNDRIP, and Kinakwii Constitution" andconstitutes "A Land Claim in Trespass, under Indigenous Laws and Traditions, in Equity, including the Aboriginal Common Law of theLand, existing prior to and after 1982, and UNDRIP and/or under The Law of Ma'at and/or Natural Justice" [...] He seeks a transfer ofthe action to the "ASMIN Tribunal ASKIT", to be tried by "a joint Panel of a Justice appointed by Her Majesty's government and a Legal Headman from ASMIN".

[Emphasis added.] 38 In dismissing the action, the Court states as follows, at paras. 30-31: [30] The statement of claim otherwise bears hallmarks of typically abusive, frivolous or vexatious litigation. Some allegations areunintelligible or nonsensical; it uses pseudo-legal terminology; and it targets a lawyer who previously acted for an opposing party inprevious proceedings involving the same parties. [31] I conclude that the action is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court's process.

It is appropriate to dismiss this action pursuantto r. 2.1.01 [...] Argument #7 - The Application of Rule 15 Triggers the Crown's Duty to Consult 39 Respectfully, I do not see how the Crown duty to consult applies with respect to the application of Rule 15 of the Rules of CivilProcedure. 40 As stated in Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v.

Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, at para. 31, the Duty to Consult arises: '[w]hen the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplatesconduct that might adversely affect it.' This test can be broken down into three elements: (1) the Crown's knowledge, actual orconstructive, of a potential Aboriginal claim or right; (2) contemplated Crown conduct; and (3) the potential that the contemplatedconduct may adversely affect an Aboriginal claim or right. 41 As a result, I do not see the application of Rule 15 as involving the Crown or any contemplated Crown conduct in this case. 42 In

summary I do not find any of the Applicant's arguments persuasive or founded in either evidence or proper legal analysis. They aredismissed in their entirety. [26] In Steinkey v. Canada, 2017 FC 124, R. Lafrenière, Prothonotary, reviewed a Statement of Claim signed by Spirit Warrior. Hecharacterized the plaintiffs in that Statement of Claim as Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants, a phrase coined byRooke, A.C.J. of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571.

Prothonotary Lafrenière in dealing with amotion by the Defendants to strike the Statement of Claim of the plaintiffs said at para. 5: 5 I see no need to waste valuable court time to write extensive reasons given that I completely agree with the written representationsfiled by the moving parties. Notwithstanding the Plaintiffs' protestations to the opposite, they clearly fall within a class of individualsdescribed in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 ,2012 ABQB 571(Meads) as "OPCA litigants", who follow a well-known path ofillogic, presumption, and pseudo-legal rants.

The pleading before me is a classic case of a vexatious party seeking to foist on the Crowna unilateral agreement and trust obligations based on nonsensical arguments, as referred to by Mr. Justice Rooke in Meads at para 447: [447] OPCA litigants frequently attempt to unilaterally foist obligations on other litigants, peace officers, state actors, or the court andcourt personnel. These foisted obligations take many forms. None, of course, creates any binding legal obligation. In that sense, these areyet more 'magic hats'. [27] In R. v.

Anderson, 2016 BCSC 2170, Spirit Warrior appeared as counsel for the accused on a motion seeking an adjournmentof trial to give the accused time to apply for an order that the Court relinquish jurisdiction over her regarding the charges she was facingand to relinquish jurisdiction to a Clan Grandmother of the Metis. Among other things, the accused also sought an order that Brown, J.recuse himself and that a judge be appointed with experience in Aboriginal law or alternatively that a “chancellor” be appointed to hearthe proposed application.

A memorandum was filed in support of the motion and in respect of this memorandum, Brown, J. said at para.23: 23 The memorandum is difficult to follow, partly because it is shot through with immaterial, unproven assertions of a conspiratorialnature; and also with assertions with no logical nexus to the court's jurisdiction or to propositions that would lead to a legitimate defencefor Ms. Anderson.

It effectively amounts to a challenge to the Canadian Government's jurisdiction to charge income taxes against Métispeople (or indeed anyone), as well as to the court's jurisdiction to hear criminal cases with Métis or aboriginal accused.

[28] A review of the decision of Brown, J. reveals that many of the arguments made in that case are similar to those that Spirit Warrior made in his arguments on behalf of the Applicants on this application.

In respect of the arguments advanced by Spirit Warrior in his memorandum, Brown, J. at para. 112, said: 112 At the outset of these reasons, I noted the difficulty of finding a logical train of propositions in the memorandum, partly because it contained so much immaterial information and unproven assertions, some of an extreme or conspiratorial nature, with little in the way of discernible logical links between the various assertions or to the jurisdiction of this court and the matter before it. Much of what was referred to was far beyond the purview of this court and its responsibilities.

Most of what was asserted does not withstand a modicum of inquiry. Practically speaking, none of it raises a judiciable issue relevant to this case. [ 29 ] Then at paras. 113 – 115, he said: 113 THE COURT: Out of respect for our legal process, I have delved into the materials more deeply than is usually necessary. I have sought to strike a balance between deciding and disposing of the proposed application altogether, and delving into the matter enough to fairly assess its merits. 114 Before I conclude this part of my ruling, it should be mentioned that the documents handed up by Ms.

Anderson, besides being handed up without notice, were not properly placed into evidence through a witness or, at the least, attached to an affidavit of a witness with a person who could swear to or solemnly affirm the maker and the provenance of the document. However, I did peruse them and I am aware of their contents. 115 Counsel referred to an unreported ruling by Madam Prothonotary Martha Milczynski of the Federal Court dated September 7, 2016 and identified only by its docket number, T-195-16.

In it, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' action pursuant to Rule 221 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 on the grounds that it was an abuse of the court's process.

The plaintiffs claimed damages in the range of two to three quadrillion dollars and sought a number of declarations, including that the plaintiff "Sir Andrew [M]iracle is a sentient, living being ... and therefore the decisions of Ontario courts are not binding without his consent." The court noted that many of the plaintiffs' allegations were inflammatory and scandalous, including references to "theft of identity, rape and murder, a birth bond system to manufacture debt, and references to the United Nations, the Pope, and questions about the Queen's lineage to Edward III." The court concluded that the action could not proceed as it concerned matters that had already been determined elsewhere, were not within the jurisdiction of the court, or were generally confusing, rambling, and scandalous and did not give rise to a cause of action.

Reading between the lines of the decision, it appears that some of the plaintiffs' claims in that case resembled certain of the allegations set out in Mr. Bogue's Memorandum of Fact and Law.

I agree with the court's analysis in that case to the extent that it characterized these types of allegations as scandalous, inflammatory, and irrelevant. [ 30 ] In terms of Spirit Warrior’s suitability to act as a representative of the Applicants in this proceeding, I would note that he has been subject to prosecution in the province of Quebec in relation to the illegal practice of law and found guilty of one count (see Barreau de Montréal v. Bogue , 2023 QCCQ 3429 and Barreau de Montréal v. Bogue , 2021 QCCQ 17269 ).

In that proceeding, Spirit Warrior made a similar argument as he made on behalf of the Applicants on this application, namely that the proceeding must be transferred to an indigenous tribunal. This argument was summarily dismissed by the Court of Quebec. [ 31 ] In my view, courts have a responsibility to ensure that inappropriate persons are not permitted to act as representatives of parties to litigation. I believe this to be consistent with the culture shift directed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hyrniak v. Mauldin , 2014 SCC 7 .

The message in Hyrniak was that courts need to control litigation so that court processes serve their function of resolving disputes between persons in a manner that reflects economic realities. Central to the need to control litigation in order to maintain and preserve the proper functioning of courts and the judicial system is the elimination of abusive, frivolous and vexatious litigation. [ 32 ] Mr. Justice D.R.G. Thomas in 1985 Sawridge Trust v. Alberta (Public Trustee) , 2017 ABQB 530 discussed the shifting orientation of litigation in Canada, including abusive litigation.

At paras. 47 – 48, he said: 47 Similarly, the Statement of Principles in its commentary at p 5 emphasizes that abusive litigation is not excused because someone is self-represented: Self-represented persons, like all other litigants, are subject to the provisions whereby courts maintain control of their proceedings and procedures. In the same manner as with other litigants, self-represented persons may be treated as vexatious or abusive litigants where the administration of justice requires it.

The ability of judges to promote access may be affected by the actions of self-represented litigants themselves. 48 That objective of controlling litigation abuse is a critical facet of the "new reality". This is reflected in recent jurisprudence of this Court. One mechanism to achieve this "culture shift" is interdiction of abusive litigation, for example via vexatious litigant orders issued under this Court's inherent jurisdiction (surveyed in Hok v Alberta , 2016 ABQB 651 at paras 14-25 , 273 ACWS (3d) 533, leave denied 2017 ABCA 63 , leave to the SCC requested, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 222 37624 (12 April 2017)).

Recent Alberta jurisprudence in this strategic direction has stressed how "fair and just" litigant control responses are ones that tackle both caused and anticipated injuries, for example:

1. identifying litigation abuse that warrants intervention in a prospective manner, by investigating what is the plausible future misconductby an abusive litigant, rather than a rote and reflex response where the Court only restricts forms of abuse that have already occurred(Hok v Alberta, at paras 35-37; Thompson v International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 955, 2017 ABQB 210 at para 61,leave denied 2017 ABCA 193; Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ABQB 237 at para 160-164; Chisan v Fielding, 2017ABQB 233 at paras 52-54); 2. recognition that certain kinds of litigation abuse warrant a stricter response given their disproportionate harm to court processes(Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General) at paras 170-187); and 3. taking special additional steps where an abusive litigant defies simple control in his or her attacks on the Court, its personnel, and otherpersons (Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629, 29 Alta LR (6th) 334; Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 690). [33] The Statement of Principles referred to by Justice Thomas is the Canadian Judicial Council Statement of Principles on Self-Represented Litigants and Accused Persons (2006).

This Statement of Principles was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada inPintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23. [34] MacLachlin, CJC (as she then was) in Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General),2014 SCC 59 commented on frivolous or vexatious cases. While her comments were made in the context of hearing fees, they havebroader application to all frivolous or vexatious cases. At para. 47 she said: 47 Of course, hearing fees that prevent litigants from bringing frivolous or vexatious claims do not offend the Constitution.

There is noconstitutional right to bring frivolous or vexatious cases, and measures that deter such cases may actually increase efficiency and overallaccess to justice. Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 59 , [2014]3 SCR 31 [35] I believe those comments of MacLachlin, C.J.C. support the view that courts have the ability and responsibility to ensure thatonly appropriate persons are permitted to act as representatives of parties to litigation. [36] Mr. Justice D.R.G.

Thomas in 1985 Sawridge Trust spoke directly on this issue at para. 55 where he said: 55 Inherent jurisdiction provides the authority for a court to scrutinize and restrict persons who attempt to act as a litigationrepresentative. This usually emerges in relation to problematic layperson representatives. For example, in R v Dick, 2002 BCCA 27, 163BCAC 62, the British Columbia Court of Appeal evaluated whether an agent with a history of abusive litigation activities should bepermitted to act as a representative.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded courts have a responsibility to ensure persons whoappear before the court are properly represented, and more generally to maintain the integrity of the court process: para 7. Permission toact as an agent is a privilege subject solely to the court's discretion: para 6. A person who is dishonest, shows lack of respect for the law,or who engaged in litigation abuse is not an appropriate agent.

Similar results were ordered in Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213, 86CPC (7th) 348; Peddle v Alberta Treasury Branches, 2004 ABQB 608, 133 ACWS (3d) 253; R v Maleki, 2007 ONCJ 430, 74 WCB(2d) 816; R v Reddick, 2002 SKCA 89, 54 WCB (2d) 646; The Law Society of B.C. v Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277, 142 ACWS (3d) 346,affirmed 2006 BCCA 161, 149 ACWS (3d) 735. [37] In this jurisdiction, my colleague, Handrigan, J., in the case of Penney v. Newfoundland and Labrador, 2020 NLSC 46 dealtwith the issue of vexatious proceedings.

He examined it in the context of a vexatious litigant who was the subject of an order that heobtain leave before he could file any applications and the jurisdiction of this Court to make such orders. At paras. 10 – 13, he said: 10 As I noted above, this Province does not have a statutory scheme for dealing with vexatious proceedings as does Ontario. However,the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to manage its own process is deep and it reflects the authority that the legislature gives to Ontariocourts in

section 140 of the Act, as Favreau, J. applied it in Olumide. 11 I note, for example, what Furlong, C.J. said about the inherent jurisdiction of this Court in Bursey v. Bursey (1966), 51 N.P.R.256, 1966 CarswellNfld 4 (Nfld. S.C.) in which he cited the ancient case of Peacock v. Bell and Kendal (1667), 1 Wms.

Saund. 73, 85E.R. 84: And the rule for jurisdiction is, that nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a Superior Court, but that which speciallyappears to be so; and, on the contrary, nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an inferior Court but that which is soexpressly alleged. 12 He added, at page 261: I can only say then, that in my opinion the jurisdiction of this Court [the Supreme Court of Newfoundland] is sufficiently ample for it todispose of matters which come before it and which the Court is not specifically forbidden to consider.

13 In the absence of statute or regulation to the contrary, I find this Court has jurisdiction to require Mr. Penney to obtain leave to start new proceedings or to continue ongoing matters and has jurisdiction to deal with Mr. Penney's application for leave. Here, I draw on the inherent authority of this Court that Furlong, C.J. recognized in Bursey . I will, however, take guidance from the Ontario legislation as Favreau, J. applied it in Olumide .

I turn now to analyze the issue I stated above, starting with the background to it. [ 38 ] This decision also supports the view that this Court has the ability to control who is permitted to act as a representative of a party in a proceeding before it. [ 39 ] Based on the foregoing, there is ample authority supporting this Court’s inherent jurisdiction to decide whether a proposed representative of parties to litigation is an appropriate person to act as that representative. [ 40 ] In respect of Spirit Warrior: a. He is a suspended member of the Law Society of Ontario and has been since 2017.

A Tribunal of the Law Society of Ontario has found that he is incapacitated to practice law. b. He was found guilty in the province of Quebec of unlawfully practicing law. c. He has a significant record of making frivolous, abusive and vexatious arguments in courts in multiple jurisdictions in Canada. He made similar frivolous, abusive and vexatious arguments on behalf of the Applicants at the hearing of the current application requesting that he be allowed to be their representative in this proceeding.

In my view, such a person is not an appropriate person to act as a litigation representative. [ 41 ] I realize that my decision may leave the Applicants in a difficult position given a hearing on whether an injunction previously granted in favour of the Plaintiff should continue is scheduled for August 1 - 2, 2023. While that is unfortunate, it does not justify the Court allowing a clearly inappropriate person to act as litigation representative.

The Applicants will have to decide if in the circumstances they wish to seek an adjournment of the scheduled hearing and in that regard I am prepared to hear such application on short notice and without the need for a written application. _____________________________ George L. Murphy Justice