BREE HAIDER PETITIONER - v. -, 2023 SKKB 153

KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN 2023 SKKB 153 Date: 20 23 07 14 Docket: FLD-RG-00091-2022 Judicial Centre: Regina, Family Law Division BETWEEN: BREE HAIDER PETITIONER - and - ALANA LEIGH STACH RESPONDENT Counsel: James Vogel, K.C. for the petitioner Lindsay Hart for the respondent JUDGMENT BROWN J. July 14, 2023 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The parties cohabited for almost 12 years. In January of 2022 they separated. The parties have not been to court previously in relation to support or property. They attended family mediation but unfortunately could not resolve their differences. [ 2 ] Both Bree and Alana are employed.

Bree, who is 46, earns considerably less income than Alana. Bree had income of $68,595 in 2020 and employment income of $65,770 in 2021. In 2022 she had line 15000 total income of $68,475, although the full tax return was not in evidence, this coming exclusively from the notice of assessment. [ 3 ] Alana, who is 50, provided her 2020 income tax return which shows employment income of $130,310.82, dividend income of $56,981.65, interest and other investment income of $13,647.11, taxable capital gains of $6,174.11 and other income of $1,141.68 in 2020 totalling $208,255.89.

Her 2021 income tax return shows employment income of $136,918.63, dividend income of $58,932.64, interest and other investment income of $12,084.94, rental income of $2,015.67, taxable capital gains of $16,679.20 and other income of $710.12 in 2021 totalling $227,341.20.

In 2022 she had employment income of $145,138.09, dividend income of $64,021.14, interest and other investment income of $14,880.79, rental income of $15,115.38, taxable capital gains of $3,357.95 and other income of $1,729.45 in 2022 totalling $244,242.80. [ 4 ] In terms of assets, Alana has possession and control of the lion’s share in that regard.

She has $1,9922,562 in a Nesbitt Burns wealth management investment account, a one-half interest in a cottage at Wee Too Beach valued at $300,000 or more, the family home valued at $400,000 or more, a condo in Kananaskis, Alberta valued at $366,000, an RRSP valued at $204,147, a TFSA valued at $103,018, a Regina Police pension which would no doubt be substantial but which was not valued and $90,000 in debt obligations. [ 5 ] Bree has a condo in Regina valued at $180,000, a $107,689 RRSP, a $14,751 TFSA, a pension valued at

$60,000 and $140,000 in debt obligations. [ 6 ] Bree seeks spousal support alone, there being no children of the relationship. She seeks an order of ongoing and retroactive spousal support. Bree avers to having lost a number of incidents to and benefits regarding her lifestyle which had previously been enjoyed when the parties were together. She says she has needs and expenses which are not being provided any longer and Alana has the means by which to meet and provide them. [ 7 ] Alana submits that Bree is underemployed and could earn considerably more than she does.

She also submits that Bree is obtaining many benefits for free with a new partner in British Columbia, and that she in fact has no needs which are not being provided for through Bree’s capacity to earn an income and the generous friends she has. Alana avers to many of the benefits claimed by Bree being in large part fictitious and things Bree did not avail herself of earlier, so there can be no loss of such amenities now. [ 8 ] The matter therefore requires a consideration of the parties’ circumstances, means and needs within the context of an interim request for spousal support.

Issue [ 9 ] Is Bree entitled to interim spousal support? If so, in what amount? DISCUSSION [ 10 ] This application relies on The Family Maintenance Act, 1997 , SS 1997, c F-6.2 . The relevant portions of s. 5, s. 7 and s. 9 are as follows: Spousal maintenance 5(1) On application, the court may order a person to provide maintenance for his or her spouse, in accordance with need, to the extent that the person is capable of doing so. 5(2) An order for the maintenance of a spouse should: (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the spousal relationship or its breakdown; (

b) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the spousal relationship; and (

c) insofar as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. . . . Amount of maintenance 7(1) In determining the amount, if any, of maintenance to be paid for a dependent spouse, the court shall take into account the needs, means and economic circumstances of the parties, including: (

a) the age and the physical and mental health of the spouses; (

b) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (

c) the measures available for the dependent spouse to become financially independent and the length of time and cost involved to enable the dependent spouse to take those measures; and (

d) the legal obligation of the respondent to provide maintenance for any other person. 7(2) In determining the amount, if any, of maintenance to be paid for a dependant, the court shall not take into account any benefit that the ministry responsible for the administration of The Saskatchewan Assistance Act provides to or for the maintenance of the dependant. Powers of court 9(1) On an application pursuant to this Act, the court may make an interim or final order on any terms and conditions that the court considers appropriate, including one or more of the following provisions: (

a) that an amount be paid periodically, either for an indefinite or limited period, or until a specified event occurs; (

b) that a lump sum be paid or held in trust on any conditions the court considers appropriate; (

c) that maintenance be paid with respect to any period before the date of the order; (

d) that a person who has a policy of life insurance as defined in The Saskatchewan Insurance Act : (

i) designate his or her dependant as a beneficiary irrevocably or for the period designated by the court; and (ii) pay all premiums on the policy; (

e) that a person who has an interest in a pension plan or other benefit plan designate his or her dependant as a beneficiary under the plan and not change that designation;

(

f) if a parent is ordered to pay maintenance for a child and whether or not the parents of the child are spouses, that the parent pay inaddition: (

i) expenses of the birth parent of the child with respect to prenatal care and the birth of the child; (ii) maintenance for the birth parent of the child for a period not exceeding 3 months immediately preceding the birth of the child; and (iii) maintenance for the birth parent of the child during any period after the birth of the child, not exceeding 6 months, that the courtmay determine as a period during which, by reason of the birth of the child, the parent ought to contribute to the maintenance of the birthparent; (

g) that costs incurred in obtaining an order pursuant to this Act be paid; (

h) that payment pursuant to the order be secured by a mortgage on land, security, deposit or bond in any form that the court directs. … [11] The principles at play with respect to the provincial legislation are the same as those in relation to the DivorceAct, RSC 1985, c 3 (2d Supp). Therefore, the authorities based on the Divorce Act are applicable here as well. [12] When making an interim spousal support order the court considers the factors set out in the legislation withinthe context of the specific circumstances of the application.

The initial question, one put front and centre here, is whether Bree hasestablished an entitlement to interim spousal support. [13] The Supreme Court of Canada decisions of Moge v Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 813 andBracklow v Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 420 [Bracklow] are the starting point for an analysis of Bree’s claim forspousal support. In Bracklow, McLachlin J. (as she then was), said at paras. 35 and 36: 35 Moge, supra, sets out the method to be followed in determining a support dispute.

The starting point is the objectives which theDivorce Act stipulates the support order should serve: (1) recognition of economic advantage or disadvantage arising from the marriageor its breakdown; (2) apportionment of the financial burden of child care; (3) relief of economic hardship arising from the breakdown ofthe marriage, and (4) promotion of the economic self-sufficiency of the spouses; s. 15.2(6). No single objective is paramount; all must beborne in mind.

The objectives reflect the diverse dynamics of the many unique marital relationships. 36 Against the background of these objectives the court must consider the factors set out in s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act. Generally,the court must look at the “condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse”. This balancing includes, but is not limitedto, the length of cohabitation, the functions each spouse performed, and any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support.Depending on the circumstances, some factors may loom larger than others.

In cases where the extent of the economic loss can bedetermined, compensatory factors may be paramount. On the other hand, “in cases where it is not possible to determine the extent of theeconomic loss of a disadvantaged spouse . . . the court will consider need and standard of living as the primary criteria together with theability to pay of the other party”: Ross v. Ross (1995), (NB CA), 168 N.B.R. (2d) 147 (C.A.), at p. 156 perBastarache, J.A. (as he then was). There is no hard and fast rule.

The judge must look at all the factors in the light of the stipulatedobjectives of support, and exercise his or her discretion in a manner that equitably alleviates the adverse consequences of the marriagebreakdown. [14] In Wongstedt v Wongstedt, 2017 SKCA 100, [2018] 4 WWR 82, our Court of Appeal considered the issue ofentitlement for applications such as this one: [25] Mr. Wongstedt does not dispute that the Chambers judge correctly identified the applicable law when it comes to assessingentitlement and quantum of spousal support.

As the Chambers judge understood, s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2d Supp),identifies the “condition, means and needs and other circumstances of each spouse” as the factors for a court to consider when making anorder for spousal support.

In Moge v Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 813 at 866, the Supreme Court explained the overallobjective of spousal support is to “achieve an equitable sharing of the economic consequences of marriage or marriage breakdown.”Given this was an interim application for spousal support, the Chambers judge also identified Wendt v Wendt, 2016 SKQB 227 at para 6[Wendt], as being applicable, where Turcotte J. had said: As pointed out by Jackson J.A. in Russell v Russell (1999), (SK CA), 179 DLR (4th) 723 (Sask CA) [Russell], theprinciples established by the Supreme Court of Canada in its decisions of Moge v Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 813, andBracklow v Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 420, aid in determining whether maintenance for a spouse should beordered under the Act, notwithstanding that those decisions addressed spousal support in the context of the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3(2d Supp).

However, as this is an interim application, the focus of the analysis is on the “needs and ability to pay” of the parties. Thisfocus follows from the principles established by the decisions of this Court in Hein v Hein, 2004 SKQB 277; Cey v Cey, 2004 SKQB493; Frass v Frass, 2006 SKQB 189; Marcotte v Marcotte, 2008 SKQB 223, 315 Sask R 280; and Antonishyn v Boucher, 2011 SKQB147, 373 Sask R 154.

Those cases confirm that at an interim stage, pending a division of family property and more complete evidencetouching on the factors and objectives used in addressing a final order of spousal support, the primary purpose of interim spousal supportis to allocate family income in a fair and equitable manner.

Any decision I make as to interim spousal support may be reviewed by aneventual trial judge and could be re-assessed based on more complete evidence (see: Frank v Linn, 2014 SKCA 87, 442 Sask R 126; andFord v Ford, 2015 SKCA 23, 457 Sask R 19). [15] Herauf J.A. subsequently addressed the purpose of a spousal support order in D.B.B. v D.M.B., 2017 SKCA 59at para 75 [D.B.B.]: [75] The purposes and objectives of a spousal support order, as conveyed in the Divorce Act, were discussed in James MacDonald & AnnWilton, The 2017 Annotated Divorce Act (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016) at 299:

Spousal support is a remedy which serves two purposes in Canadian law. Firstly, it provides compensation when a relationship hasincreased the earning power of one spouse at the expense of the other spouse. Secondly, it serves to relieve the financial need which aspouse experiences after a relationship. These two purposes animate the four objectives listed in s. 15.2(6) and s. 17(7) of the Divorce Act. In the Spousal Support AdvisoryGuidelines (“SSAG”), the strength of the compensatory and needs-based claims to spousal support both (

i) influence the amount chosenwithin the range, and (ii) help define the exceptional fact patterns in which the SSAG ranges are inappropriate. ... [16] At para. 76 of D.B.B. he noted the importance of determining entitlement first: [76] Courts keep the factors and objectives listed under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act in mind when making spousal support orders.

But,before it can determine the appropriate quantum and duration of spousal support, a court must first determine if there is a basis forentitlement, as the status of being married does not automatically entitle a spouse to support (see Moge v Moge, (SCC),[1992] 3 SCR 813 at 864 [Moge], and Bracklow v Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 420 at para 44 [Bracklow]). [17] As noted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Lee v Lee, 2014 BCCA 383, 379 DLR (4th) 1, marriagedoes not engage an automatic tool of redistribution.

Thus, disparity in income alone is not sufficient at the consideration of entitlement tospousal support stage. While crucial, and a very significant factor at the interim stage, the income gap alone is not the beginning and endof the inquiry. The other related issues need to be examined including the known aspects of the means and needs of the parties. As notedby Justice Megaw in Sydor v Sydor, 2021 SKQB 169: 63 While all of the factors set forth in s. 15.2(4) and (6) are open for consideration, at the interim stage the court is primarilyconcerned with the needs and means of the parties.

A more in-depth consideration of the factors may await a pre-trial conference andtrial. … [18] Merrifield v Merrifield, 2021 SKCA 85, 58 RFL (8th) 31 confirms that allocating family income fairly andequitably is the goal of an interim order: [77] The primary purpose of interim spousal support is to allocate family income in a fair and equitable manner, and the focus whendetermining quantum is on the needs and ability to pay of the parties: Wongstedt v Wongstedt, 2017 SKCA 100 at paras 23 and 25, 3RFL (8th) 43. … Entitlement [19] Enabling Bree to continue living at the same standard of living enjoyed prior to separation, if Alana’s ability topay warrants it is key.

Making such a determination will admittedly be introductory and a somewhat rough form of justice as it mustoccur without putting too much emphasis on the need to achieve self sufficiency. These are the interim support important objectiveswhich must be addressed. Deep analysis and overly fine parsing of what is usually conflicting affidavit evidence is not appropriate at theinterim entitlement determination stage. Rather, if a prima facie case for entitlement is made out, that will suffice at the interim stage. [20] As already noted, there is a clear disparity in income here.

I do not accept that the investment income Alanareceives is anything but income for the purposes of determining support. It is her choice whether she wishes to access it for her lifestyleor leave it to grow for the future. I accept that she has not traditionally spent it all on an annual basis and is letting it accumulate withinthe investment portfolio. Thus, while it is income, her income level including the investment returns is not necessarily indicative of thelifestyle the couple kept when together.

Their lifestyle, and that which Bree says she no longer has access to, will need to be confirmedthrough the evidence additional to the overall access to revenue Alana had available to her. [21] In relation to Bree’s current circumstances, I am not at this stage willing to conclude that she is in a romanticrelationship with her current landlord.

It is hotly disputed and at this stage I cannot conclude that there is a sufficiently strong and certainrelationship that it should lead to a refusal of the request for interim spousal support. [22] I find the accessing of Bree’s bank account information by Alana troubling. I will not conclude it was whollyinappropriate given the putative explanation given by Alana, however, it is at best highly unusual and at worst a breach of Bree’spersonal and confidential information.

I refer her to Da Silva v Kelly, 2022 ONSC 1402, 69 RFL (8th) 286 and Wilson v Sinclair, 2022ONSC 820, where cautions and the process to adhere to same are outlined. [23] I also note that the account information will eventually need to be provided in the course of this litigation.However, the manner of accessing it still matters. It is to be obtained through proper requests and, if necessary, applications fordisclosure, not via clandestine interception due to circumstances which only applied while the couple was together.

It is a readyconclusion to draw that, upon the relationship breaking down, Bree’s consent to Alana that she may access all of Bree’s personalfinancial information was withdrawn, at least by implication. [24] For the purposes of this interim order, I conclude that Bree’s expenses are not all being covered by her landlordor her friends. That issue may require re-examination at trial as this is not a final order.

For the purposes of this stop gap order, so as toget the parties to pre-trial and, if not settled there, to trial, I do not draw that conclusion. [25] I also conclude that the access to the amenities identified by Bree is significant. While Alana provided evidencethat Bree did not take full advantage of the available amenities regularly, Bree disputes this. On either view, it is still a lifestyledowngrade for Bree to have absolutely no access to those amenities, even if access was exercised more sparingly than it could have beenwhile the couple was together. It is a loss to Bree nonetheless.

It is admitted that Bree would come to the cottage when the couple wastogether, vacation in Mexico, and spend time at Kananaskis and now she is not able to do so at all. Whether that happened less often thanBree might have been able to take advantage of is not fatal. [26] Alana submits that throughout the course of their relationship the two split all expenses equally and she was not

carrying Bree. Alana adds that Bree covered many if not most of her own expenses such as her vehicle and personal expenses. She agrees the couple kept separate accounts throughout. Alana says this extended to Bree’s own travel costs even when the couple traveled together. The argument is that via splitting of the household expenses and Bree paying her own way when together, Bree’s lifestyle was no different than it is presently as she has always lived on her own income, not on Alana’s. [ 27 ] The proposition advanced is not entirely without merit.

However, it does not carry the day on an interim application such as this. The surroundings in which Bree and Alana lived and the amenities they had access to exceeded the contributions Bree made. The separation of expenses is of some moment, however it is but one part of the bigger picture.

A number of other lifestyle options were available to Bree when she was with Alana which are now gone including the family home, the cottage, the Kananaskis condo and the property in Mexico. [ 28 ] In relation to support, when considering the matter for interim purposes exclusively, the authorities confirm that it is appropriate to order interim spousal support in these circumstances.

The relevant facts are that there is a significant disparity in income on a substantial scale at the time of the parties’ separation which still exists today and Bree is living a more austere life without access to the amenities she once had access to. There is a loss to Bree’s standard of living by virtue of the parties no longer cohabitating. [ 29 ] The first of the objectives regarding spousal support is the recognition of any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown.

Based on the loss of contributing income to her life, Bree is, at this point, economically disadvantaged as a result of the relationship breakdown. At the interim stage this is a primary, albeit not exclusive, consideration as to whether she is to receive interim spousal support. Clearly Alana has an ability to pay as well, given her level of income. [ 30 ] Without the relationship and the subsequent breakdown of the same, Bree would have access to more resources on which to live and enjoy life. Her situation has deteriorated economically due to the fact that the relationship has not continued.

Bree is not now able to share in the prosperity the marriage experienced, particularly Alana`s income, but also Alana’s assets. If the parties were still together Bree would presently be benefiting from the income Alana can generate and the assets she owns and now controls. [ 31 ] I do not find any arguments that persuade me that entitlement is properly denied here.

Support is appropriately granted at the interim stage to try to assist in the maintaining of a reasonable standard of living for Bree as the parties proceed through to a final decision. [ 32 ] Alana advances Blake v Smith , 2021 SKQB 95 [ Blake ] in support of the argument to decline entitlement. However, the income difference was much less significant in Blake and the facts more difficult to draw conclusions from with the possibility of widely ranging income and expense calculations for each party.

The facts are more readily capable of directing inferences in this matter including that the parties’ incomes, while from various sources, are not riddled with substantial forms of wide ranging deductions.

I do not find Blake to be applicable to the situation arising here. [ 33 ] The conclusion that interim spousal support is warranted given the disadvantage Bree has suffered due to the breakdown of the relationship is confirmed in Meegan v Beaubier , 2013 SKQB 85 , 415 Sask R 194; Mehlsen v Mehlsen , 2009 SKQB 279 , 336 Sask R 302; Frass v Frass , 2006 SKQB 189 ; Grimsrud v Grimsrud , 2015 SKQB 324 , D.B.B . and Wilk v Martin-Wilk, 2023 SKCA 64 [ Wilk ]. [ 34 ] Thus the conclusion of spousal support entitlement on the facts before me is established.

I find for this interim determination entitlement on a non-compensatory basis is made out. The parties were together for almost 12 years. Bree’s income has been found to be substantially less than Alana’s. Amenities the couple had access to when together are now foreclosed to Bree. Bree has been economically disadvantaged as a result of the marriage breakdown and is in need of interim spousal support. Alana has the ability to pay. [ 35 ] Sufficient facts are controverted that a non-compensatory support analysis is all I will undertake at this time.

If compensatory support is sought going forward, then further fact finding will be required once more evidence is provided and when cross-examination is also available. It will therefore await pre-trial and, if not settled at that stage, a trial. Quantum [ 36 ] The remaining issue in this matter is the quantum of interim support to be paid by Alana to Bree given the undertaking of a number of obligations and payments by Alana, which I accept. [ 37 ] Wilk notes that entitlement is to be addressed separately from quantum and duration.

Consideration of the facts and ensuring there is an entitlement before moving on to amounts is critical and cannot be ignored. [ 38 ] In an interim application for spousal support such as this the primary considerations are the needs of the claimant and the ability of the other spouse to pay.

Despite this focus, the court must still consider all of the criteria from the legislation ( McPhail v Hunt, 2009 SKQB 403 at para 27 , 342 Sask R 225; A.M.T. v R.D.C., 2012 SKQB 85 at para 31 , 395 Sask R 65; Bjarnason v Bjarnason , 2012 SKQB 445 at para 16 ; Scully v Scully, 2013 SKQB 58 at para 24 , 413 Sask R 215; and Potzus v Potzus, (11 December 2015) Regina, DIV-RG-00288-2015 (Sask QB)). [ 39 ]

Section 17 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [ Guidelines ] permits income averaging in certain circumstances. The relevant provisions of the Guidelines are as follows: 16. Subject to sections 17 to 20 , a spouse's annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading "Total income" in the T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency and is adjusted in accordance with

Schedule III. 17.

(1) If the court is of the opinion that the determination of a spouse's annual income under

section 16 would not be the fairest determination of that income, the court may have regard to the spouse's income over the last three years and determine an amount that is

fair and reasonable in light of any pattern of income, fluctuation in income or receipt of a non-recurring amount during those years. [ 40 ] I find that it is appropriate to average Alana’s income from 2020 through 2022 as taken from her income tax returns for this interim determination. It has fluctuated with various items such as taxable capital gains, investment income, net rental income, a payment for a wage settlement at her place of employment and other sundry changes from year to year. Using 2022 is not the fairest determination of her income for those reasons.

The average for the three years being considered is $226,612. With respect to Bree’s income, I conclude she is working as full time as she can, therefore it is $68,475. That is the number to be used herein for Bree at present. [ 41 ] In her May 2023 financial statement, Bree sets out total expenses in the amount of $86,570. This is not an inflated statement of expenses. It could easily be more, living in Vancouver, British Columbia as she now does. [ 42 ] In her November 17, 2021 financial statement, Alana sets out total expenses in the amount of $203,334.

As pointed out by Bree, this double counts one expense which was already removed from income in her tax returns. In any event, she has a surplus of some $40,000 annually. She wants to keep the investment income growing inside that vehicle but there is no requirement she do so.

She clearly has the means to provide Bree spousal support. [ 43 ] The spousal support as calculated by ChildView , Version 2023.1.0, provides a range of spousal support of $2,368 low end, $2,763 mid-range and $3,157 high end. [ 44 ] In Linn v Frank , 2014 SKCA 87 , [2014] 10 WWR 215 [ Frank ] our Court of Appeal noted: [76] … 198 Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines ([Ottawa]: Department of Justice, 2008) have been utilized by this Court on numerous occasions.

While the Guidelines are not law, they are considered a useful tool in calculating spousal support and ensuring that spousal support awarded to individuals in similar circumstances is in a similar range [emphasis added]. [Emphasis in original] [ 45 ] After referring to the requisite standard of appellate review, the court went on to state: [85 ] . . . it is critically important to understand that the Guidelines require more analysis than inserting a few numbers into a formula to obtain a number, which is then considered to be the ideal and immutable amount of spousal support.

The Guidelines recognize the considerable discretion enjoyed by trial judges. The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines : A New and Improved User's Guide to the Final Version ([Ottawa]: Department of Justice, 2010) also make it clear that a sophisticated analysis of the parties' needs and means is required to arrive at the best possible spousal support order in the circumstances of each case. This principle is fully understood in the many decisions of the Court of Queen's Bench to date (see , for example, Billett v. Billett , 2013 SKQB 269 at para. 63 , 425 Sask. R. 217 ; Verhelst v.

Verhelst , 2013 SKQB 12 at para. 52 , 415 Sask. R. 17 ; Sangray v. Sangray , 2012 SKQB 455 at para. 6 , 407 Sask. R. 149 ; Geransky v. Geransky , 2012 SKQB 218 at para. 25 ). [ 46 ] As recognized in Frank , the Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines ([Ottawa]: Department of Justice, 2008) [ SSAG ] are an important and useful framework within which support decisions are to be considered.

Recently, in Wilk , the Court of Appeal noted their value as follows: [78] . . . the SSAG is a useful tool that should be used by judges when considering the quantum and duration of spousal support: see, for example, Linn v Frank , 2014 SKCA 87 at paras 75-88 , [2014] 10 WWR 215 ; Kosolofski v Kosolofski , 2016 SKCA 106 at para 83 , 402 DLR (4th) 423 ; and MacLennan [ MacLennan v MaLennan , 2021 SKCA 132 ] at para 90. [ 47 ] A judge has discretion, but it is appropriate to provide supporting reasons for selecting an amount from within the SSAG range.

If one departs from the range set out therein, clearly identified reasons for the departure are to be provided. It is also appropriate to take into account Bree’s needs, the property each has, the expenses each has, and the amount of spousal support recognized by the SSAG. [ 48 ] It is to be noted that Alana still resides in the family home. However, it appears to be mortgage free. She pays her own living expenses there and is not building equity through monthly payments which Bree may ultimately share in.

This weighs against giving a reduction in spousal support for carrying the home expenses and associated costs. [ 49 ] In consideration of the factors at play in this matter, I conclude that the amount appropriately paid for spousal support is $2,400 per month. It appears that through family and friends Bree is receiving lifestyle enhancements she cannot presently afford on her own. It is not the lifestyle she had with Alana, but it is also not overly meagre. While this does not disentitle her, it is a factor in finding where in the range her support amount falls.

This is in line with Alana’s available income and her expenses once adjustments in her lifestyle are made. [ 50 ] The payments for spousal support are to begin on May 1, 2023 as that is the first full month following when Alana was put on formal notice of Bree’s request for spousal support. CONCLUSION [ 51 ] It is ordered on an interim basis that Alana pay spousal support to Bree in the amount of $2,400 per month beginning in May of 2023 (inclusive). No retroactive support will be ordered at this time, that being a matter appropriately for pre-trial and, if not settled there, for trial. COSTS

[ 52 ] Bree is entitled to her costs in the amount of $1,500 payable forthwith. J. D.J. BROWN