J.W.K. PETITIONER - v. -, 2023 SKKB 238

REDACTED VERSION KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 238 Date: 2023 11 03 Docket: FLD-RG-00332-2022 Judicial Centre: Regina ___________________________________________________________________________ BETWEEN: J.W.K. PETITIONER - and - J.M. RESPONDENT Counsel: Christopher N.H. Butz for the petitioner Mary Lou H. Senko for the respondent ___________________________________________________________________________ FIAT SCHERMAN J.

November 3, 2023 ___________________________________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] J.M. and J.W.K. are the parents of their now 14-month-old son, J.L.W.K. J.M. and J.W.K. were friends, with independent lives. While J.L.W.K. was apparently an unintended result of their relationship, they have each welcomed him into their lives and each wishes to parent J.L.W.K. to the maximum extent they can.

[ 2 ] There are two applications before me for decision being: a. An application by J.W.K. filed Oct 11, 2023 seeking expanded parenting time with J.L.W.K. and associated relief; and b. An application by J.M. filed October 19, 2023 for variations of the February 9, 2023 order of Brown J. that would, inter alia , effectively give her sole decision-making along with a form of restraining order against J.W.K. [ 3 ] A total of nine affidavits, sworn between October 10 and 23, 2023 were filed by the parties on the applications.

Their respective positions with respect to the parenting of J.L.W.K. have been consistently and firmly maintained. As a consequence, their respective applications were supported by detailed written briefs of law and oral submissions before me. It could fairly be said no possible argument has been overlooked. Background Facts [ 4 ] The proceedings were commenced by J.W.K.’s petition filed December 30, 2022 in which he sought joint decision-making rights and shared parenting on a week-on/week-off basis.

Prior to this J.W.K. had been exercising some regular, but limited, parenting time with the agreement of J.M. [ 5 ] Over the 2022 Christmas period there was conflict regarding J.W.K.’s parenting time and J.W.K. and J.M. argued about same. On December 25 J.M. went to J.W.K.’s house, bringing formula, because J.L.W.K. was by prior agreement going to remain in J.W.K.’s care for a couple days. She says J.W.K. was then demanding to parent J.L.W.K. the month of February, following J.M. parenting him for the month of January.

There was a confrontation during which J.M. alleges J.W.K. assaulted her when he grabbed her by the throat and pushed her out of his doorway. He called the police and they arrived at J.W.K.’s residence shortly thereafter. [ 6 ] Following this J.W.K. filed his petition and initiated a request for a joint case conference.

On January 11, 2023 J.M. filed an application without notice, seeking a restraining order against J.W.K., an order for police assistance if required and exemption from participating in family dispute resolution pending determination of her proposed substantive application for relief. [ 7 ] The matter came before Kuski Bassett J. on January 13 in a judicial case conference with counsel for both J.W.K. and J.M. present. She also heard both counsel on J.M.’s “urgent” without notice application. In a fiat of that same date, she declined to grant a restraining order or a police assistance order.

She made an interim order to February 3, 2023, directing parenting time for J.W.K. with J.L.W.K. of: a. Four hours each Wednesday; and b. Each Saturday at 3:00 p.m. to Sunday at 3:00 p.m. together with a directive that J.M.’s proposed substantive application for relief, scheduled for chambers on February 3, 2023, proceed that date. [ 8 ] J.M.’s substantive application was heard by Brown J. on February 3, 2023, with submissions having been made by counsel for both J.M. and J.W.K. Brown J. provided a written fiat under date of February 9, 2023, which ordered: a.

J.M.’s home would be the interim primary residence of J.L.W.K.; b. A decision-making regime leading to full joint decision-making on August 19, 2023; c. J.W.K. was to have parenting time three out of five weekends and on the Monday following weekends he does not parent; and d. A full reassessment of J.L.W.K.’s best interests must be made after J.M.’s planned return to work in September of 2023. [ 9 ] The applications I am to decide involve threshold issues; being whether: a. The order made by Brown J. was intended to be an interim order to operate until resolution at pre-trial or trial of the action; or b.

Whether the intention and proper

interpretation of Brown J.’s fiat and resulting order was as an interim order intended to operate until that point in time when J.M.’s maternity leave ended with it being open to the parties to have the parenting provisions revisited at that time. [ 10 ] This decision necessarily involves an

interpretation of the fiat of Brown J. The Issues [ 11 ] Issues that need to be considered and decided include the following: i. Is the Brown J. fiat and order to be interpreted as an interim parenting order operating until pre-trial or trial or is it to be interpreted and applied as an interim order that was to operate until J.M. returned to work on the conclusion of her maternity leave with it then being open to J.W.K. to have the going-forward parenting arrangements decided at that time? ii.

If the Brown J. fiat and order is interpreted as an interim parenting order intended to operate until pre-trial or trial, do compelling circumstances exist that would justify variation of that order providing J.W.K. the increased parenting time he seeks; and iii. Whichever is the situation, on an application of the appropriate principles, should the order be varied and if so, what is in the best interests of the child J.L.W.K.?

Applicable Principles of Law [ 12 ] In Seidel v Seidel , 2021 SKCA 92 [ Seidel ], the Court of Appeal reiterated the settled principle that courts should generally not vary, on an interim basis, fundamental parenting arrangements unless the affected child faces risk of harm or there are other compelling reasons. The Court continued to emphasize that all judicial decisions regarding the parenting of a child must still be made with an exclusive eye to the best interests of the child. [ 13 ] Flowing from these principles, the above noted issues can be further refined to including: a.

Should what Brown J. ordered be viewed as a fundamental parenting arrangement to be in effect until resolved at pre-trial or trial; b. If so, it being agreed that J.L.W.K. does not face risk of harm if parented by either J.M. or J.W.K., are there “other compelling reasons” which would justify a variation of the Brown J. order; and c. If the Brown J. order is not a fundamental parenting arrangement to be in effect until resolved at pre-trial or trial or if there are compelling reasons to vary it, what is in J.L.W.K.’s best interests? My conclusions on the

interpretation of the Brown J. fiat and the resulting order [ 14 ] At paragraph 8 of his fiat of February 9, 2023 Brown J. states as follows: [8] It is not appropriate, for the reasons set out below, to make a long-term order at this time, thus only an interim order will be made. It will provide parenting time to J.W.K. and an opportunity to increase that as J.L.W.K. matures and schedules change. J.M. will return to work in September and J.L.W.K. will have matured a further seven or eight months.

The matter is then properly addressed within the context of a pretrial and, if not resolved there, then at a trial. [ 15 ] J.M.’s counsel takes the position that Brown J. clearly intended his fiat should be interpreted as making an order that was to operate until the matter was resolved at pre-trial or trial. While acknowledging a level of ambiguity in the language of the fiat, she relies principally upon the final sentence of the above quoted paragraph.

She argues that this sentence makes it clear that Brown J. intended his order to operate until the entire matter was resolved at pre-trial or trial. [ 16 ] I do not accept this argument and

interpretation. Brown J. at no point directed the parties to proceed to pre-trial. Rather, he contemplated a reassessment in September. It is my finding that what Justice Brown was ordering was a short-term interim parenting arrangement by reason of J.L.W.K. then being only six months of age and the fact that J.M. was able to provide full-time parenting while on maternity leave. For the reasons he provided, Brown J. ordered J.M. would, for the time being, be the place of primary residence of J.L.W.K.; but contemplated a full assessment to be made of J.L.W.K.’s best interests after the return of J.M. to work in September. [ 17 ] The following elements of the Brown J. fiat lead me to this

interpretation and conclusion: a. The first sentence of paragraph 8 states “It is not appropriate, for the reasons set out below, to make a long-term order at this time, thus only an interim order will be made.” b. He stated making an interim order that would “provide parenting time to J.W.K. and an opportunity to increase that as J.L.W.K. matures and schedules change. J.M. will return to work in September and J.L.W.K. will have matured a further seven or eight months” . This language conveys a clear intention that the interim order he was making was a short-term order that could be revisited by the Court when J.M. returned to work. c. This

interpretation is supported by Brown J.’s statement at paragraph 24 (being among his “ reasons set forth below” ) that “ The fact that this situation will change in September bodes in favour of the matter not being decided long-term on an interim application alone. It should be considered when September’s changes are known and J.M.’s work

schedule as well as her EDO’s and such are known and certain” . This statement makes clear his order was to be a short-term order, as distinct from a long-term interim order. d. This

interpretation is further reinforced at paragraphs 40 and 41 where Brown J. states: [40] Thus, J.L.W.K.’s relationship with J.W.K. must be defined for now but also be enabled to continue to grow and expand. J.M. must facilitate this as J.L.W.K. matures and particularly when J.M.’s

schedule changes and she returns to work in September. The long-term parenting arrangement that may yet come about cannot, however, be rushed at this time. [41] There must be an ongoing assessment as to what the next step will be in the furtherance of that relationship as measured by J.L.W.K.’s best interests when the next milestone arrives. It is important to keep in mind that a full assessment of J.L.W.K.’s best interests must be made after the return to work by J.M. in September.

Only through this process can there be appropriate consideration of the factors required to fully assess J.L.W.K.’s best interests and what type of parenting arrangement expresses that best going forward. e. It is to be noted that Brown J. expressly states he is defining J.L.W.K.’s relationship with J.W.K. “for now” and that J.M. “ must facilitate” that relationship continuing to grow and expand when she returns to work in September.

He continues stating an ongoing assessment is needed when the “next milestone arrives” and that “a full assessment of J.L.W.K.’s best interests must be made after the return to work by J.M. in September.” [Emphasis added]. I interpret this language as not only permitting a reassessment but indeed stating it must be done. [ 18 ] Given this

interpretation of the Brown J. fiat and order, I treat his order as being in fact a short-term order, intended to operate until the September milestone with the express contemplation that there is now to be a full assessment of J.L.W.K.’s best interests given the current situation. Thus the direction from Seidel that courts should generally not vary, on an interim basis, fundamental parenting arrangements is not applicable.

In the alternative, would variation on the basis of other compelling reasons be justified? [ 19 ] In the alternative and the event that my

interpretation of the Brown J. fiat is seen to be wrong, I am of the opinion that variation of the order is justified on the basis of other compelling reasons. The other compelling reasons I find include the following: a. Counsel are in agreement that given the family law division scheduling backlog to work through preparation for pre-trial, the conduct of a pre-trial and the one year or more time then required to

schedule a trial, the minimum probable time from now until the matter could be tried would be in the order of 1 ½ years. b. Counsel for J.W.K. argued that given positions taken by J.M. with respect to J.W.K.’s income and assets, this matter is not likely to reach readiness for trial for more than two years. On the evidence filed, it is clear there is a significant probability of contentious issues relating to financial disclosure and the potential for extensive questioning of J.W.K. which would delay normal progress toward readiness for pre-trial and trial.

I accept that in the circumstances of this case final resolution by trial could be well beyond two years. c. The parties are fixed in their positions. Counsel for J.W.K. stated his client wants equal shared parenting, which has been his consistent position from even prior to the birth of J.L.W.K. J.M.’s counsel expressly stated that while J.M. is prepared to consider some gradual and modest extensions to the parenting time presently ordered, she would not be prepared to consider equal shared parenting until J.L.W.K. goes to kindergarten which is four years in the future. d.

I find, as Brown J. did at paragraph 19 of his fiat, that J.L.W.K. is thriving as a happy, healthy and content baby with the care being by each of his parents. Each of J.M. and J.W.K. have appropriate home environments to care for J.L.W.K. and each is a capable and loving parent. In the hearing before me counsel for each of J.M. and J.W.K. acknowledged that the other were capable and loving parents and they had no criticisms of the other’s parenting of J.L.W.K. e.

The significant factors leading Brown J. to make the interim order he did were that J.L.W.K. was then only six months old, J.M. was on maternity leave and able to parent J.L.W.K. full time until her maternity leave ended. He noted at paragraph 23 that the full-time capacity of J.M. to parent created an additional benefit to J.L.W.K. f. J.L.W.K. is now 14 months of age. Given the time that J.W.K. has parented him J.L.W.K. has bonded with J.W.K. and the maternity leave factor is now reversed with J.W.K. able to full-time parent. g. As of November J.W.K. will be returning to work.

The evidence satisfies me that J.W.K. has arranged for a paternity leave from his employment that will permit him to parent J.L.W.K. full time for up to 18 months. I am satisfied that it is J.W.K.’s intention to utilize this paternity leave to be a full-time parent for J.L.W.K. in his parenting time. h. Brown J. has already stated there should be a full assessment of J.L.W.K.’s best interests at this time. I believe it is most assuredly not in J.L.W.K.’s best interests for a decision as to what is in his best interests to be deferred or held in abeyance for 1 ½ to 2 or more years.

The sooner a settled interim parenting arrangement can be established the better. i. In allocating parenting time the Court should give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child. Logically then, it follows that delaying a decision capable of being made is not serving the goal of the child’s best interests. In my opinion the significant potential of a 1 ½- to 2-years or more delay in making a decision that needs to be made is not acceptable. j.

Clearly the benefit of more time with a father must be balanced against any resulting detriment resulting from the reduction of time with the child’s mother.

However, given that in the present circumstances the mother J.M. will be working full time and it is her intention that J.L.W.K. would be in daycare during all or most of her working days, the decision as to what in his best interests must, as Brown J. contemplated, be re-assessed. [ 20 ] Without at this point performing the analysis of what is in J.L.W.K.’s best interests, I conclude that the factors outlined above constitute a compelling reason to vary the decision of Brown J. It is a maxim that justice delayed is justice denied.

Significant delays in making the decision of what is in a child’s best interests when appropriate applications and evidence are before the Court is unacceptable. It is my opinion that there are in the matters before me compelling reasons to make the decisions that need to be made. Analysis of the Applications Applicable Principles to Apply [ 21 ] Since J.M. and J.W.K. were not in a marital relationship the applicable legislation is The Children's Law Act, 2020 , SS 2020, c 2 [ Act ] . This Act states inter alia as follows: Joint legal decision-makers 3

(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court and subject to subsection (2) and any agreement pursuant to subsection (3), the parents of a child are joint legal decision-makers for the child, with equal powers and responsibilities. … Best interests of child 10

(1) In making, varying or rescinding a parenting order, the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child.

(2) A parenting order is not in the best interests of a child unless it protects, to the greatest extent possible, the child’s physical,

psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being.

(3) In determining the best interests of a child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including: (

a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability; (

b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other personwho plays an important role in the child’s life; (

c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent; (

d) the history of care of the child; (

e) the child’s views and preferences, by giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained; (

f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage; (

g) any plans for the child’s care; (

h) the ability and willingness of each person with respect to whom the parenting order would apply to care for and meet the needs of thechild; (

i) the ability and willingness of each person with respect to whom the parenting order would apply to communicate and cooperate, inparticular with one another, on matters affecting the child; (

j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things: (

i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child; and (ii) the appropriateness of making a parenting order that would require persons with respect to whom the parenting order would apply tocooperate on issues affecting the child; and (

k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child. … No presumption of preferred parent 11 In making, varying or rescinding a parenting order, the court shall make no presumption and draw no inference as between parentsthat one parent should be preferred over the other parent. [22] In the context of a recent amendment to the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2d Supp), s. 16(6) now reads: 16 … Parenting time consistent with best interests of child

(6) In allocating parenting time the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as isconsistent with the best interests of the child. [23] The Supreme Court of Canada said the following in Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, 71 RFL (8th) 1[Barendregt]: [133] What is known as the maximum contact principle has traditionally emphasized that children shall have as much contact with eachparent as is consistent with their best interests.

A corollary to this is sometimes referred to as the “friendly parent rule”, which instructscourts to consider the willingness of a parent to foster and support the child’s relationship with the other parent, where appropriate: seeYoung [ (SCC), [1993] 4 SCR 3], at p. 44.

Both of these considerations have long been recognized by the Divorce Act:see Divorce Act, pre-amendments, ss. 16(10) and 17(9); and Divorce Act, post-amendments, ss. 16(6) and 16(3)(c). [134] Although Gordon [ (SCC), [1996] 2 SCR 27] placed emphasis on the “maximum contact principle”, it was clearthat the best interests of the child are the sole consideration in relocation cases, and “if other factors show that it would not be in thechild’s best interests, the court can and should restrict contact”: Gordon, at para. 24; see also para. 49.

But in the years since Gordon,some courts have interpreted what is known as the “maximum contact principle” as effectively creating a presumption in favour ofshared parenting arrangements, equal parenting time, or regular access: Folahan v. Folahan, 2013 ONSC 2966, at para. 14 ;Slade v. Slade, 2002 YKSC 40, at para. 10 ; see also F. Kelly, “Enforcing a Parent/Child Relationship At All Cost? SupervisedAccess Orders in the Canadian Courts” (2011), 49 Osgoode Hall L.J. 277, at pp. 278 and 296-98.

Indeed, the term “maximum contactprinciple” seems to imply that as much contact with both parents as possible will necessarily be in the best interests of the child. [135] These

interpretations overreach. It is worth repeating that what is known as the maximum contact principle is only significant tothe extent that it is in the child’s best interests; it must not be used to detract from this inquiry. It is notable that the amended Divorce Actrecasts the “maximum contact principle” as “[p]arenting time consistent with best interests of child”: s. 16(6). This shift in language is

more neutral and affirms the child-centric nature of the inquiry. Indeed, going forward, the “maximum contact principle” is betterreferred to as the “parenting time factor”. [24] While this decision has been cited many times in Saskatchewan decisions, including the Court of Appeal, to thebest of my knowledge those citations relate to the Supreme Court of Canada’s statements on the criteria for the admission of newevidence on appeal (the application of the Palmer test (R v Palmer, (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 759) in cases where theproceedings were under the Divorce Act.

Nonetheless I am of the opinion that the above quoted guidance of Barendregt is applicable inthis case arising under The Children’s Law Act, 2020. I should not be proceeding from the position that there is a presumption in favourof maximum contact. Rather, the Court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child, through the lens of the childwithout a starting presumption. J.M.’s Application [25] The variations and relief sought by J.M. in her draft order filed October 23 and submissions by counsel inchambers evolved significantly from what was sought in her application filed October 19.

Specifically in her application she sought soledecision-making authority, being a variation from the joint decision-making authority in effect as of August 19, 2023 under the order ofBrown J. J.M.’s draft order has modified that request to decision-making: i. For the purposes of daycare while J.L.W.K. is in her care; and ii. For all other “matters necessary for J.L.W.K.’s well-being” while in her care. [26] J.M.’s position was that she should have the decision-making authority she requests, while J.L.W.K. is in hercare, on the grounds that she says effective communication is not possible between her and J.W.K.

Her counsel agreed that if she wasgranted this, on these grounds, it would be appropriate that J.W.K. should logically have reciprocal decision-making rights whileJ.L.W.K. was in his care. [27] Her application did not address variation of the parenting time directed in the Brown J. order, but in the draftorder filed she seeks a variation of J.W.K.’s parenting time with J.L.W.K. to: i. Three days every second weekend on J.M.’s non-earned day off weekends from Thursday at 4:00 p.m. to Sunday at 4:00 p.m.; and ii.

On the Thursdays of J.M.’s earned day off [EDO] weeks from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. with pick-up and drop-off at J.L.W.K.’sdaycare. [28] J.M.’s counsel argued that the relief sought should be granted and the shared parenting J.W.K. seeks should bedenied on the grounds that for there to be shared parenting and decision-making there has to be an ability of the parents to communicateeffectively. She argues this does not exist and will not exist.

She says there simply is no cooperation and J.W.K. is not prepared to adjusthis demands for shared parenting to accommodate J.M.’s needs. [29] J.M. complains of and points to the following alleged matters which she says demonstrate that there is not andcannot be effective communication along with a pattern of harassment and coercive behaviour that constitutes family violence: a. J.W.K. has consistently sought shared parenting and has threatened her with going to court to obtain this if she will not agree; b. Counsel argued there should be a “big focus” on the daycare issue.

Counsel argues J.W.K. was not supportive of J.M.’s daycareplan when the absence of daycare threatens her employment. J.M. says J.W.K.’s “harassment” of the Lumsden YWCA daycare caused atermination of her daycare registration for J.L.W.K. Her counsel argues that each parent should be entitled to make daycarearrangements and decisions within their parenting time. c. They have fought about issues like the baptism of J.L.W.K., medical appointments for J.L.W.K. and J.W.K. taking J.L.W.K. toswim when J.M. believed there were medical reasons he should not be swimming. d.

Counsel argues “The mother needs something to happen so that she is not harassed at every turn and conflict is minimized. She hastried to be accommodating, which ends up in a fight even at the doctor’s office as to if the child should go swimming when he is ill” and“Given the incidents with the baptism and daycare, the mother is concerned that the father will harass her, the daycare and any otherplace decisions may need to be made such as at health-care providers”. (Respondent’s brief pages 10 and 12.) e.

Counsel argue that “the demands and actions of the Petitioner since February, 2023 Order are of the nature of coercive, controllingbehaviour” that meet the definition of family violence and “The child is exposed to stalking behaviours and disagreements.”(Respondent’s brief page 20.) [30] I find J.M.’s

interpretation and characterization of J.W.K.’s actions to be inappropriate and not supported by theevidence. There have been differences of opinions and conflict. Each has maintained firm positions, as they are entitled to do so. By andlarge their communication has been appropriate, and they have communicated reasonably, albeit unable to agree on the fundamentalissue of the parenting arrangement.

I find the allegations of harassment, coercive behaviour and family violence to be unproven. [31] The record of the electronic communications between the parties demonstrates they are for the most partcapable of reasonable and courteous communication. The evidence respecting the daycare dispute, the baptism issue and the swimmingissue does not prove either a significant inability to effectively communicate or coercive and harassing behaviour. These were specificmatters on which they had clear differences of opinion.

To the extent effective communication failed there was fault on both sides. [32] The daycare dispute started (see paragraph 46 of J.M.’s affidavit sworn October 10 and Exhibit

G) with J.W.K.emailing J.M. raising the issue of daycare for J.L.W.K. He stated he was able to care for J.L.W.K. given his flexible

schedule and

proposed that if they could agree on his suggestion and she was concerned about a possibility of having to pay child support to him, he was prepared to waive the same. The email is not confrontational. Following this: i. There is an extensive August 5, 2023 email [Exhibit I] of J.M. to J.W.K. outlining her position in detail in which J.M. firmly advanced her position regarding daycare, parenting time and other matters; ii.

J.W.K. responds that same date, also Exhibit I, advising he has never agreed to Lumsden daycare and reminding her that pursuant to the Brown J. order there is full, mutual decision-making as of August 19, 2023; iii. Nonetheless J.M. proceeds to register J.L.W.K. for daycare with the Lumsden YWCA without seeking the concurrence of or further discussion with J.W.K.; iv. Subsequently J.W.K. contacts the YWCA informing them he is a parent with joint decision-making authority, questioning the propriety of the registration and asking for copies of documents.

On the evidence I find no impropriety in respect of J.W.K.’s communications with the YWCA; v. There is no evidence from anyone at the YWCA regarding harassment or threats. The only evidence of such is J.M.’s inadmissible hearsay evidence, found at paragraph 54 of her October 10, 2023 affidavit; vi. While the YWCA apparently did for a period cancel J.L.W.K.’s daycare registration as a result of J.W.K.’s inquiries, that registration was reinstituted, which counsel acknowledged in Chambers; and vii.

Then on September 25, 2023 J.M. completed a Child Release Form for the Lumsden YWCA (Exhibit B to the October 23, 2023 affidavit of J.M.) in which she authorized release to a number of individuals, none of whom were J.W.K., notwithstanding that he then shared joint decision-making rights. [ 33 ] Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Brown J. order the parties were to have joint decision-making as of May 9, 2023, with the provision that in the event of disagreement (which there was) J.M. could make the final determination until the child reached age 1; which he did on August 19, 2023.

J.W.K. was entitled to information, to make his position known, and lobby or litigate for what he saw as an appropriate resolution. Given the potential need to have daycare arrangements in place I do not fault J.M. for taking steps to reserve a spot.

However, given the registration would be operative from and after J.L.W.K. reaching age 1, it is my opinion that J.M. was not entitled to treat the registration as a final decision that J.L.W.K. would be attending that daycare. [ 34 ] I find no merit to the submissions that J.W.K.’s actions of taking J.L.W.K. swimming following a medical office visit demonstrates a refusal or inability to communicate effectively or as coercive behaviour. It is clear from the email communications that J.M. felt strongly on this issue.

However, Exhibit F to J.W.K.’s affidavit of October 23, 2023 evidences that on October 4, 2023 both J.M. and J.W.K. attended a medical office with J.L.W.K. regarding symptoms of illness over the last week. The nurse practitioner’s diagnosis was “AOM and tonsilitis” – AOM being the medical abbreviation for “acute otitis media” or an infection of the middle ear, for which a course of amoxicillin was prescribed. The record specifically states the child “does not need to avoid the pool with mild illness”. Given this evidence I find no basis for any suggestion that J.W.K.’s actions put J.L.W.K. at risk.

While there was obviously a difference of opinion, I am unable to conclude that it was inappropriate for J.W.K. to take J.L.W.K. to the pool during his parenting time or that this incident demonstrates coercive or controlling behaviour. [ 35 ] On a collateral point, the nurse practitioner’s notes record that J.L.W.K. was “happy to hang on to mom and dad interactive with NP and parents seeking reassurance from parents”.

This is objective evidence of J.L.W.K.’s bonding with both parents. [ 36 ] With respect to J.M.’s concerns with respect to the baptism issue, I find the evidence does not support J.M.’s position that this involved him “stalking” her. It is clear they had difference of opinion about the baptism issue. If J.M. was going to have J.L.W.K. baptized, J.W.K. was entitled to be informed and be present.

At paragraph 69 of J.W.K.’s October 23 affidavit he explains that following being informed that the baptism J.M. had been planning was not proceeding, he received a follow-up email from the church indicating there was a baptismal meeting scheduled to occur the following morning.

His evidence is that “I was concerned that J.M. had a change of mind and I attended to the church.” Given this explanation and that I have no contradicting evidence, I am unable to give any substance to J.M.’s allegations of stalking on the part of J.W.K. [ 37 ] A pattern of harassment and coercive behaviour constituting family violence has not been proven by J.M. Dealing with individual grounds advanced: a. It is J.W.K.’s right to pursue his claims for joint decision-making and parenting time in this Court. He has been consistent in maintaining this was his intention from the outset.

J.M. has, since December of 2022, been similarly consistent in her position that she was not prepared to share parenting or decision-making equally. She has similarly come to this Court to advance her position. b. I find that harassment or coercion on J.W.K.’s part has not been proven. J.M. consistently describes any communication of intentions to involve the court, including giving notice of intention to apply for a judicial case conference, as a threat. Statements of intention to pursue perceived rights in court are not properly classified as threats or intimidation. c.

Counsel for J.M. stated she placed “big focus” on J.W.K. cancelling J.M.’s arrangements for daycare for J.L.W.K. as demonstrating his coercive and controlling behaviour. For the reasons outlined above I do not find J.W.K.’s action improper, much less as proving coercive behaviour. d. More generally I find the evidence provided by J.M. does not constitute proof of harassment or coercive behaviour that constitutes family violence. While J.M. says she is fearful of J.W.K., the evidence does not satisfy me that there is legitimate cause for such fear.

There is the December 25, 2022 incident at J.W.K.’s home where she says he grabbed her by the throat and choked her. J.W.K.’s position is he was attempting to prevent her from coming into his house and was pushing her out of the door. Brown J. at paragraph 34 of his fiat makes his finding that this was an instance of family violence; but he clearly did not view it as of significance to the issue of

parenting time going forward. For the purposes of my decision his finding at paragraph 34, in its entirety, is res judicata . There is no evidence of similar actions since. [ 38 ] The variations that J.M. seeks with respect to the joint decision-making ordered by Brown J. are, as I interpreted the draft interim order filed by her counsel, limited in scope. If I am wrong and she is seeking sole decision-making as per her application, then I dismiss her application. I will deal with the limited variation sought in her draft interim order within my analysis of J.W.K.’s claim since these matters are interconnected.

Analysis of J.W.K.’s application for shared parenting generally and parenting by him as opposed to daycare Factual Findings [ 39 ] For the reasons outlined above I must make a full assessment of J.L.W.K.’s best interests based upon the present circumstances and evidence.

I note the analysis and findings made by Brown J. at paragraphs 12 to 33 of his fiat and in particular his analysis and findings under the headings Best Interests, The Nature and Strength of the Child’s Relationships With the Parties, The Plans for the Child’s Care and Ability to Meet His Needs, The Child’s Needs, Age and Stages of Development, Willingness to Support the Development and Maintenance of the Child’s Relationship With the Other and The History of Care of the Child.

Generally speaking my analysis in respect of these considerations is consistent with the findings of Brown J. [ 40 ] I must now make a full assessment of the best interests of J.L.W.K. given what has transpired since the Brown J. order, including the fact that J.L.W.K. is now 14 months old, along with the employment and other personal circumstances of the parents. Significant in this analysis are the following facts which I find based upon the evidence, namely: a. At age 14 months J.L.W.K. is bonded to both parents.

Despite differences of opinion on particular parent practices the parents both acknowledge the other is a good, attentive and loving parent. b. In the 38 weeks since February 9, 2023, while J.L.W.K.’s primary residence was with J.M., he has (when the additional summer holiday time ordered by Turcotte J. on July 20, 2023 are factored in) spent some 55 or more days (including 30 or more overnights of up to 4 nights duration) being parented by J.W.K.; c. As of mid-November J.M. will return to full-time employment.

As testified to in her October 10 affidavit, commencing at paragraph 67: i. on her return to full-time employment her manager has advised her she can do the first 5 weeks of training at home, then will work at the office in Regina for “2 to 3 months”; ii. By her fourth month back she “should” be able to work every second week at home; iii. She cannot work at home and have a child present. iv. Her work hours will be 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. or 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Since she lives in Lumsden her commute time will be in the order of 1 hour per day to travel to and from the Regina office. v.

She will have an EDO on every second Monday. d. J.W.K. has arranged a paternity leave of up to 18-months’ duration and as such he can be a full-time parent to J.L.W.K. [ 41 ] J.M. questions the veracity of the evidence of J.W.K. and L.W., his mother and employer, that J.W.K. has an 18- month paternity leave during which he will not be working and can parent J.L.W.K. full time. J.M.’s beliefs and suspicions in this respect are not supported by cogent factual evidence.

Based on the uncontradicted evidence I have, I find that J.W.K. has arranged an 18-month paternity leave during which he is willing and able to parent J.L.W.K. at any time. The Equal Shared Parenting Request [ 42 ] J.W.K. asks the Court to order equal shared parenting time. He also says that it is in J.L.W.K.’s best interest he, in addition, be permitted to parent J.L.W.K. during what would otherwise be daycare time within J.M.’s parenting time.

I will consider these requests separately starting with his request for equal shared parenting and then move on to his parenting during what would otherwise be daycare time. [ 43 ] There is no presumption in favour of shared parenting.

Section 11 of the Act states there is to be no presumption that one parent is to be preferred to the other. Sections 10(1) and (2) of the Act state that in making a parenting order, the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child and a parenting order is not in the best interests of a child unless it protects, to the greatest extent possible, the child’s physical, psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being.

The assessment is to have regard to the factors listed in s. 10(3) and any other relevant factors. [ 44 ] Parenting time decisions are to be a child-centric analysis and not made from the parents’ perspective. Since it is all about the child’s best interests it must, of necessity, be forward looking and should not focus on the past. [ 45 ] In Rogers v Porga , 2021 ONSC 4759 , 59 RFL (8th) 83, Pazaratz J . insightfully said the following: [33] The issue is not which parent was right and which parent was wrong . a. Parents are allowed to legitimately disagree. b. Shared parenting does not require instant consensus.

c. Indeed, children are often better served if parents thoroughly and even vigorously explore all options. d. And on many issues there will be no single or preferred solution. e. Parenting is an ongoing struggle to get it right. The more thought that goes into it - the more constructive discussion - the better. [34] The issue is whether the decision-making designation benefits the child by creating a reliable mechanism for appropriate decisions to be made in an efficient, productive, civil and timely manner. [35] With recent legislative changes, our court system has taken pride in our enlightened terminology. a.

We no longer use “custody” or “access” because those labels were regarded as provocative, polarizing and unhelpful to the resolution of family disputes. b. We promote more neutral and conciliatory labels like “shared parenting” because they promote mutual respect and parental involvement; and because children are better off when both parents are actively and beneficially involved in all aspects of their lives. [36] But just as outdated labels are to be avoided because they conveyed the wrong message – we have to ensure that our currently- favoured parenting designations convey the right message. a.

Shared parenting is not a prize. Or a reward. Or a badge of entitlement. b. It’s not about rights. It’s about responsibilities. c. It’s not an acknowledgement of past parenting. It’s a commitment about future parenting. d. It’s not about soothing adult egos (although that’s a helpful side-benefit). e. It’s about creating precious opportunities. f. Opportunities for both parents to maintain a meaningful role in their children’s lives. To make enlightened and important decisions in a mature, selfless, cooperative, child-focused manner. g. Opportunities for children to have the best of both worlds.

To benefit from the love, guidance, involvement, insight, culture and commitment of each parent. Even if the parents aren’t together. Even if the parents don’t like each other anymore. h. Opportunities for parents to solve problems. i. But not opportunities for incessant argument and obstruction. [ 46 ] J.L.W.K. is 14 months old, has spent significant time being parented by J.W.K. and is bonded to both parents. I have no basis to concluded either parent is not an appropriate, capable, and loving parent.

His best interests are clearly served by spending significant, indeed the maximum possible time, with each parent that can work in the circumstances. [ 47 ] Until recently J.L.W.K. was a baby and his mother, being on maternity leave, was able to care for him full time. This was the significant factor in Brown J.’s interim decision that her home should be the interim primary residence. The circumstances have changed.

J.L.W.K. has now reached the “toddler” stage of life. [ 48 ] I have concluded that at this time and into the foreseeable future J.L.W.K.’s best interests are served by him spending as much time as he can with each parent and thus I start from the position that, subject to appropriate adjustments, this should be equal parenting. This I have concluded would be so, even if both parents were working, because: a. They are equally committed, appropriate, competent and loving parents.

There is no credible evidence that the behaviour of either is such as to put J.L.W.K. at any physical, psychological or emotional risk; b. Each of the applicable factors outlined in s. 10(3) of the Act can be well served by each parent; c. They live in close proximity to each other and thus transportation and exchanges are not problematic for the parents, nor lengthy and thus tedious or harmful for J.L.W.K.; d. Each parent has appropriate accommodations and supportive family and friends; e.

When the parenting time issue is settled I am satisfied that they will be able to cooperate as parents and communicate effectively; and f.

To the extent that maximum contact with each parent is, for good reason, often seen as in a child’s best interests where there is nothing in the present circumstances that detracts from that assessment and conclusion, equal shared parenting is appropriate. [ 49 ] Since I am of the opinion that, even if both parents were working, equal shared parenting would be in J.L.W.K.’s best interests, the fact of J.W.K. now being able to parent full time by reason of his paternity leave significantly reinforces my finding that, subject to appropriate adjustments, equal shared parenting is in J.L.W.K.’s best interests.

The appropriate adjustments I contemplate arise from the fact that J.W.K. also seeks to parent when J.L.W.K. would otherwise be in daycare. Thus I must necessarily decide that issue so that I can decide whether such “appropriate adjustments” to equal parenting time should be made. Parenting during daycare

[ 50 ] The definition of “parenting time” in the Act states that it means “ the time that a child spends in the care of a person pursuant to an order . . . whether or not the child is physically with that person during that time”.

There is implicit in this definition the concept that a parent can exercise their parenting time and responsibilities with the assistance of others, including a daycare provider. [ 51 ] Given that courts are to approach the decision of what is in the best interests of the child from a child-centric perspective, this can lead to moving beyond a stage 1 decision that equal shared parenting is in the child’s best interests, to a decision that a parent on maternity or paternity leave may in addition to base level equal shared parenting also have additional parenting time where the child would otherwise be in daycare. [ 52 ] Counsel for J.M. advised the Court that J.M. wishes to choose the daycare to provide childcare for her while she is working and cited D.W. v E.O. , 2021 SKQB 157 at para 48 , as authority for the proposition that each parent is responsible to choose a daycare provider when daycare is needed during their parenting time.

I do not read this decision as authority for the proposition as stated. The only relevant portion of para. 48 reads: 48 …

e) Daycare: D.W. and E.O. shall each be responsible for choosing the day care provider when day care is needed either to attend school or work when B.W. is in their care. The costs, if any, shall be shared equally and paid within 30 days of receiving a receipt. [ 53 ] As I read the decision, this is a specific order based on the facts of that case.

It is not authority for a general proposition that in all cases where an individual is working they get to choose to send a child to a daycare of their choice as opposed to permitting an non-working parent to parent during that time. [ 54 ] I am of the view that if a parent plans to place a child in daycare during their parenting time, this weighs significantly in deciding what is in the child’s best interests. At J.L.W.K.’s age the socializing aspect or benefits of daycare are minimal. There are negative aspects to daycare compared to full-time parental care.

These include the difficulty many young children have separating from their parent, the lack of individualized attention to their needs and the significantly increased exposure to communicable diseases in such a setting. Just like in a school setting, children frequently come home with the flu, COVID, colds, viruses and other common communicable diseases because every additional child creates another vector for the infections to be communicated. [ 55 ] What is proposed by J.M. is that J.L.W.K. be in daycare for some 9 hours a day during 9 out of every 10 days she works.

This leaves little time for J.M. to actively parent. I am of the opinion that this is not in J.L.W.K.’s best interests when the alternative is for J.L.W.K. to spend some or all of this time with an available and engaged father. More generally I am of the opinion that, subject to case specific considerations, parenting time by an engaged and available parent is in a child’s best interests rather than being cared for in a daycare. [ 56 ] This conclusion, however, can engage adjustments of modifications to the background equal parenting time decision.

Since J.W.K. seeks the right to parent J.L.W.K. during any time when J.L.W.K. would be in daycare, there must be a balancing that recognizes what might be in J.L.W.K.’s short-term best interests may detract from J.L.W.K.’s more long-term best interests of maximum workable engaged parenting time with his mother. A few rushed hours of meals and chores by a single mother after a busy workday followed by sleep and the morning rush is not quality parenting time.

The issue then becomes whether the benefit to J.L.W.K. of being parented by J.W.K. when J.M. is working can be enhanced by a parenting plan that gives J.L.W.K. the benefit of additional compensatory quality parenting time with his mother when she is not working. [ 57 ] Given the above: a. In crafting a parenting arrangement my mandate and jurisdiction is to have an overarching child-centric assessment of J.L.W.K.’s best interests; b. The situation is that for the next 18 months J.W.K. will be on paternity leave and J.M. will be working. This means that J.W.K. has a flexibility that J.M. does not have; c.

What J.W.K. is asking for is effectively a right to parent J.L.W.K. during J.M.’s parenting week during daycare hours in addition to what would otherwise be equal parenting time; and d. The applications before me also ask that I make orders that involve holiday scheduling. [ 58 ] J.W.K. has full flexibility during his paternity leave. Given his unique employment situation, when his paternity leave ends he will also have flexibility well beyond that which J.M. will have. Thus scheduling of holidays is not a problem for him. He has the ability to

schedule his holidays without regard to work demands. Accordingly there is good reason to give J.M. total flexibility to

schedule her holidays, including scheduling them into what would otherwise be a J.W.K. parenting week on the weekly rotation of parenting that I will be ordering. [ 59 ] I will be making an order that starts from equal shared parenting on a week-on/week-off basis and that permits J.W.K. to parent J.L.W.K. during what would otherwise be daycare time within J.M.’s parenting weeks but then make adjustments such that J.M. will receive offsetting or compensatory parenting time when she is not working.

The concept is that for each partial daycare day J.W.K. parents J.L.W.K. during J.M.’s parenting week, she shall be entitled to an additional day parenting time from within J.W.K.’s parenting weeks on days when she is not working. [ 60 ] The compensatory days shall be entirely of J.M.’s choosing; subject only that she shall provide J.W.K. at least 21-days’ notice of her selections.

[ 61 ] The purpose and intent of the adjustment or compensatory aspect of my decision is to permit J.L.W.K. to be parented by an engaged parent focused on parenting him as opposed to the impersonal care and attention of life in a daycare while also finding a way to maximize the long-term hands-on parenting time J.M. can provide given her situation as a working mother, which is in J.L.W.K.’s best interests. In addition, the provision of this compensatory parenting time also serves the purpose of enhancing J.L.W.K.’s relationship and time with his sister, which I find to be in his best interests.

The Orders [ 62 ] I make the following interim orders on the basis that J.W.K. will continue to have parental leave for 18 months. With the passage of time and the end of J.W.K.’s paternity leave, circumstances may change significantly and if they do, it will be open to either party to come back to the Court for appropriate variation at the end of J.W.K.’s paternity leave. That aside I am hopeful that the interim parenting orders I make should be appropriate at least until J.L.W.K. enters kindergarten. [ 63 ] The orders I make herein are made because the parties are unable to agree.

The parties are encouraged to and may alter any provision of these orders by written agreement. Because it is well-nigh impossible to anticipate every complication and the permutations and combinations of complications that may arise from the implementation of these orders, it will be necessary to give the parties the ability to cooperate and find mutually reasonable and acceptable solutions to issues as and when they arise. Regarding Parenting Time [ 64 ] I order as follows with effect from Sunday, November 5, 2023 at 8:00 a.m.: a. J.M. and J.W.K. shall have joint decision-making in respect of J.L.W.K. b.

J.M.’s selection of the Lumsden Daycare as the provider of daycare services for Lumsden is approved and ordered. Both J.M. and J.W.K. shall use it for the provision of daycare for J.L.W.K. when they individually need to access daycare and they shall share the cost equally. I find it to be in J.L.W.K.’s best interests for both parents to utilize this one daycare. The stability of one daycare for J.L.W.K. is in his best interests.

Given that I am ordering J.W.K. may parent J.L.W.K. on days where J.M. would otherwise have to use the services of daycare for J.L.W.K., that facility should also be available for J.W.K. in and when a need arises. c. Subject to the adjustments hereinafter provided the parents shall have the following parenting time on a repeating four-week basis: i. Week 1: Sunday 7:30 p.m. to Sunday 7:30 p.m. – J.M. ii. Week 2: Sunday 7:30 p.m. to Friday 7:30 p.m. – J.W.K. iii. Week 3: Friday 7:30 p.m. to the second following Sunday at 7:30 p.m. – J.M. iv. Week 4: Sunday 7:30 p.m. to Sunday 7:30 p.m. – J.W.K. v.

Should J.M.’s parenting time with her daughter not coordinate with this parenting rotation, J.M. shall have the right to adjust the rotation

schedule to better fit her parenting rotation with her daughter. That shift shall be effected by inserting a full week, chosen by J.M., into the rotation

schedule during which J.M. will parent from Sunday at 7:30 p.m. to Thursday at 7:30 p.m. and J.W.K. Thursday at 7:30 p.m. to Sunday at 7:30 p.m. The purpose of this provision is to enable J.M. to shift the parenting rotation to achieve a better fit with her parenting time with her daughter and the resulting benefit to J.L.W.K. of enhanced time with his sister present. vi. If a statutory holiday (excepting Christmas) falls on or can be exercised on a Friday preceding or Monday following either Week 2 or 4 then the parenting time for those days shall be parenting time of J.M. d.

J.W.K. shall, in addition to his Week 2 and 4 parenting time have the right to parent J.L.W.K. on any day that J.L.W.K. would otherwise be in daycare during J.M.’s designated parenting weeks. e. The additional parenting time accessed by J.M. from within J.W.K.’s parenting weeks shall generate compensatory parenting time for J.M., on the basis of 1 additional full 24-hour parenting day for each partial daycare day that J.W.K. parents J.L.W.K. This compensatory parenting time shall consist of and may be claimed and accessed by J.M., in her absolute discretion from: i.

The two additional weekend days and the statutory holiday day adjustments provided for under 64 c above. ii. On any EDO, holiday days or other days that J.M. is not required to work. iii. J.M. shall have the right to

schedule and exercise her EDO’s and holidays into J.W.K.’s parenting weeks and to the extent she does so J.W.K.’s parenting time contemplated by the weekly schedules in 64 c above are reduced accordingly. This right is subject only to providing J.W.K. at least 21-days’ advance notice of such scheduling choices. [ 65 ] The purpose and intent of shortening J.W.K.’s parenting Week 2 and the adjustments to J.W.K.’s parenting time effected by subparagraphs 64 c (

v) and e above is to provide additional weekend or long weekend (statutory holidays), EDO and holiday time to J.M. to parent J.L.W.K. This recognizes that because J.M. has to work, her accessible parenting time will be reduced to less that the cumulative parenting time available to J.W.K. It seeks, in a global sense, to provide both J.M. and J.W.K. close to equal days of hands-on parenting time with J.L.W.K. given the limitations imposed by J.M.’s work obligations. An unknown is how many of otherwise daycare days J.W.K. would chose to exercise his right to parent.

He needs to make his precise plans in this respect known to J.M. as they arise. [ 66 ] Assuming one month of annual holidays for J.M. and the other assumptions in the calculations below, the 4- week rotation (exclusive of J.M.’s annual holidays) would be repeated 12 times in year with the result that J.W.K. will have the opportunity to provide parenting to J.L.W.K. for 24 weeks of otherwise daycare time or a total of approximately 120 days. The

adjustments I have directed to the parenting arrangement would generate an approximate 84 additional parenting days for J.M. calculated as follows: Two extra weekend days every rotation = 24 days Four weeks J.M. holidays with no sharing = 28 days One EDO every second worked week = 24 days Statutory holidays except Christmas = 8 days Total adjustment dates = 84 days In addition, should J.W.K. chose to take an equivalent 4 weeks’ holidays or break from parenting without J.L.W.K., then that 4 weeks would generate an additional 40 days of parenting time for J.M.

Holidays [ 67 ] J.M. has asked the Court to make specific orders with respect to holidays. For the most part what J.M. seeks has been addressed in my parenting time decisions above. She has been given the right to book her holiday time whenever she wishes, including the ability to book that time into what would otherwise be J.W.K.’s parenting weeks in the four-week rotation. [ 68 ] J.W.K. will have a right to

schedule holidays or a break from parenting whenever he wishes. To the extent to which his scheduling of holidays or a break from parenting include his scheduled parenting weeks, he shall be responsible for arranging care for J.L.W.K. unless J.M. agrees to care for J.L.W.K. during such weeks. He shall give J.M. a minimum of 21-days’ notice of his plans in this respect and J.M. shall within one week advise whether she is willing and able to parent J.L.W.K. those weeks.

J.W.K. is not entitled to compensatory parenting time should J.M. agree to parent in those weeks. [ 69 ] The following orders shall take priority over and modify any other parenting orders made herein: a. J.M. shall parent J.L.W.K. on the Mother’s Day weekend from Friday at 5:00 p.m. to Sunday at 5:00 p.m.; b. J.W.K. shall parent J.L.W.K. on the Father’s Day weekend from Friday at 5:00 p.m. to Sunday at 5:00 p.m.; and c.

In 2023 J.M. shall parent J.L.W.K. from 5:00 p.m. on December 24 to 5:00 p.m. on December 26; J.W.K. shall parent for the same period in the following year and the rotation shall continue on an annual basis thereafter. Exchanges [ 70 ] I order that the exchanges of J.L.W.K. shall occur as follows: a. During Weeks 1 and 3, when and if J.W.K. chooses to parent during what otherwise would be a daycare day: i. If J.M. is working in Regina, as selected by J.M. at: 1. Her work location or another public location in Regina; 2.

A time chosen by J.M. at a time prior to the beginning or subsequent to the end of her working day with J.M. to do the driving both ways; ii. If J.M. is working at home, as selected by J.M. at: 1. Her home or a public location in Lumsden; 2. A time chosen by J.M. at time prior to the beginning or subsequent to the end of her working day with J.W.K. doing the driving both ways; b.

During weeks 2 and 4 when J.W.K. is doing the parenting the pick-ups and deliveries shall occur at the home of J.M. or a public location in Lumsden selected by J.M. at the commencement and ending times for the parenting time with J.W.K. doing the driving both ways; and c. For Christmas, Mother’s Day, Father’s Day and J.M.’s annual holidays the exchanges shall occur at 5:00 p.m. at the residence of the parent surrendering J.L.W.K. for the event, or at a public location in the municipality of the parent surrendering possession as selected by the surrenderer with that person doing the driving both ways.

Communication [ 71 ] The parties shall forthwith commence using the OurFamilyWizard app for all communications except emergency communications and each will pay one half of the cost. Cost [ 72 ] Each party is asking costs of their applications and in respect of the other’s application. I find that the success

on the applications was divided on complicated issues and in the circumstance conclude each party should bear their own costs and so order. J. B.J. SCHERMAN