STUART DEAN MURRAY PETITIONER - v. -, 2023 SKKB 249

KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 249 Date: 2023 11 24 Docket: DIV-SA-00426-2012 Judicial Centre: Saskatoon (Family Law Division) ___________________________________________________________________________ BETWEEN: STUART DEAN MURRAY PETITIONER - and - BETTY MARIE MURRAY RESPONDENT Counsel: James J. Vogel, K.C. for the petitioner Gregory M. Kuse for the respondent ___________________________________________________________________________ FIAT GOEBEL J.

November 24, 2023 ___________________________________________________________________________ Overview : [ 1 ] The parties were married in March 2002 and separated in June 2011. They have one son together – Dane, born August 13, 2002. Dane is autistic and requires assistance in his daily living. He was 9 years old when the parties separated and is presently 21 years of age.

[ 2 ] The parties’ separation was amicable and they quickly entered into an interspousal agreement with the assistance of legal counsel. At that time, they agreed to share care of Dane with the father having primarily weekend parenting time. Their agreement also required the father to pay child support in the sum of $1,078 per month, spousal support in the amount of $1,500 per month and 100% of any special expenses incurred on behalf of Dane. According to the income tax returns filed at that time, their incomes were in the range of $125,000 for the father and $7,500 for the mother.

They obtained a judgment for divorce in August 2012 by consent, although none of the terms of their agreement were incorporated into the judgment. [ 3 ] Over the next 10 years the parties largely complied with their contractual arrangement. While the agreement required the parties to exchange income information each year, it did not include an adjustment provision for child support. That said, in 2018 the father increased his child support payment from $1,078 to $1,410 per month given an increase in his income.

The father also paid for special expenses relating to Dane’s care and treatments which he says exceeded $19,000 in total. [ 4 ] On the other hand, unbeknownst to their lawyers, the parties had a side deal respecting the contractual spousal support payments designed to allow the mother to qualify for a larger mortgage so that she could purchase a home in a preferred area of Saskatoon. According to that arrangement, the father paid spousal support to the mother in the sum of $1,500 per month as per the terms of the interspousal agreement, and obtained a deduction for same from the Canada Revenue Agency [CRA].

In turn, the mother reported the spousal support as income to CRA but returned $900 per month to the father. The parties followed this practice consistently between 2011 and 2021. [ 5 ] In August 2020 the mother began to receive disability benefits on behalf of Dane. She did not advise the father of same. [ 6 ] In September 2021, after the father discovered that Dane was receiving benefits, he proposed that all child and spousal support payments come to an end. This suggestion was not met with enthusiasm.

Not only did the mother refuse to entertain any change to the contractual support payments, but from that point on she began to retain the entire spousal support payment made by the father. In turn, the father reduced the child support payment back to the contractual amount. [ 7 ] The parties found themselves at an impasse.

Eventually, without any other recourse available, the father served and filed an application for corollary relief pursuant to the Divorce Act , RSC 1985, c 3 (2d Supp), asking the court to determine whether he had any ongoing child and spousal support obligations. [ 8 ] At the hearing, both counsel agreed that an interim order is appropriate given the controverted evidence on some issues and the dearth of evidence on others. Issues: [ 9 ] The issues raised by the positions advanced by the parties are as follows: 1. What is the father’s income for the purposes of determining his interim support obligations? 2.

What is the mother’s income for the purposes of determining her interim support obligations and entitlement? 3. Is Dane a child of the marriage for support purposes? 4. If so, what child support payment is appropriate in the interim? 5. Is the mother entitled to interim spousal support and if so, in what amount? 6. How should I exercise my discretion respecting costs?

Analysis: What is the father’s income for the purposes of determining his interim support obligations? [ 10 ] The father asks that his income be set at his base salary, being $103,000 per annum, without including any historical overtime earnings or other income. He says that he has been on a treadmill – forced to work extra hours to maintain his contractual commitments. He also says that working at this pace is not sustainable and that his health is deteriorating.

For instance, he claims to be suffering with symptoms consistent with long COVID, fatigue, exhaustion and anxiety, along with back problems that impact his work. He states that his intention, if relieved of support obligations, is to immediately reduce his hours of work and transition towards retirement. [ 11 ] The mother asks that the father’s income be determined based on his historical earnings inclusive of overtime and vacation pay.

The father reported employment income of $174,661 in 2020, $168,679 in 2021 and $149,777 in 2022. [ 12 ] The father is 55 years of age and is employed as an Electrical Construction Supervisor with SaskPower. He has been engaged in physically demanding work for the last 37 years.

That said, there is no independent evidence before the court that speaks to the father’s compromised health, or any impact that his health may have on his ability to continue to earn income commensurate with his historical earnings. [ 13 ] The case law cautions against giving weight to “bald assertions” made by a spouse that their health compromises their capacity to work: Fletcher-Tung v Tung , 2022 SKQB 78 at paras 34-36 , Kosolofski v Kosolofski , 2016 SKCA 106 , 485 Sask R 1, Lafreniere v Lafreniere , 2013 SKQB 114 , 32 RFL (7th) 286 [ Lafreniere ], appeal dismissed 2014 SKCA 13 , 433 Sask R 121, Radu v Radu , 2016 SKCA 145 , 86 RFL (7th) 1. [ 14 ] Moreover, the father is asking that the court set his income at his base rate of pay on the basis that he will no

longer work overtime, notwithstanding that there is no evidence that he has, in fact, discontinued overtime work. [ 15 ] In the circumstances, and given the state of the evidence, the most appropriate determination of the father’s income for the purposes of determining his interim support obligations is the total income reported on his most recent income tax return, without adjustment for spousal support payments and with an adjustment for union dues paid. Using this formula, the father’s income for interim support purposes is found to be $148,247 per annum.

What is the mother’s income for the purposes of determining her interim support obligations and entitlement? [ 16 ] The mother reported a total income (not including spousal support payments but inclusive of employment insurance and other benefits) in the sum of $34,936 in 2020, $33,599 in 2021 and $22,094 in 2022. [ 17 ] The mother says that she is unable to continue the seasonal employment that she has held over the last several years because of Dane’s needs and appointments, but provides little evidence respecting her current or past efforts to secure alternate employment.

In addition, the father says that she has rental income from a roommate – who also happens to have been her past employer. This is neither denied nor explained. Despite these arguments, it appears that her counsel has utilized an income commensurate with her past earnings for the purposes of determining interim support. [ 18 ] In the circumstances, and given the state of the evidence, I am inclined to impute income to the mother in the sum utilized by her counsel in the calculations filed, being $30,210 per annum.

Is Dane a child of the marriage for support purposes? [ 19 ] Support may continue to be payable for an adult child of the relationship who is unable, by reason of disability, to withdraw from parental charge or obtain the necessaries of life: s. 2(1) of the Divorce Act . The onus of proving entitlement lies with the parent who is seeking support: Nkwazi v Nkwazi , 2014 SKCA 61 at para 21 , 438 Sask R 185 [ Nkwazi ], Wetsch v Kuski , 2017 SKCA 77 at para 41 , 1 RFL (8th) 290, Ethier v Skrudland , 2011 SKCA 17 at para 17 , 97 RFL (6th) 1. [ 20 ] Dane is 21 years of age.

He has autism and over the years has presented with anxiety, anger, depression and challenging behaviours. While his symptoms appear to have settled, and he is currently participating in a lifestyle program, there is no expectation that he will ever be gainfully employed or that he will reside independently. The point of debate is whether Dane is able to meet his reasonable needs on the government benefits that are available to him. [ 21 ] In August 2020, Dane began receiving $1,092 per month in Saskatchewan Assured Income for Disability [SAID] benefits from the provincial government.

This amount increased to $1,122 in 2023. The benefits are designed to meet the reasonable living expenses of a disabled adult and are taxable to the recipient. [ 22 ] As a result of receiving these benefits, Dane reported an income of $4,331 in 2020, $14,196 in 2021 and $13,104 in 2022. The mother also receives a small living allowance from Canada Pension Plan on his behalf. [ 23 ] Counsel for the father argues that when Dane began to receive government benefits, the legal burden for his care shifted from his parents to society.

He further argues that without clear proof that Dane’s expenses are not being met, the mother has failed to meet the burden of proving that Dane remains entitled to support. [ 24 ] In response, the mother claims that the government benefits are insufficient to meet Dane’s expenses at this time. Dane is on a waiting list for an assisted living home located in Rosthern, Saskatchewan at which point his expenses will be mostly covered. Until then, the mother says that Dane will remain in her home and will require added financial support. [ 25 ] With respect, these “all or nothing” arguments are unpersuasive.

For instance, while I appreciate that the mother has made personal sacrifices for Dane’s well-being and that she continues to plan her life around what she perceives his needs to be, that alone does not create a binding legal obligation on her part, or on the part of the father.

The jurisprudence clearly distinguishes between a parent’s sincerely held desire to support an adult child, and their legal obligation to do so: Hanson v Hanson , 2003 SKQB 347 at para 26 , 43 RFL (5th) 109, Carlson v Zacharias , 2017 SKQB 97 at para 23 , 94 RFL (7th) 138 [ Carlson ], and Galbraith v Galbraith , 2018 SKQB 157 at para 48 , 9 RFL (8th) 157. [ 26 ] On the other hand, the receipt of government benefits by a disabled adult does not automatically absolve parents from their legal obligation to provide financial support, nor is it appropriate to assume that a benefit program, designed to support the needs of disabled adults, is sufficient to meet the recipient’s needs. [ 27 ] Rather, at the entitlement stage of the analysis, the focus is upon whether the benefits being received are sufficient to meet the reasonable needs of the disabled adult.

This determination is fact and case specific. In some situations, government subsidies may be sufficient to meet a disabled adult’s necessaries of life such that they are no longer entitled to parental support and in others, it may only reduce the amount of support otherwise payable. [ 28 ] In this instance, counsel for the father argues that the court does not have sufficient evidence to determine if the financial resources available to Dane are sufficient to cover his “necessaries of life” because the mother has not filed a child-centred budget.

He says that without that evidence, the mother cannot meet the burden of proof upon her. [ 29 ] In support of this argument, he cites and relies on the decision in Carlson where Scherman J., after canvassing a number of cases that considered the premise that the state should assume legal responsibility for a disabled adult child, noted that the mother had failed to provide any evidence that the child relied upon her for support or that her basic needs were not being met. With respect, Carlson can be distinguished in two ways. First, in Carlson the disabled adult child resided in a group home where her basic day-

to-day costs were covered. Scherman J. found that this was a distinguishing factor when he stated as follows: [29] Accepting the concept that the extent of and provision of “the necessaries” is fact and case specific, I do not have, in this case, thekind of fact and case specific evidence that was available in Lougheed [2007 BCCA 396] on which I could make a decision that theProgram funding is not providing Brett with the necessities. It may be so, but the evidence provided by Ms. Leonard does not establish itto be so. Ms. Leonard is not subsidizing Brett’s rent.

I accept that she has been spending support monies received to date for the benefitof Brett. Without details of what those expenditures have been and will be in the future, I am unable to conclude that they will beexpenditures for necessities. I have no budgetary evidence showing a shortfall between Brett’s needs and her resources. Brett is not livingindependently, where her day-to-day activities are being supervised by her mother and thus she remains under her charge.

Rather she isin a group home staffed 24 hours per day and Brett is under the charge of the group home supervisor. [30] Secondly, while it is true that the mother did not file nor disclose a “child-centred budget” in this matter, there isother evidence respecting Dane’s expenses before the court. The mother’s financial statement includes a breakdown of householdexpenses ($64,995 in total not including source deductions and her personal expenses) as well as expenses she directly incurs on Dane’sbehalf ($5,685).

One-half of her household expenses plus the direct expenses the mother claims to incur for Dane totals $38,182. [31] More specifically, the financial statement sworn and filed by the father does include a detailed child-centredbudget and estimates Dane’s living expenses to be $43,947 per year.

If we remove those expenses related to gifts for Dane as well asdiscretionary savings and donations, the father’s budget appears to estimate Dane’s expenses in the range of $35,000 per year. [32] In other words, while it may not be possible to determine the additional cost to the mother of maintaining Danein her home with precision, there is sufficient evidence to find that the disability income received by Dane (approximately $1,100 permonth) is insufficient to cover his living expenses and necessities of life. [33] Moreover, unlike the cases referred by the father to the court, Dane is not employable in any sense, nor does helive on his own or reside in a group home where his financial needs are met. [34] I find that Dane is unable, by reason of his disability, to withdraw from parental care or obtain the necessities oflife.

At this time, the responsibility for Dane’s support should be shared by his parents and the state. What child support payment is appropriate in the interim? [35] Section 3(2) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [Guidelines], creates a presumption that theGuidelines table amounts are appropriate for adult children. It states: 3 …

(2) Unless otherwise provided under these Guidelines, where a child to whom a child support order relates is the age of majority or over,the amount of the child support order is (

a) the amount determined by applying these Guidelines as if the child were under the age of majority; or (

b) if the court considers that approach to be inappropriate, the amount that it considers appropriate, having regard to the condition,means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the child. [36] A party who claims that the Guidelines table amount is inappropriate holds the burden to provide evidence todisplace this presumption: Leland v Klette, 2014 SKCA 122, 52 RFL (7th) 1 [Leland CA], Nkwazi, Geran v Geran, 2011 SKCA 55, 371Sask R 233. [37] That said, this is rarely a difficult burden to meet where an adult child is in receipt of disability benefits.

InLeland v Klette, 2013 SKQB 277, 426 Sask R 104, Ryan-Froslie J. (as she then was) summarized the state of the law as follows: 80 A number of cases have dealt with children who are unable to remove themselves from their parents’ charge because of illnessand/or disability and receive benefits from the government. The cases cited by David’s counsel include Phillips v. Phillips, 2005 SKQB254, 266 Sask.R. 154; Burhoe v. Goff (1999), (NB KB), 50 R.F.L. (4th) 218, 213 N.B.R. (2d) 391 (Q.B.); Grimes v.Grimes, 2002 ABQB 704, [2002] A.J. No. 981 (QL); and Buzon v. Buzon, 1999 ABQB 254, 48 R.F.L. (4th) 263.

In all these cases theCourt held the financial benefit received by the child needed to be taken into account in determining child support. Such a finding is inline with judicial authority relating to adult children who attend post-secondary education and have incomes. The fact Emma’sdependency relates in part to her disability does not mean her financial resources should be ignored when setting an appropriate level ofchild support. 81 I find Emma’s income from the SAID program must be taken into account in establishing a fair level of support for her.

Thatpayment from the public purse is for the express purpose of meeting Emma’s needs… [38] This is also a case and fact specific determination. [39] In this instance, there is little dispute that the Guidelines table amount is inappropriate. The mother accepts andagrees that the quantum of child support payable must account for the government assistance Dane receives. I agree. [40] In determining the “appropriate” level of child support, s. 3(2)(

b) directs the court to determine support withreference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of the parents to contribute to thechild’s support. This analysis puts a number of factors in play including the adult child’s circumstances and reasonable expenses along

with the financial resources available to the adult child and each of the parents. [ 41 ] The Court of Appeal in Leland CA upheld the analysis of the chambers judge when assessing a disabled adult’s expenses, described as follows: [28] As to the former point, i.e., the context in which she made her decision, it is clear the Chamber judge had full regard for the factors to be considered in determining both whether the Guidelines approach was “inappropriate” and the “appropriate” level of support for Emma.

She examined the available evidence of Emma’s “condition, means, needs and other circumstances,” noting Emma would never live independently, identifying the assistance Emma received through SAID, analyzing each line item expense set forth by Ms. Klette in her proposed budget, examining the financial statements of the parties, assessing the cost of childcare and health-related expenses, etc. In doing so, the Chamber judge reached specific and well-supported conclusions that some of the expenses Ms. Klette had budgeted for Emma were “unreasonable” or unsupported by the evidence. She noted too that some of Mr.

Leland’s criticisms of the items budgeted by Ms. Klette were “unreasonable.” The Chamber judge concluded her analysis as follows: [67] While I am cognizant of the frailty and inadequacy of child budgets, based on all of the evidence, I am satisfied the total amount budgeted by Pamela for Emma is so high as to exceed the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible. I find, based on the evidence, that Emma’s needs are $7,120 per month … . [Table omitted] Following this, the Chamber judge examined the financial ability of the parties to contribute to the support of their child.

She included in this analysis the SAID amount Emma received. [29] Importantly, when it came time to actually address the threshold question of whether the Table Amount was “inappropriate,” she gave four compelling reasons, based on the evidence she had just reviewed, as to why it was inappropriate: [84] Taking into account Emma’s means, needs, condition and other circumstances and both Pamela and David’s financial ability to provide support for Emma, I find the Guideline approach is inappropriate for the following reasons: (

i) Emma’s disability benefits should be taken into account in setting a fair level of support; (ii) David’s Table support far exceeds Emma’s reasonable needs; (iii) Emma’s needs include significant child care costs for both employment and respite purposes; and (iv) The child care costs relating to Pamela’s employment are difficult to determine and separate from her respite care costs.

In order to reduce conflict between the parties, a global order is preferable. [30] From this it is clear that the Chamber judge addressed the threshold issue by determining that there was sufficient clear and compelling evidence to displace the presumption that the Table Amount was appropriate. Indeed, the first two reasons she gave are each alone sufficient to rebut the presumption. As such, her

summary of the evidentiary burden and her reasoning throughout her judgment satisfies me that the Chamber judge correctly interpreted and applied the evidentiary burden contemplated by the Guidelines . Consequently, the answer to the first issue is “Yes.” [ 42 ] What then is the appropriate amount of child support payable for Dane, having regard to his condition, means, needs and other circumstances and the financial ability of each parent to contribute to his support? To start, it is clear that the net obligation must be shared between the parents.

The payor should not expect to reduce the amount of support payable by the benefits paid, nor should the recipient expect the payor to cover the entire shortfall. [ 43 ] Moreover, while I may not be able to determine Dane’s expenses with mathematical certainty, I am satisfied that I have sufficient, probative evidence to make a principled determination of the interim support award. It is not disputed that Dane receives $13,464 per year in SAID benefits and that the mother receives approximately $3,000 per year in caregiver subsidies on his behalf.

Estimating Dane’s reasonable living costs at approximately $35,000 per annum as extrapolated from the mother’s sworn financial statement and the child-centred budget prepared by the father, which includes those expenses that might otherwise be considered s. 7 expenses, Dane’s shortfall would be in the range of $18,500 per year. [ 44 ] For interim purposes, it is appropriate that this shortfall be shared by the parents in proportion to their incomes – with the father’s share being approximately 83% or $1,280 per month. This payment is inclusive of any contribution towards special expenses.

It is appropriate for this payment to commence on April 1, 2023 when the father first filed his application for relief, less any sums paid in the intervening time. Both parties are reminded that this is an interim order, fully reviewable at the pre-trial and, if necessary, a trial along with any claim that the father has overpaid or underpaid child support in the past. Is the mother entitled to interim spousal support and if so, in what amount? [ 45 ] A recent and thorough review of the law relevant to a determination of interim spousal support can be found in Sydor v Sydor , 2021 SKQB 169 .

The starting point is entitlement: see also Wongstedt v Wongstedt , 2017 SKCA 100 , 3 RFL (8th) 43, Lafreniere, McCrea v McCrea , 2018 SKQB 215 , 17 RFL (8th) 482, Phair v Phair , 2023 SKKB 216 [ Phair ] and Haider v Stach , 2023 SKKB 153 . [ 46 ] There are three conceptual grounds upon which entitlement to spousal support can be advanced. The first is contract and considers whether there is an express or implied agreement between the parties that provides for support.

The second is compensatory and asks whether the spouse may be entitled to compensation for forgoing employment opportunities or making other economic sacrifices. The third ground is non-compensatory. It considers whether entitlement can be based simply upon need and ability to pay, a disparity in incomes or a reduced standard of living.

[ 47 ] If entitlement is established on the evidence, the primary focus of an interim spousal support analysis generally turns to allocating the family income in a fair and equitable manner pending the division of property and more complete evidence touching on the applicable factors and objectives relevant to a final spousal support determination: Wendt v Wendt , 2016 SKQB 227 . [ 48 ] Here, the mother claims to be entitled to compensatory support due to the ongoing impact that her care of Dane has had on her ability to attain self-sufficiency.

While the mother accepts that it is appropriate for Dane to be transitioned to a group home, she argues that until that happens, she must remain available to care for Dane. In addition, while she acknowledges that she “strong-armed” the father to agree to a side-deal on spousal support to allow her to qualify for a larger mortgage, her counsel appears to be suggesting that the mother may have a contractual entitlement that was never met by the father resulting in a significant retroactive shortfall. [ 49 ] The father opposes any payment of interim support.

He argues that the parties have been living separate and apart for 12 years during which time he has been “contributing” to her support at great personal expense to himself.

While he acknowledges that the spousal support agreement was a sham, and claims that it over-represented any reasonable spousal support obligation he may have had, he also appears to suggest that he should receive credit for “paying” the mother for 12 years of spousal support after a 9-year relationship. [ 50 ] The father also takes issue with the argument that Dane’s needs have impacted the mother’s ability to attain self- sufficiency over the last 12 years. He says that until recently he and the mother shared care of Dane as well as the burden of attending to his needs.

Moreover, he deposes that the mother has access to respite resources should she wish to utilize them, but has chosen not to. Finally, he claims to have been asking that Dane be placed in a supported living environment for some time but, until this action was commenced, the mother refused to even consider it.

He suggests that her change of heart rings hollow because she only arranged for Dane to apply at one small, rural facility that has an extensive waiting list and it is unlikely there will be a spot open for Dane for many years to come. [ 51 ] As a starting point, neither party comes before the court with “clean hands” and, despite entering into a duplicitous arrangement in 2011 respecting spousal support, both parties are attempting to spin the situation to support their respective positions without considering the legal implications of same. Is there a contractual obligation?

If so, should the court give any weight to that arrangement in the circumstances? Did the contract meet the objectives of spousal support that existed at the time of separation? Has spousal support actually been paid and, if so, in what amount? Should the father get any credit for the tax subsidy made available to the mother through their “arrangement”? Should the mother be entitled to pursue spousal support after a 12-year delay given the “arrangement” she orchestrated?

None of these related issues have been argued or addressed. [ 52 ] Secondly, the father refers to a number of cases where the court considered an application to vary or terminate a spousal support order in the face of the payor’s retirement which are not particularly relevant to the situation at hand. Here, there is no final order for spousal support to vary or terminate. Similarly, it appears that there has never been a determination of spousal support obligations or objectives. Moreover, the father’s retirement has not occurred nor is it necessarily imminent.

He would like an opportunity to turn his mind to his retirement – nothing more. [ 53 ] Thirdly, in most instances where interim spousal support is before the court, finances are in flux, disclosure is pending and property division is undetermined. That is not the situation at hand. Here, the parties separated over 12 years ago and family property was divided shortly thereafter.

There is no dispute that the wife received an equal distribution of property which included a payment of $230,000 from the equity of the family home – a property that was owned by the father prior to their relationship. [ 54 ] Fourthly, the evidence respecting the mother’s efforts to attain self-sufficiency are scant. She says that she has been earning seasonal income (with employment insurance benefits) in the range of $35,000 per year for the last 10 years, but claims this will not continue.

This is largely unexplained and she fails to respond to the allegation that her former employer is also her roommate. [ 55 ] Moreover, while I accept that the mother has assumed a more significant “hands-on” commitment to Dane’s care than the father over the last year, the father had shared care of Dane pursuant to their agreement and was very involved in his care up to the fall of 2022. [ 56 ] With respect to respite, the father says that the mother could have regularly utilized alternative resources for Dane to allow her to pursue employment or further her training and education.

While her lawyer argues that this is an unrealistic view of respite care, they provided no evidence. Further, the mother’s present decision to put all of her future plans on hold (i.e. looking for work, relocating, selling her home, …) while she waits for Dane’s placement in a specific group home, appears to be largely self- imposed. [ 57 ] Finally, the income disparity, while significant, does not automatically entitle the mother to interim spousal support: Phair at para 15 .

Moreover, the budget analysis utilized to determine the quantum of interim child support payable by the father to the mother accounts for approximately one-half of the mother’s household expenses and, for so long as Dane resides in her home, will serve to indirectly subsidize the mother’s housing costs. [ 58 ] In conclusion, given the unusual arrangement of the parties, the lack of relevant evidence before the court and the time that has passed since the parties separated, I am unable to find that the mother has met the burden of demonstrating that she is entitled to interim spousal support. [ 59 ] That said, this is not a final determination and the mother is unhindered in seeking a final determination of the issue at a trial: MacDonald v MacDonald , 2010 SKCA 60 , 350 Sask R 245, Frank v Linn , 2014 SKCA 87 , 442 Sask R 126, and Ford v Ford , 2015 SKCA 23 , 457 Sask R 19.

In the meantime, for the purposes of enforcement, commencing on April 1, 2023 and until further agreement or court order, this determination shall supersede any contractual obligations between the parties pursuant to their 2011 interspousal agreement. How should I exercise my discretion respecting costs?

[ 60 ] Given the legal issues in play, the evidentiary concerns raised and the mixed success, I direct that the costs of this hearing be in the cause in the event that the parties proceed to trial. J. G.V. GOEBEL