HIS MAJESTY THE KING - v. -, 2023 SKKB 271

KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 271 Date: 2023 12 19 Docket: CRM-PA-00250-2023 Judicial Centre: Prince Albert ___________________________________________________________________________ BETWEEN: HIS MAJESTY THE KING - and - KURT RATT Counsel: Stephanie C. Lavallee for the Crown Zachary J. Carter for the accused ___________________________________________________________________________ SENTENCING JUDGMENT DANYLIUK J. December 19, 2023 ___________________________________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] Mr.

Ratt is before this Court as a result of events occurring on May 17, 2022, at La Ronge, Saskatchewan. He was indicted on two charges stemming from those events. I paraphrase those charges as follows: Count 1: The accused unlawfully killed Eric Bouchard while using a firearm (a rifle) and thereby committed manslaughter (contrary to s. 236 (

a) of the Criminal Code , RSC 1985, c C-46 ). Count 2: The accused committed an assault with a weapon (a firearm) (contrary to s. 267 (

a) of the Criminal Code ). [ 2 ] A bare guilty plea to Count 1 (manslaughter) was entered on September 19, 2023, before a different judge of this Court, who did not conduct the inquiries required by s. 606 of the Criminal Code , quite properly leaving that to me as the sentencing judge. Count 2 was stayed by the Crown. [ 3 ] I received sentencing submissions on December 1, 2023. While it would have been preferable to conclude the matter that day, documents (including briefs) were filed late.

It would have been a disservice to both the accused and his family and to the family of the deceased to have rushed this decision. Sentencing is nuanced, calling for considerable care. I therefore reserved decision for just over two weeks, indicating I would pronounce the sentence and provide reasons for same. This judgment contains the sentence and those reasons. II. Facts [ 4 ] An Agreed Statement of Facts was entered into by counsel for the Crown and the defence.

Despite the genesis of this matter occurring on August 11, 2023 (some four months prior to the actual sentencing hearing) there was no written, signed agreement pursuant to s. 655. As well, numerous other documents came late and the Crown’s brief was filed about 25 minutes prior to the opening of the hearing. Needless to say, these are not best practices. [ 5 ] The body of the Agreed Statement of Facts was contained in an email from Crown counsel to the Court, which had been copied to defence counsel. It was not signed. It was not in the usual form of an Agreed Statement of Facts.

There was no indication whether the accused specifically agreed with it; as a result I conducted an inquiry with him in open court and he indicated he accepted those facts as true. As will be seen, some relevant details were left out of the agreed facts. Again, not the gold standard of criminal procedure. [ 6 ] The following Agreed Statement of Facts in the email was read into the record by Crown counsel: On May 17, 2022 at 03:52 am, La Ronge RCMP received several reports of gunshots around 337 Bells Point Road, in Lac La Ronge Indian Band, Saskatchewan.

Reports indicated that two males, later identified as Kurt Ratt and River Miller, were dragging a body to the

nearby lake. Upon arrival on scene, RCMP members located Kurt Ratt and Venalee Roberts attempting to leave the scene. Kurt and Venalee were detained. As events were unfolding, RCMP members believed that River Miller was inside the residence refusing to come out. River Miller later surrendered after police executed a search warrant. Cst. MacDonald located Eric Bouchard submerged in the lake behind 337 Bells Point Road. Eric was weighed down with a sand bag on his head. Cst. MacDonald thought he saw breath coming from Eric Bouchard’s mouth, and heard a gurgling sound.

Life saving efforts were performed and Eric was transported to hospital by EMTs. Eric Bouchard succumbed to his injuries from a gunshot wound to the neck. Both River Miller and Kurt Ratt were each arrested for the murder of Eric Bouchard. The investigation revealed that on May 17, 2022, Eric Bouchard and Damien Morin were at 337 Bells Point Road in Lac La Ronge Indian Band, Saskatchewan. They had been at the house to fix a white SUV in the back yard. Kurt Ratt and River Miller approached Eric Bouchard and Damien Morin outside on the deck in the back yard.

Kurt and Eric got into an argument, which escalated, resulting in Kurt taking a gun out of his waistband and pointing it at Eric. Kurt was standing 2M in front of Eric on the back deck. Eric was sitting on top of a picnic table. Kurt, Eric and River were arguing. Kurt shot Eric once. Eric fell backwards onto the table and screamed. The gun was a .22 caliber, single shot, bolt action rifle. At all times, Eric was unarmed. After Kurt shot Eric, Damien tried to grab the gun. Kurt and River took the gun from Damien. Damien recalls that River began beating him on the head with the gun while Kurt punched Damien.

River hit Damien so many times that the gun broke. After the gun broke, Kurt and River went towards the house. Damien thought they were getting another gun so he ran away. As Damien was escaping the scene, he ran by witness George Bird and yelled for him to call the police. Damien said to George that “they just shot” his buddy. Three gunshots were heard by a number of witnesses. George Bird observed Kurt Ratt and River Miller dragging Eric Bouchard’s body to the lake: he saw that Kurt had the hands and River had one of the legs.

George Bird also observed River Miller return to the house, grab sand bags, then return to the lake. RCMP believe that Kurt Ratt and River Miller submerged Eric Bouchard’s body in the water, using sand bags to weigh him down. On May 18, 2022, an autopsy was completed on Eric Bouchard. The cause of death was determined to be a gunshot wound to the neck. A single bullet was recovered from Eric Bouchard’s spine during the autopsy. The bullet was sent for testing and was determined to be consistent with a .22 calibre bullet.

The forensic pathologist noted abrasions on the head as suggestive of drag type abrasions that had a red-brown appearance, which is seen when there is bleeding into the tissues, and for that to occur there should be a heart beat; meaning he was alive at the time of the abrasions. On May 18, 2022, a warrant to search was authorized and executed at 337 Bells Point Road in Lac La Ronge Indian Band, Saskatchewan. A spent .22 calibre casing was found on the deck of the residence. The scene and the lake surrounding the scene were searched for the firearm involved, but it was not located.

River Miller provided a statement and said that it was Kurt who had the gun. It was a short .22 single shot bolt action. Kurt had it on his hip. After the first shot, Damien and Kurt started fighting over the gun. He also fought Damien. Damien eventually ran off down the road. River and Kurt moved Eric’s body to the lake and grabbed sandbags; and Kurt put sandbags on Eric.

River says he threw the gun into the lake, but no firearm was ever recovered. [Emphasis in original] [ 7 ] The bolding and underlining of certain words and phrases was contained in the original email and the reason for same was never explained to the Court. [ 8 ] Crown and defence had also agreed as to the calculation of the remand credit and as to the ancillary orders to be made as part of Mr. Ratt’s sentence. [ 9 ] After the agreed facts were read into the record I canvassed s. 606 of the Criminal Code with Mr. Ratt. I was satisfied with his responses and accepted the guilty plea tendered. III.

The Law [ 10 ] In analyzing and synthesizing the factors that lead to the correct sentencing disposition, I have started by carefully considering the applicable general sentencing factors and principles. The law directs judges to consider certain matters pertaining to sentencing. Counsel have been of assistance in highlighting for the court specific factors that merited the court’s consideration.

I will now review the applicable sentencing principles set out in law. [ 11 ] First, the applicable sections of the Criminal Code are as follows: 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offenceor the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, (

i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion,sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression, or on any other similar factor, (ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender’s spouse or common-law partner, (ii.1) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years, (iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim, (iii.1) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances,including their health and financial situation, (iv) evidence that the offence was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization, (

v) evidence that the offence was a terrorism offence, or (vi) evidence that the offence was committed while the offender was subject to a conditional sentence order made under

section 742.1or released on parole, statutory release or unescorted temporary absence under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances; (

b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (

c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh; (

d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (

e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done tovictims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginaloffenders. 718.3

(1) Where an enactment prescribes different degrees or kinds of punishment in respect of an offence, the punishment to beimposed is, subject to the limitations prescribed in the enactment, in the discretion of the court that convicts a person who commits theoffence. ...

(4) The court that sentences an accused shall consider directing (

a) that the term of imprisonment that it imposes be served consecutively to a sentence of imprisonment to which the accused is subjectat the time of sentencing; and (

b) that the terms of imprisonment that it imposes at the same time for more than one offence be served consecutively, including when (

i) the offences do not arise out of the same event or series of events, (ii) one of the offences was committed while the accused was on judicial interim release, including pending the determination of anappeal, or (iii) one of the offences was committed while the accused was fleeing from a peace officer. [12] As I have noted in previous decisions, the Canadian sentencing process is now highly individualized. It is asmuch art as it is science.

Cases are assessed using applicable general principles but as same are applicable to the existing circumstances.It is incumbent upon a sentencing judge to consider all relevant factors under the Criminal Code and as enunciated in the case law, andascribe to each the weight that the circumstances require. Of necessity, this will vary from case to case. No one sentencing objectivetrumps the others. Sentencing is a flexible procedure, with relatively few predetermined results (such as minimum sentences).

As LamerC.J.C. said in R v M.(C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 500: [91] … The determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a delicate art which attempts to balance carefully the societal goals ofsentencing against the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the circumstances of the offence, while at all times taking into accountthe needs and current conditions of and in the community. … [13] Justice Fish put the matter this way at para. 1 of R v Knott, 2012 SCC 42, [2012] 2 SCR 470: [1] Trial judges must retain as much flexibility as the Criminal Code permits in crafting individualized sentences that respect theprinciples and purposes of sentencing set out by Parliament in the Code.

[14] A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the acts and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Thisprincipal is integral to modern sentencing in Canada. The Supreme Court dealt with it in R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 SCR 433.Justice LeBel said this at paras. 35 to 38: [35] In 1996, Parliament amended the Criminal Code to specifically codify the objectives and principles of sentencing (An Act toamend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, S.C. 1995, c. 22 (Bill C-41)).

According to s. 718, thefundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to “respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society”. Thisis accomplished by imposing “just sanctions” that reflect one or more of the traditional sentencing objectives: denunciation, general andspecific deterrence, separation of offenders, rehabilitation, reparation to victims, and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders andacknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community. [36] The Criminal Code goes on to list a number of principles to guide sentencing judges.

The fundamental principle of sentencing isthat the sentence must be proportionate to both the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. As this Courthas previously indicated, this principle was not borne out of the 1996 amendments to the Code but, instead, has long been a central tenetof the sentencing process (see, e.g., R. v. Wilmott (1966), (ON CA), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 33 (Ont. C.A.), and, more recently,R. v. Solowan, 2008 SCC 52, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 309, at para. 12, and R. v.

Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at paras. 40-42).It also has a constitutional dimension, in that s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms forbids the imposition of a grosslydisproportionate sentence that would outrage society’s standards of decency.

In a similar vein, proportionality in sentencing could aptlybe described as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter. [37] The fundamental principle of sentencing (i.e., proportionality) is intimately tied to the fundamental purpose of sentencing — themaintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of just sanctions. Whatever weight a judge may wish to accord tothe various objectives and other principles listed in the Code, the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle ofproportionality. Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction.

First, the principle ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of theoffence. This is closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for victims and ensures public confidence in the justicesystem. As Wilson J. expressed in her concurring judgment in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, atp. 533: It is basic to any theory of punishment that the sentence imposed bear some relationship to the offence; it must be a “fit” sentenceproportionate to the seriousness of the offence.

Only if this is so can the public be satisfied that the offender “deserved” the punishmenthe received and feel a confidence in the fairness and rationality of the system. Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness ofthe offender. In this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justice for the offender.

In the Canadiancriminal justice system, a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense ofthe other. [38] Despite the constraints imposed by the principle of proportionality, trial judges enjoy a broad discretion in the sentencingprocess. The determination of a fit sentence is, subject to any specific statutory rules that have survived Charter scrutiny, a highlyindividualized process. Sentencing judges must have sufficient manoeuvrability to tailor sentences to the circumstances of the particularoffence and the particular offender.

Appellate courts have recognized the scope of this discretion and granted considerable deference to ajudge’s choice of sentence. As Lamer C.J. stated in R. v. M. (C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 90: Put simply, absent an error in principle, failure to consider a relevant factor, or an overemphasis of the appropriate factors, a court ofappeal should only intervene to vary a sentence imposed at trial if the sentence is demonstrably unfit.

Parliament explicitly vestedsentencing judges with a discretion to determine the appropriate degree and kind of punishment under the Criminal Code. [Emphasis inoriginal.] [15] I also note that Ipeelee and R v Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688, give rise to additionaljudicial considerations when, as presently, the sentencing judge is dealing with offenders of First Nations ancestry. Mr. Ratt is a FirstNations person, thus a consideration of the applicable law bears repeating, at least in

summary fashion. [16] In addition to Gladue and Ipeelee I have considered other authorities interpreting judicial sentencing obligationswith First Nations offenders, including the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decisions in R v Chanalquay, 2015 SKCA 141, 26 CR (7th)276; R v Slippery, 2015 SKCA 149, 472 Sask R 181; R v Whitehead, 2016 SKCA 165, 344 CCC (3d) 1; R v Delorme, 2017 SKCA 3; R vLemaigre, 2018 SKCA 47; R v Kaiswatum, 2019 SKCA 7, [2019] 5 WWR 669; and R v Tinker, 2023 SKCA 54. [17] Sentencing judges must recognize that Parliament amended the Criminal Code to include s. 718.2(

e) primarilyout of concern for the high incarceration rates of First Nations people, especially when measured against the general First Nationspopulation in Canada and the disproportionate number of First Nations people within the general prison population. This subsection wasintended to have sentencing judges take a somewhat different view of sentencing in the cases where it was warranted and possible, aview that was more restorative in nature.

It was hoped that this approach would, at least in part, address the issue of theoverrepresentation of First Nations people within our prison system. [18] Gladue, Ipeelee and the other cases cited have all interpreted s. 718.2(e). It is not a “get out of jail free” card;neither is it an automatic discount to be applied to the sentences of First Nations offenders (Chanalquay, para 54; Lemaigre, para 17). Itdoes not “trump” other sentencing factors (Tinker, para 48).

Rather, it is a direction that sentencing judges must consider additionalfactors when crafting a fit sentence for an individual offender, particularly one of First Nations heritage. [19] In some respects, Gladue and s. 718.2(

e) are just refinements of the maxim: “Sentence the offender, not theoffence”. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has phrased this as “… the court must determine the extent to which an Indigenousoffender’s unique circumstance bears upon moral culpability and how the relevant sentencing objectives may be met other than througha term of imprisonment” (Tinker, para 48).

[ 20 ] There are two main additional factors to consider. Either, or both, can have an effect on what constitutes a fit and just sentence for a particular offender. [ 21 ] First, sentencing judges must consider systemic, or widespread, factors that may have impacted upon the offender presently before the court. Sentencing judges are entitled to take judicial notice of these systemic factors, such as the effects of residential schools and the theory of colonization.

These factors may illuminate the degree to which an Aboriginal offender has moral blameworthiness for the crimes he or she has committed – in other words, the degree of responsibility of the offender. [ 22 ] Seldom, if ever, does this mean that the socio-economic and cultural background of an offender is such that his or her moral blameworthiness is likely to be eliminated entirely. For example it is hard to imagine circumstances where an offender’s background will vitiate voluntariness.

But that same personal background, in some cases, will operate to create a milieu wherein the offender does not have the same chances for success as others do. As was said in Ipeelee at para 73 , “... the reality is that their constrained circumstances may diminish their moral culpability”. [ 23 ] I also hasten to add that the so-called “ Gladue analysis” is not the be-all and end-all of modern sentencing. It is one of a group of factors that can affect the level of moral blameworthiness of an offender. Clearly, it is incumbent on sentencing judges to consider all of those factors in a holistic fashion.

While the Gladue analysis is mandated by s. 718.2(e), it might be considered to be one of numerous components falling under the s. 718.1 directive: “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”. Many things might go into the s. 718.1 consideration.

These will include, but not be limited to, what is mandated by s. 718.2(e): Chanalquay , para 40 . [ 24 ] Second, sentencing judges have to consider alternative types of sentencing procedures or sanctions (other than incarceration) that might be best for this particular offender, resulting from his or her First Nation background (which will encompass culture, traditions, and heritage). This should not be conflated with the first consideration (systemic factors). But the consideration of alternate sentencing modes goes directly to the type of sentence imposed.

As Chief Justice Richards said at paragraph 43 of Slippery : [43] The second and ultimately most important set of issues—the types of sanctions—may also affect the bottom line of a sentence. While not relating to the level of an offender’s culpability, sentencing judges must recognize that different or alternative restorative justice-type sanctions may effectively achieve necessary sentencing objectives in a particular community ( Ipeelee at para 74 ). [ 25 ] I agree that it is not incumbent upon Mr. Ratt to establish any direct causal link between that background and any of the offences in question.

This is not required in sentencing: see Ipeelee , para 83 , and Slippery , paras 45 and 46 . [ 26 ] I completely agree with Chief Justice Richards’ further comments in Slippery when he said “These generalities are obviously somewhat difficult to operationalize in the context of the concrete realities of any particular on-the-ground sentencing decision” (para. 46). The discussion of the effect of systemic factors on sentencing is, frankly, far easier to conduct in the abstract. It is more difficult to apply to actual offences, particularly when the offences are more serious in nature.

For example, sentencing alternatives for an offender’s tenth theft-under (shoplifting) present themselves more readily than where (as here) a homicide is under consideration. [ 27 ] However, while the importance of Gladue and Ipeelee cannot be gainsaid, neither should they be overemphasized. They do not create an entire new system of sentencing.

The Criminal Code , and the cases interpreting same, simply make it incumbent upon sentencing judges to give genuine and meaningful consideration to s. 718.2(e), just as judges must give genuine and meaningful consideration to the other sentencing principles set out in the Criminal Code and in case law. The type of crime and its effects on the victims remain to be properly considered as well.

Chief Justice Richards said this in Chanalquay at paras 42 and 43 : [42] Thus, while s. 718.2(e), as interpreted by Gladue and Ipeelee , mandates a particular kind of analysis when sentencing an Aboriginal offender, it does not create a wholly new sentencing paradigm. Sentencing judges must attempt to give meaningful effect to the remedial purpose of s. 718.2(

e) and must be highly alert to the ongoing problem represented by the troubling incarceration rates of Aboriginal people. But, the ultimate sentencing objective is clear: considering all of the relevant sentencing principles, including s. 718.2(e), what is a fit sentence for the offender given his or her circumstances, the nature of the crime, the situation of the victim, and the interests of the community? ( Gladue at para 75 .) [43] I note that this means a sentencing judge must attempt to understand not just the situation and background of the offender and the particulars of the crime in issue.

He or she must also, to the extent reasonably possible, attempt to understand the relevant dynamics of the community and the circumstances of the victim. After all, the victims of crimes committed by Aboriginal offenders are all too frequently other Aboriginals, often ones with precisely the same Gladue backgrounds as the offenders. They must not be overlooked.

In order to understand all of this, it may sometimes be necessary for a trial judge to demand more than is typically provided in this province by way of a pre-sentence report. [ 28 ] I have very carefully considered all these principles in light of the facts before me. IV. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors [ 29 ] As with most sentencing matters coming before this court, there are both aggravating and mitigating factors affecting this offender. In coming to an appropriate sentence, a sentencing judge must duly consider and assign weight to each such factor, in light of the overarching principles enunciated above.

MITIGATING FACTORS [ 30 ] There are some mitigating factors in this case. [ 31 ] Mr. Ratt is relatively young. He was 20 at the time of the offence and is 21 now. His youth, coupled with other factors, operates in mitigation.

[32] Mr. Ratt has pled guilty to manslaughter. While the Crown argued that the tender of this plea occurred relativelylate in the piece, the fact is Mr. Ratt has saved a trial from being conducted and has spared the witnesses the ordeal of testifying. Also, aplea of guilty is indicative of Mr. Ratt taking at least some responsibility for his actions. While Mr. Ratt did not intend to kill Mr.Bouchard, through his guilty plea he acknowledges he is responsible for that death. Notwithstanding the Crown’s position, I accept thisas a mitigating factor. [33] There is support within the community for Mr. Ratt.

On December 1, 2023 when sentencing submissions weremade the courtroom was packed. Attendees were divided fairly equally between those present for the victim and those present for theoffender. This, and other information provided by defence counsel (such as Exhibit D-1, the letter of support from Doris Goulet, Mr.Ratt’s grandmother) indicates Mr. Ratt has support within his community and family. [34] Mr. Ratt has no adult criminal record. This is mitigating but the effect is reduced somewhat through othercircumstances. Mr. Ratt has a fairly extensive record as a youth.

He was only 20 when he killed another person. He had not had muchtime to accumulate a significant adult record, although with this offence all of that has changed. Still, the lack of a related adult record isto some degree mitigating. [35] The most significant facts operating in mitigation are the Gladue factors applicable to Mr. Ratt. His are not themost serious factors I have seen but they do portray an early life characterized by instability, neglect, and even abuse. These areimportant factors to consider and I have treated them very seriously.

Given the conviction for manslaughter there can be no realisticalternatives to incarceration. However, there is some diminution in Mr. Ratt’s overall moral culpability. [36] I will first explain why I say these are not the most serious Gladue factors I have seen. While Mr. Ratt relies onhis father being a residential school survivor, the PSR (pre-sentence report) information obtained directly from his father indicates heonly attended that school for four days. At page 6 of the PSR Mr.

Ratt’s father indicates he had no bad experiences there and further isquoted as saying he “did not believe his experience at the residential school had impacted Kurt”. The PSR indicates Mr. Ratt reportshaving experienced family breakdown, sexual abuse, and racial abuse. I accept that as fact, and accept that at least some decrease in Mr.Ratt’s overall moral culpability results from these Gladue factors. I am not saying there was no effect. I find the effect of these factors isless than in many other cases. Gladue factors are nuanced. It is not an all-or-nothing proposition.

Each offender’s factors must beindividually assessed. There is neither a single nor a universal effect from Gladue. [37] I further note that Mr. Ratt appears to have voluntarily gravitated to associating with a negative set of peers,even to the point of locating himself geographically in places where he is involved with a bad element. To an extent he is a product of hisbackground but to a greater extent he is a product of his own choices, including a refusal to obtain help when it is offered. [38] The defence also argues remorse as a mitigating factor. I accept Mr.

Ratt has some remorse but the extent ofsame is difficult to determine. When asked if he had anything to say he expressed an apology but it was delivered in a flat manner. Theredid not appear to be much sincerity in it. Granted, every person will deliver that message differently and a courtroom is unfamiliarterritory for most people. Still, given the way in which Mr. Ratt presented his apology, and when that is compared to and contrasted withhis behaviour before, during and after the killing, remorse is not a strong mitigating factor in this case. [39] On balance, mitigation is relatively minimal in this case.

AGGRAVATING FACTORS [40] There are numerous and significant aggravating factors. [41] Notwithstanding Mr. Ratt’s young age and his Gladue factors, he is a highly culpable individual. Thesurrounding circumstances illustrate this. This was truly a senseless crime. No real explanation has ever been provided. Mr. Ratt’sshooting of Mr. Bouchard was not related to any danger or threat. He could have withdrawn from the situation. There was absolutely noneed for him to shoot anyone. The crime was stupid, senseless. Mr.

Ratt acted in a manner entirely unacceptable and as a result anotherperson lost his life. [42] I have referred to a decision cited by the Crown, R v Laberge, 1995 ABCA 196, 165 AR 375. The assessment ofmoral blameworthiness must occur within context. At paras. 7 to 10: [7] How should a court determine the moral blameworthiness of an offender for a crime? What makes one offender more or lessculpable than another for what he has done?

The first point is that, for sentencing purposes, one must make a clear distinction betweenfault in terms of an offender’s mens rea at the time of commission of an offence and fault in terms of the offender's overall moralblameworthiness for the crime. The two are not the same. Confusion sometimes arises because fault for conviction purposes generallyturns on the question of an offender’s mens rea.

This doctrinal aspect looms large in assessing criminal culpability because of the need toensure that the offender’s mental state meets the constitutionally required level of moral blameworthiness to convict him of the offence inquestion: R. v. Martineau (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633. [8] However, for sentencing purposes, a court is not limited to evaluating moral blameworthiness in terms of an offender’s mentalstate. Indeed, it would be quite wrong to engage in that kind of acontextual analysis. That is because the offender’s level of moralculpability will be influenced by other factors.

In the case of unlawful act manslaughter, the most important of these will be what theunlawful act itself involved.

The nature and quality of the unlawful act itself, the method by which it was committed and the manner inwhich it was committed in terms of the degree of planning and deliberation are all relevant to this inquiry. [9] Unlawful acts may be divided into three broad groups: those which are likely to put the victim at risk of, or cause, bodily injury;those which are likely to put the victim at risk of, or cause, serious bodily injury and those which are likely to put the victim at risk of, orcause, life-threatening injuries.

Only when the offender’s proven mental state at the time of commission of the offence is evaluated in thecontext of the crime itself, in other words in terms of its relative degree of seriousness, is it possible to classify for sentencing purposesthe degree of fault inherent in the crime committed.

[10] To complete the moral blameworthiness picture and to ensure that an offender is properly situated in terms of sentencing vis a visothers convicted of the same offence, the court must also have regard to those personal characteristics of the offender which wouldmitigate or aggravate culpability. [43] Mr. Ratt’s criminal record is also an aggravating factor, even though it is a youth record.

He has 19 convictions.These include crimes of violence (resisting arrest), property crimes (mischief, break and enter), firearms offences, five convictions forescaping lawful custody, and five offences of failing to comply with court-ordered conditions. All in all, the record evinces a disregardfor the rule of law and the authority which all Canadians must respect in order to live within a harmonious society. Thus far in his younglife Mr. Ratt has demonstrated a marked propensity to disregard and disrupt that harmony. [44] Flowing from the record, Mr.

Ratt was under two firearms prohibitions at the time of this offence. The first wasdated August 11, 2017 and the second June 20, 2019. That Mr. Ratt was carrying a concealed weapon while under two firearmsprohibition orders is a serious aggravating factor. [45] The Agreed Statement of Facts is imprecise in several regards. One was the exact nature of the firearm used. Bythat agreement, Mr. Ratt had the weapon (a .22 calibre bolt action firearm) on his person and was carrying it inside his pants and on hiship.

However the Agreed Statement of Facts does not specify whether this was a sawed-off gun, which would make it a prohibitedfirearm. During argument Crown counsel asserted it was, but the defence said that was not part of the Agreed Statement of Facts and theCrown would have to call evidence on point. The Crown had no evidence to call. Thus the precise nature of this gun remains unknown, afactor that could have been clarified with a more careful construction of the Agreed Statement of Facts. [46] The point is this. Using a firearm in the commission of this offence, on its own, is undoubtedly an aggravatingfactor.

Parliament has recognized this by imposing a minimum sentence for using a firearm to commit manslaughter. Using a prohibitedand modified firearm would have been even more aggravating. I cannot know this, so I must treat this generically as use of a firearm. Theuse of a firearm is an aggravating factor. It is aggravated further by Mr. Ratt’s two previous youth convictions for firearms possessionoffences, and by the fact that he was subject to orders prohibiting him from even possessing firearms of any kind. [47] The Pre-Sentence Report contains information with some aggravating factors. Mr.

Ratt has gang involvementalthough he asserts he has not been involved with a gang since 2019. There is no evidence to show gang involvement at the time of thisoffence thus I have not treated that as an aggravating factor. However, Mr. Ratt does acknowledge that most of his associations are withnegative peers with whom he abuses substances and commits crimes. The PSR illustrates how Mr. Ratt appears to have very little insightinto his behaviour, blaming the community of La Ronge and the associates he has there for his misdeeds instead of taking fullresponsibility for same.

This failure to accept full responsibility is an aggravating factor and increases his risk of reoffending. At page 6of the PSR: Kurt recognizes some of his risk-factors, specifically misuse of alcohol and substances, and having negative peers. However, Kurt doesnot appear to understand he must choose positive peers and avoid negative ones. He seems to believe his peers just happen to him. Ofconcern, is that when talking about the offence, he could not express anything he could have done differently, nor recognize he couldhave stopped his action at any time. This indicates an overall lack of insight.

Kurt blames the environment of La Ronge for his offendingand states most people are not able to live in La Ronge and maintain a positive lifestyle. Kurt fails to hold himself accountable for hisbehaviour. He thinks and talks about living a prosocial life, but he does not do what is necessary to change. [48] Further, the PSR’s risk assessment puts Mr. Ratt in the “high” category for reoffending. In fact he was at the 96th percentile for reoffending, meaning only 4% of Saskatchewan offenders were assessed as having more risk factors.

His risk factors(PSR, page 9) are: “antisocial behaviour pattern, self-management, attitude, substance misuse, peers, employment, and residencestability”. This militates in favour of his separation from society for a substantial period. As noted he has limited insight. The PSR states(page 8) that after his release from youth custody Mr. Ratt failed to follow through with community support referrals. He will not takeassistance even when offered. [49] The already high risk is exacerbated by the information that while on remand on this current indictment Mr.

Rattamassed convictions on eleven discipline charges which include fighting, threats, disruption, possession of contraband, beingintoxicated, and destruction of property. One might think that while awaiting trial or disposition on a very serious charge, Mr. Ratt mighthave been on his best behaviour. Instead he continued to act in an antisocial manner, without abatement. I wish to be totally clear that Iam not using these discipline offences, on their own, as an aggravating factor in sentencing Mr. Ratt.

Rather, I am using them as part ofthe package of information before me as to his lack of insight and continued antisocial attitude, so that his risk to reoffend may beadequately assessed. [50] Overall, Mr. Ratt’s poor and antisocial attitude and disposition amount to an aggravating factor. [51] This leads me to a discussion of another aggravating factor. The Agreed Statement of Facts refers topost-offence conduct. After Mr. Ratt shot Mr. Bouchard in his neck, Mr. Bouchard lived for a period. From what is before me I cannotconclude that his death was instantaneous.

Unquestionably, the gunshot wound is the proximate cause of death. However the evidencebefore me (as set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts) points to Mr. Bouchard possibly still being alive when Mr. Ratt and hiscompanion dragged him into the lake and weighed him down with sandbags. The pathologist noted the abrasions on the head suggestMr. Bouchard’s heart was still beating when dragged. This remains true even though the gunshot is what ultimately killed him. [52] Post-offence conduct is capable of being considered in sentencing. See, for example, R v Neudorf, 2004 BCCA374, 187 CCC (3d) 190.

It feeds into the risk analysis. Even conduct which is not itself a proven criminal offence can shed light on therisk of recidivism or the prospect of rehabilitation: R v Warner, (ON CA), [1946] OR 808 (Ont CA) at 814-815. Morerecently in R v Rose (1996), (ON CA), 134 DLR (4th) 628 (Ont CA) at 648 (upheld at (SCC), [1998]3 SCR 262) the court held that the trial judge “… placed appropriate emphasis on the acts of the appellant following the murder, whichdemonstrated a lack of remorse. The post-murder actions of the appellant were, in the trial judge’s view, deserving of special sanction.”

[53] Here, it is not entirely clear from the Agreed Statement of Facts whether putting Mr. Bouchard into the lake ispost-offence conduct or part of the overall manslaughter transaction. The offence was not complete the moment the shot was fired,because Mr. Bouchard lived for some time after. But even if it is post-offence conduct I may consider same as part of the factual matrixwithin which sentence is determined. I have done so, although I have not put a huge amount of weight on it. [54] I also note the victim impact statements from Mr. Bouchard’s twin brother, his sister and his mother.

In herstatement the deceased’s mother, Lisa McLeod, spoke simply but effectively of the trauma she has sustained as a result of the death ofher son. She aptly referred to her state of being as being “in a daze” due to the loss of her son. I have paid attention to these victim impactstatements as they are important. They help judges stay in touch with the community’s sentiments. They help us understand the profoundloss felt by families which lose a member due to crime. I want to assure Mr.

Bouchard’s mother, brother and sister, and the rest of hisfamily and friends who did not speak, that I have heard you. [55] Finally, this manslaughter case arose in the context of Mr. Ratt and another man being in the yard of a thirdparty. The reason they came onto that property is unclear but I am able to conclude that the other two men, including Mr. Bouchard,were minding their own business (repairing a vehicle) when Mr. Ratt and his companion came onto that property and got into anargument with the two occupants. This is not a home invasion case, but it is broadly similar. Perhaps if Mr.

Ratt and his companion hadbeen minding their own business and had not entered that yard, for whatever reason, this would not have happened and Mr. Bouchardwould be alive. A home invasion is clearly a significant aggravating factor in a manslaughter sentencing. I cannot conclude this was ahome invasion – it is much less serious than that – but it is a case where the accused was in a place he should not have been. Thesesurrounding circumstances do operate in further aggravation. V. Case Law and Positions [56] Both counsel filed briefs and cases for my consideration. I have reviewed them.

As well, they providedsubmissions as to which factors were the most important, and ultimately what the sentencing disposition should be. CROWN POSITION [57] The Crown’s position was there should be a prison sentence of 16 to 18 years, less remand credit. [58] The Crown relied on several authorities. First is R v Anderson, 2021 ABCA 135. The Crown asserted that wherea firearm is used in the commission of manslaughter the principle of parity in sentencing is secondary to the fundamental principle ofproportionality.

At paras. 35 and 36 the Alberta Court of Appeal noted: [35] The Crown rightly submits that where a firearm is used in the commission of manslaughter, the principle of parity in sentencingis secondary to the fundamental principle of proportionality; “the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and asimilar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise of academic abstraction”: Lacasse [2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 SCR 1089] at 54, citing Rv CAM, (SCC), 1996 1 SCR 500 at para 92, 105 CCC (3d) 327.

In our view, to adjust the sentence here would besubstitution, not principled appellate review: Wharry [2008 ABCA 293] at para 56. “The fact that a different judge may have imposed adifferent sentence is irrelevant. The sentences here could have been lower, or higher, but that is not the proper basis for appellateintervention”: R v Clark, 2021 ABCA 117 at para 17. [36] The sentence imposed was proportionate and fit: manslaughter is a serious crime when it involves the use of a firearm.

The rangeof available sentences is somewhat narrowed in this case by the mandatory minimum four year sentence when a firearm is used in thecommission of the offence: s 236(

a) of the Criminal Code. Even had we been persuaded the sentencing judge erred in describing theoffence as “near murder”, the Crown correctly notes that Laberge does not fix any particular sentence range for any of the categories ofmanslaughter. [59] The Crown also cited R v Keepness, 2010 SKCA 69, 255 CCC (3d) 457. The trial judge gave an 11.5 yearsentence for manslaughter. A Crown appeal succeeded and 15 years was substituted.

The “usual range” for manslaughter sentences atthat time (four to twelve years) was held not to be binding, and not to be a stricture. [60] The Crown relied on R v Pearson, 2002 NBQB 218 at para 25, to support the proposition that manslaughter issomething more than a pure accident but something less than murder, the difference coming from the nature of the intent rather than thenature of the act itself. [61] The Crown also placed significant reliance on R v Laberge, including the “objective intent scale” mode ofanalysis contained therein at para. 17.

In assessing blameworthiness Laberge sets out that judges must consider the nature of theunlawful act that is involved, the method by which it was committed and the manner in which it was committed (that is, the degree ofplanning and deliberation). [62] Crown counsel also filed eight cases as to the range of appropriate sentence, although she correctlyacknowledged the sentencing range for manslaughter is very wide. DEFENCE POSITION [63] In reviewing the sentencing principles established by the Criminal Code and the authorities, the defenceemphasized the concept of parity. Defence counsel also spoke to Mr.

Ratt’s background and urged a careful assessment of his moralblameworthiness. The Gladue factors outlined by defence counsel have been taken into account by me in arriving at a fit and propersentence. [64] Parity was noted by defence to be a guidepost and not a straightjacket: R v Bird, 2023 SKKB 54 at para 17.Section 718.2(

b) of the Criminal Code codifies the notion that an offender’s sentence ought to be similar to sentences pronounced onsimilar offenders who have committed similar offences. Bearing this in mind, defence counsel also submitted a number of cases for

suggesting a range of eight to twelve years. These cases are discussed below in conjunction with the Crown cases on the appropriate sentencing range. VI. Analysis [ 65 ] To reiterate, the Crown suggested a suitable sentence was in the range of sixteen to eighteen years, and the defence suggested a lower range at eight to twelve years. The crime of manslaughter encompasses a wide variety of circumstances. It is a big legal tent.

This was noted by Chief Justice Richards in R v W.M., 2021 SKCA 103 at para 75 : “It can be somewhat difficult to identify the appropriate sentence for a manslaughter offence because the underlying facts of the offence vary a great deal from case to case.” [ 66 ] I have reviewed and considered all the cases filed by counsel and have considered all their submissions, as well as the applicable legal principles noted above. I have also referred to other authorities not mentioned by counsel. [ 67 ] The Crown’s higher sentencing range rested on these cases: - R v Anderson , 2021 ABCA 135 .

Crown counsel termed this a very similar case as the case at bar. After a motor vehicle accident on a rural road an altercation broke out and the offender shot and killed the victim. He pled guilty to manslaughter at a relatively early juncture and expressed sincere remorse. He had a significant adult record including related offences. The Crown sought sixteen to eighteen years and the defence eight to ten. The trial judge set the sentence at sixteen years and was upheld on appeal. This was a “near murder” case and the offender was highly culpable. - R v Keepness , 2010 SKCA 69 , 255 CCC (3d) 457 .

This was a home invasion case where four gang members (including the accused) broke into a home and conducted a serious assault on the occupants. The original sentence was eleven and one-half years but it was varied on appeal to fifteen years. This was a case justifying a departure from the accepted range of four to twelve years and it is important to note that “exceptional” circumstances are not required to depart from that range. - R v Landry , 2016 NSCA 53 , 338 CCC (3d) 162 . The victim was stealing from the offender’s lobster traps so was shot by the accused. The accused dumped the body at sea.

This was also classed as a “near murder”. The sentence was fourteen years which was affirmed on appeal. - R v Morrison , 2022 SKQB 194 . Two accused were involved in another man’s death. There was a home invasion resulting in the victim being kidnapped, taken outside the city, then shot and killed. Morrison was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life. An accomplice, Mr. Veilleux, was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter and was sentenced by Chief Justice Popescul to eighteen years. - R v Mendez , 2019 ONSC 4533 . Two men shot and killed a victim near his home.

One accused (Mendez) was found guilty of manslaughter and was sentenced to fifteen years. The jury rejected self-defence. The victim was somewhat culpable insofar as he was the first to produce the firearm, which got taken away and used against him. The Crown had sought sixteen years; the defence, eight to nine. The offender had a significant prior record but was young (under nineteen) when he committed the offence. He had done well on an extended period of remand and had furthered his education. - R v Larose , 2023 SKKB 24 .

Having just been released from a term of incarceration, the offender embarked upon a mission of “vengeance” on a man who had been rude to the offender’s wife. He took along a knife and bear spray. During a fight at the victim’s home the offender stabbed and killed him. He was sentenced to fifteen years for manslaughter, also by Chief Justice Popescul. The Crown had sought sixteen years, the defence eight. He had significant Gladue factors. A PSR assessed his risk to re-offend as high, in the 98 th percentile.

Notably, at para. 72 of his decision the Chief Justice reviewed a number of cases justifying sentences in the range of what has been sought by the Crown herein. - R v Wharry , 2008 ABCA 293 , 234 CCC (3d) 338 . A dispute arose between a motorist (the offender) and some people on the street. As he drove off the offender shot a gun in the general direction of the group, in order to scare them. In fact he killed a person. He was sentenced to twelve years. The circumstances were different than Mr. Ratt’s and there was less culpability.

This authority is somewhat dated in light of the evolution of the law of manslaughter. - R v Seruhungo, 2012 ABCA 54 , 522 AR 346 . A household dispute erupted and the offender returned to the scene with a firearm to threaten the other people. He fired into the floor and inadvertently killed someone in the level below him. Again, his culpability was less than Mr. Ratt’s. He was sentenced to twelve years. [ 68 ] In support of the lower range the defence asked me to consider the following authorities: - R v Fiddler , 2018 SKQB 197 . A manslaughter verdict was returned after a trial.

The accused shot a cousin in the head, killing him. The accused was intoxicated and there was no readily discernable reason for the shooting. No remorse was displayed. The accused had a long and serious prior criminal record but Gladue operated in mitigation. The sentence was ten years. - R v Cyr , 2023 SKKB 149 . A jury returned a manslaughter verdict after a trial on second-degree murder. The sentence was fourteen years. This was something of a drive-by shooting. The offender had a significant youth and adult record. What is not noted in the defence brief is that fact that Mr.

Cyr was himself the victim of a shooting wherein he received serious facial injuries, including the loss of his nose. - R v Yates , 2021 SKQB 247 . This was a twelve-year sentence for a manslaughter verdict rendered after a trial. Like Mr. Ratt, this offender was young (22) at the date of the offence with some prior record. Drugs played a significant role in this matter, as did Gladue factors. Somewhat distinct from the case at bar, in Yates the offender had good insight into his plight and had taken steps to address his issues, notably his addictions. He pursued further education and he held down employment.

The sentencing judge accepted that the offender offered genuine and sincere remorse. In short, the mitigating factors in Yates outweigh those present for Mr. Ratt.

- R v Gilpin , 2022 BCSC 658 . Again, this was a manslaughter verdict reached after a murder trial. The accused shot his stepfather in the head and killed him. The accused was young (23), had significant Gladue factors, no criminal record at the time of the killing, and had offered a plea to manslaughter before trial. The sentence was six and one-half years but would have been nine but for the mitigating circumstances. I recognize that this is a decision from a different province and different sentencing norms may apply. - R v Smith , 2018 BCSC 2344 . There, the sentence was seven and one-half years after trial.

While the attack leading to the victim’s death was savage, the offender had taken steps to address the causes of his offending and had successfully completed programming while on remand. As well, his criminal record was “very dated”. The Crown sought a sentence of six to thirteen years. - R v Janvier , 2020 SKPC 12 . This was a guilty plea before trial but after preliminary inquiry, which led to a sentence of nine years. The accused had fired an intended warning shot but it struck the victim in the neck and killed him. The Crown was seeking ten years, the defence six to seven.

The sentence was seven years. the accused was relatively young, had Gladue factors, had a limited criminal record, accepted responsibility from the outset, and was truly remorseful. A PSR rated his rehabilitation prospects as good. - R v Walker, 2011 SKQB 273 , 380 Sask R 227 . While this case is now somewhat dated, the accused shot and killed his daughter’s boyfriend as he had mired the daughter in a drug lifestyle. He was convicted after a jury trial. He had no criminal record. He had been a good citizen. He was remorseful. He was sentenced to eight years.

The Crown had sought eleven years, the defence a total of six and one-half due to his considerable remand credit. The sentence was eight years less remand. This case is getting a bit dated in terms of its usefulness in establishing a sentencing range. - R v Bird , 2023 SKKB 54 . This was a seven and one-half year sentence. The sentencing judge specifically found this was not a “near murder” but was more than a pure accident, as the accused had claimed. The Crown had sought twelve years, the defence sought time served which amounted to six years, nine months.

There, the offender had a troubled past with significant Gladue factors. Since the offence she left the gang life, furthered her education and took programming. It was clear there was genuine remorse. She had a lot of family support. - R v Ward , 2023 NLSC 15 . After a jury trial on murder a manslaughter verdict was returned. The sentence was five and one-half years. As in Walker the deceased was a drug dealer and was shot by the accused. The precise facts surrounding the killing were somewhat uncertain. The PSR was quite favourable to the offender. He had no prior record. He was a good prisoner on remand.

His prospects were described as good as long as he could avoid substance abuse. He was classed as a “very low risk” to reoffend. He had formed a stable domestic relationship. He took programming while on remand. The circumstances of Ward are clearly distinct from the case at bar. - R v Panipakoocho, 2022 NUCJ 43 . This is another case where a manslaughter conviction came out of a murder trial. A plea to manslaughter was offered earlier. The sentence was nine years, three months. The offender shot the victim in the leg and the victim bled out.

There were mitigating factors such as the youth of the offender, deep and genuine remorse, and Gladue factors. The offender had a criminal record as an adult. [ 69 ] I am satisfied that denunciation and deterrence are central to my consideration of arriving at a sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of this offence and to Mr. Ratt’s culpability. This was a very serious crime involving the death of another human being. Mr. Ratt has pled guilty to manslaughter. He has admitted to all the elements of that offence.

He has acknowledged his responsibility for the death of another human, although I have some doubts as to the depth and sincerity of his remorse. [ 70 ] Another significant factor is the characterization of this crime. The defence argues it is closer to an accident than to murder; the Crown says this was a “near murder”. I agree with the Crown. This was close to murder. There is nothing before me to explain, much less justify, the reason for this killing. Mr. Ratt had no business being in that yard. There was no need to possess, then brandish, a firearm. There was no reason to shoot.

There was certainly no reason to carry the dead or dying man into the lake and weigh him down with sandbags. This is closer to murder than anything else. [ 71 ] Mr. Ratt is unable to minimize his acts in causing Mr. Bouchard’s death. Mr. Bouchard is dead, lost to the world and lost to his family and friends forever. For what? For nothing. I assess Mr. Ratt as a highly culpable individual. I have absolutely no hesitation in reaching that conclusion, based upon all the evidence before me. [ 72 ] I have carefully reviewed the cases submitted by the defence. Mr. Carter did his best for Mr.

Ratt, and made cogent and thoughtful submissions on his behalf. But the facts cannot be changed. Mr. Ratt is highly culpable. The traits evinced by his prior criminal record and through the PSR cause concern. [ 73 ] In my respectful view the cases bearing the most similarity to the facts and circumstances of the case at bar are Larose, Morrison, Keepness, Anderson and Landry. All of those cases involved serious crimes, deaths that were near murders. I must give primary consideration to those cases, in particular those from this province.

Ironically, when the principle of parity so strongly espoused by the defence is employed by me, it also militates in favour of a sentence for Mr. Ratt that is closer to what the Crown seeks than the incarceration sought by the defence. [ 74 ] In R v Laberge , a form of analysis was set out when sentencing judges are considering unlawful act manslaughter. The court must first consider the nature of the unlawful act and the accused’s state of mind at the time the unlawful act was committed.

Next, the personal characteristics and circumstances of the offender are to be reviewed to determine whether culpability is aggravated or mitigated. In considering a manslaughter scenario Laberge considered the degree of risk to the deceased that was engendered by the unlawful act, and set up three categories to consider: - Acts which are likely to put the victim at risk of, or cause, bodily injury; - Acts which are likely to put the victim at risk of, or cause, serious bodily injury; and - Acts which are likely to put the victim at risk of, or cause, life threatening injuries.

[ 75 ] Both in LaBerge and in R v Shorting , 2009 SKCA 102 , 337 Sask R 134 , the objective and subjective mens rea of the offender were considered when determining where on this spectrum of risk analysis the offender should be placed.

In Shorting Justice Lane noted at para. 17: [17] The court noted the offender’s subjective mens rea (whether she knew the act was likely to cause one of the types of injuries based on acceptable inferences) as well as objective mens rea (whether she ought to have known based on the standard of a reasonable person) are both relevant to placing her degree of moral culpability on this spectrum. The court should assess each of the above categories on a subjective and objective basis.

In the objective analysis, the court should identify whether the act was likely to cause the severity of the injury at issue or simply a risk of that degree of injury. Therefore, there are many different combinations of subjective and objective culpability which are possible. The court also stated an impulsive act did not necessarily indicate a lower degree of subjective or objective mens rea. [Emphasis in original] [ 76 ] In the case at bar, I simply cannot fathom how Mr. Ratt could not have known (or certainly should have known) that carrying a firearm, pulling it, aiming it at Mr.

Bouchard and squeezing the trigger, and shooting him in the neck would present a serious danger to Mr. Bouchard. It is unimaginable. Any reasonable person would see how shooting another person in the neck would cause a risk of serious or mortal harm. Objectively, any reasonably informed onlooker would conclude this was a very dangerous thing for Mr. Ratt to do. [ 77 ] In addition to the cases cited by counsel I have examined other authorities.

One in particular stood out to me. [ 78 ] In R v Stonechild , 2017 SKQB 138 , Justice Elson noted this analysis had found favour in Saskatchewan (paras. 43, 44) in sentencing an offender charged with murder but found guilty of manslaughter by a jury. There the offender and the victim (male, 84) were known to each other and both had been drinking heavily. The victim was stabbed fourteen times with a knife and two with a screwdriver. Significant Gladue factors pertained to the offender. A Pre-Sentence Report rated risk of recidivism at 80%.

A sentence of 15 years was levied in circumstances appearing to be comprised of impulsive violence. [ 79 ] I considered the modern parity principle in significant detail in R v Sand , 2019 SKQB 123 . I incorporate and adopt those comments here. VII. The Appropriate Sentence in this Case [ 80 ] The Crown suggested sixteen to eighteen years. Respectfully, I am not quite there. Some aspects of culpability have been overemphasized by the Crown and some mitigating factors have been underemphasized. However the defence position seriously understates the degree of Mr. Ratt’s culpability.

A sentence of eight to twelve years would not meet the principles of sentencing set out in the Criminal Code and in the case authorities. Proportionality, denunciation and deterrence, and parity all call for a stronger sanction regarding Mr. Ratt. [ 81 ] I have determined that a sentence of fifteen years is appropriate. I have looked at all the Criminal Code factors and have examined case authorities submitted by counsel as well as other cases. I have specifically considered the Gladue factors Mr. Ratt recounted and took those Gladue issues into account in determining his culpability and the appropriate sentence.

My lodestar, however, has been proportionality. [ 82 ] Mr. Ratt presents to me as highly culpable. His involvement in criminality, his specific conduct within the context of this crime, and his general conduct are all aggravating factors. The need for denunciation and deterrence in cases such as this ranks high within my consideration of apposite sentencing factors. [ 83 ] I have exercised care in assessing and balancing the competing mitigating and aggravating factors pertaining to Mr. Ratt, and to carefully compare the facts pertaining to Mr.

Ratt to those pertaining to the offenders described in the case authorities. No two cases are identical. But unquestionably his level of culpability lies at the higher end, even taking his mitigating factors into account. [ 84 ] Regarding Mr. Ratt’s remand credit, counsel have agreed that Mr. Ratt spent 564 days in pre-trial detention (May 17, 2022 to December 1, 2023).

At 1.5 times that amount, the enhanced remand credit to apply is agreed to be 846 days. [ 85 ] The aggregate custodial sentence is hereby set at fifteen years (calculated as 5,475 days), less remand credit of 846 days leaving a net sentence going forward of 4,629 days. [ 86 ] Further, I make an order pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code prohibiting Mr.

Ratt from possessing any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm and any cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance for life; and any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life. [ 87 ] Pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code I make an order in Form 5.03 authorizing the taking of the number of samples of bodily substances from Mr.

Ratt that are reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis and retention in the DNA information databank. [ 88 ] Any victim impact surcharge is hereby waived in light of Mr. Ratt’s financial and personal circumstances. [ 89 ] My thanks to counsel for their assistance in this matter. “R.W. Danyliuk” J. R.W. DANYLIUK