TIMOTHY PHILIP KOROL Plaintiff - v. -, 2023 SKKB 64

KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 64 Date: 2023 03 23 Docket: KBG-SA-01072-2022 Judicial Centre: Saskatoon ______________________________________________________________________________ BETWEEN: TIMOTHY PHILIP KOROL Plaintiff - and - RICHARDSON INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, RICHARDSON INTERNATIONAL (SASKATCHEWAN) LIMITED, and RICHARDSON PIONEER LIMITED Defendants and (consolidated actions) Docket: KBG-SA-01076-2022 Judicial Centre: Saskatoon ______________________________________________________________________________ BETWEEN: RICHARDSON PIONEER LIMITED Plaintiff - and - TIMOTHY KOROL Defendant Counsel: Glenn A.

Wright for the applicant, Timothy Philip Korol Tristan N. Culham for the respondents, Richardson International Limited, Richardson International (Saskatchewan) Limited, and Richardson Pioneer Limited ___________________________________________________________________________ FIAT ROTHERY J.

March 23, 2023 ___________________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Counsel for the applicant, Timothy Philip Korol [Korol], applies for an order transferring these two consolidated actions from the Court of King’s Bench to the Small Claims Court constituted pursuant to The Small Claims Act, 2016 , SS 2016, c S-50.12 [ Act ].

Counsel submits that the inherent jurisdiction of this court grants authority to transfer these actions to the Small Claims Court over the objection of the other parties, Richardson International Limited, Richardson International (Saskatchewan) Limited and Richardson Pioneer Limited, collectively [Richardson]. [ 2 ] Counsel for Korol relies on Rule 1-4(3) of The Queen’s Bench Rules , which states that: General authority of the Court to provide remedies 1-4

(3) Nothing in these rules prevents or is to be interpreted as preventing the Court, as a superior court, from exercising its inherent jurisdiction.

[ 3 ] Counsel for Korol also relies on Rules 1-3(1), 1-3(2)(b), 1-3(2)(c), 1-3(3)(

a) and 1-3(4), which state that the purpose of the Rules are to provide a means by which claims can be justly resolved in or by a court process in a timely and cost-effective manner. Background [ 4 ] The background of the litigation between Korol and Richardson is important to provide context for this application. Richardson Pioneer Limited issued a statement of claim against Korol on June 23, 2022, claiming breach of contract based on non-delivery of barley, pursuant to a contract for Korol to produce and deliver 100 metric tonnes of barley to Richardson Pioneer Limited.

It also sued, in the alternative, that Korol misrepresented to it that he would deliver the barley. It claims judgment against Korol for $15,952.56, plus interest and costs. Korol was served with this statement of claim on June 30, 2022. [ 5 ] On August 26, 2022, counsel for Korol filed a statement of defence to this action, seeking an order that the claim of Richardson Pioneer Limited be dismissed and the contract be rendered void and unenforceable.

In the alternative, counsel for Korol states that damages for the default should be fixed at $2,900.00. [ 6 ] At the same time, counsel for Korol filed a counterclaim in this action, claiming damages against Richardson Pioneer Limited for the increased cost of replacement of canola seed and chemical supplies from another source due to Richardson Pioneer Limited refusing to supply them to Korol. [ 7 ] Counsel for Richardson Pioneer Limited filed a statement of defence to Korol’s counterclaim on October 4, 2022, denying any damages suffered by Korol because access to its website or online portal does not constitute a binding contract between the parties. [ 8 ] Meanwhile, in Small Claims Court, Korol personally filed a claim against Richardson on June 23, 2022, seeking an order that he only owes Richardson $4,400 for not supplying the barley.

Korol also sought damages of $5,000.00 for the increased cost of purchasing replacement canola seed and chemical supplies because Richardson refused to supply them. [ 9 ] The Provincial Court issued a summons pursuant to that claim on June 29, 2022, for Richardson to appear before a Provincial Court judge on September 7, 2022, at 11:00 a.m. to answer to Korol’s claim under the Act . [ 10 ] On its own motion, a judge of the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan set a date prior to September 7, 2022, for submissions by the parties as to whether some or all of the Small Claims actions should be transferred to the Court of Queen’s Bench.

Kovatch P.C.J. heard the motion on August 23, 2022, and the learned judge made the following order: Counsel for the Plaintiff in the above matter sought confirmation from the Court that his client could proceed with a small claim in Provincial Court notwithstanding an overlap action in the Court of Queen’s Bench. On the Court’s own motion, a hearing was held before Judge D. Kovatch in Regina Provincial Court at 1:00 p.m. on August 23, 2022 to hear argument as to whether some or all the Small Claim’s action should be transferred to Court of Queen’s Bench.

After hearing argument from both Parties the Court finds the most expeditious resolution and the only manner in which to resolve bifurcation of the matters is to transfer the entire matter to the Court of Queen’s Bench for determination. 1) It is therefore ordered that this action be transferred to Court of Queen’s Bench to be brought together with Richardson Pioneer Limited’s claim there. 2) It is further ordered that any costs applicable to today’s date will be costs in the cause and dealt with by the Judge hearing the matter in Court of Queen’s Bench. [ 11 ] Korol did not appeal that order. [ 12 ] At the request of counsel for Korol, the action transferred from Small Claims Court along with the action commenced by Richardson Pioneer Limited in the Judicial Centre of Regina have been transferred to the Judicial Centre of Saskatoon. [ 13 ] In November 2022, counsel for Richardson applied on a without notice basis to have the two files consolidated in accordance with Rule 3-81.

A draft consent order endorsed by counsel for Korol was filed in the application, and the consolidation order was granted November 15, 2022. This style of cause reflects the consolidation order. The Issue [ 14 ] Counsel for Korol seeks an order of this Court to transfer this consolidated file back to Small Claims Court. Counsel states that the monetary limit is within the jurisdiction of Small Claims Court, and Korol wishes to represent himself. Counsel submits that the process in Small Claims Court is less complicated, and Korol should be entitled to an expeditious hearing.

The concept of access to justice and the Court’s own foundational rules as stated in Rule 1-3 support granting such an order. [ 15 ] Counsel for Richardson objects to this application for the Court to transfer the consolidated file to Small Claims Court. Counsel submits that Korol ought to have appealed the order of Kovatch P.C.J. granted on August 23, 2022. Counsel further submits that Korol is barred from relitigating the issue of the proper forum on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata , particularly, issue estoppel.

See: British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Figliola , 2011 SCC 52 at para 27 , [2011] 3 SCR 422 . [ 16 ] The preliminary question is whether Korol is required to attend mediation in accordance with s. 42 of The Queen’s Bench Act, 1998 , SS 1998, c Q-1.01 [ QB Act ], prior to making this application to transfer the consolidated actions to Small Claims Court. If an order is necessary under s. 42 of the QB Act , I hereby order that any requirement to attend mediation is postponed until this jurisdictional question is answered.

[17] The Act addresses the transfer of actions to and from the Court of King’s Bench, as stated in ss. 14 and 15.Section 14(1) states: 14(1) An action in the Court of Queen’s Bench may be transferred to the court by the local registrar with the consent of all parties filedwith the Court of Queen’s Bench before the trial begins, if this Act applies to that claim. [Emphasis added] [18] Counsel for Korol argues that if the consent of all parties to the action is required to permit this Court to transferthe action to Small Claims Court, such an

interpretation of s. 14 of the Act undermines the full power and authority of this Court as setout in s. 9(1) of the QB Act, which states: 9(1) The court has original jurisdiction throughout Saskatchewan, with full power and authority to consider, hear, try and determineactions and matters. [19] Ontario, which has similar legislation as set out in s. 23 of the Court of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, provideslimited power to local registrars where all parties to the action consent to the transfer.

However, as explained in Shoppers Trust Co. vMann Taxi Management Ltd. (1993), (ON SC), 16 OR (3d) 192 (Ont Ct J), the legislation does not restrict the powersof the Supreme Court of Ontario, its superior court. [20] MacDonald J. stated at pages 195-196: This court’s jurisdiction as a superior court of record having “all the jurisdiction, power and authority historically exercised by courtsof common law and equity” including this court’s predecessor, the branch of the Supreme Court of Ontario known as the High Court ofJustice for Ontario, was determined conclusively by the Supreme Court of Canada in Glover v.

Minister of National Revenue, (ON CA), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 561, 130 D.L.R. (3d) 383n. Laskin C.J.C., speaking on behalf of the full court, approved at p.562 S.C.R., p. 384 D.L.R. what was said by MacKinnon A.C.J.O. on behalf of the Court of Appeal, as reported (1980), (ON CA), 29 O.R. (2d) 392 at p. 399 sub nom. Glover v. Glover (No. 1), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at p. 168: In dealing with the general jurisdiction of the Court, a term which includes inherent jurisdiction, Brooke J.A. in 80 Wellesley StreetEast Ltd. v.

Fundy Bay Builders Ltd. et al., (ON CA), [1972] 2 O.R. 280 at p. 282, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 386 at p. 388, said: As a superior Court of general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Ontario has all of the powers that are necessary to do justice betweenthe parties. Except where provided specifically to the contrary, the Court's jurisdiction is unlimited and unrestricted in substantive law incivil matters. In 80 Wellesley Street East Ltd. v. Fundy Bay Builders Ltd., (ON CA), [1972] 2 O.R. 280, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 386, theCourt of Appeal also cited with approval the following extract from Stark J.’s judgment in Michie Estate v.

Toronto (City), (ON SC), [1968] 1 O.R. 266 at pp. 268-69, 66 D.L.R. (2d) 213 (H.C.J.): It appears clear that the Supreme Court of Ontario has broad universal jurisdiction over all matters of substantive law unless theLegislature divests from this universal jurisdiction by legislation in unequivocal terms. The rule of law relating to the jurisdiction ofsuperior Courts was laid down at least as early as 1667 in the case of Peacock v. Bell and Kendall (1667) 1 Wms. Saund. 73 at p. 74, 85E.R. 84: ...

And the rule for jurisdiction is, that nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a Superior Court, but that whichspecifically appears to be so; and, on the contrary, nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an Inferior Court but thatwhich is so expressly alleged.

The legislature’s intention in enacting s. 23(2) of the Courts of Justice Act was to provide a limited transfer power to registrars.Reading both ss. 11 and 23 together, I conclude that the legislature did not intend to derogate from the general jurisdiction and power of ajudge of this court to control the processes of this court…. Also see: Ali v Schrauwen, 2011 ONSC 2158, 18 CPC (7th) 425. [21] The argument by counsel for Richardson that this application is res judicata has no merit.

The issue is whetherthis Court ought to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to transfer the consolidated actions to Small Claims Court. That has not been litigatedprior. Even the learned Provincial Court judge recognized and pointed out in his decision that resulted in the order transferring the file tothis Court that Korol was entitled to seek this remedy from the Court of Queen’s Bench (as it then was). I must conclude that thisapplication is properly before me. [22] The foundational rules as set out in Rule 1-3 are not determinative of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

Theyonly articulate the purpose of The Queen’s Bench Rules. Rule 1-2(1) clarifies that the Rules govern the “practice and procedure” in theCourt of King’s Bench. [23] As a starting point in my analysis, it is important to review what the inherent jurisdiction of the superior court is.That has been clearly articulated in Halstead v Anderson (1993), (SK KB), 115 Sask R 257 (Sask QB), whereBaynton J. stated the following at paragraphs 21 to 24: [21] There is no question that a superior court has the inherent jurisdiction to control its own process. But the scope of suchjurisdiction is not clearly defined.

Even in instances in which the court does have inherent jurisdiction to grant relief, a judge mustjudicially exercise his or her discretion as to whether or not such relief should be granted in that specific instance. [22] The historical origin and basis of the inherent jurisdiction of a superior court, and an analysis of its various facets, is set out in awell researched treatise by I.H. Jacob entitled The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, (1970), 23 Current Legal Problems, 23. This articlewas commented on and adopted as a correct statement of the law by Stanley A.

Cohen: Due Process of Law, (Carswell’s Criminal Law

Series), in particular at p. 343. It is also relied on as an authority by Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th) vol. 37, para. 14 at 22-23. Recentcases have as well adopted and favourably commented on the Jacob treatise. McCuaig v. Halverson and Moen (unreported September29, 1993, Q.B. 4482/87 Saskatoon, Osborn, J.), Montreal Trust Co. et al. v. Churchill Forest Industries (Man.) Ltd. et al., (MB CA), [1971] 4 W.W.R. 542 at 547, (Man.

C.A.). [23] Jacob discusses the juridical basis of inherent jurisdiction at p. 27: “... the essential character of a superior court of law necessarily involves that it should be invested with a power to maintain its authorityand to prevent its process being obstructed and abused. Such a power is intrinsic in a superior court; it is its very life-blood, its veryessence, its immanent attribute. Without such a power, the court would have form but would lack substance. The jurisdiction which isinherent in a superior court of law is that which enables it to fulfil itself as a court of law.

The juridical basis of this jurisdiction istherefore the authority of the judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice according to law ina regular, orderly and effective manner.” At p. 24 he clarifies the nature of inherent jurisdiction: “Moreover, the term ‘inherent jurisdiction of the court’ is not used in contradistinction to the jurisdiction conferred on the court bystatute.

The contrast is not between the common law jurisdiction of the court on the one hand and its statutory jurisdiction on the other,for the court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction even in respect of matters which are regulated by statute or by rule of court, so long asit can do so without contravening any statutory provision. ...” At p. 25 he distinguishes between the concept of inherent jurisdiction and the exercise of judicial discretion: “The inherent jurisdiction of the court is a concept which must be distinguished from the exercise of judicial discretion.

These twoconcepts resemble each other, particularly in their operation, and they often appear to overlay, and are therefore sometimes confused theone with the other.

There is nevertheless a vital juridical distinction between jurisdiction and discretion, which must always beobserved.” [24] The conclusion reached by Jacob at pp. 51-52, entitled “A Virile and Viable Doctrine” bears repeating: “It will be seen therefore that the inherent jurisdiction of the court exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction, apart fromstatute or Rules of Court. . . . . . “In this light, the inherent jurisdiction of the court may be defined as being the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers,which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of thedue process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them. . . . . . “It may be objected that this view of the nature of the inherent jurisdiction of the court postulates the existence of an amplitude ofamorphous powers, which may be arbitrary in operation and which are without limit in extent.

The answer is that a jurisdiction of thiskind and character is a necessary part of the armoury of the courts to enable them to administer justice according to law.

The inherentjurisdiction of the court is a virile and viable doctrine which in the very nature of things is bound to be claimed by the superior courts oflaw as an indispensable adjunct to all their other powers, and free from the restraints of their jurisdiction in contempt and the Rules ofCourt, it operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the court to prevent any clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice.”[Emphasis added] [24] Having concluded that I have the authority to do so, the vexing question is whether I should exercise thatdiscretion in these circumstances in ordering the transfer of the consolidated actions to Small Claims Court. [25] Certainly, the trial process at Small Claims Court is less cumbersome than at the Court of King’s Bench.

Onecan appreciate Korol’s preference for this expeditious procedure. Korol wants to represent himself, but that can be achieved in eithercourt. However, there are other factors to consider. [26] Richardson Pioneer Limited claims costs against Korol on a solicitor-client basis for the alleged breach ofcontract. Richardson Pioneer Limited would be barred from this remedy in Small Claims Court because s. 36 of the Act precludes it.

See:Rajbar v Baltic Properties and Developments Incorporated, 2014 SKQB 128 at para 24. [27] More importantly, Korol himself requires the benefit of the comprehensive disclosure and discovery processprovided by the Rules to mount his counterclaim against Richardson. At paragraphs 4 and 5 of the counterclaim, Korol states: 4. On December 14, 2021, Mr. Korol notified Pioneer’s agent, Kirk McCutcheon, that he would be seeking a legal remedy for theBarley Contract default (the subject contract of the Pioneer Claim pertaining to this action).

Kirk McCutcheon, Director of Operations forRichardson Pioneer Saskatoon, advised Mr. Korol that Pioneer would “escalate the situation on our end.” Shortly thereafter, the [sic] Mr.Korol’s access to the Pioneer web site was cut off. Mr. Korol no longer had access to the only source of electronic information regardingthe purchase of the canola seed, chemical and Production Contract. Mr. Korol does not have hard copies of the canola ProductionContract or the canola seed and chemical supply contract. 5.

On December 21, 2021, Kirk McCutcheon advised the Plaintiff that the Defendant would not provide a hard copy of the canolaproduction, nor the canola seed and chemical contract and that the [sic] Pioneer would be putting Mr. Korol’s Product Contract andseed/chemical supply order on hold.

[ 28 ] It is clear that Korol must have disclosure of Richardson’s documents to prove his allegations. Therefore, the best way to ensure “justice between the parties” and “to secure a fair trial between them” is to dismiss Korol’s application to transfer the consolidated files to Small Claims Court. These actions are better suited for the Court of King’s Bench and will continue in this Court. [ 29 ] This is a matter that required a considered decision by this Court. Accordingly, there will be no order as to costs. “A.R. Rothery” J. A.R. ROTHERY