2013 FC, 2013 FC 1096
Opinion
Date: 20131025 Docket: DES-7-08 Citation: 2013 FC 1096 Ottawa , Ontario , October 25, 2013 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Blanchard BETWEEN: IN THE MATTER OF A CERTIFICATE SIGNED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION 77(1) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT ( IRPA ); AND IN THE MATTER OF THE REFERRAL OF A CERTIFICATE TO THE FEDERAL COURT PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION 77(1) OF THE IRPA; AND IN THE MATTER OF MOHAMED ZEKI MAHJOUB REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER [ 1 ] Mr.
Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub is the named person in security certificate proceedings initiated pursuant to subsection 77(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , S.C. 2001, c. 27 [ IRPA ]. In the course of these proceedings, the Ministers have adduced evidence in support of their case that was obtained or derived from several warrants issued under
section 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 [ CSIS Act ]. These reasons dispose of a motion brought by Mr. Mahjoub to exclude this evidence. Relief Sought [ 2 ] In his “RE-MODIFIED NOTICE OF MOTION,” Mr. Mahjoub sets out his request for relief as follows: a. An order quashing the warrants issued under sections 21 , 22 or 23 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (or CSIS Act ) ; b. An order excluding all evidence and information obtained from the warrants pursuant to subsections 24(1) and (2) of the Charter;
c. An order excluding all evidence and information obtained illegally, and/or in violation of sections 7 and 8 of the Charter andin the course of procedures declared unconstitutional (Charkaoui v. Canada, 2007 SCC 9 , [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350) pursuant tosubsections 24(1) and/or (2) of the Charter and d. A declaration as to the violation of the applicant’s rights as protected under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter; e. An order reserving the applicant his right to seek a permanent stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter forthe Charter violations suffered; f. Any other remedy that the Court find [sic] just and appropriate; g. A declaration that the part of
section 2 defining a “threat to the security of Canada” with sections 12 and 21 - 24 of the CSISAct are unconstitutional and with [sic] no force or effect, as per
section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, in that these sectionsunjustifiably violate sections 2, 7, 8 of the Charter; Mr. Mahjoub seeks this relief pursuant to paragraph 399(1)(
a) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 and
section 18 of the FederalCourts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7. Facts [3] Prior to the issuance of the first security certificate in June 2000 under subsection 77(1) of the IRPA naming Mr. Mahjoub, theCanadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS or the Service) applied to a designated judge of the Federal Court of Canada pursuant tosection 21 of the CSIS Act for warrants allowing for the interception of some of Mr. Mahjoub’s communications. One or more of thesewarrants was in operation after Mr. Mahjoub’s arrest on June 26, 2000.
Disclosure of the specifics of the warrants obtained by theService during its investigation of Mr. Mahjoub would, in my opinion, be injurious to national security or the safety of persons. Anoverview of the warrants is therefore found in the “Facts”
section of the Confidential Annex. [4] When the Ministers signed the second security certificate on February 22, 2008, certifying that Mr. Mahjoub is inadmissible toCanada on the grounds of national security, the Security Intelligence Report (SIR) on which they relied contained information obtainedas a result of the
section 21 warrants. That information is contained at the following paragraphs in the SIR: (
a) Paragraph 6: In July 1999, MAHJOUB’s Canadian wife, Mona El-Fouli, was convinced that MAHJOUB would only staymarried to her until such time as he received his citizenship papers. This is an intercepted communication: see Revised Summaries ofConversations and Surveillance Reports, April 6, 2010, Tab 7. (
b) Paragraph 6: In addition, on the day of MAHJOUB’s arrest (June 26, 2000) El Fouli stated that she had decided to marryMAHJOUB because “all she knew that he was a ‘mujahed’ (holy fighter) and her marriage to MAHJOUB would bring her, and her son(Hani), closer to God”. This is an intercepted communication: see Revised Summaries of Conversations and Surveillance Reports, April6, 2010, Tab 9. (
c) Paragraph 25: MAHJOUB was a close associate of Mohamed Hafez Marzouk… This is based upon telephone toll records,see paragraph (
d) below. (
d) Paragraph 26: After MAHJOUB’s arrival in Canada, he contacted Marzouk by telephone. A telephone at MAHJOUB’sresidence was in regular contact with the cellular telephone of Marzouk from 1997 until Marzouk left Canada in May 1998. Thisallegation is based upon telephone toll records, which show that there were 11 calls between a telephone at MAHJOUB’s residence andthe cellular telephone of Marzouk. (
e) Paragraph 31: When an associate of MAHJOUB’s inquired about MAHJOUB’s news, MAHJOUB stated that he preferred totalk face to face, and reluctantly explained that he could not delve into the subject right then because of the presence of the“Moukhabarat” (i.e. secret services). In turn, this same associate asked whether MAHJOUB was referring to the civil or military“Moukhabarat” to which MAHJOUB replied “both”. This is an intercepted communication: see Revised Summaries of Conversationsand Surveillance Reports, April 6, 2010, Tab 8.
(
f) Paragraph 32: In July 2001, MAHJOUB, while in detention, got in touch with Mona El Fouli and inquired whether “she still had her telephone number on the old number”, to which she replied in the affirmative. MAHJOUB commented that he should not be blamed if one of his ex-inmates got hold of El Fouli’s new number because of that and advised her to cancel the forwarding service. El Fouli in turn stated that she would provide him with a possibly different telephone number where he could contact her. El Fouli preferred to provide him with the telephone number later .
This is an intercepted communication: see Revised Summaries of Conversations and Surveillance Reports, April 6, 2010, Tab 10. (Sourced from a Communication from the Court dated September 23, 2010) Items (
a) and (
b) have already been excluded from these proceedings following the Court’s June 19, 2012 Order. [ 5 ] On October 3, 2008, in the context of its review of the security certificate pursuant to subsection 77(1) of the IRPA (the reasonableness proceeding), this Court ordered the disclosure of the
section 21 warrants and supporting affidavits to the Special Advocates in accordance with the Ministers’ disclosure obligations outlined in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2008 SCC 38 [ Charkaoui II ] . On December 15, 2008 and January 15, 2009, the materials were disclosed to the Special Advocates, and summaries of the disclosed material were eventually provided to Public Counsel on October 5, 2010. [ 6 ] On August 3, 2010, Mr. Mahjoub submitted an “informal request” by letter to the Court seeking an Order requiring the Ministers “to communicate to Mr.
Mahjoub all the warrants, affidavits, exhibits and transcripts in relation with the intercepts/searches/investigations mentioned in the Security Intelligence Report for the purpose of challenging said warrants.” He filed a formal Notice of Motion for such disclosure on August 31, 2010. [ 7 ] In a Direction, dated August 31, 2010, the Court explained that the legality of the
section 21 warrants was not at issue in any of the motions previously brought by the Special Advocates. This fact was further confirmed at paragraphs 41, 45 and 55 of the Court’s September 13, 2010 Communication. Mr. Mahjoub filed his Motion Record for his August 31, 2010 disclosure motion on September 20, 2010. [ 8 ] On October 5, 2010, summaries of five warrants and five supporting affidavits were prepared collaboratively and ordered on consent to be disclosed to Mr. Mahjoub and his counsel pursuant to the Court’s October 4, 2010 Reasons for Order. [ 9 ] On October 25, 2010, Mr. Mahjoub brought his motion challenging the constitutional validity of the
section 21 warrants, the admissibility of the evidence obtained pursuant to these warrants, and the constitutionality of sections 2, 6, 12, 17 and 21, 22, 23, and 24 of the CSIS Act . Mr. Mahjoub in a separate motion, of which the Attorneys general were notified, also challenges the constitutionality of these same sections of the CSIS Act . It is appropriate to deal with the latter challenge at this stage in the context of the within motion as the constitutionality of the CSIS Act has decisive bearing on the legality of the warrants.
Preliminary Issues [ 10 ] The Ministers argue that the Court’s August 31, 2010 Order ( 2010 FC 937 ) is dispositive of Mr. Mahjoub’s motion to exclude the evidence obtained by the warrants authorized under
section 21 of the CSIS Act . That Order implemented the Court’s decision to exclude certain evidence pursuant to subsection 83(1.1) of the IRPA ( 2010 FC 787 ).
The Ministers also argue that the within motion is duplicative of the Special Advocates’ motion, the motion to exclude evidence pursuant to subsection 83(1.1) , which resulted in the August 31, 2010 Reasons for Order and Order and is consequently abusive. [ 11 ] The Ministers rely on the following paragraph of the August 31, 2010 Reasons for Order and Order: [66] I am of the view that the information in the supporting affidavit, not sourced from [redacted] interrogation, was sufficient to justify on reasonable grounds the belief that the warrant powers to intercept Mr.
Mahjoub’s private communications were required for the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada pursuant to the requirements of s.21 of the CSIS Act … Consequently, the information obtained and relied on by the Ministers from the intercepted communications obtained as a result of the Warrant [redacted] is admissible. [ 12 ] The motion brought by the Special Advocates on behalf of Mr. Mahjoub and the resulting Reasons and Order concerned the narrow issue of inadmissibility of evidence by operation of subsection 83(1.1) of the IRPA . Mr.
Mahjoub in this motion now challenges the validity of the warrants on the basis of the alleged unconstitutionality of the CSIS Act , the Service’s alleged failure to
provide full, fair and frank disclosure, and on the alleged non-compliance of the warrants with the CSIS Act . These issues were not before the Court at the time of the section 83(1.1) motion and were not considered in the June 9, 2010 Reasons for Order. [ 13 ] The Ministers contend that the Special Advocates considered the issue and decided not to challenge the validity of the warrants. The Ministers appear to suggest that it is too late for Public Counsel to do so. The Ministers also contend that Mr.
Mahjoub should not be allowed to re-litigate issues that have already been decided. [ 14 ] The Ministers are correct that it is not open to Mr. Mahjoub to re-litigate issues that have already been decided by the Court. Mr. Mahjoub is estopped from bringing duplicative motions. See: Toronto (City) v. CUPE, Local 79 , 2003 SCC 63 and British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola , 2011 SCC 52 at paragraph 24 . However, while the Special Advocates must represent Mr. Mahjoub’s interests in camera , they are not his counsel.
Their decision to refrain from bringing a particular motion should not therefore bind Mr. Mahjoub and his counsel. Put differently, Mr. Mahjoub should not be estopped from bringing a motion on an issue that the Special Advocates have said they will not raise. Issues [ 15 ] I will address the following issues on this motion: 1. Are certain provisions of the CSIS Act unconstitutional? (
a) Are sections 2, 6 and 12 of the CSIS Act unconstitutional for vagueness or overbreadth? (
b) Is
section 17 of the CSIS Act unconstitutional because it authorizes CSIS to enter into intelligence-sharing arrangements with foreign agencies that have poor human rights records? (
c) Are sections 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the CSIS Act unconstitutional for authorizing unreasonable search and seizure? 2. Can the lawfulness of the
section 21 warrants be challenged, and if so, in what way? (
a) Does the doctrine of collateral attack preclude challenge to the validity of the
section 21 warrants in the context of determining the admissibility of evidence pursuant to
section 24 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms ,
Part I to the Constitution Act, 1982 , c. 11 (U.K.),
Schedule B [ Charter ] in a security certificate proceeding? (
b) Is the evidence obtained pursuant to the
section 21 warrants inadmissible because Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2007 SCC 9 [ Charkaoui I ] declared the previous IRPA regime, which was the law at the time the evidence was collected, unconstitutional? (
c) Does the non-disclosure of the confidential
section 21 warrants and affidavits in support of the warrants to Mr. Mahjoub violate Mr. Mahjoub’s right to full answer and defence? (
d) In the context of a challenge to
section 21 warrants in a security certificate proceeding, can the Court consider the confidential affidavits, or must the Court restrict its consideration to the
summary of the affidavits disclosed to Mr. Mahjoub? 3. Are the
section 21 warrants themselves unlawful by reason of: (
a) The presence of information derived from torture in the supporting affidavits? (
b) CSIS’s breach of the duty of full, fair and frank disclosure by presenting misleading affidavits to the designated judge that also omitted exculpatory information? (
c) The absence of any indication that the warrants complied with the requirements of the CSIS Act , namely subsection 21(1) and paragraphs 21(2) (
a) to ( g )? (
d) The warrants’ authorization of solicitor-client interceptions, which constitutes unreasonable search and seizure? 4. Did CSIS engage in searches and seizures that were not authorized by the
section 21 warrants and not otherwise authorized by law? 5. If evidence used in this proceeding was unlawfully obtained for any of the above reasons, should it nevertheless be admitted pursuant to subsection 24(2) of the Charter ?
Analysis [ 16 ] Mr. Mahjoub raised the issue of the constitutionality of the CSIS Act in the context of his general constitutional challenge to the proceeding. As stated above, I will deal with this issue at this juncture. In my view, it is more germane to the warrants motion than to the challenge to Division 9 of the IRPA . My conclusions here are intended to dispose of the issue and to inform my conclusions in the abuse of process and reasonableness decisions. [ 17 ] The above noted issues will be considered in turn. 1. Are certain provisions of the CSIS Act unconstitutional? (
a) Are sections 2, 6 and 12 of the CSIS Act unconstitutional for vagueness or overbreadth?
Section 2 and
Section 12 [ 18 ] Mr. Mahjoub challenges the term “threats to the security of Canada” in sections 2 and 12 of the CSIS Act , alleging that they are vague and overbroad, infringing
section 7 of the Charter . For ease of reference, I reproduce the impugned provisions below. 2. In this Act, “threats to the security of Canada” « menaces envers la sécurité du Canada » “threats to the security of Canada” means (
a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage, (
b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person, (
c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, 2. Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi. « menaces envers la sécurité du Canada » “threats to the security of Canada” « menaces envers la sécurité du Canada » Constituent des menaces envers la sécurité du Canada les activités suivantes :
a) l’espionnage ou le sabotage visant le Canada ou préjudiciables à ses intérêts, ainsi que les activités tendant à favoriser ce genre d’espionnage ou de sabotage;
b) les activités influencées par l’étranger qui touchent le Canada ou s’y déroulent et sont préjudiciables à ses intérêts, et qui sont d’une nature clandestine ou trompeuse ou comportent des menaces envers quiconque;
c) les activités qui touchent le Canada ou s’y déroulent et visent à favoriser l’usage de la violence grave ou de menaces de violence contre des personnes ou des biens dans le but d’atteindre un objectif politique, religieux ou idéologique au Canada ou dans un État étranger;
religious or ideologicalobjective within Canada or aforeign state, and (
d) activities directed towardundermining by covert unlawfulacts, or directed toward orintended ultimately to lead tothe destruction or overthrow byviolence of, the constitutionallyestablished system ofgovernment in Canada, but does not include lawfuladvocacy, protest or dissent,unless carried on in conjunctionwith any of the activitiesreferred to in paragraphs (
a) to(d).
d) les activités qui, par des actionscachées et illicites, visent à saperle régime de gouvernementconstitutionnellement établi auCanada ou dont le but immédiat ouultime est sa destruction ou sonrenversement, par la violence. La présente définition ne visetoutefois pas les activités licites dedéfense d’une cause, deprotestation ou de manifestationd’un désaccord qui n’ont aucunlien avec les activités mentionnéesaux alinéas
a) à d). 12. The Service shall collect, byinvestigation or otherwise, to theextent that it is strictlynecessary, and analyse and retaininformation and intelligencerespecting activities that may onreasonable grounds be suspectedof constituting threats to thesecurity of Canada and, inrelation thereto, shall report toand advise the Government ofCanada. [Emphasis added] 12.
Le Service recueille, aumoyen d’enquêtes ou autrement,dans la mesure strictementnécessaire, et analyse et conserveles informations etrenseignements sur les activitésdont il existe des motifsraisonnables de soupçonnerqu’elles constituent des menacesenvers la sécurité du Canada; il enfait rapport au gouvernement duCanada et le conseille à cet égard. [Je souligne] [19] A similarly-worded provision, paragraph 53(1)(
b) of the former Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, withstoodconstitutional scrutiny in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1. At paragraph 2, the Supreme Courtof Canada explained that “danger to the security of Canada” was under attack for vagueness. Examining the provision through the lens ofR. v.
Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 [Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society], theSupreme Court concluded at paragraphs 83 and 92 that the phrase is not unconstitutionally vague although it is difficult to define,“highly fact-based and political in a general sense” (at paragraph 85).
The Court did not insist on direct proof of a specific threat toCanada to define this term, but it did require that there “be real and serious possibility of adverse effect to Canada” that is potentiallyserious (at paragraphs 88-89). [20] Further, in Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, the Supreme Court explained at page 643 that “a law will be foundunconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient guidance for legal debate.” At page 632, the Supreme Courtstated that legislation must: (1) give citizens fair notice of the consequences of their conduct, and (2) limit law enforcement discretion.
[21] The legislation itself defines “threats to the security of Canada” in a detailed manner in paragraphs (
a) to (d). Theseparagraphs clearly define those activities that may be considered a threat and specifically exclude lawful advocacy and dissent. I am ofthe view that the impugned provisions provide fair notice to the citizen and appropriately limit the Service’s investigative discretion. [22] Mr. Mahjoub cites the case of Ernst Zündel as an example of the definition’s vagueness: a Holocaust-denier capturedby this provision and by the inadmissibility provisions of the IRPA. However, Justice Blais (as he then was) at paragraph 6 of Zündel(Re), 2005 FC 295, explained: It is important to note that Mr.
Zündel’s views on the Holocaust had been known for years, but were of no concern to the CanadianSecurity Intelligence Service (CSIS). They may well have been an irritant to many and may have been considered as vile and perverse,but they were not enough to label him as a security threat. Rather, the investigations only began when Mr. Zündel crossed the boundariesof free speech and pursuant to the Ministers’ opinion, entered the realm of incitement to hatred and potential political violence in relationto the White Supremacist Movement.
The Court found that is was not because of Zündel’s views on the Holocaust that he was considered a security threat, but rather becauseof the threat of political violence. In my view, Zündel falls well within the ambit of a restricted definition of “threats to the security ofCanada.” It is not an example of vagueness of the impugned language of the CSIS Act. [23] In Mr. Mahjoub’s case, the investigation of his potential membership in terrorist groups and activities linked withterrorism is also related to a threat of political violence.
As such, it also comes within the ambit of a restricted definition of “threats to thesecurity of Canada.” [24] The test for overbreadth is found in R. v. Heywood, (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 at page 793 (and usedin R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69 at paragraph 37).
If legislation is overbroad, it is such that “in some applications the law is arbitrary ordisproportionate” to the state interests it seeks to advance. [25] The internal restrictions found in sections 2 and 12 of the CSIS Act define the Service’s scope of discretion byspecifically defining “threats to the security of Canada” and only permitting the Service to collect information “to the extent that it isstrictly necessary”. Further, the “threat” can only be investigated on reasonable grounds to suspect standard.
Based on the limitations andrequirements imposed on the Service by the above cited provisions, I find that the sections at issue are neither arbitrary nordisproportionate to the state interests that they seek to advance. I conclude that the provisions are not overbroad. [26] Mr. Mahjoub next appears to argue by implication that
section 12 of the CSIS Act authorized unreasonable searchesand seizures that engage his
section 7 privacy rights, thereby violating his
section 8 Charter rights. [27] Mr. Mahjoub’s main concern appears to be that the Service does not require “reasonable and probable grounds” toinvestigate an individual. He argues that the “reasonable grounds to suspect” standard in
section 12 is too low and thereby results in anunreasonable search and seizure. He relies on Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [Hunter], thelandmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada interpreting
section 8 of the Charter. In that case, the Supreme Court established thatfor a search to be reasonable, it requires reasonable and probable grounds that an offence is committed and that there is evidence to befound as a result of the search. [28]
Section 12 is about the collection of intelligence on activities that are suspected threats to the security of Canada.“Search” is defined as an investigative technique by the state that diminishes the reasonable expectation of privacy of a person (Hunter atpages 159-160; R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55 at paragraph 77), and “seizure” is defined as “taking of a thing from a person by a publicauthority without that person’s consent” (R. v. Dyment, (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 at page 431, R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC30 at paragraph 33).
There is typically no reasonable expectation of privacy if the individual does not keep the information in questionprivate, for example in R. v. Edwards, (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, the Court found that an individual did not have areasonable expectation of privacy in his girlfriend’s apartment. There is also no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage (R. v. Krist, (BC CA), 100 C.C.C. (3d) 58 (BCCA)). [29] According to R. v. Collins, (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 at page 278, a search is reasonable withoutprior judicial authorization if it is authorized by a reasonable law and conducted in a reasonable manner.
Since Mr. Mahjoub has raisedno allegations that any searches conducted pursuant to
section 12 of the CSIS Act were conducted in an unreasonable manner, I will
address whether
section 12 of the CSIS Act is a reasonable law. [ 30 ] In R. v. Kang-Brown , 2008 SCC 18 [ Kang-Brown ] and R. v A.M. , 2008 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court determined that the threshold for using a certain common law-authorized investigative technique, namely dogs trained in drug detection or “sniffer dogs”, was “reasonable suspicion”, a lower threshold than “reasonable and probable grounds” as described in Hunter . The recent companion cases R. v. Chehil , 2013 SCC 49 [ Chehil ] and R. v.
MacKenzie , 2013 SCC 50 [ MacKenzie ] addressed another challenge to this standard and upheld the “reasonable suspicion” standard for deploying the sniffer dogs. Using sniffer dogs can be done without prior judicial authorization because “they are minimally intrusive, narrowly targeted, and can be highly accurate” ( Chehil at paragraph 1 ).
As Justice Karakatsanis wrote in Chehil at paragraph 6 , “[t]he reasonable suspicion standard requires that the entirety of the circumstances, inculpatory and exculpatory, be assessed to determine whether there are objective ascertainable grounds to suspect that an individual is involved in criminal behaviour.” There must be a constellation of factors (or a single factor such as travelling under a false name) that is particularized enough to prevent indiscriminate or discriminatory searches (at paragraphs 30-31, 35).
In addition, there must be a “nexus” between the factors and the criminal conduct, even if the factors are not themselves criminal conduct (at paragraph 37). [ 31 ] The learned judge further commented in Chehil at pararaph 23 that “[b]oth the impact on privacy interests and the importance of the law enforcement objective play a role in determining the level of justification required for the state to intrude upon the privacy interest in question.” She concluded at paragraph 24 that the appropriate justification for a search lies along a spectrum depending on these factors. [ 32 ] The public interest in the Service investigating threats to the security of Canada is great.
Nevertheless,
section 12 of the CSIS Act does not, on its face, constrain the investigative techniques that may be used by the Service. In addition, unlike sniffer dog searches, under normal circumstances there is no judicial scrutiny for techniques employed pursuant to
section 12, for the search is typically conducted unbeknownst to the target individual. It is therefore useful to examine the legislative constraints on
section 12 and which techniques are actually employed by the Service pursuant to
section 12 in order to determine whether the “reasonable suspicion” standard strikes the correct balance in these circumstances. [ 33 ] While
section 12 appears to be broad in scope, it is nonetheless constrained by the warrant requirements, namely sections 21 to 24 of the CSIS Act . Parliament intended these provisions to be used in circumstances where the investigation required interference with an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. In such cases, the Service is required to obtain judicial authorization. Under the warrant process, the threshold is higher than that required for
section 12 activities. To request a warrant an affiant on behalf of the Service must attest to “the facts relied on to justify the belief, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant under this
section is required to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties and functions under
section 16… ” ( section 21(1) of the CSIS Act ). Consequently,
section 12 does not authorize intrusive searches and seizures of private information. [ 34 ] In the “ Amended Final Response to Questions Re: National Security Privilege Objections” prepared by the Service and dated March 5, 2012 (Exhibit R82), the Service disclosed a significant portion of its policies dealing with investigative techniques pursuant to
section 12, as follows: 1. OPS-101 2006, Level 1 investigative techniques allowed include reporting of open information, querying federal/provincial/territorial/municipal records and databanks, querying records held by foreign police/security/intelligence organizations. Level 1 is valid for 90 days and terminated immediately if the Service discovers that the activities of a target do not constitute a threat. 2. OPS-102 2006, Level 2, techniques allowed include level 1, use of physical surveillance, interview of the target or any other person who may have relevant information, and tasking of human sources.
Level 2 is valid for 2 years. 3. OPS-103 2006, Level 3, techniques allowed include levels 1 and 2, use of physical surveillance, and application for or execution of warrant powers of Federal Court warrants. It is valid for 2 years. It is also clear from the evidence that higher levels require higher authorization within the Service. [ 35 ] I am satisfied, on a review of the techniques enumerated in the Service policies above, that they are minimally intrusive, if they engage a reasonable expectation of privacy at all. The “reasonable suspicion” standard must be satisfied in order to employ these techniques.
Further, the policies contemplate obtaining Federal Court warrants, governed by sections 21 to 24, for more intrusive techniques. In my view,
section 12 of the CSIS Act , as interpreted by the Service, requires the Service to have an objective, particularized basis for the use of any minimally intrusive investigative techniques and strikes the appropriate balance between the public interest in investigating threats to the security of Canada and the individual target’s privacy rights. [ 36 ] The Ministers argue that Parliament has legislated a lower standard than that required by Hunter , thereby allowing an intrusive search to be conducted on reasonable grounds to suspect standard, relying on Kang-Brown at paragraphs 3, 10, and 13 . While I
accept that Parliament has the authority to legislate a lower standard for such searches and seizures, it is not apparent to me that Parliament has done so by enacting
section 12 of the CSIS Act . Intrusive searches and seizures require a warrant pursuant to
section 21. [ 37 ] Disclosure of activities specifically undertaken by the Service in relation to Mr. Mahjoub under the authority of
section 12 would, in my opinion, be injurious to national security or the safety of persons. The specifics of what was done can therefore be found in “Section A” of the Confidential Annex. [ 38 ] The following paragraphs are a
summary of my findings on this issue from the Confidential Annex. [ 39 ] In my view, on the basis of the record, all of the techniques used pursuant to
section 12 of the CSIS Act were minimally intrusive, and none of them were employed in a discriminatory or indiscriminate way. [ 40 ] Further, Mr. Mahjoub and the Special Advocates have raised no specific facts which would indicate that specific techniques authorized by
section 12 constitute unreasonable search and seizure. They have not argued that the Service did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that Mr. Mahjoub was connected to a threat to the security of Canada, nor have they argued that any particular technique failed to respect the balance between public and privacy interests. It was necessary for them to do so in order for the Court to assess a particular technique according to the requirements set out in Chehil and MacKenzie . [ 41 ] Mr. Mahjoub also challenges
section 12 of the CSIS Act as it apparently permits Service personnel to obtain statements from him pertinent to his security certificate case without his knowledge, which he claims is an infringement of
section 13 of the Charter against self-incrimination. Mr. Mahjoub, in his anaemic submissions on this issue, has failed to establish any ground upon which
section 12 of the CSIS Act could be found to be unconstitutional on the basis of
section 13 of the Charter .
Section 12 is concerned with investigating threats to the security of Canada, not obtaining statements for an immigration proceeding. These allegations pertain to the conduct of the Service in collecting and using the information gathered under the authority of
section 12, not to the constitutional validity of the provision itself. [ 42 ] For the above reasons, I find that Mr. Mahjoub’s constitutional challenge to
section 12 of the CSIS Act is without merit.
Section 6 [ 43 ]
Section 6 of the CSIS Act gives the Director of the Service, under the direction of the Minister, the control and management of the Service and all matters connected therewith. Mr. Mahjoub alleges that the provision enables several unconstitutional policies and guidelines. [ 44 ] For ease of reference, I reproduce the impugned provision below:
(1) The Director, under thedirection of the Minister, has thecontrol and management of theService and all mattersconnected therewith.
(2) In providing the directionreferred to in subsection (1), theMinister may issue to theDirector written directions withrespect to the Service and a copyof any such direction shall,forthwith after it is issued, begiven to the Review Committee. …
(4) The Director shall, in relationto every 12-month period or anylesser period that is specified bythe Minister, submit to theMinister, at any times that theMinister specifies, reports withrespect to the Service’soperational activities during thatperiod, and shall cause theReview Committee to be given acopy of each such report. 6.
(1) Sous la direction duministre, le directeur est chargéde la gestion du Service et de toutce qui s’y rattache.
(2) Dans l’exercice de sonpouvoir de direction visé auparagraphe (1), le ministre peutdonner par écrit au directeur desinstructions concernant leService; un exemplaire de celles-ci est transmis au comité desurveillance dès qu’elles sontdonnées. […]
(4) Pour chaque période de douzemois d’activités opérationnellesdu Service ou pour les périodesinférieures à douze mois et auxmoments précisés par le ministre,le directeur présente à celui-ci desrapports sur ces activités; il en faitremettre un exemplaire au comitéde surveillance. [45] Even if it were established, as alleged, that executive action performed under an enabling statute is unconstitutional,this does not render the statute itself unconstitutional (Commission des droits de la personne v. Attorney General of Canada, (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 215 at page 216). Mr.
Mahjoub has failed to show how the provision at issue falls afoul of theCharter or his Charter rights. Further, while certain policies or executive action enacted pursuant to the
section might engage Mr.Mahjoub’s individual rights, the provision itself does not. [46] I have dealt with Mr. Mahjoub’s challenges to individual policies and practices, insofar as they have been raised, in theAbuse of Process Decision. (
b) Is
section 17 of the CSIS Act unconstitutional because it authorizes CSIS to enter into intelligence-sharing arrangementswith foreign agencies with poor human rights records? [47] Mr. Mahjoub alleges that
section 17 of the CSIS Act is unconstitutional because it violates individuals’ right to privacypursuant to
section 7 of the Charter. It enables intelligence-sharing arrangements with intelligence agencies having poor human rightsrecords, and it therefore has the potential to enable sharing of personal information. [48] For ease of reference, I reproduce the impugned provision below:
(1) For the purpose of performing its duties and functions under this Act, the Service may, (
a) with the approval of the Minister, enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate with (
i) any department of the Government of Canada or the government of a province or any department thereof, or (ii) any police force in a province, with the approval of the Minister responsible for policing in the province; or (
b) with the approval of the Minister after consultation by the Minister with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate with the government of a foreign state or an institution thereof or an international organization of states or an institution thereof.
(2) Where a written arrangement is entered into pursuant to subsection (1) or subsection 13(2) or (3), a copy thereof shall be given forthwith to the Review Committee. 17.
(1) Dans l’exercice des fonctions qui lui sont conférées en vertu de la présente loi, le Service peut :
a) avec l’approbation du ministre, conclure des ententes ou, d’une façon générale, coopérer avec : (
i) les ministères du gouvernement du Canada, le gouvernement d’une province ou l’un de ses ministères, (ii) un service de police en place dans une province, avec l’approbation du ministre provincial chargé des questions de police;
b) avec l’approbation du ministre, après consultation entre celui-ci et le ministre des Affaires étrangères, conclure des ententes ou, d’une façon générale, coopérer avec le gouvernement d’un État étranger ou l’une de ses institutions, ou une organisation internationale d’États ou l’une de ses institutions.
(2) Un exemplaire du texte des ententes écrites conclues en vertu du paragraphe (1) ou des paragraphes 13(2) ou (3) est transmis au comité de surveillance immédiatement après leur conclusion. [ 49 ] Mr. Mahjoub’s challenge is relevant to paragraph 17(1)(
b) and not to the other provisions, so I shall examine that provision only. [ 50 ] This provision authorizes the Service, with Ministerial approval, to enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate with foreign governments or agencies after consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. It is consequently assumed that in completing the arrangement, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) input relating to country conditions was properly obtained and considered. The terms of that cooperation are then left to the Minister and the Service to arrange.
I accept that one of the purposes of arrangements made under this provision may be information-sharing. [ 51 ] The provision governing the creation of the arrangements, paragraph 17(1)( b ), is constrained by the requirement of consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, a minister with particular expertise in country conditions including human rights. This ensures that the Minister of Public Safety is informed about the country in question and has independent
advice from outside of the Service and his or her department. [ 52 ] Other legislative provisions further govern the information-sharing aspect of
section 17 arrangements. Pursuant to subsection 8(2) of the Privacy Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 [ Privacy Act ], the Service may disclose personal information for the purpose of furthering the objectives of the CSIS Act . Paragraphs 8(2) (
f) and ( m ), provide that:
(2) Subject to any other Act of Parliament , personal information under the control of a government institution may be disclosed … (
f) under an agreement or arrangement between the Government of Canada or an institution thereof and the government of a province, the council of the Westbank First Nation, the council of a participating First Nation — as defined in subsection 2(1) of the First Nations Jurisdiction over Education in British Columbia Act —, the government of a foreign state, an international organization of states or an international organization established by the governments of states, or any institution of any such government or organization, for the purpose of administering or enforcing any law or carrying out a lawful investigation; … (
m) for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head of the institution , (
i) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure [Emphasis added]
(2) Sous réserve d’autres lois fédérales, la communication des renseignements personnels qui relèvent d’une institution fédérale est autorisée dans les cas suivants : […]
f) communication aux termes d’accords ou d’ententes conclus d’une part entre le gouvernement du Canada ou l’un de ses organismes et, d’autre part, le gouvernement d’une province ou d’un État étranger, une organisation internationale d’États ou de gouvernements, le conseil de la première nation de Westbank, le conseil de la première nation participante — au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur la compétence des premières nations en matière d’éducation en Colombie-Britannique — ou l’un de leurs organismes, en vue de l’application des lois ou pour la tenue d’enquêtes licites; […]
m) communication à toute autre fin dans les cas où, de l’avis du responsable de l’institution : (
i) des raisons d’intérêt public justifieraient nettement une éventuelle violation de la vie privée , [Je souligne] [ 53 ] If the Service provides an individual’s personal information to foreign agencies under
section 17 arrangements for the
purposes of investigating threats to the security of Canada, the Service’s actions are also subject to paragraphs 8(2) (
f) or ( m ). [ 54 ] Paragraph 8(2) (
f) of the Privacy Act has withstood constitutional scrutiny under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter in the extradition context, where personal information was shared with foreign law enforcement agencies. Paragraphs 13-14 of United States of America v. Lucero-Echegoyen , 2011 BCSC 1028 and paragraphs 28-34 of United States of America v. Wakeling , 2011 BCSC 165 [ Wakeling ] , examine the provision in light of a
section 7 and
section 8 challenge. The British Columbia Superior Court concludes that the provision is constitutional because it strikes the right balance between protecting the “residual privacy interests which are significantly diminished in this case” and “the important state interest in unimpeded and timely sharing of lawfully obtained information between law enforcement agencies to ensure the effective investigation of criminal activity with inter-jurisdictional dimensions” ( Wakeling at paragraph 33 ). [ 55 ] While normally disclosure of interceptions of private conversations is criminal, paragraph 193(2) (
e) of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [ Criminal Code ], allows disclosure made “to a person or authority with responsibility in a foreign state for the investigation or prosecution of offences and intended to be in the interests of the administration of justice in Canada or elsewhere…” Although
Part II of the Criminal Code , which includes paragraph 193(2) (
e) does not apply to the Service by reason of
section 26 of the CSIS Act . The CSIS Act instead contains subsection 19(2) , a provision analogous to paragraph 193(2)(
e) of the Criminal Code . For ease of reference, I reproduce subsection 19(2) below:
(2) The Service may disclose information referred to in subsection (1) for the purposes of the performance of its duties and functions under this Act or the administration or enforcement of this Act or as required by any other law and may also disclose such information (
a) where the information may be used in the investigation or prosecution of an alleged contravention of any law of Canada or a province, to a peace officer having jurisdiction to investigate the alleged contravention and to the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of the province in which proceedings in respect of the alleged contravention may be taken; (
b) where the information relates to the conduct of the international affairs of Canada, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or a person designated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the purpose; (
c) where the information is relevant to the defence of Canada, to the Minister of National Defence or a person designated by the Minister of National Defence for the purpose; or (
d) where, in the opinion of the Minister, disclosure of the information to any minister of the Crown or person in the federal public administration is essential in the public interest and that interest clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure, to that minister or person. 19. 2) Le Service peut, en vue de l’exercice des fonctions qui lui sont conférées en vertu de la présente loi ou pour l’exécution ou le contrôle d’application de celle-ci, ou en conformité avec les exigences d’une autre règle de droit, communiquer les informations visées au paragraphe (1). Il peut aussi les communiquer aux autorités ou personnes suivantes :
a) lorsqu’elles peuvent servir dans le cadre d’une enquête ou de poursuites relatives à une infraction présumée à une loi fédérale ou provinciale, aux agents de la paix compétents pour mener l’enquête, au procureur général du Canada et au procureur général de la province où des poursuites peuvent être intentées à l’égard de cette infraction;
b) lorsqu’elles concernent la conduite des affaires internationales du Canada, au ministre des Affaires étrangères ou à la personne qu’il désigne à cette fin;
c) lorsqu’elles concernent la défense du Canada, au ministre de la Défense nationale ou à la personne qu’il désigne à cette fin;
d) lorsque, selon le ministre, leur communication à un ministre ou à une personne appartenant à l’administration publique fédérale est essentielle pour des raisons d’intérêt public et que celles-ci justifient nettement une éventuelle violation de la vie privée, à ce ministre ou à cette personne. [ 56 ] Both section 193(2)(
e) of the Criminal Code (the analogous provision to section 19(2) of the CSIS Act ) and paragraph 8(2) (
f) of the Privacy Act , survived a constitutional challenge in the context of RCMP wiretaps given to the United States authorities for the purposes of extradition. In United States of America v. Wakeling , 2012 BCCA 397 , the appeal decision of 2011 BCSC 165 (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court granted) both paragraph 8(2)(
f) of the Privacy Act and paragraph 193(2) (
e) of the Criminal Code were
raised, and the British Columbia Court of Appeal found the Criminal Code to be the determinative issue. [ 57 ] At paragraph 34, the Court of Appeal held that “disclosure to other administration of justice officers, domestic and foreign, is an equally obvious and necessary exception [to the criminality of wiretap disclosure in the Criminal Code ] without the necessity of further judicial authorization or further notice.” While the Court of Appeal recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in judicially authorized interceptions of private communications (the disclosure of which normally would be criminal according to subsection 193(1) of the Criminal Code ), it rejects the appellant’s argument that Parliament should protect his conversations from being used in a criminal investigation “when and where required for that purpose” (at paragraph 39).
The Court of Appeal further explains at paragraph 43 that: The information gathered by lawful electronic interception becomes law enforcement intelligence. In my opinion, it is no different than information obtained from a police informer or information contained in documents that lawfully come into the hands of the police. If disclosure is in the interests of the administration of justice, there is no need for prior judicial approval or for notice or for reporting. Such requirements would formalize and hamper the inter-jurisdictional investigation of crime and sometimes the prevention of crime.
Control of the use of lawfully-gathered police intelligence by foreign authorities is not practical and would be presumptuous. What is practical and necessary for both crime detection and crime prevention is the ability of police officers to lawfully inform their counterparts in other jurisdictions about impending criminal activity, as occurred in the present case, or past criminal activity. [ 58 ] In my view, the above reasoning finds application in this case. Specifically, it applies to disclosure of information over which Mr. Mahjoub has a reasonable expectation of privacy in conjunction with paragraph 8(2) (
f) of the Privacy Act . Mr. Mahjoub argues that the sharing of intelligence obtained by warrant between the Service and other intelligence agencies, when done in order to further the Service’s mandate to inform and advise the Government of Canada about threats to national security, re-engages his rights to privacy and constitutes an additional search or seizure. To accept this argument would formalize and hamper the inter-jurisdictional investigation of threats to the security of Canada. Further, disclosure of information to foreign agencies is reasonable if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the intrusion into the privacy of the individual. [ 59 ]
Section 17 of the CSIS Act must be understood in the context of these constraining statutory provisions.
The overarching restriction on sharing personal information with foreign agencies, found in both the CSIS Act and the Privacy Act , is that the Minister and the Service must craft arrangements appropriately and determine on a case-by-case basis whether the public interest that will be served in sharing the information outweighs the violation of the individual’s privacy. [ 60 ] In this case, the balancing would be between the public interest in national security and the “residual” and “diminished” expectation of privacy Mr. Mahjoub has in the Service’s intelligence concerning him.
Further diminishing his expectation of privacy is the fact that Mr. Mahjoub was a foreign national applying for immigration status in Canada, and he therefore consented to security screening and the use of the personal information he gave to the Canadian authorities for that purpose. [ 61 ] I now turn to consider the classified evidence on this issue. Since the disclosure of what personal information, if any, the Service shared with foreign agencies would be injurious to national security or the safety of persons, my analysis on this issue may be found in
Section “B” of the Confidential Annex . I provide in the following paragraph a
summary of my findings. [ 62 ] I am satisfied that any information-sharing that took place in Mr. Mahjoub’s case with foreign agencies was compliant with the statute and struck the appropriate balance between the public interest and Mr. Mahjoub’s “residual” expectation of privacy. [ 63 ] In
summary, an individual has, at best, a residual privacy interest in information about that individual that is lawfully collected by the Service. Further, sharing of such information with foreign agencies under
section 17 arrangements is constrained by the requirement that the Minister consult with DFAIT about a country before entering into such an arrangement. This informs the Service about the country conditions including the human rights record of the country at issue. Paragraph 8(2) (
f) of the Privacy Act and
section 19 of the CSIS Act also provide parameters to protect the information by requiring a balancing of the interests and a determination that the public interest clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy. With these constraints in place, I am satisfied that, in Mr. Mahjoub’s circumstances, the public interest in sharing the information outweighed the residual privacy interest of the individual. [ 64 ] Moreover, upon reviewing the evidence on the record concerning Mr. Mahjoub’s personal information that was shared, if any, with the foreign agencies, I am satisfied that his
section 7 Charter right to privacy was not violated.
[65] I therefore conclude that
section 17 of the CSIS Act, which permits intelligence-sharing arrangements with foreignagencies regardless of their human rights records, does not violate sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. (
c) Are sections 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the CSIS Act unconstitutional for authorizing unreasonable search and seizure? [66] Sections 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the CSIS Act allow the Service to obtain warrants from the Federal Court in order toinvestigate threats to the security of Canada. Mr.
Mahjoub alleges that these provisions are unconstitutional because they allow theService to intercept solicitor-client communications. [67] The Ministers maintain that the practice of intercepting solicitor-client communications as an incidental consequenceof the interception of communications, authorized by warrant under the CSIS Act, constitutes a long-standing exception to solicitor-clientprivilege based on the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Atwal v. Canada, (FCA), [1988] 1 F.C. 107 (C.A.) [Atwal]. [68] For ease of reference, I reproduce below the impugned provisions of the CSIS Act: 21.
(1) Where the Director or anyemployee designated by theMinister for the purpose believes,on reasonable grounds, that awarrant under this
section isrequired to enable the Service toinvestigate a threat to the securityof Canada or to perform its dutiesand functions under
section 16,the Director or employee may,after having obtained theapproval of the Minister, makean application in accordance withsubsection (2) to a judge for awarrant under this section.
(2) An application to a judgeunder subsection (1) shall bemade in writing and beaccompanied by an affidavit ofthe applicant deposing to thefollowing matters, namely, (
a) the facts relied on to justifythe belief, on reasonable grounds,that a warrant under this sectionis required to enable the Serviceto investigate a threat to thesecurity of Canada or to performits duties and functions undersection 16; (
b) that other investigativeprocedures have been tried andhave failed or why it appears thatthey are unlikely to succeed, thatthe urgency of the matter is suchthat it would be impractical tocarry out the investigation usingonly other investigativeprocedures or that without awarrant under this
section it islikely that information ofimportance with respect to thethreat to the security of Canada 21.
(1) Le directeur ou unemployé désigné à cette fin par leministre peut, après avoir obtenul’approbation du ministre,demander à un juge de décernerun mandat en conformité avec leprésent
article s’il a des motifsraisonnables de croire que lemandat est nécessaire pourpermettre au Service de faireenquête sur des menaces enversla sécurité du Canada oud’exercer les fonctions qui luisont conférées en vertu del’article 16.
(2) La demande visée auparagraphe (1) est présentée parécrit et accompagnée del’affidavit du demandeur portantsur les points suivants :
a) les faits sur lesquels ledemandeur s’appuie pour avoirdes motifs raisonnables de croireque le mandat est nécessaire auxfins visées au paragraphe (1);
b) le fait que d’autres méthodesd’enquête ont été essayées envain, ou la raison pour laquelleelles semblent avoir peu dechances de succès, le fait quel’urgence de l’affaire est telle
or the performance of the duties and functions under
section 16 referred to in paragraph (
a) would not be obtained; …
(3) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to the Statistics Act , where the judge to whom an application under subsection (1) is made is satisfied of the matters referred to in paragraphs (2)(
a) and (
b) set out in the affidavit accompanying the application, the judge may issue a warrant authorizing the persons to whom it is directed to intercept any communication or obtain any information, record, document or thing and, for that purpose, (
a) to enter any place or open or obtain access to any thing; (
b) to search for, remove or return, or examine, take extracts from or make copies of or record in any other manner the information, record, document or thing; or (
c) to install, maintain or remove any thing.
(4) There shall be specified in a warrant issued under subsection (3) (
a) the type of communication authorized to be intercepted, the type of information, records, documents or things authorized to be obtained and the powers referred to in paragraphs (3)(
a) to (
c) authorized to be exercised for that purpose; (
b) the identity of the person, if known, whose communication is to be intercepted or who has possession of the information, qu’il serait très difficile de mener l’enquête sans mandat ou le fait que, sans mandat, il est probable que des informations importantes concernant les menaces ou les fonctions visées au paragraphe (1) ne pourraient être acquises; [ … ]
(3) Par dérogation à toute autre règle de droit mais sous réserve de la
Loi sur la statistique , le juge à qui est présentée la demande visée au paragraphe (1) peut décerner le mandat s’il est convaincu de l’existence des faits mentionnés aux alinéas (2)
a) et
b) et dans l’affidavit qui accompagne la demande; le mandat autorise ses destinataires à intercepter des communications ou à acquérir des informations, documents ou objets. À cette fin, il peut autoriser aussi, de leur part :
a) l’accès à un lieu ou un objet ou l’ouverture d’un objet;
b) la recherche, l’enlèvement ou la remise en place de tout document ou objet, leur examen, le prélèvement des informations qui s’y trouvent, ainsi que leur enregistrement et l’établissement de copies ou d’extraits par tout procédé;
c) l’installation, l’entretien et l’enlèvement d’objets.
(4) Le mandat décerné en vertu du paragraphe (3) porte les indications suivantes :
a) les catégories de communications dont l’interception, les catégories d’informations, de documents ou d’objets dont l’acquisition, ou les pouvoirs visés aux alinéas (3)
a) à
c) dont l’exercice, sont autorisés;
record, document or thing to be obtained; (
c) the persons or classes of persons to whom the warrant is directed; (
d) a general description of the place where the warrant may be executed, if a general description of that place can be given; (
e) the period for which the warrant is in force; and (
f) such terms and conditions as the judge considers advisable in the public interest. … 22. On application in writing to a judge for the renewal of a warrant issued under subsection 21(3) made by a person entitled to apply for such a warrant after having obtained the approval of the Minister, the judge may, from time to time, renew the warrant for a period not exceeding the period for which the warrant may be issued pursuant to subsection 21(5 ) … 23.
(1) On application in writing by the Director or any employee designated by the Minister for the purpose, a judge may, if the judge thinks fit, issue a warrant authorizing the persons to whom the warrant is directed to remove from any place any thing installed pursuant to a warrant issued under subsection 21(3) … 24. Notwithstanding any other law, a warrant issued under
section 21 or 23
b) l’identité de la personne, si elle est connue, dont les communications sont à intercepter ou qui est en possession des informations, documents ou objets à acquérir;
c) les personnes ou catégories de personnes destinataires du mandat;
d) si possible, une description générale du lieu où le mandat peut être exécuté;
e) la durée de validité du mandat;
f) les conditions que le juge estime indiquées dans l’intérêt public. […] 22. Sur la demande écrite, approuvée par le ministre, que lui en fait une personne autorisée à demander le mandat visé au paragraphe 21(3), le juge peut le renouveler, pour une période n’excédant pas celle pour laquelle ce mandat peut être décerné en vertu du paragraphe 21(5) […] 23.
(1) Sur la demande écrite que lui en fait le directeur ou un employé désigné à cette fin par le ministre, le juge peut, s’il l’estime indiqué, décerner un mandat autorisant ses destinataires à enlever un objet d’un lieu où il avait été installé en conformité avec un mandat décerné en vertu du paragraphe 21(3)
(
a) authorizes every person orperson included in a class ofpersons to whom the warrant isdirected, (
i) in the case of a warrant issuedunder
section 21, to exercise thepowers specified in the warrantfor the purpose of interceptingcommunications of the typespecified therein or obtaininginformation, records, documentsor things of the type specifiedtherein, or (ii) in the case of a warrantissued under
section 23, toexecute the warrant; and (
b) authorizes any other person toassist a person who that otherperson believes on reasonablegrounds is acting in accordancewith such a warrant. […] 24. Par dérogation à toute autrerègle de droit, le mandat décernéen vertu des articles 21 ou 23 :
a) autorise ses destinataires, entant que tels ou au
titre de leurappartenance à une catégoriedonnée : (
i) dans le cas d’un mandatdécerné en vertu de l’article 21, àemployer les moyens qui y sontindiqués pour effectuerl’interception ou l’acquisition quiy est indiquée, (ii) dans le cas d’un mandatdécerné en vertu de l’article 23, àexécuter le mandat;
b) autorise quiconque à prêterassistance à une personne qu’il ades motifs raisonnables de croirehabilitée par le mandat. [69] The Federal Court of Appeal in Atwal finds that the CSIS Act warrant regime described in these provisions isconstitutional following a challenge to certain warrants in the context of a criminal proceeding. The Court of Appeal also finds that whenspecifically authorized by a warrant, the Service may intercept solicitor-client communications for the purposes of ascertaining whetherthere is a threat to national security.
In addition, the exception to solicitor-client privilege described in Atwal is confined to the limits ofsection 12 of the CSIS Act, which requires the acquisition and retention of the information to be “strictly necessary” to investigate asecurity threat. Moreover, the potential for incidental interception of solicitor-client communications is a preoccupation of the Court inthe process of judicial approval due to the unique status of solicitor-client privilege as a principle of fundamental justice in Canadian law(Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 61 [Lavallee] at paragraph 21). [70] Mr. Mahjoub argues that Atwal is not good law. He contends that the Federal Court of Appeal was bound to follow theearlier Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Descoteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, (SCC), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860[Descoteaux] and Solosky v. The Queen, (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821 [Solosky]. In deciding as it did in Atwal, Mr.Mahjoub contends that the Federal Court of Appeal was purporting to overrule the Supreme Court jurisprudence. [71] In order to address the argument raised by Mr.
Mahjoub, it is necessary to review these decisions in some detail.
[ 72 ] A twal is an appeal of a decision of a designated judge to refuse to rescind a CSIS Act warrant. Previously, the designated judge issued a warrant pursuant to subsection 21(1) of the CSIS Act against Mr. Atwal to search and seize documents and intercept communications, the fruits of which were used to charge Mr. Atwal with conspiracy to commit murder. Atwal directly addresses the issue of solicitor-client privileged communications. At page 123 of the decision, the Court of Appeal notes that the appellant raised the issue of the warrant’s non-compliance with
section 21 of the CSIS Act since “it authorizes seizure and interception of privileged solicitor-client communications.” [ 73 ] At pages 128-133, the Federal Court of Appeal explained that a
section 21 warrant may authorize the interception of solicitor-client communications. The Court distinguished a treatise on the law of electronic surveillance which proposes limits on surveillance to protect privileged information after a criminal charge is laid. The Court of Appeal noted that the situations are not analogous because the appellant was not charged while the warrant was in effect.
The Court also dispensed with the appellant’s concern that notwithstanding the requirements of the warrant condition forbidding disclosure, a person with knowledge thereof, for example the Director or a translator, would, nevertheless, be compellable as a witness to testify as to its content. The Court reasoned as follows: In so arguing, the appellant accords no force to the mandatory language of condition 3 forbidding such disclosure and the readiness of the courts to exclude evidence whose admission would tend to bring into disrepute the administration of justice.
I cannot conceive that the apprehended situation could actually arise. [ 74 ] At page 130, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the requirement posited by the Supreme Court in Descoteaux , that solicitor-client privilege must now be examined as a substantive rule of law and not a rule of evidence as it once was. Citing Descoteaux at page 875, the Court of Appeal reproduced the Supreme Court’s formulation of the substantive rule: 1. The confidentiality of communications between solicitor and client may be raised in any circumstances where such communications are likely to be disclosed without the client's consent. 2.
Unless the law provides otherwise, when and to the extent that the legitimate exercise of a right would interfere with another person's right to have his communications with his lawyer kept confidential, the resulting conflict should be resolved in favour of protecting the confidentiality. 3.
When the law gives someone the authority to do something which, in the circumstances of the case, might interfere with that confidentiality, the decision to do so and the choice of means of exercising that authority should be determined with a view to not interfering with it except to the extent absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the enabling legislation. 4.
Acts providing otherwise in situations under paragraph 2 and enabling legislation referred to in paragraph 3 must be interpreted restrictively. [ 75 ] The Court of Appeal addressed items iii and iv of the above-cited requirements at page 130 of its decision as follows: Subsection 21(3) authorizes the judge to issue a warrant "to intercept any communication". Given that the confidential character of such communications when electronically intercepted cannot possibly be ascertained before they are monitored, the authority of subsection 21(3) simply cannot be interpreted so as to preclude their initial interception.
In my view, conditions 2 and 3 set forth in the warrant do meet the requirement that the confidentiality of solicitor-client communications be interfered with only to the extent absolutely necessary to achieve the objects of the Act. The relevant objects are stated in
section 12 . [ 76 ] In my view, Atwal does not conflict with Descoteaux or take it out of context as alleged by Mr. Mahjoub. It adapts the requirements of Descoteaux to the national security context. Descoteaux was not decided in the national security context. The case involved a search of documents at a legal aid clinic, including an individual’s application for legal aid, for which a warrant was issued on reasonable grounds to believe that individual had committed the indictable offence of underreporting income in order to be eligible for legal aid. [ 77 ] At pages 872-873 of its reasons in Descoteaux , the Supreme Court adopted the following statement in Wigmore on
Evidence as a good
summary of the substantive conditions precedent to the existence of the right of the lawyer's client to confidentiality: Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to thatpurpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,except the protection be waived. [78] The Court went on to recognize exceptions to the rule. It stated at page 873: There are exceptions.
It is not sufficient to speak to a lawyer or one of his associates for everything to become confidential from thatpoint on. The communication must be made to the lawyer or his assistants in their professional capacity; the relationship must be aprofessional one at the exact moment of the communication.
Communications made in order to facilitate the commission of a crime orfraud will not be confidential either, regardless of whether or not the lawyer is acting in good faith. [79] The Supreme Court gave no guidance here as to applicable process to determine if the solicitor-client communicationwas made in the lawyer or assistants’ professional capacity or to facilitate the commission of a crime or fraud. In fact, at page 896 theSupreme Court stated “that the procedure will vary from one case to another.” Mr. Mahjoub contends that the Supreme Court providessuch guidance in Solosky.
Solosky at pages 841-842 establishes that there must be “reasonable and probable grounds to believe” that thecommunications are not solicitor-client privileged before the contents can be read or heard. [80] Solosky involved the interception of an inmate’s mail. The Penitentiary Act, R.S.C. 1970,c.
P-6, allowed inmates’ mail to be intercepted if those inmates were considered a threat “to the safety and security of the institution”,and the Supreme Court interpreted the regulation to mean that “the envelope be subject to opening and examination to the minimumextent necessary to establish whether it is properly the subject of solicitor-client privilege.” Solosky imposes a greater restriction onofficials intercepting solicitor-client communications than Atwal. [81] The circumstances of
section 21 warrants are far different and involve the investigation ofa threat to the security of Canada, in a context that pre-dates any legal proceeding, and when regular contact with legal counsel is notexpected for legal advice. In my view, Solosky can therefore be distinguished on its facts. Atwal was decided in the national securitycontext and reflects the state of the law in Canada concerning
section 21 warrants authorizing interception of solicitor-clientcommunications to which this Court is bound. My determination finds support in Corp. of Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Canada(Attorney General) (1998), (ON CA), 40 O.R. (3d) 489, at paragraphs 38, 78, and 90-91 (C.A.). In that case, on asimilar constitutional challenge,
section 21 warrants were found to be constitutional, and the Court expressly relies on Atwal as theleading case. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused. [82] While I find Atwal to be binding in the circumstances, that is not to say that Solosky does not provide guidance relatingto appropriate restrictions on solicitor-client intercepts after the issuance of the security certificate and the arrest of the named person. Itis then difficult to distinguish Mr. Mahjoub’s circumstances since he was an inmate.
The censorship of penitentiary correspondence isreasonably analogous to the interception of Mr. Mahjoub’s communications while incarcerated, and in my mind more analogous than thefacts of Atwal. [83] The jurisprudence appears to require a more stringent standard for exceptions to solicitor-client privilege when theinformation is sought for the purpose of acquiring evidence for legal proceedings. See: Lavallee and Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v.Blood Tribe Department of Health, 2008 SCC 44 [Blood Tribe]. I note that Solosky was cited with approval in Lavallee as the leadingcase on the issue in its circumstances.
In Solosky, the standard is articulated as follows at pages 841-842: [The] “minimum extent necessary to establish whether it is properly the subject of solicitor-client privilege” should be interpreted in sucha manner that: (
i) the contents of an envelope may be inspected for contraband; (ii) in limited circumstances, the communication may be read to ensure that it, in fact, contains a confidential communication betweena solicitor and client written for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice; (iii) the letter should only be read if there are reasonable and probable grounds for believing the contrary, and then only to the extentnecessary to determine the bona fides of the communication;
(iv) the authorized penitentiary official who examines the envelope, upon ascertaining that the envelope contains nothing in breach ofsecurity, is under a duty at law to maintain the confidentiality of the communication. [84] In Almrei (Re), 2008 FC 1216, Justice Mosley addressed a constitutional challenge to the IRPA based on an allegedbreach to solicitor-client privilege. He observed the following on the issue at paragraphs 60 and 61of his reasons: [60] Despite its importance, solicitor-client privilege is not absolute: R. v. McClure, 2001 SCC 14 , [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, atparagraphs 34-35.
The case law relied upon by the named persons to buttress the importance of the solicitor-client privilege does notexclude its possible breach for reasons of necessity: Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of Health, 2008 SCC44, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 574, at paragraphs 17 and 22; Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Bakerv. Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink, 2002 SCC 61, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209, at paragraph 36; Smith v.
Jones, (SCC),[1999] 1 S.C.R. 455, at paragraph 57. [61] Avoiding injury to national security, which can include the risks of inadvertent disclosure, may constitute a necessity that warrantspiercing the privilege in as minimal ways as the circumstances dictate. This should not be decided in a factual vacuum. [85] To conclude, I am satisfied that Atwal has not been overruled and is binding on this Court. It creates a national securityexception to solicitor-client privilege in the narrow context of a prospective CSIS investigation of a national security threat authorized bya
section 21 warrant. [86] Once an individual is detained and/or legal proceedings are initiated, it is my view that the narrower exception tosolicitor-client privilege found in Solosky applies to any warrants issued.
While the interest in protecting national security and thesecurity of the detention institution is still present, the warrant must require that once a communication is identified as one betweensolicitor and client, CSIS must have reasonable and probable grounds for believing that it is not a legitimate solicitor-clientcommunication or that it pertains to imminent danger before the interception can go any further. [87] I am satisfied that Atwal has not been overruled and as such I am bound by its determination.
The constitutionalchallenge raised in this case relating to the interception of solicitor-client communications authorized by
section 21 warrants, has beendecided by Atwal.
Section 21 of the CSIS Act is not unconstitutional simply because
section 21 warrants may authorize the incidentalinterception of solicitor-client communications for the purposes of a prospective investigation. Conclusion on the first issue [88] On the basis of the challenges submitted by Mr. Mahjoub and the facts of this case, I find that the impugnedprovisions of the CSIS Act infringe neither
section 7,
section 8 nor any other
section of the Charter. [89] The term “threats to the security of Canada” is adequately defined in
section 2 of the CSIS Act to provide notice to thecitizen of what kind of activities will be investigated and limits on the Service’s discretion to investigate activities. Parliament did notcontemplate that
section 12 would authorize unreasonable searches and seizures when privacy rights were engaged. Instead, intrusivesearches and seizures were to be authorized by
section 21 warrants.
Section 6 does not engage Mr. Mahjoub’s rights and cannot beimpugned by allegations attacking the constitutionality of the Service’s policies developed thereunder. Arrangements with foreignagencies established by the authority of
section 17 do not infringe Mr. Mahjoub’s rights, even if they entail sharing the personalinformation in the possession of the Service as intelligence. The public interest in sharing the information to further the mandate of CSISis greater than the “residual” privacy interest that Mr. Mahjoub has in the information. Lastly, sections 21-24 of the Act do not permitunreasonable searches and seizures simply because they allow the Federal Court to authorize the interception of solicitor-clientcommunications.
Prior to the commencement of any legal proceedings against a target, it may be necessary to incidentally intercept suchcommunications in the interests of national security. 2. Can the lawfulness of the
section 21 warrants be challenged? [90] The Ministers argue, as a preliminary matter, that Mr. Mahjoub is mounting an impermissible collateral attack on thevalidity of the warrants in his challenge to the lawfulness of the
section 21 warrants in these proceedings.
[91] Mr. Mahjoub raises two preliminary issues relating to the extent to which the warrants can be challenged. First, healleges that the evidence obtained pursuant to the
section 21 warrants is a priori inadmissible because it was obtained as a result of theprevious IRPA regime that was declared unconstitutional in Charkaoui I. Second, he alleges that he is unable to effectively make hischallenge to the warrants because the full text of the warrants and the supporting affidavits has not been disclosed to him, infringing hisright to full answer and defence.
In the alternative, he argues that the Court should be restricted to considering the lawfulness of thewarrants on the basis of the information that was disclosed to him, without regard to the information that does not appear in thesummaries, akin to the process used when an accused challenges a Criminal Code warrant. (
a) Does the doctrine of collateral attack preclude challenge to the validity of the
section 21 warrants in the context ofdetermining the admissibility of evidence pursuant to
section 24 of the Charter in a security certificate proceeding? [92] The Ministers rely on the decision Wilson v. The Queen, (SCC), [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594 [Wilson], insupport of their submission that this challenge to the warrants is a collateral attack on the Court’s decision to issue warrants ex partepursuant to
section 21 of the CSIS Act. They argue that Mr. Mahjoub cannot “reach back” and challenge the warrants in attempting toexclude the evidence obtained under the warrants’ authority. [93] Wilson at page 607 states that “[s]ince no right of appeal is given from the granting of
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