2011 MBCA 5, 2011 MBCA 5

Citation: J & R Property Management et al. v. Kenwell, Date: 20110202 2011 MBCA 5 Docket: AI 09-30-07124 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MANITOBA Coram: Chief Justice Richard J. Scott Mr. Justice Richard J. Chartier Mr. Justice Alan D. MacInnes BETWEEN : J & R PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, ) J. Plett ADLER PROPERTIES LTD. and ) on behalf of 4229194 MANITOBA LTD. ) J & R Property Management ) (Landlord) Appellant ) K. Lovejoy ) also known as ) Blake Kenwell ) in person ) ) T. J.

Björnson - and - ) for The Residential ) Tenancies Commission ) ) Appeal heard: ) October 14, 2010 BLAKE KENWELL ) ) Judgment delivered: (Tenant) Respondent ) February 2, 2011 MacINNES J.A. 1 The landlord, having obtained leave, appeals the decision of the Residential Tenancies Commission (the Commission) which had ordered the landlord to compensate the tenant as follows: Value of personal property wrongfully disposed of $7,702.41 Refund of storage fee $490.00 Costs $55.00 Total: $8,247.41 2 The appeal pertained to three questions for which leave was granted and to which I will shortly refer.

FACTS 3 The landlord and tenant entered into a one-year written lease agreement commencing February 1, 2008. In May 2008, one Kristina Koyle (Ms Koyle) moved into the rental unit. She brought all of her personal property, much of which was packed in boxes. On June 19, 2008, the tenant wrote the landlord advising that the tenant would be leaving the premises at the end of July 2008. In part, the tenant wrote: “p.s. Everything stored will be removed before the end of July.” The tenant also left an email address for messages. 4 The tenant and Ms Koyle went on vacation in July.

The caretakers of the complex emailed the tenant on July 6, 2008, and the tenant responded. 5 On July 11, 2008, the caretakers emailed the tenant to advise that the July rent cheque had bounced. On the same date, the landlord posted a notice of termination for non-payment of rent effective July 12, 2008, and a notice of abandonment requesting that the tenant contact the landlord by Monday, July 14, at 3:00 p.m. The latter notice stated: If I don’t hear from you, I may:

– enter the unit; – make a list of what’s left in the unit; – throw out any food or unsanitary items, or anything that is not safe to store; or – pack and store remaining items. 6 The tenant, who was still on vacation, did not respond to these posted notices nor did the caretakers attempt to reach the tenant by email in respect of them. 7 On July 14, 2008, the caretakers entered the apartment. They found some rotten food, as well as numerous boxes containing the personal effects of the tenant and Ms Koyle. The caretakers and three others proceeded to go through the contents of the rental unit.

They threw out all of the contents, except for about ten garbage bags of clothing that were donated to the Salvation Army and some personal papers. The contents that were thrown out according to the caretakers included furniture, jewellery, computer parts, books, a television set, a VHS player and a radio. There were numerous other items disposed of, and the caretakers made a partial inventory of these items. As well, the caretakers packed several boxes with personal papers found on the premises and stored these in the basement. 8 On July 24, 2008, the tenant emailed the caretakers.

The July 24 email stated that the caretakers’ July 11 email had just been received, that the tenant was unaware the rent cheque was not good, and that the tenant was now back in Winnipeg to collect the personal belongings. On July 26, the caretakers emailed the tenant stating that they would release the goods upon receipt of $490 for packing, storage, cleaning and lock change fees. The tenant and Ms Koyle attended the complex and retrieved several boxes of personal papers, upon payment of $490.

As well, they searched the garbage and found some of Ms Koyle’s medical records. 9 Some time later, the tenant filed a claim under The Residential Tenancies Act , C.C.S.M., c. R119 (the Act ). The initial hearing before a residential tenancies officer was appealed to the Commission by both the landlord and tenant, resulting in the decision of the Commission previously stated. This appeal from the Commission’s decision pertains to the three questions for which leave to appeal was granted, namely (at para. 36):

(1) Must a landlord/tenant relationship exist, with a tenant the claimant, in order for the Commission to have jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s claim against the landlord?

(2) If there is a landlord and tenant relationship in existence, does the Commission have jurisdiction to consider and award compensation in respect of the claim of a third person who is not a tenant, but is the owner of abandoned property under

Part 7 of the Act ?

(3) If the answer to question (2) is “yes,” must the third person advance a claim in order for the Commission to have jurisdiction to consider and make such an award? 10 An appeal to this court from a decision of the Commission may be taken only on a question of jurisdiction or of law, and only with leave obtained from a judge of the Court of Appeal (see s. 175(2)). As indicated, a leave application was made and allowed on the three questions above noted. As the Act requires, those questions must therefore be questions of jurisdiction or of law.

STANDARD OF REVIEW 11 The landlord asserts that the questions concern the Commission’s jurisdiction and are all questions of law.

Accordingly, the landlord says the standard of review is correctness. 12 The tenant argues that the standard of review on all three questions is correctness. 13 The Commission submits that the issues on appeal are questions of jurisdiction and that the standard of review is correctness. 14 Although there may be some argument as to whether all of these questions constitute true questions of jurisdiction, given the parties’ arguments, I will treat the three questions upon which leave was granted as questions of jurisdiction and will apply a correctness standard of review.

I turn now to address each of the three questions. ANALYSIS 15 I have attached as

Schedule A to these reasons those provisions of the Act which, in my view, are relevant to determination of the questions on this appeal. Question (1) : Must a landlord/tenant relationship exist, with a tenant the claimant, in order for the Commission to have jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s claim against the landlord? 16 The landlord argues that a landlord/tenant relationship must exist, with a tenant the claimant, in order for the Commission to have jurisdiction to consider the claimant’s claim against the landlord. In so doing, it relies upon Holy Spirit Credit Union v. Gurevich et al., 2000 MBCA 37 , 145 Man.R. (2d) 285 , where this court wrote (at para. 28): Pursuant to clause (

c) of s. 178 of the Act , the matter is referred back to the Commission for consideration of the question as to whether a

new landlord and tenant relationship was created by the conduct of the Credit Union and the tenant. The existence of such a relationship is a condition precedent to the application of the Act and to the jurisdiction of the Commission. The determination that such a relationship was created would, in my view, be subject to appellate review on a standard of correctness. 17 The landlord acknowledges that a landlord/tenant relationship existed. It argues, however, that that relationship was between it and the tenant, Kenwell, but that there was no such relationship with Ms Koyle.

Accordingly, the landlord says that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in granting an award of compensation which included compensation to Ms Koyle, who was never a tenant. 18 The tenant agrees that in order for the Act to apply and for the Commission to have jurisdiction, a residential tenancy, either implied or expressed, must exist.

The tenant asserts, as the landlord acknowledges, that here a landlord/tenancy relationship existed. 19 The tenant argues, however, that the essence of question (1) is whether the Commission has jurisdiction to deal with a claim related to the goods of a third person who is not a tenant. The tenant asserts that

Part 7 of the Act clearly addresses this question and that s. 106(3) gives the answer by specifically providing that the owner of an item of abandoned property may claim against the landlord. 20 The Commission’s position is to the same effect as that of the tenant. 21 I agree with the submissions of the tenant and the Commission.

The claimant in a claim for abandoned property need not be a tenant under a landlord/tenant relationship. 22 Here, there is no dispute that there was a landlord/tenancy agreement in existence with respect to the premises from which the goods in question were removed and disposed of by the landlord. Accordingly, Holy Spirit Credit Union is of no assistance to the landlord. As well, there is no dispute as to the fact that the goods seized were “abandoned property” as defined in the Act . 23 Section 106(3) of the Act clearly provides that the tenant or the owner of abandoned property may claim the item(

s) from the landlord and upon paying the landlord the reasonable cost for removal and storage, the landlord must return the abandoned property to the tenant or owner. Accordingly, I would answer “no” to question (1). The claimant need not be the tenant. Question (2) : If there is a landlord and tenant relationship in existence, does the Commission have jurisdiction to consider and award compensation in respect of the claim of the third person who is not a tenant, but is the owner of abandoned property under

Part 7 of the Act ? 24 For essentially the same reasons argued with respect to question (1), the landlord asserts that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to hear matters regarding Ms Koyle’s property, consider the value of it, or order the landlord to compensate her.

It argues that the Commission is a body of limited, not inherent, jurisdiction, and in acting as it did, it settled a private dispute between two parties not bound by a tenancy agreement, effectively assuming the role of a court of law. 25 The tenant, relying upon s. 106(3) of the Act , asserts that the Commission does have jurisdiction to consider and award compensation in respect of the claim of a third person who is not a tenant, but is the owner of abandoned property. 26 The Commission asserts that it is apparent that the legislation intends to give a remedy to an owner of abandoned property and that this includes the jurisdiction to award compensation to a third party owner when the landlord has removed his/her property in contravention of the Act . 27 In my view, the scheme of

Part 7 of the Act clearly provides the Commission with jurisdiction in respect of abandoned property left by either a tenant or a third party owner. 28 Section 106(2) provides the landlord with the right to remove, store, sell or dispose of abandoned property, but only in accordance with

Part 7. Sections 106.1(2) through 107(3) set the ground rules for the manner in which the landlord must act in respect of the removal of abandoned property, including its storage, disposal, sale and retention of sale proceeds. While s. 106(3) gives the owner of abandoned property the right to advance a claim against the landlord in respect of such property, s. 108 provides the landlord with protection against liability to the owner of the abandoned property for loss suffered as a result of its removal, storage, disposal or sale by the landlord, provided that the landlord substantially complies with the provisions of

Part 7. 29 In my view, the Commission does have jurisdiction to consider the claim of an owner of abandoned property and to determine whether substantial compliance with

Part 7 was met by the landlord. If it was, then there is no liability of the landlord to the owner. If substantial compliance was not met, however, then it follows logically that the Commission has jurisdiction to consider an appropriate remedy, which would include an award of compensation in respect of the claim of the third person who is not a tenant, but is the owner of abandoned property under

Part 7 of the Act . 30 I would thus answer “yes” to question (2). Question (3) : If the answer to question (2) is “yes,” must the third person advance a claim in order for the Commission to have jurisdiction to consider and make such an award? 31 The landlord argues that in order for the Commission to have jurisdiction to consider and make an award, the third person must advance a claim against the landlord. It argues that without advancing her own claim, the onus thereby shifts onto the landlord to disprove the entitlement of a stranger instead of keeping the onus upon the actual claimant to demonstrate a legal and factual basis for compensation.

32 It asserts that this case is an example of such an instance. The landlord was directed to pay $7,702.41 on account of personal property, but only $2,585.25 of that award was actually related to the property of the person who was the maker of the claim (the tenant). The landlord says that the balance of the award was thus made to a person whom the landlord did not know was staying in the rental unit and who, for that reason, is technically not even a party to these proceedings, all without any explanation from the Commission as to the basis upon which she was entitled to any compensation. 33 The tenant argues that while not advancing a claim herself, Ms Koyle took

part in the proceedings and gave evidence of her belongings which were left on the demised premises. Beyond that, the tenant argues the existence of an obligation to Ms Koyle with respect to her property left on the demised premises which was seized and disposed of by the landlord. I note, however, that upon questioning, the tenant essentially acknowledged that there was no basis for the existence of a legal obligation, vis-à-vis Ms Koyle, such as being a bailee of goods, etc. 34 The Commission argues that the intention of the legislature in respect of the Act is as set out in the

preamble. It is to provide a comprehensive code to aid in the settlement of disputes when small sums of money are at issue. The Commission asserts that, in most cases, it is likely more efficient for the tenant to claim for all abandoned property in his/her rental unit, which was the case here. 35 In determining the answer to question (3), one must decide whether “shall” is mandatory or directory and what is meant by the word “application.” I will deal first with the latter point. 36 Section 152(1.1) of the Act appears to require an application in order to have a matter determined under the Act .

It reads: Application 152(1.1) A person who wishes to have a question or matter determined shall make an application to the director. 37 Interestingly, the French version of s. 152(1.1) substitutes the word “demande” for “application” and “peut” for “shall.” It reads: Demande 152(1.1) Toute personne qui désire faire trancher une question peut présenter une demande en ce sens au directeur. 38 The two fundamental rules of

interpretation applying to bilingual legislation as described in The Honourable Mr. Justice Michel Bastarache et al ., The Law of Bilingual

Interpretation (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008), are as follows (at p. 15): The bilingual model is based upon two fundamental principles, which we will discuss in this section. The first principle is the Equal Authenticity Rule. According to this rule, both the English and French versions of a statute are equally authentic statements of legislative intent, and neither one is supreme or paramount over the other. The second principle is the Shared Meaning Rule.

This rule provides, in short, that both versions of the statute are expressions of the same legislative intent and that courts interpreting statutes should, as far as possible, attempt to ascertain that intent through a determination of the shared or common meaning of the two versions. 39 Arguably, the French version of s. 152(1.1) suggests a process that may be somewhat less strict and formal than does the English version of the section. 40 As well, bilingual considerations aside, what stands out in respect of s. 152(1.1) is that neither version of the

section speaks of an application or a “demande” in the prescribed form. There are, however, other provisions in the Act which specifically require an application “in the prescribed form.” See ss. 127(2), 133(3) and 137(2). 41 While it is true that Ms Koyle did not formally file an application, the evidence is clear that she appeared at the hearing with a detailed list of her property. She testified that “her belongings” were in the unit. One can reasonably infer that despite the absence of a formal filed application, she came to the hearing actively seeking a remedy for her lost property.

The reasons of the Commission support that conclusion. They wrote in their reasons for decision: Ms Koyle filed a very extensive 5 page list of her belongings which she totalled at $42,643.00. The panel does not doubt that she lost a lot of property. She had several witnesses testify as to the extent of her property. .... 42 As well, ss. 187(1) and (2) of the Act provide, respectively: Effect of lack of formality in proceedings 187(1) No proceeding under this Act is invalid by reason only of a defect in form, a technical irregularity or a lack of formality.

Substantial compliance with forms, etc. 187(2) Substantial compliance with requirements respecting the contents of forms, notices or documents is sufficient unless the director or the commission is of the opinion that it would result in unfairness to any person.

43 It would seem that the foregoing provisions of the Act are in keeping with the general intent of the Act as set forth in itspreamble, that dispute resolution should be “fair, informal, accessible, inexpensive, expeditious and amicable.” 44 Though factually distinguishable from this case, when considering a defect in form, regard may be had to the decision of A &M Transport Ltd. v. Black, [1983] F.C.J. No. 930 (C.A.) (QL). In that case, a regulation pursuant to the Canada Labour Code required awritten authorization by a complainant. In the absence of such an authorization, Thurlow C.J. had occasion to comment: ....

Section 203 of the statute and

section 6 of the regulations provide that no proceeding under

Part V of the Act is invalid by reasononly of a defect in form or a technical irregularity.

It must we think be taken that the signing and making of the complaint were in factauthorized by the complainants even though not in writing and in such circumstances it appears to us that the lack of a writtenauthorization was no more than a defect in form or a technical irregularity which did not render the proceeding void or deprive the Boardof its jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. 45 As regards the question whether “shall” is in the context here mandatory or directory, Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on theConstruction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008), describes the basic principle of statutory

interpretation asfollows (at pp. 74-75): When “shall” and “must” are used in legislation, to impose an obligation or create a prohibition or requirement, they are alwaysimperative. A person who “shall” or “must” do something has no discretion to decide whether or not to do it. A person prohibited fromdoing something is equally devoid of lawful choice. The issue that arises in connection with “shall” and “must” is not whether they areimperative, but the consequences that flow from a failure to comply.

In some legislation, the consequences of failing to do what one isobliged to do (or not do) are clearly set out, but in other contexts the legislation is silent and it is left to the courts to determine whethernon-compliance can be cured. If breaching an obligation or requirement imposed by “shall” entails a nullity, the provision is said to be mandatory; if the breach can befixed or disregarded, the provision is said to be directory. .... 46 In the recent decision of this court in B.W. v.

Child and Family Services of Winnipeg, 2009 MBCA 95, 245 Man.R. (2d) 186,Hamilton J.A. examined, in some detail, the law surrounding mandatory versus directory provisions. She wrote (at para. 38): The object of the legislation in question and the effect of the ruling are crucial factors for determining whether a provision is mandatoryor directory. See British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 4; (SCC),166 N.R. 81; 44 B.C.A.C. 1; 71 W.A.C. 1, and Blueberry River Indian Band and Doig River Indian Band v.

Canada (Minister ofIndian Affairs and Northern Development), (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344; 190 N.R. 89, in which McLachlin, J., as shethen was, wrote (at para. 42): ... This court has since held that the object of the statute, and the effect of ruling one way or the other, are the most importantconsiderations in determining whether a directive is mandatory or directory: British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada(Attorney General) ... 47 In Caddy Lake Cottagers Association v. Florence-Nora Access Road Inc. et al. (1998), (MB CA), 129Man.R. (2d) 71 (C.A.), as explained by Pierre-André Côté, The

Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 2d ed. (Cowansville: LesÉditions Yvon Blais, Inc., 1991) at 204, Helper J.A. adopted the following three factors (at para. 42): Three factors appear to influence the courts: the prejudice caused by non-compliance with formalities, the potential consequences of acourt finding of nullity, and the subject matter of legislation. See also, Wolfrom v.

Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists (Man.), 2001 MBCA 152, 160 Man.R. (2d) 62. 48 Helper J.A. also cited, with approval, the reasons of Kerans J.A. in Bridgeland Riverside Community Association and City ofCalgary et al., Re (1982), 1982 ABCA 138 , 135 D.L.R. (3d) 724 (Alta.

C.A.), in which he stressed the elements of prejudiceand fairness (at p. 730): .... ... [A]bsent an express statutory statement of effect, no defect should vitiate a proceeding unless, as a result of it, some real possibilityof prejudice to the attacking party is shown, or unless the procedure was so dramatically devoid of the appearance of fairness that theadministration of justice is brought into disrepute. 49 Thus, the result of nullification and its effect on the parties and others, in the context of the object of the legislation, are keyto the inquiry, which Iacobucci J. described as “blatantly result-oriented” in British Columbia (Attorney General) v.

Canada (AttorneyGeneral);

An Act Respecting the Vancouver Island Railway (Re), (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 41 at 123. He also wrote thefollowing about this process of statutory

interpretation (at pp. 123-24): .... ... [T]he manipulation of mandate and direction is, for the most part, the manipulation of an end and not a means. In this sense, toquote again from Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [ (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721], the principle is “vague andexpedient” (p. 742). This means that the court which decides what is mandatory, and what is directory, brings no special tools to bearupon the decision. The decision is informed by the usual process of statutory

interpretation. But the process perhaps evokes a specialconcern for “inconvenient” effects, both public and private, which will emanate from the interpretive result. 50 While the factors have been described in different ways in the case law, they consistently focus on the two considerationsexplained in Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), (SCC),

[1995] 4 S.C.R. 344 , as stated in B.W. , “the object and purpose of the legislation and the effect of ruling the provision mandatory or directory. The latter really focusses on the effect of automatic nullification if the provision is mandatory” ( B.W. , at para. 42 ). 51 In my view, the combined effect of the foregoing is that the provision in question is directory. That is, s. 152(1.1) does require an owner of abandoned property who wishes to advance a claim against the landlord to make an application to the director for such relief.

However, such an application, given the present language of the Act , may be made formally or informally. 52 The danger, of course, is that without any participation by the actual owner of the property, there will be real difficulty and consequent uncertainty as to proof of the substance and value of the claim advanced. This ought to cause a real concern for the tribunal if asked to make an award of compensation against the landlord payable to anyone other than the real owner.

To make such an award could result in significant prejudice to the landlord both in respect of the landlord’s ability to challenge the existence and proof of the claim and in causing the landlord to become obligated to pay an amount to someone other than the real owner, which would result in that person receiving a windfall if the money did not find its way to the real owner. 53 The former concern is very evident here. Ms Koyle advanced the claim, which she valued at $42,643. Ultimately, however, the Commission awarded her the depreciated value of her property in the amount of $5,117.16.

Without her pursuing the claim and attending to testify and be subject to examination and cross-examination, the Commission would have been left very much at sea in attempting to value the claim in anything but a purely arbitrary fashion. 54 In this case, the landlord’s argument that it did not know that Ms Koyle was living on the premises and that it is thus somehow unfair that the landlord should have to compensate her for abandoned property misses the point. 55 The circumstances here are that there was a landlord/tenant relationship in existence and there was abandoned property left on the tenancy.

At the time the landlord seized the abandoned property, it did so believing the property to be the tenant’s.

Part 7 of the Act clearly provides for the manner in which the landlord is to deal with abandoned property. The Commission found that it failed to comply with the provisions of the Act in that regard. In short, the claim advanced and the remedy granted pertained in essence not to who owned the abandoned property, but to the fact that the property was abandoned on the tenancy and that the landlord, after seizing the property as it was entitled to do, failed to comply with the provisions of the Act concerning abandoned property.

It thus lost the protection of s. 108 and exposed itself to a claim for a remedy as a result of its breach. 56 Moreover, in this case, there can be no doubt that Ms Koyle, while she did not make or file a claim in the formal sense of the word, clearly advanced a claim by providing a five-page list of her goods and testifying as to them and their value. 57 In all of the circumstances here, the Commission had jurisdiction to grant the award to Ms Koyle as it did. To so act was, in my view, consistent with the general intent of the Act to provide a comprehensive, simple and effective dispute resolution mechanism.

There was no prejudice caused by non-compliance with the filing of a formal application, and to conclude that failure to do so would effectively result in a nullity would be to produce a wholly unjust result. 58 Accordingly, I would answer “yes” to question (3), but conclude that the language of s. 152(1.1) is directory and that although informal, an application was made here by Ms Koyle. Thus, the Commission had jurisdiction to deal with her claim. 59 I would therefore dismiss the landlord’s appeal. There will be no costs. __________________________ J.A. I agree: ________________________ C.J.M.

I agree: __________________________ J.A.

SCHEDULE A The

preamble of the Act provides: THE RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT C.C.S.M., c. R119 WHEREAS Manitobans recognize that the law respecting the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants and the regulation of rents is in need of general reform; AND WHEREAS it is in the public interest that the law respecting landlords and tenants and the regulation of rents should be set out in a

comprehensive code; AND WHEREAS Manitobans recognize that the small sums of money typically at issue between landlords and tenants, the need for prompt settlement of disputes and the desirability of preserving ongoing harmonious relationships between landlords and tenants require innovative dispute resolution that is fair, informal, accessible, inexpensive, expeditious and amicable; AND WHEREAS many of the usual disputes between landlords and tenants can be resolved in an informal, administrative setting; AND WHEREAS it is in the interests of landlords and tenants that the knowledge and skill of persons specializing in landlord and tenant and rent regulation matters be combined in a specialist tribunal and brought to bear on the review and resolution of disputes; NOW THEREFORE HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, enacts as follows: . . . . .

PART 7 TENANT’S PERSONAL PROPERTY “Abandoned property” defined 106(1) In this Part, “abandoned property” means personal property left by a tenant in a rental unit or residential complex that the tenant has vacated or abandoned or from which the tenant has been evicted, other than property being stored under an agreement with the landlord. Landlord’s powers re abandoned property 106(2) A landlord may remove, store, sell or dispose of abandoned property only in accordance with this Part.

When property to be returned to tenant 106(3) The tenant or the owner of an item of abandoned property stored by the landlord may claim the item by paying the landlord the reasonable cost of removing and storing the abandoned property and the landlord shall give the item to the tenant or owner. . . . . .

Storing other property 106.1(5 ) A landlord who removes abandoned property that cannot be disposed of under subsection (2) (worthless, unsanitary or unsafe property) or (4) (property of little monetary value) must, subject to any direction of the director, store the property in a safe place and manner for at least 60 days. . . . . . Sale or disposal of unclaimed property 107(1) If the tenant or the owner fails to claim and remove abandoned property stored by the landlord within the 60-day time period referred to in subsection 106.1(5) or

section 106.2, the landlord may (

a) in the case of property referred to in subsection 106.1(1) (personal documents and photographs of little value), dispose of them at an appropriate disposal facility; and (

b) in any other case, sell or dispose of the abandoned property in a manner and subject to any conditions set by the director. . . . . .

PART 11 PROCEDURES . . . . . Application 152(1.1) A person who wishes to have a question or matter determined shall make an application to the director. . . . . . Effect of lack of formality in proceedings 187(1) No proceeding under this Act is invalid by reasons only of a defect in form, a technical irregularity or a lack of formality. Substantial compliance with forms, etc. 187(2) Substantial compliance with requirements respecting the contents of forms, notices or documents is sufficient unless the director or the commission is of the opinion that it would result in unfairness to any person.

. . . . .