Hintz v. Chief Firearms Officer (Man.), 2011 MBCA 60

Citation: Hintz v. Chief Firearms Officer (Man.), 2011 MBCA 60 Date: 20110803 Docket: AR 08-30-06946 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MANITOBA Coram: Madam Justice Barbara M. Hamilton Mr. Justice Martin H. Freedman Mr. Justice Alan D. MacInnes BETWEEN : RUDOLPH HINTZ ) R. Hintz ) on his own behalf (Applicant) (Appellant) Appellant ) ) S. M. Telles-Langdon - and - ) for the Respondent ) CHIEF FIREARMS OFFICER FOR ) Appeal heard: MANITOBA ) May 17, 2011 ) (Respondent) Respondent ) Judgment delivered: ) August 3, 2011 FREEDMAN J.A. 1 The appellant is a gun collector.

He applied to the respondent for renewal of a licence to possess certain handguns, but his application was partially denied. Adhering to the procedure set out in s. 74 of the Firearms Act (the Act ), he referred the matter to a Provincial Court judge, who, after hearing viva voce evidence, confirmed the respondent’s decision. The appellant then appealed pursuant to s. 77 of the Act to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, who dismissed his appeal. Under s. 80 of the Act , leave to appeal to this court may be granted on any ground that involves a question of law alone.

The appellant sought leave to appeal. 2 Leave was granted on the following question of law: Can the requirement under s. 12(6)(

b) of the Firearms Act that “beginning on December 1, 1998 the particular individual was continuously the holder of a registration certificate for that kind of handgun”, in order for that individual to qualify for the license privilege permitting possession of a prohibited handgun, be met by that individual having been issued and continuing to hold a restricted registration certificate for a handgun (or part thereof) that meets the definition of a prohibited handgun under s. 12(6.1)(

a) of the Firearms Act / s. 84(1) of the Criminal Code ? The Firearms Act /The Legal Context 3 The pertinent rules controlling who may legally possess firearms in Canada are contained in the Act and the Criminal Code . In a case with similarities to the present one, Canada (Attorney General) v. Demchuk , 2007 BCSC 326 , L. Smith J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court said that (at para. 4): The facts of this case are fairly straightforward, but because of the tortured history of the last decade’s legislative changes regarding possession of firearms in Canada, its legal context is not.

4 A clear introduction to that context was given by MacDonnell J. in R. v. Whitmore et al. , 2008 ONCJ 166 (at paras. 2-3 ): Prior to December 1, 1998, the control, registration and regulation of firearms was governed by

Part III of the Criminal Code . On February 14, 1995, the Firearms Act ( Bill C-68) received first reading in the House of Commons. The effect of the legislation was to substantially amend

Part III of the Code and to create a new regime for the control of firearms. Bill C-68 received Royal Assent on December 5, 1995. The majority of the provisions of the new Act came into force on December 1, 1998. A central component of the new regime is the requirement that an individual must hold a license to possess the kind of firearm in question and a registration certificate for that firearm. Eligibility to hold a license and/or a registration certificate is determined by reference to the provisions of the Firearms Act .

Pursuant to the Act , the Chief Firearms Officer is responsible for issuing licences and the Registrar of Firearms is responsible for issuing registration certificates . [emphasis added] 5 As MacDonnell J. indicated, the Act provides for the licensing of persons and the registration of firearms so as to permit in certain circumstances the lawful possession of firearms.

Section 13 of the Act states: Registration Certificates 13. A person is not eligible to hold a registration certificate for a firearm unless the person holds a licence authorizing the person to possess that kind of firearm. 6 The

section in the Act that is the focus of this case is s. 12(6). This

section is found under the general heading and sub- headings reading: “AUTHORIZED POSSESSION,” “Eligibility To Hold Licences,” and “ Special Cases – Prohibited Firearms, Weapons, Devices and Ammunition .” Subsection (6) has a marginal note describing it in these terms: “Grandfathered individuals – pre- December 1, 1998 handguns.” The subsection reads:

(6) A particular individual is eligible to hold a licence authorizing that particular individual to possess a handgun referred to in subsection (6.1) if (

a) on December 1, 1998 the particular individual (

i) held a registration certificate under the former Act for that kind of handgun , or . . . . . (

b) beginning on December 1, 1998 the particular individual was continuously the holder of a registration certificate for that kind of handgun . [emphasis added] 7 The appellant says that he meets all the requirements of s. 12(6) and he relies on this subsection for the right to be issued a licence to possess the handguns in question. The Crown says that the appellant fails to satisfy clause ( b ), and that he has not been, since December 1, 1998, the continuous holder of a registration certificate for “that kind of handgun.” 8 Section 12(6) deals with eligibility to hold a licence to possess “a handgun referred to in subsection (6.1).” The relevant parts of that provision are:

(6.1) Subsection (6) applies in respect of a handgun (

a) that has a barrel equal to or less than 105 mm in length or that is designed or adapted to discharge a 25 or 32 calibre cartridge; and (

b) in respect of which (

i) on December 1, 1998 a registration certificate had been issued to an individual under the former Act, . . . . . 9 It should be noted that in s. 12(6.1)( b )(i), the individual to whom the registration certificate had to have been issued by December 1, 1998 need not be the same individual whose eligibility for a licence is dealt with in subs. (6).

It appears that the intent of this particular provision is that a handgun that had not been registered on December 1, 1998 to some individual would not qualify as the basis for licence eligibility. 10 Under the Act and the Criminal Code , firearms are in one of three classifications, namely, non-restricted, restricted or prohibited. Section 84(1)(

a) of the Code defines a “restricted firearm” to include a handgun that is not a prohibited firearm. A handgun described in clause (

a) of subs. (6.1) of the Act (often referred to as a “12(6) handgun” or a “12(6.1) handgun,” being a handgun that has a barrel equal to or less than 105 mm in length or that is designed or adapted to discharge a 25 or 32 calibre cartridge), is included in the definition of a “prohibited firearm” in s. 84(1) of the Code . The lawful possession of prohibited firearms is very strictly controlled and limited. 11 In Whitmore , MacDonnell J. continued with his useful explanation of the legislative context (at paras. 5, 7, 9-10): Before the advent of the Firearms Act , 12(6.1) handguns were classified as restricted weapons under

Part III of the Criminal Code . Possession of a restricted weapon was not an offence provided that the possessor held a registration certificate issued by a local registrar of firearms. Bill C-68 amended the Criminal Code to reclassify 12(6.1) handguns as prohibited firearms. To protect persons who had lawfully acquired and registered 12(6.1) handguns prior to the tabling of the legislation, the Firearms Act contained a grandparenting provision that entitled those persons to obtain licenses and registration certificates.

However, anyone who acquired and registered a 12(6.1) handgun subsequent to February 14, 1995 and prior to December 1, 1998 - a time period when possession was restricted but not prohibited - did not qualify for a license unless, inter alia , he or she had held a registration certificate for this type of handgun prior to February 14, 1995. As indicated above, a central component of the new regulatory regime is the requirement of a licence in order to possess a firearm.

As licensing had not existed under the previous regime, the Firearms Act contained a number of provisions to ease the transition from the former system to the new. For example, Firearms Acquisition Certificates were temporarily deemed to be licenses, and registration certificates that had been issued under

Part III of the Criminal Code were deemed to be registration certificates issued under the Firearms Act . Section 127(2) of the Act specifically provided, however, that all deemed registration certificates would expire on December 31, 2002. … Parliament considered amendments to the Firearms Act to expand grandparenting to include individuals who had acquired and registered 12(6.1) handguns after February 14, 1995 but prior [to] the commencement day of the new regime.

The amendments were eventually enacted as part of S.C. 2003 c. 8, s. 14, which received Royal Assent on May 13, 2003, and came into force on April 10, 2005. As amended, s. 12(6) of the Firearms Act provides as follows [see para. 6 above]. It is common ground that on December 1, 1998 each of the applicants held a registration certificate under the former Act (the Criminal Code ) for their 12(6.1) handguns, and thus each of them is able to satisfy the eligibility criterion set forth in s. 12(6)(a).

The issue is whether they or anyone beyond those who were already grandparented before the 2003 amendments can satisfy the requirements of s. 12(6)(b). The problem arises because the registration certificates that the applicants held on December 1, 1998 had been issued under s. 109(7) of the Criminal Code and s. 127(2) of the Firearms Act expressly provided that those certificates would expire on December 31, 2002. The amendments to s. 12(6) did not come into force until 27 months and ten days later .

In the opinion of both the Chief Firearms Officer and the Registrar of Firearms, this necessarily meant that none of the applicants had been “continuously the holder of a registration certificate” for a 12(6.1) handgun since December 1, 1998.

[emphasis added] 12 In Demchuk , L. Smith J. described the resulting situation this way (at paras. 26-27): While Bill C-10A , which would have moved the grandparenting date from February 14, 1995, to December 1, 1998, was still being considered by Parliament, s. 127(2)(

b) of the Firearms Act caused all registration certificates which had been issued under the former Criminal Code to expire. Bill C-10A did not come into effect until after all of the registration certificates had expired. In brief, by the time the legislation came into effect, it had set up, for those who acquired handguns after February 14, 1995, a requirement for grandparented status -- continuous registration -- which was impossible to meet.

Despite attempts by some Members of Parliament and others to bring about an amendment which would rectify the situation, such amending legislation was not passed. 13 Thus, there was an original grandparenting provision, covering those who had purchased and registered their handguns prior to February 14, 1995. As to the second grandparenting provision, its effect was explained this way in Demchuk when the judge summarized the Crown’s submission as follows (at paras. 28-29): .... (

b) Individuals who first acquired their handguns between February 14, 1995 and December 1, 1998, were not licensed to possess prohibited handguns after December 1, 1998 since they could not benefit from the original grandfathering provision (which applied only to pre-February 14, 1995 owners), and the new grandfathering provision (which might have otherwise covered them) had not yet been assented to. The Crown’s position is that Mr. Demchuk did not qualify for the “original grandfathering provision” and in the end no-one qualified for the “new grandfathering provision”. 14 L.

Smith J. accepted the Crown’s submission, and although the facts are different here, the Crown in this case adopted an argument to similar effect. The Factual Context 15 The appellant’s renewal application for a licence indicated that he was already the owner of firearms in all three classes. His application was granted with respect to the non-restricted and restricted classes, but was denied with respect to the prohibited class. He wanted a licence that carried, as he argued, “12(6) privileges”; that is, he wanted his licence to permit him to possess prohibited handguns.

This was refused, and it was this part of his licence renewal application that was the subject of the reference to the Provincial Court judge, the appeal to the Queen’s Bench judge and that is the subject of this appeal. 16 The appellant’s case is based on his assertion that he satisfies the requirements of clause (b), and that he has been continuously since before December 1, 1998, and still is, the holder of a registration certificate for a 12(6) handgun.

He owned and held different handguns and different registration certificates during this roughly 13-year period, but the key fact is that throughout the period there was never a time, he says, that he did not have the required registration certificate for a 12(6) handgun. 17 He acquired certain handguns between February 14, 1995 and December 31, 1998. He obtained registration certificates for these handguns. The Crown said they were “restricted” under the previous regime, but would become prohibited under the Act . Those certificates expired on December 31, 2002, by virtue of s. 127 of the Act .

But prior to that expiry, the appellant acquired two other handguns. They were registered before the other registration certificates expired on December 31, 2002, and they are still registered. These two handguns, he said, were 12(6) handguns and were the same kind of handgun whose registration certificates had expired on December 31, 2002. Thus, he argued, he held an unbroken series of qualifying registration certificates for two 12(6) handguns. 18 One of the two handguns is a 32 calibre FN Browning model 1922 and the other is a reclassified 32 calibre Unique model C.

These handguns were purchased by the appellant in 2000 and 2001 respectively. 19 The Registrar of Firearms (the Registrar) issued registration certificates for these handguns in each of those years. The evidence shows that the Browning was not a 7.65 (32) caliber, and that the barrel of the Unique was modified, so for registration purposes the Registrar regarded each gun as restricted and not prohibited. Accordingly, the registration certificates for each handgun describe the “Class” of the gun as “Restricted.” 20 In his letter refusing the renewal application, the respondent told the appellant:

…. The purpose of this letter is to clarify for you the reason you are not eligible to obtain the 12(6) class for which you have applied. On April 10, 2005 Bill C-10A came into effect, it outlined the requirements that you must meet in order to be eligible for the 12(6) class. One of the requirements of the new legislation regarding the 12(6) class was that you must be the continuous holder of a registration certificate for that kind of handgun since December 01, 1998.

Between December 31, 2002 and April 10, 2005 you did not hold a registration certificate for that kind of handgun, as your RWRS [Restricted Weapons Registration System] certificates expired on December 31, 2002.

Since you do not meet the criteria of being a continuous holder of a registration certificate for that kind of handgun since December 01, 1998 I do not have the authority to issue you a firearms licence with the 12(6) class. …. 21 The appellant’s case in the Provincial Court was based on alleged errors in the registrations of the two handguns, as shown by the following exchanges, when the appellant, representing himself, was cross-examining the area firearms officer who testified for the Crown: BY MR.

HINTZ : Q And did you, did you -- after we had spoke about the issue had you contacted anybody else in regards to whether or not I had a certificate for that kind of gun? A Yes, I, I did contact the Registrar and we had discussions because I wanted to confirm that I wasn’t missing anything, confirming that you did not have any prohibited handguns registered to you. Q Did I claim that I did have a, a gun of that type, a prohibited handgun registered but registered as restricted? A Did you claim this to me? Q Yes. A Yes, you did. . . . . . Q ….

What -- if a prohibited handgun was registered as restricted, okay, and if we determined that it was a prohibited handgun but with a restricted certificate would that, under the Act, comply with the licensing requirements? A No, it wouldn’t, because if I read the Firearms Act it clearly states registration certificates. …. 22 Then this exchange occurred with the judge: THE COURT: So how do you see this [as] an error on his part? This is where I’m having difficulty. I’m focusing on this, ‘cause this seems to be the essence of our case.

MR. HINTZ: What -- THE COURT: Where do you see the error? MR. HINTZ: What, what I’m saying is, and the requirement is that you have to be the holder of a registration certificate for that kind of gun. THE COURT: Right. MR. HINTZ: All right? It doesn’t list that the handgun, which is a prohibited handgun, has to [be] issued a prohibited registration certificate. It does not say that. It only says that it has to be issued a registration certificate. . . . . . THE COURT: Help me. I mean, I’m trying to find the substance of your case. MR.

HINTZ: The registration certificates that he looked at only showed what the registrar considered them to be. Okay. THE COURT: Okay. Are you saying that the registry was inaccurate? Is that the substance of your case, that he referred to an inaccurate record? MR. HINTZ: Yes. . . . . . THE COURT: You’re arguing that the gun wasn’t a prohibited weapon? MR. HINTZ: No, I’m arguing that it was, but it was considered by the registry as restricted, inaccurately. . . . . . MR. HINTZ: … [The respondent’s] decision was based on incorrect, according to me, incorrect information in the registry … . . . . . MR. HINTZ: Okay.

I have an affidavit from the person that had sold me the gun that was incorrectly registered. And the, the gun was registered as restricted because the -- and this is just a little background. The, the registry had considered it to be a .380 calibre gun. If the gun was .380 calibre it was not prohibited. If it was a [7.65] or .32 calibre gun then the gun is a prohibited handgun. Okay? So the registry had registered the gun as being a .380 calibre when it was an error made by the verifier. And I have an affidavit by the verifier stating ….

23 When the appellant gave his evidence, this exchange took place: THE WITNESS: …. As, as I said, should we not base the decision on the licensing based on the Criminal Code as opposed to a registry determination? …. THE COURT: Okay. I take it this is all boiling down to one, one point. Not an irrelevant point though. That you’re arguing that there was a registration certificate issued for the weapon. THE WITNESS: Yes. THE COURT: And that it doesn’t matter whether the registration was classified as prohibited or restricted. THE WITNESS: That’s correct. THE COURT: It was a registration certificate.

That’s your argument? 24 The evidence of the area firearms officer pointed out the significance, for licensing purposes, of the registration certificates issued by the Registrar: A I’m saying that if you had an issue with a firearm which the certificate was issued by the registrar then your, your issue should be with them, not, not so much with me because again, I’m taking my information -- I have to take information from the registry which bases information as far as registering firearms on the information provided by yourself. . . . . .

A …. … [B]ut obviously the certificate is issued by the registry and I have to put a lot of, a lot of weight on what, on that certificate issued by the registry that’s been mandated to issue these certificates. . . . . . Q You did or you used the registry’s information? A Well, I looked at the firearm. You had identified a firearm that you had. I believe this is what you had done with your application, is you had identified one registration certificate. And I did look at that firearm and it was, and it was registered as a restricted.

And I looked at the description and to me it did fit the description of a restricted firearm. Q But it is conceivable that that information could have been incorrect? A Well, information based on what you had given the registry, perhaps, but you have to remember I did not examine the firearm.

I’m not a firearms technician. I was basing it strictly on the information and the data provided on the firearm. [emphasis added] The Judgments Below 25 It seems to be clear that both the Provincial Court judge and the Queen’s Bench judge erred in certain respects in their decisions. The Crown stated in its factum that the Provincial Court judge had “admittedly made some palpable factual errors” in describing the relevant registration certificates.

The Crown further acknowledged that the Queen’s Bench judge did not address the errors made in the court below, and that “[i]ndeed, he did not even mention either of the 2000 and 2001 registration certificates.” 26 The Crown submitted that due to the errors made in the courts below, the legal analysis had proceeded without regard to the registration certificates that are central to the case.

It proposed that the interests of justice would be best served if this court essentially ignored those decisions and applied the appropriate standard of review to the respondent’s decision, based on an accurate statement of the facts. 27 While the self-represented appellant did not directly address this argument, he did argue that both judges had misunderstood the applicable principles, and, of course, he was arguing against their decisions. 28 Neither of the judgments dealt with the argument of the appellant that his possession from 2000 and 2001 of two registration certificates for what he said were 12(6) handguns, together with his prior possession of registration certificates from before December 1, 1998 until December 31, 2002, in respect of other 12(6) handguns, met the test set out in s. 12(6) of the Act . 29 This is, of course, an appeal from the decision of the Queen’s Bench judge, but only on the question of law on which leave was granted.

That question focusses on registration certificates, and that question cannot be answered with reference to that decision, since, as noted, the judge did not deal with the question of registration certificates. I conclude that we should adopt the approach suggested by the Crown. After referring briefly to the arguments of the parties, I will determine the appropriate standard of review, assess the decision of the respondent applying that standard of review, and then directly answer the question on appeal.

The Arguments 30 The appellant agrees that he did not qualify for a licence to hold prohibited handguns under the original grandparent clause, since he did not possess what are now classified as prohibited handguns prior to February 14, 1995. But, he says, he does qualify under the second grandparent clause, since in his view, beginning on December 1, 1998 he was continuously the holder of a registration certificate for “that kind of handgun” (referring to the Browning and the Unique).

He argues that what is important is the actual gun, and that what “class” the gun may be in, and what “class” is shown on the registration certificate, is not determinative.

He argues that those two handguns should be classified as prohibited, and that he holds registration certificates for them. 31 The appellant said that the reference in the respondent’s letter to “RWRS certificates” was to certificates issued under the Restricted Weapon Registration System, being the database under the previous governing legislation; the Crown did not dispute this statement. 32 The Crown said that the appellant has never been eligible to hold a licence to possess a prohibited handgun, and neither the original nor the second grandparenting provision was of any benefit to him.

It argued that his case depended upon an alleged misclassification by the Registrar of the two guns, and that the appellant was arguing that they were, in fact, prohibited guns even though the registration certificates carried the designation “restricted.” The Crown argued that even a misclassification could not benefit the appellant. Standard of Review 33 In British Columbia (Chief Firearms Officer) v. Fahlman , 2004 BCCA 343 , 187 C.C.C. (3d) 495, the British Columbia Court of Appeal said (at para. 16): .... With respect to the nature of the review, s. 75(3) is important. It reads … “

(3) At the hearing of the reference, the burden of proof is on the applicant or holder to satisfy the provincial court judge that the refusal to issue or revocation of the licence, registration certificate or authorization, the decision or the refusal to approve or revocation of the approval was not justified.” .... 34 The court continued (at para. 23): In my opinion, because the judge must determine whether the decision under review was justified based on the record as amplified by relevant evidence heard on the review, the test is one of reasonableness. 35 The Provincial Court judge in the present case also found (at para. 8) that the standard was reasonableness. 36 The Dunsmuir principles ( Dunsmuir v.

New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190) should be applied here. While

there is no privative clause in the Act , the purpose of the respondent’s office and work, the nature of the question before him and his expertise in the matter of licencing of individuals in relation to firearms, all suggest a deferential standard when he is interpreting the Act . See also, Alliance Pipeline Ltd. v. Smith , 2011 SCC 7 at para. 28 , 328 D.L.R. (4th) 1, and Celgene Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2011 SCC 1 at para. 34 , 327 D.L.R. (4th) 513. 37 Parliament has conferred on the respondent the responsibility for issuing or refusing to issue licences.

The respondent is required to interpret the provisions of the Act relating to licensing, a task for which he is uniquely qualified, and one where any relevant factual issues (such as here) are not easily separable from the legal issues. Moreover, as the respondent argued, the

interpretation of s. 12(6) does not involve issues of central importance to the legal system as a whole and does fall squarely within the respondent’s area of expertise. 38 Taking into account all these factors suggests, to me, a resulting deferential standard of reasonableness, which I would apply to the respondent’s decision. Analysis and Decision 39 The appellant’s position amounts to this proposition: that so long as the handguns in question are registered, the “class” shown on the registration certificates is irrelevant.

Since, in his view, the definition in the Code of a prohibited weapon would apply to these two handguns, and since he had registration certificates for them, albeit the certificates showed the class as “restricted,” he was the holder of registration certificates for handguns of the “prohibited” kind. 40 It is important to note the distinction between the registration of a weapon, a task assigned to the Registrar, and the licensing of an individual, a task assigned to the respondent. Those are two very different matters, and are the responsibility of distinct governmental officials.

In my view, the appellant’s argument unduly minimizes the significance of the role that registration of a weapon plays in the licensing process. 41 The respondent, who is responsible for the licensing of individuals to hold weapons, must rely on the registration of weapons as determined by the Registrar. When he makes a licensing decision, it is reasonable that he assume that the registration certificates issued by the Registrar are correct. His role does not extend to going behind the registration certificates.

If they are incorrect, it is not for the respondent to correct them, as he has no responsibility for registration of weapons; rather, it would be the responsibility of the Registrar to take whatever steps are appropriate. The evidence of the area firearms officer made that clear. 42 The appellant had sought a licence to lawfully possess prohibited handguns. In order to receive this licence he had to have held, continuously since December 1, 1998, a registration certificate for “that kind of handgun” (s. 12(6)(

b) of the Act ). In my view, the phrase “that kind of handgun” connotes a handgun falling within a particular class, as illustrated by the online site Thesaurus.com (<http://www.thesaurus.com>) as at August 3, 2011: Main Entry: kind Part of Speech: noun Definition: class, species Synonyms: brand, breed, classification, family, genus, ilk, kin, order, race, set sort, type, variety See also Maurice Waite et al. , eds.

Oxford Thesaurus of English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) sub verbo “kind”: kind – noun … sort , type, variety, style, form, class, category, genre; genus, species, race, breed, family, strain, order, natural kind; brand, make, model design, version, line, mark. 43 The appellant argued that the Act does not contemplate a certificate such as those that had been issued here, i.e., a “restricted registration certificate” (and see the question of law at para. 2 above).

In my opinion, what is clearly meant by that phrase is a registration certificate for a handgun which is stated, on the certificate, to be in the restricted class. 44 In order to receive the licence sought, the appellant must have held for the period commencing December 1, 1998, a registration certificate for a handgun falling within the prohibited class. In my opinion, from the respondent’s perspective, whether a handgun falls within a particular class is to be determined by the applicable registration certificate. 45 The evidence shows that the appellant does not satisfy this requirement.

He did not have a prohibited handgun registered to him before February 14, 1995. The deemed registration certificates that he did have expired on December 31, 2002. The Browning and Unique handguns were registered as falling within the restricted class. Thus, the respondent concluded, correctly in my view, that the appellant did not meet the s. 12(6)(

b) requirement. 46 If the two handguns do meet the Code definition of “prohibited,” as implied in the question of law before us, and as the Crown conceded only for the purpose of argument, then the registration certificates are in error and they should be corrected by the Registrar. Unless and until that occurs, the registration certificates establish, at least for purposes of licensing individuals under the Act , that the handguns are in the restricted class. (It may be the case that if the handguns are properly in the prohibited class and registration

certificates were to issue accordingly, the appellant would not be eligible to be licensed to possess such handguns as neither grandparent clause applies to him. That situation is not directly before us.) 47 In interpreting the Act , and particularly s. 12(6), the respondent is, as the Crown argued, an administrative decision-maker exercising a statutory authority. The standard of reasonableness applies to both the process followed and the outcome reached.

No issue was taken with the process followed by the respondent, and, in any event, I find that it met the Dunsmuir standard (at para. 47 ) of “justification, transparency and intelligibility.” 48 As to outcome, what “kind of handgun” these guns are is determined, for the purpose of licensing of individuals under the Act , by the registration certificates issued by the Registrar for those handguns. That is what the respondent concluded.

He observed the registration certificates marked as “Restricted” and told the appellant that he did not “meet the criteria of being a continuous holder of a registration certificate for that kind of handgun [i.e., in the prohibited class] since December 01, 1998.” Not only was his decision reasonable, it was correct. The decision itself clearly falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes. There is no basis for judicial intervention. 49 I would answer the question of law put to us in the negative.

Holding a registration certificate for a handgun (or part thereof) that is stated to be in the restricted class (even if that handgun meets the definition of a prohibited handgun), does not satisfy the requirement under s. 12(6)(

b) of the Act for the individual to qualify for a licence permitting possession of a prohibited weapon. 50 I would dismiss the appeal without costs. _________________________________J.A. I agree: J.A. I agree: J.A.