Cherewyk v Cherewyk, 2018 MBCA 13

Citation: Cherewyk v Cherewyk, 2018 MBCA 13 Date: 20180214 Docket: AF17-30-08830 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MANITOBA Coram: Madam Justice Freda M. Steel Madam Justice Holly C. Beard Madam Justice Janice L. leMaistre BETWEEN : BECKIE LEA CHEREWYK ) S. J. Cherewyk ) on his own behalf ) (Petitioner) Respondent ) S. R.

Golden-Greenwood ) for the Respondent - and - ) ) Appeal heard: STEVEN JOSEPH CHEREWYK ) January 8, 2018 ) ) Judgment delivered: (Respondent) Appellant ) February 14, 2018 Amended Judgment: An amendment was issued on April 3, 2018; the amendments have been made to the text and the notice of amendment is appended to this judgment. BEARD JA I. THE ISSUES [ 1 ] Mr.

Cherewyk has appealed an interim order granted under the Divorce Act , RSC, 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), on September 26, 2016, (the 2016 interim order) wherein the motion judge dismissed his motion to reduce the child support that he was paying and refused to order that Ms Cherewyk contribute to specific expenses under

section 7 of the Manitoba, Child Support Guidelines Regulation , Man Reg 58/98 (the Manitoba Child Support Guidelines). (See the Divorce Act , sections 2(1) “ applicable guidelines ” (

a) and 2(5); and the Order Designating the Province of Manitoba for the Purposes of the Definition “applicable guidelines” in subsection 2(1) of the Divorce Act , SOR/98-288.) [ 2 ] Mr. Cherewyk’s grounds of appeal are as follows: (

i) the motion judge misapprehended the evidence and erred in fact regarding his determination of the percentage of time that the children spent with each parent and also in the determination of his income; (ii) the motion judge erred in principle by failing to consider and properly apply

section 9 of the Manitoba Child Support Guidelines; and (iii) the motion judge erred in failing to make any order regarding Ms Cherewyk’s contribution to special expenses for the children under

section 7 of the Manitoba Child Support Guidelines. [ 3 ] The motion judge also dismissed Ms Cherewyk’s motion for spousal support in the event that the child support was reduced, which order has not been appealed. [ 4 ] Mr. Cherewyk filed a motion to introduce further evidence on appeal. As this appeal can be decided without that evidence, I would dismiss the motion.

II. THE FACTS [5] The parties were married on September 12, 1998, and separated on July 1, 2012. There are two children of themarriage, AAC born on July 29, 2003, (presently 14 years old) and EMC born on May 3, 2007 (presently 10 years old). [6] Mr. Cherewyk is a commercial airline pilot. He worked for Jazz Air L.P. from March 2006 until June 2016, when hebegan to work for Air Canada, where he is still employed.

Ms Cherewyk is a hairstylist and has worked as such since 1996, both as anemployee and as the owner of her own salon. [7] Immediately following the separation, the parties had an agreement whereby the children spent significant periods oftime with each parent and Mr. Cherewyk paid child support. There was a contested interim hearing that resulted in an interim orderunder the Divorce Act pronounced on April 22, 2014, (the 2014 interim order) containing, essentially, the following terms related to childcare and control and child support: joint care and control of the children to the parties; Mr.

Cherewyk to have care and control for twoseparate periods of seven days and six nights consecutive each month; Mr. Cherewyk’s income was set at $60,000 per year andMs Cherewyk’s income was set at $15,000 per year; Mr.

Cherewyk was ordered to pay full child support as per the Manitoba Table ofthe Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (as it then appeared), which the motion judge set at $840 per month for the twochildren until further order of the court; arrears of $1,520 were to be paid by September 1, 2014; Ms Cherewyk’s motion for spousalsupport was dismissed; there was an order to exchange tax returns and notices by June 1, 2014, and annually thereafter; and

section 7special expenses were to be shared on a pro rated basis, based on the parties’ respective incomes, although there was no determination asto the actual expenses that would be shared. [8] While Mr. Cherewyk has concerns about some of the factual findings in the 2014 interim order, there is, as he hasacknowledged, no appeal of that order before us; however, the

interpretation of that order by the motion judge hearing the 2016 variationapplication is an issue in this appeal. [9] The parties entered into a consent variation order pronounced on June 8, 2015, (the 2015 variation order) wherebythe parties would each have care and control of the children for 50 per cent of the time, alternating on a weekly basis, with adjustmentsfor vacations and special holidays. This order does not deal with child or spousal support. [10] Once the 2015 variation order was granted, Mr.

Cherewyk advised Ms Cherewyk that the child support should beadjusted to take into account his increased time with the children. They were not able to come to any agreement, so he filed a motion onJanuary 25, 2016, for a variation of the 2014 interim order, and Ms Cherewyk filed her motion for spousal support. Those motions wereboth dismissed, as set out in the 2016 interim order, and Mr. Cherewyk has appealed the dismissal of his 2016 motion. III.

VARIATION OF INTERIM ORDERS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL [11] An application to vary a child support order granted under the Divorce Act is governed by section 17(4) of the DivorceAct and

section 14 of the Manitoba Child Support Guidelines, which state as follows: Factors for child support order 17(4) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a child support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change ofcircumstances as provided for in the applicable guidelines has occurred since the making of the child support order or the last variationorder made in respect of that order. Circumstances for variation 14 For the purpose of subsection 17(4) of the Divorce Act, and

section 37.2(3) of The Family Maintenance Act, any one of the followingconstitutes a change in circumstances that gives rise to the making of a variation order in respect of a child support order: (

a) in the case where the amount of child support includes a determination made in accordance with the applicable table, any change incircumstances that would result in a different child support order or any provision thereof; (

b) in the case where the amount of child support does not include a determination made in accordance with a table, any change in thecondition, means, needs or other circumstances of either parent or of any child who is entitled to support; . . . [12] The test for varying an interim order has generally been stated to require the applicant to establish a material change incircumstances since the granting of the underlying order.

Applications to vary interim orders should be rare, and there is a heavy onuson the applicant to meet that test, rather than just proceeding to trial and resolving all matters after a full hearing. (See, for example,Coley v Coley, 1981 CarswellMan 26 (CA); Cloutier-Chudy v Chudy, 2008 MBQB 155 at para 10; and Huculak v Huculak, (BC CA), 1998 CarswellBC 135 at paras 3, 5 (CA in Chambers).) [13] This Court recently confirmed the stringent standard of review for an appeal of an interim order in a family proceedingin Dillon v Dillon, 2016 MBCA 125.

I can do no better than to repeat that explanation, which applies in this case (at paras 3-6):

This Court has consistently and for many years discouraged appeals of interim orders, particularly in family matters. For example, inGale v Gale, 2008 MBCA 134, 231 ManR (2d) 188, this Court stated (at para 61): Family law litigants, like all litigants, are entitled to their strict legal rights. However, given the highly discretionary nature of mostfamily law interim orders, coupled with the financial cost of appeal, delay and, in most cases, limited impact in the event of trial,appealing interim family law orders does not practically benefit the parties.

Most interim matters are capable of efficient review at trial,that is, unless delay operates to the benefit of one of the parties.

I am not suggesting that is the case here, but I am suggesting that theparties would be better served by concluding disclosure issues and proceeding to trial. (See also Vauclair v Vauclair (1998), (MB CA), 126 ManR (2d) 136 at para 3 (CA); Martin v Orris, 2010 MBCA59 at para 5, 255 ManR (2d) 126; and Cottyn v Anderson, 2014 MBCA 48 at para 7, 306 ManR (2d) 87.) The reason for discouraging interim appeals was explained in Martin (at para 6): It is well understood that orders granted on an interim basis are often made without the benefit of a full record and the careful judicialanalysis that is possible following a trial.

They often do not provide the best legal and evidentiary foundation for appellate review. There is unease about deciding important legal issues without the benefit of a full record.

That is the reason why appellate courts preferto review matters after a final decision has been reached. (See also this Court’s comments in Grandbois v Grandbois (1998), (MB CA), 131 ManR (2d) 110 at paras 2-4(CA).) As this Court stated in Graham v Graham, 2013 MBCA 66 at para 14, there is ample authority that an interim order that does notproperly reflect the state of things when all of the evidence has been adduced at trial can be corrected retroactively.

This is a reflection ofthe fact that the record at the interim hearing is imperfect and that errors are better resolved based on the more complete record that willexist following a trial. The standard of review on the appeal of interim orders in family matters is well settled and clear. It was recently set out by this Court inCottyn (at para 7): . . . . An appellate court will not interfere with an interim family order absent a serious error in principle, a complete misapprehension ofthe evidence, or the order being so clearly wrong that it amounts to an injustice (Gale v.

Gale (2007), 2007 MBCA 162 , 220Man.R. (2d) 306; 407 W.A.C. 306; 2007 MBCA 162, at paras. 5-6). (See also Webster v Lusty (1992), (MB CA), 83 ManR (2d) 193 at para 6 (CA).) [14] For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that the errors made by the motion judge are sufficiently serious andmaterial that they meet this very high standard of review and warrant appellate correction notwithstanding that the order at issue is aninterim variation order. IV.

CHILD SUPPORT The Motion Judge’s Decision [15] The motion judge noted that there is a very high standard to meet to vary an interim order, which he found had not beenmet. First, he accepted Ms Cherewyk’s argument that the children had been with Mr. Cherewyk 46 per cent of the time under the 2014interim order. He found that the increase in Mr. Cherewyk’s periods of care and control from 46 per cent to 50 per cent under the 2015variation order was not significant enough to support a change in the 2014 child support payments. Second, he found that the change inMr.

Cherewyk’s income following the 2014 interim order was minimal and did not meet the high standard to vary that order. He madeno reference at all to

section 9 of the Manitoba Child Support Guidelines and did not carry out the analysis required under that provision. The Parties’ Positions

[ 16 ] Mr. Cherewyk’s main argument on the appeal is that the motion judge erred in accepting that he had the children 46 per cent of the time under the 2014 interim order. He argued that he had them only 39 per cent of the time, as was explained in his affidavit of September 16, 2016. His position is that this error led to two further errors. First, even if an increase from 46 per cent to 50 per cent would not be sufficient to support a variation, an increase from 39 per cent to 50 per cent would be. Second, the method of calculating child support when one parent has the children 40 per cent or more of the time is determined by

section 9 of the Manitoba Child Support Guidelines, but the motion judge erred both by failing to refer to

section 9 and by failing to apply it to determine the amount of child support. [ 17 ] Ms Cherewyk’s position is that Mr. Cherewyk’s lawyer argued during the motion hearing that Mr. Cherewyk had the children 43 per cent of the time under the 2014 interim order and, further, that the 2014 interim order implicitly took into account

section 9. Her position is that the increase in Mr. Cherewyk’s care and control, whether from 43 per cent or 46 per cent, to 50 per cent was not significant enough to meet the test for varying an interim order and that the motion judge did not err either by misapprehending the evidence in that regard or in finding that the test for a variation of an interim order had not been met. Analysis Mr. Cherewyk’s Care and Control [ 18 ] I agree with Mr.

Cherewyk’s position that the motion judge materially misapprehended the evidence regarding his periods of care and control of the children. [ 19 ] Under the 2014 interim order, Mr. Cherewyk had the children for two periods of six nights and seven days each per month. Days one and seven were transition days, when Mr. Cherewyk’s period started either after school or at noon on a non-school day. Thus, these days were shared by the parents. If one looks at a day as being a 24-hour period, a period from noon on day one until noon on day seven is six 24-hour periods.

This equates to six days per period, which is 12 days per month and 144 days per year, or 39 per cent of the time. Ms Cherewyk’s calculation is based on seven days per period, being 14 days per month and 168 days per year, or 46 per cent, which does not accord with the 2014 interim order. [ 20 ] In situations where pick-ups and drop-offs occur before and after school, the jurisprudence suggests that it is the number of nights that should generally be counted.

This is in accordance with this Court’s comments in Cabot v Mikkelson , 2004 MBCA 107 at para 40 and generally accepted in Mehling v Mehling , 2008 MBCA 66 . In my view, the correct calculation is that put forth by Mr. Cherewyk. [ 21 ] In addition, the motion judge erred when he accepted Ms Cherewyk’s position that the increase in the 2015 variation order only added two days per month. In fact, the increase to 50 per cent also added two full periods of seven days each in every year, for a further 14 days per year. This is because the 2014 interim order granted Mr.

Cherewyk two periods of care and control per month or 24 periods per year, while the 2015 variation order extended his care and control to every second week, which equates to 26 periods per year. As Mr. Cherewyk was to have care and control for 50 per cent of the time, this would equate to a total of 182.5 nights per year or an additional 38.5 nights. In my view, the addition of 38.5 nights – over one month per year – is a material change in circumstances. [ 22 ] Thus, it is clear that the motion judge erred by materially misapprehending the evidence as to the amount of time that Mr.

Cherewyk had the children under both the 2014 interim order and the 2015 variation order (neither of which are under appeal).

Section 9 of the Manitoba Child Support Guidelines [ 23 ] Neither the first motion judge who granted the 2014 interim order nor the motion judge who granted the 2016 interim order addressed or even mentioned

section 9 of the Manitoba Child Support Guidelines or undertook the required analysis. That provision states as follows: Shared Custody 9 Where each parent exercises a right of access to, or has physical custody or care and control of a child for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year, the amount of the child support order must be determined by taking into account (

a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses; (

b) the increased costs of shared custody arrangements; and (

c) the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each parent and of any child for whom support is sought. [ 24 ] The Supreme Court of Canada explained the

interpretation and application of this provision in Contino v Leonelli- Contino , 2005 SCC 63 . That decision was summarized by this Court in Kolisnyk v Loscerbo , 2010 MBCA 1 at paras 9-18 . From that

summary, I would distill the following points: - once a parent’s care and control reaches the 40 per cent threshold, the court must undertake a

section 9 analysis to determine child support – the application of the provision is not discretionary; - the three factors in

section 9(a), (

b) and (

c) are conjunctive – none is to prevail; - the emphasis is to be on flexibility and fairness, taking into account the facts of the particular case;

-

section 9(

a) requires the court to determine the Table amount of support to be paid by each parent, which amounts are to be set-off to determine an initial amount payable as a starting point; - the initial amount payable is reviewed in accordance with sections 9(

b) and (

c) to determine whether any adjustment is required to take account of the financial realities of the parties; -

section 9(

b) requires the court to review the parties’ costs and budgets regarding the children’s needs and decide whether the shared custody has increased the costs overall; - under

section 9(c), the court has a broad discretion to consider the overall financial circumstances of the parents and the needs of the children and to analyse the ability of each parent to “absorb the costs required to maintain the appropriate standard of living in the circumstances” (at para 17); and - if the

section 9 application represents a variation, the court must determine whether the recipient parent had incurred costs based on the pre-existing amount of child of support and the effect that a reduction in support would have on that parent’s ability to pay those costs. [ 25 ] Once the 40 per cent threshold was reached, the motion judge was obligated to undertake the analysis under

section 9 to determine Mr. Cherewyk’s ongoing support obligations, and he clearly erred in law in not doing so. While it was argued that that threshold had been met in the 2014 interim order, the facts (as explained at paras 19-21 herein) clearly show that not to be the case. Further, a review of that motion judge’s reasons shows that he made no reference to

section 9 and did not undertake a

section 9 analysis; in fact, he stated that the parties would have “joint care and control”, with no reference to “shared custody”, and he ordered that Mr. Cherewyk pay the full amount of child support. While that motion judge stated “[Ms Cherewyk] needs the contribution of child support in order to maintain the household and I am going to order that he pay the full amount” and “[b]ecause he is paying the full amount of child support there will be no order of spousal support at this time”, in my view, those comments do not either constitute a finding of shared custody pursuant to

section 9 in the 2014 variation proceeding or replace the requirement for a proper

section 9 analysis as part of the 2016 variation proceeding. [ 26 ] If the motion judge hearing the 2016 variation application had undertaken a proper

section 9 analysis, he would have considered the increase in Ms Cherewyk’s employment income from $15,000, as set in the 2014 interim order, to $28,078 per year and the reduction in her monthly expenses from $4,202 to $3,393. His failure to take into account the change in her financial situation was a material error in law, as well. Application of

Section 9 to the Facts [ 27 ] The parties had filed a significant amount of financial information for the 2016 variation hearing, which forms the basis of this analysis. [ 28 ] Under

section 9(a), the court is to determine the Table amount of support to be paid by each parent, which amounts are to be set-off to determine an initial amount payable as a starting point. [ 29 ] While Mr. Cherewyk argued as part of his 2016 variation application that his income had decreased following the 2014 interim order because he was off work due to medical problems, he has now returned to work and he acknowledged, at the appeal hearing, that his current income is only minimally lower than the $60,000 that was set in 2014.

Given that this is a reasonable approximation of his income for the last number of years, it is the best indicator of his income for calculating child support on an interim basis. In this case, the effect of any temporary fluctuations in his income and employment expenses is better determined at a final hearing. As noted, Ms Cherewyk’s 2015 employment income was $28,078. These are the income figures that will form the basis of this analysis. [ 30 ] According to information provided by both parties, at an annual income of $60,000, Mr.

Cherewyk would pay child support of $831 per month, while Ms Cherewyk would pay child support of $374 per month on an annual income of $28,078. Deducting the lesser from the greater would leave Mr. Cherewyk paying $457 per month in child support as a starting point. [ 31 ]

Section 9(

b) requires the court to review the parties’ costs and budgets regarding the children’s needs and to determine whether the shared custody arrangement has increased the costs overall. From a review of the expense statements filed by the parties for the 2014 interim order and for the 2016 variation proceeding, it appears that the expenses for the children have remained relatively unchanged, with Mr. Cherewyk paying a somewhat higher amount than Ms Cherewyk. Both, however, are contributing to the children’s basic and ongoing expenses. [ 32 ] Finally, under

section 9(c), the court has a broad discretion to consider the overall financial circumstances of the parents and the needs of the children and to analyse the ability of each parent to “absorb the costs required to maintain the appropriate standard of living in the circumstances”. [ 33 ] Mr. Cherewyk has an unusual employment arrangement that was in place long before the separation. He works as a pilot out of Toronto, but the parties agreed that they wanted to live and raise their children in Brandon to be close to their extended families. This means that Mr.

Cherewyk must commute to Toronto an average of three times per month, at his own cost, to get to work, which entails driving to Winnipeg, flying to Toronto, staying in a hotel and eating in restaurants. His evidence indicated that, for 2016, he expected to pay $1,200 in union dues and $4,900, plus the cost of driving from Brandon to Winnipeg, to commute to Toronto. [ 34 ] Mr. Cherewyk argues that these amounts should have been deducted from his income in calculating the Table amount of child support under

section 9(

a) and that the failure to do this was an error in all of the interim orders. Ms Cherewyk does not accept this position and is opposed to the deduction. [ 35 ] In my view, it is appropriate to deduct these amounts from Mr. Cherewyk’s gross income when calculating child

support and, for the purpose of this order, it is not necessary to determine whether that adjustment should be made under

section 9(

a) or (c). Making this adjustment would result in his income being $53,900. In argument before the motion judge, Mr. Cherewyk provided a support guideline printout assuming his income to be $54,496, so I will accept this as his adjusted income. [ 36 ] Mr. Cherewyk’s child support obligation (based on his annual income being $54,496) would be $751 and Ms Cherewyk’s would be $374, with the result being that, as a starting point set-off under

section 9(a), Mr. Cherewyk’s child support obligation would exceed Ms Cherewyk’s by $377 per month. According to the support calculations provided by Mr. Cherewyk to the motion judge, at these annual incomes and these child support obligations, Mr. Cherewyk’s net disposable income is slightly higher than that of Ms Cherewyk. If that net child support obligation were increased to approximately $450 per month, their net disposable incomes would be roughly equal. [ 37 ] It appears from their expense statements that each parent is spending considerably more than he or she earns, although Mr.

Cherewyk’s monthly shortfall is significantly higher than that of Ms Cherewyk. Their living circumstances appear to be similar in that each owns a home, is paying a mortgage and driving a vehicle. Further, both have accumulated debts that must be paid. Given the total income of the parties, there is no way to structure the payments to alleviate the debt problems that each has – each will have to make adjustments. [ 38 ] Taking all of this into consideration, I would order Mr.

Cherewyk to pay child support in the amount of $824 per month to Ms Cherewyk and Ms Cherewyk to pay child support in the amount of $374 per month to Mr. Cherewyk. These payments will be effective from July 23, 2015, the date on which Mr. Cherewyk gave written notice (by letter dated July 21, 2015) that he was seeking a decrease in the child support payments. [ 39 ] I would emphasize that this is a variation of an interim support order. The figures used are not necessarily those that would be accepted following a trial, but they are the best information available at this time.

It is open to the parties to argue for a further adjustment at trial, depending on the facts as determined at that time. V.

SECTION 7 SPECIAL EXPENSES [ 40 ] As regards the

section 7 special expenses, which were basically the additional cost for extended health care through his former employer for the children and for their music and swimming lessons, the motion judge found that they should be agreed by the parties in advance, not paid by Mr. Cherewyk and claimed retroactively. He accepted Ms Cherewyk’s position that she could not afford the expenses, so he found that either Mr. Cherewyk would have to stop paying them or cover them himself, and he dismissed Mr.

Cherewyk’s application for reimbursement either retroactively or on an ongoing basis. [ 41 ] Without commenting on the motion judge’s findings, which I do not necessarily endorse, in my view, these matters are better dealt with at a final hearing. I note that Mr. Cherewyk’s present employer covers the entire cost of his health care including for the children, so he no longer incurs this cost on an ongoing basis. I would make no order as regards these amounts, but would leave any adjustments to be determined at trial. VI.

SPOUSAL SUPPORT [ 42 ] While Ms Cherewyk has not appealed the dismissal of her motion for interim spousal support, she did note in argument, firstly, that the reason for that dismissal was that Mr. Cherewyk would be paying full child support and, secondly, that her income remains considerably lower than that of Mr. Cherewyk. It appears from the financial information and income calculations that were provided that, with the child support payments set out in paragraph 38 herein, the parties will have roughly equivalent net disposable incomes.

In my view, an interim order of spousal support would not be warranted even at this reduced level of child support. VII. CONCLUSION [ 43 ] In

summary, I would find that the motion judge made material errors in his factual findings as to the percentage of time that Mr. Cherewyk had care and control of the children pursuant to the 2014 interim order and also by failing to recognize that, following the variation in care and control in 2015, Mr. Cherewyk’s periods of care and control increased from under to over 40 per cent. He then erred by finding that there had been no material change in circumstances and dismissing Mr. Cherewyk’s variation application on that basis. [ 44 ] Further, the motion judge erred in law by failing to apply

section 9 of the Manitoba Child Support Guidelines to determine whether a variation in child support was appropriate following the 2015 variation order. [ 45 ] I would find that Mr. Cherewyk had care and control of the children 39 per cent of the time under the 2014 interim order, which increased to 50 per cent pursuant to the 2015 variation order. Applying

section 9 of the Manitoba Child Support Guidelines, I would find that Mr. Cherewyk’s interim child support payments to Ms Cherewyk should be set at $824 per month and Ms Cherewyk should pay interim child support to Mr. Cherewyk of $374 per month. These payments will be made retroactive to July 23, 2015, the date on which Mr. Cherewyk gave written notice to Ms Cherewyk that he was seeking a variation in the child support. I would, on an interim basis, also dismiss Mr. Cherewyk’s motion for an adjustment for

section 7 special expenses. As noted earlier, these findings are subject to review at trial. [ 46 ] If the parties cannot agree to a

schedule for the payment of the amounts owing by Ms Cherewyk to Mr. Cherewyk, they can apply to the panel to determine that issue. [ 47 ] Although it has no effect on the outcome of this appeal, I would note that the motion judge made comments to

Mr. Cherewyk’s counsel during argument that were unhelpful in advancing the hearing of the motion, which was well presented. [ 48 ] Given that Mr. Cherewyk has, largely, been successful, I would order that he have his costs, on a tariff basis, both in the court below and on this appeal. ______________________________ JA I agree: ______________________________ JA I agree: ______________________________ JA CREST COURT OF APPEAL PROVINCE OF MANITOBA WINNIPEG R3C OP9 NOTICE OF AMENDMENT April 3, 2018 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: Re: Cherewyk v Cherewyk , 2018 MBCA 13 Docket No.

AF17-30-08830 Released on February 14, 2018 Subsequent to releasing our reasons in this matter, but before the certificate of decision was released or an order signed, it came to the attention of the panel that a restructuring of the child support payments could provide the parties with an income tax benefit. The parties were notified and have agreed to this restructuring. As a result, paragraphs 36, 38, 42 and 45 of our reasons delivered on February 14, 2018, were deleted and new paragraphs substituted, as now appear herein.