R v Castel, 2020 MBCA 41

Citation: R v Castel, 2020 MBCA 41 Date: 20200330 Docket: AR18-30-09178 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MANITOBA Coram: Mr. Justice Marc M. Monnin Madam Justice Janice L. leMaistre Madam Justice Lori T. Spivak BETWEEN : HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN ) L. C. Robinson ) for the Appellant Respondent ) ) C. A.

Vanderhooft - and - ) for the Respondent ) LEAH LINDA CASTEL ) Appeal heard and ) Decision pronounced: ) March 18, 2020 (Accused) Appellant ) ) Written reasons: ) March 30, 2020 LEMAISTRE JA (for the Court): [ 1 ] The accused appeals her conviction of second degree murder, after a trial by judge alone, for stabbing her brother, Willard Castel (Castel). After hearing the appeal, we dismissed it with brief reasons to follow.

These are our reasons. [ 2 ] After her father was struck in the head with a board and knocked out, the accused went looking for Castel and his friend, Mathias Colomb (Colomb) whom she believed were responsible for the attack. She pursued Castel and Colomb and stabbed each of them in the back twice. One of the stab wounds penetrated Castel’s left lung causing his death. Colomb survived his injuries. The accused was charged with attempted murder for stabbing Colomb but was convicted of aggravated assault.

She has not appealed her conviction for aggravated assault. [ 3 ] At the trial, the Crown called 15 civilian witnesses and three police officers. It also filed a number of exhibits by consent. The accused testified and admitted stabbing Castel and Colomb.

The sole issue at the trial was whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the intent required for second degree murder and attempted murder under the Criminal Code . [ 4 ] Regarding the offence of second degree murder, the accused argued that the evidence established she was intoxicated and/or provoked and therefore the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that she had the required intent for second degree murder. [ 5 ] The trial judge concluded that in the context of the whole of the evidence “at a minimum [the accused] meant to cause [Castel] bodily harm that she knew would likely kill him and was reckless whether [Castel] died or not” and found her guilty of second degree murder. [ 6 ] On the appeal, the accused argues that the trial judge erred by failing to conclude that her advanced degree of intoxication prevented her from foreseeing the consequences of her actions and that, although the test for provocation had not been met, he failed to consider the evidence of provocation in the context of the accused’s degree of intoxication.

The accused also contends that, “when the evidence of intoxication is considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, the ongoing fight, the presence of weapons and the lack of evidence speaking to the specific circumstances of how the stabbing occurred,” the verdict was unreasonable. [ 7 ] We have not been persuaded that the trial judge erred or that the verdict is unreasonable. [ 8 ] The trial judge carefully considered the evidence relevant to the defences of intoxication and provocation and

recognised the “overlap between” the evidence on these two issues.

He understood that in order to convict the accused of second degree murder, he had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that “[t]he requisite state of mind for second degree murder [had] been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” In our view, the trial judge identified the correct legal principles and made no errors in applying the law to the facts. [ 9 ] The trial judge accepted on the evidence that the accused was in an advanced state of intoxication ( see R v Daley , 2007 SCC 53 at paras 40-42 ) but rejected the accused’s assertion that her degree of intoxication rendered her incapable of forming the required intent for second degree murder. [ 10 ] In support of his conclusion, the trial judge noted in particular that the accused’s reliability and credibility were “undermined very significantly” by factors including: • the accused claimed that she blacked out at certain points during the events despite “detailed recollections leading up to and following those moments”; • the accused refused to acknowledge statements she made to the police at the time of her arrest and gave evidence at the trial inconsistent with these statements; and • during her testimony the accused resiled from a pre-trial agreement that she stabbed Castel and Colomb. [ 11 ] In concluding that the requisite state of mind for second degree murder had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial judge stated: . . .

A number of witnesses confirmed that during the [events] . . . leading up to the stabbing, [the accused] was able to understand, be understood, talk, walk and run. She was not staggering, she was not falling down. [The accused] demonstrated the presence of mind when [her father] was struck to . . . pursue [Castel] and [Colomb], including searching in [a nearby] trailer. Upon determining [Castel] and [Colomb] were not in . . . [the] trailer, [the accused] decided to look elsewhere. . . .

It was [the accused’s] own unsolicited evidence under oath that she was mad when [her father] was struck because it had happened before; she had determined following the previous incident to not let anyone pick on her family again. [The accused] stabbed [Castel] two times in the back with a knife.

In all of the circumstances, it is difficult to conceive that [the accused] did not foresee that [Castel’s] death would be a consequence of her acts. [ 12 ] After considering the evidence relevant to the issue of intent and the defences of intoxication and provocation, the trial judge again turned his mind to whether the Crown had proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 13 ] We are of the view that the trial judge made no error of law in concluding that the accused had the state of mind necessary for second degree murder. [ 14 ] We have also not been persuaded that the verdict was unreasonable. [ 15 ] The evidence established that after the accused’s father was struck in the head, the accused became angry, pursued Castel and stabbed him in the back twice.

After the stabbing, the accused fled the scene, admitted stabbing Castel and disposed of the knife. One stab wound penetrated Castel’s lung and was “at least” seven centimetres deep. The other stab wound was five centimetres deep. [ 16 ] We are satisfied that the trial judge’s conclusions were reasonable in light of the totality of the evidence and that “the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury or a judge could reasonably have rendered” ( R v RP , 2012 SCC 22 at para 9 ). [ 17 ] In the result the appeal was dismissed. JA JA JA