Armoyan v. Armoyan, 2013 NSCA 99

NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL Citation: Armoyan v. Armoyan , 2013 NSCA 99 Date: 20130910 Docket: CA 389169 CA 407024 Registry: Halifax Between: Lisa Armoyan Appellant v. Vrege Sami Armoyan Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Joel E. Fichaud Appeal Heard: June 19-20, 2013 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Subject: Fresh Evidence on Appeal - Conditions of Adjournment and Anti-Suit Injunctions - Forum Non Conveniens - Admissibility of Improperly Obtained Evidence

Summary: Ms. Armoyan petitioned for divorce in Florida. Mr. Armoyan petitioned for divorce in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia (Family Division). The courts of both jurisdictions conducted proceedings to determine which was the convenient forum. In February 2012, the Nova Scotia proceeding was adjourned, and the judge of the Family Division issued an order with a condition that restrained Ms. Armoyan from advancing the Florida divorce proceeding until after the Nova Scotia Court had issued its ruling on forum conveniens . Ms. Armoyan appealed that condition (CA 389169).

In September 2012, the judge of the Family Division determined that Nova Scotia was the convenient forum for all issues except custody. Ms. Armoyan appealed that ruling (CA 407024). The two appeals were consolidated. Also under appeal was the judge’s evidential ruling, during the forum conveniens hearing, that certain email evidence was inadmissible. At the appeal hearing each party submitted fresh evidence.

Issues: The issues were: (1) whether the fresh evidence should be admitted, (2) whether the condition to the adjournment should be overturned, in CA 389169, (3) whether the judge’s ruling on the forum conveniens should be wholly or partially overturned, in CA 407024, and (4) whether the judge’s evidential ruling was erroneous. Result: The Court of Appeal: (1) admitted the fresh evidence from both parties; (2) granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal in CA 389169, and held that the condition of adjournment, that restrained the advancement of the Florida proceeding, should be

excised; (3) granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal in part on CA 407024, upheld the judge’s ruling that Nova Scotia was the forum conveniens for the division of matrimonial property under the Matrimonial Property Act of Nova Scotia, but overturned the judge’s ruling that Nova Scotia was the forum conveniens for the divorce, child support, spousal support and related issues under the Divorce Act ; and (4) dismissed the appeal from the evidential ruling, based on mootness and the absence of the subject document from the appeal record, without ruling on the merits of admissibility.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the Appellant, to be quantified after the submission of further evidence and submissions on costs. This information sheet does not form part of the court’s judgment. Quotes must be from the judgment, not this cover sheet. The full court judgment consists of 154 pages. NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL Citation: Armoyan v. Armoyan , 2013 NSCA 99 Date: 20130910 Docket: CA 389169 CA 407024 Registry: Halifax Between: Lisa Armoyan Appellant v. Vrege Sami Armoyan Respondent Judges: MacDonald, C.J.N.S., Fichaud and Bryson, JJ.A.

Appeal Heard: June 19-20, 2013, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Held: Fresh evidence from both parties is admitted, and: on CA 389169 - leave to appeal is granted, the appeal is allowed, and Condition # 2 of the Order of the Supreme Court (Family Division) is excised, with costs of the appeal to the Appellant in an amount to be determined separately; and on CA 407024 - leave to appeal is granted, the appeal is allowed in part, and the Florida Court is determined to be the forum conveniens for all matters, except that the Nova Scotia court is the forum conveniens for the division of matrimonial property further to an application under the Matrimonial Property Act of Nova Scotia, with costs for the proceeding in the Family Division and on the appeal to the Appellant in amounts to be determined separately, per reasons for judgment of Fichaud, J.A.; MacDonald C.J.N.S. and Bryson, J.A. concurring.

Counsel: Mary Jane McGinty and Christine J. Doucet for the appellant

Gordon R. Kelly and Noémi Westergard for the respondent Reasons for judgment : CONTENTS Paragraph 1. Background 2 2. The Florida Proceeding 17 (

a) The Writ Ne Exeat 18 (

b) Mr. Armoyan’s Hague Convention Petition 20 (

c) Mr. Armoyan’s Disqualification Motion 27 (

d) The Stay 32 (

e) Mr. Armoyan’s Financial Disclosure 34 (

f) Mr. Armoyan’s Stipulation to Avoid Disclosure 47 (

g) Interim Support Order 54 (

h) Costs Orders Against Mr. Armoyan 55 (

i) Mr. Armoyan’s Default Under the Interim Support and Costs Orders 57 (

j) Florida’s Enforcement of the Interim Support and Costs Orders 60 (

k) Florida Court’s Consideration of Anti-Suit Injunction, Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens 68 (

l) The Florida Divorce 76

3. The Nova Scotia Proceeding 94 (

a) Forum Conveniens for the Computer Issue 95 (

b) Mr. Armoyan’s Second Divorce Petition 96 (

c) Ms. Armoyan’s Forum Non Conveniens Motion 98 (

d) Mr. Armoyan’s Movement of Assets 100 (

e) Res Judicata of Florida Ruling on Privilege 108 (

f) The Jurisdiction/ Forum Non Conveniens Hearing 111 (

g) Adjournment of February 24, 2012 113 (

h) Ms. Armoyan’s Appeal of the Condition Restraining the Florida Proceeding 116 (

i) Conclusion of the Jurisdiction/ Forum Non Conveniens Proceeding 118 (

j) Ms. Armoyan’s Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens Ruling 122 4. Issues 125 5. First Issue - Fresh Evidence 127 (

a) The Law on Fresh Evidence 131 (

b) Application of the Palmer Tests 134 (

c) Admissible Form of the Evidence 143 (

d) Conclusion - Fresh Evidence 158

6. Second Issue - The Adjournment Appeal 163 (

a) Standard of Review 172 (

b) The Effect of Condition #2 177 (

c) Procedural Error 181 (

d) Substantive Error 188 (

e) Mootness 205 (

f) Conclusion - Adjournment Appeal 206 7. Third Issue - Forum Non Conveniens Appeal 207 (

a) Jurisdiction Simpliciter - Mr. Armoyan’s “Ordinary Residence” 210 (

b) Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act , s. 12 217 (

c) Ms. Armoyan’s Advancement of the Florida Proceeding 225 (

d) Conflicting Decisions 239 (

e) Juridical Advantage 256 (

f) Comity and the “Nova Scotia Family” 262 (

g) Comparative Fairness and Efficiency 273 (

i) Division of Matrimonial Property 276 (ii) Child and Spousal Support 283 • Access to Justice 284

• Functional Effectiveness 292 • Respect for Stipulation 310 • Conclusion 311 (

h) The Marital Agreement 313 (

i) Res Judicata/Issue Estoppel 332 (ii) Validity of Forum Selection Clause - Merits of Issue 357 (iii) Strong Cause Doctrine 359 8. Fourth Issue - Admissibility of Evidence 361 9. Conclusion 376 [ 1 ] This divorce is tangled in a legal mesh that stretches between the courts of Florida and Nova Scotia. The appeal involves the forum non conveniens principles. Those principles include comity and comparative fairness and efficiency in the administration of justice. 1. Background [ 2 ] Mr. Armoyan was born in Tartous, Syria, and came to Nova Scotia at a young age. Ms. Armoyan was born in Toronto.

They married in Toronto in October 1993. He was 32, and she was 21. This has been the only marriage for either. They resided in Toronto until they moved to Halifax in 1996. Their marriage was traditional, soon producing three children. Their son was born in 1995 while they were in Toronto. Their daughters were born in 1996 and 1998, while the family was in Halifax. The family resided in Halifax from 1996 until the summer of 2007. [ 3 ] Mr. Armoyan is a successful businessman who “enjoyed a very substantial net worth”, according to the decision under appeal ( 2012 NSSC 323 , para 31 ).

The Florida judge who tried the matter found “the parties during their intact marriage accumulated a net worth in excess of $50 million” (below, para 88). Though Mr. Armoyan has disclosed the first page of some tax returns, he has not provided full income disclosure in the nearly four years since the divorce proceedings began. Ms. Armoyan’s 2007 T1 General Tax Return, prepared while they were together, reported that Mr. Armoyan’s net income for 2007 was $6,882,336.76. [ 4 ] For the 2007-08 school year in Toronto, the family inhabited rented premises, while they secured their Halifax house. The first page of Mr.

Armoyan’s T1 General 2007 tax return said his “residence” was Ontario. [ 5 ] By February 2008, the Armoyans’ marriage had developed some strains.

[ 6 ] On February 28, 2008, while they were living in Toronto, Mr. and Ms. Armoyan flew to Halifax to sign a document entitled “Agreement Dealing With Matrimonial Relationship, Assets and All Matters Related Thereto” (“Marital Agreement”). Nova Scotia was advantageous to Mr. Armoyan because, generally, business assets are not “matrimonial assets” under Nova Scotia law. The Marital Agreement said: (1) a $2 million trust would be established for Ms. Armoyan, “to be solely managed by the Husband” as the Trustee, which she could draw down by instalments,

(2) Ms. Armoyan released any claim she might have to support payments or to the matrimonial home and other assets, (except for her own RRSP, personal effects and one vehicle to be transferred to her father) and, (3) of particular relevance to this appeal: 20. PROPER LAW The parties hereto agree that the law governing this Agreement is the law of Nova Scotia and further agree that any court action taken in connection with any of the matters outlined herein is to be brought in the courts of Nova Scotia and no other jurisdiction.

The Marital Agreement attaches certificates of independent legal advice signed by counsel for each of Mr. and Ms. Armoyan. Mr. Armoyan’s lawyer, who drafted the Marital Agreement, testified that his objective was to prepare a “bulletproof” agreement. Later, I will review the Agreement’s treatment by the Florida Court and by the judge in the Decision under appeal (paras 79-80 and 313-60). After signing the document in Halifax on March 1, 2008, Mr. and Ms. Armoyan flew back to Toronto. [ 7 ] In the summer of 2008, after their Toronto lease expired, the family stayed in Halifax for several weeks.

Then, at the end of August 2008, the family moved to Florida. The judge’s decision under appeal said: [15] A decision evolved by which the family would relocate to Boca Raton Florida, USA. The parties have opposite perspectives about how that had developed. The Petitioner [Mr. Armoyan] placed considerable emphasis on a mutual desire to try a fresh start in Florida as part of a plan to revitalize their marriage which had faced difficulty. A company in which he had an interest gave him a contract of employment by which he would pursue certain business interests in Florida for the company.

The letter of employment confirms that he may be required to relocate the family to Florida for as much as three years. A one-year employment non-immigration visa, sponsored by the company was obtained. The family moved there for the school year 2008/09 and lived in rented and furnished accommodation. The company that employed Mr. Armoyan for his time in Florida was Armco Capital Inc. (“Armco”). Armco had a substantial land development business and was controlled by Mr. Armoyan and his brother George Armoyan. [ 8 ] In August 2008 Mr. Armoyan signed a lease for 800 NE Harbour Drive, in Boca Raton, Florida.

From September 2008 to June 2009, their three children attended school in Boca Raton. Mr. and Ms. Armoyan lived in their Florida home with the children. Ms. Armoyan visited relatives in Toronto for several weeks in the spring of 2009. Mr. Armoyan travelled outside Florida, including to Halifax, for business reasons. [ 9 ] On June 17, 2009, the Armoyans’ younger daughter had surgery at the IWK Children’s Hospital in Halifax. Mr. and Ms. Armoyan accompanied their daughter to Halifax for the surgery and for her six week post-surgical recovery period.

In August 2009, after the recovery period, the family left for a two week cruise to Europe. After the cruise, the family returned directly to their Florida home for the 2009-10 school year. [ 10 ] In September 2009, the Armoyans’ daughters returned to public school in Boca Raton. Their son enrolled in Upper Canada College in Toronto. Mr. and Ms. Armoyan continued to live in the Florida home with their daughters. [ 11 ] On October 20, 2009, Ms. Armoyan filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage in the 15 th Judicial Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, Florida. [ 12 ] According to Mr.

Armoyan’s affidavit, on October 22, 2009 at their Florida house, Ms. Armoyan served Mr. Armoyan with the divorce petition. Mr. Armoyan deposed that he was “very surprised”. Mr. Armoyan’s later Nova Scotia divorce petition says that cohabitation ceased on October 12, 2009.

[ 13 ] On December 8, 2009, Mr. Armoyan returned to Nova Scotia, where he filed a Petition for Divorce in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia (Family Division) on December 9, 2009. [ 14 ] By December 9, 2009 there were concurrent divorce proceedings in Florida, initiated by Ms. Armoyan, and Nova Scotia, initiated by Mr. Armoyan. [ 15 ] Thereafter, Ms. Armoyan has remained in Florida with her daughters, who continued their schooling in Florida. The Armoyans’ son has attended private school in Toronto where he has lived with his maternal grandparents, and returns to Florida to stay with his mother and sisters.

The children have had little connection with Mr. Armoyan, who has withdrawn any parenting and custody claims, and virtually no connection to Nova Scotia. Ms. Armoyan has no employment, has attempted to further her education in Florida, and raises the children there as a single parent. She has no connection to Nova Scotia and no intent to return. Since December 2009, Mr. Armoyan has lived primarily in Halifax, but has travelled to the Middle East and elsewhere for business or personal reasons. [ 16 ] I will track the progress of the proceedings in Florida and Nova Scotia since the autumn of 2009. 2.

The Florida Proceeding [ 17 ] The following commentary outlines, by topic, the salient aspects of the Florida litigation. I will just recite from the various Decisions that appear in the Appeal Books. This outline is not exhaustive and omits over a hundred rulings, many having been contested, by the Florida Circuit Court and District Court of Appeal between October 2009 and October 2012, related to this divorce. The Florida Circuit Court’s Order of September 5, 2012 (discussed below, para 77) noted (para 22) that there had been 722 pleadings to that date in addition to appeal pleadings.

I will cross reference to show the connections in these labyrinthine proceedings. (

a) The Writ Ne Exeat [ 18 ] On November 3, 2009, at Ms. Armoyan’s ex parte motion, the Circuit Court issued a writ of ne exeat . Mr. Armoyan was served in Florida. The writ restrained Mr. Armoyan from leaving Florida until arrangements were made to support his children. [ 19 ] The Circuit Court issued another Order, filed January 20, 2010, that dissolved the writ of ne exiat . The dissolution was effective as of early December, 2009, and Mr. Armoyan was permitted to leave Florida in early December.

According to the recital in the dissolution Order, the writ was dissolved after considering the evidence presented, including but not limited to, the Husband’s representation that he will abide by the Orders of this Court, The transcript of Mr. Armoyan’s testimony before Judge Stern on December 2, 2009 says: Q. You claim under oath that you’re going to follow this Court’s order? A. Yes. Q. And that you have ties to Florida so that the Court shouldn’t concern itself by you not coming back? A. That’s correct. The dissolution Order directed that Mr. Armoyan deposit $150,000 to Ms.

Armoyan’s account, toward support, and provided

The Husband must abide by all Orders of this Court, past and future, until otherwise ordered. (

b) Mr. Armoyan’s Hague Convention Petition [ 20 ] Mr. Armoyan petitioned the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, for a ruling that his daughters be returned to Canada. His application was based on the Hague Convention. Before the hearing of that application, Mr. Armoyan obtained from the Circuit Court an order that there be no custody ruling on the divorce proceeding, for any of the three children, until the Hague Convention matter was determined. The nature of the Hague Convention proceeding required a judge to issue a Report and Recommendation to the State of Florida.

Circuit Court Judge Turnoff conducted a hearing in November 2010, and heard testimony from Mr. and Ms. Armoyan and their two daughters. He issued a Report and Recommendation on December 23, 2010. [ 21 ] Judge Turnoff’s Report stated that the children were habitually resident in Florida, and recommended that Mr. Armoyan’s Hague Convention motion be dismissed. Where Judge Turnoff’s Report gives citations to his transcript or record, I will insert “[c.o.]” for “citations omitted”. [ 22 ] The Report characterized Mr.

Armoyan’s Hague Convention petition as follows: An evidentiary hearing on the Amended Petition [c.o.] took place before the undersigned on Wednesday, November 24, 2010. ... Petitioner’s [Mr. Armoyan’s] filings herein amount to nothing more than a carefully orchestrated scheme to overwhelm Respondent financially by forcing her to defend herself in numerous causes of action filed by Petitioner in multiple jurisdictions.

As part of his relentless pursuit, Petitioner, through his Amended Petition [c.o.], which was filed under seal and submitted under oath [Judge Turnoff’s emphasis], managed to manipulate this Court into taking immediate action. Misrepresentations to the Court In furtherance of his scheme, Petitioner represented to this Court that his children were being illegally retained in this District by Respondent. [c.o.].

Specifically, Petitioner urged this Court that: (1) immediate court action was required, (2) that there was a real danger that Respondent would conceal the children and/or take them out of this jurisdiction, (3) that irreparable harm to the children would result, (4) that emergency treatment of this matter was warranted, and that (4) ex parte relief was necessary . [c.o.] (“the entry of an emergent order preventing her [from concealing the children outside the jurisdiction] is appropriate and necessary as a provisional remedy”).

Petitioner went so far as requesting that this Court “issue a Warrant of Arrest” for Respondent. [c.o.]. The Court, now having had the benefit of hearing testimony, and making credibility determinations, finds that neither of the above were true. The catalyst for this action was most certainly not the return of his children to Canada.

Rather, its sole purpose was to harass, intimidate, and quite frankly, bully the Respondent - while at the same time conveniently continuing to delay the underlying dissolution of marriage proceedings pending in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach County, Florida, to wit: Case No: 05-2009 DR 012086 xxxx SB (“Florida divorce action”).

In fact, the instant proceedings were cited and used by Petitioner in order to secure himself an emergency stay of the Florida divorce action. [c.o.] Since the filing of the Florida divorce action, Petitioner has relentlessly used his vast means and resources to initiate litigation geared solely towards delaying a determination as to support payments, and forcing Respondent to defend herself with limited means. ... This Court shall neither condone nor assist Petitioner in these endeavours.

It is high time that the underlying custody and support issues pending in the Florida divorce action move forward on the merits. Consistent with the above, it is this Court’s finding that the Amended Petition [c.o.] was frivolous and vexatious from its inception. ...

[ 23 ] Based on the testimony of Mr. and Ms. Armoyan and their two daughters, Judge Turnoff’s Report said the following about the family’s place of “residence”: Petitioner’s original visa was valid from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009. [c.o.] He and his family entered the United States sometime in August 2008. [c.o.] Upon their arrival, the family secured housing in Boca Raton, Florida. [c.o.] They remained in Florida until the summer of 2009, when they briefly returned to Canada. The family, all except for their son, J.A., returned to Florida at the end of the summer in August 2009.

In the meantime, Petitioner continued to travel to and from Canada from August through October 2009. [c.o.] ... Petitioner claims that on or about November 18, 2009, less than one month after Respondent filed for divorce, he learned that Armco had abruptly terminated his employment and revoked his visa, and consequently, those of Respondent and the children. ... ... Petitioner suggests that he was a mere employee, subject to the decisions of his employer; an employee that relocated to Florida solely at the behest of his employer.

Petitioner also asserts that he was surprised to learn of his termination and equally surprised to discover that Armco had “revoked” and/or “cancelled” his visa [c.o.] Nothing could be further from the truth. There is no doubt, at least in this Court’s mind, that the termination of Petitioner’s employment, and subsequent revocation of his visa, was no coincidence.

Upon questioning by the Court, Petitioner conceded that his family has various ownership interests and connections to Armco. [c.o.] Specifically, his sister-in-law owns the “controlling part” of Armco’s parent company, and his brother is the chairman of the board. [c.o.] Upon further questioning by the Court, Petitioner also admitted that he personally owns fifty percent of Armco’s parent or “mother” company, i.e., “Gevox.” ... All of this is consistent with Respondents’ testimony that Petitioner is “pretending” that he does not own Armco. [c.o.].

In this Court’s view, for all intents and purposes, Petitioner and Armco are one and the same. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Petitioner caused Armco to transfer him to Florida when he was attempting to save his marriage, which by his own admission was in trouble in 2008. To illustrate, Armco’s May 9, 2008 letter indicates that Petitioner’s employment would commence on July 8, 2008, and was expected to require residency in the United States for up to three years. [c.o.].

When things did not go as planned - i.e., Respondent filed for divorce in October 2009 - Petitioner, almost like a puppet master, caused Armco to terminate his employment and revoke his visas, and by extension, those of his family. Petitioner’s sudden and immediate “termination” on November 18, 2009 came almost one month to the day after Petitioner was served with divorce papers on October 22, 2009. [c.o.].

All this, notwithstanding Petitioner’s prior claim, and Armco’s written confirmation on May 20, 2009, that his original employment had been “renewed” for one more year, and that he had been approved for a second visa for the period of July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010. [c.o.]. In this Court’s view, these seemingly coincidental events are consistent with a well thought out “win-at-all-costs” plan to force Respondent to return to Canada after Petitioner, vis-a-vis Armco, caused her visa and that of the children to be revoked.

Petitioner relentlessly followed through on his plan without regard for the harm it would cause to his children by: 1) leaving them with no legal immigration status in the United States, and 2) the possibility of having their mother arrested by the United States Marshals upon the filing of this action. ... In order to establish a prima facie case under the Convention, Petitioner must establish that: (1) the habitual residence of the child immediately [Judge Turnoff’s italics] before the date of the alleged wrongful removal or retention was in the country to which return is sought, ... ...

Applying the law to the facts of this case, the undersigned finds that Petitioner, in addition to the fabrications and misrepresentations noted above, has failed to set forth a prima facie case, as Canada was not the children’s habitual residence immediately before the time of the alleged removal. Habitual Residence ... Petitioner specifically contends that the habitual residence of the family, including the children, was in Halifax, Nova Scotia [c.o.] The evidence suggests otherwise.

While the Convention does not specifically define the term “habitual residence” it has come to mean the place where the child has lived for some period of time for a settled purpose. ... Here, both children testified that they were last in Halifax in the summer of 2009 when C.A. underwent back surgery, and that prior to that they had not lived there since 2006. [c.o.] The testimony indicates that the parties actually lived in Toronto, Canada from September 2007 through July 2008. In Toronto, the family lived in a rented home pursuant to a ten month lease [c.o.], and the children attended school there. [c.o.].

They had initially relocated to Toronto, because Respondent and the children hated living in Halifax. [c.o.] In fact, the children so despised Halifax that prior to leaving for Toronto, they “smashed all [their] toys,” and “[wrote] on the windows” because they “knew [they] were never [going] back” [c.o.]. Clearly, in their mind, they were not returning. Eventually, the family left Toronto because Petitioner hated it there. [c.o.] (“[we left Toronto] because my mom hated Halifax and my dad hated Toronto.”) . As part of their move from Toronto, they sold their furniture. [c.o.].

Upon leaving Toronto, the family returned briefly to Halifax, where they spent the summer of 2008. [c.o.]. At the end of the summer, they relocated to Florida. [c.o.] All evidence suggests that Petitioner consented to the move in an effort to save his marriage. Indeed, the entire family was trying to find a place where they could all be happy. They ultimately settled on Boca Raton, Florida because it was the place “they all loved” and where they “were going to stay”. [c.o.] In furtherance of same, Petitioner sought to develop business in Florida and establish a life here.

When they first arrived in Florida, the family, including all three of their children, resided at a condominium owned by Petitioner’s mother. [c.o.]. Later, around August-September 2008, the family secured a rental property at 800 N.E. Harbour Drive in Boca Raton, Florida. [c.o.]. The official period of the lease was from August 29, 2008 - June 28-29, 2009. [c.o.]. However, the evidence suggests that the parties continued to rent the property on a month-to-month basis well after the end of the lease. [c.o.]. In fact, Respondent and the children continued to reside at the 800 N.E.

Harbour Drive address until Petitioner, on his own, notified the landlady that they would not be living there anymore. [c.o.]. ... It is also important to note that all of the Armoyan children attended school in Palm Beach County, Florida during the 2008-2009 school year. [c.o.]. Petitioner himself admits that during September 2008 through May 2009, with the exception of school observed holidays, the children remained in Florida. [c.o.]. The following school year, J.A. expressed his desire to return to boarding school in Toronto. [c.o.].

However, C.A. and V.A. remained in Florida, and attended private schools in Boca Raton. [c.o.]. Petitioner admits that they attended school in Boca Raton with his permission, and that he paid the tuition for same. [c.o.] To this day, C.A. and V.A. continue to attend school in Boca Raton. However, they are now in public schools, because Respondent cannot afford private school tuition. Are the Children Settled in Florida Having determined that the children’s habitual residence was relocated to Florida, the undersigned shall address the issue of whether the children are settled or acclimated here. ...

[Judge Turnoff’s review of the evidence is omitted] Consistent with the above, it is the finding of this Court that these children are acclimatized and doing well in Florida. They have both adjusted to their schools, made friends and become involved in both school and extracurricular activities. [ 24 ] The Report says, of the daughters’ intentions: As noted above, C.A. is twelve and V.A. is fourteen. Both girls are quite bright, mature, and very articulate. Each was well composed, testified calmly, and readily answered the questions posed to them.

In the Court’s opinion, their age and level of maturity warrant the consideration of their views. Here, both girls object to being returned to Canada. They have both testified that they enjoy their friends, school and extracurricular activities in Florida. In other words, they have expressed a hugh [ sic ] sense of belonging. A sense that they are building their lives here; whereas in Halifax they felt as if they had no life. [c.o.] In this connection, when they speak about Halifax they describe a feeling of not belonging. ...

In this Court’s view, both girls have made it clear that they do not wish to return to Halifax. Rather, their wish is to remain in Florida with Respondent [Ms. Armoyan]. [c.o.]. [ 25 ] Judge Turnoff’s Report concluded: V. Conclusion Consistent with the above findings, the Court, having considered the stated wishes of the children, finds that Respondent has established this exception by a preponderance of the evidence. The children should remain in Florida. ... The Report recommended that Mr.

Armoyan’s motion be dismissed and that: the Court enter an Order advising the State of Florida Court in the divorce proceedings that it may proceed with the matters pending before it. [ 26 ] The Report was for the review of the District Court. On September 28, 2012, after the review, the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida dismissed Mr. Armoyan’s Petition to return the children to Canada. [see para 38 of Circuit Court’s Divorce Judgment of October 26, 2012, below, para 79] (

c) Mr. Armoyan’s Disqualification Motion [ 27 ] Before their separation, Ms. Armoyan had cloned information from the hard drive of Mr. Armoyan’s laptop computer. The information apparently disclosed assets of Mr. Armoyan or his companies. Ms. Armoyan showed this information to her Florida attorney and accountant. Mr. Armoyan applied in the Florida Court to disqualify Ms. Armoyan’s Florida divorce counsel and accountant, on the basis that they had seen privileged information.

The Florida Circuit Court established a process, involving review of the allegedly privileged information by a court appointed Special Master, whereby the information could be reviewed to determine whether a privilege had been violated.

[ 28 ] Judge Stern of the Florida Circuit Court heard the matter. On December 15, 2010, Judge Stern issued a ruling with a stinging rejection of Mr. Armoyan’s position (quoted below, para 31). In July 2011, the Fourth District Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Armoyan’s appeal on a procedural ground, to allow Mr. Armoyan to offer additional evidence, and remitted the disqualification issue for a rehearing before the Circuit Court. [ 29 ] On August 1, 2011, the Circuit Court scheduled January 4, 2012 for the rehearing of Mr. Armoyan’s disqualification application. Mr.

Armoyan was to testify on that date. [ 30 ] On January 4, 2012, Mr. Armoyan did not appear in Circuit Court, and had not made other arrangements for his testimony. His counsel requested an adjournment, which the Court denied. On January 11, 2012, the Florida Circuit Court issued an Order that dismissed Mr. Armoyan’s motions to disqualify Ms. Armoyan’s counsel and accountant. That ended Mr. Armoyan’s claim to disqualify Ms.

Armoyan’s attorney and accountant. [ 31 ] Judge Martz’ eventual Divorce Judgment of October 26, 2012 (para 30, quoted below in para 79) “reincorporates” Judge Stern’s findings from the ruling of December 15, 2010. Those, now reincorporated, findings in Judge Stern’s December 15, 2010 Order included: 1. The Husband claims that he had maintained a laptop computer (which is owned by ARMCO CAPITAL, INC., which in turn is owned by the Respondent/Husband and his brother) containing information, including communications, for business purposes, all unconnected with this divorce.

The Wife claims that the said computer had also been used to send and receive privileged communications between the Husband and his attorneys, and also attorney work product involving matters and information pertinent to this case, including but not limited to the drafting and negotiating of the parties’ postnuptial agreement which is sought to be used by the Husband in support of his argument that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the parties or their marriage. It is undisputed that the accountant, Robert W. Zucker, has possession of, and has seen, many if not all of the allegedly privileged documents.

The Wife’s counsel is alleged to have seen the documents, and in a September 16, 2010 letter to Husband’s counsel indicating which documents he seeks to use (identifying each by Bates stamp number), counsel implicitly admits knowing their content. 2. The Husband maintains that the Wife’s counsel, by virtue of his having reviewed the documents, and by virtue of “his” CPA having reviewed the documents, the Wife has an unfair informational advantage or tactical advantage through the disclosure of the privileged information in those documents.

The Husband maintains that the Wife, in taking possession of the Husband’s laptop, and by turning it over to her professionals involved in this case, is guilty of an abuse of the judicial process. The Husband contends that only by disqualification of the Wife’s counsel and CPA can the damage be undone. ... 6. Where privilege is asserted in a Privilege Log, an in camera inspection must be held before the court can order documents to be produced. Snyder v. Value Rent-a-Car , 736 So.2d 780 , 782 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1999). ...

The Court’s in camera inspection of the documents has revealed that a number of documents and communications contained on the laptop’s hard drive clearly are relevant to crucial issues herein, issues raised by the Husband, who thereafter sought to conceal evidence potentially harmful to him on these very issues. ...

Section 90.502, Fla.Stats., is the

section of Florida’s Evidence code dealing with the attorney-client privilege. It provides in pertinent part as follows: “90.502. Lawyer-client privilege ...

(4) There is no lawyer-client privilege under this

section when:

(

a) The services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew was a crime or fraud. ... (

c) A communication is relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the lawyer, arising from the lawyer-client relationship . [Judge Stern’s italics]” 9. Any privilege attaching to the Respondent’s conversations with his counsel of record herein have been waived, insofar as they relate to the issue of his concealment from the Wife of (

a) the nature and extent of his assets and income at the time of negotiating and executing the postnuptial agreement, and (

b) the facts surrounding his residency, at least insofar as it involves his animus manendi in Florida. As to (a), Respondent clearly was causing untruths to be made to this Court. This was a fraud on the Court and on Petitioner and her attorney, as well as on Respondent/Husband’s own attorneys as well. As to (c), this Court assumes that Respondent’s counsel of record herein was unaware that she was unwittingly repeating to this Court falsehoods fed to her by her client, the Respondent. ...

Respondent’s use of his counsel in this manner constitutes a breach of duty by the client to the lawyer, and obviates the privilege with respect to anything the Respondent has told that counsel with respect to the contents of the material at issue, and also regarding the issues to which they relate. ... 10.

Similarly, if Respondent withheld from his Canadian attorney, Michael Ryan, who drafted and helped Respondent to negotiate his postnuptial agreement, the full scope of Respondent’s assets and income, then Respondent would have been using his unwitting counsel as a conduit to defraud Petitioner and her then counsel, Bryan [ sic - Brian] Church, and, ipso facto , would have been breaching his duty to his own counsel. Thus, there is no privilege as to any communications between Respondent and attorney Ryan which relate to his assets, net worth and income, and also to his residency. ... 13.

In the case at bar, respondent/Husband, through his apparently unsuspecting attorney of record, Melinda Gamot, misrepresented to this Court that the hard drive in question contained only [Judge Stern’s italics] corporate material, much of which involved corporate trade secrets. There was a categorical assertion by Ms. Gamot that “there is no personal information relative to this case.

It’s all proprietary information pertaining to Armco.” [c.o.] When asked if she personally had examined the entire hard drive, she candidly stated that she has no personal knowledge of what is on the hard drive, and that she had relied on Affidavits filed in the Court in Nova Scotia, where an action was instituted in an unsuccessful attempt to create an alternate forum to litigate issues involved in this case; that Court promptly deferred to this Court as the appropriate forum.

Two and a half months later, said counsel represented that “[w]e don’t think there’s any marital asset records on that hard drive that she cloned.” ... 14. ... The pretense that the computer contained no data of a personal nature clearly was intended to create the false perception that immediate return of all material on the hard drive, and copies thereof, could in no way deprive the Wife of relevant material helpful to her case. 15. ...

Through his own attorney and through his corporation’s attorney, the Husband conducted a full-court press, both here and in the Nova Scotia Court, to keep the those [ sic ] documents from being used by Wife’s counsel even though it was now a matter of record that the Special Master had identified documents of relevance herein, contradicting those counsels’ prior repeated assurances to this Court that no personal information was in the subject material. 16.

Now that the cat is out of the bag and the existence of relevant material on the hard drive is manifest, the Husband, having failed to thwart the administration of justice by the use of deception on this Court, the Fourth District Court of Appeal and the Nova Scotia Court, seeks to disqualify the Wife’s attorney and CPA in a new attempt to derail this case. This Court will not reward the Husband’s attempts in this and two other Courts, to thwart the discovery of the truth and to prevent the resolution, on an informed basis, of all the issues between the parties.

17. ... In reviewing documents submitted under seal for examination, the Court notes that the documents certainly contain material relevant to the Petitioner/Wife’s contention that she was not apprised of the full extent of her Husband’s financial situation (and even suggesting that the Respondent/Husband had purposely withheld from his Canadian attorney (William “Mick” Ryan) who assisted him in negotiating the postnuptial agreement involved here), and relevant also to the issue of the parties’ residence and intentions with respect thereto. ... 18. ...

The Husband himself, in attempting to convince the Court to prohibit opposing counsel from seeing the material, actually waived the privilege as to his attorney-client communications contained on the hard drive, by falsely declaring and repeatedly declaring that no such privileged documents exist on it. Such declarations were made more than once, over a significant period of time, before this Court and the appellate court. The Husband had gambled that his fraudulent statements would induce this Court to do his bidding; he lost. ... 21.

The Respondent, through his attorney and through his company’s attorney, intentionally and repeatedly misrepresented the nature of the contents of the hard drive as being limited solely to trade secret information of the company, and expressly asserted to both courts that there was nothing on the hard drive of any import or relevance to this case and the issues of concealment of assets and of the parties’ residency. The Respondent’s willfulness in causing these misrepresentations cannot be denied. ... 23.

This Court invokes a principle of long-standing in this State, a principle which state and federal courts throughout the nation have invoked in declining to permit subterfuge by one party to prevail over the good faith of the other party: “The trial of a lawsuit should be a sincere effort to arrive at the truth. It is no longer a game of chess in which technique of the maneuver captures the prize.” [case citation omitted]. Ruling The Husband’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Wife’s Counsel Joel M. Weissman, P.A. and The Husband’s Verified Motion to Disqualify Robert W.

Zucker, P.A./Zucker Forensics should be, and the same both hereby are, DENIED. (

d) The Stay [ 32 ] On December 22, 2010, Mr. Armoyan applied to the Florida Circuit Court for a stay of the Florida divorce proceeding. The Court heard the motion on March 3, 2011. On April 6, 2011, the Florida Circuit Court stayed the Florida divorce proceeding until the determination of Mr. Armoyan’s motion to disqualify Ms. Armoyan’s counsel and accountant. The Stay allowed an exception, that Ms. Armoyan could seek interim maintenance for herself and the children. [ 33 ] The Stay ended on January 11, 2012, when the Florida Circuit Court issued the order that finally dismissed Mr.

Armoyan’s motion to disqualify Ms. Armoyan’s counsel and accountant (above, para 30). On January 4, 2012, Mr. Armoyan’s counsel had requested that the Stay be continued, but the Florida Circuit Court denied that request. (

e) Mr. Armoyan’s Financial Disclosure [ 34 ] Financial disclosure from Mr. Armoyan was a struggle from the outset of the Florida divorce proceeding. [ 35 ] Immediately after Ms. Armoyan’s petition was filed, a Circuit Court Judge issued an Order of October 20, 2009:

Pursuant to §61.21(4), (5) and (9), Florida Statutes §61.30(1)(a), Florida Statutes and Florida Family Law Rules of Procedures 12.285(b) (2), (d), (j), it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: ... 5. Each party shall file and serve a completed, notarized Financial Affidavit in substantial conformity with Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.902(b), if the party’s gross income is less than $50,000.00 or Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.902(c), if the party’s gross income is $50,000.00 or greater. 6.

The parties shall file and serve a completed Child Support Guidelines Worksheet in substantial conformity with Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.902(e). 7. The parties cannot waive the requirement that Financial Affidavits and a Child Support Guidelines Worksheet be filed and served. No Final Judgment determining child custody and visitation may be entered absent determination of child support, and child support may not be determined without the information required to be disclosed in the Financial Affidavits and Child Support Guidelines Worksheet. 8.

The Financial Affidavits and Child Support Guidelines Worksheet must be served within forty (45) [ sic ] days of service of the petition on Respondent but, in any event, at least five (5) days before Court ordered mediation, absent agreement of the parties in writing or Court order. [ 36 ] On December 17, 2009, after the expiry of the time period for Mr. Armoyan’s Financial Affidavit mentioned in the October 20, 2009 Order, the Circuit Court issued an Order, on Ms. Armoyan’s ex parte motion, to compel Mr. Armoyan’s financial disclosure: 2.

Pursuant to Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Administrative Order No. 5.202-5/09 the Husband shall provide his completed Family Law Financial Affidavit and compliance with mandatory disclosure to the Wife through her counsel within ten (10) days from the date of this Order. [ 37 ] On January 11, 2010, the Circuit Court issued an “Agreed Order” that vacated the previous Order to Compel Mr. Armoyan’s Financial Disclosure and, instead, directed that Ms. Armoyan’s motion to compel disclosure be heard before a judge. [ 38 ] On January 21, 2010, the Circuit Court, after having heard argument, ordered: 1.

Wife’s Motion to Compel Response to Request to Produce and Answers to Standard Family Law Interrogatories be and same is hereby GRANTED. 2. The Husband shall provide his full and complete Response to Wife’s First Request to Produce and his Answers to Standard Family Law Interrogatories to the Office of Joel M. Weissman, P.A. on or before February 22, 2010. [ 39 ] On November 10, 2009, Mr. Armoyan had applied in the Florida Court to challenge the Florida Court’s jurisdiction to hear the divorce and for a ruling that the Florida Court was not the forum conveniens .

Accordingly, on February 19, 2010, the Circuit Court issued an Order that (1) scheduled March 9, 2010 for the hearing of the Jurisdiction/ forum non conveniens issue, and (2) extended the date for Mr. Armoyan’s “compliance with Mandatory Disclosure” to March 19, 2010. The Order justified the extension as “giving the

Court time to rule on the Husband’s pending Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ahead of the return date on the referenced Orders”. [ 40 ] Logistics and witness unavailability delayed the hearing of the jurisdictional/ forum non conveniens issue. The matter was not ready for hearing on March 9, 2010, and was adjourned. On March 24, 2010, the Circuit Court issued an Order stating: 2. The hearing on the issue of jurisdiction will be decided soon, and there would be no prejudice to the Wife in the Court’s staying financial discovery for a very short time. The Court did not fix a new date for Mr.

Armoyan’s disclosure but, instead ordered that Mr. Armoyan provide the disclosure “within ten (10) days of the date of the Court’s written Order ruling that this Court has jurisdiction”. [ 41 ] On June 7, 2011, the Circuit Court issued an Order that deferred Florida’s consideration of the forum non conveniens issue until after the consideration of forum non conveniens by the Family Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. The Florida Court was under the impression that the Nova Scotia Court would consider that matter within several weeks, in June 2011. The Florida Court’s order said: A.

This Court is going to wait until after the June hearings in Nova Scotia to make its decision on forum non conveniens. [ 42 ] As it turned out, the Nova Scotia Court did not deal with the forum non conveniens in June 2011. Nova Scotia’s Court did not issue a ruling on that matter until September 2012 (discussed below, paras 111-15, 118-21). [ 43 ] On September 28, 2011, the Florida Circuit Court issued an Order that scheduled the hearing of the jurisdictional/ forum non conveniens issue after the rehearing of Mr. Armoyan’s motion to disqualify Ms. Armoyan’s attorney and accountant.

That disqualification rehearing had been scheduled for January 4, 2012 (above, para 29). [ 44 ] As I will discuss (para 75), the Florida Court did not address the jurisdictional/ forum non conveniens matter until April 4, 2012. So the time limit (10 days after the jurisdictional ruling) for Mr. Armoyan’s financial disclosure, prescribed in the Circuit Court’s Order of March 24, 2010, did not expire until April 14, 2012. [ 45 ] As I will also discuss (paras 57-67), by February 2012, Mr. Armoyan had defaulted on his court ordered interim support for Ms.

Armoyan and his children, his Florida counsel had withdrawn, and Mr. Armoyan had jettisoned his responsibility under Florida law. This dispatched any issue of disclosure. [ 46 ] As a result, throughout the Florida divorce litigation, Mr. Armoyan managed to escape the full financial disclosure that is prescribed by Florida’s divorce laws. (

f) Mr. Armoyan’s Stipulation to Avoid Disclosure [ 47 ] As noted above (paras 32-33), the Florida divorce proceedings had been stayed until the determination of Mr. Armoyan’s claim that Ms. Armoyan’s counsel and accountant were disqualified. That matter was not determined until January 2012. But an exception to the stay was that Ms. Armoyan could seek interim maintenance, termed by the Florida orders as “temporary” or “separate” maintenance. The calculation of interim maintenance would be assisted by financial disclosure from Mr. Armoyan, which Mr. Armoyan had resisted. [ 48 ] On April 6, 2011, Ms.

Armoyan requested an Order that Mr. Armoyan provide financial disclosure to enable the calculation of interim maintenance. On April 15, 2011, the Circuit Court issued an order that required Mr. Armoyan to either (1) provide that disclosure or (2) file a stipulation that he could pay any reasonable award of maintenance and that the stipulation would be available for contempt proceedings to enforce the award, should he then fail to pay.

[ 49 ] Specifically, the Circuit Court’s Order of April 15, 2011 states: THIS MATTER was before the Court April 6, 2011 on the Wife’s Motion to Compel Husband’s compliance with financial disclosure. After hearing argument of counsel and being fully advised, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: For purposes of financial disclosure pertaining to the Wife’s claim for temporary maintenance under Count II of her Amended Petition, i.e.

FS § 61.09, the Husband is to provide a complete financial affidavit by April 13, 2011, unless by the time he submits a verified stipulation signed by him, that he agrees for purposes of the upcoming temporary support and maintenance hearing, and for purposes of any motion for contempt to enforce the orders that arise out of that hearing, should he not comply that he has the ability to pay whatever amounts the Court deems reasonable and necessary. [ 50 ] Mr. Armoyan chose to give the stipulation instead of disclosure.

The later Orders of the Florida Circuit Court filed January 24, 2012 and February 14, 2012 (that I will discuss below, paras 58, 62) recite the circumstances of Mr. Armoyan’s stipulation. [ 51 ] The Circuit Court’s Order filed January 24, 2012 says: 1.

This Court entered an order on the Wife’s Motion to Compel the Husband’s Compliance with Discovery, requiring the Husband to either comply with financial disclosure by April 13, 2011, or to stipulate that he has the ability to pay an amount that this Court deemed just and necessary as to the Wife’s claim for temporary support and attorney’s fees under Florida Statute § 61.09. (DE 409). 2.

On April 11, 2011, the Husband stipulated that he has the ability to pay any amount this Court deemed reasonable and necessary, so as to avoid the requirement to comply with financial disclosure (DE 403), as requested by the Wife. Further, the Husband agreed that said stipulation would address (for the purposes of contempt) his ability to pay, should he fail to comply with the orders regard the same. (DE 403). [ 52 ] The Circuit Court’s Order of February 14, 2012: 1.

In advance of the hearing regarding the Wife’s Application for F.S. § 61.09 Separate Maintenance, this Court permitted the Husband to file a signed written stipulation that he has the ability to pay any reasonable award of support and/or attorney’s fees, in lieu of providing mandatory disclosure. (DE 409). ... 2.

On April 11, 2011, the Husband filed a stipulation stating that he has the ability to pay any reasonable and necessary award of temporary support and maintenance, and that said stipulation would be applicable for the purposes of contempt, regarding the orders as to the same. (DE 403) [ 53 ] The Circuit Court’s Order of September 5, 2012 (below, para 77, recital C), quotes Mr.

Armoyan’s stipulation: I stipulate that I have the ability to pay the amounts this Court deems reasonable and necessary for temporary maintenance and support and, for purposes of contempt, should I not comply with the order that arises out of that hearing on the Wife’s temporary maintenance and support.

(

g) Interim Support Order [ 54 ] On August 11, 2011 the Florida Circuit Court issued an Order (“Interim Support Order”) that Mr. Armoyan pay to Ms. Armoyan support for Ms. Armoyan and the children. Mr. Armoyan was represented by counsel. The Order said: ... After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel and being fully advised, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 1.

The Wife is entitled to separate maintenance from October 20, 2009 through April 30, 2011 as follows: a. $368,596.77, representing $20,000 per month, prorated and $25,000 per month prorated from April 22 to April 30, 2011, for undifferentiated maintenance and support for the Wife and minor children. The court has not yet addressed tax consequences of these funds. b. $10,059, representing the children’s medical expense reimbursement. c. $52,946, representing Jonathan’s boarding school tuition paid by the Wife. d. $17,349, representing tuition for the parties’ daughters to attend St. Andrews.

The Husband believes that tuition is refundable as the children did not complete the school year. The Court hereby assigns to the Husband all rights to negotiate with the school and to collect any and all refunds due and owing. The Wife shall fully cooperate and sign all forms as required for the Husband to have the authority to both negotiate with the school and to collect the refunds. e. The above sums total $448,951. f. The Husband is entitled to a credit for payments made directly to the Wife or children for their support. The Husband claims the amount of that credit $151,478.

The parties shall confer and if they cannot reach agreement then they shall return to Court for further ruling. g. The Court is not crediting the amount set forth in subparagraph e above with the $550,000 paid to the Wife in three lump sum payments of $150,000, $250,000 and $150,000, for the reasons set forth on the record. h. The amount of $297,473, representing the difference between the amount due in subparagraph e and the amount of credits claimed by the Husband shall be paid by the Husband, from any source he chooses to the JM Weissman trust acct, by August 20, 2011. 2.

Going forward and effective April 22, 2011, the Husband shall pay the Wife $25,000 per month as undifferentiated maintenance and support for the Wife and children. Payment shall be due on the first day of each month beginning, May 1, 2011. The Court acknowledges that the pro rata difference between the support due for April 2011, and the amount previously paid by the Husband, was made up and paid with his May 1, 2011 payment. 3. In addition, the Husband shall pay for all reasonable and necessary medical, dental, orthodontia, and drug prescriptions for the children not covered by health insurance.

The Husband shall not be responsible for any of the above listed health expenses for the children for non-emergency care for which he has not given prior written consent, within ten days of being requested for consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. The Wife shall take all steps reasonably necessary to make arrangements for the Husband to pay the healthcare provider directly so that the Husband has clear access to the health related expenses and treatment records for the children.

If there is a healthcare provider who refuses to take payment directly from the Husband, and should the Wife incur any out-of- pocket expenses, then the Husband shall reimburse her for those expenses within 30 days of presentation of the actual paid receipts, after the appropriate insurance credit. The Wife shall maintain and pay for the children’s Florida, USA health insurance, as the cost of that

insurance has already been factored into her monthly interim support. (

h) Costs Orders Against Mr. Armoyan [ 55 ] On September 1, 2011, the Florida Circuit Court issued an order that quantified Ms. Armoyan’s recoverable costs for the Interim Support proceeding. The Order required Mr. Armoyan to pay $75,000 to Mr. Joel Weissman, Ms. Armoyan’s attorney, and $50,000 to Mr. Robert Zucker, Ms. Armoyan’s forensic accountant, by September 10, 2011. [ 56 ] On January 24, 2012, the Circuit Court issued two Orders that quantified as $56,659 and $10,069 the attorney’s fees, or taxable costs in Canadian terms, that were payable by Mr. Armoyan to Ms.

Armoyan pursuant to Orders of the Florida District Court of Appeal. These amounts resulted from appeals taken in 2011 to the District Court of Appeal. The Circuit Court’s Orders said: The Husband shall pay the Wife’s appellate attorney’s fees in the amount of $56,659.00 to the Joel M. Weissman, P.A. Trust Account within thirty (30) days of January 5, 2012. The Husband shall pay the Wife’s appellate attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,069.00 to the Joel Weissman, P.A. Trust Account within ten (10) days of January 5, 2012. (

i) Mr. Armoyan’s Default Under the Interim Support and Costs Orders [ 57 ] Through January 2012, Mr. Armoyan paid prospective support ($25,000 monthly) ordered by

article 2 of the Interim Support Order. That Order,

article 1(h), had also required Mr. Armoyan to pay $297,473 in arrears of child and spousal support, owing for October 20, 2009 (the separation) to April 30, 2011. Mr. Armoyan did not pay the arrears, despite his stipulation of April 11, 2011. Neither did Mr. Armoyan make the financial disclosure that he avoided by giving the stipulation. Nor did Mr. Armoyan satisfy the costs (attorney’s fees and accountant’s fees) ordered on September 1, 2011. [ 58 ] The Florida Circuit Court began to address Mr.

Armoyan’s default by an Order, filed January 24, 2012, entitled “Order on the Viability of the Husband’s Stipulation as to Ability to Pay as it Pertains to the Wife’s Contempt Applications”. Basically, the Court gave Mr. Armoyan the opportunity to show inability to pay, in which case he would be required to make the financial disclosure that the Court had waived in return for his stipulation of April 11, 2011 (above, paras 47-53).

The Order of January 24, 2012 said: ... after hearing argument of counsel, and the Court being otherwise duly advised in the premises, it is thereupon ORDERED: ... [The Order recites Mr. Armoyan’s April 11, 2011 stipulation, the Interim Support Order of August 11, 2011 and the Costs Order of September 1, 2011] 5. The Wife has filed contempt applications, alleging that the Husband has failed to comply with the foregoing orders, which are scheduled to be heard by this Court on February 14, 2012. 6.

The Court finds, that the Husband shall be held to the stipulation he agreed to, as it pertains to his ability to comply with the orders as stated, for the purposes of contempt.

7. Should the Court find that the Husband has not paid the sums due and owing to the Wife (as stated in the Wife’s contempt applications), the Husband may be held in contempt at that time, based upon the stipulation. 8. However, this Court finds (as addressed by the Husband’s objections) that the Husband’s stipulation cannot extend to the remedy of incarceration. And, the Court is required to conduct a hearing to determine a present finding as to the Husband’s ability to pay the amount required that may be a purge to contempt in part. 9.

Should the Husband currently contend to assert a claim of the inability to comply with the foregoing orders as to the financial ability to pay the sums due, and claim as a defense to the Wife’s contempt applications said financial inability, the Husband is required to comply with all discovery requests of the Wife (See Docket Entries 68, 69, and 409), including the filing of a financial affidavit and the supporting documents as to the same, as it would be inequitable to limit the Wife’s remedies, on her contempt applications as to said issues. 10.

As such, the Husband shall be required to advise this Court and the Wife in writing by filing such notice (within fifteen (15) days from January 5, 2012) whether he will assert an inability to pay as a defense to the Wife’s contempt applications as stated. If the Husband choses [ sic ] to claim a financial inability, then he shall comply with the Wife’s outstanding discovery. [ 59 ] Mr. Armoyan responded by ceasing to honour the Interim Support Order. Beginning with the amount due on February 1, 2012, he stopped paying even the ongoing $25,000 monthly that had been ordered by

article 2 of the Interim Support Order, as blended prospective support for Ms. Armoyan and their children. (

j) Florida’s Enforcement of the Interim Support and Costs Orders [ 60 ] Not surprisingly, Mr. Armoyan’s default ignited activity in Florida. [ 61 ] On February 14, 2012, each of Mr. Armoyan’s Florida counsel, Ms. Melinda Penney Gamot, and Jane Kreusler Walsh, and their law firms, moved for permission to withdraw as Mr. Armoyan’s counsel of record. The Circuit Court issued Orders that granted the motions and directed that future notice to Mr. Armoyan be “mailed to 6009 Quinpool Road, 10 th Floor, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3K5J7”. On August 23, 2012, Mr.

Armoyan testified that this was the address of his office where he picks up mail. Notices of subsequent proceedings before the Florida Court were addressed to Mr. Armoyan at that Halifax location. [ 62 ] Also on February 14, 2012, the Circuit Court issued an “Order Adjudicating the Husband Vrege Armoyan in Civil Contempt and Granting Other Relief” for each of the court-ordered amounts respecting which Mr.

Armoyan was in default - i.e. the arrears of interim support through April 30, 2011 ($297,473) under the Interim Support Order, the February, 2012 interim support payment ($25,000) under the Interim Support Order, and Ms. Armoyan’s recoverable legal costs ($75,000 and $56,659, and $10,069) and accounting fees ($50,000) that Mr. Armoyan had been ordered to pay under the Orders that are described above. The Orders are similarly worded. I will quote the Order that relates to Mr. Armoyan’s default in the payment of the $25,000 due on February 1, 2012 for Ms.

Armoyan and the children: ... the Court makes the following findings of fact: ... 10. The Court finds that the Husband has failed to comply with the Order Granting Wife’s Application for F.S. § 61.09 Separate Maintenance, as he has willfully failed to pay to the Wife $25,000.00, which was due February 1, 2012.

11. The husband has also willfully failed to provide any discovery, pursuant to the Order on the Viability of the Husband’s Stipulation. [ i.e. the Order of January 23, 2012, quoted above] ... BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, it is thereupon ORDERED : A.

The Husband be and hereby is found in willful contempt of this Court for failure to pay the sum of $25,000.00, plus interest at the rate of 4.75% for the period of February 1, 2012 through the date of payment (for a sum of $45.55, to date) for a sum due and owing, as of February 14, 2012, in the amount of $25,045.55 with further interest to accumulate at the statutory rate, per annum. B. The Husband had the ability to comply with the Orders of this Court and has willfully refused to do so. ... [ 63 ] Also on February 14, 2012, the Florida Circuit Court issued Writs of Bodily Attachment against Mr.

Armoyan related to his violations of the Court’s Orders. [ 64 ] On February 22, 2012, the Circuit Court issued Orders of Commitment against Mr. Armoyan. The Orders are similarly worded for the several amounts owing. The Order for commitment based on his default in paying the February, 2012 support for Ms. Armoyan and his children says: 2. This Court finds that the Husband, VREGE ARMOYAN has the present ability to pay the separate maintenance support as stated in this order and has willfully refused to do so. 3.

Husband, VREGE ARMOYAN shall be incarcerated forthwith in the Palm Beach County Jail for a period of no less than sixty (60) days. However, Husband may purge this commitment by the payment of $25,045.55 to Lisa Armoyan. [ 65 ] On February 29, 2012, the Circuit Court issued a Writ of Ne Exeat against Mr. Armoyan. The Writ cited Mr. Armoyan’s “[f]ailure to pay court ordered support”, “[f]ailure to pay court ordered attorney’s fees and costs” and “[f]ailure to comply with discovery orders, or in the alternative to comply with orders to make payment”. The Writ said: 2.

The Husband, Vrege Armoyan, is hereby enjoined and restrained from removing himself from the State of Florida until further Order of this Court. 3. All law enforcement agencies are requested to assist this Court in effectuating this Order forthwith, including, but not limited to, the detention of the Husband, Vrege Armoyan, if necessary, should he attempt to remove himself from the jurisdiction of the State of Florida without further Order of this Court. [ 66 ] On March 6, 2012, the Circuit Court issued Execution Orders against the property of Mr.

Armoyan to satisfy the judgements. [ 67 ] The Interim Support Order of August 11, 2011 (above, para 54) had ordered Mr. Armoyan to pay $25,000 monthly as blended support for Ms. Armoyan and the children. After Mr. Armoyan defaulted in his monthly interim support payment obligations on February 1, 2012, for enforcement purposes it became necessary that the spousal and child support be separately delineated. On April 19, 2012, the Florida Circuit Court issued an Order that allocated the $25,000 as $10,000 monthly spousal support and $15,000 monthly child support for the Armoyans’ two daughters. The Order said:

The Court entered an Order Granting Wife’s Application for F.S. § 61.09 Separate Maintenance, dated August 11, 2011 retroactive from October 20, 2009 with the stipulation that the Husband had the ability to pay, as he agreed that he desired not to file financial information disputing any claims of inability to pay. The Court adopted the Husband’s stipulation, and continues to adopt the Husband’s stipulation.

The Wife has requested this Court to delineate between alimony and child support for enforcement purposes as to the amounts the Court has addressed in its Order Granting Wife’s Application for F.S. § 61.09 Separate Maintenance dated August 11, 2011. The Court finds that based upon the evidence, it is thereupon, ORDERED : ... 2. The alimony to the Wife was and is $10,000.00 per month as of October 20, 2009. ... 3.

The child support for children, Victoria Armoyan and Christina Armoyan (Jonathan Armoyan was not addressed by the Court at the hearing on separate maintenance) is $15,000.00 per month as of October 20, 2009. ... (

k) Florida Court’s Consideration of Anti-Suit Injunction, Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens [ 68 ] On November 10, 2009, Mr. Armoyan applied in the Florida Court to challenge that Court’s jurisdiction and to contend that the Florida Court was not the convenient forum. Ms. Armoyan, for her part, sought an injunction from the Florida Court to restrain Mr. Armoyan from proceeding with the divorce proceedings in Nova Scotia. The jurisdictional issues had been scheduled for hearing in September 2010. But that court time was exhausted by other disputed issues.

According to an “Agreed Order” of September 8, 2010, the jurisdictional issues were re-scheduled for hearing on November 4 and 5, 2010. As it unfolded, the matter still was not ready for hearing on the November dates. On April 6, 2011 the Florida Circuit Court issued an Order stating that the anti-suit injunction and related issues would be addressed at a hearing on April 21, 2011. [ 69 ] After hearing counsel, on June 7, 2011 the Florida Circuit Court issued an Order.

The Order deferred consideration of the anti-suit injunction and the jurisdictional/ forum non conveniens issues until after what the Florida Court understood to be an imminent ruling on forum non conveniens by the Nova Scotia Court. The Order of June 7, 2011 said: A. This Court is going to wait until after the June hearings in Nova Scotia to make its decision on forum non conveniens. That approach will end up with having the issue in one Court. This Court hopes the Canadian Court will address the issue, because that is the better of the two. B.

This Court will Order a status check on this motion subsequent to the June hearings in Nova Scotia (once a ruling is received from Nova Scotia). ... Based upon the foregoing, it is thereupon, ORDERED :

1. This Court defers ruling on said Motion as to the injunction until the forum non conveniens arguments and other issues scheduled in June, 2011 via the Nova Scotia Court, are determined and the parties advise this Court of the outcome of those hearings. 2. Thereafter, the Court will enter further orders, as necessary, addressing issues that are to be ruled upon by this Court. [ 70 ] The Nova Scotia Courts did not hear the matter in June 2011.

The Family Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia opened its hearing of the jurisdictional/ forum non conveniens issues on October 24, 2011, concluded its hearing on August 24, 2012, and issued a Decision in September 2012 (discussed below, paras 111-15, 118-21). [ 71 ] Given the lack of progress in Nova Scotia, on September 28, 2011 the Florida Circuit Court ordered that the jurisdictional issues and anti-suit injunction matter would be considered after the re-hearing of Mr. Armoyan’s motion to disqualify Ms. Armoyan’s Florida counsel.

As noted above (para 29), that re-hearing had already had been scheduled for January 4, 2012. [ 72 ] As I have discussed (para 30), on January 11, 2012, the Circuit Court dismissed Mr. Armoyan’s motion to disqualify Ms. Armoyan’s counsel. So, as prescribed in its September 28, 2011 Order, the Florida Court then considered itself free to address Ms. Armoyan’s motion for an anti-suit injunction and Mr. Armoyan’s motion on the jurisdictional/ forum non conveniens issues. [ 73 ] The Circuit Court dealt with Ms.

Armoyan’s motion for an anti-suit injunction, and pronounced its ruling in open Court on February 14, 2012, followed by a written Order filed on February 29, 2012. By this time, Mr. Armoyan had defaulted on his support payments under the Interim Support Order. The Circuit Court’s written Order of February 29, 2012 said: ... This Court finds: A. The Wife filed her Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on October 20, 2009. B. The Court has previously denied the Husband’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction of himself. Thus, this Court has personal jurisdiction of the Husband. C.

The Husband has requested this Court for the period of time to date for various relief including, but not limited to: i. Disqualification of Wife’s counsel and forensic accountant. (Denied with prejudice); ii. Stay of orders of this Court; iii. And, other remedies and relief as addressed by previous orders of this Court. D. In advance of this Order, this Court entered support orders requiring the Husband to pay $25,000.00 per month on behalf of the Wife and children. As well as, retroactive support (which he failed to pay; contempt orders and other ancillary orders have issued regard [ sic ] the same). E.

This Court has under consideration the Husband’s claim of credits of $151,000.00 as to further required retroactive support. F. This Court has before it various other pleadings of the Husband including, but not limited to issues involving alleged trust agreement between the parties pursuant to the alleged Agreement Dealing with Matrimonial Relationship, Assets and all matters Related Thereto, which is subject to various motions by both parties before this Court.

... [The next three paragraphs recite the claims in Ms. Armoyan’s Florida Divorce petition and Mr. Armoyan’s Nova Scotia two Divorce Petitions] J. In respect to the Canadian proceedings, this Court faced a conundrum as to the Husband’s suggestion that the Wife’s counsel should be disqualified. Which disqualification was initially denied, appealed, and reversed for procedural error (in not permitting the Husband to testify). Said was remanded to this Court (when this Court became the successor to the previous Court) to address those issues of disqualification.

As such, this Court was reluctant to proceed on any aspect other than the support of the Wife and the children, and some ancillary attorney’s fees from those hearings until the motion to disqualify was ruled upon. Such motion has been ruled upon. It has been denied with prejudice. K. Recently, this Court has entered specific orders to enforce various orders to require the Husband to pay the Wife and her legal counsel dollars previously ordered by the Court.

And, the failure by the Husband to pay the same in complete disregard of this Court’s requirements; as well as, the Husband’s stipulation as to his ability to pay the amounts previously ordered. L. Currently before the Court is a Wife who is responsible for three (3) minor children, and whom this Court, as stated, ordered the Husband to pay the Wife certain support currently and retroactively, (separate maintenance) pending further order of this Court as to the other issues generally addressed in this order. M.

This Court cannot permit a litigant in this jurisdiction to file pleadings before this Court; request relief before this Court; stipulate to acts before this Court; permit this Court to act on those stipulations; and based upon what the Court perceives is the litigant’s dissatisfaction with the results of this Court’s decisions to date, attempt to usurp this Court’s jurisdiction by filing actions in another jurisdiction.

The result of which may (but for this order enjoining the Husband from prosecuting those actions) proceed to adjudication of identical issues or substantially similar issues that are before this Court. N. Such result, if permitted unheeded, would cause this jurisdiction, as well as, any other jurisdiction, (particularly the Canadian Court) to forego uniformity, and embrace anarchy and literally chaos should this Court would [ sic ] not enter this order as stated. O.

The public policy of this State requires that the parties initially before the Court, (unless this Court determines lack of jurisdiction) to respect and honor the decisions of this Court. And, from this Court’s review the Country of Canada has no less of a requirement. P.

Should this Court not grant the Wife’s relief as ordered, the Court finds that based upon the evidence and its own understanding of the proceedings to date, that there will be irreparable harm to the Wife, and particularly to the minor children who not only have endured the proceedings in this jurisdiction, but have been required to testify in the United States Federal Court, Case No. 10-CV 23579 JAL, [Mr.

Armoyan’s Hague Convention claim], so as not to be removed from this State’s jurisdiction under the Husband’s claim that the Wife abducted the children from the Canadian jurisdiction; which said claim to date in the Federal proceedings has been rebuked, albeit under review. Based upon the foregoing, it is thereupon ORDERED : 1.

The Husband and all those persons acting on his behalf including his agents, employees, and servants whom [ sic ] take direction from the Husband be and hereby are enjoined and restrained from prosecuting any action whatsoever for a dissolution of marriage, attorney’s fees, equitable distribution, child support determinations, applications as to custody of the children (other than as pending before the Federal District Court The Honorable Joan A. Lenard as to a review of the order of The Honorable William C.

Turnoff), as well as any alleged claim of validity or invalidity to the Agreement Dealing with Matrimonial Relationship, Assets and all matters Related Thereto, pending further order of this Court. ...

4. This Court specifically recognizes and acknowledges that it cannot in any fashion enjoin another jurisdiction from exercising its ability to determine how it may choose to act. However, this Court does request any other jurisdiction, particularly the jurisdiction in the Country of Canada in the proceedings the Court is familiar with in Docket No.

HFD 1201-65036, No. 735636, FFH CIV-070342, SFHMCA-068981 to honor this Court’s order and preclude the Husband from attempting to usurp this Court’s jurisdiction based upon the above findings. [ 74 ] This Order, pronounced on February 14, 2012 and filed February 29, 2012, also enjoined Ms. Armoyan from prosecuting a divorce proceeding and claims for collateral relief, other than her Florida petition, except as needed to obtain foreign recognition and enforcement of Florida judgments related to the divorce. [ 75 ] On April 4, 2012, the Circuit Court ruled on Mr.

Armoyan’s motion, outstanding since November 10, 2009, to dismiss the Florida divorce based on lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens . Mr. Armoyan had been given notice of the hearing. The Order recited that he had been “mandated” to appear. He did not attend. The Florida Court’s “subject matter jurisdiction” turned on whether the Petitioner, Ms. Armoyan, had been resident in Florida for six months before she filed her Petition for Divorce on October 20, 2009. The Florida Court determined that it had jurisdiction, and that Florida was the convenient forum, and dismissed Mr. Armoyan’s motions to dismiss.

The Circuit Court’s Order of April 4, 2012 said: This Court has entered previous orders regarding discovery in this cause. The Husband has failed to comply with the same. The Husband failed to appear for the hearing on this issue including, but not limited to, his failure to appear based upon an Order to Show Cause by this Court where his personal presence was, in fact, mandated. ...

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds as to the Wife’s residency for the purpose of the complete subject matter jurisdiction of this Court effective October 20, 2009 (the date the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage filed with this Court), the Wife: a. Has a Social Security Card; b. Has a valid Florida Driver’s License; c. Has an automobile registered in Florida; d. Has a Florida identification card; e. Had and has residential lease dated 8/27/09 for a home located at 800 NW Harbour Dr., Boca Raton, Florida, and a current lease for a residence at 401 NE Mizner Blvd., #906, Boca Raton, FL 33432; f.

Has a fitness training certificate issued by Fitness Institute International on November 30, 2010; g. Has a Passport for herself dated 2/28/08 and a Passport for JA dated 8/12/08, and VA and CA both dated 8/14/08; h. Has a U.S. Employment Authorization Cards [ sic ] dated August 10, 2009 and March 27, 2009; i. Has evidence of her residency as of September 2008 via Aerogold/CIBC Visa account printout for the periods of 10/1/08 through 1/7/09; 1/10/09 through 5/11/09; and 5

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