Shurson v. Shurson, 2011 NSSC 163
Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Shurson v. Shurson, 2011 NSSC 163 Date: 20110427 Docket: SFHMCA 040843 Registry: Halifax Between: Allan Shurson Applicant and Laurie Shurson Respondent Judge: Associate Chief Justice Lawrence I. O’Neil Heard: May 28, June 10, August 17 and October 7, 2010, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Post Hearing Submissions: November 2010 Counsel: William Leahey, for the Petitioner Sally Faught, for the Respondent By the Court : Index Introduction, paragraph 1 Issues, paragraph 8 History of Litigation, paragraph 9 Evidence of Mr. Shurson, paragraph 12 Evidence of Jean Hall, paragraph 20
Evidence of Ms. Burgess, paragraph 25 Evidence of Mr. Burgess, paragraph 37 Position of the Parties, paragraph 47 Spousal Support Generally, paragraph 50 Change of Circumstances, paragraph 53 Pension Income: Double Counting, paragraph 56 Severance Income, paragraph 77 Effect of Re-Marriage, paragraph 80 Future Spousal Support - Current Income of Mr. Shurson, paragraph 81 - Current Income of Ms. Burgess, paragraph 84 - Entitlement, paragraph 87 - Duration/Quantum, paragraph 90 Introduction [ 1 ] Hereinafter, the former Ms. Shurson will be referred to as Ms.
Burgess. [ 2 ] The parties were married December 27, 1975; separated in August 2003 and divorced March 4, 2008 by an order of the Superior Court of Justice (Family Division) in Ottawa, Ontario. Support issues and the division of property had been earlier decided by Justice Legere-Sers following a trial in February 2007.
Her orders issued July 12, 2007 as provided by the Maintenance and Custody Act , R.S.N.S. 1989 c. 160 and the Matrimonial Property Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275. [ 3 ] There is no evidence that the terms of Justice Legere-Sers order were incorporated into a Corollary Relief Judgment. [ 4 ] In a decision dated September 11, 2008, Justice Beryl MacDonald, of this court, varied the spousal support obligation ordered by Justice Legere-Sers. [ 5 ] A need to vary the order was initially contemplated to reflect the division of Mr. Shurson’s military pension. This division was ordered in 2007 but occurred in 2008.
The spousal support obligation was reduced by Justice MacDonald to $2,500 per month from $3,500 per month, effective September 1, 2008. [ 6 ] The parties raised three (3) children, now fully grown. The youngest is completing her undergraduate degree at an Ottawa university. [ 7 ] Mr. Shurson seeks to terminate his spousal support obligation to Ms. Burgess. Mr. Shurson resides in the Ottawa region and Ms. Burgess resides in Dartmouth. [ 8 ] Issues: 1. Should Mr. Shurson’s spousal support obligation to Ms. Burgess be terminated/ varied?
2. If it should be varied, how? 3. Related to issues 1 & 2 is the income, actual or attributed that Ms. Burgess derives from the L.I.F., the fund holding her lump sum share of Mr. Shurson’s pension. In February 2008, Ms. Burgess accepted a lump sum of $524,000, which she invested. The investment instrument is known as a L.I.F. (Life Income Fund). History of Litigation [ 9 ] The parties’ initial order provided for spousal support, payable by Mr. Shurson in the amount of $3,500 per month.
It is unclear whether a Corollary Relief judgment incorporated the orders flowing from the decision of Justice Legere Sers, reported as Shurson v. Shurson , 2007 NSSC 101 . It appears not. As stated, spousal support was reduced to $2,500 per month by Justice Beryl MacDonald, as a result of a variation application (pursuant to the Maintenance and Custody Act supra) and hearing in 2008. Her decision is reported as Shurson v. Shurson , 2008 NSSC 264 , released September 11, 2008. I note that Mr.
Shurson’s variation application herein was filed November 19, 2009 pursuant to s. 37 of the Maintenance and Custody Act supra. [ 10 ] Mr. Shurson now seeks a further variation of the spousal support obligation because of the remarriage of Ms. Burgess in August 2009 and the new financial circumstances of the parties, including the termination of his employment on September 30, 2010. [ 11 ] Evidence commenced May 28, 2010; continued on June 10, 2010, August 17, 2010 and October 7, 2010. Mr. Shurson was recalled on October 7, 2010 to give evidence of his then recent loss of employment.
Post trial written submissions were received in late November 2010. Each party called an expert to testify on the value of Ms. Burgess’ interest in the military pension earned by Mr. Shurson. More specifically the evidence related to the sustainability of the L.I. F. (Life Income Fund); which holds the lump sum equivalent to her former interest in that pension. Evidence of Mr. Shurson [ 12 ] Mr. Shurson first testified on May 28, 2010. He described his employment circumstances and income. As stated, he was recalled on October 7, 2010 to describe his lay-off and his prospects for employment.
The following description of his income must be read with this in mind. [ 13 ] Mr. Shurson testified that following his separation from Ms. Burgess, he retired from the Canadian Forces and accepted employment in the private sector. He was employed as an aeronautics engineer by General Dynamics and earned $123,495.37 per year. He described his work week as demanding; in the range of 60-70 hours per week. He worked long days in the office and he worked at home in the evenings and over the weekends. [ 14 ] He testified that he was attempting to maximize his earnings because of his age and the need to soon work less.
He was concerned that his high earnings were not sustainable. Mr. Shurson explained that his current high earnings are fairly recent in origin (Exhibit 6). [ 15 ] His statement of income prepared October 16, 2009 (Exhibit 6), placed his annual income as $152,495.60; including pension income of $2,417.83 per month. His 2009 T1 General Income Tax and Benefit Return (Exhibit 3) shows a line 150 income of $158,490.00. Of this amount, the pension income was $29,013. Mr. Shurson explained the pension is indexed. [ 16 ] In response to questioning on cross-examination, Mr.
Shurson confirmed that his annual income has increased by in excess of $11,000 since the last variation hearing and that he makes contributions to his RRSP account, which contributions in 2009 exceeded $25,000.
[ 17 ] On re-direct, he testified that the last year he lived with Ms. Burgess, he earned $87,624 as a member of the Canadian military. [ 18 ] Mr. Shurson was recalled as a witness, on October 7, 2010. He testified that he had been terminated and was without employment. As part of his termination, he was to receive severance pay of $76,500 plus vacation pay of $2,332.16 (Exhibit 35). He had not regained employment at the conclusion of his case in November 2010. [ 19 ] Mr. Shurson impressed the court as candid, and credible. He did not demonstrate or communicate any animus towards his former spouse.
Evidence of Jean Hall [ 20 ] Jean Hall is the common law partner of Mr. Shurson. She holds a doctorate in psychology and is a former resident of the United States. She holds a work visa that permits her to work in Canada. Several years ago she began to build a practice in the Ottawa area. Her income has increased to her current level of $111,000 in 2008, from $19,623 in 2006. As her practice grows and expenses level off (Exhibit 10), she explained that she has probably achieved her income ceiling, given that she is working as much as she can. [ 21 ] Ms.
Hall has grown children in the United States and remains in contact with them. [ 22 ] She and Mr. Shurson strive to equally share their joint expenses, such as housing. [ 23 ] I am satisfied that Ms. Hall testified honestly and made no effort to avoid answering questions put to her. [ 24 ] She and Mr. Shurson purchased a home. That development caused them to formalize the equal sharing of their joint expenses. Her estate planning includes benefits for her children. Evidence of Ms. Burgess [ 25 ] Ms. Burgess is employed as an educational aide with the Halifax School Board.
She began working with the school board in 1995 and began contributing to a pension plan through her employment in 1999 and continues to do so. She is currently employed full time during the school year. She is a member of a union and has priority of placement should her employment opportunity diminish. She does not work over the summer or when the school is on a break, such as Christmas, March break or Easter, for example.
She testified that she will not be seeking work for the summer because she needs a “rest” from school. [ 26 ] Her income in recent years was as follows (Exhibits 22, 23 & 27): Line 150 2006 Notice of Assessment $52,747 Employment $22,747; Spousal Support $30,000 Line 150 2007 Notice of Assessment $66,515 Employment $27,339; Spousal Support $39,000
Line 150 2008 Notice of Assessment $94,776 Employment $29,596; Spousal Support $39,000 Other $25,891 (retirement account - LIF) [ 27 ] In 2008, Ms. Burgess withdrew $25,891 from her L.I.F. [ 28 ] In 2009, her income from employment was $31,315.41. She received spousal support of $30,000 in 2009 (Exhibit 22). However, she withdrew only $14,616 from her retirement account (L.I.F.). [ 29 ] In 2010, Ms. Burgess again expects to withdraw $14,616 from her retirement account (L.I.F.) at a rate of $1,218 each month. [ 30 ] Ms.
Burgess testified that as part of the property division following the breakdown of her marriage to Mr. Shurson, she received one half of the pension entitlement earned by him until the point of their separation. This amounted to a lump sum payment of $525,000 to her, in February 2008. [ 31 ] After consulting a financial adviser, she invested the funds in a L.I.F. and agreed upon a medium risk growth strategy. [ 32 ] These funds must currently (2010) be withdrawn at an annual rate that falls between a minimum of $12,728.93 and a maximum of $28,757.96 (Exhibit 32). Ms.
Burgess testified that she has decided to withdraw an amount close to the lower range. She explained that she made this decision to ensure she has funds remaining in this account when she is elderly. [ 33 ] Ms. Burgess agrees that her budget shows a small surplus that would not exist if spousal support was eliminated. [ 34 ] Ms. Burgess agreed that as a consequence of her marriage to Mr. Burgess, her lifestyle improved in as much as she moved from an apartment to a four bedroom home in Colby Village.
It was suggested to her that her shelter cost fell to $380/month, but she disagreed and said there are costs in addition to the mortgage. She also agreed that her opportunity to travel with Mr. Burgess is a further improvement in her life style. [ 35 ] It was suggested to Ms. Burgess that some of the expenses shown on her statement of expenses are double counted, given that they are also subsumed in her credit card debt for which she shows a monthly obligation. [ 36 ] Ms. Burgess testified that she incurred unanticipated costs associated with her daughter’s move to Halifax and costs due to her wedding to Mr.
Burgess. Evidence of Mr. Burgess [ 37 ] Mr. Gordon Burgess married the Respondent in August 2009. He is a retired policeman. His income consists of his pension as a retired police officer and Canada Pension income. He owns a rental property which does generate earned income for him. Mr.
Burgess’ T1 General 2009 tax return shows his line 150, total income to have been $67,069.91 (Exhibit 15). [ 38 ] He lives with Ms. Burgess in a home he owns on Hardisty Court. He also owns a rental property on Graham Street. He and Ms. Burgess executed a marriage contract on June 4, 2009. It appears at Exhibit “B” of the affidavit of Ms. Burgess (Exhibit 19). [ 39 ] Mr. Burgess testified that he and Ms. Burgess equally share living costs with the exception of vacations they take together. Mr. Burgess pays for these vacations, either in cash or with “points”. [ 40 ] In the course of cross examination, Mr.
Burgess testified that the substantial debt on his VISAs includes more than $40,000 expended on improvements to the Graham Street property. He estimates that of the $1,300 plus monthly VISA payment shown on his statement of expenses, approximately $800 relates to debt incurred to improve his rental property. [ 41 ] I am satisfied that this amount of $800 is in the nature of a saving, given that it is an investment in a real estate rental that has resulted in a substantial return. Mr.
Burgess testified that the Graham Street property had appreciated about $70,000 as a consequence of the $40,000 in improvements he made to it. Another $15,000 was invested in the Hardisty Court home he now occupies with Ms. Burgess. [ 42 ] I conclude that these parties have a financial arrangement that is supportive and generous to each other, but has as an underlying premise, that they will equally share expenses. Clearly, when one can not, the other is prepared to pick up the difference. This happened when Mr. Burgess assumed responsibility for some of the expenses associated with Ms.
Burgess’ daughter’s move to Halifax. [ 43 ] I am also satisfied that generally they have decided to bequeath their respective estates to their children from earlier marriages. [ 44 ] Mr. Burgess testified that he has a monthly over draft of about $1,100. Given that this remains constant and is not accumulating, my conclusion is that his budget is breaking even without a monthly deficit in fact. Further, given that the bulk of his VISA payment of $1,300 is in the nature of an investment, I do not regard this expenditure as an expense of operating a home. [ 45 ] Mr. Burgess confirmed that he and Ms.
Burgess make a number of recreational trips together, annually. [ 46 ] In conclusion, I am satisfied that Mr. Burgess spends what he earns. However, he has a comfortable life style. Ms. Burgess does as well. The spousal support she receives is a factor in her having a comfortable lifestyle. Mr. Burgess line 150 income in recent years was: 2006 - $79,888.39; 2007 - $78,348.47; 2008 - $118,489.24 and 2009 - $67,069.91 (Exhibit 18). Position of the Parties [ 47 ] Ms. Faught argues on behalf of Ms.
Burgess, inter alia that the basis of the spousal support order is compensatory; that given the length of the parties’ marriage, it should be for a prolonged period; a presumptive claim to equal standards of living upon resolution exists; that Ms. Burgess’ remarriage has not resulted in a significant change to her financial circumstances; and Mr. Shurson continues to have the means to pay spousal support. [ 48 ] Mr. Leahey argues, on behalf of Mr. Shurson, that Ms. Burgess is no longer entitled to spousal support. He bases his argument on his conclusion that Ms.
Burgess has received all the compensatory support to which she is entitled, and on his conclusion that the current condition needs and means of the parties do not require any transfer of income to Ms. Burgess. Ms. Burgess’ economic circumstances have been improved by her marriage to Mr. Burgess. Mr. Leahey argues that income should be imputed to Ms. Burgess in the amount of $26,500 to reflect a more reasonable draw by Ms. Burgess from her L.I.F. Mr. Burnell testified that this level of withdrawal was sustainable.
[49] Given Mr. Shurson’s unemployment in November 2010, the calculation of the quantum of spousal support, should the courtfind entitlement, is dramatically affected. Spousal Support Generally [50] The two often cited cases on entitlement to spousal support are Moge v. Moge (SCC), [1992] S.C.J. No. 107and Bracklow v. Bracklow (SCC), [1999] S.C.J. No. 14. The decision in Moge, supra, is often described as finding thebasis for spousal support to be one of compensating the receiving spouse for that spouse’s economic disadvantage flowing from themarriage.
The Bracklow decision supra is cited as establishing the non-compensatory approach which focuses on the concept of mutualobligation and need. Bracklow also introduced a contractual basis for ordering spousal support. The result is that the current body oflaw is more of an assessment of “needs” and “means”. The real debate is frequently about amount and duration of spousal support, notentitlement. [51] The Supreme Court of Canada in Bracklow (1999), (SCC), 1 S.C.R. 420 commented on how a marriagebreakdown changes the presumption of mutual support that exists during marriage.
In Bracklow Justice McLachlin, as she then was, introduced the court’s judgment with the following: I. Introduction 1. What duty does a healthy spouse owe a sick one when the marriage collapses? It is now well-settled law that spouses mustcompensate each other for foregone careers and missed opportunities during the marriage upon the breakdown of their union. But whathappens when a divorce - through no consequence of sacrifices, but simply through economic hardship - leaves one former spouse self-sufficient and the other, perhaps due to the onset of a debilitating illness, incapable of self-support?
Must the healthy spouse continue tosupport the sick spouse? Or can he or she move on, free of obligation? That is the question posed by this appeal. It is a difficult issue. It is also an important issue, given the trend in our society toward shorter marriages and successive relationships. [52] On behalf of the court, she answered the various questions.
She stated inter alia: 19 In analysing the respective obligations of husbands and wives, it is critical to distinguish between the roles of the spouses duringmarriage and the different roles that are assumed upon marriage breakdown. **** 21 When a marriage breaks down, however, the situation changes. The presumption of mutual support that existed during themarriage no longer applies. Such a presumption would be incompatible with the diverse post-marital scenarios that may arise in modernsociety and the liberty many claim to start their lives anew after marriage breakdown.
This is reflected in the Divorce Act and theprovincial support statutes, which require the court to determine issues of support by reference to a variety of objectives and factors. **** 32 Both the mutual obligation model and the independent, clean-break model represent important realities and address significantpolicy concerns and social values. The federal and provincial legislatures, through their respective statutes, have acknowledged bothmodels. Neither theory alone is capable of achieving a just law of spousal support. The importance of the policy objectives served byboth models is beyond dispute.
It is critical to recognize and encourage the self-sufficiency and independence of each spouse. It isequally vital to recognize that divorced people may move on to other relationships and acquire new obligations which they may not beable to meet if they are obliged to maintain full financial burdens from previous relationships. On the other hand, it is also important torecognize that sometimes the goals of actual independence are impeded by patterns of marital dependence, that too often self-sufficiency
at the time of marriage termination is an impossible aspiration, and that marriage is an economic partnership that is built upon a premise (albeit rebuttable) of mutual support. The real question in such cases is whether the state should automatically bear the costs of these realities, or whether the family, including former spouses, should be asked to contribute to the need, means permitting. Some suggest it would be better if the state automatically picked up the costs of such cases: Rogerson, "Judicial
Interpretation of the Spousal and Child Support Provisions of the Divorce Act , 1985 (Part I)", supra, at p. 234, n. 172. However, as will be seen, Parliament and the legislatures have decreed otherwise by requiring courts to consider not only compensatory factors, but the "needs" and "means" of the parties. It is not a question of either one model or the other. It is rather a matter of applying the relevant factors and striking the balance that best achieves justice in the particular case before the court.
Change of Circumstances [ 53 ] I am satisfied that the law on the variation of spousal support whether the application to vary is pursuant to the Maintenance and Custody Act or the Divorce Act dictates that I make the same analysis. The parties herein preferred the analysis and authorities that interpreted the Divorce Act. I will therefore provide my analysis by reference to that jurisprudence.
Section 37 of the Maintenance and Custody Act and Section 17(1) of the Divorce Act , S.C., 1985 c.3 (2 nd Supp.) provide that a spousal support order is subject to variation. Prior to considering an application to vary spousal support, section 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act requires that the court first satisfy itself that a change in the “condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse has occurred”. As is the case when an initial spousal support order is made, a variation order must take certain factors into consideration.
Note, that the objectives of spousal support are the same in the case of an interim or initial spousal support order provided for by s.15.2(4) of the Divorce Act as when a variation of a spousal support order is considered as provided by s. 17 (4.1) of the Divorce Act . [ 54 ] Sections 15.2(4), s.17(1), s.17(4.1) and s.17(7) read: Factors 15.2(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including (
a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (
b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and © any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. Order for variation, rescission or suspension 17.
(1) A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, prospectively or retroactively, (
a) a support order or any provision thereof on application by either or both former spouses; or (
b) a custody order or any provision thereof on application by either or both former spouses or by any other person. Factors for spousal support order 17.
(4.1) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a spousal support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change in the
condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse has occurred since the making of the spousal support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order, and, in making the variation order, the court shall take that change into consideration. * * * * * Objectives of variation order varying spousal support order [ note these are the same as the criteria contained in s.15.2(6) when the initial order was being considered] 17.
(7) A variation order varying a spousal support order should (
a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the former spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (
b) apportion between the former spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; © relieve any economic hardship of the former spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (
d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each former spouse within a reasonable period of time. [ 55 ] I am satisfied that the threshold requirement that a change of circumstances be shown has been met by Mr. Shurson. Ms. Burgess’ remarriage is a potentially significant change in circumstances that must be examined to determine what impact, if any, it will have on Mr. Shurson’s spousal support obligation. Mr. Shurson’s loss of lucrative employment is also a significant change of circumstance that meets the threshold requirement.
The court’s jurisdiction to consider the variation application is established. Pension Income: Double Counting [ 56 ] A central issue for the court to consider is the manner in which Mr. Shurson’s pension income and Ms. Burgess’ L.I.F. income or potential L.I.F. income is to be accounted for when the issue of spousal support is considered. [ 57 ] A significant part of the case on behalf of Mr. Shurson centres on whether the court should even consider Mr. Shurson’s pension income given the asset that gives rise to the pension income for both parties has already been divided.
A related issue is whether having decided to consider the parties pension incomes should Ms. Burgess be permitted to have her annual pension income set at the lowest minimal level she is required to withdraw from the L.I.F. [ 58 ] Mr. Shurson began receiving his pension income in 2003. The pension division order is dated July 12, 2007. (The parties separated in 2003). [ 59 ] The Supreme Court of Canada in Boston v.
Boston , 2001 SCC 43 considered the issue of double recovery of the pension benefits of a spouse. [ 60 ] The majority beginning at paragraph 34-37 defined the double recovery problems as follows: 34 The term "double recovery" is used to describe the situation where a pension, once equalized as property, is also treated as income from which the pension-holding spouse (here the husband) must make spousal support payments. Expressed another way, upon marriage
dissolution the payee spouse (here the wife) receives assets and an equalization payment that take into account the capital value of thehusband's future pension income. If she later shares in the pension income as spousal support when the pension is in pay after [page429]the husband has retired, the wife can be said to be recovering twice from the pension: first at the time of the equalization of assets andagain as support from the pension income. 35 Double recovery appears inherently unfair in cases where, to a large extent, the division or equalization of assets has addressed thecompensation required.
In equalizing the spouses' net family properties, the husband or wife as the case may be must include the futureright to the pension income as "property" on his or her side of the ledger. This means that the pension-holder must, on separation ordivorce, transfer real assets of equal value to the pension to the other spouse in order to retain the pension under the property accounting. 36 The pension-holder cannot divide the actual pension as it cannot be accessed until retirement. The pension entitlement cannot besold or transferred.
The apparent unfairness arises when the other spouse receives support payments from the pension income after thepension-holder retires. Professor James G. McLeod stated in his annotation to Shadbolt v.
Shadbolt (1997), (ONSC), 32 R.F.L. (4th) 253, at p. 253: "Put another way, [the pension-holding] spouse receives nothing in return for the real assetstransferred to his or her partner in order to retain his or her pension under the property accounting." 37 The double recovery issue here arises if the wife is permitted to seek further support from her former husband where the ability topay support is determined by including the same pension, the value of which was previously used to determine the value of the husband'snet family property, and to calculate the equalization payment owing to the wife.
It is this issue which remains unsettled. [61] These principles were confirmed in Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25 , 2006 S.C.J. No. 25. Our Court of Appealapplied these principles in Slater v. Slater, 2004 NSCA 8. The Annual Review of Family Law 2010, Carswell at p.506, the followingsummary of the law on this issue appears: . . . . .
However, most courts have interpreted Major, J.’s reasons in such a way that the exceptions to the rule have overtaken the rule and“double dipping” continues as a matter of course and are reluctant to do any more than to reduce support to reflect a payor’s reducedincome after retirement . . . . . [62] Mr. Shurson’s military pension was divided equally. Clause 1 of the order of Justice Legere-Sers dated July 12, 2007, hereinprovides for the same. Ms. Burgess received a sum of $524,000 as a lump sum payment for her share of the pension.
As stated, this sumwas invested in a L.I.F. [63] Both parties offered expert opinion evidence on how this fund is being managed, should be managed and more precisely, howmuch money Ms. Burgess should be withdrawing from the fund each year to meet her living expenses. Ms. Gmeiner testified on behalfof Ms. Burgess. Her report is identified as Exhibit 32. Mr. Burnell testified on behalf of Mr. Shurson. His reports are identified asExhibit 30 and Exhibit 31. [64] It is known that Mr. Shurson’s income from his military pension is in the range of $29,000 per year.
In 2008 and 2009, it wasapproximately $29,013 (Exhibit 3 & 6A) and in 2010, it was estimated to be in the same range. [65] Ms. Burgess has some discretion when determining how much income she may withdraw from the L.I.F. into which shedeposited her share of Mr. Shurson’s military pension. The Income Tax Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)) requires that a minimumamount must be withdrawn from the L.I.F. by Ms. Burgess, each year, to maintain the tax sheltered status of the fund.
The PensionBenefits Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 340 provides for maximum permitted withdrawals from a L.I.F. [66] In 2010, the minimum that Ms. Burgess could withdraw from her fund was $12,728.93 and the maximum was $28,757.96 (seepage 2, question 5 of Exhibit 32). [67] Ms. Gmeiner and Mr. Burnell gave evidence relevant to the prudent management of the L.I.F. owned by Ms. Burgess. In
particular, they differed on what assumptions should be made about the rate of growth of the value of the fund and therefore, the level ofwithdrawals Ms. Burgess could prudently make. [68] Ms. Burgess initially invested the cash in a combination of instruments including stocks. The principal of the fund suffered as aresult of the financial crisis in 2008. This has caused Ms. Burgess to take a more cautionary approach when deciding how much to nowwithdraw from the L.I.F. each year, within the range of mandatory minimum and maximum withdrawals. Ms. Gmeiner supports thisdecision. [69] Mr. Burnell disagrees.
He does not share the pessimism of Ms. Gmeiner about the performance of the fund. He observes thathistory demonstrates that dips in the stock market are typically erased by periods of significant growth and the over all returns on aninvestment is much higher than Ms. Burgess is assuming. [70] Mr. Burnell also asserts that had Ms. Burgess invested only in securities, you would have had a return in the four percent rangeand minimal or no risk. He also testified that over time a 4% return is very conservative and a higher rate of return could be reasonablyplanned for.
However , his view is that even at a 4% rate of growth Ms. Burgess can comfortably withdraw an amount in the mid twentythousands from the L.I.F; significantly more than she currently proposes. I am persuaded, on a balance of probabilities, by the evidenceof Mr. Burnell on this point. [71] Ms. Gmeiner references the fact of Mr. Shurson’s pension being indexed as evidence of an inequity between the benefit Mr.Shurson receives from his pension and that which Ms. Burgess receives. However, the lump sum received by Ms.
Burgess has acomponent compensating her for this benefit. [72] I am satisfied that on the facts before the court, Ms. Burgess must accept the consequences of her investment choices. She willreap the rewards and incur the losses associated with a higher risk investment strategy. The court’s view might be different were thefacts different i.e. were Ms. Burgess at risk of financial hardship. She is not. [73] Ms. Burgess can look forward to receipt of pension income from her employment; a share of Mr. Shurson’s Canada Pensionincome and continued employment income. Given the onerous work
schedule Mr. Shurson has followed I would not have difficultyimputing additional income to Ms. Burgess for the summer period. Her “taking the summer off “ and looking to Mr. Shurson to payspousal support for the same period is not persuasive. I need not consider that issue on these facts and given the evidence. She isyounger than Mr. Shurson and has not been working the hours he has. She is expected to look for work over the summer when theschools are closed. Mr. Shurson is in his late fifties. He is without work. [74] Ms. Burgess also has the financial support of Mr. Burgess. Their marriage has improved Ms.
Burgess’ standard of living. [75] I am also persuaded that Ms. Burgess’ rate of withdrawal from her L.I.F. should be imputed to the level followed in 2008, i.e.$25,991. This conclusion is consistent with her obligation to bear the risk of her investment decisions and by the conclusion that this rateof withdrawal will not jeopardize the L.I.F. as a long term source of income. My conclusion is also influenced by the general aversion ofcourts to sanction double counting. I am setting off the pension income of Mr. Shurson with the L.I.F. income of Ms.
Burgess; given thefacts. [76] When assessing the means of the parties, I will not consider the pension income of either party. I repeat that this conclusion isfact specific. I am mindful of the decision of Justice Gass in Slater v. Slater 2003 NSSF 4 , [2003] N.S.J. No. 83 (Q.L.),affirmed 2004 NSCA 8. Severance Income [77] Mr. Burgess is now unemployed. His former high rate of income was at the heart of Justice Legere-Sers order and that ofJustice MacDonald. One can not conclude that Mr. Shurson’s continued employment at a high income is certain or even probable.
Mr.Shurson gave evidence, which I accept, that he has grave concerns about his ability to find employment; certainly at the income level hehas enjoyed in recent years. I accept that he will, in good faith, pursue employment.
[ 78 ] Mr. Shurson will receive severance income. Exhibit 35, a letter dated September 30, 2010 from Mr. Shurson’s former employer, General Dynamics, to Mr. Shurson outlines the financial terms of Mr. Shurson’s severance. The termination package has a combined total value of $76,500.00 plus accrued vacation owing which was valued at $2,332.16. [ 79 ] Part, if not all of this income is meant to assist an employee’s transition to new employment and to avoid an abrupt cessation of income. I view the cautious management of these funds to take on a higher priority give that they are finite in nature.
It would be imprudent for Mr. Shurson to spend these funds based on his historical spending pattern in the absence of replacement employment income. For that reason, in assessing his available income for spousal support purposes, simply extrapolating his income based on the number of weeks of severance, is not the fairest assessment of his income available for the payment of spousal support. Nor would disregarding these funds be the fairest outcome for Ms. Burgess. Spousal support is a financial obligation like many of the others Mr. Shurson must meet.
Effect of Re-Marriage [ 80 ] Remarriage or re-partnering in and of itself is not a reason to vary a spousal support order. The significance of this change is the extent to which it impacts on an assessment of the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of the parties. An obvious point of relevance is the extent to which re-partnering impacts on a person’s expenses or contributes to an improvement or diminution in one’s standard of living. Future Spousal Support - Current Income of Mr. Shurson [ 81 ] In 2009, Mr.
Shurson received pension income of approximately $29,000 and employment income of approximately $129,425 (Exhibit 3). He was without employment at the conclusion of this hearing in November 2010. He was to receive a severance payment however. [ 82 ] He testified that he could not live on his pension income and he had to find replacement work. I accept his evidence that he will have difficulty replacing his recent employment earnings. I conclude that he will be eligible for unemployment insurance income and I have considered that he will have this additional income.
I note that he is a former employee who contributed to the employment insurance fund (see exhibit 4). [ 83 ] I also accept that he began searching for alternative employment in the summer of 2010 when he became concerned that he could be terminated, due to a lack of work. - Current Income of Ms. Burgess [ 84 ] In recent years, Ms. Burgess has earned approximately $32,000 as a teacher’s aide. I find that this employment is secure and this income level is secure. She has a level of seniority that will protect her from cut backs in funding of this service. She also has L.I.F income as discussed supra.
She is also available to work over the summer. Summer employment generating a modest income would result in her income from employment increasing to the mid thirty thousand range. [ 85 ] As stated, I fix her L.I.F. income at $25,891for 2011. [ 86 ] I agree with Mr. Leahey’s observation that Ms. Burgess has been significantly compensated by virtue of the parties’ division of
property, including pension entitlement. There is no doubt that the policy basis of the law governing property division, has as an objective, the sharing of the marital assets spouses acquired. However, the obligation to compensate a spouse is not always fully realized as a result of property division. When one spouse is left with an ongoing superior earning capacity, ongoing spousal support may be ordered with the goal in whole or in part, being the payment of compensatory support. In her pre-hearing submission, filed May 20, 2010, at paragraph 15 and 20, Ms. Faught, on behalf of Ms.
Burgess argues: 15. . . . . . In the words of Justice Legere Sers, Mr. Shurson is “able to continue to utilize his expertise gained during his career and marriage to engage in lucrative employment opportunities”. Thus his ability to make the significant employment income he is now able to earn was facilitated by Mrs. Burgess moving with him and having primary care of their children as his career developed. . . . . . 20. Mrs. Burgess’ compensatory entitlement to support has not been exhausted by Mr.
Shurson having paid support for a mere 7 years in the face of a 28 year traditional military marriage with three children. Clearly Ms. Burgess has received significant compensation in the form of ongoing spousal support. On the facts before me, concluding that further spousal support should be ordered is a more elusive conclusion, given Mr. Shurson’s state of unemployment. - Entitlement [ 87 ] Ms. Burgess’ entitlement to ongoing spousal support was found by Justice Legere-Sers and again by Justice MacDonald. The financial circumstances of the parties are now very different. Mr.
Shurson is no longer receiving employment income. There is no question that his ability to pay spousal support is significantly impacted by his loss of employment. He is; however; in transition and I am not persuaded that he will remain unemployed. Nevertheless, I am also of the view that Ms. Burgess remains entitled to spousal support on a compensatory basis. The parties lived together as husband and wife for twenty-seven years. They have been separated for approximately seven and one half years.
I need not determine for how much longer the obligation should continue. [ 88 ] The spousal support advisory guidelines suggest an indefinite duration for spousal support following long term marriages. [ 89 ] On the facts before the court, I conclude that the obligation to provide spousal support remains. The compensatory element of the initial order is not satisfied. It is unlikely that Mr. Shurson will remain without employment income. - Duration/Quantum [ 90 ] Ms. Burgess’ current level of income and that of Mr.
Burgess give them a household income comparable to that which she enjoyed in the last years of her marriage to Mr. Shurson. Mr. Burgess’ income is derived from the Canada pension plan and an employment pension. His income totals approximately $59,000 per year. Ms. Burgess has L.I. F. income and employment income. [ 91 ] Her standard of living is not less than that which she enjoyed with Mr. Shurson even after excluding spousal support income. In 2002 while they were together, that household income was $107,000. Mr. Shurson earned $87,000 and she earned approximately $20,000.
Exclusive of income received as spousal support, her household income with Mr. Burgess is approximately $117,000. (This later figure attributes a mid twenties level of L.I.F. income). [ 92 ] The court acknowledges that Mr. Burgess and Ms. Burgess have a pre-nuptial agreement and do have a level of separation of income and expenses that must be considered before concluding that the total household income is available to them both. That is not the case.
[ 93 ] It is true, however, that they do help each other meet financial obligations of the other, from time to time. [ 94 ] Ms. Burgess has been able to make considerable discretionary expenditures. She helped her daughter and other family members with travel costs. She helped another daughter with living costs while she was living in Halifax. [ 95 ] I am satisfied that Mr. Shurson’s income should be extrapolated to February 28, 2011 to reflect his severance payment.
His loss of employment is deemed to have occurred February 28, 2011. [ 96 ] Established case law and the Spousal Support Guidelines support setting the spousal support obligation at a nominal amount. [ 97 ] The result is that Mr. Burgess’ spousal support obligation is nominal. I set it at $1.00 per month effective March 1, 2011. [ 98 ] He will be subject to a requirement to report any changes in his income to Ms. Burgess within two weeks of the change. [ 99 ] Were I satisfied that Mr.
Shurson would not receive employment income again, I would terminate entitlement on the basis that the evidence establishes that any compensation due Ms. Burgess as compensatory support was realized by her. ACJ.
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