Grant v. Gold Star Realty, 2011 NSSC 2
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Grant v. Gold Star Realty, 2011 NSSC 2 Date: 20110106 Docket: Hfx No. 309750A Registry: Halifax Victoria Maxwell Grant Appellant and V & G Realty Limited, operating as "Gold Star Realty", National Properties Limited, Arthur D. Vogt and David Vogt Respondents LIBRARY HEADING Judge : The Honourable Justice Gerald R. P. Moir Heard: October 25, 2010 Subject: Small Claims Court appeal; Notice of contention; Real estate agent's duty of disclosure, content of duty; Damages for loss of chance.
Summary: Small Claims Court found a real estate agent retained under a dual agency agreement is not a fiduciary. However, the agent owed a contracted duty of disclosure and breached the contract by failing to disclose a material fact. However, the court found no loss and dismissed the client's claim. Issues:
(1) Whether a notice of contention should be accepted for filing?
(2) Whether, as claimed in the notice of contention, the adjudicator overstated the content of the contractual duty of disclosure?
(3) Whether the adjudicator erred in not assessing damages for loss of chance? Result:
(1) Although the Small Claims Court Regulations do not provide for a notice of contention, that does not stop a respondent from arguing that the decision under appeal was right for other reasons. The notice gives the respondent no procedural right.
It merely warns of the argument and reduces the risk of an adjournment.
(2) The contract provided for disclosure, and the adjudicator had to interpret the contract to determine the content of the duty to disclose. It is not limited as contended. The adjudicator correctly determined the content.
(3) The adjudicator's fact-finding is deferred to. His fact-finding precludes an award of damages based on lost chance. THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT'S DECISION. QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET . SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Grant v. Gold Star Realty, 2011 NSSC 2 Date: 20110106 Docket: Hfx No. 309750A Registry: Halifax Victoria Maxwell Grant Appellant and V & G Realty Limited, operating as "Gold Star Realty", National Properties Limited, Arthur D. Vogt and David Vogt Respondents DECISION
Judge: The Honourable Justice Gerald R. P. Moir Date of Hearing: October 25, 2010 Counsel: W. Augustus Richardson, Q.C., for appellant Colin D. Bryson, Q.C., for respondents Moir, J. : Introduction [ 1 ] Ms. Grant bought a home in Halifax in June, 2001 for $381,000. She had hired the same firm of agents, the members of which were father and son, as acted for the seller. She had made an offer of $360,000 through the younger agent, but he told her of a competing bid that was about to be made. So, she increased her offer to $381,000. [ 2 ] Some years later, Ms.
Grant found out that the competing offer had been made by a company owned by the elder agent's ex- wife and that he had been an officer of it at the time. [ 3 ] Ms. Grant sued in Small Claims Court. She argued that the firm of agents breached duties of disclosure they owed to her, and the measure of her damages is the difference between the $381,000 she paid and the $360,000 she first offered. [ 4 ] In a written decision, Adjudicator Rubin Dexter dismissed Ms. Grant's claim. She appeals to this court.
The Adjudicator's Findings [ 5 ] The Honourable Adjudicator began his decision by setting out the factual background. [ 6 ] The more senior of the two realtors, Mr. Arthur Vogt, had long been a friend of Mr. Gordon Low. Mr. Low decided to sell his home in Halifax. He signed a listing agreement with Mr. Vogt's agency, V & G Realty Limited trading as Gold Star Realty. [ 7 ] Soon afterward, Ms. Grant viewed the property and decided to make an offer. The senior Mr. Vogt was busy, so his son took over to help prepare the offer. Mr. David Vogt provided Ms.
Grant with a “Limited Dual Agency Agreement”, by which realtors are able to act for both sides because they provide only the limited services of a go-between. No advice is provided. [ 8 ] Ms. Grant offered $360,000, ten thousand dollars more than the list price. Adjudicator Dexter found that the market was "hot" at the time. [ 9 ] The senior Mr. Vogt showed the property to his ex-wife, who made an offer through a company owned by her and of which her ex-husband was the secretary. Coincidentally, she offered the same price as Ms. Grant had done. [ 10 ] The adjudicator quoted from Ms.
Grant's testimony about what she would have done had she known the truth about the competing offer:
Had I known that the competing bid was by a company that Arthur Vogt's ex-wife was the principal of and that Arthur Vogt was anofficer or ex-officer, I would have got another agent or called to Nova Real Estate Commission. We would have stopped the process. We might have walked away. I don't know that we would have gone ahead with it. [11] It had been argued for Ms. Grant that the true bidder was V & G. The adjudicator found otherwise. He accepted the evidenceof Mr. Vogt's ex-wife to the effect that he exercised no control over her company.
The adjudicator said that there was no evidence hercompany's offer was not bona fide. He appears to have found that it was bona fide, although the amount must have been surprisinglycoincidental. [12] Ms. Grant also argued that the defendant was liable for breach of fiduciary and contractual obligations. These claims werefounded on the defendant's "failure to disclose to Ms. Grant the non-arm's length relationship between Arthur Vogt and the competingofferor". Arbitrator Dexter made a number of findings in connection with those claims: · Arthur Vogt did not … inform Ms.
Grant of his position as an officer or ex-officer of NPL or that the principal was his formerspouse. · Mr. Vogt continued to be the secretary of NPL. · he failed to disclose any of the said information. · such information was 'material' in that it should have been obvious to Arthur Vogt that it would likely have influenced theconduct of Ms. Grant in the transaction, at the very least causing her to seek out another agent. The Adjudicator's Reasons [13] In light of his findings, Adjudicator Dexter dismissed those of Ms.
Grant's claims that were based on allegations of what Iwould take to be fraud, the claim that Ms. Grant was bidding against her own agent and that this fact was concealed from her. [14] So, the adjudicator turned to the claim of a breach of duty of disclosure owed as a fiduciary or contractual obligation. [15] The adjudicator rejected the proposition that the Vogts, or their firm, were in a fiduciary relationship with Ms. Grant. Hereferred to the three factors for determining a new category of fiduciary relationship in Hodgkinson v. Simms, (SCC),[1994] S.C.J. 84.
He observed that the usual agency between realtors and their clients is fiduciary, but he said that none of theHodgkinson factors applied in a limited dual agency. "There must be something more than a simple undertaking by one party to provideinformation and execute orders...". [16] In reaching this conclusion, Adjudicator Dexter relied on Lee Estate v. Royal Pacific Realty Corp., [2003] B.C.J. 1393 (S.C.)and Murray v. Tilley, [2005] N.J. 5 (S.C.).
[17] However, Adjudicator Dexter found a breach of a contractual duty of disclosure. The limited dual agency agreement providesfor a general duty of disclosure, and the adjudication turned to a professional standard for the content of the contracted duty. Thestandard is prescribed by subordinate legislation, the by-laws of the Nova Scotia Real Estate Commission. Also, Adjudicator Dexterrelied on Ocean City Realty Ltd. v. A & M Holdings Ltd., [1987] B.C. J. 593 (C.A.) and Raso v. Dionigi, (ON CA),[1993] O.J. 670 (C.A.). [18] The adjudicator reasoned that the information about the senior Mr.
Vogt's connection with the competing bidder was materialbecause knowledge of it would likely have influenced Ms. Grant's conduct. She would have got another agent or called theCommission. The failure to disclose the information was, thus, a breach of contract. [19] The difficulty with Ms. Grant's claim was with the assessment of damages. Adjudicator Dexter said "I can find no causalconnection between the failure to disclose...[and] the increased purchase price...". "At its highest, Ms. Grant's evidence was that she'might' have walked away from the transaction." The Appellant's Position [20] Ms.
Grant argues that the adjudicator failed to apply settled principles for assessing damages for breach of a duty of disclosure: Once the court finds that non-disclosed facts are material "speculation as to what course...[the principal], on disclosure, would have takenis not relevant." In other words, it is not open to a real estate agent who has failed to disclose a material fact "to prove that the transactionwould have closed had disclosure been made." Moreover, the onus of proof that no damage arose as a result of the fiduciary's breach ofduty shifts to the defendant.
The passages in quotes are found at para. 25 and 28 of Raso. For the assertion about onus, the appellant relies on "the longstandingequitable principle that where the plaintiff has made out a case of non-disclosure and the loss occasioned thereby is established, the onusis on the defendant to prove that the innocent victim would have suffered the same loss regardless of the breach.": LaForest, J. inHodgkinson v. Simms, (SCC), [1994] S.C.J. 84 at para. 76. [21] Ms. Grant refers to Mucci v. C.M.F.
Realty Ltd., [1999] O.J. 2700 (S.C.J.), in which damages for a failure by a realtor todisclose his family relationship with a seller were measured by the difference between the price paid by the plaintiffs and what theyprobably would have paid had they been told of the relationship. [22] Reference is also made to Cymar Leasing Ltd. v. Swanston, [1978] A.J. 610 (D.C.), in which a realtor was required to disgorgeprofits.
The agent had agreed to find a property for his principal, he secretly purchased it for himself, and he flipped it to his principalwithout disclosing his interest. [23] The appellant does not suggest that the adjudicator ought to have assessed damages on the difference between what Ms. Grantpaid and what she would have paid had she been informed. Nor is it suggested that there was any profit to be disgorged.
Rather, herposition on appeal is that she should be compensated for loss of chance. (I am told that this approach was not suggested to theadjudicator.) The Respondents' Position [24] The respondents maintain that the Honourable Adjudicator erred in finding that the information about Mr. Vogt's connectionswith the other bidder was material and in his conclusion that there was a contractual duty of disclosure. They sought to raise these issuesby notice of contention.
[ 25 ] Ms. Grant disputed the notice on the ground that it is not permitted under the Small Claims Court regulations. The prothonotary agreed with that, but she referred the issue to me. [ 26 ] The respondents also argue that the possibility of compensation for loss of chance does not arise on the facts of this case. Notice of Contention [ 27 ] The Small Claims Court regulations say nothing for, or against, a notice of contention. Rule 7.04 provides that legislation "establishing procedures to be followed on...an appeal prevail over an inconsistent provision of" Rule 7 - Judicial Review and Appeal.
Rule 7.04 refers to the regulations under the Small Claims Court Act as an example of prevailing legislation. [ 28 ] Rule 7 covers appeals to, as well as reviews in, the Supreme Court. Rule 7.20 adopts the Appeal Court rule about notices of contention, with a change in the filing deadline. The Appeal Court Rule on notices of contention in the 2008 Rules has its origin in the 1972 Rules. Before that, there was no such provision. [ 29 ] The notice of contention did not establish a procedural right for respondents. They were always free to argue that the judgment under appeal was right for other reasons.
In order to improve efficiency, the judges imposed a Rule requiring early notice of such an argument. [ 30 ] In my view, the respondents are entitled to argue that Adjudicator Dexter ought to have found differently, and his conclusion ought therefore to be maintained. If a notice of contention is not required, Mr. Bryson has merely done Mr. Richardson the courtesy of warning him about his arguments in that regard. [ 31 ] I allowed the notice of contention to be filed. Obligation to Disclose [ 32 ] By-laws of the Nova Scotia Real Estate Commission are made under the Real Estate Trading Act , S.N.S. 1996, c. 38 .
Subsection 38(3) of the statute obligates a realtor to disclose in writing to a buyer or seller that he has an interest in real estate being bought or sold. The obligation applies to sales by a corporation in which the realtor holds five percent or more of the share. It would not apply in this case. [ 33 ] The adjudicator based his decision, in part, on
article 40 of the Commission by-laws. The respondents argue that the by-laws cannot be treated as expanding disclosure obligations beyond that in the statute itself. [ 34 ]
Article 40 requires disclosure of "any conflict that may exist" and "any other facts that may be likely to influence the person's decision". The “person” is the principal. [ 35 ] In my opinion, s. 38 of the statute was irrelevant to Adjudicator Dexter's task.
Section 8 of the statute authorizes the by-laws. Paragraph 8(1)(
p) authorizes by-laws that "prescribe standards of professional conduct". This covers a broad range of conduct, including disclosure on subjects not covered by the narrow provisions of s. 38. [ 36 ] The by-laws could not derogate from s. 38, but s. 38 does not imply that it covers the whole of disclosure as a subject of professional conduct.
[37] The adjudicator had to determine the terms of the contract between the respondents and the appellant. [38] The "limited dual agency agreement" expressly preserves "a duty of disclosure to both the Buyer and the Seller". The contractprovides three exceptions, none of which are applicable. Adjudicator Dexter's task was to determine, in part, the scope of those verygeneral words "a duty of disclosure".
He correctly turned to professional standards and did not make the mistake of limiting the issue tothe narrow subject of s. 38. [39] The respondents also argue that the adjudicator imposed "fiduciary - like" duties although no fiduciary relationship existed. With respect, a term in the contract imposed a broad duty of disclosure, and the adjudicator rose to the task of determining the meaningof the contract's open-ended term. Materiality [40] If it was for me to decide, I would say that the fact of the competing bid was material and all information helpful for evaluatingthe significance of it would be material.
That would include the amount, the identity and circumstances of the competing bidder, and theagent's relationship, if any, with the competitor. But, it is not for me to decide that. [41] The meaning of materiality is a matter of law. An adjudicator who, like Adjudicator Dexter, shows a correct understanding ofmateriality is engaged in an assessment of fact when he determines whether information is material to a decision made by a party. Suchan exercise is beyond the appellate jurisdiction of this court on a Small Claims Court appeal. As cited by Mr. Bryson: Brett MotorsLeasing Ltd. v.
Welsford, (NS SC), [1999] N.S.J. 466 (Saunders, J.) at para. 14; MacIntyre v. Nichols, 2004 NSSC 36, [2004] N.S.J. 68 (LeBlanc, J.) at para. 23, and; French v. Checkmate Home Inspections, [2008] N.S.J. 446 (Robertson, J.) atpara. 6. [42] Adjudicator Dexter correctly interpreted the disclosure provision in the limited dual agency agreement. His determination thatthe information withheld from the principal was material is a determination entitled to deference. Therefore, I cannot interfere with hisfinding of a breach of contract.
Damages [43] The purpose of an award of damages for breach of contract is to put the innocent party in the position she would have occupiedhad the contract been performed as promised. [44] In Mucci, the court had evidence upon which to find that, with disclosure as contracted, the plaintiffs would have purchased theproperty for less than they paid and some evidence from which the court was able to assess how much less. Adjudicator Dexter had noevidence from which to approach damages that way. He did not, and apparently could not, find that Ms.
Grant could have purchased theproperty for less. [45] There was evidence that Ms. Grant might have walked away from the purchase. There was no basis, however, for finding thatshe would have been better off had she done so. [46] In Cymar Leasing, the realtors were ordered to disgorge profits. That fiduciary remedy may be available in cases of breach ofcontract that have a fiduciary-like aspect. It is not a remedy for this case because it is clear that the realtors had no stake in the salebeyond their commissions.
[47] The difficulty with the claim for lost chance is in the phrase "the loss occasioned thereby is established" in the long standingequitable principle discussed at para. 20 above. [48] The defendant may bear a certain onus after the plaintiff establishes that a loss was occasioned by the non-disclosure, but theplaintiff has to establish the fact of the loss. It is not correct to say that "the onus of proof that no damage rose as a result of the...breachof duty shifts to the defendant". Rather, "It is not enough to prove the loss of a mere chance.": Central Guaranty Trust Co. v.
PattersonKitz, [1995] N.S.J. 113 (S.C.) at para. 49. In that case, Justice Tidman also said "The burden is on a plaintiff to prove the existence of areasonable probability that a benefit would have been obtained had it not been for the defendant's...breach of contract." [49] The benefit to which Justice Tidman referred is described as "an advantage of some real substantial monetary value.":Eastwalsh Homes Ltd. v. Anatal Developments Ltd., (ON CA), [1993] O.J. 676 (O.C.A.), para. 42.
Griffiths J.A.discusses "The Law Relating to Loss of Chance" at para. 31 to 42 of Eastwalsh. [50] The discussion in Eastwalsh makes it clear that the plaintiff must prove that she lost a chance, described as a reasonableprobability, of obtaining a benefit of substantial monetary value. What may pass for a shifting onus is really the principle that a plaintiffwho proves such a loss of a chance is not shut out by difficulties of qualification.
Rather, the court will "discount the value of the chanceby the improbability of its occurrence": para. 36. [51] This seems to me to be like the situation whenever a court has to assess damages on the basis of a hypothetical, or a futureevent. Once the loss is proved, the difficulties of determining hypotheticals, or forecasting the future, are answered by the assessment ofchances. [52] In this case, the adjudicator found that no loss had been proved. Had the contract been performed as promised, had disclosurebeen made, Ms.
Grant might have walked away without making an offer, hired a new agent, or called the Commission. The adjudicatorcould see no causal connection between walking away, hiring a new agent, or calling the Commission and the loss of any benefit. Thatbeing so, Ms. Grant's case would have improved had the law of lost chance been drawn to Adjudicator Dexter's attention. Conclusion [53] I see no error of law in Adjudicator Dexter's reasons, and I must defer to his fact-finding. The appeal is dismissed, but I alsoreject the grounds in the notice of contention. I will order no costs. J.
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