First National Financial Corporation v. Raynard, 2011 NSSC 205
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: First National Financial Corporation v. Raynard, 2011 NSSC 205 Date: 20110527 Docket: SY No. 318254 Registry: Yarmouth Between: First National Financial Corporation Applicant v. Jeffrey J. Raynard Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Arthur J. LeBlanc Heard: April 27, 2011, in Yarmouth, Nova Scotia Written Decision: June 3 , 2011 Counsel: Stephen Kingston, for the Applicant Respondent – no appearance By the Court : [ 1 ] This is a motion pursuant to rule 3.03(1)(
c) for an order abridging the time for filing the notice of motion for assessment of a deficiency judgment. Background [ 2 ] The plaintiff commenced legal proceedings to recover from the defendant the amount outstanding on a mortgage held by the plaintiff, and alternatively, to obtain an order for foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged land and premises pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 72. The defendant did not file a Statement of Defence and upon an Order for Foreclosure and Sale being granted, a Sheriff’s sale was held on June 10, 2010.
The plaintiff was the purchaser at the sale and then re-sold the land and premises on December 16, 2010. Shortly before the re-sale, the plaintiff’s law firm sought instructions from the plaintiff with reference to a possible motion for deficiency judgment. [ 3 ] On February 9, 2011 the plaintiff indicated its intention to pursue a claim for a deficiency. In the course of the preparation of the documents to seek such a deficiency counsel realized that the limitation date for filing of a motion seeking a deficiency was January
2, 2011, namely, 6 months after the effective date of the default judgment, rather a period computed from the date of the re-sale. Themotion to file for a deficiency judgment was filed March 15, 2011. The Civil Procedure Rules [4] Civil Procedure Rule 72.12 requires that if the sale of foreclosed property is by public auction, a mortgagee who seeks anassessment of the deficiency must file a notice of motion to assess the amount of the deficiency within six months after the effective dateof the default judgment. [5] Rule 72.11(3) provides that the effective date of the default judgment is 15 days after the applicable of the following dates: (
a) The date of the sale by public auction, if the mortgagee purchases the property; (
b) The day the balance of the purchase price is paid to the Sheriff or other person conducting the sale the public option, if theperson other than the mortgagee purchases the property; (
c) The date of closing, if the sale is by approved agreement. [6] As the plaintiff purchased the property at public auction on June 10, 2010, the effective date referred to in Rule 72.11(3)(a)was July 2, 2010.
When applying the provisions of the Rule, the relevant limitation period in respect of this motion was January 2, 2011. [7] Although there has been no jurisprudence reported in respect of Rule 72.12, this Rule is essentially the same as 1972 Rule47.10(3) which provided as follows: 47.10(3) An application for deficiency judgment shall be made to the Court within six (6) months from the date of the Sheriff's sale, onten (10) days notice. [8] The old Rule was modified to the extent that the current rule provides additional time beyond the six months when onefactors in that the date of default judgment is 15 days after the date of sale by public auction. [9] In support of the motion, counsel acting for the plaintiff at the time of the initial foreclosure proceedings averred in hisaffidavit as to the reason why the motion for deficiency was not filed within the required time period. [10] Counsel acting on behalf of the plaintiff on the motion to extend the time limit (different counsel than that who acted on behalfof the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceedings) submitted that the date was inadvertently missed because of a misreading of the relevantrule in the previous lawyer’s office.
The error was not caught until after the limitation period had passed. The Law and Conclusion [11] The law on deficiency judgments is clear: a request for an abridgment of time will not be granted, to permit late notice ofmotion for assessment of a deficiency judgment, unless the plaintiff can provide a reasonable excuse for missing the limitation. [12] I refer to the decision of our Court of Appeal in Royal Bank v.
Phillips (1994), 1994 NSCA 100 , 133 N.S.R. (2d) 232.At para. 7, Hallett J. stated as follows: A deficiency judgment following a mortgage foreclosure of residential property imposes an onerous burden on a mortgagor guarantorbecause they would reasonably assume, at the time the loan was made and the mortgage security given, that the value of the homewould exceed the loan.
When this assumption is not borne out they become potentially liable for a debt that was not reasonably expected.As well, the mortgagee, in an ordinary residential mortgage transaction, would have decided at the time the loan was made that thesecurity would be sufficient to cover the loan in the event of a default. In circumstances where it does not the mortgagee must apply fordeficiency judgment within the time allowed by the Rules unless there is a reasonable excuse for failing to do so.
[13] The plaintiff submits a number of cases for the proposition that "inadvertence" can amount to a reasonable excuse that justifiesthe motion for abridgment of the time in the Rules. Among the authorities cited, the plaintiff referred to the case of Cummings v. NovaScotia (Minister of Community Services), 2011 NSCA 2 for the proposition that the "reasonable excuse" requirement on an abridgmentof time motion is lessened where the applicant can demonstrate merits in their case.
However, most of the authorities referred to by theplaintiffs are instances where the default judgment was being overturned where the defendant provided some explanation for not filing atimely defence. There are indeed some cases that do suggest that inadvertence can ground a motion for abridgment of time.
However,the cases cited by the plaintiff in respect of inadvertence deals with circumstances of default judgments being set aside where thedefendant provided some explanation for not filing a timely defence, but in no instance are the cases in support of inadvertence either infailing to have knowledge of a particular limitation limit or in misinterpreting what I believe is a clear provision in the Rules. [14] It is important to attempt to understand what is the apparent inadvertence in this case.
If the inadvertence is on account of thefailure to appreciate that the time limit ran from the effective date of the judgment and ended six months from that date, then I cannotaccept that such omission can amount to a reasonable excuse as contemplated by the binding case law. It can be reasonably stated thatlack of knowledge of a limitation period is not a reasonable excuse for not having taken a necessary step in the proceeding. [15] I refer to the decision of Milbury v.
Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2007 NSCA 52, where the Nova Scotia Court of Appealexplained that the discoverability rule, which delays the start of the limitation period until the relevant facts are discovered, does notapply where the facts were known, but the plaintiff was ignorant of the law. At para. 27, the Court stated: It is the discovery of the facts giving rise to a cause of action that starts the time running, not the discovery of the applicable law.Ignorance of the law does not postpone the starting of the time period. See Coutanche v. Napoleon Delicatessen, (ON CA), [2004] O. J.
No. 2746 (Ontario Court of Appeal) and Hill v. South Alberta Land Registration District (1993), 1993 ABCA 75, 135 A.R. 266 (Alberta C.A.). [16] Applying this dictum to the limitation period in Rule 72 makes sound policy sense. If ignorance of the law were a legitimateexcuse for an abridgment of time motion in the deficiency judgment context then it can be fairly be anticipated that any time thelimitation period is missed, ignorance of the law will be pled as a reasonable excuse. Ignorance of the law or failure to read the Rules isnot a reasonable excuse.
I also find that misinterpreting what appears to be a clear and straightforward Rule would not, in my respectfulview, be a reasonable excuse. [17] I have also considered whether the provisions of the Limitation of Actions Act provide some guidance as to whether I shouldgrant the motion to extend the time. In 1982, the Act was amended permitting the court to disallow a defence based on the timelimitation and to allow the action to proceed if it appeared to the court to be equitable. In making this determination, the Court mustbalance the prejudice of the parties.
The statute contains a list of factors the court ought to consider coming to its decision. [18] The amendments to the Act that I addressed above, allowing for bringing of an action after a limitation has expired, wereproclaimed into law in 1982. However, the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal comes after these amendments became law and theCourt of Appeal in Philips did not consider these factors in determining whether there was a reasonable excuse. [19] I agree that inadvertence can ground reasonable excuse for a motion for abridgment of time in the Rules.
However, in thecontext of a limitation period, and more specifically deficiency judgments, the Court should assess and consider reasonable excusehaving in mind the words of the Court of Appeal. [20] It is my respectful conclusion that that the misreading of a clearly-worded rule until after the limitation period has lapsed is nota reasonable excuse. With the greatest of deference, ignorance of the law does not prevent the limitation period from running. [21] I therefore deny the motion to abridge the time period. Leblanc, J.
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