2011 NSSC 222, 2011 NSSC 222
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA (FAMILY DIVISION) Cite as: C.M. v. Nova Scotia (Community Services), 2011 NSSC 222 Date: 20110606 Docket: SFSNCFSA63742 Registry: Sydney, N.S. Between: C.M. Applicant/Respondent v. Minister of Community Services Respondent/Applicant Editorial Notice Identifying information has been removed from this electronic version of the judgment. Judge: The Honourable Justice Darryl W. Wilson Heard: June 1, 2011, in Sydney, Nova Scotia Written Decision: June 6, 2011 Counsel: Matthew MacNeil - Counsel for C.M. Carolyn MacAulay - Counsel for A.M. and P.M.
Sanaz Gerami - Counsel for the Minister of Community Services By the Court: [ 1 ] C.M., the mother, applied to terminate an Order for Permanent Care and Custody. A.M. and P.M., the maternal grandparents, filed a motion requesting they be granted party status pursuant to Section 36(1)(
f) of the Children and Family Services Act , for the purpose of commencing their own application to terminate the Permanent Care and Custody Order of their grandchild or joining the termination proceeding initiated by their daughter. [ 2 ] The Minister opposes the grandparents’ motion for party status. [ 3 ] J.M., the child, was born September *, 2008. He was taken into the care of the Minister of Community Services on April 3, 2009. Three weeks after being taken into care he was placed in the interim care of his paternal grandparents while the mother accessed services in order to address protection concerns.
The maternal grandmother, who had discussed interim care of J.M. with the paternal grandmother, but not the Minister, was content with the paternal grandmother providing interim care. [ 4 ] C.M. is also the mother of N.M., age 10, from an earlier relationship. She consented to an Order placing N.M. in the custody of her parents in 2004. N.M. has lived with his maternal grandparents since 2004. He is not the subject of any protection proceedings. [ 5 ] The mother consented to an Order of Permanent Care and Custody for J.M. on February 16, 2010.
The plan of care filed by the Minister of Community Services was for J.M. to be placed for adoption with his paternal grandparents. [ 6 ] The maternal grandparents were not aware that their daughter had consented to an Order of Permanent Care and Custody and that the paternal grandparents would be adopting him. They did not find out about the Permanent Care and Custody Order and the plans for adoption until September, 2010. At that time, the maternal grandparents contacted the Minister seeking permission to take J.M. with them and his half-brother on a short vacation to Moncton.
The Minister could not agree to this request since J.M. was in the permanent care and custody of the Minister with plans to be placed for adoption. The maternal grandparents were informed of this fact and that a representative for the Minister would get back to them. [ 7 ] The maternal grandparents were extremely upset they were not informed of the Permanent Care and Custody Order. Until September, 2010, the maternal grandparents were under the impression that their daughter was accessing services and would eventually have the child returned to her care.
At that time, they could not contest the Permanent Care and Custody Order. They were content with the care their grandson was receiving with the paternal grandparents and were comforted by the fact that their grandson would remain with family. [ 8 ] The process to place J.M. for adoption with his paternal grandparents had begun in March, 2010 after the Permanent Care and Custody Order was issued. In July, 2010, the Minister became aware from their S.A.F.E. Assessment of information that the paternal grandparents had not disclosed during the 1.5 years J.M. was in their care.
The Minister gave the grandparents time to respond to this information. The Minister was assured by the grandparents that they would address the Minister’s concerns. The grandparents were unable to address the Minister’s concerns. In January, 2011, the Minister decided to abandon the plan to place J.M. for adoption with his paternal grandparents. [ 9 ] The maternal grandparents became aware that the Minister was not proceeding with their plan to have J.M. adopted by his paternal grandparents in January, 2011.
At that time, the maternal grandparents requested the Minister place J.M. with them for the purposes of adoption. The Minister did not immediately respond to the maternal grandparents’ request. [ 10 ] J.M. was moved to a new foster-to-adopt home on February 16, 2011. At a case conference meeting on March 3, 2011, the Minister decided it was time to discuss the adoption of J.M. with his new foster parents.
[11] The Minister held a case conference on March 23, 2011 on the issue of J.M.’s adoption. A decision was made to place J.M. ina permanent adoptive home with his current foster parents. [12] The maternal grandparents’ request to be considered as adoptive parents was discussed during this case conference. TheMinister did not support placing J.M. with his maternal grandparents for the purpose of adoption for the following reasons:
(1) J.M. has been in the permanent care and custody of the Minister for a year;
(2) The unforeseen delays regarding the adoption process of the paternal grandparents;
(3) The unforeseen circumstances changing the Minister’s position regarding the adoption plan of the paternal grandparents;
(4) The child’s sense of time and his best interests;
(5) The time that would be required to train and assess the maternal grandparents versus the readiness and willingness of the currentfoster parents to adopt J.M. immediately;
(6) The uncertainty of the maternal grandparents being approved for adoption;
(7) The need to establish permanency and stability for the child;
(8) J.M. has settled very well in his current foster placement. [13] The maternal grandparents have had custody of N.M., their older grandchild, since 2004. They visited J.M. with their daughter,at the Minister’s offices, before he was placed with the paternal grandparents. They had regular weekly visits with J.M. while he was inthe care of the paternal grandparents before and after the Permanent Care and Custody Order. They would take N.M. with them on thesevisits and N.M. played with his half-brother, J.M., during these visits. They celebrated Christmas with J.M.
The Minister was notaware of the extent of the contact that the maternal grandparents and N.M. had with J.M. [14] The maternal grandparents own their own home in *. The maternal grandmother has been employed as a * with the sameemployer for the last 18.5 years. The father worked 20 years as a *. For the last four years he has been employed as a *. His work hastaken him to Western Canada for periods of time, but he recently started a new job in the local area. THE LAW [15]
Section 48 of the Act deals with the termination of Permanent Care Orders. Subsection 48(3) states:
(3) A party to a proceeding may apply to terminate an order for permanent care and custody or to vary access under such anorder, in accordance with this Section, including the child where the child is sixteen years of age or more at the time ofapplication for termination or variation of access." (Emphasis added.) [16] In order to commence this application to terminate a Permanent Care Order or be joined to the mother’s termination application,the grandparents must be a party to the proceeding. They were not a party to the proceeding placing J.M. in permanent care.
Section 36lists who is to be a party to a proceeding and includes subsection 36(1)(
f) which provides: (
f) any other person added as a party at any stage in the proceeding pursuant to the Family Court Rules. [17] A person who did not participate in the original proceeding but later offers themselves as a candidate to care for the child maystill apply to be joined as a party under subsection 36(1)(
f) for the purpose of commencing a termination application (Children's AidSociety of Shelburne County v. I.C., [2001] N.S.J. 260 (C.A.)). [18] The test for permitting standing and leave to a person who is not a party and without prior involvement in the proceeding andthe rationale for it was discussed by Chipman, J.A. in C.A.S. of Halifax v. R.B. 2003 NSCA 49 , 2003, N.S.C.A. 49, at
paragraphs 35-40. 35 At para 48 Bateman, J.A. points out that the test to be applied on a leave application is not set out in the Act and hasreceived little judicial consideration. Generally such applications are made by a parent or person from whom the child has beenapprehended, and who now seeks to demonstrate a change of circumstances.
In such a context, the applicant must adducesufficient evidence to warrant a hearing and thereby put the Agency plans on hold. 36 At para 52 Bateman, J.A. identified nine compelling circumstances shown by the appellants making it necessary in thechild's best interests to invoke the court's jurisdiction in favour of the foster parents for joinder and leave.
While generallyAgency decisions respecting placement should be free from court intervention, there are circumstances such as were then beforethe court where it may be appropriate for the court to exercise a supervisory jurisdiction, she said. 37 The best interests of the child is the paramount consideration; s. 2(2) of the Act.
Although the Act lays down no test forjoinder and leave at any given time and draws no specific distinction in s. 36 between applications before and after an order forpermanent care has been made, a sharp distinction is recognized in the Act between proceedings before and after a permanentcare order has been given. 38 An examination of s. 42 of the Act shows that prior to a permanent care order being made, the court is to exhaust allreasonable alternatives, including the consideration of less intrusive alternatives and if necessary to remove a child from the careof a parent or guardian, to consider placement with a relative, neighbour or other member of the community or the extendedfamily.
After the permanent care order has been made, the Agency becomes the legal guardian of the child with the mandate toseek a permanent placement for him or her, most often adoption.
After such an order has been granted, although it may beterminated, there are a number of restrictions that apply: see s. 48(4) and (6). 39 Having regard to the Statute and the case law, particularly I.C., supra, I am satisfied that the test for permitting standingand leave to one who is not a party and without prior involvement in the proceedings is more stringent than that applied byDellapinna, J., ie. the "reasonable alternative" test. 40 As the best interests of the child is always the paramount consideration, and as its application always involves a factspecific exercise, there must always be flexibility.
Having so said, after a permanent care order is made, a non party with noprior involvement in the proceedings must, as a general rule, as in I.C., show compelling circumstances justifying status andleave. There are, as the court pointed out in I.C., supra, risks to the child of the delay inherent in granting standing to one, notpreviously involved in the proceedings, who seeks to present a new plan after the granting of a permanent care order. This sameconcern has been expressed by this Court even in the context of late attempts to submit new plans before the making of apermanent care order.
See for example Family and Children's Services of Kings County v. B.D. (1999), 1999 NSCA 180 ,177 N.S.R. (2d) 169; [1999] N.S.J. No. 220 (Quicklaw) at para 22-23. In I.C., supra the court not only found that there werecompelling circumstances requiring the hearing of the termination application but also that in the circumstances of that case, thedelay resulting in so doing "should not be a significant factor. [19] The Minister’s submissions that the grandparents’ motion for standing be dismissed include:
(1) The grandparents have not shown compelling reasons in support of being granted party status for the purpose of being consideredadoptive parents and if they are granted party status, they have not provided a compelling reason to justify a delay in the permanentplacement of the child for the purposes of their adoptive assessment;
(2) In the absence of bad faith or unfairness the court should not intervene in agency decisions about placement of a child in permanentcare and custody by allowing the grandparents to seek court intervention to be considered as potential adoptive parents. (Reference thecase of Minister of Community Services v. N.N.M., 2008 NSCA 69 , 268 N.S.R. (2d) 109, C.A.). [20] The Pre-Trial Brief of the grandparents caused confusion. The Brief indicated they were seeking to be added as parties to anapplication to terminate a Permanent Care and Custody Order for the purpose of being considered as adoptive parents. The application to
terminate a Permanent Care and Custody Order is a different issue than a request to be considered for permanent placement for thepurpose of adoption. Section 48(8) of the Children and Family Services Act provides: On a hearing of an application to terminate an order for permanent care and custody, the court may: (
a) dismiss the application; (
b) adjourn the hearing of the application for a period not to exceed ninety days and refer the child, parent or guardian orother person seeking care and custody of the child for psychiatric, medical or other examination or assessment; (
c) adjourn the hearing of the application for a period not to exceed six months and place the child in the care and custody ofa parent or guardian, subject to the supervision of the agency; (
d) adjourn the hearing of the application for a period not to exceed six months and place the child in the care and custody ofa person other than a parent or guardian, with the consent of that other person, subject to the supervision of the agency; or (
e) terminate the order for permanent care and custody and order the return of the child to the care and custody of a parentor guardian or other person. [21] The court cannot order placement of the child with the grandparents for the purposes of adoption on an application to terminatepermanent care and custody. [22] The case of Minister of Community Services v. N.N.M., supra, is distinguishable from the present case. N.N.M. involved achallenge to the Minister’s decision on an adoption placement and did not involve a consideration of the test to be applied on anapplication for standing to commence a termination proceeding. [23] Bateman, J.A., in C.A.S. of Shelburne County v. C(
L) and C(H.R.) et al 2001 NSCA 108 , 2001, N.S.C.A. 108 atparagraph 60, identified the potential relief available to the applicants. 60 I am aware that there will be significant difficulties to address on a termination hearing. Unless the Agency reversesits position on the C.s as potential adoptive parents, it may not be open to them to adopt B.J.S. The question, then, is what reliefcould be granted to them if the court is persuaded that it is in B.J.S.’s best interests to remain in their care? The only optionwould be a custody order.
Presumably, it will be necessary for them to apply for leave to commence an application for custodypursuant to the Maintenance and Custody Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 160 (formerly the Family Maintenance Act) and, under theFamily Court Rules, seek joinder of that action with the termination proceeding under the Family Court Rules. [24] The applicants in C.A.S. of Halifax v. R.B. and C.A.S. of Shelburne County v.
I.C. were required to seek standing becausethey did not participate in the original proceeding and leave to apply to terminate a Permanent Care Order because of the restrictions intheir right to apply, pursuant to Section 48(6) of the Act, which provides:
(6) Notwithstanding subsection (3), a party, other than the agency, may not apply to terminate an order for permanent care andcustody (
a) within thirty days of the making of the order for permanent care and custody; (
b) while the order for permanent care and custody is being appealed pursuant to
Section 49; (
c) except with leave of the court, within
(
i) five months after the expiry of the time referred to in clause (a), (ii) six months after the date of the dismissal or discontinuance of a previous application by a party, other than the agency, to terminate an order for permanent care and custody, or (iii) six months after the date of the final disposition or discontinuance of an appeal of an order for permanent care and custody or of a dismissal of an application to terminate an order for permanent care and custody pursuant to subsection (8), whichever is the later; or (
d) except with leave of the court, after two years from (
i) the expiry of the time referred to in clause (a), or (ii) the date of the final disposition or discontinuance of an appeal of an order for permanent care and custody pursuant to
Section 49, whichever is the later. [ 25 ] Applications for joinder as a party and leave to apply to terminate the Permanent Care Order are to be considered at the same time. ( C.A.S. of Shelburne County v. I.C. , supra, at paragraph 43). [ 26 ] Further, while the Minister’s decision respecting placement should be free from court intervention, there are circumstances when it may be appropriate for the court to exercise a supervisory jurisdiction. ( C.A.S. of Halifax v. R.B. , supra, at paragraph 36 ).
This comment appears to have been made in reference to a period of time when the Minister had unfettered discretion to make decisions respecting permanent placement. [ 27 ] If the grandparents are granted standing, there are no restrictions on their right to joinder. The mother has filed an application to terminate the Order for Permanent Care and Custody, which will be heard June 21, 2011. Notice of the proposed adoption of J.M. had not been given at the time the mother filed her application to terminate. [ 28 ] Family Court Rule 5.09 referred to Section 36(1)(
f) allows any person, with leave of the court, to intervene in a proceeding and become a party thereto where the person claims and can show a direct interest in the subject matter of the proceeding. It provides: 5.09 Any person may, with leave of the court and subject to enactments respecting confidentiality, intervene in a proceeding and become a party thereto where, such person (
a) claims, and to the satisfaction of the court by the filing of an affidavit containing the grounds for the intervention, can show a direct interest in the subject matter of the proceeding, concerning the enforcement of the judgment therein; or (
b) has a right to intervene under an enactment or Rule.
[ 29 ] The test for standing pursuant to Rule 5.09 does not appear too onerous.
As commented upon by Professor Thompson in his annotation, the court would have to be satisfied of the reasons for the absence of prior involvement and of the viability of the proposed plan, in order to grant leave. [ 30 ] The more stringent compelling circumstances test enunciated in R.B. , supra , may still apply post-permanent care and custody applications for standing only unaccompanied by an application for leave to apply to terminate a Permanent Care Order because of the distinction noted by Chipman, J. in the statute between proceedings before and after a Permanent Care Order has been given. [ 31 ] The compelling circumstances that favour granting the maternal grandparents’ application for standing are:
(1) They had no knowledge the child was placed in the permanent care and custody of the Minister until seven months after the fact and had no opportunity to present a placement plan of their own;
(2) They maintained ongoing interest in the welfare of the child, including weekly contact through access visits before and after the child was placed in permanent care, until the visits were stopped by the Minister in January, 2011;
(3) They have had custody of, and are caring for, the child’s sibling who had regular contact with his brother until January, 2011;
(4) The Minister was not aware of the extent of the grandparents’ and sibling’s contact with the child;
(5) The grandparents who are employed and have their own home, appear to have a viable plan to propose;
(6) The Minister has not identified any reason why the child cannot be placed with the maternal grandparents; [ 32 ] The argument against granting standing is the impact of delay in permanent placement on the child.
The Minister has an approved adoptive family who are willing to take the child immediately. [ 33 ] The non-placement of the child after the Permanent Care Order was issued was due to the paternal grandparents’ non- disclosure of relevant information which affected their approval as adoptive parents and the Minister’s delay in deciding to abandon the plan to place the child for adoption with the paternal grandparents. [ 34 ] Currently, the mother has a statutory right to apply to terminate the Order for Permanent Care and Custody.
The Minister’s unfettered discretion to make placement decisions has been put on hold by the mother’s termination application. Granting the grandparents standing to join the application will not add further delay and, therefore, the delay is not significant. [ 35 ] A delay in permanent placement by the Minister may occur if the court decides to adjourn the termination hearing and place the child with the grandparents during a supervisory period, or orders an assessment, but that delay is permitted by statute after the termination hearing.
It is not a delay to the permanent placement of the child, caused by granting standing to the grandparents. [ 36 ] The child’s best interest is always the paramount consideration in any application pursuant to the Children and Family Services Act . I have considered the relevant factors and I find it is in the child’s best interests that the maternal grandparents’ motion for standing be granted.
J.
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