Scotia Mortgage Corporation v. Chalmers, 2011 NSSC 339
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Scotia Mortgage Corporation v. Chalmers, 2011 NSSC 339 Date: 20110927 Docket: Hfx No. 330446 Registry: Halifax Between: Scotia Mortgage Corporation Plaintiff v. Cathy Chalmers and Richard L. Chalmers Defendants Judge: The Honourable Associate Chief Justice Deborah K. Smith Heard: July 7 th and September 27 th , 2011 in Chambers, Halifax, Nova Scotia Oral Decision: September 27 th , 2011 Written Decision: October 4 th , 2011 Counsel: Rebecca L. Hiltz LeBlanc for the Plaintiff No one appeared on behalf of Richard L. Chalmers
By the Court : [ 1 ] Scotia Mortgage Corporation has brought a motion for an assessment of a deficiency judgment against Richard L. Chalmers pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 72.12. The matter came before me in regular chambers on July 7 th , 2011. Mr. Chalmers did not appear at that time despite being personally served with notice of the motion. [ 2 ] At the commencement of the hearing, I raised the issue of whether the Notice of Motion had been filed within the time requirements of Civil Procedure Rule 72.12. I requested that counsel provide me with written submissions on the matter.
This was done and the matter has now returned before me. BACKGROUND [ 3 ] On May 31 st , 2006 Cathy Chalmers and Richard L. Chalmers mortgaged a property located at 5076 Granville Road, Granville Ferry, Annapolis County, Nova Scotia. The mortgage eventually fell into arrears. On June 8 th , 2010 the Plaintiff brought an action against the Defendants for foreclosure, sale and possession. In addition, a claim was made for a deficiency judgment. The action was not defended and on August 19 th , 2010 the Honourable Justice C.
Richard Coughlan granted an Order for Foreclosure, Sale and Possession. [ 4 ] The property was sold by way of sheriff’s sale on October 8 th , 2010. The Plaintiff purchased the property at the said sale. On April 26 th , 2011 the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion seeking to assess the deficiency judgment (against Mr. Chalmers only) pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 72.12. LAW AND ANALYSIS [ 5 ] Civil Procedure Rule 72.11 deals with deficiency judgments. It provides: Deficiency judgment 72.11
(1) A statement of claim or notice of application for foreclosure, sale, and possession may include a claim against a person who is liable for the amount, if any, by which the mortgage debt exceeds the amount realized from the sale.
(2) A mortgagee who claims a deficiency judgment may have default judgment for the deficiency against the party claimed to be liable for the mortgage debt, unless the party claimed against files a notice of defence or contest, or attends at the hearing of the application for an order for foreclosure, sale, and possession and obtains permission to contest the claim.
(3) The effective date of the default judgment is fifteen days after the applicable of the following dates: (
a) the date of a sale by public auction, if the mortgagee purchases the property; (
b) the day the balance of the purchase price is paid to the sheriff or other person conducting a sale by public auction, if a person other than the mortgagee purchases the property;
(
c) the date of closing, if the sale is by approved agreement.
(4) The amount of the default judgment must be assessed by a judge.
(5) Interest is calculated in accordance with the mortgage until the effective date of judgment and in accordance with the Interest on Judgments Act afterwards.
(6) The judgment extinguishes six months after its effective date, unless a notice of motion for an assessment of the amount of the deficiency is filed. [Emphasis added] [ 6 ] Civil Procedure Rule 72.12 deals with motions for an assessment of a deficiency and provides: Motion for assessment of a deficiency 72.12
(1) A mortgagee who seeks an assessment of a deficiency must file a notice of motion to assess the amount of the deficiency before one of the following deadlines: (
a) six months after the effective date of the default judgment, if the sale is by public auction. (
b) ten days after the day of the closing of a sale by approved agreement.
(2) A mortgagee who makes a motion for a deficiency judgment against a party who has not designated an address for delivery must, unless a judge orders otherwise, give notice of the motion to the party in the same way a party is notified of a proceeding under Rule 31 - Notice, as if the notice of motion were an originating document.
(3) The notice must be delivered no less than ten days before the day the motion is to be heard, unless a judge orders otherwise. [Emphasis added] [ 7 ] In the case before me the property was sold at public auction. Accordingly, the Notice of Motion to assess the amount of the deficiency had to be filed before the deadline set out in C.P.R. 72.12(1)(
a) which is six months after the effective date of the default judgment. [ 8 ] Civil Procedure Rule 72.11(3) provides that the effective date of a default judgment is fifteen days after the date of a sale by public auction if the mortgagee purchases the property. As indicated previously, in the case at bar, the mortgagee purchased the property at public auction.
What then is the effective date of the default judgment in this proceeding? [ 9 ] Relying on Civil Procedure Rule 94.02(1), the Plaintiff takes the position that Saturdays, Sundays and holidays should not be included when calculating the effective date of the default judgment and that, accordingly, the effective date of the default judgment was October 29 th , 2010. As indicated previously, the Notice of Motion for the assessment of the deficiency was filed on April 26 th , 2011.
The Plaintiff therefore takes the position that the motion was filed within the time frame required by Civil Procedure Rule 72.12(1)(a).
[ 10 ] The issue in this case comes down to the question of whether Saturdays, Sundays and holidays should be counted in the fifteen day period used to calculate the effective date of the default judgment. [ 11 ] Civil Procedure Rule 94.02 deals with time calculations. Civil Procedure Rule 94.02(1) provides: Time 94.02
(1) The period of days in a Rule that permits or requires something to be done in a number of days does not include any of the following: (
a) the day the period begins; (
b) a Saturday and Sunday in the period; (
c) a weekday the office of the prothonotary is closed during the period; (
d) the day on which a thing is required, or first permitted, to be done. ................. [Emphasis Added] [ 12 ] The Rules must be interpreted in accordance with the principles for the
interpretation of legislation (Rule 94.01(1).) In addition, the Nova Scotia
Interpretation Act applies to the Rules unless a contrary intention appears ( Rule 94.01(2) .) [ 13 ] The
Interpretation Act provides at ss. 19 (
k) and (l): ............... (
k) where the time limited for the doing of any act expires or falls upon a Saturday or a holiday, the time so limited extends to and the act may be done on the first following day that is not a Saturday or a holiday; (
l) where a period of time dating from a given day, act or event is prescribed or allowed for any purpose, the time shall be reckoned exclusively of that day or of the day of the act or event; ............... [ 14 ] Civil Procedure Rule 94.02(1) is clear. The period of days in a Rule that permits or requires something to be done in a number of days does not include Saturdays, Sundays or a weekday when the office of the prothonotary is closed during the period.
The question arises – does Civil Procedure Rule 72.11(3), which determines the effective date of a default judgment, permit or require something to be done in a number of days? In my view, it does not. Accordingly, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays are included in the fifteen day period used to calculate the effective date of a default judgment.
[15] Counsel for the Plaintiff has referred the Court to s. 11 of the Nova Scotia
Interpretation Act which reads as follows:
Preamble and
interpretation provision 11
(1) The
preamble shall be read as part of an enactment to assist in explaining its purport and object.
(2) An
interpretation or definition
section or provision contained in an enactment applies to the whole enactment unless (
a) a different intention is expressed; or (
b) the meaning of the
interpretation or definition
section or provision is inconsistent with the context or purpose of the enactment.R.S., c. 235, s. 11. [16] Counsel has also referred to the decision of Lamer, C.J.C. in Ontario v. C. P.
Ltd., (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R.1031, where it is stated at p. 1050: Thus, the first task of a court construing a statutory provision is to consider the meaning of its words in the context of the statute as awhole........... [17] Counsel has also referred to the comments of Iacobucci, J. in Rizzo and Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (SCC), [1998]1 S.C.R. 27, where it is stated at p. 41: ..........Elmer Driedger in Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983) best encapsulates the approach upon which I prefer to rely. Herecognizes that statutory
interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of legislation alone. At p. 87 he states: Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of
an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammaticaland ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. [18] Counsel submits that based on these authorities, Civil Procedure Rule 72.11(3) cannot be read in isolation and that CivilProcedure Rule 72.11 must be read as a whole. The Plaintiff notes that Civil Procedure Rule 72.11(1) permits a claim for a deficiencyjudgment to be made and that Civil Procedure Rule 72.11(2), inter alia, permits a mortgagee to obtain default judgment against amortgagor if the action is undefended.
The Plaintiff submits that since Rule 72.11 as a whole permits various things to be done and, shesuggests, each of these things must be done within a prescribed period of time after the effective date of the default judgment, CivilProcedure Rule 94.02(1) should apply when calculating the effective date of the default judgment. [19] I do not find this argument persuasive. There is, in my view, nothing in Civil Procedure Rule 72.11 which permits something tobe done within a prescribed period of time.
More importantly, there is nothing in this Rule which permits or requires something to bedone in a number of days. [20] The Plaintiff further submits that “an
interpretation of the Civil Procedure Rules that does not apply the time computation Ruleto all of the Civil Procedure Rules” would be contrary to the tenets of statutory
interpretation as set out by the Supreme Court of Canadaand would be contrary to s. 11 of the
Interpretation Act.
[ 21 ] There is no dispute that Civil Procedure Rule 94.02 applies to the Rules generally. However, pursuant to Rule 94.02(1), Saturdays, Sundays and holidays will only be excluded in the calculation of time if a Rule permits or requires something to be done in a number of days.
That is not the case here. [ 22 ] In the Plaintiff’s brief it is stated that the “current Civil Procedure Rules are completely silent on computations of time that are to include Saturdays and holidays, and it is therefore submitted such computations of time are not to be conducted under the current regime . ” I do not accept this argument. The “current regime” is that the period of days in a Rule that permits or requires something to be done in a number of days does not include Saturdays, Sundays or a weekday when the office of the prothonotary is closed.
Otherwise, such days are included in the calculation of time. [ 23 ] The Plaintiff has also referred the Court to former Civil Procedure Rule 3.01(h) ( Civil Procedure Rules 1972.) In my view, reference to this former Rule is of no assistance to the Plaintiff in this motion. [ 24 ] Finally, the Plaintiff submits that on numerous occasions since the inception of the current Civil Procedure Rules the Court has accepted the practice of not including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when calculating the effective date of a default judgment.
During the hearing of this matter, I referred counsel to one such case – First National Financial Corporation v. Raynard , 2011 NSSC 205 . That case involved a motion to extend the time for the filing of a Notice of Motion for an assessment of a deficiency judgment. During the course of the decision, the chambers judge determined the effective date of the default judgment. One can determine from the date that he selected that he did not include Saturdays and Sundays in the calculation.
The Plaintiff submits that I am bound by this decision and that in accordance with the “current practice” of the Court, I should not include Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when calculating the effective date of the default judgment in the case before me. The difficulty with this argument is that it does not appear that this issue (whether Saturdays, Sundays and holidays should be included or excluded when calculating the effective date of a default judgment) has ever been raised or considered in any of these other cases.
In these circumstances, where the issue has not been specifically considered, I do not consider myself bound by previous decisions. [ 25 ] The effective date of default judgment in this case was October 23 rd , 2010. The Notice of Motion for the assessment of the deficiency was filed on April 26 th , 2011. As indicated previously, if a sale is by public auction, a Notice of Motion to assess a deficiency must be filed before the deadline set out in Civil Procedure Rule 72.12(1)(
a) which is six months after the effective date of the default judgment. Six months from October 23 rd , 2010 is April 23 rd , 2011. April 23 rd , 2011 was a Saturday. April 24 th , 2011 was a Sunday. While not raised by the Plaintiff, it turns out that April 25 th , 2011 was Easter Monday – a day in which the prothonotary’s office was closed. [ 26 ]
Section 19 (
k) of the
Interpretation Act provides that where the time limited for the doing of any act expires or falls on a Saturday or a holiday, the time so limited extends to and the act may be done on the first following day that is not a Saturday or a holiday. As indicated, April 23 rd , 2011 was a Saturday and April 24 th , 2011 was a Sunday. Pursuant to s. 7(1) (
j) of the
Interpretation Act the term “holiday” includes Sunday. While Easter Monday is not specifically referred to in s. 7(1)(
j) of the
Interpretation Act , I am satisfied that it was a holiday and, accordingly, pursuant to s. 19(
k) of the
Interpretation Act the time to file the Notice of Motion in this proceeding was extended to Tuesday, April 26 th , 2011. The Notice of Motion was filed that day and, accordingly, it was filed within the time frame required by Civil Procedure Rule 72.12(1)(a). The Plaintiff is therefore entitled to proceed with the motion. Deborah K. Smith Associate Chief Justice
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