Myers v. Bradstock, 2011 NSSC 342
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Myers v. Bradstock, 2011 NSSC 342 Date: 20110919 Docket: Hfx No. 343756 Registry: Halifax Between: Maxine Florence Myers and Shirley Marie Farrell Applicants v. Robert Ward Bradstock and Anna Claire Bradstock Respondents LIBRARY HEADING Judge : The Honourable Justice Glen G. McDougall Heard: June 15 & 16, 2011, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Subject: Right-of-way by prescription; Limitation of Actions Act ; Land Registry Act
Summary: The applicants acquired title to certain property at 1616 Shore Road, Eastern Passage after their mother’s death. Their mother first acquired title to the property in 1947 from her parents. The property had frontage on a public road but access had always been over the lands retained by the original grantors. That property changed hands on several occasions and is now owned by the respondents. The respondents tried to prevent the applicants from using the original driveway over their land by placing stones across it and then eventually erecting a chain-link fence.
The applicants commenced an application in court seeking a declaration that they have a right-of-way by prescription over the adjoining property along with an injunction enjoining the respondents to remove the fence and to cease impeding their use and enjoyment of the driveway to gain access to their property. Issue:
(1) Are the applicants entitled to a right-of-way by prescription over the respondents’ adjoining property?
(2) Should the respondents be required to remove the fence they had erected across the applicants’ driveway? Result: The use and enjoyment of the driveway over the respondents’ property in order to gain access to the applicants’ property has been open, continuous and notorious since 1947. The applicants are granted a right-of-way by prescription and the respondents are ordered to remove the fence and to refrain from doing anything in the future that might impede the applicants and their guests and their successors in title from using the driveway. THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT'S DECISION.
QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET . SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Myers v. Bradstock, 2011 NSSC 342 Date: 20110919 Docket: Hfx No. 343756 Registry: Halifax Between: Maxine Florence Myers and Shirley Marie Farrell Applicants v. Robert Ward Bradstock and Anna Claire Bradstock Respondents Judge: The Honourable Justice Glen G. McDougall Heard: June 15 & 16, 2011, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Counsel: Matthew J.D. Moir, for the applicants Joshua J. Santimaw & Matthew Conrad, for the respondents By the Court : 1 . This matter began as an Application in Chambers.
It was subsequently converted to an Application in Court. The applicants seek an order for: I. a declaration that the applicants have a right of way by prescription to use a driveway which crosses the respondents’ property at 1612 Shore Road, Eastern Passage, Nova Scotia, in favour of the applicants’ property at 1616 Shore Road, Eastern Passage, Nova Scotia; II. an injunction enjoining the respondents to remove a fence which prevents access across the driveway; and III. costs. 2 . In support of the application a number of affidavits were filed including:
➢ three affidavits of Maxine Florence Myers (one of the applicants); ➢ a rebuttal affidavit of Maxine Florence Myers; ➢ an affidavit of Shirley Marie Farrell (the other applicant); ➢ an affidavit of Barbara Romkey-Deveau; ➢ an affidavit of Florence Mildred Crosby; ➢ an affidavit of Eric Ross Fraser; and ➢ a rebuttal affidavit of Alice Naugle. 3 . Counsel for the respondents cross-examined all of the applicants’ affiants except for Alice Naugle. 4 .
In support of the respondents’ position, affidavits from the following individuals were filed: ➢ Robert Bradstock (one of the respondents); ➢ Wanda Webber; ➢ Alice Naugle; ➢ Susan Sceviour; ➢ Glenys B. Naugle; and ➢ a supplementary affidavit of Glenys B. Naugle. 5 . Counsel for the applicants cross-examined Wanda Webber and Glenys Naugle. He also cross-examined Robert Bradstock, out-of-court, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 53.03(3). A transcript of this cross-examination was filed in advance of the hearing. 6 . Counsel for both sides filed written submissions and both were heard orally.
Counsels’ effort in presenting the case on behalf of their respective clients is much appreciated. Factual Background and Discussion: 7 . The applicants, Maxine Florence Myers and Shirley Marie Farrell, are the owners of property located at Eastern Passage, Nova Scotia bearing Civic Number 1616 Shore Road. The property was previously owned by the applicants’ mother, Sarah Faulkner. 8 . Sarah Faulkner acquired the property from her parents, Thomas and Levina (a.k.a. “Levinia”) Naugle by deed dated April 26, 1947 and registered May 21, 1947. 9 .
Sarah Faulkner and her family first occupied this property after relocating from Devil’s Island on May 31, 1946. The Faulkner family consisted of Sarah Faulkner, her husband and three daughters. Mrs. Faulkner lived at 1616 Shore Road continuously until the date of her death on December 5, 1997. In all she lived in the same house located on the property for more than 50 years after receiving the deed of ownership from her parents. Her daughters, the two applicants, both remember when the family moved to their new home from Devil’s Island. 10 .
The structure which was converted into their home previously served as a garage for the main property owned and occupied by Thomas and Levina Naugle. The respondents are the current owners of what remains of the property that once contained the Thomas and Levina Naugle homestead. It bears Civic Number 1612 Shore Road. It is over 1612 Shore Road that the applicants seek a right-of- way by prescription to access their adjoining property located at 1616 Shore Road. 11 .
In support of their claim, the applicants offered affidavit evidence supported by photographs showing the existence and use of the disputed driveway by their parents and their successors in title. Vehicular use of the driveway was mainly by visitors and guests since Mrs. Faulkner never owned a vehicle. In addition to vehicular traffic, the driveway, based on affidavit evidence not only of the applicants but also other family members and friends or neighbours, was used for pedestrian access continuously from at least 1947. 12 .
The respondents offered a different view supported by the affidavits of prior owners of 1612 Shore Road following conveyance of ownership by Levina Naugle to her son and daughter-in-law, William G. and Glenys B. Naugle, by deed dated March 3, 1969 registered March 4, 1969 in Book Number 2297 at Page Number 347 et seq. 13 . Glenys B. Naugle, the widow of William G. Naugle, held title to the property after her husband’s death. She eventually conveyed it to Leslie R. Webber et ux , Wanda G. Webber by deed dated September 3, 1981 and registered October 13, 1981 in Book Number 3526 at Page Number 0177 et seq.
14 . In a statutory declaration sworn to on the 13 th day of December, 2010 (a copy of which is attached to her affidavit sworn to on the 14 th day of April, 2011 and filed the 15 th day of April, 2011), Wanda Webber indicated that during the three years or so period when she and her husband owned the land “there was no driveway on the property being used for access to Sarah Faulkner’s property,....” She further indicates that her observations were made during the times when she visited the property. Mr. and Mrs. Webber planned to eventually build a cottage on the property. They never actually lived there. 15 .
Mrs. Webber was cross-examined by counsel for the applicants. She confirmed the contents of her affidavit and statutory declaration and reiterated that there was no driveway servicing 1612 Shore Road while she was the co-owner. She also indicated there was no driveway leading to 1616 Shore Road but simply a grassed, pull-over area. She stated she never saw any cars parked next to or behind the house which was then owned and occupied by Sarah Faulkner. 16 . Mrs. Webber’s evidence is limited by the fact that she was only an occasional visitor. Indeed, it is inconsistent with the evidence of Robert W.
Bradstock, the respondent and current co-owner of the property known as 1612 Shore Road. Mr. Bradstock and his wife, Anna Claire Bradstock, acquired title to this property from Mr. and Mrs. Webber by deed dated the 7 th day of November, 1984 and registered the 22 nd day of November, 1984 in Book Number 3921 at Page Number 114 et seq. In his affidavit sworn and filed the 12 th day of April, 2011 he indicates that a driveway first had to be constructed in order to gain access to the site where he and his wife built their new home in 1985.
Photographs taken during construction show the driveway during the period of construction. Of particular interest to the court is the photograph attached as Exhibit “C” to the Bradstock affidavit. It shows the front of the newly constructed house as well as the driveway. The photograph was obviously taken from the direction of the Shore Road. What is of particular interest are the tire tracks in the right foreground. They appear to signal the entrance to another driveway or turning area heading toward the Sarah Faulkner property at 1616 Shore Road. 17 .
Another photograph attached to the Bradstock affidavit as Exhibit “D”, obviously taken sometime after the house was constructed, shows the Bradstock driveway from the front of the house looking towards the Shore Road. There is no problem discerning the presence of what appears to be the driveway leading from the main driveway towards the adjoining property owned by the applicants. There is evidence of gravel covering a portion of the connecting driveway and beyond that further evidence of its continuation in the direction of the house at 1616 Shore Road.
All of this is consistent with the evidence of the applicants and various other affiants who swore that the driveway servicing 1616 Shore Road has been in existence since the time the property was first carved out of the main property owned by Thomas and Levina Naugle and conveyed to their daughter, Sarah Faulkner, in 1947. 18 . When questioned out-of-court on his affidavit, Mr. Bradstock confirmed that Sarah Bradstock did not have her own driveway leading directly from the Shore Road to her property. There was only one driveway, which as pointed out by Mr.
Bradstock and several others, was the driveway that serviced 1612 Shore Road. 19 . Further evidence of this was supplied by Mr. Bradstock who indicated that when sidewalks were first installed by the Municipality sometime in 1995 only one cut-out was left for his driveway. He gave evidence that he then spoke to Mrs. Faulkner in an effort to persuade her to request a cut-out over the sidewalk to her property. He said that she stated that she had no need for a driveway since she did not own a motor vehicle.
While no one disputes the fact that Sarah Faulkner never owned a motor vehicle there is ample evidence that others used their vehicles to access her property either to drive her home on occasion or to visit her over the many years she owned and occupied 1616 Shore Road. 20 . It is also interesting to note that the sidewalk installers left a cut-out for the Bradstocks but not for Mrs. Faulkner. It was not until she asked them to come back (after being persuaded by Mr. Bradstock) that a second cut-out was installed.
Likely, it was because there was evidence of a driveway from the Shore Road to 1612 Shore Road but none directly from the Shore Road to the Faulkner property at 1616 Shore Road. 21 . Mr. Bradstock’s evidence of having given permission to Sarah Faulkner to begin using his driveway after it was constructed in 1985 and the suggestion by Glenys B. Naugle that she and her husband also gave permission for use of the original driveway that served the old Thomas and Levina Naugle homestead is far from convincing.
Likewise, with the evidence of Wanda Webber, who was simply an infrequent visitor to the property over the course of the three years when she and her husband owned what is now 1612 Shore Road. 22 . I accept the evidence of the applicants supported by the photographic evidence of the existence of the driveway and its open, notorious and continuous use from at least 1947. 23 . Their evidence is further supported by the evidence of Eric Ross Fraser who was born in 1953.
He can recall traversing the driveway over 1612 Shore Road both on foot when he was a youngster playing with other children in the neighbourhood and later by motor vehicle since at least 1981 when he visited the property to assist Mrs. Faulkner and Maxine Myers’ husband, Arnold (a.k.a. “Junior”) Graham. He testified that he regularly drove his vehicle “over the driveway which crosses part of 1612 Shore Road” in order to visit “... the property at 1616 Shore Road....” Mr. Fraser was cross-examined by counsel for the respondents.
Although a friend of the applicants and other members of the Naugle family, he was not a relative and has no vested interest in the outcome of this case. Not only was he certain of his use of the driveway over 1612 Shore Road to gain access to 1616 Shore Road, he also testified that no one ever challenged his use of the driveway at any time. Furthermore, he testified that from time to time he witnessed others accessing 1616 Shore Road over the very same driveway he used without interference or objection of any kind. 24 .
The existence, location and use of the driveway right-of-way claimed by the applicants is also supported by the affidavit evidence of Barbara Romkey-Deveau who was cross-examined on her affidavit. She testified to the fact that she had, at one time,
worked with Sarah Faulkner at Oceanview Manor. In all she estimated that she worked with Mrs. Faulkner for between 10 and 15 years. 25 . Since Mrs. Faulkner did not have a motor vehicle, Mrs. Romkey-Deveau would often give her a drive home whenever their shifts coincided. She estimated this occurred at least once per week. She was also a friend of Maxine Myers, one of the applicants, and visited her regularly when she lived at 1616 Shore Road. Also, as her parents were friends of Sarah Faulkner, she would also accompany them whenever they visited her.
Whenever she attended at the property either with her parents or when she drove Mrs. Faulkner home she always entered the property over the driveway leading from Shore Road to 1612 Shore Road and then over the connecting portion of the driveway to 1616 Shore Road. At no time did anyone every try to prevent her from using the driveway or to ask her to refrain from doing so. 26 . Florence Mildred Crosby also provided an affidavit and made herself available for cross-examination. Mrs. Crosby (known as “Granny” by many who know her) first came to Nova Scotia from New Brunswick some 57 years ago.
She first moved to Eastern Passage around 1958. From 1958 to about 1965, Mrs. Crosby and her husband rented the old Naugle homestead located on what is now 1612 Shore Road – the present Bradstock property. She recalls vividly the driveway that was located on the property. This driveway not only serviced the Faulkner property at 1616 Shore Road it also was used for access to the property on the opposite side (i.e., the left hand side as you enter 1612 Shore Road). That property was owned by another member of the Naugle family. She also testified that this was the only way to gain access to the Faulkner property.
There was no driveway access directly from Shore Road to 1616 Shore Road. Vehicular access to 1616 Shore Road was only possible by entering the driveway to 1612 Shore Road first and then crossing over it to the adjoining property now owned by the applicants. 27 . Even after moving away from 1612 Shore Road, Mrs. Crosby continued to visit 1616 Shore Road on a regular basis until about six years ago. She not only drove her own vehicle over the driveway that has been there since she first became acquainted with the property in 1958 but she has also seen other vehicles using it.
No one has ever challenged her use of the driveway nor is she aware of anyone else being challenged. Findings and Conclusion: 28 . In the face of this over-whelming evidence and the fact that Wanda Webber was merely an occasional visitor to the property that she and her husband owned at 1612 Shore Road, I find that the driveway to 1616 Shore Road is and has always been (at least back to 1947 when in first became a separate lot) over 1612 Shore Road. There never was a driveway to 1616 Shore Road directly from the Shore Road since it was first created by Thomas and Levina Naugle for their daughter, Sarah Faulkner.
The use and enjoyment of the driveway has been open, notorious and continuous since then. Any challenge to the use of the driveway by the owners and occupiers of 1616 Shore Road since 1947, if any, did not occur until long after the requisite uninterrupted period of 25 years which results in an indefeasible right of user by prescription under
section 32 of the Limitation of Actions Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258. 29 . Any suggestion by Glenys B. Naugle that use of the driveway by Sarah Faulkner was with permission is suspect. When cross-examined, Mrs. Naugle was very vague in terms of any conversations she had had with Sarah Faulkner about the on-going use of the driveway. During cross-examination she also indicated that Sarah Faulkner had her own driveway leading directly to her property from the Shore Road. Clearly, based on the preponderance of evidence of the other witnesses, she is mistaken. 30 . I am also not persuaded when Mr.
Bradstock says he gave permission to Sarah Faulkner to use his driveway to access her property. Any efforts to prevent use of the existing driving – the driveway that has existed since at least 1947 – was in recent months when the Bradstocks or someone acting on their behalf first placed rocks across it and, later, when they had a chainlink fence erected adjacent to the applicants’ property. 31 . According to the Land Registration Act , S.N.S. 2011, c. 6,
section 74 , sub-
section 2 , any interest in a parcel of land acquired by adverse possession before the date the parcel is first registered pursuant to the Act is absolutely void within ten years of such registration unless there is: a. (
a) an order of the court confirming the interest; b. (
b) a certificate of lis pendens certifying that an action has been commenced to confirm the interest; c. (
c) an affidavit confirming that the interest has been claimed pursuant to
section 37 of the Crown Lands Act; or d. (
d) the agreement of the registered owner confirming the interest, has been registered or recorded before that time. 32 . The respondents first converted their parcel of land to the new registry system created by the Land Registration Act , supra , on January 11, 2006. In the face of the respondents’ efforts to prevent the applicants from continuing to use and enjoy what they and their mother before them had always used and enjoyed, there was little they could do other than to commence an application to assert their prescriptive right of user. 33 .
I find that the applicants have established the right to a prescriptive easement over the driveway that extends from the Shore Road over the property owned by the respondents bearing Civic Number 1612 Shore Road. The use of this driveway has been enjoyed without permission, express or implied, of the respondents or their predecessors in title since 1947.
34 . The applicants and their predecessors in title have used the aforementioned driveway openly, continuously and notoriously throughout that time and should be permitted, along with their successors in title, their heirs and assigns as well as any visitors or guests, to its on-going use and enjoyment without interruption or interference by the respondents and their successors, heirs and assigns. 35 .
The respondents are ordered to remove the fence that cuts off the driveway and to refrain from taking any other action that might impede the applicants’ use of the driveway to gain access to 1616 Shore Road including anyone who might choose to visit that property. I ask that an order reflecting this decision be prepared and presented for issuance by the court. 36 . The parties are encouraged to try to reach an agreement on costs. If an agreement cannot be reached, I will accept their counsels’ written submissions within 30 days of release of this decision. McDougall, J.
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