R. v. MacIsaac, 2011 NSSC 345
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: R. v. MacIsaac, 2011 NSSC 345 Date: 20110914 Docket: CR. Ant. 344819 Registry: Antigonish Between: Eric Doyle MacIsaac Plaintiff - and - Her Majesty the Queen Respondent LIBRARY HEADING Judge : The Honourable Justice A. David MacAdam Heard: July 12, 2011, in Antigonish, Nova Scotia Subject: Appeals, sentencing, conditional discharges
Summary: The appellant pleaded guilty to one count of common assault and two counts of assault causing bodily harm. The Provincial Court judge sentenced him to three months imprisonment in respect of the common assault and, consecutive to that, three months concurrent on each count of assault causing bodily harm. The six-month total sentence was to be served in the community on house arrest. The sentencing judge rejected the defence submission for a conditional discharge.
Several letters of reference in the appellant’s favour failed to reach the sentencing judge, due to having been inadvertently sent by counsel to the wrong fax number. Issue: Was there a denial of natural justice in sentencing the accused in the absence of the letters of reference? Result: The Appeal Court found that the content of the missing letters of reference would reinforce the positive pre-sentence report as well as other evidence in the accused’s favour that had been before the sentencing judge.
The court was not satisfied that the letters would have materially affected the sentencing judge’s reasoning, or that they would have likely led to a different result, particularly in the assessment of whether it would not be contrary to the public interest to order a discharge. The court was not satisfied that the absence of the reference letters led to any error or denial of natural justice by the sentencing judge. THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT'S DECISION. QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET .
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: R. v. MacIsaac, 2011 NSSC 345 Date: 20110914 Docket: CR. Ant. 344819 Registry: Antigonish Between: Eric Doyle MacIsaac Appellant v. Her Majesty the Queen
DECISION Judge: The Honourable Justice A. David MacAdam. Heard: July 12, 2011, in Antigonish, Nova Scotia Final Written Submissions: June 28, 2011 Counsel: Brian P. Casey, for the Appellant Catherine E. Ashley, for the Respondent By the Court : Introduction 1 . The appellant, Mr. MacIsaac, pleaded guilty to one count of assault and two counts of assault causing broadly harm. He was sentenced to three months imprisonment in respect to the common assault and, consecutive to that, three months imprisonment, concurrent, on each count of assault causing bodily harm, for a total of six months imprisonment.
The sentence was to be served in the community, with a house arrest component for the six months. The court rejected the defence submission for a conditional discharge. 2 . The Notice of Appeal references the inadvertent failure by defence counsel to forward to the trial judge a number of letters of reference on behalf of Mr. MacIsaac. Apparently counsel used the wrong number in faxing the letters to the court, and as a result the sentencing judge did not have the letters of reference. The appellant says that in the circumstances this amounted to a breach of natural justice, and asks the
Summary Conviction Appeal Court to allow the appeal and sentence the appellant to "time served, or otherwise impose a more appropriate sentence." In written submissions, the appellant also requests a conditional discharge. i. Background 3 . The appellant's written submission summarizes the circumstances that led up to the assaults. Although the Crown takes some exceptions to the appellant's account, there is little substantial disagreement. Mr. MacIsaac was an 18-year-old, first-year university student, living in residence at St. Francis Xavier University.
On homecoming weekend in October 2009 he began consuming alcohol at eight o'clock in the morning. By the time of the assaults he had been drinking, on and off, for some 14 hours. He went to a house occupied by some other students, who were hosting a get-together for homecoming. The house had apparently belonged to Mr. MacIsaac's grandfather at one time and he had visited it as a child. He asked if he could enter and view the interior. He was allowed in, but was eventually asked to leave. He left, but returned a few minutes later. He entered and went up the stairs, where he sat down. One of the victims, Mr.
Cole Halley followed him up the stairs and asked him to leave. The Crown’s submission then describes the assaults: a. At this time, for reasons unknown, MacIsaac turned around and punched Halley in the face and knocked him down a flight of stairs into the wall at the bottom of the staircase and Mr. Halley had hit the bottom of the wall of the stairs case so hard it damaged the drywall. b. While at the bottom of the stairs, MacIsaac continued to punch Halley in the head.
Another resident of the house, Douglas McNerney tried to pull MacIsaac off of Halley and while doing so, MacIsaac turned and punched McNerney in the mouth and he also hit Carly Savoie, another resident, in the mouth as well. Subsequently McNerney received five stitches to his mouth and Savoie required dental work on her front teeth to repair the damages sustained from the assault. (sic) 4 . The defence submission states that Mr. MacIsaac struck Ms. Savoy by accident while intending to strike one of the male
occupants, and notes that the police found that Mr. MacIsaac was immediately remorseful for hitting her. This is acknowledged by theCrown in written submissions, although Crown counsel adds that Mr. MacIsaac did not appear to be sorry about hitting Mr. Halley orMr. MacNearney. i. The Sentencing Decision 5. In his reasons the Provincial Court judge noted that Mr. MacIsaac had pled guilty and that this was a mitigating factor insentencing. He also observed that by admitting his guilt, Mr.
MacIsaac was accepting responsibility for his actions, a factor to be takeninto consideration with respect to individual deterrence, reformation and rehabilitation. This also prevented the necessity of the threevictims attending and testifying at trial about what had happened. 6. The trial judge held that it was an aggravating factor that the assaults occurred in someone else's residence, in circumstanceswhere Mr. MacIsaac was in a position similar to that of a trespasser, having reentered the residence after being asked to leave.
The courtwas, he noted, entitled to consider all of the circumstances of the offences. He observed that crimes of violence are serious offences, andthat the Court of Appeal has held that general deterrence is a primary factor in sentencing for violent crimes, although individualdeterrence for the offender, reformation and rehabilitation must also be considered and weighed as well. He noted that reformation andrehabilitation are always significant in sentencing a first-time offender. He cited the purposes and principles of sentencing outlined in s.718 of the Criminal Code. 7.
The sentencing judge made reference to victim impact statements provided by the victims of the assaults. He reviewed Mr.MacIsaac's personal background and noted he had no prior convictions and that the presentence report was "a positive one", and hereferred to Mr. MacIsaac's attempts to advance his education, his history of seeking employment, and concluded that he appeared to be,generally speaking, on "a positive path in his life." The sentencing judge referenced the evidence of Mr. MacIsaac's uncle and mother, aswell as that of Mr. MacIsaac himself. He stated that it was a positive factor that Mr.
MacIsaac had genuine remorse and regret for hisactions. However, the sentencing judge noted that Mr. MacIsaac had voluntarily consumed a large volume of alcohol on the day of theassaults, and stated that this was Mr. MacIsaac's responsibility, as was everything that had occurred. 8. The Crown sought a sentence of imprisonment for 12 months, to be served in the community under a conditional sentenceorder, to be followed by six months' probation. Mr. MacIsaac sought a conditional discharge.
The sentencing judge reviewed therequirements for a conditional discharge, which require the court to be satisfied that a discharge is in the best interests of the defendantand not contrary to the public interest. He noted that "best interests of the defendant" meant more than not having a criminal record. Healso observed that there are a number of factors in the court's consideration of whether granting a discharge would be contrary to thepublic interest. He stated that the more serious the offences, the more likely that not imposing a conviction would be contrary to thepublic interest.
He added that “the more the offences and the principles applicable to those offences require the court to place primaryemphasis on general deterrence, the more likely it is that a discharge would be contrary to the public interest." 9. The sentencing judge referred to R. v. Dalton (1977), (NS CA), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 555, 1977 CarswellNS245, [1977] N.S.J. No. 444 (S.C.A.D.). In Dalton, the appellant was 23 years old at the time of the offence (marijuana possession). Hewas studying for an MBA. He had no criminal record and was apparently of good character.
The sentencing judge held that a dischargewould be in the best interests of the appellant, but was not satisfied that it would not be contrary to the public interest. In affirming thesentencing judge's decision not to order a discharge, the Appeal Division said, at para. 15, "the discharge would undoubtedly be “in thebest interests” of the appellant, but not in any peculiarly strong way, and not sufficiently strongly to tip the balance against the interest ofthe public in deterring the commission of the offence by a mature young man.
The offence was indeed minor...It was not, however,committed impulsively or naively by an immature young person." 10. The sentencing judge noted Mr. MacIsaac's evidence that there could be repercussions in his chosen career path if aconviction was entered. He continued (at pp. 74-75 of the transcript): a. ... the more significant issue here is, would a discharge be contrary to the public interest? It is my conclusion that it would.There are three offences here. Mr. MacIsaac assaulted three different people on this occasion. I take into consideration that this was onechain of ongoing events related.
Nevertheless, there were on successive occasions in that ongoing altercation, applications of force byMr. MacIsaac to three different individuals in the context of he being in that residence without permission. The Court recognizes apotential impact on Mr. MacIsaac in arriving at that conclusion, but as many Courts have pointed out before, this is a balancing process. Ihave to consider the best interests of the public and whether a discharge would be contrary to those public interests.
I have to properlyemploy the purposes and principles of sentencing in determining what a fit and proper sentence is that appropriately carries the degree ofgeneral deterrence necessary. 11. The sentencing judge indicated that he was satisfied that not much was required for the purpose of specific deterrence, as itappeared that Mr. MacIsaac had remorse for his actions and appreciated the impact of his conduct on the individuals adversely affected.
He went on to say that there must be "an appropriate degree of deterrence generally to discourage this kind of behaviour." The offenceswere "ultimately unprovoked assaults on individuals who were either doing no more than trying to get Mr. MacIsaac to leave in the caseof Mr. Halley, and ultimately in the case of Mr. McNerney and Ms. Savoie trying to assist Mr. Halley in the circumstances he foundhimself in, namely being assaulted by Mr. MacIsaac" (transcript, pp. 75-76) (sic). 12. The sentencing judge did not consider that a fine would carry the appropriate deterrent message, in view of the aggravatingfactors.
He concluded that the purposes and principles of sentencing required a custodial sentence. He was satisfied that it could beserved in the community under a conditional sentence order, to be followed by a period of probation (transcript, p. 76). i. The Law
13. The Criminal Code provides that a defendant may appeal against sentence: s. 813(a)(ii). The Court of Appeal (in this casethe
Summary Conviction Appeal Court) is required to vary the sentence or dismiss the appeal: s. 687(1). As noted by the Crown, thereis considerable authority for the principle that appellate courts should show deference when reviewing decisions of trial judges inappeals against sentence. In R. v. Metzler, 2008 NSCA 26, Bateman J.A. said, for the court: a. [24] Sentences are afforded a deferential standard of review on appeal. This has been articulated in a number of ways. In R. v. C.A.M., (S.C.C.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; S.C.J.
No. 28 (Q.L.), Lamer, C.J.C., for a unanimous Court, said: b. [90] Put simply, absent an error in principle, failure to consider a relevant factor, or an overemphasis of the appropriatefactors, a court of appeal should only intervene to vary a sentence imposed at trial if the sentence is demonstrably unfit. Parliamentexplicitly vested sentencing judges with a discretion to determine the appropriate degree and kind of punishment under the CriminalCode ... c. [91] . . .
The determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a delicate art which attempts to balance carefully thesocietal goals of sentencing against the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the circumstances of the offence, while at all timestaking into account the needs and current conditions of and in the community. The discretion of a sentencing judge should thus not beinterfered with lightly. 14. More recently, in R. v. Adams, 2010 NSCA 42, Bateman J.A. said, for the court: a. [15] In fixing sentence a judge is exercising a statutorily authorized discretion under s.718.3(1) of the Criminal Code.
Aswith other discretionary decisions, the standard of review on appeal is a deferential one. This standard has been articulated in a number ofways. As expressed by Macdonald, J.A. of this Court in R. v.
Cormier (1975), (NS CA), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 687 at p. 694: b. 20 Thus it will be seen that this Court is required to consider the "fitness" of the sentence imposed, but this does notmean that a sentence is to be deemed improper merely because the members of this Court feel that they themselves would have imposeda different one; apart from misdirection or non-direction on the proper principles a sentence should be varied only if the Court is satisfiedthat it is clearly excessive or inadequate in relation to the offence proven or to the record of the accused. 15. To a similar effect, in R. v.
L.M., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, 2008 SCC 31, LeBel J. said, for the majority: a. [14] In its past decisions, this Court has established that appellate courts must show great deference in reviewingdecisions of trial judges where appeals against sentence are concerned. An appellate court may not vary a sentence simply because itwould have ordered a different one. The court must be "convinced it is not fit", that is, "that . . . the sentence [is] clearly unreasonable"(R. v. Shropshire, (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 46, quoted in R. v. McDonnell, (SCC), [1997] 1S.C.R. 948, at para. 15).
This Court also made the following comment in R. v. M. (C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500,at para. 90: b. . . . absent an error in principle, failure to consider a relevant factor, or an overemphasis of the appropriate factors, a court ofappeal should only intervene to vary a sentence imposed at trial if the sentence is demonstrably unfit. c. .... d. [15] Owing to the profoundly contextual nature of the sentencing process, in which the trier of fact has broad discretion,the standard of review to be applied by an appellate court is one based on deference.
The sentencing judge has "served on the front linesof our criminal justice system" and possesses unique qualifications in terms of experience and the ability to assess the submissions of theCrown and the offender (M. (C.A.), at para. 91)... 16. With respect to the principles applicable to sentencing of first-time offenders, the appellant cites the comment in Ruby onSentencing, 6th ed. at 5.140, that "the general rule for most offences is that a sentence should not be imposed on a youthful offender forthe purpose of general deterrence, but should rather be directed at rehabilitation.
The transition from statutorily defined young person toadult should not be marked by an immediate abandonment of rehabilitation as the primary goal in cases where the prospect of successfulrehabilitation is real." 17. The appellant also notes the following comments by Bateman J.A., for the Court of Appeal, in R. v. Butler, 2008 NSCA 102: a. [32] Mitigating the length of sentence is the fact that this would be a first incarceration for Mr. Butler. In R. v. Riley,1996 NSCA 112 , [1996] N.S.J. No 183 (Q.L.)(C.A.) at para 26, the Court approved the following statement from Ruby onSentencing, 4th ed at page 204): b.
The proper sentencing of first offenders requires that the sentencing judge exhaust all other possibilities before concludingthat imprisonment is required. . . thus, in examining the possibility of a custodial term, the court should ask whether it is “the onlyappropriate sentence to be imposed”. One may be treated as if one were a first offender, in appropriate circumstances, if a custodialsentence has never been imposed, or even if one has served only a very minor term of imprisonment.
The notion that a first offendershould be treated leniently in the hope that lesser punishment would be effective has been characterized as ‘doubly so’ in the case ofyouthful first offenders. There is a presumption of fact that one who has not offended previously is capable of reform and not to be dealtwith accordingly. (Emphasis by Bateman J.A.) c. [33] Sentences for youthful offenders should, where appropriate to the circumstances, lean toward rehabilitation ratherthan general deterrence...
18. The sentencing judge was cognizant of the discussion of discharges in R. v. Fallofield (1973), (BC CA),13 C.C.C. (2d) 450, [1973] B.C.J. No. 559, 1973 CarswellBC 184, where the British Columbia Court of Appeal provided the followingsummary of principles: a. 21 From this review of the authorities and my own view of the meaning of s. 662.1, I draw the following conclusions,subject, of course, to what I have said above as to the exercise of discretion. b.
(1) The
section may be used in respect of any offence other than an offence for which a minimum punishment isprescribed by law or the offence is punishable by imprisonment for 14 years or for life or by death. c.
(2) The
section contemplates the commission of an offence. There is nothing in the language that limits it to a technicalor trivial violation. d.
(3) Of the two conditions precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction, the first is that the Court must consider that it isin the best interests of the accused that he should be discharged either absolutely or upon condition. If it is not in the best interests of theaccused, that, of course, is the end of the matter. If it is decided that it is in the best interests of the accused, then that brings the nextconsideration into operation. e.
(4) The second condition precedent is that the Court must consider that a grant of discharge is not contrary to the publicinterest. f.
(5) Generally, the first condition would presuppose that the accused is a person of good character, without previousconviction, that it is not necessary to enter a conviction against him in order to deter him from future offences or [*455] to rehabilitatehim, and that the entry of a conviction against him may have significant adverse repercussions. g.
(6) In the context of the second condition the public interest in the deterrence of others, while it must be given dueweight, does not preclude the judicious use of the discharge provisions. h.
(7) The powers given by s. 662.1 should not be exercised as an alternative to probation or suspended sentence. i.
(8) Section 662.1 should not be applied routinely to any particular offence. This may result in an apparent lack ofuniformity in the application of the discharge provisions. This lack will be more apparent than real and will stem from the differences inthe circumstances of cases. 19. As discussed earlier, this appeal centres on five letters of reference on behalf of Mr. MacIsaac, which both counsel apparentlybelieved had been forwarded to the sentencing judge. As it turned out, they had been erroneously sent to the wrong fax number. Bothcounsel referred to the letters in their submissions.
The letters were provided by friends and relatives of Mr. MacIsaac and his family andwere positive as to the background and character of Mr. MacIsaac. Reference was made to the fact that these events were out ofcharacter. 20. In her oral submission, Crown counsel noted that she anticipated that the defence would present reference letters, and statedthat if it were not for the reference letters and the positive presentence report, the Crown had intended to seek actual custody rather thanrecommending a conditional sentence, as it had. 21.
Although he was not privy to these letters of reference, the sentencing judge had before him information as to the backgroundand character of Mr. MacIsaac. The letters reinforce the positive nature of the presentence report. The sentencing judge acknowledgedthat Mr. MacIsaac was a first-time offender and that the presentence report was positive. He considered the evidence of Mr. MacIsaac'suncle and his mother, and had the benefit of Mr. MacIsaac's testimony as well. The letters of reference would likely have reinforced thepositive aspects of Mr. MacIsaac's background. 22.
However, I am not satisfied they would have materially affected the reasoning and conclusions reached by the sentencingjudge. He clearly considered the evidence to the effect that the offences were out of character for Mr. MacIsaac, having regard to hisupbringing and background. He held that it would have been in the accused's best interests to receive a discharge, a conclusion that theletters would likely reinforce.
However, I am not satisfied that having these letters before him would have affected the sentencingjudge's reasoning on whether it would be "not contrary to the public interest" to order a discharge. 23. The record does not provide a basis to find a denial of natural justice by the sentencing judge. The sentencing judge did notreceive the missing letters due to an error by the appellant's then-counsel. The record does not suggest that anyone involved adverted tothe error. There was no action or omission by the trial judge that could reasonably have given rise to a denial of natural justice.
Withrespect to the content of the requirements of natural justice, I refer to the following comment from R. v. Rondeau, (BCSC), [1974] 5 W.W.R. 664,1973 CarswellBC 258 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 10: a. The cases dealing with the principles of what is called natural justice propound essentially only two fundamental principles,although stated in various ways. The first of these is that no tribunal shall sit in judgment in its own cause and it shall act in good faith.The second of these is encompassed in the Latin phrase audi alteram partem.
Essentially all other principles of what is called naturaljustice are variations upon or flow from these two.... 24. Similarly, in R. v. Holman (1982), (BC PC), 16 M.V.R. 225, 1982 CarswellBC 461 (B.C. Prov. Ct.),
affirmed (1982), (BC SC), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 748, the court said, at para. 23, "[t]he rules of natural justice, whichdeveloped in the context of a system of parliamentary sovereignty, are rules of procedure only: the right to a hearing, the right tounbiased adjudication, and (a recent development) the right to a ‘fair' procedure." Essentially, natural justice requires a fair hearing,which I am satisfied the appellant received. 25. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the absence of the reference letters led to any error or to a denial of natural justiceby the sentencing judge.
This being the sole ground identified in the Notice of Appeal, the appeal is dismissed. 26. Appeal dismissed. i. ii. MacAdam, J.
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