R. v. Chan, 2011 NSSC 350
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: R. v. Chan, 2011 NSSC 350 Date: 20110928 Docket: CR. No. 334922 Registry: Halifax Between: Her Majesty the Queen -and- Joseph Endelle Chan LIBRARY HEADING Judge: The Honourable Justice Robert W. Wright Heard: September 7, 8, and 9, 2011 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Decision: September 28, 2011 Subject: Voir Dire on admissibility of statement to police - ss. 10(
a) and 10(
b) and 24(2) of the Charter.
Summary: The accused was arrested for possession of a restricted handgun, inter alia, and promptly given his Charter rights and police caution. He immediately implemented his right to counsel upon arrival at the police station. The accused was then also under investigation for attempted murder and related gun offences in respect of a shooting incident which had occurred six days earlier. The police seized the opportunity of his arrest and detention on the current charges to obtain and execute a search warrant of his residence that day, followed by a videotaped interview concerning both events.
The police did not inform the accused of the second ground for his detention (their investigation of the shooting incident) until the commencement of their interview some ten hours after his arrest on the current charges (he was not arrested or charged for the shooting incident until a month later). At the same time, the police repeated to the accused his Charter rights and caution whereupon he waived his right to further consult his lawyer. The statement which was then taken from the accused was largely exculpatory. Issues:
(1) Did the police commit a Charter breach by failing to promptly inform the accused of the second ground for his detention and his added jeopardy, and his right to further instruct counsel without delay, and
(2) If a Charter breach was committed, should the statement be excluded under a s. 24(2) analysis?
Result: The police did commit a breach of the accused ’ s s.10 Charter rights by failing to promptly inform him of the added grounds for his detention and his right to further instruct counsel without delay. Notwithstanding the presumptive general exclusion of statements obtained following a Charter breach, the statement was ruled to be admissible after a balancing of the three lines of inquiry required to be made under a s.24(2) analysis. The court concluded that the admission of the statement would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT'S DECISION. QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THE COVER SHEET. SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: R. v. Chan, 2011 NSSC 350 Date: 20110928 Docket: CR. No. 334922 Registry: Halifax Between: Her Majesty the Queen -and- Joseph Endelle Chan Decision Judge: The Honourable Justice Robert W. Wright Heard: September 7, 8 and 9, 2011 at Halifax, Nova Scotia Written
Decision: September 28, 2011 Counsel: Crown Counsel - Chris Morris Defence Counsel - Don Murray Wright, J. [ 1 ] On April 8, 2010 during business hours, a shooting took place at a barbershop/clothing store establishment located in Sackville, Nova Scotia. The incident was captured by a surveillance video camera whose footage was seized by the police. According to the police evidence, the shooter attempted to shield his identity by the successive use of a newspaper and bandana to cover his face.
The evidence further indicates that three rounds were fired from a handgun at an unidentified person who fortunately was uninjured. Both fled the scene shortly afterwards. [ 2 ] The lead investigator assigned to the case was Det. Cst. Stephen McCormack who attended the scene with others. After later viewing the surveillance video, Det. Cst. McCormack formed the personal belief that the perpetrator of the shooting was the accused, Joseph Chan, based upon their prior contact in the criminal justice system. From that day on, the accused was Det. Cst.
McCormack ’ s primary suspect. [ 3 ] It was only six days later (on April 14 th ) that two other police officers had an encounter with the accused in Uniacke Square in Halifax at about 2:30 p.m. Csts. Withrow and McIsaac were on bicycle patrol on a walking lane in that area when they observed the accused, walking with another individual, holding an open can of beer.
When the accused saw the police officers, he engaged them by asking a couple of impertinent questions which led to a discussion about the open beer can in a public place. [ 4 ] As soon as that happened, the accused bolted, with the police in hot pursuit. After the accused rounded a corner, he was out of sight by the officers for a few seconds but they continued their pursuit when they saw him pop up behind a row of parked cars. In a matter of moments, they apprehended and arrested him for a Liquor Control Act violation.
The accused resisted arrest but was eventually taken down and handcuffed. [ 5 ] In conducting a search incidental to that arrest, the police found a quantity of hash and about $925 in cash in the pockets of the accused. This raised the spectre of further charges being laid and the officers radioed for a transport vehicle which quickly arrived. The accused was placed in the patrol car at about 2:37 p.m. [ 6 ] Because of his behaviour, Cst. McIsaac felt that the accused had hidden something during his flight in the vicinity of the row of the parked cars he had been seen behind.
His suspicion was based on the fact that the accused had fled over the discussion of an open can of beer, was observed keeping his right hand in the pocket of his hoodie, his body movements as he ran, and the fact that after he popped up from behind the row of cars, he ran again to seemingly distance himself from that area.
[ 7 ] With the accused secured in the back of the patrol car, Cst. McIsaac therefore decided to conduct a search underneath the parked cars in whose proximity the accused had been seen. Within one minute, he found a Glock 9 mm. handgun hidden near the top of a recently disturbed pile of leaves which was located under the second car he searched under. This discovery was recorded in the police officer ’ s notebook as having occurred at about 2:39 p.m. [ 8 ] When Cst.
McIsaac returned toward the nearby patrol car and advised that he had found a gun, the accused immediately denied that it was his, or that his fingerprints would be found on it, even though he had not yet been told that he would be charged with any firearm offence. [ 9 ] Cst. Withrow then attempted to read the accused ’ s Charter rights and caution to him in the back seat of the car but at that point, the accused was yelling in an agitated state and not listening to the officer. Cst. Withrow therefore waited for the accused to calm down before reading his Charter rights and caution to him a second time.
The accused was also then informed of his arrest for additional charges relating to the possession of hashish, unlawful possession of a firearm, and resisting arrest. [ 10 ] After being advised of his right to counsel, the accused said he wanted to speak to his lawyer and requested to specifically consult with Mr. Eugene Tan. He was then immediately transported to the police station where Csts. Withrow and McIsaac arrived within five minutes or so on their bicycles and took over the custody of the accused. [ 11 ] At approximately 3:04 p.m., Cst.
Withrow informed the accused of an additional charge that would be laid for breach of a prohibition order, along with the offences of resisting arrest, possession of hashish and unlawful possession of a restricted firearm. Cst. Withrow also then repeated the accused ’ s Charter rights and caution to him which the accused said that he understood. He then requested a call to his lawyer. [ 12 ] After waiting about ten minutes for a telephone to become available, Cst. Withrow began his attempts to contact Mr. Tan at about 3:14 p.m. by calling a number given to him by the accused.
It turned out to be a wrong number as was the second telephone number provided by the accused. Cst. Withrow then decided to call the law firm of which Mr. Tan is a member and succeeded in getting through. He advised Mr. Tan of the charges that were going to be laid against the accused and then gave the phone receiver to the accused to use in a private room. [ 13 ] Approximately ten minutes later, at 3:38 p.m., the accused emerged from the private room and said that he was done talking with his lawyer. Cst. Withrow then turned the accused over to Det. Cst.
McCormack, who he knew was the lead investigator in respect of the April 8 th shooting incident, before turning his own attention to completing the necessary file work pertaining to the current charges. The accused was then taken to a monitored interview room at approximately 3:50 p.m. by Det. Cst. John A. Mansveld, who Det. Cst. McCormack had asked to assist. [ 14 ] At about 3:51 p.m., Det. Cst. McCormack joined Det. Cst. Mansveld in the interview room where they conducted a further body search and gave the accused water and a power bar. At that point, the accused said that he had been asking for the phone. Det.
Cst. Mansveld asked if he had yet talked to a lawyer which the accused confirmed that he had. When asked if he was happy with the advice he got, the accused replied that he was supposed to call him back or that the police were supposed to make phone calls for him. When the accused asked again if he was to get a phone call, Det. Cst. Mansveld said not yet but that he would later on. [ 15 ] Det. Cst.
Mansveld explained in his evidence that he understood that the accused was requesting a phone to make personal calls to reach outsiders which he was dismissive of because he did not want the word getting out that the police were planning to obtain and execute a search warrant of the accused ’ s residence. He said that he knew that the accused had already contacted his lawyer (just minutes before that) and took it that he was content with the advice he had received.
The accused was then left alone in the interview room as of 3:57 p.m. where he laid on the floor to sleep. [ 16 ] The next interaction of any consequence between the accused and police occurred at about 17 minutes after midnight when Csts.
Withrow and McIsaac entered the interview room. Their purpose in doing so was to effect service of a
summary offence ticket for the liquor offence, as well as a Notice of Documents concerning an additional charge being laid in respect of a firearm prohibition order in effect. Because of that added jeopardy from the additional gun charges being laid, the accused was then informed of the charges he was facing as a result of the events of April 14 th . He was accordingly re-read his Charter rights and caution. [ 17 ] When asked if he wanted to speak to his lawyer again, the accused first replied “ of course ” . Cst.
Withrow then said he would make the call for the accused and that it was his choice (or words to that effect, considering the poor sound quality of the recording). The accused thereupon declined to exercise his right to counsel, declaring that he didn ’ t want to bother his lawyer at that time of night when it was not going to really change anything and that he would talk to him tomorrow. Cst. Withrow replied that if the accused changed his mind, the police would make the call to his lawyer for him. By this time, the accused had again laid down on the floor.
The officers left the room at about 12:24 a.m. [ 18 ] Csts. Withrow and McIsaac made no mention to the accused at the time that he was under investigation for the April 8 th shooting incident and would be interviewed about that as well because their responsibility was only for the charges arising from April 14 th . They considered that it was not their place to tell the accused about the other investigation when it was under the direction of Det. Cst. McCormack. [ 19 ] Det. Cst.
McCormack ’ s personal belief that the perpetrator of the April 8 th shooting was the accused was strengthened when the gun found by Cst. MacIsaac near the scene of his arrest appeared to match the gun seen on the surveillance video. He therefore took responsibility for the accused at approximately 3:50 p.m. after the accused had exercised his right to counsel.
The accused was then placed in a monitored interview room and left there while the police investigation continued. [ 20 ] The immediate plan was to first obtain and execute a search warrant for the residence at North Street where the accused was believed to live, and for which Det. Cst. McCormack felt that he now had sufficient grounds to get. Once that search was completed, Det. Cst.
McCormack then intended to interview the accused in respect of the events that occurred on both April 8 th and April 14 th because he felt they were related. [ 21 ] The search of the residence was finished close to midnight, the most notable find being a 9 mm. round that matched the gun found by Cst. McIsaac. Det. Csts.
McCormack and Mansveld then returned to the police station to prepare for their interview of the accused which began at 1:24 a.m. (April 15 th ). [ 22 ] Up until that time, the accused had not been informed by anyone that he was a suspect in the April 8 th shooting incident and that he was under investigation for it. It was only at the outset of the interview of the accused by Det. Csts. McCormack and Mansveld that he was made aware of this. Det. Cst.
Mansveld then explained to the accused the charges against him in relation to the events of April 14 th but also then informed the accused that he was being investigated for the April 8 th shooting incident. The accused was then told that he was being given a police caution before their interview about that investigation but that he was then neither under arrest nor being charged with respect to the shooting incident.
He was further made aware of the potential charges that would emanate from that shooting, including attempted murder. [ 23 ] Because of the added jeopardy facing the accused by reason of being questioned about the April 8 th shooting incident for which he was under investigation, Det. Csts. McCormack and Mansveld again read to the accused his Charter rights and caution. The accused replied that he understood. When then asked if he wished to call a lawyer, the accused replied that he did not because it was probably a little late and the lawyer and his family should be allowed to rest. Det. Cst.
Mansveld replied that he had the 1-800 number if the accused were to change his mind. However, over the span of the next two hours taken up by the interview, the accused did not again raise his right to counsel. [ 24 ] Det. Cst. McCormack said that he was following standard protocol in leaving the accused in the monitored interview room at the police station while his investigation continued with the execution of a search warrant (he otherwise would have been placed in cells pending his court appearance the next morning). Cst.
McCormack felt that nothing further was going to happen with respect to the accused until he was to be interviewed after the execution of the search warrant.
[ 25 ] When asked on cross-examination what he considered the accused ’ s status to be while held in the interview room, Det. Cst. McCormack said that the accused was being remanded in respect of the April 14 th offences and was being held in custody for his court appearance the next morning on those charges.
He said he seized that opportunity to interview the accused not only in respect of the charges laid for the April 14 th events, but also in furtherance of his investigation of the April 8 th shooting in respect of which the accused was informed, Chartered and cautioned as above recited. [ 26 ] The interview lasted until 3:36 a.m. The police did not get the admissions hoped for, with the accused maintaining an exculpatory position throughout.
The limited evidentiary value of the interview lies in the circumstantial evidence of the accused ’ s admission of prior visits to the barbershop for a haircut (owned by people he knew), his awareness of the presence of a surveillance camera, and inconsistencies as to when he was last in Sackville. [ 27 ] Ultimately, it was not until May 13 th that charges were laid against the accused with respect to the April 8 th shooting, including attempted murder, after the police obtained further evidence including ballistics expert evidence and an eyewitness identification. [ 28 ] As to the conduct of Det. Csts.
McCormack and Mansveld in their interaction with the accused during the course of the interview, I have no hesitation in concluding that there were no threats or promises given, no police trickery and no oppressive conduct. They did not deny him access to counsel. Rather, at the outset of the interview, the accused was again offered the opportunity to make a call to his lawyer of choice after being informed of the added jeopardy arising from being under investigation for the April 8 th shooting incident.
After he declined that opportunity, he was advised he could also call duty counsel at any time if he changed his mind. Furthermore, I am satisfied that the accused demonstrated an operating mind throughout the interview. He showed no signs of vulnerability from the late hour after a long wait, most of which he slept through. [ 29 ] With these findings in respect of the four requisite factors to be considered as enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Oickle 2000 SCC 38 , I conclude that the Crown has proven the voluntariness of the statements given by the accused during the interview beyond a reasonable doubt. That finding subsumes any s. 7 analysis under the Charter of the accused ’ s right to silence ( see R. v. Singh , 2007 SCC 48 ). [ 30 ] What is left to consider, however, is whether the police violated the accused ’ s right to be informed promptly of all the reasons for his detention and the right to instruct counsel without delay under s. 10(
a) and (
b) of the Charter and if so, whether the statement should be excluded under a s.24(2) analysis. This has become the main focus of the defence position. Sections 10(
a) and (
b) read as follows: Everyone has the right on arrest or detention (
a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefore; (
b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right; [ 31 ] It should be noted that an applicant has the burden of satisfying three pre-requisites for exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter. First, an applicant seeking such exclusion of evidence bears the burden of persuading the court, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her rights have been infringed. Secondly, an applicant has to establish that an adequate relationship or connection exists between the Charter violation and the evidence sought to be excluded to bring it within the domain of s. 24(2).
Thirdly, the applicant has the burden of persuading the court that admission of the evidence could bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [ 32 ] It should be added that in some situations where the applicant proves certain facts pertaining to a particular issue, a presumption will arise which is left to the Crown to rebut. Whenever such a burden shifts to the Crown, it is to be discharged also on a balance of probabilities. [ 33 ] In addition to the foregoing general principles, the court must also bear in mind the purpose of s. 10(
b) of the Charter. This has recently been the subject of extensive judicial writing by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sinclair , 2010 SCC 35 and its companion cases of R. v. McCrimmon , 2010 SCC 36 and R. v. Willier , 2010 SCC 37 . I will limit my quotations from this jurisprudence to the
following passages from Sinclair between paras. 24-32: 24. The purpose of s. 10(
b) is to provide a detainee with an opportunity to obtain legal advice relevant to his legal situation. Inthe context of a custodial interrogation, chief among the rights that must be understood by the detainee is the right under s. 7 of theCharter to choose whether to cooperate with the police or not. . . . . 26. The purpose of the right to counsel is "to allow the detainee not only to be informed of his rights and obligations under the law, butequally if not more important, to obtain advice as to how to exercise those rights": R. v. Manninen, (SCC), [1987] 1S.C.R. 1233, at pp. 1242-43.
The emphasis, therefore, is on assuring that the detainee's decision to cooperate with the investigation ordecline to do so is free and informed.
Section 10(
b) does not guarantee that the detainee's decision is wise; nor does it guard againstsubjective factors that may influence the decision. Its purpose is simply to give detainees the opportunity to access legal advice relevantto that choice.
Section 10(
b) fulfills its purpose in two ways. First, it requires that the detainee be advised of his right to counsel. This is called theinformational component. Second, it requires that the detainee be given an opportunity to exercise his right to consult counsel. This iscalled the implementational component. Failure to comply with either of these components frustrates the purpose of s. 10(
b) and resultsin a breach of the detainee's rights: Manninen. Implied in the second component is a duty on the police to hold off questioning until thedetainee has had a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel. The police obligations flowing from s. 10(
b) are not absolute. Unless adetainee invokes the right and is reasonably diligent in exercising it, the correlative duties on the police to provide a reasonableopportunity and to refrain from eliciting evidence will either not arise in the first place or will be suspended: R. v. Tremblay, (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435, at p. 439, and R. v. Black, (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138, at pp. 154-55. 28. Once informed of his right to consult counsel, the detainee may waive the right, deciding not to avail himself of the opportunity toconsult that has been provided. The right to choose whether to cooperate with the police, the basic purpose of s. 10(
b) has been respectedin the event of a valid waiver, and there is consequently no breach. . . . . 32. We conclude that in the context of a custodial interrogation, the purpose of s. 10(
b) is to support the detainee's right to choosewhether to cooperate with the police investigation or not, by giving him access to legal advice on the situation he is facing. This isachieved by requiring that he be informed of the right to consult counsel and, if he so requests, be given an opportunity to consultcounsel. [34] The court further stated (at para. 29) that “The fact that the police complied with s. 10(
b) does not mean that a statement isvoluntary under the confessions rule. Conversely, the fact that a statement is made voluntarily does not rule out breach of s.10(b)”. [35] It is, of course, only where a statement is found to be voluntary that the s. 24(2) remedy of exclusion arises. Most commonly, thiswill occur because of added protections under s.10(
b) of the Charter (see R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at para. 90). [36] As quoted earlier from Sinclair, the purpose of s.10(
b) is to provide a detainee with an opportunity to obtain legal advice relevantto his legal situation. Hence, the added protections under s. 10 whereby a person on arrest or detention has the right to be informedpromptly of the reasons therefore and the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. “Without delay” means immediately. Asarticulated in R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, these duties are triggered immediately upon an individual’s arrest or detention because “theconcerns about self-incrimination and the interference with liberty that s.10(
b) seeks to address are present as soon as a detention iseffected” (see para. 41). [37] What makes the present case a bit out of the ordinary is the fact that upon the arrest of the accused on April 14th (when he wasproperly given his Charter rights and caution followed by the implementation of his right to counsel, all in relation to the current charges), he was also then under investigation for the April 8th shooting incident. [38] Once the responsibility for his custody was turned over by the arresting officers to Det. Cst. McCormack, the reasons for his detention thus became twofold. The accused was thereby put in added jeopardy as the primary suspect in the April 8th shooting, which
Cst. McCormack felt to be a related incident. Knowing that the accused was going to be held in custody overnight pending his court appearance on the current charges the next morning, he therefore decided to seize the opportunity to further his investigation and interview the accused on both events. [ 39 ] As acknowledged by defence counsel in his closing submissions, the fortuitous arrest and detention of the accused on April 14 th was a situation which the police could legitimately capitalize on.
However, it is argued, the police then had a duty to inform the accused promptly of this second ground for his detention and his right to access counsel without delay in respect of the added jeopardy he was facing.
It is argued that the police failed in that duty and that the appropriate remedy for its breach is the exclusion of the statement under a s.24(2) analysis. [ 40 ] Notwithstanding the bona fide intentions of the police officers, the inescapable conclusion I have drawn is that a breach of the accused ’ s s.10 rights did occur because of the failure of the police to inform the accused promptly of the added reason for his detention and to afford him a further opportunity to consult counsel without delay about that added jeopardy.
Whether he would have then chosen to do so (he waived the opportunity later on), or whether the statement would have been given notwithstanding the Charter breach, is pure speculation which the court will not engage in. The fact remains that the police had a duty to promptly inform the accused of the added ground for his detention when it arose (especially with the potential charges being much more serious) and his right to further consult counsel without delay about his added jeopardy.
That duty was not adequately discharged on the facts of this case. [ 41 ] Having found that a breach of the accused ’ s s. 10 Charter rights was committed, the court is now required to engage in a s.24(2) analysis to determine whether the statement later obtained from him should be excluded from evidence. [ 42 ] In the seminal case of R. v. Grant , supra , the Supreme Court of Canada set out a new line of inquiry to be undertaken in a s.24(2) analysis. The court emphasized that that
section is meant to consider “ whether the overall repute of the justice system viewed in the long term, will be adversely affected by admission of the evidence ” . The new line of inquiry was articulated as follows (at para. 71): A review of the authorities suggests that whether the admission of evidence obtained in breach of the Charter would bring the administration of justice into disrepute engages three avenues of inquiry, each rooted in the public interests engaged by s. 24(2), viewed in a long-term, forward-looking and societal perspective.
When faced with an application for exclusion under s. 24(2), a court must assess and balance the effect of admitting the evidence on society's confidence in the justice system having regard to: (1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may send the message the justice system condones serious state misconduct), (2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused (admission may send the message that individual rights count for little), and (3) society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.
The court's role on a s. 24(2) application is to balance the assessments under each of these lines of inquiry to determine whether, considering all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
These concerns, while not precisely tracking the categories of considerations set out in Collins, capture the factors relevant to the s. 24(2) determination as enunciated in Collins and subsequent jurisprudence. [ 43 ] When the impugned evidence is a statement that is obtained from the accused following a Charter breach, such statements will be subject to a presumptive general, although not automatic, rule of exclusion. It was so held in Grant (at paras. 91-92 ) in which the court went on to say (at para. 98): In
summary, the heightened concern with proper police conduct in obtaining statements from suspects and the centrality of the protected interests affected will in most cases favour exclusion of statements taken in breach of the Charter, while the third factor, obtaining a decision on the merits, may be attenuated by lack of reliability.
This, together with the common law's historic tendency to treat statements of the accused differently from other evidence, explains why such statements tend to be excluded under s. 24(2). [ 44 ] Nonetheless, it is clear that the three pronged inquiry above mentioned must still be made to enable the court to properly exercise its discretion. [ 45 ] Under the first avenue of inquiry (the seriousness of the Charter infringing state conduct), the court must examine whether the evidence was obtained through an inadvertent or minor violation or through a wilful or reckless disregard of Charter rights.
The further along that spectrum that a given case is placed, the more likely it is to bring the administration of justice into disrepute because of the negative effect on public confidence in the rule of law.
[ 46 ] In considering this first avenue of inquiry, the court may also consider surrounding circumstances such as the urgency of the situation and whether the police acted in good faith. Negligence or wilful blindness cannot be equated with good faith and the police are rightly expected to know what the law is, once the rules are established.
It follows that only minor or inadvertent slips will favour admission of an impugned statement. [ 47 ] Under the second avenue of inquiry (the impact on the Charter protected interests of the accused), the court must evaluate the extent to which the breach actually undermined the interests protected by the infringed right. The more serious the impact on those interests, the greater the risk that the admission of such evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [ 48 ] Intrusions into rights stemming from the principle against self-incrimination tend to be treated more seriously.
It is only violations that marginally affect the right of the accused to make an informed choice whether to speak with the police authorities that will favour admission. [ 49 ] Under the third avenue of inquiry, the court must consider whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion. It is clear from Grant that reliability of the evidence is an important factor in this inquiry.
The more reliable the evidence is, the more favourably it should be considered for admission (and vice versa). [ 50 ] Once the court has engaged in this three
part inquiry, it must then determine whether, on balance, the admission of the evidence obtained following a Charter breach would bring the administration of justice into disrepute ( see Grant at para. 85 ). [ 51 ] In following this analytical approach prescribed by Grant in the present case, I find at the outset that the impugned conduct of the police was far from egregious. The accused was lawfully being held in custody on April 14 th after having been properly given his Charter rights and police caution and implementing his right to counsel.
Parenthetically, the accused was not entitled to a second consultation with his lawyer in respect of the current charges being laid that day in the absence of any changed circumstances pertaining thereto. The primary concern here was the duty upon Det. Cst.
Mansveld and/or McCormack to have promptly informed the accused of the second ground for his detention. [ 52 ] The overall situation was that the accused was being held overnight on the charges of the day pending his court appearance the next morning and the police officers seized that opportunity, legitimately, to pursue their investigation of the April 8 th shooting incident. They simply wanted to obtain and execute a search warrant of the accused ’ s residence before questioning him in respect of both incidents.
Before they began that interview, they took corrective action in informing the accused of his added jeopardy and again offered to implement his right to counsel as part of repeating his Charter rights and caution. No evidence was obtained from the accused in the meantime in the wake of the earlier breach of his s. 10 Charter rights. [ 53 ] In my view, none of the officers involved with the accused on April 14 th - 15 th demonstrated any bad faith conduct or any wilful disregard for the accused ’ s Charter rights.
All things considered, I conclude that the breach of his s. 10 rights was of a minor and inadvertent nature. [ 54 ] I further conclude on the facts of this case, and in light of the purpose of s. 10(b), that the Charter breach here only marginally affected the right of the accused to make an informed choice of whether to speak with the police authorities. Again, the police took corrective action before the commencement of their interview of the accused and no evidence was obtained from him before that. The waiver of implementing his right to counsel at that time was the accused ’ s choice to make.
Nor did he at any time during the course of the interview make a further request to call a lawyer even though that opportunity was explained to him at its commencement. [ 55 ] Finally, this case obviously involves serious charges where there is significant societal interest in its adjudication on the merits. In my view, the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process favours admission of the statement, there being no indication that the Charter breach committed by the police undermined its reliability.
[ 56 ] As the Supreme Court of Canada said in Grant , the balancing mandated by s. 24(2) is qualitative in nature and not quantitative. The evidence on each line of inquiry must be weighed in the balance to determine whether, having regard to all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [ 57 ] Having engaged in that analysis, I conclude that the presumptive exclusion of the statement obtained following a breach of the Charter has been rebutted and that its admission in evidence at trial would not put the administration of justice into disrepute.
The accused ’ s videotaped statement to the police will accordingly form part of the trial evidence as sought by the Crown. J.
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