R. v. G.A.W., 2011 NSSC 383
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: R. v. G.A.W. , 2011 NSSC 383 Date:
(20111020) Docket: CRA Yar. No. 323562 Registry: Halifax Between: G. A. W. Appellant v. Her Majesty the Queen Respondent Editorial Notice Identifying information has been removed from this electronic version of the judgment. Restriction on publication:
Section 486 of the Criminal Code of Canada Judge: The Honourable Justice Arthur LeBlanc Heard: April 7, 2011, in Yarmouth, Nova Scotia Final Written Submissions: October 17, 2011 Written Decision: October 20, 2011 Counsel: Philip J. Star, Q.C. for the Appellant James Fyfe, Esq., for the Respondent By the Court : Introduction [ 1 ] The appellant appeals his convictions for sexual assault (contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code ) and touching a person under 14 years of age for a sexual purpose (contrary to s. 151 ).
The decision appealed from [ 2 ] The complainant alleged that the appellant sexually assaulted and touched her while she was babysitting at his house. The appellant picked up the complainant, then aged 12, at school at 1 p.m. on 11 February 2009, so that she could babysit his child, A. On arriving at his home with the complainant, the appellant went to work in the woods, after offering her $40.00 to assist him. She declined, thinking he was joking. The complainant remained in the house until the appellant's wife, C. (also known as M.) arrived home, at about 5 p.m.
They had supper, and the accused and his wife left to go bowling around 6 p.m. The complainant went to bed around 9:30, sleeping in A's room. She did not hear the appellant and his wife return home. [ 3 ] The appellant stated that he bought three draught beer while bowling, although his wife did not notice this. She saw no signs that he had been drinking, but said it would not be unusual for him to do so. The appellant said he did not finish any of his three beer, because he was not feeling well, which the trial judge took to mean that he had an upset stomach.
When they got home, he checked on A with a flashlight. He said his wife went to bed by 12:30 a.m., while he stayed up until between 12:50 and 1 a.m. [ 4 ] At this point, the trial judge said, "the versions of the events as to what took place ... diverge and become diametrically opposed." The complainant's evidence was that the appellant came into A’s room, where she was sleeping on an air mattress, shone a flashlight at her, and touched her on three separate occasions.
She said she then left the room and locked herself in the bathroom, where she remained until about 5 a.m., when the appellant woke her and she went to sleep on the sofa in the living room. The appellant denied touching the complainant in a sexual manner, but agreed that he had gone to the bathroom around 5 a.m. and found the door locked, with the complainant inside. [ 5 ] The trial judge reviewed the "diametrically opposed" accounts of the complainant and the appellant.
In describing the account offered by the appellant, the trial judge said: The accused says ... that he went to bed at 12:50 or closer to 1:00 a.m. He started to doze off when [A] called out "Dad." This was after he was in bed, as I said, he said he started to doze off and estimated the time that he had been in bed at about fifteen minutes. He went in, saw [A] there who wanted milk. The dog went into the bedroom at or about the same time and jumped on the bed on top of [A]. The accused put the dog in the kennel.
He had a flashlight with him that he says he never shone on [the complainant] but because the air mattress was laid out the way it was, he took the flashlight into the room with him that first time that he went in to avoid stepping on anyone but he denied it was shone in [the complainant's] eyes. He gave [A] milk. He laid with [A] who wanted his "mole," which meant to [the accused] that [A] just wanted to rub his hand over a mole that apparently he has which provides [A] some comfort when he tries to sleep.
This wasn't possible because of the way that they were laying but he did lay in bed for a period of time to comfort [A]. [A] did rub him for a period of time just stroking, I think it was his arm but I could be wrong on that point, I didn't make a specific note. But he said he stroked his arm for a period of time until he stopped which meant to [the accused] that [A] was now asleep and it was safe for him to get up and go without leaving him there awake and perhaps uncomforted.
He said, at that point in time, he had absolutely no contact with [the complainant] except maybe his foot may have hit her somewhere when he was taking the dog off of the bed and putting it - getting it into the kennel. He said she didn't move. He left at that point in time, went to bed, woke up at 5:00 o'clock in the morning, [the complainant] was in the bathroom, the light was on.
She, after he - he checked to make sure she wasn't in the bedroom with [A], went back, he spoke to her, she complained of throw up in her mouth, he offered her a Rolaid and perhaps made the comment to her that or, took it that she may be suffering from the same sour stomach, as it were, that he was suffering from because of the lasagne and, at that point in time, he says his wife told her to go lay on the couch because she was not feeling well.
He then went back to bed, got up the next morning, nothing was untoward from his point of view.... [ 6 ] The trial judge went on to review the complainant's account of the alleged events, including her videotaped statement, which was admitted into evidence. He described her evidence respecting the first alleged incident as follows, making reference to her video- taped statement: In the video she says that the accused came in when she first saw him that early morning with a flashlight, with the light flickered in her eyes, she woke up, the dog was with him.
The baby was beside her and at that point in time, she says in the video then "like, he tried
touching me," pants were tight, he left, came back in, tried doing it again. The officer then asked her, "when he tried, what did he do?"Her response was, "He put his hands down her pants," the officer asked "How?" She said, "He slowly moved his hands down my pants,under my underwear and stuff and just touched me." Her question then was, "Did he put his entire hand down your pants," to which sheresponded "Yeah." She also added, He didn’t put his fingers inside of me, he just, like, rubbed my leg." The officer then said thesewords, "So he rubbed your vagina with his hands?
How long did he do that?" to which she responded, "He'd go for about five minutesand then he would come back." She was asked how long this occurred, she said, "About an hour and a half to two hours," clearlyreferring to the time frame of the whole incident. [7] Moving to the second incident described by the complainant, the trial judge said: The officer then said, "The second time, did he do the same thing?" to which she responded, "Yeah." She then described a third incidentthat occurred, she says, when - when she was having a dream that he was touching her and she woke up to find that, in fact, his hand wasdown her pants, under her underwear and that he was rubbing her.
She says that when she woke up and realized this was occurring, shemoved, spoke to the cat "B." and rubbed the cat on the head or neck but the accused slowly moved his hand away and got up and left, inher testimony before the Court, not in the video, and I've just highlighted some of the portions of the video. I have not described it all. In fact, after the alleged second incident, she got up, went to the bathroom, says that she came back after that, was shaking and nervous,was upset and had trouble getting asleep.
In her testimony, she said that the flashlight woke her up but yet she was fake sleeping while he was beside her with regard to the firstincident, if I can call it that. She says that he didn't actually lift the waistband of her pyjamas, he tried to then he went out and that he wastrying to lift the waistband with - with his fingers and that the second time was essentially the same thing. [8] As to the third incident, the trial judge described the complainant’s evidence as follows: The third time, she says in her testimony before the Court as well, the hand was down her pants, under her underwear.
He was rubbingaround. She was dreaming that this - that she was being touched, that she woke up and she conceded in her testimony on cross-examination that she has had dreams before, once or twice, when she woke up and it was hard to remember whether it was real or not.Again, she said she spoke to the cat, to which the accused responded, as she had said in her video, that [A] had essentially been callingfor him and that that's why he was in the room at that time.
She said that after she had moved, rubbed the cat, he had moved his hand slowly away, he got up and left, she went, she took her blanketand a pillow into the bathroom because she did not essentially want this to happen again and she locked herself there and was not arouseduntil he came to the bathroom door at about 5:00 in the morning. [9] Beginning his analysis of the evidence, the trial judge stated again that there were "two diametrically opposed versions of theevents before the Court...." It was essentially a case where the complainant "says this happened and he says it did not." The trial judgecontinued: But, to describe a case as a "he said, she said" situation is, to some extent, to trivialize what is before the Court and this is a criminal trialand everyone must remember that when a Court deals with a criminal trial, it is not a contest of which version the Court prefers.
It is nota question of saying I prefer the evidence of [the accused] over [the complainant] or vice versa. It is, as in all criminal trials, a case as towhether or not the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. [10] The trial judge went on to frame the issue in the context of the analysis set out in R. v.
W. (D.), (SCC), [1991]1 S.C.R. 742, which must be considered in assessing the evidence when the accused testifies in his own defence: In assessing the evidence before the Court, it's clear that the evidence must be assessed as a whole and it's clear that as I assess theevidence, I must apply the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of W.D. which really provided a roadmap totrial judges instructing juries as to how they were able to apply the principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Firstly, if I assess the evidence of the accused, it's the whole of the testimony and I believe the accused then I must find him not guilty. Well, really there's no surprise there because if I believe the accused and I accept his testimony, I would find that he did not sexually assault [the complainant] nor touch her for a sexual purpose and I would find him not guilty.
But, even if I were not to believe the accused and accept his testimony, there may be circumstances where his evidence raises a reasonable doubt and if, after considering the whole of his testimony, I'm left in a state of reasonable doubt by his evidence, I must also find him not guilty. It's only if I reject his evidence that I would then go on to consider the rest of the evidence to determine whether or not I am convinced by that [ sic ] rest of the evidence that the Crown has established the case beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 11 ] The trial judge referred to the
interpretation of W.(D.) in R. v. W. (E.M.) , 2009 NSPC 33 , reversed 2010 NSCA 73 , appeal allowed and conviction restored, 2011 SCC 31 , as a
summary of the trial judge's task in a "he said/she said" trial. Such a trial, he said, was "no different than any other criminal trial. It is always a question of whether or not the Crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt." (At the time of the trial, W.(E.M.) had not yet been reversed by the Court of Appeal, nor restored by the Supreme Court of Canada.) [ 12 ] The defence argued at trial that the appellant's denials should be accepted, and pointed to conflicts in the complainant's evidence and the fact that the officer who interviewed her asked leading questions.
The trial judge said: The defence points out leading questions that were asked by the officer in obtaining the video. There were the candid responses of [the complainant] about the fact that she was dreaming before the third incident and that she honestly concedes that sometimes, which she said was once or twice, that she had woken up from a dream to - to find it hard to tell whether it was something that had been real or not. I have watched and reviewed once again carefully all that was said by [the complainant] in the video that she gave to Constable Schmalz and a member of Family and Children’s Services.
I listened to the video in full yesterday because I wanted to make sure that I had heard everything correctly because [the complainant’s] voice was difficult sometimes to hear on the video in the courtroom and when I compare what was said in the video to her testimony, it does appear at first blush that there is a significant conflict between the versions of events that she testifies about, however, when I review the video carefully, I do agree with Mr.
Star that the officer led or asked many leading questions of the complainant and the leading questions that she asked highlight the danger that can exist in asking leading questions in such a situation. In my review of the video testimony I highlighted some of those.
In my view, when one carefully listens to her testimony that she gives in the video, although she does agree with some of the leading questions that were asked by the officer, when one considers what she actually said with the testimony that she gave, I find that there really is no material inconsistency between the versions that she gave on the video and her testimony. [ 13 ] The trial judge stated that questions of chronology that would be significant to an adult are not always "of the same significance to a child experiencing events and subsequently being questioned about them." In analysing the complainant's evidence, he said: As we, as adults, attempt to consider the evidence of anyone, we often like to deal with it in a chronological detailed matter of fact manner of what happened first, what happened next, what happened then, what happened after that and issues of time and place are not always the same - of the same significance to a child experiencing events and subsequently being questioned about them. [The complainant] was asked what happened essentially first and she said in her video then, "Like, he tried touching me.
My pants were tight. He left. He came back.
He tried doing it again," and then she was asked, "When he tried, what did he do?" Constable Schmalz, obviously, and from looking at the video, was asking her to detail from her mind, from Constable Schmaltz's mind, what happened that first and second time when he tried but I got the distinct impression after watching the whole of the video that [the complainant] wasn't talking about that, [she] was talking about the significant event that had happened to her, from her point of view, and she said in response to that question "When he tried, what did he do?" she said, "He put his hands down my pants," and she was asked "How?" and she described it as "slowly moving his hands down my pants, under my underwear and stuff and just touched me." "Did he put his entire hand down?" "Yeah" and, because adults would like to deal with things in chronological order, there was the natural inclination to suggest that she was discussing the first incident when she discussed that in the video and then she was asked crucially a very leading question and I know the officer meant well as she was doing this but it was very inappropriate for her to do that in that situation because
then she said 'So, he rubbed your vagina with your (sic) hand?" Officer's [ sic ] have to be so careful not to put words like that in children's mouths or anyone's mouth because it is evidence that must come from them. She agreed. She was asked about the second attempt too and she said, "So, did he do the same thing the second time?" [ 14 ] Acknowledging that the complainant had "said early on in her statement what had happened the first and second time, 'Like he tried touching me.
He left, came back, tried doing it again'," the trial judge commented that "when she agreed with the officer that he did the same thing the second time, the casual observer of the video would think or would think perhaps that she was describing hands under the underwear rubbing around." The trial judge did not agree that on "a full listening of the video and considering its context that, that is exactly what she said.
What she said happened that third time after she awoke from her dream was essentially consistent between her video and her testimony." [ 15 ] The trial judge agreed that the complainant's agreement with some of Cst. Schmalz's suggestions led to inconsistencies between the statement and her evidence in court.
He took the view, however, that the inconsistencies were not material, and that in each case the complainant "was attempting, as best she could, to give a truthful version of what took place that night to her." [ 16 ] As noted earlier, there was a question as to whether the complainant was able to distinguish events that happened while she was awake from possible dreams. Noting that he had considered the complainant's testimony in the context of the entire testimony, the trial judge commented: I've considered the issue of a dream and I've considered her honest responses, her fair responses to Mr.
Star's questioning in that regard but, in my view, the totality of her evidence suggests that she was steadfast that while she was dreaming this, what she complained of was not something that she was dreaming of but something that she was experiencing after she awoke. She describes how the hand, while it was there, was slowly moved away, how she moved to rub the cat and call the cat by name. She then left to go to the bathroom and locked herself in where she obviously was at 5:00 o'clock that next morning. She went to school the next day.
She reported the incident to friends then to her sister at home then to her mother.
She was troubled by comments she said the accused made the next morning or she was creeped out by it, I think were her words, when the accused had mentioned when she had come out of the bathroom the next morning sometime when everybody was waking up, words to the effect that "ewe, who would drive around with someone like you?" basically referring to her as ugly and then saying that she was hot or nice looking. [ 17 ] The appellant’s evidence was that “he did not recall at any time saying words to the effect that [the complainant] was hot or joking with her about her looks in any way.” The trial judge noted that evidence in the video statement respecting similar comments allegedly made by the appellant to the complainant's sisters should not have been admitted, and had not been considered.
There was also evidence of the complainant's demeanour the day after the alleged incident, which he held was "not probative of anything" in the case. [ 18 ] The trial judge proceeded to consider the evidence given by the appellant in his own defence. His denial was "in and of itself ... internally consistent. He withstood vigorous cross-examination and while he concedes going into the room with a light and laying there with his son," he denied any contact with the complainant.
The trial judge went on: His version of what happened after in the bathroom at 5:00 o'clock accords with his wife's recollection as to what took place and not with [the complainant's]. [The complainant] says that he told her to go lay on the couch, whereas the accused and his wife say that it was his wife that directed her to lay there and that she did so because she was concerned that [A] not get sick if, in fact, [the complainant] was sick. That inconsistency is, in my view, not material.
As well, it's a relatively ... innocuous collateral event as to who said what at a particular time when it's conceded that those words and directions were said and given. The accused gives a version of events that suggests that after he went to bed that his son, [A], called for him.
His wife indicates that she was, since she had a child, not a deep sleeper anymore but she did not hear [A] that night call out for his father and [the complainant] says the same thing but I do accept that in the circumstances where individuals are sleeping, some sleeping individuals may hear something that others do not. [ 19 ] The trial judge went on to weigh the evidence. He said: As I said, it's important to weigh and consider the evidence of each witness that testifies in light of the whole of the testimony before the Court.
After careful consideration of the evidence as a whole, I find that I accept the evidence of [the complainant] and reject the evidence of the accused.
[The complainant] struck me as a witness that was trying hard to tell the truth. The inconsistencies that I have detailed only developedwhen extremely leading questions were asked to her or statements that she made in the video were misunderstood by the officer that tookthe statement. She provides incidental details like the dog coming into the room the first time, speaking to the cat the third time to avoidthe touch of the accused such that it convinces me that beyond a reasonable doubt that she was describing a real event at that time andnot a dream. She went to the bathroom on two separate occasions.
She describes her feelings of being upset and shaking when she cameback from the bathroom the first time and as she described that, I got the distinct impression that she was describing something that shewas truly experiencing. While the accused's evidence is internally consistent, when I weigh that evidence in the context of the whole of the evidence, I find that Ido not believe his denials and it does not raise a reasonable doubt in my mind.
Where the evidence varies, I reject the evidence of theaccused and accept the evidence of the complainant and find that it proves, the complainant's evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubtthat the accused on two occasions began attempts to put his hand under the waistband of her pyjamas and succeeded a third time when[the complainant] was asleep but that she then woke up and found the accused rubbing an area of her body underneath her underwear.She turned, she moved to alert him to the fact that she was awake. She rubbed the cat.
The accused got up said that he was there because[A] had called for him then he left, she went and locked herself in the bathroom where she was at 5:00 o'clock in the morning. [20] The trial judge concluded, after "having carefully considered all of the evidence," that the accused was guilty of both of thecharged offences. Grounds of Appeal [21] The grounds of appeal, as set out in the Amended Notice of
Summary Conviction Appeal, include claims that the trial judge: (1) "erred in law in failing to correctly apply the test with respect to reasonable doubt" as required by R. v.
W.(D.), (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742; (2) "erred in law in explaining away significant inconsistencies in the alleged victim's testimony without any factual and/or legal basis todo so"; (3) "erred in law in rejecting the accused's evidence without giving any reasons whatsoever for doing so"; (4) "erred in law in rejecting the accused's evidence in that he assessed it in the context of all the evidence"; and (5) "erred in law in failing to give adequate reasons for his decision." [22] In his factum the appellant says these five issues can be reduced to three: the alleged error in applying W.(D.), the allegedfailure by the trial judge to "direct himself or apply the proper legal principles when assessing the reliability and credibility of witnessesas well as the issue of reasonable doubt," and the alleged failure to provide adequate reasons.
The Crown frames the issues in a similarmanner, retaining the issue of whether the trial judge erred in law in rejecting the accused's evidence without giving reasons for doing so.This issue appears to me to be intermingled with the trial judge's handling of the issues of credibility and reliability, and of the allegedlyinsufficient reasons.
Summary conviction appeals [23] The standard to be applied by a
Summary Conviction Appeal Court was discussed in R. v. Nickerson (1999), 1999 NSCA 168, 178 N.S.R. (2d) 189, 1999 CarswellNS 203 (C.A.), where Cromwell J.A. (as he then was) cited the earlier Court of Appealdecision in R. v. Miller (1999), 1999 NSCA 51 , 173 N.S.R. (2d) 26, and said, at para. 5: Unlike appeals to this Court in
summary conviction matters, appeals to the
Summary Conviction Appeal Court on the record mayaddress questions of both fact and law. Hallett, J.A., for the Court, recently described the role of the
Summary Conviction Appeal Courtjudge in R. v. Miller ... at pp. 27-29: On an appeal to a
summary conviction appeal court ... from a
summary conviction, on the ground that the verdict is unreasonable orunsupported by the evidence, the duty of the Supreme Court judge as an appellate court is explained in Yebes v. The Queen (1988), (SCC), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 417. McIntyre, J., for the Court, stated at p. 430:
...The function of the Court of Appeal, under s. 613(1)(a)(
i) of the Criminal Code, goes beyond merely finding that there is evidence tosupport a conviction. The court must determine on the whole of the evidence whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury,acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered. While the Court of Appeal must not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, inorder to apply the test the court must re-examine and to some extent reweigh and consider the effect of the evidence. The process will bethe same whether the case is based on circumstantial or direct evidence. [Emphasis in Miller.] . . .
On an appeal from a conviction for a criminal offence on the ground that the guilty verdict is unreasonable, the appellate court judge isrequired to review, and to some extent, reweigh the evidence to determine if the verdict is unreasonable. Assessing whether a guiltyverdict is unreasonable engages the legal concept of reasonableness (Yebes, supra at p. 427). Thus, the appellate review, on the groundsset out in s. 686(1)(a)(
i) of the Code entails more than a mere review of the facts. The appellate court has a responsibility, to some extent,to do its own assessment of the evidence and not to automatically defer to the conclusions of the trial judge which is what the appellatecourt judge seems to have done in this appeal. [24] Cromwell J.A. went on to note that the “scope of review of the trial court's findings of fact by the
Summary Conviction AppealCourt is the same as on appeal against conviction to the Court of Appeal in indictable offences,” pursuant to ss. 882(1) and 686(1)(a)(i)of the Criminal Code (Nickerson at para. 6.) He continued, at para. 6: ... Absent an error of law or a miscarriage of justice, the test to be applied by the
Summary Conviction Appeal Court is whether thefindings of the trial judge are unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. B.(R.H.), (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656 (S.C.C.) at 657, the appeal court is entitled to review the evidence at trial, re-examine and reweigh it, but only for the purpose of determining whether it is reasonably capable of supporting the trial judge'sconclusions. If it is, the
Summary Conviction Appeal Court is not entitled to substitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial judge.In short, a
summary conviction appeal on the record is an appeal; it is neither a simple review to determine whether there was someevidence to support the trial judge's conclusions nor a new trial on the transcript. [25] I will now consider the arguments respecting the grounds of appeal. The W.(D.) Analysis [26] The appellant says the trial judge erred in applying the test from R. v. W. (D.), (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. InW.(D.), the Supreme Court of Canada considered the burden of proof and the weighing of credibility where there is competing evidenceby the accused and the complainant.
Cory J. said, for the majority, at pp. 757-758: A trial Judge might well instruct the jury on the question of credibility along these lines: First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit. Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.
Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence whichyou do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused. [27] Cromwell J.A. (as he then was) reviewed the W.(D.) analysis in the judge-alone context in R. v. Chittick, 2004 NSCA 135,2004 CarswellNS 465. He said, at para. 21: [T]here is no question that the W. (D.) principle applies equally to the reasoning processes of judges and juries.
A trial judge will befound to have erred, if upon review of the judge's reasons in light of the trial record, it appears that he or she simply chose betweenalternative versions offered by the Crown and the defence and, having done so, convicted if the Crown's version was preferred.... Failureto specifically refer to the W. (D.) principle is not fatal on its own in a judge alone trial. The W. (D.) principle is not a magic incantationwhich trial judges acting as triers of fact must mouth to avoid appellate intervention.
The question for the appellate court in a judge alonecase is whether, upon consideration of the whole of the judge's decision and the evidence at trial, it appears that the judge did not applythe proper test and therefore did not apply his or her mind to the possibility that despite having rejected the evidence of the respondent,there might nevertheless be a reasonable doubt.... [28] The appellant says the trial judge did not turn his mind to the possibility that a reasonable doubt might exist after rejecting his
evidence.
After finding his evidence internally consistent and partly corroborated by his wife, the trial judge nevertheless preferred theevidence of the complainant, which, he says, was "wrought with inconsistencies." The appellant submits that the trial judge found thecomplainant more credible and chose to believe her, effectively resulting in a “credibility contest," contrary to W.(D.). [29] In response, the Crown points to the trial judge's reference to the importance of weighing the evidence of each witness in lightof all the evidence, and his subsequent conclusion that after "careful consideration of the whole" he accepted the complainant's evidenceand rejected that of the accused.
With respect to the internal consistency of the appellant's evidence, the trial judge stated that, havingweighed his evidence in the context of all the evidence, he nevertheless did not believe the appellant's denials, and was not left with areasonable doubt. [30] The appellant cites R. v. Saulnier, 2005 NSCA 54, in support of the argument that the trial judge omitted to consider reasonabledoubt.
I do not believe this situation can be equated to Saulnier, where the trial judge made no reference to reasonable doubt, to the W.D.test, to the presumption of innocence or to “whether or not doubt arose in the trial judge's mind, either from the evidence of the appellantalone or from the evidence as a whole” (para. 36.) The trial judge in this case specifically adverted to the W.(D.) analysis and to thepresumption of innocence, and repeatedly returned to these themes in the course of his reasons. I am not convinced that he omitted a step(as was the case, for instance, in Walker v.
The Queen, 2011 NSSC 279). [31] I am not satisfied that the trial judge misapplied W.(D.) in the manner suggested by the appellant. Assessing reliability and credibility [32] The assessment of a witness’s testimony requires the trial judge to take into account whether the evidence is truthful (that is,whether the witness is doing their best to relate the events as they recall them) and whether the evidence is reliable (that is, whether thewitness can accurately describe what happened). In R. v. Morrissey (1995), (ON CA), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 1995CarswellOnt 18 (Ont.
C.A.), Doherty J.A. said, at para. 33: Testimonial evidence can raise veracity and accuracy concerns. The former relate to the witness' sincerity, that is his or her willingness tospeak the truth as the witness believes it to be. The latter concerns relate to the actual accuracy of the witness' testimony. The accuracy ofa witness' testimony involves considerations of the witness' ability to accurately observe, recall and recount the events in issue. When oneis concerned with a witness' veracity, one speaks of the witness' credibility.
When one is concerned with the accuracy of a witness'testimony, one speaks of the reliability of that testimony. Obviously a witness whose evidence on a point is not credible cannot givereliable evidence on that point. The evidence of a credible, that is honest, witness may, however, still be unreliable.... [33] There are several aspects to the appellant’s argument on this ground of appeal. He says the trial judge failed to differentiatebetween credibility and reliability.
He points to various inconsistencies within the complainant's testimony and between her trialevidence and the video statement, which he says are sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt. He says the trial judge’s misapprehension ofmaterial inconsistencies constituted an error of law. The Crown says the trial judge's reasons demonstrate that he properly assessed thecredibility of the witnesses. Had he not recognized or addressed inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, it is submitted, this wouldnot be the case.
However, the Crown says, the trial judge "was aware of and sensitive to the alleged inconsistencies and considered themvery carefully…. He resolves the apparent inconsistencies and explains precisely how he goes about this." [34] Among the alleged inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence are contradictory statements as to whether she was awakethroughout the entire time of the alleged incidents. On direct examination she said she was awake the entire time, while her cross-examination and the statement both indicate that she fell asleep between incidents.
There are also said to be inconsistencies in heraccount of how many times the appellant came and went from the room. These are matters that the appellant referred to in oral argumentas material inconsistencies, adding that “not so much turns on” them, as compared with the test applied by the trial judge in assessing theevidence. [35] Another alleged inconsistency arises from the complainant’s description of the second incident. The complainant said in herstatement that the appellant was in the room for two minutes, of which he was touching her for one minute.
She also said, however, thathe would touch her for a time, wait a few minutes and touch her again. At trial she said he was in the room for five minutes. Theappellant says this evidence is confusing and contradictory. In oral argument, appellant’s counsel also alluded to confusion orinconsistency over other points, such as whether the complainant went to the bathroom after the second or third incident, whether theappellant had the flashlight he was carrying turned on, and whether the complainant left his own bedroom door open when he came intothe room.
[36] The appellant also points to the complainant's evidence that she dreamed about what was happening just before she woke upand found the appellant in the room, as well as her evidence that there had been times in the past when, on waking, she did not knowwhether she had been dreaming or the event had actually occurred.
The appellant says this suggests that she "was not certain whether shewas dreaming the incident or whether it actually happened, or both." [37] The appellant says the trial judge did not distinguish between credibility and reliability, particularly in relation to the evidencerelating to dreaming. The appellant says this failure should have raised a reasonable doubt on its own. The Crown says the trial judgegave reasons for concluding that the evidence of the complainant's dream did not impact on her reliability.
The trial judge reasoned thaton the totality of her evidence, "what she complained of was not something that she was dreaming of but something that she wasexperiencing after she awoke." He noted her description of the hand slowly moving away, and her description of touching the cat andcalling it by name. [38] The appellant also criticizes the trial judge’s reference to the age of the complainant. In R. v.
S. (D.D.), 2006 NSCA 34, 2006CarswellNS 109, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not sufficiently examine the inconsistencies in the complainant'sevidence, particularly where there were serious contradictions between her evidence and that of other witnesses. Saunders J.A., inholding that the trial judge had erred by jumping from a credibility finding to a finding of guilt without addressing reasonable doubt,noted that the complainant was 13 years old when the alleged incidents occurred, and almost 15 at trial.
He said, at para. 54: … Clearly she was not a child witness, nor was she an adult testifying to events that occurred to her when she was a child many yearsbefore. Neither was she describing (as is often the case in historical-crime trials) a litany and variety of sexual assaults spread over manymonths or years. Rather, the unlawful conduct she ascribed to her father involved three assaults all occurring within a three or four weekperiod beginning after school started in September and ending in early October. In these circumstances the strong warning expressed byMcLachlin, J. (as she then was) in R. v.
W. (R.) (1992), (SCC), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 134 (S.C.C.), at pp. 143-44 is especiallyapt. The Chief Justice observed: As Wilson J. emphasized in B.(G.), these changes in the way the courts look at the evidence of children do not mean that the evidence ofchildren should not be subject to the same standard of proof as the evidence of adult witnesses in criminal cases. Protecting the liberty ofthe accused and guarding against the injustice of the conviction of an innocent person require a solid foundation for a verdict of guilt,whether the complainant be an adult or a child.
What the changes do mean is that we approach the evidence of children not from theperspective of rigid stereotypes, but on what Wilson J. called a "common sense" basis, taking into account the strengths and weaknesseswhich characterize the evidence offered in the particular case.
It is neither desirable nor possible to state hard and fast rules as to when a witness's evidence should be assessed by reference to "adult" or"child" standards - to do so would be to create anew stereotypes potentially as rigid and unjust as those which the recent developments inthe law's approach to children's evidence have been designed to dispel. Every person giving testimony in court, of whatever age, is anindividual, whose credibility and evidence must be assessed by reference to criteria appropriate to her mental development,understanding and ability to communicate. But I would add this.
In general, where an adult is testifying as to events which occurred whenshe was a child, her credibility should be assessed according to criteria applicable to her as an adult witness.
Yet with regard to herevidence pertaining to events which occurred in childhood, the presence of inconsistencies, particularly as to peripheral matters such astime and location, should be considered in the context of the age of the witness at the time of the events to which she is testifying.[Emphasis by Saunders J.A.] In my respectful view the trial judge repeatedly over emphasized the "youth" of the complainant and this tended to lessen the scrutinywith which her evidence was assessed. [39] The appellant submits that the complainant, being over the age of 13 at the time of the trial, should not be considered a childwitness.
Her evidence was given about ten months after the events allegedly occurred, and she was able to review her statement. Thetrial judge, he submits, linked the inconsistencies in her evidence to her youth. He noted, for instance, that chronology is not always ofthe same significance to a child as it might be to an adult.
The appellant says the overemphasis on the youth of the complainant led thetrial judge to reduce the scrutiny he gave to her evidence. [40] The appellant says inconsistencies in the complainant’s could be attributable to dreams, supplemented with ideas "fed" to herthrough leading questions by the interviewing officer (a practice criticized by the trial judge). He also says the trial judge's attribution ofthe inconsistencies to the complainant's youth was not based on her evidence, but on speculation, as she did not herself offer such reasonsfor the discrepancies.
[41] The Crown takes the position that the trial judge properly considered the inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence with anawareness of the child's perspective. The Crown notes the following comment from R. v. W. (R.), (SCC), [1992] 2S.C.R. 122, 1992 CarswellOnt 90, where McLachlin J. (as she then was) said, at para. 30: The Court of Appeal next referred to the fact that the evidence of the younger children was fraught with inaccuracy. This is true,particularly with respect to B.W.'s evidence.
Some of the inconsistencies are minor, for example, an error on the distance from a van to aball game many years ago. Others are more significant, relating to the sleeping arrangements of the three children, the location ofbedrooms in the house and possibly the respondent's night-time attire.
While it was the proper task of the Court of Appeal to considersuch inconsistencies, one finds no mention of the fact that the trial judge was alive to them and resolved them to his satisfaction in hisreasons for judgment, nor of the fact that many of the inconsistencies may be explained by reference to the fact that a young child mightnot be paying particular attention to sleeping arrangements or clothing or that the children had lived in a variety of differentarrangements, which might well have given rise to confusion on such details. [42] In my view, the trial judge was aware of the inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, and was careful to make clear thatthese inconsistencies did not shake her credibility.
The trial judge was careful to make clear that he had considered these inconsistencies,but was nevertheless satisfied that the complainant was attempting to tell the truth. In particular, he was clearly concerned about theeffect of the leading questions asked by the officer in the complainant’s statement. I am not satisfied that his consideration of the leadingquestions as a source of confusion was unwarranted speculation, as the appellant submits. I believe a trial judge can conclude, forinstance, that a witness was confused by leading questions without the witness saying this specifically. [43] In R. v.
Lake, 2005 NSCA 162, 2005 CarswellNS 538, the court considered the first stage of the W.(D.) analysis (whether theaccused is believed), in a situation where credibility was crucial to the decision. The trial judge accepted the evidence of the Crownwitnesses, but did not clearly analyse the credibility of the accused. In ordering a new trial, Fichaud J.A. stated that "it is impermissibleto reject the accused's testimony solely as a consequence of believing the Crown witnesses. The trier of fact should address both whetherthe Crown witnesses are believed and whether the accused is disbelieved" (para. 21).
The point of the first W.(D.) step is "not to isolatethe accused's testimony for assessment, but to ensure that the trier of fact actually assesses the accused's credibility, instead ofmarginalizing it as a lockstep effect of believing Crown witnesses" (para. 22). Similarly, Saunders J.A. concluded, in R. v. S.(D.D.), 2006NSCA 34, at para. 97: The trial judge did not ever say that he did not believe the appellant. At no time did he refer to the presumption of innocence, nor to thefundamental question as to whether or not a reasonable doubt existed.
He failed to recognize and apply the second and third steps in theR. v. W. (D.) formulation. He repeatedly referred to the "consistency of the complainant's testimony." The approach taken by the trialjudge here, and resulting errors, are similar to that which occurred in both R. v. S. (D.C.), 2000 NSCA 61 , [2000] N.S.J. No.144 (N.S. C.A.) and in R. v. Lake, supra. [44] In R. v.
L.(C.J.), 2004 MBCA 126, 2004 CarswellMan 466, the Manitoba Court of Appeal, per Freedman J.A., commented thata trial judge's explanation of "his or her reasons for finding an accused not credible … should usually be done with specific reference tothe evidence of the accused" (para. 44). He cited R. v. N. (P.L.F.) (1999), (MB CA), 138 Man.
R. (2d) 205 (Man.C.A.), where Philp J.A. held that it was not sufficient for the trial judge "to say that the accused was 'vague and indefinite' in histestimony or that his evidence displayed an 'astonishing lack of recall about any pertinent fact or detail.' It was not enough to say thatmuch of the victim's collateral evidence 'was corroborated by other witnesses'." Rather, Philp J.A. said, "reference to specific evidentiarydetails, or the absence of them, was required to support those general conclusions.
The failure of the trial judge to set out his reasons forhis conclusions constituted an error in law" (cited in L.(C.J.) at para. 45). Freedman J.A. went on to say, at paras. 52-54: Although the judge said he had to give the accused the benefit of any reasonable doubt, in the absence of any reasons for his credibilityfinding regarding the accused, it is not clear that he actually did that. Without any analysis at all of the accused's evidence, it appears thejudge may have unintentionally engaged in the "forbidden reasoning" process warned against in [R. v.
Maharaj (2004), (ON CA), 186 C.C.C. (3d) 247, 2004 CarswellOnt 1921]. As was said by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Strong, [2001] O.J.No. 1362 (Ont. C.A.) (at para. 9): ... The appellant's evidence was not inherently incredible. .... a total rejection of his evidence to the point where it did not even leave areasonable doubt without any explanation is unsatisfactory. ... the absence of any explanation for rejecting totally the appellant'sevidence strongly suggests that he was disbelieved because the complainants were believed. This approach ignores the burden of proof.
Similarly, in the present case, there is nothing about the evidence of the accused that appears to warrant a finding that he was notcredible. The only concrete matter which the Crown identified before us was the inconsistency referred to above…. But the accused
explained that inconsistency. If the judge was not satisfied with that explanation, it would have been better had he said so, and given his reasons for so finding. He said nothing on that matter in his credibility conclusions. Moreover, the judge did not, "point to any of the typical reasons for finding a witness' evidence not credible: a previous [unexplained] inconsistent statement, evasiveness, or even demeanour, to name but a few" ( D. (S.) , at para. 29).
Instead, he concluded that he was "not ready to accept" the accused's evidence, without explaining why that equivocal view of that evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt. [ 45 ] Freedman J.A. also commented on the preferred order for making assessments of credibility, stating that it is "preferable to decide on the credibility of an accused before that of a complainant," particularly in a jury trial, although he added that "[u]ltimately, the order does not matter, provided it is clear that the fact-finder did not ever lose sight of the paramount principle of reasonable doubt" (para. 62).
He summarized, at para. 64: In my opinion, when a judge disbelieves an accused, the judge should explain the reasons for that conclusion, with explicit reference to the testimony of the accused, except if, (
i) having regard to the case as a whole, the reasons for rejection of the accused's evidence are clear from the judge's reasons in their entirety, and from all the evidence, and (ii) the reasons demonstrate that there was no incorrect shifting of the burden of proof from the Crown to the accused. [ 46 ] The appellant also cites similar comments in R. v. McIntosh , 2010 ABCA 352 , R. v. Stuparyk , 2008 ABCA 41 and R. v. V.Y. , 2011 SCC 22 . [ 47 ] The trial judge referred to R. v.
W. (E.M.) , 2009 NSPC 33 , as a guide to weighing the evidence in a case involving allegations of sexual assault and sexual touching, where the evidence of the complainant and of the accused is directly opposed. The conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal (at 2010 NSCA 73 ), but was restored by the Supreme Court of Canada (at 2011 SCC 31 ). In the trial decision, Campbell Prov. Ct.
J. interpreted the warning in Lake against discounting the evidence of the accused simply because the complainant is believed as a "direction to assess the evidence of the accused, before any conclusions have been reached as to credibility." The evidence of the complainant and the accused, he said, must be examined in light of each other's contradictory evidence (paras. 20- 21).
Farrar J.A., for the majority of the Court of Appeal, held that the trial judge had not explained his reasons for rejecting the evidence of the accused, but rather held that it did not raise a reasonable doubt when it contradicted that of the complainant, and concluded that the decision as a whole suggested that the trial judge used prior consistent statements to buttress the complainant's credibility (paras. 62 and 76).
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in restoring the trial judge's decision, held that his "careful and thorough reasons when read as a whole in light of the trial record do not support the inference drawn by the majority of the Court of Appeal" (para. 7). [ 48 ] The appellant says this is a situation similar to Lake , in that the trial judge rejected his evidence in favour of that of the complainant without adequate explanation. He says the trial judge did not adequately assess his evidence in the context of all the evidence. Rather, it is argued, he picked the version of events he found most likely.
The Crown agrees that the trial judge did not set out reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence or for finding that there was no reasonable doubt because of the accused's evidence despite his rejection of it.
The Crown also agrees that the trial judge believed the complainant's evidence, "having considered all the evidence," and that, weighing the evidence of the accused in the context of all the evidence, he did not believe the accused's denial, nor was he left with a reasonable doubt by it. [ 49 ] The Crown appears to suggest that Lake is distinguishable , on the basis that the trial judge in that case said nothing about the accused's credibility.
Fichaud J.A., dissenting in W.(E.M.) , took the view that the trial judge had considered the accused's version before concluding that the evidence as a whole left no reasonable doubt, thus complying with W.(D.) . The Crown argues that W.(E.M.) stands for the proposition that a trial judge need not necessarily give specific reasons for rejecting the accused's evidence, but must consider the accused's evidence in the context of all the evidence before rejecting it, and argues that this is how the trial judge proceeded in the present case. [ 50 ] The Crown cites R. v.
Jaura , 2006 ONCJ 385 , another sexual assault case pitting "the credibility of a single Crown witness, the complainant, against a single defence witness, the defendant" (para. 1). After reviewing the complainant's evidence, and finding it to be "completely credible" (para. 8), the trial judge said, at para. 9: The defendant's evidence was neither impressive nor unimpressive. In a qualitative sense, it was rather neutral. It seemed neither patently true nor patently false.
Being a general denial of the core of the allegations, it necessarily lacked detail, substance and the flavour that can sometimes alternatively either support or undermine believability. His demeanour while testifying was unremarkable. He did not contradict himself; no central or peripheral falsity was exposed by cross-examination. I am unable to identify or articulate any shortcoming or flaw within the defendant's evidence. Viewed in isolation it cannot be rejected as untrue.
[ 51 ] The trial judge framed the issue as whether it was permissible to "reject the defendant's evidence (and convict) solely on the basis of my acceptance of the complainant's evidence" (para. 10), and came to the following conclusion at paras. 20-21: In
summary, it is my view that the case law establishes that, in a "she said/he said" case, the Rule is that a trial judge can reject the evidence of an accused and convict solely on the basis of his acceptance of the evidence of the complainant, provided that he also gives the evidence of the defendant a fair assessment and allows for the possibility of being left in doubt, notwithstanding his acceptance of the complainant's evidence. Quite apart from case authority, there is ample reason to conclude that this must be the Rule.
If it were otherwise, there would effectively be a legal corroboration requirement imposed in these cases and the undoing of years of reform in this area. Alternatively, the issue of guilt would turn on whether the trial judge could identify and articulate that little something extra over and above the complainant's evidence - that flaw in the accused's evidence or its presentation - that would become the additional crumb on which a conviction could be supported.
Reasons for judgment would become an exercise in highly subjective nit picking of the accused's evidence, disingenuously disguising the real reason for its rejection. Finally, if the Rule was otherwise, it would be necessary for this to be explained to juries. [ 52 ] The Crown also cites the following comments of McLachlin C.J.C. in R. v.
M. (R.E.) , 2008 SCC 51 , 2008 CarswellBC 2037 , at para. 66 , addressing a trial decision where no specific reasons were given for rejecting the evidence of the accused: Finally, the trial judge's failure to explain why he rejected the accused's plausible denial of the charges provides no ground for finding the reasons deficient. The trial judge's reasons made it clear that in general, where the complainant's evidence and the accused's evidence conflicted, he accepted the evidence of the complainant. This explains why he rejected the accused's denial.
He gave reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence, finding her generally truthful and "a very credible witness", and concluding that her testimony on specific events was "not seriously challenged"…. It followed of necessity that he rejected the accused's evidence where it conflicted with evidence of the complainant that he accepted. No further explanation for rejecting the accused's evidence was required. In this context, the convictions themselves raise a reasonable inference that the accused's denial of the charges failed to raise a reasonable doubt. [ 53 ] I note also R. v.
J.M.H. , 2011 SCC 45 , where the Supreme Court of Canada held that “the trial judge did not have to ‘reject’ the complainant’s evidence in order to be left with a reasonable doubt arising from the whole of the evidence” (para. 18). [ 54 ] The appellant has also submitted the recent New Brunswick Court of Appeal decision in S.S. v. R. , 2011 NBCA 75 . In that case, the majority, per Bell J.A., commented on the significance of reasons for credibility findings, and where the outcome depends largely on the contradictory testimony of witnesses (paras. 32-33).
The majority noted that “if a trial judge accepts part of the accused’s testimony, in order to convict, he or she must explain at the second stage of the W.(D.) test, why the accused’s evidence nonetheless does not raise a reasonable doubt” (para. 35). In the alternative, if the trial judge finds inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, “he or she must explain, at the third stage of the W.D. test, why the totality of the evidence nonetheless proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict” (para. 35). The appellant submits that both of these conditions were met in the present case.
I would hesitate to conclude that the trial judge “accepted” the appellant’s evidence; rather, he found it internally consistent, and consistent with certain of his wife’s evidence, but made clear that he accepted the complainant’s evidence where there was a conflict between the two, and that he was not left with a reasonable doubt by the appellant’s evidence.
I note also the following passage from the dissenting reasons of Deschênes J.A. in S.S. , at para. 15 : I take the liberty of reproducing relevant excepts of some of the principles to keep in mind when considering the adequacy of reasons for judgment generally, and questions of credibility in particular. Those principles were considered in [ Sheehan v. R. , 2010 NBCA 85 ], relying upon [ R. v. R.E.M. , 2008 SCC 51 ]: These purposes [for which reasons are delivered] are fulfilled if the reasons, read in context, show why the judge decided as he or she did.
The object is not to show how the judge arrived at his or her conclusion, in a “watch me think” fashion. It is rather to show why the judge made that decision. The decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Morrissey predates the decision of this Court establishing a duty to give reasons in Sheppard . But the description in Morrissey of the object of a trial judge’s reasons is apt. Doherty J.A. in Morrissey , at p. 525, puts it this way: “In giving reasons for judgment, the trial judge is attempting to tell the parties what he or she has decided and why he or she made that decision” (emphasis added).
What is required is a logical connection between the “what” -- the verdict -- and the “why” -- the basis for the verdict. The foundations of the judge’s decision must be discernable, when looked at in the context of the evidence, the submissions of counsel and the history of how the trial unfolded. [Emphasis in original.] … The trial judge should not be found to have erred in law for failing to describe every consideration leading to a finding of credibility, or to the conclusion of guilt or innocence. Nor should error of law be found because the trial judge has failed to reconcile every frailty in the
evidence or allude to every relevant principle of law. Reasonable inferences need not be spelled out.
For example if, in a case that turnson credibility, a trial judge explains that he or she has rejected the accused’s evidence, but fails to state that he or she has a reasonabledoubt, this does not constitute an error of law; in such a case the conviction itself raises an inference that the accused’s evidence failed toraise a reasonable doubt. […] Appellate courts must ask themselves the critical question set out in Sheppard: do the trial judge’s reasons, considered in the context ofthe evidentiary record, the live issues as they emerged at trial and the submissions of counsel, deprive the appellant of the right tomeaningful appellate review?
To conduct meaningful appellate review, the court must be able to discern the foundation of theconviction. Essential findings of credibility must have been made, and critical issues of law must have been resolved.
If the appellatecourt concludes that the trial judge on the record as a whole did not deal with the substance of the critical issues on the case (as was thecase in Sheppard and Dinardo), then, and then only, is it entitled to conclude that the deficiency of the reasons constitute error in law.[para. 12] [55] I find this a useful statement of the trial judge’s duty in dealing with questions of credibility, and in respect of the issue ofsufficiency of reasons generally (on which more below). [56] The appellant maintains that the trial judge explained away material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, speculatingas to why her evidence at trial was inconsistent with her statement.
The Crown says the trial judge carefully reviewed the evidence, gavereasons for accepting the complainant's evidence and correctly articulated and followed the W.(D.) analysis. He rejected the accused'sevidence and was not left in a reasonable doubt by it, after considering it in the context of the whole of the evidence. [57] The trial judge was faced with a “he said/she said” situation (a phrase which, I note, Campbell Prov. Ct. J., in W.(E.M.),referred to as “unsettling”, due to its potential to trivialize the issues).
Inevitably, his assessment of the credibility and reliability of thecomplainant and the accused were crucial to his analysis of reasonable doubt. To begin with, the trial judge repeatedly alluded to the W.(D.) analysis, and the specific nature of a “he said/she said” situation, as described by Campbell Prov. Ct. J. in W.(E.M.). To state the test,of course, is not proof that he applied it, but I am satisfied that he was mindful of the W.(D.) requirements throughout his analysis. Heacknowledged specific inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, and explained why he did not find them to be material.
Headdressed the evidence of her dreams, and of the leading questions in her statement, and resolved the concerns arising from those issues.He acknowledged the internal consistency of the appellant’s evidence, as well as its consistency on some points with evidence of otherwitnesses. He nevertheless concluded that, in the light of the entire evidence, he accepted the complainant’s evidence, and preferred it tothe evidence of the accused where there was a conflict.
He further made clear that the accused’s denials did not raise a reasonable doubt. [58] Doubtless, the trial judge’s decision rested essentially on his preference of the evidence of the complainant over that of theaccused, but I fail to see what more the trial judge ought to have done in the circumstances. I am not persuaded that he followed thecourse forbidden by W.(D.) and simply chose one account over the other.
I am satisfied that he appropriately applied the W.(D.) test.More broadly, in relation to the additional issues arising from the Notice of Appeal, I am satisfied that the trial judge properly addressedcredibility and reliability. I am not satisfied that he erred in taking the complainant’s youth into account, though I do not believe that heapplied a differential standard or lesser degree of scrutiny to her evidence as a result.
Sufficiency of reasons [59] The appellant says the trial judge did not sufficiently explain why he rejected his denial of guilt, or how he resolved the"significant difficulties" in the complainant's evidence so as to conclude that the appellant was guilty. [60] The Supreme Court of Canada considered sufficiency of reasons, and the content of the duty to give reasons, in R. v. Sheppard,2002 SCC 26 , [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869. Among the guiding principles set out by Binnie J., at para. 55, was that an “accused personshould not be left in doubt about why a conviction has been entered.
Reasons for judgment may be important to clarify the basis for theconviction but, on the other hand, the basis may be clear from the record.
The question is whether, in all the circumstances, thefunctional need to know has been met.” While making it clear that not every insufficiency of reasons will be the basis for an appeal,Binnie J. noted that reasons “acquire particular importance when a trial judge is called upon to ... resolve confused and contradictoryevidence on a key issue, unless the basis of the trial judge's conclusion is apparent from the record, even without being articulated.” Thequestion of sufficiency of reasons on the issue of credibility arose In R. v.
M.(R.E.), 2008 SCC 51, where McLachlin C.J.C. said, at paras.50-51: What constitutes sufficient reasons on issues of credibility may be deduced from [R. v. Dinardo [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, 2008 SCC 24],where Charron J. held that findings on credibility must be made with regard to the other evidence in the case (para. 23). This may requireat least some reference to the contradictory evidence. However, as Dinardo makes clear, what is required is that the reasons show thatthe judge has seized the substance of the issue. "In a case that turns on credibility... the trial judge must direct his or her mind to the
decisive question of whether the accused's evidence, considered in the context of the evidence as a whole, raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt" (para. 23). Charron J. went on to dispel the suggestion that the trial judge is required to enter into a detailed account of the conflicting evidence: Dinardo , at para. 30 . The degree of detail required in explaining findings on credibility may also, as discussed above, vary with the evidentiary record and the dynamic of the trial. The factors supporting or detracting from credibility may be clear from the record.
In such cases, the trial judge's reasons will not be found deficient simply because the trial judge failed to recite these factors. [ 61 ] Deficient reasons, standing alone, are not a basis for appeal. There must be some prejudice arising: Sheppard at paras. 26 and 33 . The appellant argues that the record does not disclose why he was convicted, other than the trial judge's preference of the credibility of the complainant. He submits that the reference to her youth, and its implications for her treatment of chronology, does not accomplish this.
He goes on to argue that "[w]ithout explicitly stating as much, the decision may very well be founded on credibility and the lack of proper judicial reasoning does not allow the accused to properly formulate an argument on appeal to counter the trial judge's disbelief of his testimony." As such, he submits, he is prejudiced in exercising his right to appeal by the uncertainty as to the grounds for the trial judge's conclusion. [ 62 ] The Crown says the trial judge's reasons were sufficient to demonstrate how he dealt with the inconsistencies in the evidence and other issues, such as the significance of the dream.
I agree. As will be clear from the discussion above, under the other grounds of appeal, I am satisfied that the trial judge’s reasons demonstrate that he turned his mind to the question of whether the accused’s evidence, in the context of all the evidence, raised a reasonable doubt. Conclusion [ 63 ] I note that the appeal court has a duty to consider the trial evidence in order to determine whether the trial judge’s findings “are unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence”: Nickerson , supra , at para. 6 .
As I have discussed, I am satisfied that the trial judge adequately explained his reasoning and assessed the evidence in context; I am not persuaded, for instance, that he merely “explained away” inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.
Ultimately, I am satisfied from my own review of the record that the evidence was reasonably capable of supporting the trial judge's conclusions. [ 64 ] For the foregoing reasons, I am not satisfied that the appeal should succeed on any of the grounds identified, including alleged misapplication of W.(D.), the law regarding credibility and reliability and sufficiency of reasons. The appeal is therefore dismissed. Leblanc, J.
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