Hefler Forest Products Ltd. v. MCAP Leasing Inc., 2011 NSSC 505
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Hefler Forest Products Ltd. v. MCAP Leasing Inc., 2011 NSSC 505 Date: 20111005 Docket: Hfx No. 351937 Registry: Halifax Between: Hefler Forest Products Limited, a body corporate Applicant v. MCAP Leasing Inc., a body corporate, Pinnacle Office Systems Inc., a body corporate, and Lawrence O’Brien Respondents LIBRARY HEADING Judge : The Honourable Justice John D. Murphy Heard: October 5, 2011, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Decision: February 15, 2012 {Oral decision rendered October 5, 2011} Subject: Equipment lease –validity when goods not delivered by third party
Summary: The applicant, Hefler, agreed to lease a copier when approached by O'Brien, the principal of Pinnacle Inc. O'Brien is now bankrupt and Pinnacle has ceased operations. Lease financing was to be by MCAP, which provides financing for office equipment and approved Hefler as a prospective lessee. O'Brien had Hefler’s manager sign a standard form pre-printed lease contract, with blank spaces for insertion of particulars of the equipment and other details.
The manager signed in three places – confirming delivery and installation of equipment, executing the contract, and authorizing MCAP to make periodic withdrawals for lease payments; he also initialed a page of terms and conditions. The lease specified that Pinnacle/O'Brien (“the vendor”) was not MCAP’S agent. Before signing, Hefler’s manager only partially reviewed the documents and did not read the terms and conditions. He expected the vendor to hold the lease until the copier was delivered and the missing particulars provided, but the vendor relayed the lease to MCAP.
Hefler faxed a void cheque to MCAP to enable direct withdrawal payments. The vendor faxed MCAP an invoice, which stated that the copier was sold to MCAP and shipped to Hefler. MCAP obtained verbal confirmation from Hefler that the copier was delivered, completed the blanks in the lease, released approximately $60,000 to the vendor to pay for the copier, and began withdrawing lease payments from Hefler’s account. The vendor never delivered the copier to Hefler, which did not realize for 15 months that MCAP was making withdrawals from its account.
Hefler sought a declaration that the lease between it and MCAP was invalid, requested the return of payments and an injunction preventing MCAP from withdrawing future payments. The vendor did not participate at the hearing.
Issue: Is the lease between Hefler and MCAP valid, even though the copier was not delivered to the lessee by the third-party vendor? Result: The lease is valid, Hefler's application is dismissed. There is a valid and enforceable contract between Hefler and MCAP. The lease contained all essential terms, and came into force when executed by Hefler. It did not contain an express or implied condition precedent requiring delivery and installation before enforceability. MCAP was not bound by stipulations made by the vendor, who did not have ostensible authority from MCAP.
Hefler knew that the vendor was not MCAP’s agent. There was no collateral contract creating a condition precedent. Both Hefler and MCAP are innocent parties, but Hefler was in a better position to detect non-delivery of the copier. Hefler erroneously advised, in writing and orally, that the copier had been received when in fact it had not. As between Hefler and MCAP, Hefler is responsible for the funds that MCAP released to the vendor.
Hefler's application against MCAP is dismissed, but may continue against the vendor for recovery of funds paid on the lease and any funds that will be paid for the remainder of the lease. THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT'S DECISION. QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET . SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Hefler Forest Products Ltd. v. MCAP Leasing Inc., 2011 NSSC 505 Date: 20111005 Docket: Hfx No. 351937 Registry: Halifax Between: Hefler Forest Products Limited, a body corporate Applicant v.
MCAP Leasing Inc., a body corporate, Pinnacle Office Systems Inc., a body corporate, and Lawrence O’Brien Respondents Judge: The Honourable Justice John D. Murphy Heard: October 5, 2011, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Decision: February 15, 2012 {Oral decision rendered October 5, 2011}
Counsel: Stephen C. Kent, for the applicant Andrew J. Sowerby, for the respondent MCAP Leasing Respondent, Pinnacle Office Systems Inc., unrepresented Respondent, Lawrence O’Brien, unrepresented By the Court : Overview [ 1 ] Bad things can happen when business persons fail to adequately read contracts before they sign them. Matters are worsened when a lessee stipulates erroneously to a lessor, in writing and again orally, that the leased goods have been delivered by a third-party vendor.
When the lessor pays the vendor for the goods apparently delivered, and the vendor never delivers those goods, who bears responsibility for repayment of the released funds? In this case, as between the lessee and lessor, it is the lessee that is responsible. Therefore, this application by the lessee, which seeks a declaration that an equipment lease is invalid and that payments made under it cease and be returned, is dismissed as against the lessor. The lessee may maintain its application against the third-party vendor.
Background [ 2 ] The applicant, Hefler Forest Products Limited ("Hefler"), is a saw mill and wood products company based in Nova Scotia. It has a staff of approximately 40 and has been in business for more than 100 years. Dugal Prest is the general manager of Hefler. [ 3 ] The respondent, MCAP Leasing Inc. ("MCAP"), is an extra-provincial corporation that provides financing for office equipment. The respondent, Pinnacle Office Systems Inc. ("Pinnacle"), was a Nova Scotia Limited company that sold office equipment, but has since ceased operations.
The respondent, Lawrence O'Brien, was a principal of Pinnacle at the relevant time. Mr. O'Brien is presently an undischarged bankrupt. [ 4 ] In mid-August, 2009, Mr. O'Brien approached Mr. Prest to inquire whether Hefler was in need of any office equipment. Hefler had previously purchased office supplies and equipment from Pinnacle and had a relationship with Mr. O'Brien. [ 5 ] Mr. Prest, on behalf of Hefler, agreed to lease a Konica C550 Color Bizhub Digital Imaging System (the "Copier"), an all-in-one networked office copier, printer, scanner, and fax machine.
The lease financing was to be provided by MCAP, with payments to begin in September 2009. Hefler applied to and was approved by MCAP as a prospective lessee. [ 6 ] Approximately one week later, Mr. O'Brien attended at the office of Hefler with a MCAP lease contract (the "Lease") for Mr. Prest to sign on behalf of Hefler. The Lease is a standard form, pre-printed document, provided by MCAP for vendors to use when selling or leasing equipment financed by MCAP.
It is a two-page document, with blank spaces on the front for insertion of the particulars of the Lease, including, for example, the type of equipment, date of execution, and lessee bank account information. The second page includes the Lease terms and conditions. [ 7 ] The Lease was signed by Mr. Prest in three locations: 1) confirming delivery and installation of the equipment; 2) executing the contract; and 3) authorizing MCAP to make periodic withdrawals for lease payments. Mr. Prest also initialed the second page of terms and conditions.
The Lease also included an acknowledgment clause (acknowledging that the lessee has read the attached terms
and conditions), a non-cancellation clause, a representation and warranty clause (requiring the lessee to seek any warranties from the vendor and specifying that the vendor was not an agent for the lessor), and an entire agreement clause. [ 8 ] Mr. Prest provided an affidavit, and was cross-examined at the hearing. His evidence indicated that prior to signing the Lease, he only partially reviewed the document, and did not read the Terms and Conditions. He had a conversation with Mr.
O'Brien about his concern that he was "confirming delivery and installation" of the Copier when that had not taken place, and that there were missing particulars, such as the Copier's serial number and Hefler's banking information. Despite these reservations, Mr. Prest signed the Lease and initialed the Terms and Conditions, under the impression that the Lease would be held by Mr. O'Brien until the Copier was delivered and the missing particulars provided. But the Lease was not held, and instead, Mr.
O'Brien forwarded it on to MCAP. [ 9 ] On August 17, 2009, Hefler faxed a void cheque to MCAP for the purposes of direct withdrawal payments. That same day, Pinnacle faxed MCAP an invoice for the Copier, setting out the amount to be paid ($59,869.55 including HST) and the machine's serial number. The Pinnacle invoice states that the Copier was sold to MCAP and shipped to Hefler. [ 10 ] There is a disagreement between the parties on whether Hefler provided MCAP with any further confirmation of delivery beyond the "confirmation clause" in the Lease. Hefler submits that no verbal confirmation was provided.
MCAP states that verbal confirmation was provided pursuant to its standard operating procedures for leases over $10,000. [ 11 ] Sometime after August 18, 2009, MCAP, believing everything to be in order, inserted the lease reference number and commencement date on the Lease and executed the document. MCAP then released payment to Pinnacle, and began withdrawing monthly payments from Hefler's bank account pursuant to the Lease. [ 12 ] Unfortunately, Pinnacle never delivered the Copier to Hefler.
Hefler did not discover that MCAP was making periodic withdrawals from its account, for the Copier Hefler never received, until December 2010, some 15 months after the Lease commencement date. Mr.
Prest immediately advised MCAP of the non-delivery, but MCAP took the position that Hefler was liable for the rent payable on the Lease. [ 13 ] On July 7, 2011, the applicant filed a Notice of Application in Chambers seeking a declaration that the lease between Hefler and MCAP was invalid and of no force or effect, return of all payments made by Hefler to MCAP on the lease, and an injunction preventing MCAP from withdrawing any further payments from Hefler's bank account. [ 14 ] The application was heard on October 5, 2011. Neither the respondent, Pinnacle Office Systems Inc, nor the respondent, Mr.
O'Brien, appeared nor was represented. Only Hefler and MCAP participated in the application. At the end of the hearing, I gave an oral decision finding the Lease valid, and dismissing Hefler's application. Subsequent to that decision, MCAP requested that I provide written reasons. What follows are my written reasons. Issue [ 15 ] The fundamental issue on this application is whether the Lease between Hefler and MCAP is valid even though the property being leased, the Copier, was never delivered to the lessee by a third-party vendor.
Position of the Parties [ 16 ] Hefler submits that delivery of the Copier was a condition precedent to the Lease. Hefler further submits that Mr. O'Brien was acting as an agent for MCAP and that MCAP should be bound by the stipulations made by Mr. O'Brien, namely that the Lease would only come into effect once the Copier was delivered. Hefler contends that parol evidence should be admitted to establish the condition precedent. In the alternative, Hefler submits that delivery was an implied condition of the Lease.
In the further alternative, Hefler argues that the terms and conditions of the Lease should not be enforced because they were fine print on the reverse side of the Lease document. Hefler contends that enforceability, despite non-delivery, is an exclusionary clause that should have been brought to its attention in order to make it enforceable.
[17] MCAP submits that the Lease is binding and enforceable. MCAP contends that the Lease should be interpreted objectively onthe basis of the written agreement and not subjectively on the basis of what Hefler thought it was signing. MCAP further submits thatthe contract was between Hefler and MCAP, that Pinnacle was a stranger to contract, and that any conversations between Hefler andPinnacle are irrelevant to the enforceability of the Lease. MCAP argues that the Lease was sufficiently complete so as to be binding.
MCAP further argues that delivery of the Copier was not a condition precedent to the Lease becoming enforceable. MCAP states thatHefler was in a better position to detect the alleged fraud perpetrated by Pinnacle and/or Mr. O'Brien. Law and Analysis [18] The principles or precepts for contractual
interpretation were recently reviewed by this Court in BC Rail Partnership v.Standard Car Truck Company, 2009 NSSC 240, 282 NSR (2d) 112. I do not intend to recite this review and the principles in detail. [19] The object of contractual
interpretation is to give effect to the parties' objective intentions, as determined by the words used inthe contract and occasionally by the factual matrix present when those words were chosen (Eli Lilly & Co. v Novopharm Ltd, (SCC), [1998] 2 SCR 129, 161 DLR (4th) 1); Ryan v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2005 NSCA 12,230 NSR (2d) 132). [20] Absent ambiguity in the contract, extrinsic evidence is not admissible (Hawrish v. Bank of Montreal, (SCC),[1969] SCR 515). This does not mean that the Court must interpret the contract in a vacuum; the Court may look at the "surroundingcircumstances" or "factual matrix" in its objective
interpretation of the contract (Hill v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), (SCC), [1997] 1 SCR 69). [21] In Geoffrey L. Moore Realty Inc. v. Manitoba Motor League, 2003 MBCA 71, 2003 CarswellMan 229 at para. 19, theManitoba Court of Appeal discussed the distinction between inadmissible extrinsic evidence and admissible surrounding circumstances: If evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible, what is meant by inadmissible extrinsic evidence? Most commonly it isevidence of subjective intention or of the negotiations leading to the final contract.
In Eli Lilly, the extrinsic evidence in questionconcerned the subjective intentions of the parties' principals. See also Glimmer Resources Inc. v. Exall Resources Ltd. (1999), (ON CA), 119 O.A.C. 78 (Ont. C.A.), in which evidence of subjective intention was excluded. [22] More particularly, it is evidence of the surrounding circumstances that are known to both parties that is admissible (WaterStreet Pictures Ltd. v. Forefront Releasing Inc, 2006 BCCA 459, 2006 CarswellBC 2476 at para. 24).
Likewise, "evidence of thesubjective intentions of the parties which were not communicated to each other" is not admissible (emphasis added) (Kentucky FriedChicken Canada v. Scott's Food Services Inc. (1998), (ON CA), 114 OAC 357, 1998 CarswellOnt 4170 at para. 24(CA)). [23] In this case, Hefler and Pinnacle reached an agreement to purchase the Copier subject to third-party financing provided byMCAP. Hefler and Pinnacle were consensus ad idem on all the essential terms, including model and price. [24] Hefler applied to MCAP for financing. MCAP extended an offer of financing to Hefler in the form of the Lease.
The Leasewas missing some particulars, such as the Copier's serial number, the commencement date, and Hefler's bank account information, but itincluded all essential terms, such as price, model, and payment frequency. Moreover, the Lease included a clause allowing the lessor toinput these missing particulars at a later date. Hefler accepted the offer and executed the Lease. [25] At the hearing, Hefler attempted to argue that the contract was not formed until MCAP signed the Lease and inserted thecommencement date. I do not agree with this
interpretation, but even if I did, it does not affect the result of this case, since theinformation added by MCAP after Hefler signed the Lease had no impact on the essential terms of the agreement. By August 18, 2009,the Lease was signed by both parties and funds had been released by MCAP to Pinnacle – consensus ad idem, offer, acceptance, andconsideration had all been satisfied.
[26] Hefler submits that the Lease contained an express or implied clause that delivery was a condition precedent to enforceability. The Lease contained no such clause, express or implied. To the contrary, the Lease contained a clause and separate signature line wherethe lessee expressly confirmed delivery and installation. This line was signed by Mr. Prest. Delivery and installation could not be anexpress or implied condition of the Lease since confirmation of same was included as part of the Lease. [27] Hefler further submits that the stipulations of Mr.
O'Brien – that the Lease would only come into force upon delivery – createdcollateral contract between Hefler and MCAP to that effect. Hefler cites Irwin Commercial Finance Canada Corp. v. EagleComputer Systems Ltd, 2005 SKQB 261, 266 Sask R 238 for the proposition that when a lessee has no contact with a lessor, thestipulations of a third-party vendor to the lessee can bind the lessor, since the vendor is acting as an agent for the lessor. There arecertainly other cases, not cited by Hefler, that support this proposition (See eg. Alberta Pacific Leasing Inc. v.
Mak (1997), (AB KB), 208 AR 257, 1997 CarswellAlta 834 (QB)). [28] I am not bound by stare decisis to follow any of these decisions, but I certainly take note of them, given their similarities withthis case. However, what makes this case distinguishable is that Mr. O'Brien was not acting as an agent for MCAP. Mr. O'Brien did nothave ostensible authority to bind MCAP. Mr. Prest had had previous interactions with Mr. O'Brien and Pinnacle. Further, Mr. Prest, asan experienced businessperson, knew or ought to have known that Pinnacle and MCAP were separate entities and that Mr.
O'Brien actedon behalf of Pinnacle, not MCAP, especially given Hefler's prior interactions with the former. Moreover, the Lease expressly stated, inthe ‘Terms and Conditions’ that Mr. Prest failed to read, that the vendor was not an agent of the lessor and vice versa. In addition, theLease included an "entire agreement" clause, which Mr. Prest also failed to read.
In these circumstances, no collateral contract isestablished stipulating that delivery and installation is a condition precedent of the Lease. [29] Even if I am wrong on my conclusion that delivery and installation was not a condition precedent of the Lease, I find that theextrinsic evidence establishes that Hefler waived this condition.
There was significant affidavit and viva voce evidence tendered at thehearing on what confirmation Hefler gave MCAP regarding receipt of the Copier, beyond the "confirmation clause" in the Lease. [30] Gordon Herridge, Chief Financial Officer of MCAP, swore an affidavit on behalf of MCAP. Mr. Herridge explained that theprocedure of MCAP for all financing over $10,000 was to seek a verbal confirmation of delivery in addition to the "confirmation clause"in a Lease. MCAP would document this verbal confirmation before releasing funds to a vendor.
MCAP provided the Court with aVerbal Confirmation of Delivery document, dated August 18, 2009, that states that an employee of MCAP called Hefler and received averbal confirmation of delivery from Mr. Prest. [31] Mr. Prest filed an affidavit stating that he did not provide any verbal confirmation of delivery to MCAP. Mr. Prest testified oncross-examination that he did not recall providing such a verbal confirmation. Mr. Prest testified candidly, but with some uncertaintyregarding exact dates. He testified that he received a lot of calls in the regular course of his duties.
He could not say with absolutecertainty that he did not give a verbal confirmation of delivery, but he did testify that none was given. [32] On a balance of probabilities, I prefer the evidence of MCAP to that of Mr. Prest. MCAP explained its standard operatingprocedure and provided documentary proof that that procedure was followed, resulting in a verbal confirmation of delivery from Mr.Prest. I find that Mr.
Prest, more likely than not, did provide a verbal confirmation to MCAP; such a confirmation was erroneous, muchin the same manner that Hefler did not detect withdrawals for the Copier it had not received for more than a year, but I accept that it wasmade. [33] The verbal confirmation of delivery had the effect of waiving any condition precedent for the Lease to come into force. On thebasis of this confirmation and believing everything to be in order, MCAP entered the remaining details on the Lease and released thefunds to Pinnacle.
Thus, the extrinsic evidence supports the conclusion that the Lease was enforceable despite non-delivery of theCopier. [34] Hefler did not expressly plead non est factum, but the underlying premise of its submissions is that Hefler should not be boundby the Lease because it relied on the stipulations of Mr. O'Brien rather than reading the precise terms of the Lease. Hefler also argues,citing Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978), (ON CA), 83 DLR (3d) 400 (Ont CA) [Tilden], that the"representations and warranties clause" should have been brought to its attention.
[35] In my view, Tilden is of no assistance to Hefler in this case. Firstly, MCAP does not need to rely on the exclusionary"representations and warranties clause" to enforce the Lease. That clause limits MCAP's liability for improper installation and defectswith the Copier; it has no application to this situation where the lessee erroneously stipulates that the Copier was delivered, and the lessorseeks to enforce payment. Secondly, even if Tilden does apply, this case is distinguishable.
Unlike in Tilden, the parties in this casewere both sophisticated commercial parties; the ‘Terms and Conditions’ were legible; the lessee placed his initials signifying that he hadread the terms; and the lessee signed a clause to the effect that he had read the terms. [36] Mr. Prest had the opportunity to read the Lease and its terms, but he chose not to in any great degree. As an experiencedbusinessperson, he knew that executed contracts carried legal effect. In Marvco Colour Research Ltd. v.
Harris, (SCC), [1982] 2 SCR 774 [Marvco], the Supreme Court of Canada considered the question of whether the defence of non est factum isavailable to a party who, knowing a document has legal effect, carelessly fails to read the document, thereby permitting a third party toperpetrate a fraud on an innocent party.
The Court held that such a defence was not available, and stated, at pp. 785-786: In the result the defendants-respondents are barred by reason of their carelessness from pleading that their minds did not follow theirhands when executing the mortgage so as to be able to plead that the mortgage is not binding upon them. The rationale of the rule issimple and clear.
As between an innocent party (the appellant) and the respondents, the law must take into account the fact that theappellant was completely innocent of any negligence, carelessness or wrongdoing, whereas the respondents by their careless conducthave made it possible for the wrongdoers to inflict a loss.
As between the appellant and the respondents, simple justice requires thatthe party, who by the application of reasonable care was in a position to avoid a loss to any of the parties, should bear any lossthat results when the only alternative available to the Courts would be to place the loss upon the innocent appellant. In the finalanalysis, therefore, the question raised cannot be put more aptly than in the words of Cartwright J. in Prudential, at p. 929: "... which oftwo innocent parties is to suffer for the fraud of a third".
The two parties are innocent in the sense that they were not guilty ofwrongdoing as against any other person, but as between the two innocent parties there remains a distinction significant in the law,namely that the respondents, by their carelessness, have exposed the innocent appellant to risk of loss, and even though no duty in lawwas owed by the respondents to the appellant to safeguard the appellant from such loss, nonetheless the law must take this discardedopportunity into account (emphasis added). [37] In this case, there was no suggestion that MCAP fraudulently induced Hefler to contract or that there was unequal bargainingpower between the parties.
Both Hefler and MCAP were innocent parties. However, Hefler was in a better position to detect and reportthe non-delivery of the Copier. Instead, Hefler stipulated in writing and orally that it had received the Copier. On the basis of thesestipulations, MCAP released the funds to Pinnacle. Since Hefler was in the better position to detect the non-delivery it is Hefler notMCAP that must bear responsibility. Conclusion [38] There is a valid and enforceable contract between Hefler and MCAP. The Lease contained all the essential terms, and cameinto force when it was executed by Hefler.
The Lease did not contain an express or implied condition precedent requiring delivery andinstallation before enforceability. [39] Mr. O'Brien did not have ostensible authority from MCAP and Hefler was aware that Mr. O'Brien was not the agent of MCAP. Further, the Lease contained an "entire agreement" clause. Any stipulations Mr. O'Brien made to Hefler did not become part of theLease. There was no collateral contract creating a condition precedent. [40] Both Hefler and MCAP were innocent parties in these unfortunate circumstances. However, Hefler was in a better position todetect non-delivery of the Copier.
Instead, Hefler stipulated erroneously, in writing and orally, that the Copier had been received whenin fact it had not. [41] As between Hefler and MCAP, it is Hefler that is responsible for the funds that MCAP released to Pinnacle. For these reasons,Hefler's application is dismissed. Hefler may maintain its application against the respondents, Pinnacle and Mr.
O'Brien, for recovery ofthe funds that have been paid on the Lease and any funds that will be paid for the remainder of the Lease. [42] MCAP shall have Tariff "C" costs of $1,000 (inclusive of disbursements) for this half-day hearing, given the extensive briefingand work that went into this application.
J.
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