Wade v. Burrell, 2011 NSSC 60
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Wade v. Burrell, 2011 NSSC 60 Date: 20110228 Docket: Hfx No. 185646 & Hfx No. 263570 Registry: Halifax Between: BRANDON WADE, infant, by his litigation guardian, STEPHEN MADDEN and PETER WADE and GAIL WADE and CYNTHIA ELIZABETH HARDING Plaintiffs v. MARGARET BURRELL, DEBORAH DAVIS, ALAN DAVIS and HEATHER DAVIS Defendants - and - Between: BRANDON WADE, infant, by his litigation guardian, STEPHEN MADDEN Plaintiff - and - THE CO-OPERATORS GROUP LIMITED carrying on business as COSECO INSURANCE COMPANY Defendants Judge: The Honourable Associate Chief Justice Deborah K.
Smith Heard: July 15 th , 2010, January 26 th , 2011 and February 9 th , 2011 Halifax, N.S. Oral Decision: February 9 th , 2011 Written Decision: February 28 th , 2011 Counsel: John A. McKiggan, Esq. on behalf of the Plaintiff, Brandon Wade Ronald Pizzo, Esq. appearing on behalf of Arnold Pizzo McKiggan No one appearing on behalf of the other parties. By the Court : [ 1 ] This is a motion for approval of an infant’s settlement, the appointment of a trustee in relation to the settlement funds and
approval of a solicitor’s account for services rendered. The motion is brought pursuant Civil Procedure Rules 36.13, 36.14 and 36.15. [ 2 ] The matter was heard before me on July 15 th , 2010 and January 26 th , 2011. On February 9 th , 2011, I provided the parties with my decision and indicated that written reasons would follow. These are my reasons. FACTS [ 3 ] Brandon Wade is presently twelve years of age.
On September 7 th , 2000 (when Brandon was two years of age) he was involved in a tragic motor vehicle accident as a result of which he suffered serious and permanent injuries. [ 4 ] According to the affidavit evidence filed in support of this motion, Brandon’s father, Peter Wade, was placing Brandon in a stroller in a parking lot at the time of the accident. The Defendant, Margaret Burrell, was driving a vehicle owned by the Defendants, Deborah and Alan Davis. Ms.
Burrell backed the vehicle that she was driving into Peter Wade’s vehicle as a result of which Brandon was pinned and crushed between his father’s vehicle and a vehicle parked next to his father. This third vehicle was being driven by Cynthia Elizabeth Harding. Ms. Harding claimed to have been injured in the collision. [ 5 ] As a result of the accident, Brandon suffered a severe head injury, a lung contusion and a fractured left humerus. He was admitted to the intensive care unit of the Izaak Walton Killam Hospital for Children and remained in hospital for three months.
Brandon made significant gains after his release from hospital but more than ten years after the accident his condition remains grim. A 2009 neuropsychological report indicates that Brandon requires constant supervision and cannot be left alone for more than a few minutes at a time. He has poor attention and impulse control, the potential to behave aggressively, weak social skills, poor memory as well as extremely weak academic skills.
In a May 28 th , 2010 report sent to Brandon’s solicitor, Brandon’s neuropsychologist expressed the opinion that Brandon has extremely weak daily living skills (below the 1 st percentile in all areas measured), is probably going to be permanently unemployed and will probably require assisted care for the rest of his life. [ 6 ] Brandon’s solicitor, John A.
McKiggan, has indicated that in his opinion, if the matter had proceeded to trial, Brandon’s non- pecuniary damage claim would have been in excess of $200,000.00; his loss of income claim (if assessed as an income loss rather than a diminished earning capacity) should have been valued in excess of $700,000.00 and his cost of future care claim would be assessed in the range of $2,000,000.00 to $3,000,000.00. This latter portion of Brandon’s claim was assessed by a cost of future care expert (Ms.
Gabriel) at $6,000.000.00. [ 7 ] Unfortunately, the value of Brandon’s claim greatly exceeds the funds available to pay the claim. The Defendants (in Hfx. No. 185646) carried motor vehicle insurance in the amount of $500,000.00. In addition, Brandon’s parents had an additional $500,000.00 in SEF 44 coverage. As will be seen below, the Defendants will be personally contributing towards the settlement, but the funds that are available will clearly not fully compensate Brandon for his loss. APPROVAL OF THE INFANT’S SETTLEMENT [ 8 ] The parties propose to settle this case on the following basis: (
a) The Defendants’ insurer (Wawanesa) will pay their policy limits of $500,000.00 minus the sum of $1,500.00 which was paid to Cynthia Elizabeth Harding to settle her claim and $1,527.99 which was paid for the property damage claim to the Wades’ vehicle. The sum of $50,000.00 has already been paid by way of an interim payment. An additional $206,972.01 will be paid now and a further $240,000.00 will be placed in a structure. In addition, Wawanesa will make a contribution towards costs in the amount of $13,000.00 and will pay disbursements in the amount of $13,919.77; (
b) The Wades’ SEF 44 insurer (The Co-operators) will pay their policy limits in the amount of $500,000.00. This entire amount will be placed in a structure. In addition, The Co-operators will contribute $5,143.52 towards costs as well as $7,856.48 for disbursements;
(
c) Deborah and Alan Davis will personally pay the sum of $140,000.00; and (
d) Margaret Burrell will personally pay the sum of $299,375.56. [ 9 ] As will be seen from the above, the total amount of the proposed settlement is $1,436,347.57 (including the interim payment already made in the amount of $50,000.00). In addition, there will be total contributions towards costs in the amount of $18,143.52 and disbursements in the amount of $21,776.25. [ 10 ] I am advised that the structured settlement payments will total more than $2,500,000.00 over Brandon's anticipated lifetime. [ 11 ] The Defendant, Margaret Burrell, sold her home in order to contribute to the settlement.
When the proposed settlement was first brought before the Court on (July 15 th , 2010) Ms. Burrell still had held title to her property. The plan was for her to continue to hold title but to sell the property and pay the net proceeds to Brandon. I expressed concern about problems that could arise in these circumstances and suggested that the property be sold before the Infant Settlement Order was finalized. This was done (the property sold on October 29 th , 2010) and the matter returned before me on January 26 th , 2011.
The net proceeds received from the sale of the property ($207,638.56) are part of the $299,375.56 that Ms. Burrell is contributing towards the settlement. [ 12 ] While it is clear that the proposed settlement is not sufficient to fully compensate Brandon for his losses, I am satisfied from the evidence presented that this settlement is in Brandon’s best interests. With the exception of two small payments (one of which was made to Ms.
Harding in the amount of $1,500.00 and the second of which was made to Brandon’s parents in the amount of $1,527.99) Brandon will be receiving the full amount of all available insurance proceeds plus a contribution towards costs and disbursements. In addition, Margaret Burrell and Deborah and Alan Davis will be personally contributing an additional $439,375.56 towards the settlement. I have been provided with evidence of each of their assets and liabilities as well as their incomes. Mr.
McKiggan has advised the Court that in his opinion the personal contributions being made by the Defendants exceed the recovery that Brandon would be able to achieve if he obtained a judgment against the Defendants and forced them into bankruptcy. While, in my opinion, the funds that are being paid will not fully compensate Brandon for his losses and may well be insufficient to cover his full costs of care in the future, I am satisfied that it is a proper resolution of the matter and that the settlement is in Brandon’s best interests. APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE [ 13 ] Mr.
Stephen Madden (Brandon’s grandfather and litigation guardian) seeks to be appointed trustee of the settlement funds. All of the requirements of Civil Procedure Rule 36.14 have been fulfilled and Mr. Madden has agreed to execute a bond in a form approved by the Court with one surety. In the event that Mr. Madden becomes unable or unwilling to act as trustee he asks that the Public Trustee for the Province of Nova Scotia be appointed trustee without bond. Mr. McKiggan has advised the Court that the Public Trustee has consented to being named trustee in the event that Mr.
Madden is unable or unwilling to act. [ 14 ] I indicated in court that I am prepared to appoint Mr. Stephen Madden trustee of the settlement funds on the condition that he execute the bond approved by the Court with Ms. Jadwiga (Judy) Madden named as surety. In the event that Mr. Madden becomes unable or is unwilling to act as trustee, the Public Trustee for the Province of Nova Scotia shall be trustee without bond. APPROVAL OF COUNSEL’S ACCOUNT [ 15 ] As indicated above, Brandon was injured on September 7 th , 2000. Mr.
McKiggan advises that he was approached by Brandon’s family shortly after the accident to represent Brandon. Mr. McKiggan’s time records relating to this matter commence the day following the collision. [ 16 ] According to Mr. McKiggan’s evidence, he advised Brandon’s family in September of 2000 that his normal rate for services rendered was $175.00 per hour and that his rate increased annually. (His normal hourly rate at the present time is $350.00.) Mr.
McKiggan has indicated that Brandon’s family advised him that they did not have the financial resources to hire him at his normal hourly rate and that they wanted to hire him on a contingency fee basis.
[ 17 ] On September 18 th , 2000, Brandon’s father, Peter Wade, entered into a written Contingency Fee Agreement with Mr. McKiggan’s firm. According to Mr. McKiggan, his usual contingency fee contract provided for a fee of up to 25% if Brandon's claim settled more than 60 days before trial and increased to a maximum of 35% if the claim settled within 60 days of trial or proceeded through to trial. Stephen Madden (Brandon's grandfather) negotiated a reduction in this standard fee in light of the fact that Brandon's claim could turn out to be significant. In particular, Mr.
McKiggan agreed to reduce his usual fee of up to 25% (if the case settled more than 60 days before trial) to 20%. In addition, he reduced his maximum fee of up to 35% (if the case settled within 60 days of trial or proceeded through to trial) to 30%. [ 18 ] At the time that this Contingency Fee Agreement was entered into it was anticipated that Peter Wade would act as Brandon’s litigation guardian.
It was subsequently decided that Brandon’s parents would advance their own claim in relation to this matter (their claims were subsequently dismissed by consent.) Due to the conflict that would then exist, Brandon’s grandfather, Stephen Madden, agreed to be Brandon’s litigation guardian rather than Mr. Wade. As a result, a second Contingency Fee Agreement was signed (this time by Stephen Madden) on May 23 rd , 2002. The first and second Agreements are substantially the same. It is the second agreement that Mr.
McKiggan's firm (the "Firm") relies on in relation to their fees. [ 19 ] The second Contingency Fee Agreement includes the following terms: ..................
(2) Subject to paragraph (6) below, the Client shall not be required to pay any fees or disbursements to the Solicitor with respect to this retainer unless recovery is made against the persons mentioned in paragraph (1) above either by way of judgment or by way of settlement of the aforementioned action, in which event compensation shall be paid to the Solicitor as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4) below.
The client is responsible for all disbursements, which may arise during the course of the proceeding; save for “office disbursements” such as postage, fax transmissions etc. which will be billed to the client at the conclusion of the proceeding. [The inconsistency in this paragraph relating to disbursements is contained in the Agreement itself.]
(3) The Solicitor shall employ the services of such expert witnesses as the Solicitor deems necessary and the Client agrees to pay the expenses and fees of such expert witnesses and [such fees] shall be deemed to be disbursements in this proceeding.
(4) In the event of recovery as mentioned in paragraph (2) above by way of settlement more than Sixty (60) days before the date of trial, the Solicitor shall be entitled to payment of all reasonable and proper disbursements incurred in respect of the action and all matters relating thereto together with reasonable compensation for the services rendered which compensation shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of any recovery or settlement after deduction of all reasonable and proper disbursements. The Harmonized Sales Tax (15%) will be charged to the client on all applicable disbursements and on legal fees and shall be in addition to the herein before mentioned.
(5) In the event of recovery as mentioned in (2) above by way of Judgment or by way of settlement claim within Sixty (60) days of the date of trial, the Solicitor shall be entitled to payment of all reasonable and proper disbursements incurred in respect of the action and all matters relating thereto together with reasonable compensation for the services rendered which compensation shall not exceed thirty percent (30%) of any recovery or settlement after deduction of all reasonable and proper disbursements. The Harmonized Sales Tax (15%) will be charged to the Client on all applicable disbursements and on legal fees and shall be in addition to the herein before mentioned.
(6) In the event of recovery as mentioned in paragraph (2) above by way of judgment and in the event that costs in the action are awarded to the Client, the Solicitor shall be entitled to payment of such costs and the said costs are not to be considered as part of the recovery but as credit t [to] the Solicitor’s legal fees.
(7) In the event that the Client terminates this retainer without a reasonable cause or the Solicitor terminates this retainer for a reasonable cause or the Client personally settles the matter referred, the Solicitor shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the services rendered to the date of such termination together with reimbursement of all reasonable and proper disbursements made by the Solicitor to date. The Harmonized Sales Tax will be charged to the client on all applicable disbursements and on legal fees and shall be in addition to the herein before mentioned.
For the purposes of this agreement “reasonable compensation” is agreed to be the solicitors [sic] hourly rate of $175.00.
(8) In the event that the Solicitor obtains an offer of settlement for the Client which the Solicitor recommends in writing be acceptedby the client, and the Client rejects the Solicitor’s advice and instructs the Solicitor to continue further settlement negotiations and/orproceed to trial resulting in a final settlement or judgement less than the offer of settlement recommended by the Solicitor, the partiesagree that the legal fees to be paid to the Solicitor pursuant to this agreement shall be based on the amount of the settlement offer whichthe Solicitor recommended be accepted. Solicitors fees to be taxed and approved by the Taxing Officer.
(9) This Agreement may be reviewed by a Taxing Officer at the Client’s request and may either at the instance of the Taxing Officeror the client be further reviewed by the court and either the Taxing Officer or the Court may vary, modify or disallow the Agreement. ..................
(11) The Client acknowledges the existence of a true contingency in the proposed litigation on the issue of liability, quantum or both. [Emphasis in the original] [20] Mr. Madden did not have independent legal advice in relation to this Contingency Fee Agreement. [21] The Firm takes the position that Clause 5 of the Contingency Fee Agreement signed by Mr. Madden is applicable in thecircumstances of this case and that based on that clause they are entitled to charge a fee of 30% of the proposed settlement (30% of$1,436,347.57).
They have proposed, however, to reduce the principal sum upon which the fee is based to $1,400,000.00 and to reducetheir fee to 28%. They therefore propose that the Court approve fees in the amount of $392,000.00 (28% of $1,400,000.00) plus HST inthe amount of $58,800.00 for total fees of $450,800.00. [22] When this matter originally came before the Court counsel referred to the decision in Cogan (Re), (2008), (ON SC), 88 O.R. (3d) 38 (Sup. Ct. J.) in support of his requested fees.
I asked to be briefed further on the issue of fees and counsel fileda second brief referring also to the decisions in Ormrod (Litigation guardian of) v. Goodall, 2002 NSSC 243; Saulnier v. Tynski,2009 NSSC 262; Adler (Litigation guardian of) v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., [2009] O.J. No. 2095 (Sup. Ct. J.); Harnish v. Perry Rand Ltd., [1994] N.S.J. No. 383 (N.S.S.C.) and Morris v. Sparling, [2007] O.J. No. 3497 (Sup. Ct. J.).
I havereviewed and considered all of these cases in arriving at my decision. [23] Civil Procedure Rule 77.13 deals with counsel's entitlement to reasonable compensation for services performed. It provides: Counsel’s fees and disbursements: entitlement and assessment 77.13
(1) Counsel is entitled to reasonable compensation for services performed, and recovery of disbursements necessarily andreasonably made, for a client who is involved in a proceeding.
(2) The reasonableness of counsel's compensation must be assessed in light of all the relevant circumstances, and the following areexamples of subjects and circumstances that may be relevant on the assessment: (
a) counsel's efforts to secure speed and avoid expense for the client; (
b) the nature, importance, and urgency of the case;
(
c) the circumstances of the person who is to pay counsel, or of the fund out of which counsel is to be paid; (
d) the general conduct and expense of the proceeding; (
e) the skill, labour, and responsibility involved; (
f) counsel's terms of retention, including an authorized contingency agreement, terms for payment by hourly rate, and terms for value billing. [ 24 ] Civil Procedure Rule 36.15 deals with the approval of counsel's accounts when counsel is to be paid by a represented party and provides: Approval of counsel ’ s accounts 36.15
(1) Counsel who is to be paid by a represented party from a fund owned directly or beneficially by a represented party, or from funds of an estate, must make a motion for a judge to allow counsel’s account, unless the instrument or other authority under which the representative was appointed provides otherwise.
(2) The motion must be supported by an affidavit providing evidence of all of the following: (
a) the terms of retention and, if the terms included payment on a contingency, a copy of the contingency agreement; (
b) a description of the services rendered by counsel, including, unless a judge permits a
summary, the date, amount of time, and description of each service; (
c) details of the disbursements; (
d) counsel’s usual hourly rate, if counsel has established an hourly rate; (
e) the hourly rate charged on the account, if counsel charges the representative party by the hour; (
f) an explanation of the risks undertaken by counsel, if the retention was on a contingency; (
g) a copy of the account, which may include an amount required to conclude counsel’s work.
(3) The affidavit may provide other relevant information, such as information for evaluating counsel’s charges based on results achieved, skill, experience, and timeliness.
(4) A representative may make a motion for directions about an account submitted by counsel. [ 25 ] Mr. McKiggan has provided the Court with the information required by Civil Procedure Rule 36.15 .
[ 26 ] In this case, Brandon’s grandfather entered into a written Contingency Fee Agreement for services rendered by the Firm. The Firm acknowledges that when considering approval of fees in an infant’s settlement situation the Court is not bound to follow the terms of any Contingency Fee Agreement that may have been entered into. They submit that the appropriate question for the Court to consider is whether the contingency fee sought by the Firm is fair and reasonable in the circumstances (see the comments of Gruchy, J. in Ormrod (Litigation guardian of) v.
Goodall , supra at ¶ 19 .) I agree with counsel’s submission that this is the appropriate question for the Court to consider. [ 27 ] What then does the Court take into account when deciding whether the fee sought is fair and reasonable? In my view, there is no precise answer to this question. The matters that the Court will take into account when determining whether a fee is fair and reasonable may vary depending upon the circumstances of the case. In this case, the salient factors are: (
a) The time and effort required and spent; (
b) The complexity and importance of the matter; (
c) Whether special skill was required and provided; (
d) The results achieved; (
e) The terms of the Contingency Fee Agreement entered into in relation to this matter; (
f) The circumstances of the person who is to pay counsel or of the fund out of which counsel is to be paid; (
g) The amount of the settlement; (
h) Who is to receive any award of costs; and (
i) The risks involved in pursuing the matter. [ 28 ] I will review each of these factors in detail. (
a) The time and effort required and spent [ 29 ] Mr. McKiggan has been representing Brandon since September of 2000 – a period in excess of 10 years. Over this time he has filed two actions (one against Margaret Burrell, Deborah Davis, Alan Davis and Heather Davis and the second against the Wades’ insurer.) In addition, he has filed and prepared for a number of applications/motions including: (
i) An application for approval of the interim payment in the amount of $50,000.00;
(ii) An application to consolidate the Wades’ action with Ms. Harding’s action; (iii) An application for
summary judgment (which was consented to in relation to Margaret Burrell, Deborah and Alan Davis and was not pursued in relation to Heather Davis); (iv) An application to assess damages (this matter was scheduled to be heard over four days in July of 2010 but was settled approximately one week prior to the hearing); and (
v) A motion for approval of the infant’s settlement (the matter presently before me.) [ 30 ] Mr. McKiggan advises that there was extensive documentary disclosure in this case and one week of discovery examinations (six people were discovered.) Experts’ reports were obtained from a number of individuals. [ 31 ] Mr. McKiggan has further advised that managing
Section B expenses was overwhelming for Brandon's parents and, accordingly, he assumed responsibility for managing Brandon's
Section B claim. [ 32 ] According to the time records which have been provided to the Court, Mr. McKiggan has recorded 688 hours in relation to this matter. Mr. McKiggan has advised the Court that at his standard hourly rates throughout the years, this translates (on an hourly rate basis) to a figure of $195,933.75. (
b) The complexity and importance of the matter [ 33 ] While in my view, this case was not difficult from a liability perspective (I will comment further on this later in my decision) the file was complex. There were limits issues in relation to the insurance policies in question, there were claims by Ms. Harding and Mr. and Ms. Wade that could affect the amount of money that was available for Brandon and there was the issue of evaluating Brandon’s damage claim in light of his serious and long term injuries. [ 34 ] There is no doubt that the case was very important to Brandon and his family. (
c) Whether special skill was required and provided [ 35 ] In my opinion, the liability aspect of this case did not require any special skill. However special skills were required to effectively deal with the insurance and damage issues. (
d) The results achieved [ 36 ] While in my view, this settlement will not fully compensate Brandon for his losses and while I anticipate that the funds recovered may well be insufficient to cover all of his needs in the future – I am satisfied that the results that were obtained were the best that could be achieved in the circumstances. I make particular note of the fact that Mr. McKiggan did not stop when he obtained the limits of all available insurance. His persistence resulted in personal payments being made by the Defendants in the amount of $439,375.56 over and above the policy limits.
(
e) The terms of the Contingency Fee Agreement entered into relation to this matter [ 37 ] As I have indicated previously, the Firm takes the position that the starting point in relation to their fee is Clause 5 of the Contingency Fee Agreement which they say entitles them to 30% of the settlement (a figure which they propose to reduce to 28%.) In my view, it is not at all clear that under the Contingency Fee Agreement in question the proper starting point is 30%. Clause 5 bears repeating. It reads:
(5) In the event of recovery as mentioned in (2) above by way of Judgment or by way of settlement claim within Sixty (60) days of the date of trial , the Solicitor shall be entitled to payment of all reasonable and proper disbursements incurred in respect of the action and all matters relating thereto together with reasonable compensation for the services rendered which compensation shall not exceed thirty percent (30%) of any recovery or settlement after deduction of all reasonable and proper disbursements.
The Harmonized Sales Tax (15%) will be charged to the Client on all applicable disbursements and on legal fees and shall be in addition to the herein before mentioned. [Emphasis added] [ 38 ] As a preliminary matter, the Agreement refers to compensation which shall not exceed 30% . It does not refer to a fee of 30%. [ 39 ] In addition, in this case, there was no trial.
Summary judgment was obtained in July of 2008. An application was filed for an assessment of damages which, according to Mr. McKiggan, was settled approximately one week prior to the hearing. The Contingency Fee Agreement does not appear to contemplate this particular situation. (
f) The circumstances of the person who is to pay counsel or of the fund out of which counsel is to be paid [ 40 ] Brandon is an infant who, according to his neuropsychologist, will likely be permanently unemployed and will probably require assisted care for the rest of his life. It appears from the figures provided by Mr. McKiggan that Brandon’s future care needs may exceed the funds that will be available as result of this settlement. (
g) The amount of the settlement [ 41 ] When analysing whether a proposed fee is fair and reasonable the Court should consider the amount of the settlement itself. Twenty-eight percent of a $750,000.00 settlement may be fair and reasonable, whereas twenty-eight percent of a $1,436,347.57 settlement may not be fair and reasonable. (
h) Who is to receive any award of costs [ 42 ] As indicated previously, the two insurers involved in this claim are contributing costs in the total amount of $18,143.52. The Firm agrees that these costs should be deducted from the amount of fees that I approve. In other words, Brandon will receive the benefit of the costs being paid.
(
i) The risks involved in pursuing the matter [ 43 ] This is a significant factor in the circumstances of this case. [ 44 ] This is not a situation where liability for the collision was seriously in issue. Brandon was being placed in a stroller in a parking lot when he was pinned between two vehicles. According to the Statement of Claim, Ms. Burrell's vehicle was the only vehicle being operated at the time of the collision. [ 45 ] The Defendants (in Hfx. No. 185646) apparently took the position that Ms. Burrell's foot was on the brake at the time of the collision and that her vehicle had spontaneously accelerated.
I am advised that the model of the Defendants’ car had been subject to a recall for issues relating to spontaneous acceleration. [ 46 ] No expert evidence was ever provided in support of a defence of spontaneous acceleration. In addition, an expert engineer retained by the Plaintiff's solicitor indicated that there was no merit to this suggestion. [ 47 ] Even if there had been spontaneous acceleration that does not mean that liability for the collision was in issue in relation to Brandon.
If spontaneous acceleration had occurred it simply would have transferred the exposure for the loss to the manufacturer of the Davis’ vehicle. [ 48 ] It was also suggested by Deborah and Alan Davis that their vehicle was not being operated as a family car at the time of the collision and that the Defendant, Margaret Burrell, was not acting as their servant or agent at the time of the accident. Further, the Co- Operators apparently denied liability on the basis that the Defendants (in Hfx.
No. 185646) were not underinsured drivers as defined in the SEF 44 policy. [ 49 ] It would be rare, indeed, for Defendants not to raise some type of defence. The Court, however, must consider whether any of the defences raised had a serious chance of success. In this case this issue is best answered by the fact that Margaret Burrell and Deborah and Alan Davis all consented to
summary judgment being taken out against them. In addition, the SEF 44 insurer agreed to pay the full amount of their limits without the need for a trial. This gives an indication of how little risk there was on the issue of liability. [ 50 ] That is not to suggest that there were no risks involved in the circumstances of this case. Mr. McKiggan has advised that Brandon was in a coma after this accident and there was a real concern that he might not survive his injuries.
He has further indicated that after Brandon's recovery from the initial trauma, he suffered from a potentially life-threatening seizure disorder that meant he might not survive until trial. This was a risk that the Firm assumed. [ 51 ] There was also uncertainly in relation to insurance limits, the competing claim of Ms. Harding (who apparently alleged that she was permanently disabled as a result of the accident but settled her claim for $1,500.00) and the risk that the Defendants, in their personal capacity, would not be in a position to respond to a judgment.
While these factors introduced an element of risk to the case, there was not, in my view, a serious risk that the Firm would not get paid at the end of the day.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS [ 52 ] After considering all relevant factors, I have concluded that the Firm’s proposed fee of $392,000.00 plus HST in the amount of $58,800.00 (total $450,800.00) is not fair and reasonable compensation in the circumstances of this case. I make particular note of the low level of risk that the Firm assumed when taking on this file as well as the circumstances of the infant Plaintiff. [ 53 ] During the hearing counsel referred to the decision in Cogan (Re) , supra , where Smith, J., (in the course of approving the full amount of a contingency fee agreement) commented that contingency fee agreements promote the valid objective of insuring that injured
plaintiffs (including children and parties under disability) have access to the courts to recover damages for injuries suffered as a result of another’s negligence. This, in my view, is a valid consideration (see also the comments of Duncan, J. in Saulnier v. Tynski , supra , at ¶ 41 .) That is not to suggest, however, that contingency fee agreements are the only way to insure that valid claims are pursued in circumstances where a client cannot afford to pay a lawyer’s hourly rate on an ongoing basis.
In cases such as Brandon’s, where it is likely that the lawyer will get paid at the end of the day, the lawyer can agree to bill for services rendered at the conclusion of the matter with the agreed upon fee reflecting the fact that the lawyer may have to carry the file for a number of years before being paid. [ 54 ] It must also be recognized that the facts in Cogan (Re) , supra , were substantially different from those in the present case. That case involved a medical malpractice claim where liability was seriously in issue.
On the eve of trial the plaintiff’s lawyer settled the claim for $12,543,750.00 a result which the judge approving the fee described as “exceptional” (he noted that the amount of the settlement was almost double the previous highest award for a cerebral palsy case, was twice the estimated value of the Plaintiff’s damages given by a settlement conference master and was three times greater than the opinion on damages given by the Defendants’ experts.) Smith, J. noted that the settlement adequately met the infant’s needs after the payment of the proposed legal fees and commented about the large financial risk assumed by the law firm in taking on the file.
In particular, he noted that the Defendants had a lengthy expert report which indicated that the Plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by an alleged 15 minute delay in giving birth and also noted that in 98 per cent of cases of children born with cerebral palsy, the cause is not known and is not related to inappropriate obstetrical care.
As found by Smith, J. the risk of an adverse liability finding in that case was “high” and the lawyer assumed a “large financial risk” on behalf of the child. [ 55 ] In my view, the risks assumed by the Firm in the circumstances of this case are significantly different than those assumed by the Plaintiff’s firm in Cogan (Re) , supra . [ 56 ] In the case at bar, Mr. McKiggan obtained a very good result for Brandon in light of the insurance limits that were available. In addition, he and his Firm carried the case for over 10 years without compensation.
In my view, these facts should be reflected in the fee that is approved. Weighing all of the above factors, I have concluded that a fair and reasonable fee in this case is $280,000.00 plus HST. The $18,143.52 in costs received from the Defendants will be deducted from this amount. Accordingly, the amount paid to the Firm out of the settlement funds will be $261,856.48. [ 57 ] An Order has been issued accordingly. Deborah K. Smith Associate Chief Justice
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