Ruparell v. Armbrae Academy, 2012 NSSC 211

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Ruparell v. Armbrae Academy, 2012 NSSC 211 Date: 20120530 Docket: Hfx. No. 346559 Registry: Halifax Between: Shivani Ruparell Plaintiff v. Halifax Ladies College, carrying on business as “ Armbrae Academy ” Defendant LIBRARY HEADING Judge: The Honourable Justice Cindy A. Bourgeois Heard: May 7 and 8, 2012, in Halifax, N.S. Subjects: Resignation; damages arising on termination of fixed term employment contract; appropriateness of claims for general, aggravated and punitive damages.

Summary: The parties entered into a fixed term employment contract whereby the Plaintiff would provide teaching services at the Defendant school for the 2010/2011 academic year. In early January 2011, the parties met to discuss the Plaintiff’s continued employment. A dispute arose as to whether the Plaintiff resigned her position. She asserted she did not, with the Defendant taking a contrary view. The Plaintiff claims damages, including the balance of wages payable to the end of the contract term, as well as general, aggravated and punitive damages. Result: The Plaintiff did not resign her position.

A resignation must be clear and unequivocal. Such was not the case in this instance. As this was a fixed term contract, the Plaintiff was entitled to the balance of wages owing thereunder, subject to deduction for any failure to mitigate. The Defendant was unable to establish a failure to mitigate. The evidence before the Court did not establish a valid claim for general, aggravated or punitive damages. The Plaintiff was awarded a sum reflective of the balance of wages under the contract of employment. THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT’S DECISION.

QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Ruparell v. Armbrae Academy, 2012 NSSC 211

Date: 20120530 Docket: Hfx. No. 346559 Registry: Halifax Between: Shivani Ruparell Plaintiff v. Halifax Ladies College, carrying on business as Armbrae Academy Defendant Judge: The Honourable Justice Cindy A. Bourgeois Heard: May 7 and 8, 2012, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Decision: May 30, 2012 Counsel: Michael P. Scott, for the Plaintiff Dillon Trider, for the Defendant By the Court : [ 1 ] The Plaintiff Shivani Ruparell has brought action against her former employer, the Halifax Ladies College, carrying on business as “ Armbrae Academy ” (hereinafter “ Armbrae ” ). Ms.

Ruparell submits she was wrongfully terminated from her employment, and seeks damages accordingly. Given the manner of her dismissal, Ms. Ruparell further seeks general, aggravated and punitive damages. [ 2 ] The outcome of the Court ’ s determination primarily hinges upon whether, or not, Ms. Ruparell resigned from her teaching position at Armbrae. If she did resign, the parties agree there was no dismissal, wrongful or otherwise. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [ 3 ] There is little dispute between the parties as to the factual background giving rise to the matter before the Court.

[ 4 ] In the spring of 2010, Ms. Ruparell, who had recently obtained a Master of Education degree from Cambridge University, was seeking a teaching position. She interviewed at Armbrae with Headmaster Gary O ’ Meara, who found her to be articulate, bright and an impressive candidate. Ms. Ruparell was offered a position at Armbrae for the 2010/2011 year, teaching Grade 7 Science, along with Grade 11 and 12 Biology. [ 5 ] The position offered was not fulltime. It paid a salary of $28,000 per annum, on a “ pro-rated ” basis. Ms.

Ruparell signed a Memorandum of Agreement in June, accepting Armbrae ’ s offer of employment. [ 6 ] Although Ms. Ruparell was to commence her duties in late August, she was unable to do so given an injury requiring surgery and rehabilitation. She was able to report to her position on or around October 12, 2010, at which time she commenced teaching of the above noted classes. [ 7 ] Ms. Ruparell ’ s direct supervisor at Armbrae was Ms. Karen Fougere, the Senior School Director. Prior to the conclusion of the fall term in December of 2010, Ms. Fougere provided direction and input to Ms.

Ruparell with respect to her teaching methodology, class structure and resolving some student and parent concerns. Although some difficulties did arise during the first two months of Ms. Ruparell ’ s teaching, none were such that formal disciplinary steps were taken or considered. Nor did Ms. Fougere feel the need to discuss performance issues regarding Ms. Ruparell with the Headmaster. [ 8 ] All parties left for the December break anticipating Ms.

Ruparell ’ s employment would continue as contemplated in the Memorandum of Agreement. [ 9 ] It is the events which unfolded during the first week of the January school term which gives rise to the dispute. It is agreed that Ms. Ruparell and Mr. O ’ Meara met on January 4, and again on January 7, 2011. It is the statements made in the latter meeting and in particular, how such comments are to be objectively interpreted, which goes to the core of the present dispute. POSITION OF THE PARTIES

a) Ms. Ruparell [ 10 ] Ms. Ruparell asserts that at no time, did she resign from her position at Armbrae, and would have finished out the balance of her teaching contract. She testified that over the December break, and while in the process of preparing her lesson plans for the coming term, she began to question the “ push back ” she had receive from Ms. Fougere in relation to her teaching methodology. Ms.

Ruparell described that she endorses a student-driven method of teaching, with her pupils being expected, with her guidance, to seek out information, as opposed to a teacher at the front of a class room, being the sole deliverer of the curriculum. Although not dismissive or critical of this teaching approach, Ms. Fougere had directed Ms. Ruparell to adjust the percentage of time devoted to student-directed learning, favouring a heavier emphasis on a teacher lecture method. [ 11 ] Ms. Ruparell strongly believes in her preferred teaching methodology, and wanted to continue to utilize this approach.

She hoped that Armbrae would see the benefit of this, and permit her to continue to utilize this approach in the coming term. If this was not going to be possible, she was considering, as an option, seeking to be released from her contract. She requested to meet with Mr. O ’ Meara on January 4th to discuss these concerns. Ms. Ruparell testified she discussed her concerns with Mr. O ’ Meara, and confirmed that she raised with him the possibility of being released from her contract. The parties agreed to reconvene to discuss the matter later in the week, on January 7 th . [ 12 ] Ms.

Ruparell testified that on January 7th, she and Mr. O ’ Meara discussed matters further, including their respective options. She testified that at no time during the meeting did she definitively offer her resignation, although she acknowledges that she was still giving that serious consideration. Ms. Ruparell testified that she left the Friday meeting, with the understanding that both she and Mr. O ’ Meara would give matters further consideration over the weekend, and that a final determination would be reached on Monday, when a subsequent meeting was planned. [ 13 ] Ms.

Ruparell testified that she was shocked to receive an email from Mr. O ’ Meara on Monday, without the follow up meeting,

indicating that he accepted her resignation. [ 14 ] Ms. Ruparell claims damages amounting to the balance payable under the fixed term contract. With respect to the claim for general, aggravated and punitive damages, in his final submissions to the Court, Ms. Ruparell ’ s Counsel indicated that if this Court determined that Armbrae ’ s conduct following January 7th was based upon a genuine misunderstanding as to whether Ms. Ruparell resigned, that such claims could not be made out.

b) Armbrae [ 15 ] The position of Armbrae, as communicated by Mr. O ’ Meara, was that Ms. Ruparell clearly resigned during the January 7th meeting. The only issue left unresolved at the conclusion of that meeting was whether, or not, Mr. O ’ Meara would decide to accept the resignation. He would think about that over the weekend, and advise Ms. Ruparell accordingly on the following Monday, by way of a follow-up meeting. Mr. O ’ Meara testified that he concluded that it was in the best interest of the school, and most notably the students, that Ms.

Ruparell ’ s resignation be accepted, and he communicated this to her via email on Monday morning. Armbrae asserts that following the resignation being accepted, it hired a replacement teacher, only after that, Ms. Ruparell attempted to revoke the previous resignation. [ 16 ] Armbrae asserts that Ms. Ruparell was not wrongfully dismissed, nor was she treated in any manner which would attract the nature of damages being sought. It was asserted in the alternative, that if the Court determined that Ms.

Ruparell had been wrongfully terminated, the Court should not award the balance payable under the fixed term contract, rather a lesser sum reflective of Ms. Ruparell ’ s short-lived employment and failure to mitigate. ISSUES [ 17 ] The following issues are to be determined by the Court:

a) Did Ms. Ruparell resign from her position?

b) If it is found Ms. Ruparell did not resign, but was terminated, what damages, if any, should she be awarded? This involves a consideration of what special damages arise, as well as whether Ms. Ruparell appropriately sought to mitigate those damages, as well as the appropriateness of further general, aggravated and punitive damages. LAW AND DETERMINATION

a) Did Ms. Ruparell resign from her position? [ 18 ] Ms. Ruparell has the burden of establishing to the Court that she was, as alleged, wrongfully dismissed. As part of this, she submits that she did not resign. [ 19 ] It appears that both parties are in agreement with respect to the test this Court should apply to determine whether there was a

resignation in the present instance. An employee ’ s intention to resign must be clear and unequivocal. [ 20 ] In its pre-trial brief, the Defendant relies upon the test as outlined by Ball in Employment Law in Canada , (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2012) as follows: 8:10 RESIGNATION The test for determining whether an employee has resigned is an objective one.

As Millward, J. stated: “Given all the surrounding circumstances, would a reasonable person have understood by the plaintiff’s statement that he had just resigned?” In order to tender an effective resignation, an employee must have the legal capacity to contract. An offer of resignation may be revoked before there is acceptance thereof. If a letter of resignation is not accepted as offered, it is not binding on the employee and does not terminate the employment relationship. An employee may resile from a resignation, provided the employer has not relied upon it to its detriment.

For an employer to successfully argue that an employee has resigned, the evidence must be clear and unequivocal that the employee has actually resigned. To be clear and unequivocal, the resignation must objectively reflect an intention to resign, or conduct evidencing such an intention. [ 21 ] I have carefully considered the evidence of both Ms. Ruparell and Mr. O ’ Meara with respect to both the circumstances leading up to, and the discussions undertaken between them on January 7, 2011. In addition, both parties have sought to rely upon several email and text message exchanges undertaken by Ms.

Ruparell with family and friends following that meeting and over the subsequent weekend. Each party asserts that the content of those exchanges support their respective positions. [ 22 ] I find that Ms. Ruparell did not clearly and unequivocally resign her position on Friday, January 7, 2011, and as such, I determine that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment. In reaching the above conclusion, I accept the evidence of Ms. Ruparell that at the conclusion of the meeting, although she was strongly considering resigning, both she and Mr.

O ’ Meara agreed to think matters through over the weekend, with a final determination to be communicated over the weekend. I find Ms. Ruparell ’ s evidence in this regard preferable to that of Mr. O ’ Meara for several reasons. Ms. Ruparell has been consistent in her evidence as to her belief in the content and intentions expressed at the January 7 th meeting, and in relation to other matters. Although Mr. O ’ Meara has consistently put forward the view that he believed Ms.

Ruparell resigned during the January 7 th meeting, the Court does have concern with respect to other instances in the evidence where he has indicated that his original discovery evidence changed, after having discussions with others which served to “ refresh his memory ” of events. Ms. Ruparell ’ s evidence, in my view, is more reliable. [ 23 ] The text messages and emails submitted into evidence, do not, in my view, support the Defendant ’ s position that Ms. Ruparell unequivocally resigned on January 7 th . Within an hour of the meeting concluding, Ms.

Ruparell expresses to third parties that she “ thinks she just resigned ” from her position, but goes on to say that she has until Monday to think matters over at which time she will give a final decision. The Court has no hesitancy in concluding that Ms. Ruparell was considering various options, and resigning her position was one that she was very seriously considering. I further have no hesitancy in concluding that she conveyed this to Mr.

O ’ Meara during the January 7 th meeting, but giving serious consideration to resigning, reserving the weekend to give further consideration, does not constitute an unequivocal resignation. The text messages and emails support that this is the understanding Ms.Ruparell held, immediately following the meeting, and are supportive of her evidence regarding the substance of her discussions with Mr. O ’ Meara.

b) If it is found Ms. Ruparell did not resign, but was terminated, what damages, if any, should she be awarded? This involves a consideration of what special damages arise, as well as whether Ms. Ruparell appropriately sought to mitigate those damages, as well as the appropriateness of further general, aggravated and punitive damages . General, aggravated and punitive damages [ 24 ] It is perhaps easier to consider the latter part of the above issue first. As noted earlier, Plaintiff ’ s Counsel asserted that if this Court determined that Armbrae, through its Headmaster, was genuinely mistaken as to Ms. Ruparell ’ s intention to resign, and there was

no mala fides in its conduct, that the claims for damages, other than the special damages arising from the breach of contract, wereunwarranted. [25] Although I have found Ms. Ruparell’s evidence as to the content of the January 7th meeting preferable to that of Mr. O’Meara,I do accept his evidence that there was never any intent to treat Ms. Ruparell poorly or with maliciousness. I find that Mr. O’Mearaunderstood that Ms. Ruparell was resigning or would be imminently resigning, and he certainly was not aware of the “legal niceties” ofhow to deal with this unusual circumstance.

I find his conduct, including that following the January 7th meeting was motivated by hisdesire to provide stability for the students taught by Ms. Ruparell. In hindsight, he may have gone about matters differently, but again,his conduct was not malicious towards Ms. Ruparell. [26] The Court heard evidence that Ms. Ruparell was asked to leave the school, in the presence of work colleagues, when she visitedthe day following her termination. Again, although in hindsight, this matter may have been dealt with differently, it, and the otheraspects of Ms.

Ruparell’s treatment by Armbrae do not “offend the court’s sense of decency”, and do not serve to attract punitivedamages (see Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 30). [27] In terms of the general and aggravated damages sought by Ms. Ruparell, other than her indicating that she was “somewhathumiliated” to be asked to leave the school, no evidence was adduced regarding any further mental distress suffered. As directed by theSupreme Court in Keays v.

Honda Canada Inc., 2008 SCC 39, in order to attract such damages, the employer’s behaviour must not onlybe objectionable, the employee must establish that the manner of dismissal caused distress which was in the contemplation of theparties. The damage award is to reflect the actual damages suffered by the claimant, not an arbitrary figure. [28] Given the Court’s findings regarding the nature of Armbrae’s conduct, and the lack of evidence adduced to support a claim forgeneral or aggravated damages, Ms. Ruparell’s claims for general, aggravated and punitive damages are dismissed.

Damages for breach of contract [29] Having concluded that Ms. Ruparell did not resign, but was dismissed from her employment, the Court now turns to consideran appropriate quantum of damages. Ms. Ruparell asserts that as this is a fixed term contract, that she should be entitled to the balance ofunpaid wages she would have otherwise earned. Armbrae asserts that as Ms.

Ruparell was a part-time, probationary employee, thatpaying her until the end of January on a gratuitous basis, was more notice than required under the Labour Standards Code, R.S.N.S., andthat even if the Court determines she was dismissed, she has been provided adequate damages. [30] The Court does not accept that Ms. Ruparell was a “probationary” employee as that term is typically understood. As Mr.O’Meara confirmed in his evidence, that term was utilized in the Memorandum of Agreement as reflecting that the School was notobligated, after the term of the contract, to re-hire Ms. Ruparell in subsequent years.

Even if she was “probationary” in the usual sense,the fact that this dispute involves a fixed term contract, would not impact on the calculation of damages. Similarly, the LabourStandards Code, or common-law notice, or payment in lieu thereof, do not come into play in a fixed term contract. [31] The damages arising from termination of a fixed term contract was explained by Cacchione, J. in Nicholas v. Pictou LandingBand Council (2000), 2000 NSSC 42 , 189 N.S.R.(2d) 64 as follows: 60.

The measure of damages for breach of a fixed term contract is the recovery of wages the plaintiff would have received had the defendant performed the contract in the manner least disadvantageous to itself. In Employment Law in Canada (3rd) ed. (ButterworthsCanada, 1998), the authors discuss damages under a fixed term contract by stating at 14.3: Where an employee has been hired for a definite term, in the absence of just cause for

summary dismissal he or she can be terminatedonly by full payment of the contract amount of wages.

61. In Burton v. Howlett (1999), (NS SC), 178 N.S.R. (2d) 325 (N.S.S.C.) Hall, J. was dealing with an action forwrongful dismissal under a fixed term contract. In addressing the issue of damages he states as follows at page 337: This is not the ordinary case of wrongful dismissal where the court is obliged to fix the appropriate period of notice. The term ofemployment was fixed by the contract between the parties. The defendant breached that contract by dismissing the plaintiff without justcause.

Subject to any reduction for failure to mitigate, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover for the unexpired term of the contract or$46,000 as claimed by her counsel. [32] I adopt the above as reflective of the current law in relation to damages arising from breach of a fixed term contract. I turn nowto calculating damages, in particular the quantum of the unexpired term of Ms. Ruparell’s contract. [33] As a preliminary point, the Court feels compelled to comment upon the nature of the evidence provided in terms of thequantification of the Plaintiff’s claim.

At the commencement of trial, the parties filed a Joint Exhibit Book, a process which is nowencouraged by the Civil Procedure Rules, and of great assistance to the Court in most instances. At the conclusion of evidence, the Courtraised with Counsel that there were several documents contained within the Joint Exhibit Book which had not been referenced by anywitness in viva voce evidence. Having asked Counsel whether these documents should be considered by the Court, both parties advisedthat they wished the documents to form part of the evidence. [34] In her direct evidence, Ms.

Ruparell referenced the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between herself and Armbrae,dated on or about June 10, 2010. That agreement contained the following term: 3. In consideration of the foregoing, the School will pay the Teacher the total sum of Twenty-eight Thousand Dollars ($28,000) for theschool year 2010/2011, or pro rata for any part thereof, to be paid in equal installments of one-twelfth of the total salary on the fifteenth (15th) day of each month from September to August.” [35] Ms. Ruparell was delayed in commencing work, until on or about October 12, 2010.

In her testimony she was not asked howthe agreed salary was pro-rated in light of the delay, nor to confirm the amounts of salary actually received by her. She did confirm shewas paid until the end of January. The exhibit book contained documents described as “ADP Print Out of Employee Informationrespecting Shivani Ruparell” and “Record of Employment of Shivani Ruparell”, however, neither were referenced in the course oftestimony, nor in submissions. [36] In his cross-examination, it was put to Mr. O’Meara by Plaintiff’s counsel that the amount Ms. Ruparell was paid on a monthlybasis was $2333.33. Mr.

O’Meara indicated that he was not sure of the amount, but that the figure suggested to him “sounds right”. Mr.O’Meara was not directed to any financial documents. [37] As plaintiff, Ms. Ruparell has the burden of establishing her financial loss. The Court accepts that she was paid for a portion ofOctober, as well as the months of December and January. The Court also is aware that the contract provided for a total contract sum of $28,000, payable on a pro-rated basis. The contract further provides that payment was to be made on the 15th day of each month. Itprovided that Ms.

Ruparell’s duties would commence August 23, 2010 and conclude on June 21, 2011. [38] There was unfortunately, no direct evidence from Ms. Ruparell explaining what she received in terms of salary, or how it waspro-rated to reflect that she commenced her employment in mid-October, as opposed to August 23, 2010 as contemplated in theMemorandum of Agreement. Ms.

Ruparell claims the balance owing for the fixed term, but how does the Court calculate this, when itwas not clearly articulated in the evidence? [39] In addition to the two documents referenced above, there is also a document in the Joint Exhibit Book described as “CanadaRevenue Agency – 2010 Personal Tax Credit Return of Shivani Ruparell”. It was also not referenced by any witness, or in submissions. It has what appears to be a “sticky note” attached to the first page, containing handwritten calculations, which appear to be a calculationof wages paid on a monthly rate of $2333.33.

Although it may be a reasonable assumption that Ms. Ruparell prepared these calculations,it is not for the Court to seek out evidence to support a party’s claim, and to make assumptions in a vacuum.

[ 40 ] The Record of Employment does provide the Court with some assistance, but as will be further explained, it is limited. The Record of Employment discloses the following: Ms. Ruparell ’ s first day worked was October 12, 2010; The last day for which she was paid was January 7, 2011; and The final pay period ending date was January 31, 2011. [ 41 ] The ROE further contains in sections 15A and 15B respectively, total insurable hours of 320 and total insurable earnings of $8749.99 “ according to chart on reverse ” , respectively.

The reverse side of the ROE, which would have broken down how the hours and wages were calculated over each pay period, was not provided. This makes the information contained in the ROE difficult to interpret. In addition, the ROE indicates that “ the last day paid ” was January 7 th , which is directly in conflict with the evidence of both Ms. Ruparell and Mr. O ’ Meara that she was paid until the end of January. Is the ROE correct? Are the parties correct? [ 42 ] The final document relating to the issue of wages is the “ ADP Print out of Employee Information respecting Shivani Ruparell ” .

It appears, unlike the ROE, to be complete. It contains information relating to the standard hours of work per month as being 80.00 and the “ Salary per Pay ” as being $1750. It was dated October 12, 2010; the date Ms. Ruparell was able to commence work. [ 43 ] Without viva voce evidence, the Court is left with a difficult task in interp reting the above noted documents. A plaintiff, who carries the burden of establishing his or her damages, is well advised to not place a trier of fact in such a position. He or she does so at their peril. [ 44 ] Ms.

Ruparell is entitled to damages for breach of the fixed term contract. From the evidence and documents before the Court, I conclude that the original term sum of $28,000 was pro-rated due to the delay in commencing employment. As suggested in the “ ADP Print-out ” , Ms. Ruparell ’ s resulting monthly salary was to be $1750.00. I accept from both parties that Ms. Ruparell was paid until the end of January. Under the Memorandum of Agreement, should she have continued in her position, she would have received her last pay on August 15, 2012. This results in a remaining term of 6.5 months for which Ms.

Ruparell would have been paid, should the contract have been completed. This equates to a loss of $11375.00. [ 45 ] As was noted above, this determination is subject to Ms. Ruparell ’ s obligation to mitigate her damages. The Defendant asserts that Ms. Ruparell did not mitigate her damages, and that her damages should be reflective of this failure on her part. The burden to establish a failure to mitigate rests with the Defendant. [ 46 ] Ms. Ruparell testified that she made initial inquiries with respect to the potential for teaching jobs within Nova Scotia immediately following her dismissal.

She determined, given the poor job market, she would return home to Ontario, where she had family supports. Ms. Ruparell testified that she made efforts in that Province to obtain teaching positions, both immediately, and to secure potential placements for the following academic year. She testified she contacted School Boards, sent out her resume, and responded to job postings electronically.

When none of these efforts resulted in any type of employment in the teaching field, she started a tutoring company in the spring of 2011, however, that endeavour did not prove profitable. [ 47 ] Armbrae asserts that it was unreasonable for Ms. Ruparell to not accept employment in another field, suggesting that at a minimum, the wages which she could have earned at a minimum wage position should be deducted from any award. Further, Armbrae takes issue with Ms. Ruparell providing her family with clerical assistance in their business on a voluntary basis, during the same time frame. Ms.

Ruparell asserts that this clerical work was provided, not as employment per se, but as part of contributing to the overall family enterprise. Ms. Ruparell was living at home with her parents, rent free during this time. [ 48 ] Notwithstanding Ms. Ruparell not producing any documentary evidence of her re-employment attempts in the months following her termination, I accept her evidence that she diligently attempted to find a teaching position. I reject the Defendant ’ s

assertion that Ms. Ruparell, the holder of a Master of Education degree, with a passion for teaching, must accept a minimum wage job in order to fend off a mitigation argument. Ms. Ruparell was entitled to take a reasonable period of time to try to find a replacement teaching position, both during the remaining contract term, as well as for the upcoming school year. There is no evidence before the Court that the voluntary, part-time assistance she provided in her family business impeded her search efforts in any way. Further, the fact that Ms.

Ruparell, in the fall of 2011, requested a full time position in her father ’ s company, with more responsible duties, does not establish a failure to mitigate within the contract period. [ 49 ] Armbrae further takes issue with the fact that Ms. Ruparell took a week vacation in July and August respectively; suggesting this also establishes a failure to mitigate. I reject this argument. If the contract had not been terminated, Ms. Ruparell would have received wages in July and August, notwithstanding that her duties ended on June 23 rd .

She would have been entitled to payment during this time frame, even if she had secured alternate employment or chosen to spend the two months lounging on the beach. [ 50 ] Armbrae has failed to establish a failure to mitigate. CONCLUSION [ 51 ] Ms. Ruparell was wrongfully terminated from her position at Armbrae Academy. She is entitled to the balance of the contract sum owing under the fixed term contract, which is found to be $11375.00. [ 52 ] The Plaintiff claimed pre-judgment interest in her pleadings. Neither party addressed this in either their pre-trial briefs or oral submissions.

I will hear the parties on this issue, if necessary. [ 53 ] If the parties cannot agree with respect to pre-judgment interest as well as costs, written submissions should be provided to the Court on or before July 13, 2012. Bourgeois, J.