Morrison v. Morrison, 2015 NSSC 328

SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia FAMILY DIVISION Citation: Morrison v. Morrison , 2015 NSSC 328 Date: 20151118 Docket: SFSND 1206-6767 Registry: Sydney, Nova Scotia Between: Corry Lee Morrison Petitioner v. William Angus Morrison Respondent DECISION Judge: The Honourable Justice Robert M. Gregan Heard: October 6, 2015, in Sydney, Nova Scotia Written Release: December 4, 2015 Counsel: Christopher T. Conohan for the Petitioner Damien P. Barry for the Respondent By the Court: INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Corry Lee Morrison and William Angus Morrison lived together for about 14 years.

The separation was precipitated because criminal charges were laid against Mr. Morrison. Those criminal charges remain outstanding. Ms. Morrison asks the court to grant her exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and interim spousal support. ISSUES [ 2 ] The issues which the court will decide are: 1. What are the court’s credibility findings? 2. Should Ms. Morrison be granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial home? 3. Is there an entitlement by Ms. Morrison to spousal support? HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS [ 3 ] The parties lived together for about 12 years before they married on November 17, 2012.

They separated in September/October 2014. Mr. Morrison stands accused of a number of criminal offences involving Ms. Morrison.

[ 4 ] A Petition for Divorce had also been previously filed by Ms. Morrison on October 30, 2014. Because Mr. Morrison had not been served with the Petition, counsel for Mr. Morrison took the view that the Petition was stale-dated. [ 5 ] On June 25, 2015, an Application and Notice of Motion for Interim Relief was filed by Ms. Morrison wherein she sought spousal support and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. Mr. Morrison took the view that the Interim Application could not proceed given that the Petition was no longer properly before the court. [ 6 ] Ms. Morrison refiled.

The file number assigned to that Petition was the same file number of the original Petition from October 30, 2014. [ 7 ] The Interim Hearing was initially scheduled for a docket appearance on September 1, 2015, but at the request of the court, a telephone conference was held on August 31, 2015. During the pre-trial telephone conference, counsel for Mr. Morrison advised that he was prepared to accept service on behalf of his client.

The court directed that since service was accepted, the interim application regarding both exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and spousal support would be dealt with on the hearing set for October 6, 2015. [ 8 ] Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the court was asked to rule on the admissibility of medical evidence contained in the affidavit of Ms. Morrison. Attached to Ms. Morrison’s affidavit was a medical note from Dr. Ali setting out his treatment. Dr. Ali had been subpoenaed to attend court on October 6, 2015, but was unable to be served as he was out of the country.

In addition, medical particulars and the medical file in relation to Ms. Morrison had been requested by counsel for Mr. Morrison and was not provided prior to the trial. Given non-compliance with Rule 55, the court refused to admit the medical evidence. Dr. Ali’s evidence was not considered. [ 9 ] The court also made a number of rulings concerning the inadmissibility of provisions in the various affidavits. The offending provision were struck for Rule non-compliance, and thus not considered by the court. Evidence of the Petitioner, Corry Lee Morrison [ 10 ] Thirty-six year old Ms.

Morrison testified that she dated Mr. Morrison for about six months before commencing a common-law relationship with him. This common-law relationship lasted approximately 12 years when the parties married in November of 2012. The parties separated in September/October 2014, the separation occurring as a result of criminal charges being laid against Mr. Morrison in Cape Breton. [ 11 ] Ms. Morrison’s son, age 13, also lived with the parties. Because Mr. Morrison did not act in loco parentis of the child, no claim for child support was made. [ 12 ] Much of the evidence of the Ms.

Morrison, both in her affidavit evidence and in response to her questions posed by counsel, on cross-examination, centred around abuse that she purports was suffered at the hands of Mr. Morrison. She said the abuse began very shortly after commencing cohabitation and continued until the date of separation. [ 13 ] During their relationship, Ms. Morrison said that the family lived in Nova Scotia, Ontario, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. It was largely un-contradicted as to the duration of time that the parties lived in the various provinces. Ms. Morrison maintained that she followed Mr.

Morrison to those provinces to support him in his employment. [ 14 ] Mr. Morrison maintained that Ms. Morrison simply followed him out west and spent periods of time residing with other people. When pressed on cross-examination, Mr. Morrison acknowledged that during the times that they were residing in the western provinces, Ms. Morrison would perform household duties. He also conceded that while Ms. Morrison did live with other persons during what he termed “dust-ups”, these were for very short periods of time and Ms. Morrison always returned to live at home with him. [ 15 ] Ms.

Morrison’s evidence was that upon returning to Cape Breton, the abuse continued and Mr. Morrison was charged in Nova Scotia with offences that were alleged to have occurred in September of 2014. Those matters are still before the criminal court and no decision with respect to the innocence or guilt of Mr. Morrison has been made. [ 16 ] Attached to Ms. Morrison’s affidavit is a Recognizance which sets out the terms and conditions of Mr. Morrison’s release. Ms. Morrison maintains that Mr. Morrison has not been in compliance with the Recognizance.

More will be referred to in my decision on this point. [ 17 ] Since the separation in September/October 2014, Ms. Morrison maintains that she is unable to work and the inference she wishes to have the court draw is that she is unable to work because she is not capable, emotionally or physically, because of the abuse of the Mr. Morrison. [ 18 ] Ms. Morrison has been living in the matrimonial home situate in Glace Bay. Mr. Morrison is currently on a Recognizance which prohibits him from being at the matrimonial home. In her affidavit evidence and on cross-examination, Ms.

Morrison gave evidence with respect to a vehicle that had been parked in the driveway at the matrimonial home, which was removed without permission at the direction of Mr. Morrison. Evidence of the Respondent, William Morrison [ 19 ] Mr. Morrison gave evidence through the exhibits, as well as on cross-examination. Mr. Morrison vehemently denied the allegations of abuse. He further denied that he was controlling with respect to the finances, accessing bank accounts or financial information shared between the parties. [ 20 ] Mr. Morrison also disputed the extent of the common-law union.

He maintained that there were periods of time when the parties were not living common-law, especially in the western provinces.

[ 21 ] On cross-examination, Mr. Morrison admitted that the amount of time Ms. Morrison spent with third parties was for brief periods, and following which the parties always reconciled. [ 22 ] Mr. Morrison, in addition to denying the claims of abuse alleged by Ms. Morrison, also took issue with an assertion that Ms. Morrison did not drink or do drugs until after she began cohabitating with him. Mr. Morrison’s position is that Ms. Morrison always had a substance abuse problem, which was hidden from him and which only became apparent to him after cohabitation. [ 23 ] On cross-examination, Mr.

Morrison agreed that he drank more than Ms. Morrison and that he would often share his alcohol with Ms. Morrison, despite the fact that it was becoming apparent to him that Ms. Morrison was having difficulty and was abusing substances, which included not only alcohol, but drugs. He also admitted that on one occasion he took Ms. Morrison to a drug dealer to obtain illicit drugs. ANALYSIS [ 24 ] What are the court’s credibility findings? [ 25 ] The court, as trier of fact, is entitled to accept some, none or all of the evidence of the parties. Having heard the evidence in this matter, where the evidence of Ms.

Morrison contradicts the evidence of Mr. Morrison, I find Ms. Morrison to be credible and reject the evidence of Mr. Morrison. There were a number of areas where their evidence differed. [ 26 ] The court will set out some examples where there was a discrepancy in the evidence. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather by way of example. Living Arrangements [ 27 ] The court heard evidence regarding various locations where the parties resided throughout their cohabitation and marriage. [ 28 ] Ms.

Morrison gave detailed evidence as to the length of time and positions that she held in Sarnia, Ontario and out west. I found her evidence credible because she was able to recite, in detail, the particulars of the jobs she held and the length of time that she was employed. It was clear from her evidence that these jobs were temporary and that Mr. Morrison was the main bread winner for the parties. The jobs she did take over were of a short duration and were following Mr.

Morrison, while advancing his career, and that in addition to her holding these jobs, the parties agreed that her duties would be to set up housekeeping for the parties during those periods of time. [ 29 ] Mr. Morrison acknowledged this in cross-examination begrudgingly wherein when asked about her abilities in terms of looking after the house, when following him out west on cross-examination, he did acknowledge that she performed her duties looking after the household, however, that with respect to most of the duties, including making meals that she “did not do it very well”.

Debt Acquired After Separation [ 30 ] The court also heard evidence from the parties regarding debt which was accumulated in the name of Mr. Morrison. Mr. Morrison advanced post-separation that Ms. Morrison had accumulated a large amount of debt in his absence while working in British Columbia to feed her substance abuse. His assertion was that those debts were acquired in his name fraudulently by Ms. Morrison, without his knowledge. Ms. Morrison denied these allegations. [ 31 ] The court accepts Ms. Morrison’s evidence on this point for the following reasons: [ 32 ] It was obvious from the evidence of Ms.

Morrison that, throughout the course of the relationship, she had very little control or say over the payment of bills and the record keeping and financing of the parties. [ 33 ] I found her evidence credible on this point because it was given in a straight-forward manner and she was able to recall, with clarity, events and times when she was, for instance, locked out of the home by Mr. Morrison and had to obtain assistance to get into the home. I accept her evidence that Mr. Morrison would not allow her to have control of the finances and maintained belongings in order to keep control over her.

This was acknowledged by Mr. Morrison on the stand when, in cross-examination, when asked about whether or not he would withhold banking cards, personal identification, or other documents from Ms. Morrison and his response was that he would often keep them as Ms. Morrison would “lose things”. Mr. Morrison then stated, however, that after arguments if Ms. Morrison was leaving the home for a cooling-off period, he would always return those items to her “if she asked”. I find that this type of evidence lends credibility to Mr.

Morrison being controlling with respect to the parties’ finances and the relationship between the parties. [ 34 ] The court heard much evidence about bills that were purported to have been incurred by Ms. Morrison and lines of credit having been applied for and run-up in Mr. Morison’s name. When asked in cross-examination about those items, Ms. Morrison was adamant, with the exception of a portion of a bill from the Shopping Channel, wherein a couple of items of jewelry were purchased with Mr. Morrison’s knowledge, that she was not responsible for the bills claimed by Mr. Morrison.

She explained that she would never purchase items, particularly items such as jewelry without first seeking permission and approval from Mr. Morrison. I found Ms. Morrison credible on this point since, as the court has already alluded to, the court finds that it was Mr. Morrison who had control of the finances and records. The court accepts, as well, that after separation it was Mr. Morrison who received and had access to the bills and financial records, which were delivered to the home of Mr. Morrison’s sister.

Demeanour Evidence [ 35 ] While not determinative of matters, the court would make the following observations with respect to the demeanour of the parties while testifying. Ms. Morrison’s evidence was given in a straight-forward manner. Throughout her evidence, Ms. Morrison was emotional, could be seen visibly shaking while testifying. At one point, she appeared to be having difficulty breathing and a brief adjournment of 15 minutes was given to allow Ms. Morrison time to compose herself.

[ 36 ] In contrast, Mr. Morrison was evasive in his answers on cross-examination and at one point challenged counsel by answering a question posed to him with a question of his own. [ 37 ] Other areas of evidence to note regarding Mr. Morrison’s evidence were as follows: [ 38 ] Mr. Morrison, on cross-examination, admitted that while he (up until about two months’ ago), has paid for the heat and lights, cable and telephone bills and property taxes, he did not pay for any heating costs (oil or the day-to-day necessities for Ms. Morrison, i.e. groceries or food).

His response was that when the parties separated in the Fall of 2014, that the fridge was full of groceries. Mr. Morrison also questioned the amounts that Ms. Morrison had listed in her monthly expenses, which from the court’s perspective, appeared extremely modest. [ 39 ] In relation to his own financial circumstances, Mr. Morrison testified that he was laid off on August 2, 2015 and introduced into evidence at the hearing on October 6, 2015, a copy of a document purporting to be a layoff notice, which he said was presented to him and that he was asked to sign on August 2, 2015.

No other documentation supporting his layoff has been provided and the document with respect to the layoff was provided to the court and to counsel on October 6, 2015. [ 40 ] Finally, in his evidence, Mr. Morrison admitted as well that he has not been in compliance with the Recognizance pointing to the fact that he misunderstood that he was to remain at the Cambridge Suites as a part of his Recognizance. In addition, Mr. Morrison also admitted that he has been in contact with Ms. Morrison via text – in direct violation of the Recognizance. [ 41 ] Should Ms.

Morrison be granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial home? Position of the Parties [ 42 ] Ms. Morrison urges the court to order interim exclusive possession of the home pursuant to Sections 11 and 19 of the Matrimonial Property Act . Ms. Morrison also points out that Mr. Morrison is currently on a Recognizance, which requires him not only to not enter the matrimonial home but also to be out of the town of Glace Bay. [ 43 ] Ms. Morrison also asks the court to consider that due to her condition, she is unable to re-establish herself in a new residence at this time and that Mr.

Morrison has the means and abilities to reside elsewhere. [ 44 ] Mr. Morrison argues that an Order should not be granted to Ms. Morrison for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and contents because he is of the view that he was the primary owner of the home prior to the relationship with Ms. Morrison. In addition, he argues that since being laid off, it has required him to find alternate accommodations which are no longer covered by his employment and given these added costs, he should be given exclusive possession of the home.

Decision [ 45 ] Sections 11 and 19 of the Matrimonial Property Act provide authority to the court to grant an order for interim exclusive possession. The factors which I must consider are set out in s. 11(4), which provides as follows: Conditions for order for possession

(4) The court may only make an order for possession of the matrimonial home under subsection (1) or (3) where, in the opinion of the court, (

a) other provision for shelter is not adequate in the circumstances; or (

b) it is in the best interests of a child to make such an order. *** Interim order 19 The court may make such interim order as it considers necessary for the proper application of this Act, pending the bringing or disposition of an application under this Act. [ 46 ] I am granting Ms. Morrison interim exclusive possession. She has no other adequate provision for shelter in the circumstances. She is not employed and based upon her evidence, I find that she is not currently in a position to seek other accommodations either financially or emotionally. As referred to in her evidence, Ms.

Morrison, in giving her evidence, was upset, frightened, and having difficulty dealing with day-to-day routines. [ 47 ] In contrast, Mr. Morrison has already secured other shelter which is adequate and has the financial means to do so. [ 48 ] In addition, based upon the evidence, which the court has heard to date , the court has serious concerns about the ability of Mr. Morrison to follow court orders. He has, in his own evidence, admitted to breaching the Recognizance which is in place with respect to residency at the Cambridge Suites, which was not adhered to, as well as contacting Ms.

Morrison directly. [ 49 ] The court has no confidence that Mr. Morrison would preserve the matrimonial home and contents in the absence of an Order giving Ms. Morrison exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and contents. The court has authority to order, pursuant to

Section 19 of the Matrimonial Property Act , such orders “as it considers necessary”. Given the circumstances, I find it is necessary. [ 50 ] Furthermore, in addition to this proceeding, there is also matters before the criminal court, and there is in place, a criminal Recognizance which prevents Mr. Morrison from being around the matrimonial home. Therefore, logically a court order under the Matrimonial Property Act, confirming this, is appropriate.

[51] Is there an entitlement by Ms. Morrison to spousal support? Position of the Parties [52] Ms. Morrison seeks spousal support in keeping with the Spousal Support Guidelines. Ms. Morrison also asks the court to findthat she suffers from a disability and is unable to work at the present time. Finally, she asks the court to impute an income based uponMr. Morrison’s 2014 income tax information, given his abrupt termination of employment. [53] Mr. Morrison takes the view that spousal support should not be awarded in the circumstances of this case. He basis thisconclusion on the facts that: 1.

The parties’ marriage was of a limited duration; 2. The parties’ marriage was non-traditional in nature; 3. Ms. Morrison did not contribute, in any way, to Mr. Morrison’s career; 4. Ms. Morrison has not provided clear, cogent and convincing evidence of an inability to work; 5. Mr. Morrison argues that any referrals for medical treatment on behalf of Ms. Morrison had been due to her drug dependency issues,and not owing to any alleged abuse on his part; 6. Ms. Morrison is young and qualified as an esthetician and, therefore, has the ability to earn income. 7. Mr.

Morrison is unemployed and is currently on EI Benefits; and, 8. Mr. Morrison has continued to maintain the household bills while Ms. Morrison enjoys exclusive possession of the matrimonialhome. [54]

Section 15.2 of the Divorce Act, provides the court with the jurisdiction to award spousal support. The factors I must considerare set out in s. 15.2(4), which reads as follows: Spousal support order 15.2

(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration thecondition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including (

a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (

b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (

c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. [55] The objectives are set out in

section 15.2(6) which reads as follows: 15.2(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; *** (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. [56] I have considered these provisions. [57] In Bracklow v. Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, the Supreme Court of Canada, set out three groundsupon which a spouse may be entitled to spousal support under the Divorce Act, as follows: 1. Compensatory; 2. Contractual; 3. Non-compensatory. [58] The court is also reminded of the comments as set out in Richards v. Richards

(2012) NSCA 7 at a hearing with respect tointerim spousal support, the emphasis is to be placed upon the means and needs, rather than the ultimate entitlement issue. Nonetheless,I am satisfied that there are both compensatory and non-compensatory factors upon which an interim order can issue. These factors areas follows: 1. Ms. Morrison uprooted on several occasions to follow Mr. Morrison out west as he advanced his career. These moves negativelyimpacted upon Ms. Morrison’s financial independence. 2. Ms. Morrison, at times, assumed the role of homemaker and secondary wage earner.

3. There is a significant disparity in the income earning capacity of the parties after separation. Mr. Morrison earned in excess of $200,000.00 in 2014, while Ms. Morrison’s income for 2014 was approximately $9,900.00. [ 59 ] I am also satisfied, given the evidence that I have heard at this interim hearing that there clearly is a need by Ms. Morrison for spousal support. There is also clearly means whereby Mr. Morrison has the ability to pay spousal support. [ 60 ] The court relies on a recent decision of Carter v. Carter 2015 NSJ 404 .

There, Associate Chief Justice O’Neil, dealing with the issue of interim spousal support, made an Order for interim support in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, so long as the Petitioner, Mrs. Carter, was in the matrimonial home in Port Hawkesbury, which was listed to be sold. The amount of $2,100.00 per month was based upon a projected income of $106,000.00 - $107,000.00 per year to the husband. The Order further allowed that upon Mrs. Carter vacating the home, the amount of spousal support was to be increased to $3,300.00 per month.

The higher amount was ordered, taking into account the added share of expenses that Mrs. Carter would incur after leaving the home following the sale. [ 61 ] In Carter as well, the Petitioner advanced post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of abuse that had occurred at the hands of the Respondent, Mr. Carter. Unlike in the Carter case, the court does not, at this stage, have the benefit of medical evidence to support a diagnosis of PTSD. This matter, if applicable, can be determined at trial.

It need not be resolved on an interim motion. [ 62 ] What is the appropriate quantum of spousal support that should be paid by Mr. Morrison to Ms. Morrison? [ 63 ] To establish quantum, I must determine the number of years of cohabitation and Ms. Morrison’s income. Position of the Parties on Cohabitation [ 64 ] Mr. Morrison asks the court to limit a calculation of spousal support under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines to the length of the marriage of approximately two years. Ms. Morrison urges the court to consider the entire period of cohabitation. Decision [ 65 ] I prefer the approach suggested by Ms.

Morrison. The authorities make it very clear that when considering the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, their application is for the period of cohabitation as opposed to strictly the period of marriage. Position of the Parties on Income [ 66 ] As already referred to, having established that a period of cohabitation was approximately fourteen years, what then is the appropriate level of income to be attributed to Mr. Morrison? Mr. Morrison’s counsel, Mr. Barry, urges the court to consider the fact that Mr. Morrison is currently in receipt of EI Benefits. In his evidence, however, Mr.

Morrison has not yet received the EI Benefits and is uncertain as to the amount but noted that he will have $300.00 deducted off of each EI payment that he receives for Union Dues. He has not specified what his amount of EI income will be. [ 67 ] Mr. Conohan, on behalf of Ms. Morrison, urges the court to impute income to Mr. Morrison based upon his 2014 Notice of Assessment of $234,000.00. Decision [ 68 ] The Statement of Income of Mr. Morrison, Exhibit # 11 , shows that as of August 8, 2015, Mr.

Morrison had a year-to-date income of $126,794.00. [ 69 ] Furthermore, Exhibit #9 was introduced, which was a copy of a layoff notice of Mr. Morrison. The evidence of Mr. Morrison on cross-examination was that he was presented with a copy of the layoff notice on August 2, 2015 and asked to sign it. He gave no explanation as to why he was laid off, other than the document itself, which is a hand-written note, which indicates, “shortage of work”. No ROE was provided. As the court has noted previously, Mr.

Morrison was reported to have been laid off on August 2, 2015, after he became aware of the Petition for Divorce. Furthermore, the documentation setting out the layoff was not introduced with the court until October 6, 2015 and a copy was not provided to counsel for Ms. Morrison, prior to that date. The court has grave concerns with respect to the timing of Mr. Morrison’s layoff. As was pointed out by counsel for Ms. Morrison, Mr. Morrison had an income of $234,000.00 in 2014. [ 70 ] In Richards v.

Richards , supra, Bryson, J.A., held that “means is a broad term” that includes “all financial resources, capital and income, as well as earning capacity” (see paragraph 45). In Ferguson v. Ferguson, [2014] NSJ No. 506, para. 52 , the court reminds us that the burden is on the Respondent, on a balance of probabilities, by the production of clear, convincing and cogent evidence proving income substantially lower than previous years’ earnings. [ 71 ] I find, based on the evidence, Mr. Morrison has failed to do so. I do not accept Mr. Morrison’s position on income for the following reasons: 1. Mr.

Morrison provided no particulars of ancillary job search efforts. 2. Mr. Morrison’s alleged layoff was not convincing. As already referenced, no ROE’s were submitted. The purported layoff was on a hand-written note. 3. The layoff was convenient. It took place coincidentally upon Mr. Morrison’s knowledge of the current divorce proceedings being commenced and interim maintenance motion being filed. 4. Mr. Morrison has a history of earning substantial income in the vicinity of $200,000.00. His income for 2014 was $234,000.00. His income for 2013 was $146,782.00. As of August 8, 2015, Mr.

Morrison’s year-to-date income was $126,794.00 and he will continue to earn income through EI benefits.

[ 72 ] For the purposes of setting spousal support, the court imputes an income to Mr. Morrison of $200,000.00. I impute this income based upon the history of past earnings and earning capacity as set out above. [ 73 ] A review of the exhibits in the proceedings shows that Ms. Morrison’s income was made up on income from Social Assistance, Child Tax Benefit and child support paid by the father of her thirteen year old son.

I do not consider these sources as income for purposes of analysis under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines. [ 74 ] Under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines a low, medium and high range are set out. Factors to be considered are as follows: 1. Mr. Morrison has experienced a recent layoff; 2. The fact that there has been payment of the property taxes and minimal contributions by Mr. Morrison, up until at least the last two months; 3. Ms. Morrison has had the benefit of living in the matrimonial home rent free, while Mr.

Morrison has been laid off and has the added cost of accommodations. [ 75 ] I, therefore, find taking into account all of the circumstances, that this is an appropriate case to apply the low range of the Guidelines. Mr. Morrison must pay spousal support in the amount of $3,250.00 per month, commencing September 1, 2015. There are procedural issues owing to the fact that the Petition had been filed in 2014. Therefore, the issue of retroactive support will be dealt with more fully at a later stage.

It is also not appropriate to deal with the issue of retroactive support at an interim hearing, given the number of other factors such as division of matrimonial property and debt, which must be considered in an ultimate determination of spousal support. CONCLUSION [ 76 ] In

summary then, the court orders: 1. Pursuant to Sections 11 and 19 of the Matrimonial Property Act , Ms. Morrison shall have interim exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and contents, until otherwise ordered by the court. 2. Mr. Morrison must pay spousal support to Ms. Morrison, in the amount of $3,250.00 per month, commencing September 1, 2015, payable until otherwise ordered by the court. Support to be paid through the Maintenance Enforcement Program. COSTS [ 77 ] The court also received submissions for costs. Mr. Conohan, on behalf of Ms. Morrison, seeks costs in the amount of $5,000.00. Mr.

Barry, on behalf of Mr. Morrison, urges the court to make no award for costs. [ 78 ] Rule 77 of the Civil Procedure Rules and the Costs and Fees Act set out the appropriate Tariffs with respect to costs. This matter came before the court by way of motion for a one day hearing. While evidence (and submissions) took place over a period of two days – the total amounted to approximately a one day hearing. I, therefore, order costs in the amount of $2,000.00 payable to Ms. Morrison by Mr. Morrison, representing the amount in the range of costs under Tariff C for a contested hearing of one day or more.

This will ensure justice between the parties and is in keeping with the factors outlined in Rule 77 . Gregan, J.