Rideout v. Woodman, 2016 NSSC 205

SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia FAMILY DIVISION Citation: Rideout v. Woodman , 2016 NSSC 205 Date: 2016-08-05 Docket: Sydney No. 1206-004440 Registry: Sydney Between: Kyle Rideout Applicant v. Rachel Woodman Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Theresa M. Forgeron Heard: March 23 and April 29, 2016, in Sydney, Nova Scotia Written Decision: August 5, 2016 Counsel: Liam Gillis for Kyle Rideout Nicole MacIsaac for Rachel Woodman By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] Kyle Rideout and Rachel Woodman are former spouses who are locked in a dispute over child support. [ 2 ] Mr.

Rideout wants the court to retroactively decrease child support and forgive outstanding arrears. His request is premised on two factors. First, Mr. Rideout states that his child support obligation was terminated, or at least suspended, because of a 2010 agreement that the parties’ two children would be adopted by Ms. Woodman and her husband. In the alternative, Mr. Rideout argues that for several years, his annual income was significantly less than that upon which the current order is based. His variation application should therefore be granted. [ 3 ] For her part, Ms. Woodman strenuously disputes Mr.

Rideout’s claim. She notes that Mr. Rideout’s legal obligation to pay child support did not terminate because the adoption was not finalized. In addition, Ms. Woodman asks that income be retroactively imputed to Mr. Rideout, and that a sizeable retroactive payment be granted, including an order for the payment of retroactive and prospective s. 7 expenses for orthodontic and cheerleading expenses. [ 4 ] I will now determine the contested issues. Issues [ 5 ] In my analysis, the following questions will be addressed: • What is the effect of the proposed adoption on Mr.

Rideout’s support obligation? • Has either party proven a material change in circumstances? • Should the table amount set out in the 2005 order be varied? • Should an order for the payment of s.7 orthodontic and cheerleading expenses be granted retroactively or prospectively? Background Information

[6] The parties were married in April 1999. They have two children, one born in 1999 and the other in 2001. The marriage wasnot lengthy. The divorce was finalized in October 2003. [7] Only nominal child support was payable at the time of the divorce. The Corollary Relief Judgment states that “[u]pon theRespondent, Kyle Leonard Rideout, resuming work he is to pay child support in line with the Federal Child Support Guidelines.” [8] About 18 months later, in May 2005, a variation order issued based on Ms. Woodman’s application. Although he was servedwith the variation application, Mr.

Rideout did not participate in the proceedings because he was incarcerated at the time. The May 2005order directed Mr. Rideout to pay monthly child support of $306. This Guideline amount is based on an annual income of $21,600 giventhe Tables in effect at the time. [9] Mr. Rideout did not become aware of the 2005 child support order until 2009 when his wages were garnished. In March 2010,Mr. Rideout therefore commenced a variation application. [10] The parties participated in the conciliation process as a result of Mr. Rideout’s variation application.

During conciliation, it wasloosely agreed that the matter would be concluded by Ms. Woodman and her spouse adopting the children. To enable the adoptionapplication, Mr. Rideout signed and returned a consent to adoption that was drafted by Ms. Woodman’s lawyer. Mr. Rideout incorrectlyassumed that his variation application was resolved. [11] Unbeknownst to Mr. Rideout, the adoption was not finalized for a number of reasons including the fact that Ms. Woodman wasunable to obtain the consent of the Department of Community Services to forgive outstanding maintenance arrears.

In addition, Ms.Woodman was financially strapped; she could not afford the adoption application. [12] In November 2013, Mr. Rideout filed a second application to vary, despite the fact that his 2010 variation application had notbeen concluded. He did so because his wages were once again being garnished. It was at this point, that Mr. Rideout discovered that theadoption had not been advanced. [13] Mr. Rideout did not perfect his variation applications; financial disclosure remained outstanding. In January 2015, an order wasgranted that directed Mr. Rideout to file his income tax returns from 2009 until 2014.

The order also stated that once the income taxreturns and assessments were filed with the court, the variation application would be scheduled. [14] Mr. Rideout eventually filed the requisite disclosure. A date assignment conference was held on September 30, 2015. [15] In November 2015, Ms. Woodman filed a response in which she sought to retroactively increase child support, and to obtainpayment for various s. 7 expenses. [16] The initial hearing date of December 14, 2015 was adjourned at Mr. Rideout’s request and given the consent of the parties. Thehearing was rescheduled to March 23, 2016.

The hearing could not be completed on that day; it was continued on April 29. The parties,and each of their spouses, filed affidavits and were subject to cross-examination. Ms. Woodman and her husband testified via videoconference pursuant to the orders for commission. Oral submissions supplemented the written materials filed by counsel. The courtadjourned for decision. Analysis [17] What is the effect of the proposed adoption on Mr. Rideout’s support obligation? Position of the Parties [18] Mr.

Rideout states that his support obligation terminated, or at least was suspended, once he executed the consent to adoptionwhich Ms. Woodman’s lawyer drafted. Mr. Rideout further notes that neither Ms. Woodman, nor her husband, advised him that theadoption had not been processed. Mr. Rideout states that Ms. Woodman should be estopped from failing to advance the adoptionapplication given his good faith reliance. [19] In contrast, Ms. Woodman states that Mr. Rideout’s legal obligation was never terminated because the adoption was notfinalized.

Decision [20] I find that the loose adoption agreement discussed by the parties during the 2010 conciliation process did not terminate Mr.Rideout’s child support obligation for the following reasons: • The adoption was not advanced; adoption was only a potential solution that never materialized. • A proposal to adopt does not trigger a termination of the parent child relationship as envisaged in s. 80 of the Children and FamilyServices Act. • Child support is the right of the child; parents cannot barter away child support through contractual covenants: Richardson v.Richardson, (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857. [21] I also note that this conclusion is in keeping with the comments of Campbell, J. in K. v .D., 2004 NSSF 115, para 19. [22] In reaching this conclusion, I nonetheless recognize that Mr.

Rideout was led to believe that the adoption would occur. Therefore, any financial hardship which may have arisen from Mr. Rideout’s reliance on the executed consent to adoption, is bestexamined in the context of the retroactive claim for child support and in the repayment

schedule for any outstanding arrears.

[23] Has either party proven a material change in circumstances? [24] Before a court can vary a child support order, the moving party must prove that a material change in circumstances has occurredsince the granting of the last court order. Each of the parties argues that a material change in circumstances has occurred. Position of Mr. Rideout [25] Mr. Rideout states that a material change has been proven in that his income was, for the most part, significantly less than thatpredicted in the last court order. Mr. Rideout further opines that income should not be imputed to him.

He notes that employmentopportunities were not only hampered by a lack of skills and experience, but also by his incarceration. He states that having a criminalrecord negatively affected employment opportunities. He further states that he was off work for a period of time because of backsurgery, and then for educational reasons. He enrolled in the METI course to assist in obtaining work out west. [26] Mr.

Rideout states that his income for child support purposes is as shown on line 150 of his income tax returns as follows: Year Line 150 Income2005 $14,5922006 $11,7952007 $8,7572008 $6,4312009 $6,8242010 $32,4652011 $24,2362012 $19,6822013 $5,0492014 $3,2672015 (T4s) $20,032 Position of Ms. Woodman [27] For her part, Ms. Woodman states that a material change in circumstances has been proven for two reasons. First, incomeshould be imputed to Mr. Rideout because he was underemployed. Ms. Woodman says that Mr. Rideout did not produce sufficientevidence to properly advance his claim of a reduced ability to earn income.

From Ms. Woodman’s perspective, Mr. Rideout was, and is,capable of earning at least $32,000 per year, as he did in 2010. [28] Second, Ms. Woodman, further notes that the 2005 order did not contemplate orthodontic and cheerleading expenses which shesubsequently incurred and which satisfy the material change in circumstances criteria. Law [29] Given these submissions, I must now determine if income should be imputed to Mr. Rideout since the 2005 court order. InSmith v. Helppi, 2011 NSCA 65 (N.S. C.A.), para 16, Oland J.A. approved the factors outlined by Dr. Julien D.

Payne, in ImputingIncome, "Determination of Income; Disclosure of Income", Child Support in Canada, Danrab Inc., August 3, 1999 as quoted byMartinson, J. in Hanson v. Hanson, (BC SC), [1999] B.C.J. No. 2532 and by Wilson J. in Gould v. Julian, 2010NSSC 123 (N.S.S.C.). These factors are as follows: • There is a duty to seek employment in a case where a parent is healthy and there is no reason why the parent cannot work. It is "noanswer for a person liable to support a child to say he is unemployed and does not intend to seek work or that his potential to earn incomeis an irrelevant factor." (V. (J.A.) v.

V. (M.C.) at para 30.) • When imputing income on the basis of intentional under-employment, a court must consider what is reasonable under thecircumstances. The age, education, experience, skills and health of the parent are factors to be considered in addition to such matters asavailability of work, freedom to relocate and other obligations. • A parent's limited work experience and job skills do not justify a failure to pursue employment that does not require significantskills, or employment in which the necessary skills can be learned on the job.

While this may mean that job availability will be at thelower end of the wage scale, courts have never sanctioned the refusal of a parent to take reasonable steps to support his or her childrensimply because the parent cannot obtain interesting or highly paid employment. • Persistence in unremunerative employment may entitle the court to impute income.

• A parent cannot be excused from his or her child support obligations in furtherance of unrealistic or unproductive careeraspirations. • As a general rule, a parent cannot avoid child support obligations by a self-induced reduction of income. [30] In Parsons v. Parsons, 2012 NSSC 239, paras 32 and 33, this court distilled other principles applicable to s. 19 imputationclaims as follows: • The discretionary authority found in s.19 must be exercised judicially, and in accordance with rules of reason and justice, notarbitrarily.

A rational and solid evidentiary foundation, grounded in fairness and reasonableness, must be shown before a court canimpute income: Coadic v. Coadic, 2005 NSSC 291 (N.S.S.C.). • The goal of imputation is to arrive at a fair estimate of income, not to arbitrarily punish the payor: Staples v. Callender, 2010NSCA 49 (N.S.C.A.). • The burden of establishing that income should be imputed rests upon the party making the claim, however, the evidentiary burdenshifts if the payor asserts that his/her income has been reduced or his/her income earning capacity is compromised by ill health:MacDonald v.

MacDonald, 2010 NSCA 34 (N.S.C.A.); MacGillivary v. Ross, 2008 NSSC 339 (N.S.S.C.). • The court is not restricted to actual income earned, but rather, may look to income earning capacity, having regard to subjectivefactors such as the payor's age, health, education, skills, employment history, and other relevant factors. The court must also look toobjective factors in determining what is reasonable and fair in the circumstances: Smith v. Helppi, 2011 NSCA 65 (N.S.C.A.); VanGool v. Van Gool (1998), (BC CA), 113 B.C.A.C. 200 (B.C.C.A.); Hanson v. Hanson, (BC SC),[1999] B.C.J.

No. 2532 (B.C.S.C.); Saunders-Roberts v. Roberts, 2002 NWTSC 11 (N.W.T.S.C.); and Duffy v. Duffy, 2009 NLCA 48(N.L.C.A.). • A party's decision to remain in an unremunerative employment situation, may entitle a court to impute income where the party hasa greater income earning capacity. A party cannot avoid support obligations by a self-induced reduction in income: Duffy v. Duffy,supra; and Marshall v.

Marshall (2007), 2008 NSSC 11 (N.S.S.C.). • The test to be applied in determining whether a person is intentionally under-employed or unemployed is reasonableness, whichdoes not require proof of a specific intention to undermine or avoid child maintenance obligations. Decision [31] I have applied the law stated above based upon the evidence presented at the hearing. In so doing, I have decided that incomeshould be imputed for some of the years in question, while in other years, I have declined to do so. My reasons for so doing are outlinedbelow. 2005 [32] I have imputed income of $21,600 to Mr.

Rideout for 2005 based on the 2005 order for the following reasons: • Mr. Rideout was aware that court proceedings had been initiated and did nothing to respond to the variation application. • Although incarcerated, Mr. Rideout nonetheless could have participated. Transport orders are routinely issued when family lawlitigants are incarcerated and express an interest in attending court hearings. • Mr. Rideout was financially eligible for Legal Aid if he wanted to retain legal counsel. He also could have participated as anunrepresented litigant. He could have responded in some fashion. Mr.

Rideout chose not to do so. Instead, he ignored the courtproceedings. In such circumstances, Mr. Rideout is not in a position to complain about the outcome: Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25,para 34. • Orders are presumed correct and must be respected for a reasonable period before being subject to variation: Conrad v. Rafuse,2002 NSCA 60, per Roscoe, J.A., para 25 2006 to 2009 [33] I decline to impute income to Mr. Rideout between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2009 because he was incarcerated forsome of these years and was unable to secure meaningful employment for a period of time after he was released.

I accept that a criminalrecord and a period of incarceration negatively impact on employability, especially in Mr. Rideout’s circumstances. 2010

[ 34 ] I accept that Mr. Rideout earned $32,465 in 2010 and that no further imputation is sought for that year. Imputation would be inappropriate in any event. 2011, 2012 and 2015 [ 35 ] I decline to impute income for 2011, 2012, and 2015 because Mr. Rideout was earning an amount in keeping with that upon which the 2005 order is based. Mr. Rideout’s skills and experience are limited, and the amount he earned for each of these years is in the reasonable range in the circumstances.

As noted, the goal of imputation is not to punish, but rather to achieve a fair estimate of income that is reasonable in the circumstances. 2013 and 2014 [ 36 ] I impute income of $21,600 for 2013 and 2014 which is based on the 2005 order for the following reasons: • Mr. Rideout did not supply credible evidence meaningfully linking his health needs to an inability to work, or to a reduced ability to work: St. Jules v. St. Jules , 2012 NSCA 97 ; Dalton v. Clements , 2016 NSSC 38 ; Ferguson v. Ferguson , 2014 NSSC 350 ; Deveaux v. Deveaux , 2013 NSSC 246 ; Wetzel v. O’Quinn , 2013 NSSC 301 ; Parsons v.

Parsons , supra ; M. (L.A.) v. M. (K.G.) , 2000 ABQB 80 ; MacDonald v. Pink , 2011 NSSC 421 ; McKinnon v. Serroul , 2011 NSSC 386 ; MacGillivary v. Ross , 2008 NSSC 339 ; Vanbeek v. Vanbeek , [2008] O.J. No. 2004 ; and Pamma v. Pamma , 1999 CarswellBC 2227 . • Mr. Rideout did not supply credible evidence about the METI course or why it was reasonable for him to enroll in it in the circumstances: Montgomery v. Montgomery , 2000 NSCA 2 . Mr. Rideout only worked out west for a brief period.

There is no credible evidence linking his current employment with the course that he undertook. • $21,600 is within the reasonable range of what Mr. Rideout is capable of earning given the circumstances. 2016 [ 37 ] I find that Mr. Rideout will earn about $29,500 in 2016 given his year-to-date earnings, his skills, ability and experience, together with the weather-based nature of his employment as described in the evidence. Material Changes [ 38 ] In

summary, I find that material changes in circumstances have been proven as follows: • Mr. Rideout’s income was less than $21,600 from 2006 to 2009; and in 2012 and 2015. • Mr. Rideout’s income was greater than $21,600 in 2010 and 2016. • Ms. Woodman incurred orthodontic and cheerleading expenses after the 2005 order issued. These expenses were not contemplated at the time of the 2005 order. [ 39 ] Should the table amount set out in the 2005 order be varied? [ 40 ] As noted previously, Mr. Rideout seeks to retroactively decrease child support and to have any outstanding arrears forgiven. In contrast, Ms.

Woodman seeks to retroactively increase child support. Retroactive Decrease and Forgiveness of Arrears [ 41 ] The test for a retroactive decrease in child support is set out in Smith v. Helppi , supra , wherein Oland, J.A. approved the test stated by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, in Brown v. Brown , 2010 NBCA 5 which provides as follows at para 21: 21 In

summary, the jurisdiction to order a partial or full remission of support arrears is dependent on the answer to two discrete questions: Was there a material change in circumstances during the period of retroactivity and, having regard to all other relevant circumstances during this period, would the applicant have been granted a reduction in his or her support obligation but for his or her untimely application?

As a general proposition, the court will be asking whether the change was significant and long lasting; whether it was real and not one of choice. [ 42 ] As previously noted, I have found that a material change in circumstances that was significant, long lasting, and was not self- induced was proven from 2006 to 2009; and in 2012, and 2015. Had Mr. Rideout made application at the time, his variation would have been granted. A forgiveness of arrears is therefore proven and appropriate as outlined in the chart to follow at para 45.

Retroactive Increase [ 43 ] The test for a retroactive increase in child support is set out by the Supreme Court of Canada S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R. ) , 2006 SCC 37 . Bastarache J., for the majority, states as follows: • Child support is the right of the child and such right survives the breakdown of the relationship of the child's parents [para 38]. • The child loses when one parent fails to pay the correct amount of child support [para 45].

• Parents have an obligation to support their child according to their income and this obligation exists independent of any statute or court order [para 54]. • The payment of a retroactive award is not an exceptional remedy [para 97]. • A retroactive maintenance award should be payable from the date the custodial parent gave effective notice to the non-custodial parent [para 118]. • It is generally inappropriate to make a retroactive award more than three years prior to the date when formal notice was provided to the non-custodial parent [para 123]. • The quantum of a retroactive award must be tailored to fit the circumstances of the case [para 128]. • The court must examine and balance four factors when determining the issue of retroactivity [para 99]. • The first factor concerns the reasonableness of the custodial parent's excuse for failing to make a timely application in the face of the nonpayment of child support, or in the face of an insufficient payment of child support [paras 101 and 104]. • The second factor relates to the conduct of the non-custodial parent.

If the non-custodial parent engages in blameworthy conduct, then the issuance of a retroactive award is usually appropriate.

The determination of blameworthy conduct is a subjective one based on objective indicators [para 108] and the court should take an expansive view as to what constitutes blameworthy conduct in the face of the nonpayment or insufficient payment of child support [paras106 and 107]. • The third factor to be balanced focuses on the circumstances, past and present [para 110] of the child, and not of the parent [para 113], and include an examination of the child's standard of living [para 111]. • The fourth factor requires the court to examine the hardship which may accrue to the non-custodial parent as a result of the non- custodial parent's current financial circumstances and financial obligations [para 115], although hardship factors are less significant if the non-custodial parent engaged in blameworthy conduct [para 116]. [ 44 ] Ms.

Woodman has proven that a retroactive increase in child support is appropriate for the years when either Mr. Rideout earned more than $21,600 and during the years when the court imputed income to Mr. Rideout of 21,600 for the following reasons: • Ms. Woodman had a reasonable excuse for the delay in filing a retroactive claim. Mr. Rideout did not produce income information on an annual basis. • Mr. Rideout acted in a blameworthy fashion by delaying his production of income information and by not increasing child support payments when his income increased. Further, Mr.

Rideout was consistently in arrears in the payment of child support, leaving the significant burden of budgetary adjustments to the children and Ms. Woodman. • The children have a need of increased support, although Ms. Woodman and her husband have ensured that all of their needs have been met to date. I am confident, however, that Ms. Woodman will use any retroactive support award for the children’s benefit. • Mr. Rideout experiences financial difficulties. To ensure that the retroactive award/arrears payment will not interfere with Mr.

Rideout’s obligation to pay ongoing support, any retroactive /arrears payment will be collected at a rate of $50 per month. [ 45 ] A retroactive increase is therefore granted, as outlined in the following table:

Chart Showing Table Amount of Child Support Payable [1] Year Income Monthly Table Due Total Yearly Due 2005 $21,600 $306 $2,142 [2] 2006 $11,795 $136 $1,632 2007 $8,757 $13 $156 2008 $6,431 $0 $0 2009 $6,824 $0 $0 2010 $32,465 $486 $5,832 2011 $24,236 $358 $4,296 2012 $19,682 $283 $3,396 2013 $21,600 $306 $3,672 2014 $21,600 $306 $3,672 2015 $20,032 $286 $3,432 2016 $29,500 $431 $3,448 [3] Total Amount Due $31,678 [ 46 ] Should an order for the payment of s.7 orthodontic and cheerleading expenses be granted retroactively or prospectively? Position of the Parties [ 47 ] In November 2015, Ms.

Woodman filed a claim for s.7 expenses related to orthodontic and cheerleading expenses. In her brief, she claims total expenses of $18,174.77 to be proportionately prorated between the parties, although during closing submissions, Ms. Woodman admitted that some of the actual out of pocket expenses were overstated. [ 48 ] For his part, Mr. Rideout disputes the payment of these expenses, noting several difficulties including insufficient evidence, and erroneous and incomplete financial data.

He further states that the expenses, especially cheerleading, are too expensive in the circumstances to meet the s. 7 definition. Law [ 49 ]

Section 7 of the Guidelines provides the court with the discretionary authority to make an award, which is in addition to the table amount, to cover the cost of all, or a portion of an expense that is proven to be special or extraordinary: T.(D.M.C.) v. S.(L.K. ), 2008 NSCA 61 , para 25 . The s.7 analysis is fact specific and must be undertaken on a case by case basis: Staples v. Callender , 2010 NSCA 49 , para 32 .

In determining whether an expense is special or extraordinary, the court is directed to balance factors that are related to necessity in the context of the child’s best interests, and reasonableness based on the means of the parents, those of the child, and the family’s spending pattern prior to separation. In addition, other hurdles must be met for extracurricular activity expenses as noted in s.7 (1.1). Further, the court is mandated to reduce expenses based upon any available subsidy, benefit, income tax credits or deductions.

Braces [ 50 ] Orthodontic expenses usually are deemed to meet the s.7 threshold as a special expense. Ms. Woodman’s orthodontic claim, however, was problematic because of incomplete and erroneous financial information as was revealed during cross-examination. Ms. Woodman was forced to admit that the total amount which she claimed was erroneous. For example, Ms. Woodman claimed $7,600 as the cost of braces for one child, but eventually admitted that she incurred only $4,100, less the income tax benefit associated with claiming the expense, and any possible contribution from Mr. Woodman’s health plan. Mr.

Woodman was uncertain if his plan had or could contribute to the cost of the braces. Similar evidentiary issues also surfaced in respect of the orthodontic claim attributed to the other child. [ 51 ] In the circumstances, I find that $4,000 is the total amount of orthodontic expenses, for both children, which should be sharable between the parties for the following reasons: • Ms. Woodman provided erroneous and incomplete financial information and should not be permitted to benefit from so doing. • Braces are ordinarily necessary for a child’s health. • Mr.

Rideout is of limited means and it is not reasonable for him to pay more than his prorata share of $4,000. • There is no evidence of the parties’ spending pattern before separation, however, Mr. Rideout was not consulted before the expense was incurred. [ 52 ] Neither party provided their 2015 income tax return. I will use the parties’ 2014 incomes to determine the proportional reimbursement. In 2014, Mr. Rideout was deemed to have earned $21,600; Ms. Woodman earned $36,535. Mr. Rideout will thus pay $1,486 to Ms. Woodman for his share of the orthodontic expenses for both children.

This amount will be payable at a rate of $50 per month until it is paid in full. A retroactive payment is appropriate applying the D.B.S. factors and for the reasons previously articulated. Cheerleading Expenses

[ 53 ] I am not prepared to grant any additional award for cheerleading expenses for the following reasons: • I do not find that cheerleading is necessary in the context of Kristen’s best interests. Kristen, according to her mother’s evidence, is a well-adjusted, bright child who is doing well. Although cheerleading is enjoyed by Kristen, it is not necessary for her best interests. • Mr. Rideout was not consulted before the expense was incurred. • Some of the cheerleading expenses are set off through fundraising efforts. • Mr.

Woodman, who was consulted about the cheerleading expenses, voluntarily contributes significantly to their cost. • In the past, Ms. Woodman was able to use the fitness tax credit to generate income tax savings to assist with the cheerleading expenses. • Ms. Woodman overstated the amount which she actually paid towards the cheerleading expenses. • Mr. Rideout is not able to pay cheerleading expenses given that his annual income is slightly less than $30,000. Mr.

Rideout would not be able to meet the other child support obligations noted in this decision if he was ordered to contribute to the cheer leading expenses. [ 54 ] In

summary, Mr. Rideout must contribute $1,486 for his prorata share of the orthodontic expenses. No contribution is required for the cheerleading expenses. Conclusion [ 55 ] The variation applications of the parties are granted to the extent provided in this decision, and as follows: • Mr. Rideout will pay ongoing support based on an annual income of $29,500 and at a monthly rate of $431. • The Maintenance Enforcement Program will recalculate the amount of retroactive maintenance/arrears outstanding based upon the table created in para 45 of this decision, less all payments received from Mr. Rideout by MEP.

Outstanding retroactive maintenance/arrears will be paid at a rate of $50 per month. • Mr. Rideout will pay $1,486 for his prorata share of the orthodontic expenses, such sum will be payable at a rate of $50 per month until paid in full. • Mr. Rideout is not required to contribute to cheerleading expenses. [ 56 ] Mr. Gillis is to draft the variation order. Subject to any offers to settle, or any costs submissions, it appears that success was mixed. If either party wishes to be heard on costs, however, written submissions should be filed by September 7, with responses no later than September 14. Forgeron, J.