R v. MacDonald, 2020 NSSC 104
Opinion
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia Citation: R v. MacDonald , 2020 NSSC 104 Date: 20200211 Docket: CRPH No. 487828 Registry: Port Hawkesbury Between: Her Majesty the Queen Appellant v. Andrew M. MacDonald Respondent Library Heading Judge: The Honourable Justice Patrick J. Murray Heard: October 1, 2019, in Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia Written Decision: February 11, 2020
Summary:
Summary conviction Appeal by Crown from an acquittal. Circumstantial evidence. Discussion re: burden of proof and findings of fact. Impaired Driving by drug. (Accused “huffing” from aerosol spray can “air duster”) Appeal allowed and conviction entered. Remitted to Trial Court for Sentence. THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT'S DECISION. QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET. SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: R v. MacDonald , 2020 NSSC 104 Date: 20200211 Docket: CRPH No. 487828 Registry: Port Hawkesbury Between: Her Majesty the Queen v. Andrew M.
MacDonald Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Patrick J. Murray Heard: October 1, 2019, in Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia Written Decision: February 11, 2020 Counsel: Darcy MacPherson for the Crown Adam Rogers for the Respondent, Andrew M. MacDonald
By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] This is an appeal by the Crown from a decision of the Honourable Judge Richard MacKinnon dated April 18, 2019, wherein he acquitted the Respondent, Andrew MacDonald, on the charge of operating a motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired by a drug. [ 2 ] Crown and Defence agree that a thorough review of the facts are contained in the Crown’s brief. This
summary in paragraph 5 herein quotes at length from the decision of Judge MacKinnon as it pertains to his findings. [ 3 ] The six (6) grounds of appeal which are also set out below following the facts at trial. Facts at Trial [ 4 ] On April 18, 2019, the Respondent was summarily tried in Provincial Court in Port Hawkesbury, NS, on a charge alleging that on or about May 2, 2018 at or near Port Hawkesbury, NS, he did operate a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug, contrary to section 253(1) (
a) of the Criminal Code . [ 5 ] The trial judge summarized the evidence and his conclusions, (between line 10 on page 193 and line 10 on page 203 of the trial transcript thus: …With respect to this particular charge, the elements of jurisdiction and identification have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The other elements are that the crown must prove that Andrew MacDonald on May 2 nd , 2018 was operating a motor vehicle. I do have evidence to establish that he was operating a motor vehicle. … The evidence of Crown witnesses indicated the following: On May 2 nd , 2018 Mr.
MacDonald was observed inhaling from an aerosol can. That aerosol can that he was inhaling from is similar to the aerosol cans that are depicted in exhibit number 2, photograph number 2, 3, 4, and 5. Mr. Petrie, who was parked beside Mr. Andrew MacDonald in Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia observed him inhaling from an aerosol can that was blue and that had an orange trigger, and that is what is depicted in those photographs, a blue aerosol can that has an orange trigger and that has on the car the words Emzone, E-M-Z-O-N-E, air duster. This is a product that is described by Ms.
Jillian Sayer as being a commercially available aerosol products containing compressed gas. These are products designed to expel a high pressure stream of gas from a cannister and are intended to be used for removing dust and light debris from intricate equipment such as computer keyboards and electronics. Abuse of air duster products through intentional inhalation of the expelled contents directly into the nose or mouth has been reported. Civilian witnesses testified that on May 2 nd , 2018 Mr.
Andrew MacDonald, after inhaling from a blue aerosol can would be unconscious for, one witness said a minute, another witness, Ms. Sutherland, said from between 20 to 40 seconds, and that he did this five or six times while being in the driver’s seat of a vehicle, parked beside the vehicle that was being driven by Mr. Petrie, in which Ms. Sutherland was a passenger. It certainly appears from their evidence that Mr. MacDonald was inhaling a substance.
They indicated in their testimony that, and I conclude, that based on the fact that he would be unconscious after inhaling from an aerosol can that it would appear that he was under the influence of some substance, after inhaling from this aerosol can. Mr. Petrie and Ms. Sutherland testified that after Andrew MacDonald did this five or six times he drove out of the Walmart parking lot and then drove through the Town of Port Hawkesbury and that his driving was erratic. The first thing that they noticed was that when they caught up to Mr.
MacDonald, because they had followed him after he went through the intersection of Tamarac Drive and Number 4 Highway, or I believe it’s Number 4 Highway and not the 104 Highway at the intersection of… the exit from.. I looked at the exhibits to see if there is a street name indicated where the Walmart store in Port Hawkesbury is located, but there’s not, but in any event, that the entrance to the Tamarac subdivision on Tamarac Drive. Mr. MacDonald had proceeded through that intersection before they left to follow him. …[W]hen they were observing Mr.
MacDonald appearing to inhale a substance from the blue aerosol can and be unconscious for a period of time after each time that he appeared to inhale the substance, they were concerned enough that Ms. Sutherland telephoned 911 and spoke to a police dispatch person and was filing a complaint of an impaired driver. Police eventually located Mr. MacDonald on McLaughlin Drive in Port Hawkesbury. Ms. Sutherland and Mr. Petrie first observed Mr. MacDonald after he had gone through that initial intersection, stopped on a cul de sac off of Spruce Street.
After they passed by the cul de sac and turned around and went back, Mr. MacDonald, in a Santa Fe vehicle, drove out of that cul de sac and proceeded onto Spruce Street, Spruce Street and at the intersection of Spruce Street turned… and Pine Ridge Drive, turned onto Pine Ridge Drive.
… It was at that intersection, the intersection of Spruce Street and Pine Ridge Drive and although they, both witnesses, said that Mr. MacDonald’s drive was erratic, there was nothing specific in their testimony to indicate that there was any bad driving between Tamarac Drive and the location where they next saw the vehicle, off of Spruce Street, or between Spruce Street and Pine Ridge Drive, but at Pine Ridge Drive they indicated that Mr.
MacDonald was operating the vehicle of the wrong side of the road and that there was a school bus coming around the corner of Pine Ridge Drive onto Spruce Street and that a head on collision was narrowly avoided. Ms. Sutherland said that the school bus had to… school bus driver had to slam on his brakes. Mr. MacDonald swerved his vehicle and a collision was narrowly avoided. Mr. MacDonald then continued on Pine Ridge Drive onto Crandall Drive, onto MacSween Street, onto the 104 Highway, or Reeves Street, onto Granville Street and then onto McLaughlin Drive.
And his vehicle, or the vehicle he was driving was parked in a driveway when they arrived at the same location and parked their vehicle across the street, or on the street at McLaughlin Drive where Mr. MacDonald has parked, had parked his vehicle. They indicated in their testimony that in addition to the near collision with a school bus that Mr. MacDonald would sometimes not stop at stop signs. At other times, he would stop longer than was necessary at stop signs. And on Granville Street between the 104 Highway and McLaughlin Drive, Mr.
MacDonald stopped his vehicle in the middle of the road for a period of time and it appeared for … it appeared that the vehicle was stopped for no apparent reason and all of these things resulted in them concluding that Mr. MacDonald was driving erratically and I find that the crown has established that the Mr.
MacDonald was driving erratically when he traveled from Spruce Street to the location where he stopped his vehicle on McLaughlin Drive. …Corporal Woodfine … took the photographs which are marked as exhibit number 2 and Corporal Woodfine testified that, I believe it was on May 3 rd , 2018, he went to the Walmart Store in Port Hawkesbury and that he viewed video tape that had been taken by the store and that this vide taped showed a person that had similar clothing, or the same clothing, as Mr. MacDonald was waring on May 2 nd , 2019.
The video tape showed a person bending over and picking up an item off a shelf, and Corporal Woodfine took photographs. Photograph number 1 shows what I will refer to as a desk. It also appears to be a check out point where purchasers can pay for goods that are purchased at the Walmart Store. Photograph number 2 shows the area where the person that was seen by Corporal Woodfine in the video tape had bent over and picked up an item off of the shelf. In photograph number 2 the shelf where this person had bent over and picked up an item shows blue cans with orange triggers.
There is a space to the left of these blue cans with orange triggers where there are no products located. Photograph number 3 shows a closer up view of that same shelf where the cans with orange triggers are located. In photograph number 4, which is a closeup of the same location, it can be seen that those blue cans that have orange triggers have the words on them Emzone Air Duster. Photograph number 5 is, again, a closer view of the Emzone Air Duster cans. The crown has also introduced into evidence … exhibit number 5. Constable Hopkins referred to it as … a Walmart receipt.
And it shows that at pretty much the exact same time that a person was observed picking something up off a shelf where Emzone Air Duster is located or stored, that a (massage) ball for $9.97 and an air duster for $9.93 was purchased and Corporal Woodfine testified that he viewed video… at Walmart … that shows that Andrew MacDonald, the accused, checked out or purchased items at a check out … he observed Andrew MacDonald … purchase items. At pretty much this exact same time.
He, as I say, viewed that on video… In her report, Jillian Sayer, who was qualified to give expert opinion evidence in the areas of physiology and pharmacology of drugs and their effects on behaviour, motor control and driving performance indicated, and I’m referring to page 2 of her report which is dated, and I’m referring to date of issue, 2018 07 06, which I take it to be July 6, 2018.
She indicated in her report in paragraph number 3, Emzone Air Duster contains the compressed gas 1, 1 – difluoroethane referred to as DFE, and I will refer to the substance as DFE during the balance of this decision. … With respect to the witness, Corporal Woodfine, I accept his testimony about what he observed and Corporal Woodfine testified that when he observed Mr. MacDonald coming out of a shed behind a residence on McLaughlin Drive on May 2 nd , 2018 and he had arrived there as a result of the report from Ms. Sutherland, that he observed Mr.
MacDonald to stumble, almost fall, had to balance himself by putting his hand on the house and also had to balance himself by leaning on the vehicle that he observed in the driveway on McLaughlin drive where he ended up after looking for the vehicle that was the subject of the report from Ms. Sutherland. It would appear that Mr. MacDonald, at that point in time, was under the influence of something, or was suffering the effects of something that would lead one to conclude that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by something. I accept the evidence of Constable Hopkins, who testified that Mr.
MacDonald seemed to … Corporal Woodfine also said that Mr. MacDonald’s speech was slurred and that there was … that he made observations about the eyes of Mr. MacDonald. Constable Hopkins said that it appeared to him that Mr. MacDonald stumbled or tripped over, I can't remember the word that he used, but it was either a patio stone, or something to that effect, and Constable Hopkins evince, in my view, corroborates the evidence of Corporal Woodfine and the evidence of Corporal Woodfine in many respects corroborates the evidence of Ms. Sutherland and Mr. Petrie.
I accept the evidence of Mr. Petrie and Ms. Sutherland about what they observed. There are minor differences in their testimony. Mr.Petrie corrected his evidence in terms of what he was able to observe after first catching up to Mr. MacDonald’s vehicle. Also correctedhis evidence about where there was a, in his view, an improper stop at a stop sign. Ms. Sutherland did not refer to the aerosol can thatshe observed Mr. MacDonald apparently inhaling from. She did not say anything about it having an orange trigger or top whereas Mr.Sutherland (sic) said that he did.
However, in my view, those minor differences did not lead me to conclude that Mr. Petrie was not acredible witness and does not lead me to conclude that he was not reliable and I make the same conclusion, or come to the sameconclusion with respect to the evidence of Ms. Sutherland.
I found her to be a credible witness and a reliable witness and I also make thecomment that they acted in a way that we would hope all responsible citizens would act when observing what they observed and tryingto prevent somebody from being injured or killed as a result of a person who may be impaired when operating a motor vehicle. … I am able to come to the conclusion that Mr. MacDonald purchased air duster, but there’s nothing on the Walmart receipt to indicatewhat kind of air duster was purchased by Mr. MacDonald. With respect to whether or not Mr.
MacDonald was inhaling a substance andtherefore was impaired by a drug. I do not have, and the police were not able to locate, anything by way of a aerosol can. There has beenno analysis of any aerosol can that was being inhaled from by Mr. MacDonald, and even though Ms. Sayer indicated in her report thatEmzone Air Duster contains DFE and that DFE, when inhaled, does impair a person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle, I am not able to conclude that whatever Mr. MacDonald was inhaling on May 2nd, 2018 was a drug. I’m not able to conclude what any drug was that Mr. MacDonald was inhaling on May 2nd, 2018.
And I’m not able to conclude that although Mr. MacDonald was guilty of bad driving,I’m not able to conclude that Mr. MacDonald’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by a drug. [6] The learned trial judge went on to acquit the Accused. The Crown filed a Notice of
Summary Conviction Appeal on May 8,2019 containing the following grounds: Grounds of Appeal 1. The verdict of acquittal is unsupported by the evidence. 2. The trial judge erred in law by requiring the Crown to prove the brand of aerosol inhaled by the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. 3. Even if the Crown were required to prove the brand of aerosol inhaled by the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial judgeerred in failing to find that the Crown did prove the brand. 4. The trial judge erred in law by misapprehending the evidence. 5. The trial judge erred in law piecemealing the evidence. 6.
The trial judge failed to conduct the trial fairly when he acquitted on the basis of a point which was neither argued nor addressed byeither party – with no opportunity for counsel to do so. 7. Such other grounds as may become apparent from the trial transcript, once it is available. Standard of Review in
Summary Conviction Appeals [7] The Respondent summarized the standard of review in
summary conviction appeal matters in its factum. The Crown agreeswith the following standard of review as contained in paragraph 9 of the Respondent’s factum: 9. The standard has been described in numerous recent decisions from our Courts, each of which references the still-leading case of R v.Nickerson (1999) 1999 NSCA 168 , 178 N.S.R. (2d) 189 [Tab 4]. Among these more recent referencing cases is that of R v.MacDonald, 2012 NSSC 157 [Tab3]. In that decision, Justice McDougall describes the standard as follows: [12] The standard to be applied by the
Summary Conviction Appeal Court was set out by Cromwell, J.A. (as he then was) in R. v.Nickerson (1999), 1999 NSCA 168 , 178 N.S.R. (2d) 189, 1999 CarswellNS 203. He said, at paras. 5-6: Unlike appeals to this Court in
summary conviction matters, appeals to the
Summary Conviction Appeal Court on the record mayaddress questions of both fact and law. Hallett, J.A., for the Court, recently described the role of the
Summary Conviction Appeal Courtjudge in R. v. Miller (1999), 1999 NSCA 51 , 173 N.S.R. (2d) 26 (N.S.C.A.) at pp. 27-29: On an appeal to a
summary conviction appeal court (in this Province, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia), from a
summary conviction,on the ground that the verdict is unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence, the duty of the Supreme Court judge as an appellate courtis explained in Yebes v. The Queen (1988), (SCC), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 417. McIntyre, J., for the Court, stated at p. 430: ...The function of the Court of Appeal, under s. 613(1)(a)(
i) of the Criminal Code, goes beyond merely finding that there is evidence tosupport a conviction. The court must determine on the whole of the evidence whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury,acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered. While the Court of Appeal must not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, inorder to apply the test the court must re-examine and to some extent reweigh and consider the effect of the evidence. The process will be
the same whether the case is based on circumstantial or direct evidence. (emphasis by Cromwell J.A.) . . . On an appeal from a conviction for a criminal offence on the ground that the guilty verdict is unreasonable, the appellate court judge isrequired to review, and to some extent, reweigh the evidence to determine if the verdict is unreasonable. Assessing whether a guiltyverdict is unreasonable engages the legal concept of reasonableness (Yebes, supra at p. 427). Thus, the appellate review, on the groundsset out in s. 686(1)(a)(
i) of the Code entails more than a mere review of the facts. The appellate court has a responsibility, to some extent,to do its own assessment of the evidence and not to automatically defer to the conclusions of the trial judge which is what the appellatecourt judge seems to have done in this appeal. The scope of review of the trial court's findings of fact by the
Summary Conviction Appeal Court is the same as on appeal againstconviction to the Court of Appeal in indictable offences: see sections 822(1) and 686(1)(a)(
i) and R. v. Gillis (1981), (NS CA), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 169 (N.S. C.A.) per Jones, J.A. at p. 176. Absent an error of law or a miscarriage of justice, the test to beapplied by the
Summary Conviction Appeal Court is whether the findings of the trial judge are unreasonable or cannot be supported bythe evidence. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. B. (R.H.), (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656 (S.C.C.) at 657,the appeal court is entitled to review the evidence at trial, re-examine and reweigh it, but only for the purpose of determining whether itis reasonably capable of supporting the trial judge's conclusions. If it is, the
Summary Conviction Appeal Court is not entitled tosubstitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial judge. In short, a
summary conviction appeal on the record is an appeal; it isneither a simple review to determine whether there was some evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions nor a new trial on thetranscript. [13] The Court of Appeal has restated this standard in various cases most recently in R. v. C.E., 2009 NSCA 79. In that case, the Courtwent on to cite the remarks of Fish J. in R. v.
Clark, 2005 SCC 2, to the effect that appellate courts "may not interfere with the findingsof fact made and the factual inferences drawn by the trial judge, unless they are clearly wrong, unsupported by the evidence or otherwiseunreasonable. The imputed error must, moreover, be plainly identified. And it must be shown to have affected the result. ‘Palpable andoverriding error' is a resonant and compendious expression of this well-established norm" (C.E. at para. 31, citing Clark at para. 9). [8]
Section 813(b)(
i) of the Criminal Code permits the Attorney General or his agent to appeal to the appeal court from an orderdismissing an information. Section 812(1)(
c) states that for the purposes of sections 813 to 828 “appeal court” means in the Province ofNova Scotia, the Supreme Court. [9] Further, the combined effect of s. 822(1) and s. 686(1)(a)(
i) appears to allow such modifications as are necessary to permit asummary conviction appeal of an acquittal on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence. In order toachieve this, the word “conviction” in s. 686(1) must be “modified” to include the word “acquittal”. [10] With this provisions noted, I am satisfied the standard of review set out above is the appropriate one for this Appeal. While theAppellant took issue with certain aspects as contained in the Respondent’s brief, I propose not to conduct an analysis of that disagreementany further.
The record of the appeal hearing will reflect the Crown did not agree that subsequent paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of theRespondent’s brief, as it pertained to the standard of review, were applicable. These, the Crown argued, were applicable to appeals fromacquittal in indictable offences. I concur. [11] Counsel were not in total agreement as to the Standard of Review. I therefore wish to thoroughly address this point. In the caseof R v. Hweld, 2018 NSSC 288, Justice Peter Rosinski discussed the standard of review in
summary conviction appeals. [12] My learned colleague in his decision included a discussion regarding the difference between the standard of review for appealsbefore the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal and the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, as a Court of Appeal. My learned colleague referred toseveral decisions of our Court of Appeal: that of Justice Peter Bryson, J.A., in R v. Alkhatib, 2013 NSCA 91; Justice Farrar in R v.Pottie, 2013 NSCA 68; and Justice Fichaud in R v. Francis, 2011 NSCA 113. I have added emphasis to paragraph 16 of Hweld, inwhich Justice Rosinski’s refers to his decision in R v.
Garland, 2014 NSSC 445. [14] I will repeat what I said in R. v. Garland 2014 NSSC 445: … 33 More recently, Justice Bryson, sitting as a chambers judge in R. v. Alkhatib 2013 NSCA 91, reiterated the differences in the approachtaken by the Court of Appeal when reviewing an appeal heard by a
summary conviction appeal court (a superior court justice), incontrast to that of a superior court justice acting as a
summary conviction appeal court: 13 Justice Farrar in R. v. Pottie, 2013 NSCA 68 explained the standard of review for
summary conviction appeals: [15] In the recent decision of R. v. Francis, 2011 NSCA 113, Fichaud, J.A. considered the standard of review to be applied in an appealpursuant to s. 839(1)(
a) of the Criminal Code. In
summary, there are two standards of review at play in
summary conviction matters; thefirst is the standard of review to be applied by the SCAC judge when reviewing the trial decision; and the second being the standard weapply to the decision of the SCAC judge. [16] The standard of review for the SCAC judge when reviewing the trial judge's decision, absent an error of law or miscarriageof justice, is whether the trial judge's findings are reasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence.
In undertaking thisanalysis the SCAC court is entitled to review the evidence at trial, re-examine it and re-weigh it, but only for the purposes ofdetermining whether it is reasonably capable of supporting the trial judge's conclusions. The SCAC is not entitled to substitute
its view of the evidence for that of the trial judge. [17] Our jurisdiction is grounded in the error alleged to have been committed by the SCAC judge. It is not a de novo appeal from the trial judge. This Court must determine whether the SCAC judge erred in law in the statement or application of the principles governing its review (see Francis, para. 7 ; see also R. v . R.H.L . , 2008 NSCA 100 ; R . v . Travers, 2001 NSCA 71 ; R . v . Nickerson , 1999 NSCA 168 , para. 6 ). This distinction is important when considering whether to grant leave; the error we must identify is in the SCAC judge's decision. Findings of the Trial Judge [ 13 ] Below is a
summary of the findings of fact or mixed law and fact found by the trial judge. The Respondent, Andrew MacDonald is referred to as “AMD”. i. That AMD was inhaling from the blue aerosol can and would be unconscious for a period of time. Page 194; ii. That AMD was under the influence of some substance after inhaling from this aerosol can. Page 195; iii. That AMD then drove erratically through the town. Page 195; iv. The two civilian witnesses were concerned enough that Ms. Sutherland phoned 911 filing a complaint of impaired driver. Page 195; v.
That AMD was driving in an erratic manner between Tamarac intersection and Spruce St. Once he reached Pine Ridge (at the intersection of Spruce St.) Mr. MacDonald drove on wrong side of the road and narrowly avoiding a head on collision with a school bus. He swerved his vehicle and a collision was avoided. Page 196; vi. That AMD stopped longer than necessary at stop sign and for a time stopped his vehicle in the middle of the road on Granville Street, between Highway 104 and McLaughlin Drive. Page 197; vii.
That AMD’s driving was erratic when he travelled from Spruce to where he stopped his vehicle on MacLaughlin Drive. Page 197; viii. The Walmart video viewed by Cpl. Woodfine shows person with similar or the same clothing that AMD was wearing on May 2, 2018. Page 198; ix. The same video showed a person bending over and picking up an item off the shelf. Photo 2 of Exhibit 2 shows the area where a person is seen bent over and picked up an item, off the shelf. The shelf where this person bent over and picked up an item shows blue (air duster) cans with orange triggers. Page 198; x.
The photos in Exhibit #2 shows an empty space to the left of these blue cans with orange triggers where there are no products located. Page 198; xi. Photos 3 and 4 show the same shelf where cans with orange triggers are located. Photo 4 is a close up a blue can with an orange trigger, with the name “Emzone Air Duster” thereon. Page 198; xii. The Walmart receipt obtained by Cst. Hopkins in Exhibit #5 shows at almost the exact time, the person was observed picking something off a shelf, an air duster for $9.93 was purchased. Page 199; xiii. Cpl. Woodine viewed the video tape that shows that Mr.
MacDonald checked out or purchased items at a check out at the location where purchasers pay for their items. He observed Mr. MacDonald purchase items, at “pretty much the exact same time”. Photo 5 is a closer view of “Emzone” cans. Page 199;
xiv. The Crown asked the trial judge to conclude that Mr. MacDonald was inhaling substances from an Emzone Air Duster aerosol can. Page 199; xv. The trial judge was unable to come to the conclusion requested by the Crown for the reasons explained by him. Pages 202, 203. [ 14 ] The trial judge was able to conclude that the Accused was impaired by something that would lead one to conclude that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by something. (Page 201) [ 15 ] The trial judge was not able to conclude “what any drug was” Mr.
MacDonald was inhaling on May 2, 2018. (Page 203) [ 16 ] The trial judge accepted Cpl. Woodfine’s testimony about what he observed. (Page 200) He also accepted the evidence of Mr. Petrie and Ms. Sutherland about what they observed. (Page 201) He concluded they were both credible and reliable. [ 17 ] Ms. Sutherland refers to the aerosol can that Mr. MacDonald was inhaling from as being blue in color. She did not indicate that it had an orange trigger or orange top. Mr.
Petrie did identify the can shown in photo 5 of Exhibit 2, (an orange trigger or top) stating, “I would say that’s the same can”. (Page 202) [ 18 ] The Crown argued that as a result of Mr.
MacDonald’s inhaling this substance, his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by a drug. [ 19 ] The Crown submits there was no analysis by the trial judge of the expert opinion and there was no rejection of that opinion by the trial judge. [ 20 ] The Crown submits that whatever air duster the Respondent inhaled from, impaired his ability, stating this is clear from the evidence of his erratic driving and signs of impairment given by the civilian witnesses and the police officers.
Respondent’s Submissions [ 21 ] According to the standard of review, in order for the appeal to succeed, this Court must not only determine that the trial judge was “clearly wrong” about a factual finding, but also that the error in question affected the result. [ 22 ] Here, even if the trial judge had accepted that the air duster was the brand suggested by the Crown, there was still a further hurdle to leap. The trial judge would have had to also find as a fact that the DFE was actively impairing Mr. MacDonald while he was operating a motor vehicle.
The Respondent states such a finding was never made, and that the evidence from the expert toxicologist, when combined with the eyewitness accounts, would in any event not support this conclusion. [ 23 ] The Respondent, AMD, in his factum made a number of submissions on this appeal. I shall refer to these in
summary form. i. That the trial judge found Ms. Sutherland’s account more reliable than Mr. Petrie’s. ii. There was no evidence of how much of the “air duster” can was consumed. iii. There was no DRE expert or toxicology report. iv. AMD would be slumped over for 20 - 30 seconds and then re-awaken. v. AMD inhaled for very short periods, from seconds to a minute. vi. That the effects of inhaling passed very quickly, within seconds or minutes. vii. There was not a great deal of evidence of impaired driving. viii.
While AMD’s driving was erratic he was able to negotiate multiple intersections and faced straight in when he parked his vehicle. ix. According to the expert, any impairment would have dissipated quickly. Thus there is no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he was impaired during the drive. There was some stumbling on a patio stone, that was it. x. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Expert Report confirms: • That effects of DFE dissipate rapidly; • It is commonly administered repeatedly over time to maintain desired effects; and • Length of time effects can last depend on volume and frequency of inhalation. xi.
The bus driver incident was not noteworthy enough to warrant a report. [ 24 ] I turn now to the analysis of the Grounds of Appeal. Analysis
Ground #1 - Decision Unsupported by the Evidence [ 25 ] The Crown maintains the decision to acquit Mr. MacDonald is not supported by the evidence. On the contrary, the Appellant submits, there was ample evidence to establish proof that the Respondent was impaired by a drug, beyond a reasonable doubt, when he drove his Hyundai Santa Fe, through the streets of Port Hawkesbury, as shown in Exhibit #’s 6, 7, and 8. [ 26 ] The key finding made at trial was that the Crown failed to establish that the aerosol can that the Accused inhaled from was an Emzone brand air duster.
Once again, his reasons as explained by him in the decision, are: … I am able to come to the conclusion that Mr. MacDonald purchased air duster, but there’s nothing on the Walmart receipt to indicate what kind of air duster was purchased by Mr. MacDonald. With respect to whether or not Mr. MacDonald was inhaling a substance and therefore was impaired by a drug. I do not have, and the police were not able to locate, anything by way of a aerosol can. There has been no analysis of any aerosol can that was being inhaled from by Mr. MacDonald, and even though Ms.
Sayer indicated in her report that Emzone Air Duster contains DFE and that DFE, when inhaled, does impair a person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle, I am not able to conclude that whatever Ms. MacDonald was inhaling on May 2 nd , 2018 was a drug. I’m not able to conclude that although Mr. MacDonald was guilty of bad driving, I’m not able to conclude that Mr. MacDonald’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by a drug… [ 27 ] In his decision, the trial judge found that the Respondent was “impaired by something”.
The trial judge was not satisfied that the Crown had established guilt by proving that the Accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by a drug. Establishing impairment by a drug is an essential element of the offence requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 28 ] The Crown submits the evidence at trial did establish that the Accused inhaled from an aerosol can containing the drug DFE. Relying on the evidence of Ms. Sayers, who gave opinion evidence, the Crown says the trial judge’s conclusion that he was unable to conclude that whatever Mr. MacDonald was inhaling was a drug, was in error.
The Crown submits the drug was proven by establishing the brand. The evidence of the expert that the brand contained the drug DFE was uncontradicted. [ 29 ] The Crown therefore submits the evidence at trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Respondent purchased an Emzone air duster on the date and time in question and that it contained the drug DFE. [ 30 ] Further, the Appellant submits the evidence at trial also established that Mr. MacDonald’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by that drug. The video evidence established that Mr.
MacDonald was seen purchasing (an air duster) at the time that he was at Walmart and for the exact same price as shown in the photos displaying this product taken by Cpl. Woodfine. [ 31 ] The Crown says that the trial judge could come to no other rational conclusion, but that this (Emzone) was the brand of aerosol can used by Mr. MacDonald. The Appellant submits the evidence was clear that, after inhaling from the can numerous times, Mr. MacDonald immediately drove out of the parking lot, in a most erratic manner, at one point he stopping in the middle of the road.
The Appellant says according to the evidence, he narrowly missed a school bus travelling toward him within the school zone in which he was driving. [ 32 ] This is not a new trial on the record. This Court is obligated to re-examine and re-weigh the evidence, but not to substitute its decision for that of the trial judge.
The task of this Court is to determine whether the trial judge’s findings can reasonably be supported by the evidence. [ 33 ] The Respondent, argues that while there was evidence that he was observed inhaling from an aerosol can similar to the brand shown in the photos, the trial judge specifically found the evidence was insufficient to establish the specific brand relied upon by the Crown. [ 34 ] Mr. MacDonald says the evidence of the civilian witnesses differed in their description of the can.
The trial judge made note of this in his decision. (Page 202) [ 35 ] In his reasons the trial judge stated that there was nothing on the receipt that established the brand, nor was the can located and there was no analysis of any can. The learned judge acknowledged that Ms.
Sayer indicated in her report, that Emzone Air Duster contains DFE and that DFE when inhaled, does impair a person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle. (Page 202) [ 36 ] The Respondent submits that without the can there could be no analysis of any drug, but also there could be no evidence of how much was consumed, which impacted the degree of impairment, according to the expert evidence. [ 37 ] Paragraph 41 of the Respondent’s factum states: 41.
Not only did this lack of evidence prevent the Trial Judge from making a determination as to what the accused may have inhaled, it also prevented any analysis as to the volume of substance potentially inhaled.
This evidence would have been helpful to the toxicologist in determining both the particular drug (if any) ingested, and also the potential length of time such drug may have had an effect on the individual ingesting it. [ 38 ] The trial judge made reference in his decision that the photos showed an empty space on the shelf, next to where the Emzone brand was displayed. [ 39 ] The Respondent suggested that a different brand of a similar product may have been located in the empty space shown in the photos next to the Emzone brand, and for a similar price. [ 40 ] The Respondent says the Crown established, through the expert evidence, that the substance DFE and its effects was connected to one particular brand.
[ 41 ] The Respondent argues that even if it had been proven that the can inhaled from contained a drug, the Court must also be satisfied that the Accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by the drug. [ 42 ] Mr. MacDonald argues that according to the expert evidence, the effects of inhaling dissipate quickly, lasting only for seconds or a minute. He submits, no finding was made by the trial judge that Mr. MacDonald consumed any substance while driving. There had been no finding, says the Respondent, that the drug DFE was actively impairing the Respondent, Mr.
MacDonald, in the operation of his vehicle. [ 43 ] The Respondent submits this is an additional hurdle that the Crown is unable to overcome on this appeal. As a result, he says, the trial judge’s decision is not clearly wrong, unsupported by the evidence or otherwise unreasonable. ( R v. Clark , 2005 SCC 2 ) [ 44 ] In the Appellant’s reply factum, the Appellant submitted: 15.
At paragraph 15 of the respondent’s factum, counsel points out that the trial judge “never made” a finding “that DFE was actively impairing (the respondent) while he was operating a motor vehicle.” The appellant acknowledges that such a finding was “never made”, but asserts that this argument is really a red herring. The context of the trial judge’s decision makes it clear that if the trial judge had found that the brand of air duster purchased was “Emzone”, the conclusion that the respondent was impaired by DFE while driving was a virtual certainty.
If fact, it would have been the only reasonable conclusion . [ 45 ] In his factum the Respondent states that Courts of Appeal are advised to be especially cautious when reviewing perceived gaps in evidentiary analysis or reasoning when analysing decisions on acquittal where the judge had found there to be reasonable doubt. ( R v. H.(J.M.) , 2011 SCC 45 ) [ 46 ] The Crown argues there is a significant gap in the analysis, in that the trial judge made no reference to a key piece of evidence given by Mr. Petrie. Mr. Petrie identified the Emzone can in Exhibit #2, photo #5, as a blue can with an orange trigger. Mr.
Petrie stated in his evidence, “I would say that’s the same can”. [ 47 ] At this time, I pause to state that the trial judge heard the evidence and observed the witnesses testify. In addition, the trial judge stated in his decision that he was not going to refer to all the evidence, but he had considered all the evidence in arriving at his decision. (Page 200) [ 48 ] Accordingly, I have been careful to review the evidence in assessing whether it is reasonably capable of supporting the trial judge’s conclusion. [ 49 ] In its factum at paragraph 5, the Crown lists from (
a) to (
l) facts which it says are “beyond argument”. Summing up the circumstantial evidence that was presented at trial, the Crown submitted in its factum: 5. If the respondent bent over and picked up an item where the $9.93 Emzone air duster aerosol cans were located then went to the checkout and purchased air duster for $9.93, and then went to the parking lot and huffed from an aerosol can that looked so much like the Emzone cans that Mr.
Petrie would say they are the same can , the only reasonable, rational and logical conclusion one could reach is that the respondent was huffing from an Emzone brand air duster aerosol can. [ 50 ] The Respondent argues that even if the Court were to find the circumstantial evidence so strong as to overrule the trial judge on the issue of the brand of air duster, the length of potential impairment could leave doubt as to whether any effects remained when Mr.
MacDonald began operating his vehicle. [ 51 ] With respect, I cannot accept that argument, because of Judge MacKinnon’s finding that the Respondent “was under the influence of something that would lead one to conclude that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by something”. The acquittal was based on the trial judge’s inability to conclude that “whatever Mr. MacDonald was inhaling on May 2, 2018, was a drug”. I say this having recognized that the judge’s conclusion referred to the “point in time” when Mr.
MacDonald had been found at the residence. [ 52 ] The questioning by Defendant’s counsel of the officer’s observations at the residence in relation to the can was that Constable Hopkins was unable to say, “whether Andrew MacDonald had just inhaled more of this stuff” from the air duster. (Page 92, 93) [ 53 ] The trial judge’s finding at page 201 was: “It would appear that (the Respondent) “at that point in time” was under the influence of something or was suffering the effects of something that would lead one to conclude that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by something”. [ 54 ] Mr.
MacDonald’s appearance of being “under the influence something or suffering the effects of something” at the residence was immediately after he had been observed driving in an erratic manner, “through the town”. Decision [ 55 ] Establishing that Mr. MacDonald’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by a drug was an essential element of the offence. At trial the Crown led evidence that the Emzone brand of air duster contained the drug DFE.
It was therefore necessary for the Crown to establish that the Respondent was huffing from an aerosol can of the brand name Emzone, as it was shown in Exhibit #2, photos 1, 3, 4, and 5. [ 56 ] The Crown submits that if proof of the particular brand of air duster was required (the Crown has argued in the alternative that it was not necessary), it was only required to be proven on a balance of probabilities. In the Crown’s reply brief, the Crown submitted the following: 13c. The brand name of the aerosol inhaled is not an essential element of the offence, but rather one aspect of circumstantial evidence, to
be considered in the context of the whole of the evidence which aspect need only be established on a balance of probabilities. Havingestablished the brand name to at least that standard was (at law) sufficient to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, including theessential element of impairment by drug; [57] In R v.
Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, the Supreme Court of Canada stated what a trial judge is required to do when assessingcircumstantial evidence: [37] When assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should consider “other plausible theor[ies]” and “other reasonablepossibilities” which are inconsistent with guilt: R. v. Comba, (ON CA), [1938] O.R. 200 (C.A.), at pp. 205 and 211, perMiddleton J.A., aff’d (SCC), [1938] S.C.R. 396; R. v. Baigent, 2013 BCCA 28 , 335 B.C.A.C. 11, at para. 20; R.v. Mitchell, [2008] QCA 394 (AustLII), at para. 35.
I agree with the appellant that the Crown thus may need to negative these reasonablepossibilities, but certainly does not need to “negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might beconsistent with the innocence of the accused”: R. v. Bagshaw, (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 2, at p. 8. “Other plausible theories”or “other reasonable possibilities” must be based on logic and experience applied to the evidence or the absence of evidence, not onspeculation. [38] Of course, the line between a “plausible theory” and “speculation” is not always easy to draw.
But the basic question is whether thecircumstantial evidence, viewed logically and in light of human experience, is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other thanthat the accused is guilty. [39] I have found two particularly useful statements of this principle. [40] The first is from an old Australian case, Martin v. Osborne (1936), 55 C.L.R. 367 (H.C.), at p. 375: In the inculpation of an accused person the evidentiary circumstances must bear no other reasonable explanation.
This means that,according to the common course of human affairs, the degree of probability that the occurrence of the facts proved would beaccompanied by the occurrence of the fact to be proved is so high that the contrary cannot reasonably be supposed. [41] While this language is not appropriate for a jury instruction, I find the idea expressed in this passage — that to justify a conviction,the circumstantial evidence, assessed in light of human experience, should be such that it excludes any other reasonable alternative — ahelpful way of describing the line between plausible theories and speculation. [42] The second is from R. v.
Dipnarine, 2014 ABCA 328 , 584 A.R. 138, at paras. 22 and 24-25. The court stated that“[c]ircumstantial evidence does not have to totally exclude other conceivable inferences”; that the trier of fact should not act onalternative
interpretations of the circumstances that it considers to be unreasonable; and that alternative inferences must be reasonable,not just possible. [43] Where the line is to be drawn between speculation and reasonable inferences in a particular case cannot be described with greaterclarity than it is in these passages. [58] In this case a witness the trial judge found at trial to be credible and reliable, identified the Emzone brand of air duster beinghuffed from by the Respondent, stating, “ I would say that’s the same can”, which the witness described as being blue with an orangetrigger.
The Court found that the can was “similar” to those in Exhibit 2 photos 2, 3, 4, 5, all of which described or shown the Emzonebrand of air duster. (Page 193) [59] Although the Walmart receipt did not identify the brand of air duster, the evidence was that at the exact same time, a personwearing the same clothes as Mr. MacDonald that day purchased an air duster for the exact price, as shown in the photos ($9.93), theprice of the Emzone air duster, having been seen in a video bending down in the exact same location that contained this brand. [60] In addition to Mr.
Petrie’s evidence on the type of can, the Crown submits the evidence of the Respondent’s driving isconsistent with the evidence of the expert as to effects the drug DFE, would have on a person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle. [61] The trial judge was not bound to accept the expert evidence. He could decide to accept all, part or none of a witness’stestimony. He could reject the evidence of a witness in whole or in part, including of course, Mr.
Petrie’s. [62] I have considered that the evidence or lack of evidence may have caused the trial judge to have a reasonable doubt aboutwhether the Crown had proven what if any, drug had impaired Mr. MacDonald’s ability to operate a motor vehicle. The photos inExhibit 2, for example, show the shelf as it was the next day, not as it was on May 2, 2018.
The trial judge clearly stated that he didconsider all of the evidence in arriving at his decision. (Page 200) [63] In this appeal, I find the circumstantial evidence before the trial judge to have been particularly strong, in relation to Crownestablishing the brand of air duster, such that his conclusion is not reasonably supported by the evidence. [64] The reasons put forth by the experienced judge for being unable to reach the conclusion the Crown was seeking, did not, in myrespectful view, account for all of the circumstantial evidence that was presented.
Apart from the receipt not indicating the type of airduster purchased and there being no can for an analysis to be performed, there was ample evidence that the can being “huffed” from bythe Respondent, was of the kind that contained the drug DFE. [65] This is not a simple review to determine whether there was some evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions. [66] I have carefully considered whether the trial judge could reasonably have come to any other rational conclusion based on theevidence or lack of evidence.
If that were the case, his reasonable inferences ought to be respected. [67] Having re-examined and to some extent re-weighed and considered the effect of the evidence in accordance with the standard of
review, I am of the view that the evidence is not reasonably capable of supporting the trial judge’s conclusions. In my view, the onlyreasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the brand name of the air duster can (Emzone) had been established on abalance of probabilities. [68] Consequently, based on the record at trial, I am satisfied there were no reasonable inferences, other than guilt.
I therefore findthe trial judge’s conclusion is not supported by the evidence. [69] In arriving at this conclusion, I have been mindful that I must be careful and especially cautious when analyzing a decision onacquittal, where the trial judge found there to be reasonable doubt.
Further, that the re-examining and re-weighing is only for thepurpose of determining whether the evidence is reasonably capable of supporting the trial judge’s conclusions and not for the purpose ofsubstituting my view of the evidence for that of the trial judge. [70] The Appeal on Ground #1 is allowed. [71] Although it may not be necessary for me to decide Grounds 2-6, given that I have allowed the Appeal on Ground 1, I believe itis prudent to do so, in any event.
Ground #3 - Even if the Crown were required to prove the brand of aerosol inhaled by the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the trialjudge erred in failing to find that the Crown did prove the brand.
Ground #4 - The trial judge erred in law by misapprehending the evidence. [72] The Crown has combined grounds 3 & 4 such that it its Factum reads: Ground #3 and Ground #4 -Even if the Crown were required to prove the brand of aerosol inhaled beyond a reasonable doubt,the trial judge misapprehended the evidence in failing to conclude that the Crown did prove the brand was “Emzone” beyond areasonable doubt. [73] Because the trial judge in his reasons for the conclusion he reached, (or actually was unable to reach), referred in the paragraphthat immediately followed to R v Lifchus, (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, the Crown argues, “it is clear he was using thestanding of beyond a reasonable doubt and not on a balance of probabilities”, in considering whether the Crown established the brandname of the air duster huffed by the Respondent.
The Crown refers to this as the “single sticking point”. [74] With respect, I do not agree with the Crown’s submission. My reading of the trial judge’s decision is that he was summarizingthe basis for the acquittal, namely that there was reasonable doubt. He was pointing out that the standard of proof (of each of theessential elements of the offence) is beyond a reasonable doubt and not on a balance of probabilities. He was referring to proof of theoffence as a whole. [75] The Respondent’s submission on this point is: 29.
Following this review and evaluation, the Trial Judge turns from a consideration of individual pieces of evidence to the ultimatequestion in his final paragraph, where the question of reasonable doubt is at once both considered and determined. [76] I concur with the Respondent in respect of the appeal on these grounds. As a result, Grounds 3 and 4 of the appeal aredismissed.
Ground #2 - The trial judge erred in law by requiring the Crown to prove the brand of aerosol inhaled by the accused beyond areasonable doubt. [77] This ground to some extent overlaps with the previous Grounds 3 and 4. [78] Referring at length to R v.
Collin, 2008 BCCA 431, the Crown argues the trial judge “did” find on a balance of probabilitiesthat the brand of air duster aerosol from which the Respondent huffed from was Emzone. [79] The Crown correctly submitted that this individual piece of evidence need only be established to that standard in consideringwhether the case as a whole has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. [80] With respect, I am unable to agree with the Appellant’s argument on the ground.
As previously stated in my reasons undergrounds 3 and 4, the trial judge’s reasons in my view, do not make it clear he had found that the brand had been proven on a balance ofprobabilities.
In fact, I have found that he did not but should have made that finding. (See below at paragraph 83). [81] The Crown has said that nowhere in the conclusion did the judge explicitly indicate the standard of proof to which he expectedthe Crown to establish the brand name of the air duster. [82] The Crown has inferred from the trial judge’s reasons that he found this particular piece of evidence had been proven on abalance of probabilities. [83] My reasons for allowing the appeal on Ground 1, are that the trial judge erred in not reaching that conclusion, “as a piece ofcircumstantial evidence that had only needed to be proven on a balance of probabilities”.
This is what the Crown argued under Ground1. It is somewhat inconsistent for the Crown to also say he did find that the brand was established to the correct standard. [84] I therefore dismiss this ground of appeal, being Ground 2. Ground #5 – Error by Piecemealing The Evidence.
[85] The Appellant’s submission on this ground in contained at paragraph 22 of its Factum. 22. In the present case, the trial judge placed too high a burden on the Crown by piecemealing the evidence concerning the brand of theaerosol, by isolating the lack of a brand name on the WalMart receipt and ignoring an analysis of the whole Crown’s case. [86] The Appellant provided an explanation of the basis in law for this ground by referring to R v. Robertson, 2017 BCSC 2402, atparagraphs 20 of its factum: 20. This ground, to some extent, overlaps with ground #2.
In R. v Robertson, 2017 BCSC 2402 the court addressed theseissues under the subheading, "Standard of Proof and Circumstantial Evidence" (at para 18) thus: [18] The Crown must prove the elements of the offences in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. It is only those elements ofthose offences that are subject to the criminal standard of proof; individual pieces of evidence are not subject to that same standard andcan be proved on a balance of probabilities.
Rather than examining pieces of evidence in isolation, a trier of fact must consider the totalbody of evidence and assess whether, taken as a whole, it proves the elements of the offences in the indictment beyond a reasonabledoubt. The Court went on to cite paragraphs 16 - 18 of Collin (including the extract from paragraph 9 of Khan (BCCA), above, then went on tosay: [20] It is an error to analyze each piece of evidence separately out of context with the whole of the evidence: R. v. Carpio, 2012 BCCA484 at para. 20.
Individual facts may be weak but when assessed as a whole may lead to no reasonable conclusion other thanguilt. [21] The recent Supreme Court of Canada case of Villaroman discusses the rule in Hodge's Case and sets out the law regarding thedrawing of inferences from circumstantial evidence.
When the Crown's case is based on circumstantial evidence, "the basic question iswhether the circumstantial evidence, viewed logically and in light of human experience, is reasonably capable of supporting an inferenceother than that the accused is guilty": Villaroman at para. 38. [87] The Respondent in its factum addresses this Ground #5 as follows: 39. The Trial Judge did not examine the evidence regarding the spray can in isolation.
It was crucial to determining whether the accusedwas impaired by a drug. [88] It was the Crown in presenting its case that led evidence in respect of one brand of air duster, as containing the drug, DFE. I amaware of the Crown’s position that the expert evidence, defining what a drug was, is sufficient to establish this element of the offence,having regard to the remaining evidence.
The opinion given was that a “drug” was “any substance that when taken into the body has aneffect on the body”. (Page 13) [89] It appears clear that as the evidence unfolded, including the expert evidence called by the Crown, the brand name of the can didbecome an important piece of evidence in establishing whether there was impairment by a drug. [90] I find the trial judge did not piecemeal the evidence but was obligated to address it in his reasons for determining whether allthe elements of the offence had been proven.
Ground #6 – Unfair Process [91] The Crown submission under this Ground is that neither Defence counsel or the Crown addressed the point of whether theevidence established the brand name, of the aerosol can from which the Respondent huffed. [92] The Crown submits that the acquittal was entered on the basis of this unargued point.
In its factum the Crown cited R v.Abdule, 2016 ABCA 5: [93] The Crown submitted, natural justice and s. 7 of the Charter demand that if a trial court is prepared to pass a verdict on thebasis of an unargued point, that the trial court ought first to provide counsel an opportunity to address the point. [94] The Respondent has correctly pointed out that the issue of the can was raised by the Defendant in both cross-examination,(Transcript pages 61-63, and 93) and again in closing argument (Transcript pages 186-189). [95] The Respondent also states in his factum at paragraph 44: 44.
Simply put, the trial judge found there was a crucial piece of evidence missing, and without that evidence, he was unable to find thatall elements of the offence had been made out by the Crown. [96] I concur with the Respondent (though not with the finding itself) that the trial judge found he was unable to make a findingbased on a key piece of evidence. Although I have found he erred, that does not mean the trial was unfair or that it was decided on anissue that was not raised.
Having read the above transcript references, it seems to have been raised by the Defendant. [97] In addition the Crown’s expert gave opinion evidence that frequency and volume were factors in determining the length of timethe effects can last. It was the Crown that sought to introduce expert evidence as to the single brand. Surely the Crown was aware of theimpact that had on their case and the burden of proof. [98] I would dismiss this ground of Appeal. Remedy and Disposition - Ground 1.
[ 99 ] I find the error on Ground #1 to have affected the verdict. I am of the view that, pursuant to section 686(4) (b)(ii) of the Criminal Code , the appropriate remedy to is to set aside the acquittal and enter a conviction. Instead of this Court passing sentence, the matter is remitted to the trial court to impose sentence. [ 100 ] Order accordingly. Murray, J.
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