R v. Mombourquette, 2020 NSSC 105
Opinion
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia Citation: R v. Mombourquette , 2020 NSSC 105 Date: 20200305 Docket: SN No. 487824 Registry: Port Hawkesbury Between: Her Majesty the Queen Appellant v. George Gregory Mombourquette Respondent Library Heading Judge: The Honourable Justice Patrick J. Murray Heard: November 6, 2019, in Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia Written Decision: March 5, 2020
Summary:
Summary conviction Appeal. New impaired driving provisions effective December 18, 2018. Presumption of identity whether presumption of identity (allowing Crown to rely on ___ results within 2 hours of driving) still available to Crown in transition cases. Accused was charged prior to repeal of section 258(1)(c), but trial occurring after repeal. Appeal allowed and matter remitted back for new trial, as acquittal granted on motion for directed verdict. NSSC held presumption of identity available to the Crown. Repeal did not prevent presumption from applying in “transition cases”, such as this one.
Authorities in R v. Sheikh and R v. Porchetta discussed. THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT'S DECISION. QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET. SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: R v. Mombourquette , 2020 NSSC 105 Date: 20200305 Docket: SN No. 487824 Registry: Port Hawkesbury Between: Her Majesty the Queen Appellant v. George Gregory Mombourquette Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Patrick J. Murray Heard: November 6, 2019, in Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia
Written Decision: March 5, 2020 Counsel: Keavin-Mathieu S. Gallant Finnerty, for the Crown Kevin Patriquin, for the Respondent, George Mombourquette By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] This is an appeal by the Crown from a decision of the Honourable Judge Laurel Halfpenny-MacQuarrie, given on April 25, 2019, in which she granted a motion for a directed verdict, resulting in an acquittal of Mr. Mombourquette.
The charge against the Respondent was that of operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol concentration was “over 80mg/100ml”. [ 2 ] At issue in this appeal are the new impaired driving provisions of the Criminal Code , enacted on December 18, 2018. Although the Accused was charged prior to that date, his trial occurred after then. Thus, as in many instances across the country, questions have arisen. The main question on this appeal is whether the evidentiary presumption was still available to the Crown, in Mr. Mombourquette’s trial. His situation is referred to as a “transitional case”.
Concise Statement of Facts [ 3 ] On August 4, 2018, Constable Justin Jodrey of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) pulled over a motor vehicle in St. Peter’s, Nova Scotia at around 13:15 (1:15 p.m.) on the same date. After a brief interaction, the officer read the Approved Screening Device Demand, (ASD), to Mr. Mombourquette. He failed the roadside ASD test and was arrested for impaired driving. The Respondent was subsequently taken to the St. Peter’s RCMP detachment where he provided two breath samples directly into an approved instrument operated by Constable Smith.
Constable Smith is a qualified breath technician. The first reading was 150 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood. The first sample was taken at 14:01 (2:01 p.m.) on August 4, 2018. The second reading was 140 milliliters of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. The second sample was taken at 14:22 hours (2:22 p.m.) on August 4, 2018. [ 4 ] The Crown says the officer formed a reasonable suspicion that the Respondent’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol. The Respondent says the officer formed a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Mombourquette had alcohol in his body.
Overview of the Appeal [ 5 ] The Respondent was charged that on or about August 4, 2018, at or near Granville Street, St. Peters, Nova Scotia, he did operate a motor vehicle while he was impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(
a) of the Code . The Respondent was further charged with the “over 80” contrary to section 253(1)(
b) of the Code , on the same date and place. On April 25, 2019, a trial was held in the Provincial Court in Port Hawkesbury before the Honourable Judge Halfpenny-MacQuarrie. The learned honourable trial judge adopted the reasoning in R v. Shaikh , 2019 ONCJ 157 , at paragraph 39 where the learned trial judge stated: 39. Parliament’s express repeal of s. 258 of the Criminal Code took effect December 18, 2019. While his charges arose prior to when the Act to amend came into force, Mr. Shaikh’s trial on those charges did not commence until after the legislative repeal of s. 258 had come into effect.
As a result of s. 14 of the Act to amend, s. 258 of the Criminal Code was no longer in effect at the time of Mr. Shaikh’s trial. In the absence of any expert opinion evidence relating to Mr. Shaikh’s breath test results back to the time he is alleged to have been I care or control. I find that the Crown has failed to prove that Mr. Shaikh was “over 80” at the relevant time.
In other words, I find that the Crown has failed to prove an essential element of the “over 80” offence beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 6 ] The honourable trial judge dismissed the over 80 charge before the court finding that the presumption of identity in s. 258 of the Code did not apply to the case at the bar. The honourable trial judge found that without expert toxicologist evidence, the Crown could not prove the Respondent’s blood alcohol content at the time of testing was the same as at the time of the alleged offence.
The honourable trial judge held the presumption of identity did not survive the repeal on December 18, 2018, of the driving offences under sections 249 - 261 of the Code . [ 7 ] The Appellant’s appeal is against the dismissal of count 2, the over 80 charge by the honourable trial judge. The grounds of appeal as amended, and summarized by me are as follows. Grounds of appeal [ 8 ] The Grounds of Appeal are set out in Appendix “A”. [ 9 ] The Crown says the trial judge erred in law (1) in holding that the Crown could not rely on the presumption of identity in the now-repealed s. 258(1)(
c) of the Code ; and (2) in finding that without expert evidence of retrograde extrapolation there was no evidence of the Respondent’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving. Standard of Review [ 10 ] There appears to be no dispute that the issues on appeal are questions of law subject to a correctness standard.
Legislation [11] The presumption of identity, as formerly contained in s. 258(1)(c), and repealed on December 18, 2018 is attached as Appendix“B”. This
section permitted the Crown to establish the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving, or being in care or control bysubmitting a certificate, establishing among other things, that two (2) breath tests were properly taken, at least 15 minutes apart, from anapproved instrument, and within 2 hours of driving. This “presumption” allowed the Crown to prove its case without calling expertevidence, in the form of a toxicologist, to “read back” the breath results to the time of driving, or care and control, as the case may be.
Ithas been described as an “evidentiary shortcut”, because without it, expert evidence would be needed to “extrapolate” the readings. From the manner of proving its case, it made in easier for the Crown in that sense. The presumption has been around for some 50 years. (See R v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37.) [12] The Amending Act, SC 2018, c. 21, repealed sections 249-261 of the Code. The repeal came into force on December 18, 2018. In place of the
section 258, the presumption of identity,
section 15 of the amending Act enacted a new presumption of accuracy by wayof s 320.31(1) of the Code, replacing the previous presumption of accuracy, also found in section 258(1). As a result, the inquiry is nolonger the accused’s BAC at the time of driving. The s. 258(1)(
c) presumption of identity is obsolete going forward, but a modifiedpresumption of accuracy remains. [13] Pursuant to the Amending Act, the new s. 320.31 presumption of accuracy “applies to the trial of an accused that is commencedon or after the day on which
section 15 comes into force, if the sample or samples to which the trial relates were taken before that day”:Amending Act, s 32(2). Transitional cases [14] The Amending Act does not specifically address the availability of the presumption of identity in transitional cases. A review ofthe jurisprudence shows that considerable litigation has resulted when new laws fail to address when certain amendments take effect, andmore to the point whether certain presumptions survive during the transitional period. (See See R v. Ali, (SCC), [1980]1 S.C.R. 221 and R v. Dineley, 2012 SCC 58.) [15] Courts have since struggled with these issues, through the process of statutory
interpretation and the applicable rules ofconstruction, in determining a statute’s purpose and intent. In short, parliament’s intention. [16] These matters can become complex. What has evolved from the jurisprudence on this issue, is two lines of authority, thatwhich follows Shaikh, as did the trial judge here, and those which have followed R v. Porchetta, 2019 ONCJ 244. [17] In Shaikh, Burstein, J. held the amendments apply immediately to existing charges and therefore the presumption wasunavailable to the crown in transition cases. In Porchetta, Rose, J. held that the presumption of identity was still available to the crown. A brief
summary of these cases follows. The Facts in Shaikh [18] Mr. Shaikh was attempting to gain entry into a pub on a university campus. He was denied. The manager of security felt hewas too intoxicated. Mr. Shaikh did not agree and attempted to force his way in. Campus security was called and when they arrived Mr.Shaikh was seated in the driver’s side of his vehicle located outside of the pub. His vehicle engine was running and on a couple ofoccasions actually moved. Police were called and Mr. Shaikh was ultimately arrested at 12:00 a.m.
He provided breath samples, whichresulted in readings of 170 and 160, taken at 1:01 a.m. and 1:24 a.m. respectfully. [19] Mr. Shaikh plead not guilty to the offence which occurred on February 18, 2018. His trial was set for January 23, 2019. Following the alleged offence, Bill C- 46 was enacted containing the new provisions of the Code. Section 258(1) which contained boththe presumption of identity and the presumption of accuracy was repealed. At trial Mr.
Shaikh argued that with this change, the crowncould no longer rely on the presumption of identity. [20] In Shaikh, the court's reasoning is summarized at para 39: [39] Having considered the principles of statutory
interpretation and the relevant provisions of the
Interpretation Act, I am left with theclear and unambiguous wording of s. 14 of the Act to amend: “… sections 249 to 261 of the [Criminal Code] are repealed.” Parliament’s express repeal of s. 258 of the Criminal Code took effect December 18, 2018. While his charges arose prior to when theAct to amend came into force, Mr. Shaikh’s trial on those charges did not commence until after the legislative repeal of s. 258 had comeinto effect. As a result of s. 14 of the Act to amend, s. 258 of the Criminal Code was no longer in effect at the time of Mr. Shaikh’s trial.
In the absence of any expert opinion evidence relating Mr. Shaikh’s breath test results back to the time he is alleged to have been in careor control, I find that the Crown has failed to prove that Mr. Shaikh was “over 80” at the relevant time. In other words, I find that theCrown has failed to prove an essential element of the “over 80” offence beyond a reasonable doubt. [21] In the present case, the trial judge referred to Burstein J., looking at “what was repealed and what wasn’t”, and to parliament,specifically, stating that the presumption of accuracy remained, thus having “put its mind” to the issue.
She concluded that “the crowndoes not have the benefit of that presumption in cases such as before the court today.” She cited paragraph 39 above as authority for herdecision in adopting the reasoning in Shaikh. “I echo those comments”, she said. [22] By contrast, the court in Porchetta held that the provisions in question were substantive in nature and continued to apply toexisting proceedings. The Facts in Porchetta
[ 23 ] Ms. Porchetta was driving her vehicle when she was stopped by police. The constable earlier heard a radio call about a possible impaired driver and decided to investigate in the area that had been reported. As he drove, his dash camera captured the events which followed. Reportedly, Ms. Portchetta’s car had hit a curb and as the officer’s vehicle approached hers from behind. She was on the curb. She was the lone occupant in the driver’s seat. During a conversation she indicated that she blew a flat tire. The Constable smelled alcohol and formed a suspicion that she had consumed alcohol.
He asked her to exit the vehicle and perform a roadside screening test. She initially refused. She finally agreed to blow into the device. She failed and was then arrested. She later provided breath samples with readings of 149 mg% and 150 mg%. She plead not guilty. [ 24 ] The offence date alleged was June 29, 2017, before December 18, 2018. The trial commenced after that date on April 11, 2019. Ms. Porchetta argued at trial that the crown could not rely upon the presumption of identity as it was repealed. The defendant relied on the Shaikh decision.
Rose, J held in Porchetta : [38] Aside from the substantive nature of s. 258 , and the clearly substantive changes to the drinking and driving legislation, I find that Parliament had a clear intention in C-46 to simplify the law relating to proof of BAC. It would be quite inconsistent to find that Parliament intended to keep s. 253 (1)(
b) intact for legacy cases but make it substantially more difficult to prove those charges by wiping away the presumption of identity and rendering null and void the police investigations for those cases. That would be absurd. Furthermore, C-46 affected not just the new law, but the old one as well, as discussed above. If Parliament were to have intended the
preamble about simplification of manner of proof of BAC in Over 80 cases to apply only to new charges under s. 320.14, but not the old ones that it repealed but still in the Court system, it would have said so. I disagree with Burstein J.’s finding in Shaikh at par. 34 (iii) that the new evidentiary provisions can be adopted to trials of existing charges. It is not possible to do that and still implement Parliament’s express intention to simplify proof of Over 80 cases. The new Over 80 and impaired operation provisions are quite different.
The presumption of identity is unnecessary in the new provisions because the new legislation doesn’t require proof of BAC at the time of driving. Analysis [ 25 ] The prominent issue arising from the 2018 amendments is one of statutory
interpretation, and specifically, whether these provisions apply in transitional cases. [ 26 ] It should be noted that at the time of the trial decision in this matter, Shaikh was the early authority which addressed the amendments in a most thorough and comprehensive way. Comparing then to now, there has been a substantial body of case law that has evolved on this issue. Much of what has transpired since then are cases which have held a contrary view to Shaikh . [ 27 ] Virtually all of the cases have discussed and applied the rules of statutory
interpretation in determining whether the repeal of the presumption of identity is prospective or retrospective. [ 28 ] Another approach is to determine whether the amendments are substantive or procedural in nature.
If they are substantive, it will usually be the case that they would be operative from the date of the amendments, going forward. [ 29 ] If they are deemed procedural, they would take effect immediately and include those cases “in transition", where the charges were laid prior to the amendments, but the trial occurs after the amendments are proclaimed. [ 30 ] That said, the trial judge here, in adopting Shaikh , found that Parliament had turned its mind to the transitional phase.
In her decision, the honourable trial judge stated at page 56: The presumption of accuracy remains, and they specifically stated that and for parliament to have put its mind to that is very helpful for courts and judges when having to interpret what, what currently exists when we are dealing with this transitional phase. What, what we do going forward, after a charge is laid after December 18 th , is well set out in the new provisions under
section 320, but what do we do in that interim period is the issue. He went through that and he concluded that the provision of identity that existed no longer exists and the Crown does not have the benefit of that presumption in cases such as before the Court the today. [ 31 ] In its Notice of Appeal the Crown alleges that the trial judge erred in finding that the Crown could no longer rely on the former s. 258(1)(c). [ 32 ] The Appellant’s submission is that “unless a contrary intention appears, transitional cases are to be continued as if nothing changed”. [ 33 ] The Respondent submits that “the clear repeal of the
section incorporating the presumption of identity is prima facie , a contrary intention, especially in light of the fact that Parliament, also repealed the presumption of accuracy, but expressly provided for its survival in the new legislation”. [ 34 ] This was one of the underpinnings of Burstein, J’s reasoning in Shaikh . Justice Burstein, the author of the decision in Shaikh , found that the Act to Amend reflected the clear and unambiguous intent of parliament to have the repeal of the presumption of identity apply immediately.
Justice Burstein pointed out that s. 32(2) of the Act to Amend expressly dictates that the new s. 320.31(1), i.e. the new presumption of accuracy, is to apply immediately. 32.2(2). Transitional Provisions Subsection 320.31 of the Criminal Code , as enacted by s. 15 of this Act, applies to the trial of an accused that is commenced on or after the day which that
section 15 comes into force … [ 35 ] The new legislative scheme, in s. 320.31, has a regime of evidentiary presumptions just as the old one did. By expressly
declaring that the new presumption regime, housed in s. 320.31(1), is to be effective immediately, Justice Burstein reasoned that parliament conveyed a clear intention for the old regime of presumptions to be displaced immediately. [ 36 ] In the contrary view, it has been held that the real clarity that is needed is not in respect to what has been repealed, but the timing when the repeal takes effect. (See R v. Bhandal , 2019 ONCJ 337 ) [ 37 ] Also in R v. McManus , 2019 ABQB 829 , the first
Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision on this issue, Henderson, J. rejected the notion that retention of the presumption of accuracy meant that Parliament had intended both presumptions to apply retrospectively. [ 38 ] A common theme in the Respondent’s submission is that the repeal language is clear and unambiguous (following the Shaikh reasoning). The Respondent cites R v. Myers , 2019 SCC 18 , in stating that in interpreting the Code provisions, the words must be taken in their grammatical ordinary sense. Further, a straightforward reading of a repeal
section means just that. Simply put, this means its no longer in effect says the Respondent. This is a provision which benefits the Crown and “conversely” affects the Respondent’s rights. In addition, the Respondent argues that Parliament was not silent on the issue. Consequently, the Respondent says, the decision of the learned trial judge was not inconsistent with the clear will of Parliament. Amendments [ 39 ]
Section 14 of the Act to Amend , in repealing the older legislative scheme, plainly states: The heading before
section 249 and sections 249 to 261 of the Act are repealed. [ 40 ] The repeal of the charging provisions, ss. 253(1)(
a) and 253(1)(b), must be considered in light of what
section 43(
e) of the
Interpretation Act allows in terms of whether an enactment may be enforced after its charging provision is repealed. 43. Effect of repeal Where an enactment is repealed in whole or in part, the repeal does not … (
c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, accruing or incurred under the enactment so repealed … (
e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any right, privilege, obligation, or liability, referred to in paragraph (c)… [ 41 ] The key question is whether the Act to Amend immediately repealed s. 253(1)(
c) of the Code , or if that
section continues to apply to transitional cases. In R v Alex , 2017 SCC 37 , the Supreme Court of Canada summarized the purpose of s.253(1)(
c) as well as its companion section 258(1)(g), which are often referred to as establishing the “presumption of identity” and the “presumption of accuracy”: These [evidentiary] shortcuts… permit the Crown to establish an accused’s blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the alleged offence by filing a certificate recording the accused’s breath readings… in the case of “over 80” charges, this relieves the Crown from having to call two witness at every trial: (1) a breath technician to attest to the accuracy of the breath readings; (2) an expert toxicologist to relate the readings back to the time when the alleged offence occurred. [ 42 ] The presumption of accuracy was re-enshrined in s. 320.31(1) of the Code by the Act to Amend , but the presumption of identity was not.
If the former presumption of identity does not apply to transitional cases, as Judge Halfpenny-MacQuarrie found at trial, then she was correct in holding that the Crown would have needed expert evidence to prove Mr. Mombourquette’s BAC. If the former presumption does apply to transitional cases, however, then the Honourable trial judge erred and this appeal should be allowed. [ 43 ] I agree with the comments of Burstein, J. in Shaikh , that it is not the role of the Courts to create “fixes” for legislative omissions. Parliament has, however, passed the
Interpretation Act to assist courts with this onerous task. [ 44 ] That Parliament intended impaired driving cases, during the transition period to be subject to more onerous evidentiary demands of expert toxicology reports has been found to be implausible. ( R v. Cameron , 2020 NSSC 58 , at paragraph 49 ) [ 45 ] Further, support for this conclusion can be found in the recent Nova Scotia case of R v. McDermott , 2019 NSPC 70 , decided by the Honourable Provincial Court Judge Theodore (Ted) Tax. [ 46 ] In McDermott , Judge Tax considered both the
preamble to the Amending Act , as well as the
Interpretation Act provisions respecting repeals in deciding that the Shaikh decision was inconsistent with parliament’s intent: 38. ... It would be quite inconsistent to find that Parliament intended to keep section 253(1)(
b) intact for “legacy cases” but make it substantially more difficult to prove those charges by wiping away the presumption of identity and rendering null and void the police investigations for those cases. That would be absurd...... Parliament’s express intention (was) to simplify proof of over 80 cases. The new over 80 and impaired operations are quite different. The presumption of identity is unnecessary in the new provisions because the new legislation does not require proof of blood-alcohol concentration at the time of driving. 39. For these reasons I find that, in law,
section 258 applies to the case at bar.
[47] Judge Tax found that the presumption of identity remained available to the crown in matters for trial “where the breath testswere taken before December 18, but the trial was held after that date”. [48] I turn to discuss a decision of the Honourable Judge Gregory Lenehan, JPC, in R v. Lao, and R v. Harlow, a decision of theHonourable Judge James H.
Burrill, JPC, both unreported Nova Scotia decisions. [49] In Lao, Judge Lenehan, after a careful review, was persuaded that the “evidentiary shortcut” remained, agreeing with RenwickJ, who held that it was “beyond question that the former offence of excess BAC has survived the repeal of s. 258” and therefore theevidentiary presumptions found under the old law would continue for those prosecutions. (Bhandal, supra, at paragraph 29 and 30) [50] In Harlow, Judge Burrill captured the essence of the facts and the law on his cases, in a few short paragraphs: The facts in the case are essentially, for the issues involved here, unremarkable.
Constable Chad Stanford had received a report of an impaired driver on the Ohio Road in Lower Ohio, Shelburn County Nova Scotia on the 19th day of October of 2018, they patrolled there,found the accused and ultimately, he was taken back for breach tests to the RCMP detachment and the Crown seeks to tender acertificate of a Qualified technician that talks about his breath samples and the results of those breath samples that were taken at 11:59 hours on the 19th day of October, and the second test being taken at 00:21 hours on the 20th day of October 2018.
Of course, what the issue is is whether or not there’s any proof before the Court as to what his blood alcohol level was at the time he wasdriving. There is the certificate, if admissible, before the Court that says what his blood alcohol content was at 11:59 hours on the 19th and 00:21 hours on October the 20th, but of course, his breath was not tested at the time he was driving. Without the
section of the Criminal Codethat’s known as the Presumption of Identity, which related the readings taken back to the detachment back to the time of the driving andmakes that conclusive proof, of what his blood alcohol level was then the Crown would have no case, as in this case, they haven’t calledan expert that would extrapolate the – the readings back.
As I’ve said I’ve reviewed the case law carefully, with respect to these matters, to this issue and without reading extensively from thecases I will say that I have decided that, with the greatest of respect to Judge Burstein, in the Ontario Court of Justice in the Shaikh case Ibelieve that that decision is wrong in law and I essentially adopt the reasons, set out in the case of Queen vs. Porchetta, a subsequent decision [2019] O.J. No. 1985, decision of Judge Rose, from the Ontario Court of Justice, on April the 18th, 2019. It is inconceivable to me that parliament intended to repeal
Section 258 and not have it applicable to cases that were in the pipeline, as it were. Cases that had occurred prior to December 18th of 2018 and had not yet fully been adjudicated. [51] The judge then quoted from Porchetta at paragraph 38. He indicated that having read Shaikh and having raised it withCounsel, he did not agree with it and stated it was not binding on him. [52] In its Brief, the Crown has provided some 28 – 30 cases, in support of its position.
The Defence has also cited numerous cases,with an emphasis on Shaikh, but also provided additional cases, including the trial decision of Judge Richard MacKinnon, in R v.Cameron, supra, as well as R v. Melhado, 2019 Q. J. No. 1993. [53] In Melhado, decided April 3, 2019 Judge S. D. Brown followed the reasoning of Justice Burstein in Shaikh. In Melhado thecourt held: 4 There's been a clear revocation of the presumption of identity in what the government's done, and it may be an oversight on their partbut I agree with Justice Burstein.
I really can't put it any better than he has and, unfortunately that puts us in a situation where these casesthat are in the system at this time seem to be impossible to prove without the existence of the toxicologist or a toxicologist report going inon consent which reads back the -- the breath readings to the time of driving, that was the shortcut presumption of identity that wasrepealed. And, accordingly, I have no way of doing that without evidence from the toxicologist. 5 And in this case, I hold that I would follow the reasoning of Justice Burstein in R. v.
Muhammad Shaikh, and for the record that is adecision released March 26, 2019, citation, the only citation I have for that now is 2019 ONCJ 157 in the CanLII database and, withoutthe presumption of identity the Crown's case on the over 80 fails. [54] The case of R v. Sivalingam, 2019 ONCJ 239, is supportive of the decision in Porchetta. At paragraph 96 Justice RichardSchwarzl observed: 96. For cases on or after December 18, 2018 the inapplicability of the old presumption of identity would require expert evidence.
Addedlayers of in-court testimony is the opposite of simplification. (Emphasis added) Decision [55] In my view, a proper reading of
section 43 of the
Interpretation Act supports the conclusion that the presumption of identitysurvives the repeal and applies to transition cases. This
section is intended to deal with the very issue before the Court, a repeal oflegislation. The
Interpretation Act is clear in stating that “any legal proceeding, as described in paragraph (
e) may be continued as if theenactment had not been so repealed”. Under s. 258(1)(
c) the Crown had the right to utilize the presumption of identity, as it had done fordecades. [56] In addition, I am persuaded that this
interpretation is supported by rules of construction discussed in Ali, supra, and R v. Copley,(1998), (ON CA), 43 CCC (3d) 396. [57] In Ali, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled:
It is not in dispute that the rule as to the retrospective operation of procedural statutes is not absolute; it is only a guide that is intended to assist in the determination of the true intent of Parliament which is the main objective of statutory construction. [ 58 ] In Dineley the Supreme Court stated: There are a number of rules of
interpretation that can be helpful in identifying the situations to which new legislation applies. Because of the need for certainty as to the legal consequences that attach to past facts and conduct, courts have long recognized that the cases in which legislation has retrospective effect must be exceptional. [ 59 ] Accordingly, I have been persuaded by the reasoning in Bhandal , which is similar on the facts in respect of the appeal before me. In that case, Renwick, J., reasoned as follows: 23.
The court in Shaikh refers to the clear intention of Parliament which is found in the unambiguous wording of s. 14 of the Act to Amend : “sections 249 to 261 of the Act are repealed.” Respectfully, this is not the clear intention which is at issue. 26. Again, Parliament’s intention of retrospectivity for the presumption of accuracy (a purely procedural provision) is clear.
One would expect that if there were a legislative intention to repeal the presumption of identity retrospectively that would have been equally obvious in the new law. [ 60 ] The case of Copley , although decided much earlier, is also instructive as it too dealt with a similar repeal of the presumption of identity in 1985, and its replacement with a new provision in the Code . In Copley the court observed: While there is no clear intention to preserve the presumption, there is certainly n clear intention to abolish it, even for a limited period. The certificates would be much less valuable without the presumption.
In my opinion, the most that can be said is that s. 207 is neutral as to the continuance of the presumption. No clear intention therefore having been shown, the
Interpretation Act , R. S.C. 1970, c. I-23 which applies “unless a contrary intention appears” can be resorted to and in my opinion, ss. 35 and 36 of that Act readily resolve the problem. [ 61 ] It is my view, that this appeal need not be decided on the basis of whether the repeal of s. 249 to 261 are procedural or substantive. I concur that the true intention that must be gleaned pertains to, not to the repeal itself, but the effect or timing of the appeal to those cases previously in the criminal justice system. [ 62 ] As has been held in R v. Taylor , 2019 ABPC 165 , “although the principles of statutory
interpretation draw a general distinction between procedure and substance, simple or straight lines between these two concepts are very difficult to draw.” (Para. 24 ) [ 63 ] Even if the new provisions are considered to be procedural, I am satisfied that the presumption remains intact for cases charged under the old statutory regime, but which are tried in the transition period. [ 64 ]
Section 12 of the
Interpretation Act states that every enactment shall be remedial in nature, and shall be given a large and liberal consideration to ensure the adamant of its objects. [ 65 ]
Section 13 states that the
preamble of an enactment shall be read as intending to assist in influencing its purpose and object. [ 66 ] The
preamble as continued in the Act to amend has, as one of its stated objects, “to simplify the law relating to the proof of blood alcohol concentration”. [ 67 ] So, it can been seen that the emphasis in simplifying is on proof, which in my view, would clearly include a presumption used in the proving of an offence. [ 68 ] In Porchetta , Rose, J. recognized the importance of courts giving effect to the
preamble of the new legislation, in which parliament expressed its intention. This was a factor that weighted heavily in favour of his finding that the presumption of identity continued to apply to transitional cases. [ 69 ] As stated in R v. Yip-chuck , 2019 ONCJ 367 : 8.
It is unimaginable, that after fifty years, Parliament would intentionally decide to repeal and discontinue that presumption for the last few months for which it would be required. [ 70 ] In the result, I concur with the Appellant that the trial judge erred in holding that the presumption of identity did not apply, and was unavailable to the Crown in Mr. Mombourquette’s case at trial. [ 71 ] Respectfully, the appeal is therefore, allowed on the first ground.
Because the decision at trial was granted on the Defence’s motion for a directed verdict, the appropriate remedy is a new trial, as suggested by the Defence in the event the appeal was allowed. Ground #2 and 3 [ 72 ] Only if I had found that the presumption of identity under the repealed
section 258 of the Code did not apply to the case at bar, would it have been necessary for the Court to address Grounds #2 and 3 as set out in the Amended Notice of Appeal. Accordingly, it is not necessary for the Court to do so. [ 73 ] Appeal allowed. Order accordingly. Murray, J.
Appendix “A” 1. That the Learned Trial Judge erred in law in finding that the Crown cannot rely on the presumption of identity concluding the former
section 258.(1)(
c) of the Criminal Code of Canada was no longer in effect at the time of trial. 2. That the learned trial judge erred in law in finding that without expert opinion evidence of retrograde extrapolation, there was no admissible evidence of the Respondent’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving to provide the other 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 3. That the Learned Trial Judge erred in law in failing to extrapolate the accused’s blood alcohol content in the context of the Crown evidence at trial. 4. Such other grounds of appeal as may appear from a review of the record under appeal. Appendix “B” 258
(1) In any proceedings under subsection 255(1) in respect of an offence committed under
section 253 or subsection 254(5) or in any proceedings under any of subsections 255(2) to (3.2), (
c) where samples of the breath of the accused have been taken pursuant to a demand made under subsection 254(3), if ▪ (i) [Repealed before coming into force, 2008, c. 20, s. 3 ] ▪ (ii) each sample was taken as soon as practicable after the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed and, in the case of the first sample, not later than two hours after that time, with an interval of at least fifteen minutes between the times when the samples were taken, ▪ (iii) each sample was received from the accused directly into an approved container or into an approved instrument operated by a qualified technician, and ▪ (iv) an analysis of each sample was made by means of an approved instrument operated by a qualified technician, evidence of the results of the analyses so made is conclusive proof that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood both at the time when the analyses were made and at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed was, if the results of the analyses are the same, the concentration determined by the analyses and, if the results of the analyses are different, the lowest of the concentrations determined by the analyses, in the absence of evidence tending to show all of the following three things — that the approved instrument was malfunctioning or was operated improperly, that the malfunction or improper operation resulted in the determination that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, and that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood would not in fact have exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed;
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