Dorey v. Nelson, 2020 NSSC 107
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: Dorey v. Nelson , 2020 NSSC 107 Date: 20200124 Docket: Halifax No. 485895 Registry: Halifax Between: Jason Dorey and Norena Nelson Applicants v.
Dennis and Judith Nelson Respondents D E C I S I O N Judge: The Honourable Justice Glen McDougall Heard: January 24, 2020, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Counsel: Aaron Schwartz, for the Applicants Dennis Nelson, self represented for the Respondents By the Court: [ 1 ] The Applicants – Jason Dorey and Norena Nelson seek an Order: - declaring that the Respondents (who are Dennis and Judith Nelson) have no legal or equitable interest in the property located at 15 Avondale Road, Cole Harbour, Nova Scotia, which has a (PID 00407551) and its henceforth referred to as (the “Property”).
The Order also seeks : - A Declaration that the Respondents are tenants at the Property as defined in the Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 401 , as amended; The Applicants are seeking special damages. They are seeking punitive damages. They are seeking costs and such other relief as this Honourable Court deems just and appropriate. Initially, the Applicants sought aggravated damages, but that claim has since been abandoned. In the brief filed on behalf of the Applicants, and in oral submissions of counsel, Mr.
Schwartz, it was indicated that the Applicants are also asking for a date certain by which the Respondents are to vacate the property and to provide vacant possession. [ 2 ] The Respondents, who are represented by Dennis Nelson personally, contest the Application and ask that it be dismissed. They claim an equitable interest in the property by virtue of either a resulting or constructive trust or alternatively, the right to reside at the property, along with the Applicants, until such time as the mortgage on the property has been paid in full, at which time: (
i) the parties would subdivide the property and carve out a vacant lot for the Applicants’ sole use and ownership as compensation for
their efforts to purchase the property and to be responsible for the payment of the mortgage encumbering it. The house lot (so-called) would then be conveyed to the Respondents for their sole use and ownership. I suspect even if I was inclined to grant that relief, the chances of Mr. Dorey and Ms. Nelson residing amicably with Ms. Nelson’s parents is not a realistic expectation.
But, that will be left for reasonable people, and with the elapse of time, and hopefully with understanding, maybe things might change for the better. [ 3 ] The Respondents contend that this amounts to a contract that binds the parties and that while the mortgage remains outstanding, they are entitled to remain in possession of the property. It should be noted that the Respondents did not file a pre-hearing brief. Mr. Nelson was, however, provided with ample opportunity to make oral submissions and he took advantage of that and I commend him for the job he did in that regard.
It’s not always easy to come into a Supreme Court courtroom, if you’re not legally trained, and deal with individuals like myself, who are a kind of unknown quantity, so Mr. Nelson, again, I commend you. You did a very admirable job, given the circumstances and given the fact that you are not, like Mr. Schwartz, legally trained. Factual Background [ 4 ] The facts relating to this case are, in many respects, uncontested.
I say this based on admissions contained in the Respondent’s Notice of Contest, as well as, in the affidavits of one of the Respondents, Dennis Nelson, and what he said in answering questions put to him during cross-examination by the Applicant’s counsel, Mr. Schwartz. [ 5 ] Where there is some disagreement is in relation to the payment of utilities and certain expenses associated with renovations to the original structure prior to its destruction by fire. A fire that was deliberately set by the Respondents’ son, Owen. Owen resided at the property with his parents and other members of the Nelson family.
I accept that the Nelsons paid for utilities most of the time, but not all the time. I also accept that Mr. Nelson carried out some renovations to the property but received the benefit of reduced monthly rent for his efforts. Other than this, the evidence of Jason Dorey, which is corroborated by the affidavit evidence of his wife, Norena Nelson, establishes the factual underpinnings that support the claims being advanced. [ 6 ] I will borrow heavily from the brief filed by the Applicants’ counsel, Mr. Aaron J.
Schwartz, which reflects the background and history as derived from the affidavits filed in support of the application along with the admissions made by the Respondents in their Notice of Contest and in the three affidavits filed by Mr. Nelson, personally, and the further admissions he made during cross- examination. [ 7 ] I commend Mr. Schwartz for providing a thorough and detailed
summary of the facts of this case. [ 8 ] I hope you will forgive me for referring to them in quite some detail, but I feel he has done a very, very commendable job in putting together the factual scenario, and I’ll borrow, as I said heavily from what he provided in the brief that he filed on behalf of the Applicants. [ 9 ] I find the following to be the facts of this case: 11. The Applicants, Jason Dorey and Norena Nelson, are respectively the son-in-law and daughter of the Respondents, Dennis and Judith Nelson. 12.
Beginning in 1995, the Respondents, as well as their children, including the Applicant, Norena Nelson, began residing at the Property as tenants. 13. On or about April 1, 2006, the Applicant, Jason Dorey, began residing at the Property with the Respondents and Norena Nelson. The Applicants were in a relationship with one another and were expecting a child together at that time. 14. On or about January 8, 2008, the Applicants purchased the Property from the previous owners, Ross and Thelma Burgess. They purchased the property as joint tenants. 15. The purchase price of the Property was $197,000.00.
The Property had previously been listed for $299,000.00 and, at the time of the Applicants’ offer to purchase, was listed for $229,000.00. 16. The Applicants, Jason Dorey and Norena Nelson, were respectively 24 years and 28 years old when they purchased the Property. The Respondents, Dennis and Judith Nelson, were both in their late fifties at that time. 17. To facilitate their purchase of the Property, the Applicants: a. Withdrew approximately $30,000.00 from their personal savings; b. Utilized their one-time Federal Government First Time Home Buyer’s Plan; c.
Obtained mortgage financing from The Toronto-Dominion Bank in the amount of $193,419.53, with a 40 year amortization period; d. They paid all legal fees and disbursements, including the deed transfer tax; e. They purchased title insurance; f. They purchased mortgage insurance; and g. They purchased property insurance through the Royal Bank of Canada.
18. The Respondents did not contribute financially to the Applicants’ purchase of the Property. In stating this, I do not accept Mr. Nelson’s evidence that his wife and fellow Respondent contributed $1400.00 to help defray costs associated with the closing. 19. In October 2007 the Applicants were pre-approved for a mortgage with The Toronto-Dominion Bank for a mortgage amount of $200,00.00.
Prior to being pre-approved for a mortgage with The Toronto-Dominion Bank, the Applicants met with a mortgage broker as well as representatives from the Toronto-Dominion Bank and Scotiabank in an effort to secure mortgage financing such that they would be able to acquire a property. 20. The Respondents were not involved in any of the Applicants’ dealings with mortgage brokers, financial institutions, lawyers, or otherwise throughout the course of the Applicants’ purchase of the Property.
The Applicants did not consult with the Respondents about purchasing the Property, nor did the Applicants intend or consider anyone other than the Applicants to have an interest in the Property at the time of the purchase. 21. Subsequent to the Applicants’ purchase of the Property, the Applicants and the Respondents agreed that the Respondents could continue residing at the Property by paying the Applicants a monthly sum for rent as well as for the utilities associated with the Property.
This is admitted in the Respondents’ Notice of Contest; however, the Respondents do not classify the monthly payments as “rent”. 22. The Respondents’ monthly payments to the Applicants were initially $1,000.00 per month and have historically been between $800.00 to $1,000.00 per month since this time. The Respondent, Dennis Nelson, often at his insistence, assisted with some of the labour work for repairs or renovations to the Property, and the monthly payments were adjusted by the parties to reflect such contributions. The Applicants also provided the Respondents money on multiple occasions.
These facts are admitted in the Respondents’ Notice of Contest. 23. The Applicants also regularly provided the Respondents with additional monies each Christmas in further consideration for any labour work the Respondent, Denis Nelson, completed at the Property. 24.
The Applicants and the Respondents, as well as the Applicants children, and many of the Respondents’ other children and grandchildren, resided at the Property together from January 8, 2008 until March 4, 2016, at which time the home situated on the Property sustained damage due to, as I referred to earlier, an interior fire lit deliberately by the Respondents’ son, Owen Nelson. 25. Prior to the fire of March 4, 2016, the Applicants paid for all the materials and any outside labour associated with major renovations and repairs completed to the home situated on the Property, which included: a. Plumbing work; b.
New flooring; c. New windows and doors; d. New kitchen cabinets; e. Furnace repairs; f. Oil tank repairs; g. Hot water tank repairs; h. Landscaping; i. Construction of a shed; j. Electrical work; k. An extension on the home;
l. Drywall installation; and m. Insulation installation. 26. As mentioned, the Respondent, Dennis Nelson, assisted with the labour involved with some of the above noted repairs and renovations and the Respondents’ monthly rental payments to the Applicants were adjusted and reduced to reflect those contributions. 27. The aforementioned extension to the home was a bedroom for the Applicants’ daughter, which was financed by the Applicants through a Home Equity Line of Credit in the amount of $30,000.00, which was secured against the Property. 28.
As a result of the aforementioned fire, the home situated on the Property was uninhabitable, forcing the parties to move out of the Property. 29. On or about May 6, 2016, the Applicants purchased and moved into 127 Ashgrove Avenue, Cole Harbour, Nova Scotia. The Applicants required mortgage financing for their purchase of this home, which was obtained through The Toronto-Dominion Bank. 30.
In late 2016, the Applicants’ property insurer determined that the home situated on the Property could not be repaired and provided the Applicants with the options of accepting a cash settlement or rebuilding the property at the insurer’s expense. The Respondents were not involved in this decision. These facts are admitted in the Respondents’ Notice of Contest. 31. The Applicants decided to rebuild the Property, and throughout late 2016 and 2017 the Applicants chose a contractor, Gerald Mitchell Contracting Ltd., and finalized the building plans and the specifications for a new home.
The Applicants spent considerable time and effort in finalizing the building plans and specifications, selecting building materials, and overseeing that the construction of the new home was in accordance with the Applicants’ specifications. 32. The Applicants made all of the final decisions with respect to the construction of the new home. The Respondents were not contacted by the Applicants’ insurer or the Applicants’ contractor during the construction. The Respondents had no decision-making authority. These facts are admitted in the Respondents’ Notice of Contest.
Interestingly, despite the admission of these facts, the Respondents’ Notice of Contest states at paragraph 8 of the Grounds of Contest that the Respondents made decision and gave directions about the construction of the new home; however, the Respondents’ admit that the Applicants or the Contractor denied their demands. I find that it was the Applicants who made all major decisions in regard to the re-build. 33. In addition to the construction work on the new home paid for by the Applicants’ insurer, the Applicants also paid out of pocket for customizations to the new home. 34.
The Applicants continued to the be responsible for the mortgage payments on the Property to the Toronto-Dominion Bank from the date of the fire, March 4, 2016, until December 11, 2017, at which point the mortgage was discharged by The Toronto- Dominion Bank. 35.
From March 4, 2016, until March 2018, when the new home on the Property was completed, the Applicants and the Respondents continued their arrangement of the Respondents paying the Applicants monthly rent, which during this period was $900.00 per month, and the Applicants providing the Respondents with a place to reside, which during this period was a two bedroom apartment located at 113-1109 Cole Harbour Road, Cole Harbour, Nova Scotia. As indicated, the Applicants continued to be responsible for their mortgage with The Toronto-Dominion Bank for the majority of this time. 36.
While the home on the Property was being rebuilt and the Respondents were residing at 113-1309 Cole Harbour Road, the Respondents continued to regularly use the garage and garden of the Property. 37. During the construction of the new home on the Property, a new tax assessment value was provided to the Applicants, which the Applicants appealed.
38. The new home on the Property was substantially completed on or about February 13, 2018, at which time the Applicants executed a new mortgage with The Toronto-Dominion Bank. 39. On February 12, 2018, Gerald Mitchell Contracting Ltd. provided the Applicants with an Atlantic New Home Warranty Certificate and location certificate. It was not provided to the Respondents. 40.
Prior to the new home being built on the Property, the Respondent, Dennis Nelson, attended the Applicants’ home at 127 Ashgrove Avenue, and indicated that the Respondents were concerned that the Applicants would move into the new home being built on the Property. At this time, the Applicants advised the Respondent, Dennis Nelson, that once the home was completed, the Respondents could continue to reside at the Property under the previous arrangement of the Respondents paying for rent and utilities. 41.
On or about February 27, 2018, the Applicants provided the Respondents with a list of rules for the Respondents to follow while residing at the Property. These rules included that the Respondents were tenants, that rent was to be $1,000.00 per month, and that the Respondent’s son, Owen Nelson, was not to reside at the Property. (not surprisingly). These rules were accepted by the Respondents, and discussed by the Respondents with the Applicant, Norena Nelson. 42. In early March 2018 the Respondents began residing in the new home on the Property. 43.
In May 2018 the Applicants learned that they were going to have a third child and determined that their current living arrangements at 127 Ashgrove Avenue would no longer accommodate the growing family. This fact is admitted in the Respondents’ Notice of Contest. 44. The Applicants were approached by a prospective renter for 127 Ashgrove Avenue in late May or early June 2018 and, as a result, determined that they would rent 127 Ashgrove Avenue and move into the Property. 45.
In late May 2018, Owen Nelson, who was charged with a number of Criminal Code offences, was placed into the Respondent, Dennis Nelson’s, care. The Respondent, Dennis Nelson, was acting as Owen Nelson’s surety ad provided the Property’s address as his address. When the Applicants learned of Owen Nelson’s residence at the Property, the Applicants informed Owen Nelson and the Respondents that the Applicants did not permit Owen Nelson to reside at the Property.
Owen Nelson subsequently had his bail conditions altered and moved out of the Property on or about June 5, 2018 as a result of the Applicants’ condition that Owen Nelson not be permitted to reside at the Property. 46. Around the same time that the Applicants learned they were expecting a third child, the Respondent, Dennis Nelson, advised the Applicants that the Respondents intended to vacate the Property in mid-June 2018. 47. The Respondents, however, did not vacate the Property, as they had indicated. 48.
On September 18, 2018, the Applicants provided the Respondents with a Notice to Quit, which stipulated a vacate date of October 31, 2018. The Respondents did not vacate the Property on this date. That matter subsequently went before a Residential Tenancies Officer on November 22, 2018. 49. On November 26, 2018, the Respondents were ordered to vacate the Property by March 31, 2019. 50. The Respondents appealed the aforementioned Order of the Director of Residential Tenancies to the Small Claims Court of Nova Scotia.
On December 17, 2018, the presiding Adjudicator set aside the aforementioned Order of the Director of Residential
Tenancies with respect to the March 31, 2019 vacate date, but declined to make any findings of fact. 51. Since providing the Respondents with a Notice to Quit on September 18, 2018, the Respondents have refused theApplicants entry to the home on the Property, except on or about May 25, 2019, when the Respondent, Dennis Nelson, briefly allowedthe Applicant, Jason Dorey, to attend the home with a representative of Efficiency Nova Scotia to perform a warranty inspection.
Despite providing the Respondents with more than 24 hours notice of this inspection, the Applicant, Jason Dorey, was not provided withfull access of the Property from the Respondents. 52. Due to the Respondents’ refusal to allow the Applicants access to the Property, the Applicants have been unable to arrangeto have maintenance performed on the Property, which includes having Gerald Mitchell Contracting Ltd. attend the Property to correctdefects to the windows under the Atlantic New Home Warranty.
The Applicants have also been unable to have filters changed on thefurnace or perform any inspection as to the state of the Property, which may result in the Applicants’ Atlantic Home Warranty beinginvalidated. 53. Since June 2019, the Respondents’ son, Owen Nelson, has been residing at the Property without the Applicants’permission and in complete disregard of the rules provided to the Respondents by the Applicants as a condition of their tenancy. 55. Neither of the Respondents has been gainfully employed since the Applicants purchased the Property.
Further, theRespondent, Dennis Nelson, has gone bankrupt on at least two occasions. [10] At para. 54, on page 9, of the Applicants’ brief, the following
summary succinctly captures the events that occurred since theproperty was purchased by the Applicants in 2008: 54. Since purchasing the Property in 2008, the Applicants have been responsible for and paid the mortgages on the Propertywith The Toronto-Dominion Bank, property taxes, property insurance, and, as mentioned, the costs associated with all major repairs andrenovations (with the exception of the costs associated with rebuilding the home after the March 4, 2016 fire, which were paid by theApplicants’ insurer under their policy of insurance).
At no time have the Respondents’ monthly payments to the Applicants covered themonthly mortgage payments, property taxes, insurance and other expenses related to the Property. The Applicants have also paid for theRespondents’ utility usage on a number of occasions. [11] This, I believe, accurately, and as I said succinctly, reflects the reality of the situation. [12] The Applicants maintain that the property was not purchased by or for the Respondents. They further maintain that anycontributions made by Mr.
Nelson, in the form of labour, have been accounted for and adequately compensated by way of rentalreductions and monetary payments. Issues [13] The issues for this Court to consider are:
(1) Whether the Respondents have an equitable claim to the Property, either by: a. Resulting Trust; b. Constructive Trust, or c. By Unjust Enrichment;
(2) Whether the Respondents have a claim to the Property in contract;
(3) If the answers to Issues 1(a), (
b) and (
c) and Issue (2) are “No”, then what relief should be granted? Issue 1(a): Whether the Respondents have an equitable claim to the Property arising out of a Resulting Trust? [14] Counsel for Mr. Dorey and Miss Nelson referred to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17,in which Rothstein, J., for the majority stated at para. 20, the following: A resulting trust arises when title to property is in one party’s name, but that party, because he or she is a fiduciary or gave novalue for the property, is under an obligation to return it to the original title owner: see D.W. M. Waters, M.R.
Gillen and L.D. Smith, eds., Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada (3rd. ed. 2005), at p. 362. While the trustee almost always has the legal title, in exceptionalcircumstances it is also possible that the trustee has equitable title: see Waters’ Law of Trusts, at p. 365, noting the case of Carter v.Carter (1969), (BS SC), 70 W.W. R. 237 (B.C.S.C.). [Emphasis added]
[ 15 ] Mr. Schwartz, as counsel for the Applicants, also cited the case of Nicholson v. Whyte, 2005 NSSC 198 wherein the Honourable Justice R. James Williams, of this court, had this to say, at paragraph 7: The law relating to resulting trusts was summarized in Hamilton v. Hamilton
(1996) Carswell Ont. 2421 (Ont. C.A.) where the court stated at paragraph 39: A presumption of a resulting trust arises in favour of persons who contribute financially to the purchase of a property but do not take title in their own name, and do not intend to give a gift of the entire beneficial interest in the property to the registered or recorded title holder. Equity presumes that the non-titled party does not intend a gift when he contributes to the purchase price of a property.
The non-titled party is treated as the equitable holder of the beneficial interest; the extent of his or her beneficial interest is proportionate to the financial contribution made to acquire the property. The presumption of a resulting trust is rebuttable on a showing by the title-holder that the non-titled party intended the title-holder to have the property for his or her own benefit. The presumption of a resulting trust is also rebuttable on a showing that the transfer to the titled party was not gratuitous.
See Oosterhoff and Gillese, Text, Commentary and Cases on Trusts , 4 th ed. (1992) and Hovius, Family Law: Cases Notes and Materials, 3 rd ed. (1992). [Emphasis added] [ 16 ] What followed was a very detailed analysis of Justice Williams decision. Based on the analysis, counsel for the Applicants noted the many similarities between that case and the case that is now before this Court. At paragraph 66 of his brief, Mr. Schwartz, pointed out the following: (
a) There is no evidence that the Respondents had an executed Agreement of Purchase and Sale to purchase the Property; (
b) There is no evidence that the Property was put into the Applicants’ names for any reason to benefit the Respondents. The reason the Property was put into the Applicants’ names is solely because the Applicants purchased the Property for their own benefit; (
c) The Applicants signed the mortgage with The Toronto-Dominion Bank. The Respondents signed nothing and guaranteed nothing. (
d) The Respondents claim that their efforts resulted in the Applicants’ ability to purchase the Property. The evidence indicates that the Applicants secured their own financing, made an independent offer to purchase the Property, depleted their personal savings, utilized their one-time First Time Home Buyer’s Plan, and acquired property, title, and mortgage insurance. The evidence indicates that the Respondents played no role in any act required for the Applicants to purchase the Property; (
e) The Respondents put nothing into the Property, financially or otherwise, to provide the Applicants with any assistance in purchasing the Property; (
f) The Property has been re-financed and a second mortgage has been placed on the Property since the Property was purchased. The Respondents had no role in either; (
g) All mortgage payments, taxes, insurances, and other costs related to the Property were paid for by the Applicants; (
h) The Applicants paid for all major repairs or renovations on the Property, including all materials and labour required. Any labour provided by the Respondent was minimal and was accounted for through a reduction in monthly rent and the Respondents being provided with additional monies by the Applicants. The Respondents have presented no evidence in relation to paying for materials or outside labour. (
i) During the rebuild of the home on Property there was a General Contractor. The evidence indicates that the Respondents had no oversight or control during the rebuild. The evidence further indicates that all communications with the insurer and General Contractor were through the Applicants; and (
j) The Applicants challenged the Property tax assessment of the Property. It was not challenged by the Respondents. [ 17 ] I agree with counsel’s
interpretation of the cases referred to in his brief. A presumption of a resulting trust arises in favour of persons who contribute financially to the purchase of property, but who do not take title in their own name and do not intend to give a gift of the entire beneficial interest in the property to the registered title holder. [ 18 ] As indicated earlier, the Respondents have made no financial contribution towards the acquisition of the property.
Nor, have they granted any interest in the property to the Applicants, as they had no interest to grant. [ 19 ] The Applicants, on the other hand, used approximately $30,000.00 of their personal savings, arranged for the mortgage from The Toronto-Dominion Bank, purchased title and mortgage insurance, paid legal fees and other closing costs, arranged for and paid for property insurance and capitalized on their, one-time only, First Time Home Buyers’ Plan, in order to acquire the property. [ 20 ] Furthermore, the Respondents have not made any contributions to enhance the value of the property as the Applicants, at all times, have paid the property taxes, the mortgage payments, and any costs associated with repairs or renovations. [ 21 ] The Respondents have paid rent and the cost of most utilities, albeit with some contribution, on occasion, by the Applicants. [ 22 ] I find that the Respondents’ equitable claim arising by resulting trust fails. [ 23 ] The Applicants acquired title to the property in an arms-length purchase from an independent seller.
The purchase was made without financial or other support from the Respondents.
Issue 1(b): Whether the Respondents have an equitable claim to the Property by virtue of a Constructive Trust? - and - Issue 1(c): Whether the Respondents have an equitable claim to the Property by unjust enrichment? [24] I will look at Issues 1(
b) and (
c) together as they are closely intertwined based on the law as it exists in Canada. [25] Counsel for the Applicants relies, primarily, on two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. [26] In Rawluk v. Rawluk, (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, Cory, J. at para. 86 had this to say: These cases show that in Canada the doctrine of remedial constructive trust has been accepted for almost a decade as an importantremedial device whose prime function is to remedy situations of unjust enrichment.
Again, it shows how closely intertwined these two equitable remedies co-exist. [27] In a more recent case, McLachlin, J. (as she then was), at page 987 of her decision in Peter v. Beblow, ,[1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, said the following: The basic notions are simple enough. An action for unjust enrichment arises when three elements are satisfied: (1) an enrichment;(2) a corresponding deprivation; and (3) the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment. These proven, the action is establishedand the right to claim relief made out.
At this point, a second doctrinal concern arises: the nature of the remedy. ’Unjust enrichment’ inequity permitted a number of remedies, depending on the circumstances. One was a payment for services rendered on the basis ofquantum meruit or quantum valebat. Another equitable remedy, available traditionally where one person was possessed of legal title toproperty in which another had an interest, was the constructive trust. While the first remedy to be considered was a monetary award, theCanadian jurisprudence recognized that in some cases it might be insufficient.
This may occur to quote LaForest, J. in Lac Minerals Ltd.v. International Corona Resources Ltd., (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, at p. 678, ‘if there is reason to grant to the plaintiffthe additional rights that flow from recognition of a right of property’. Or to quote Dickson, J., as he then was in Pettkus v.
Becker, (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, at p. 852, where there is a contribution [to the property] sufficiently substantial and direct as toentitle [the plaintiff] to a portion of the profits realized upon sale of [the property].’ In other words, the remedy of constructive trustarises, where monetary damages are inadequate and where there is a link between the contribution that founds the action andthe property in which the constructive trust is claimed. [Emphasis added] [28] Justice McLaughlin in Peter v.
Beblow, supra, elaborated on this point, at pages 995 and 996, of the decision where shewrote: In Canada the concept of the constructive trust has been used as a vehicle for compensating for unjust enrichment in appropriatecases. The constructive trust, based on analogy to the formal trust of traditional equity, is a proprietary concept. The plaintiff is found tohave an interest in the property. A finding that a plaintiff is entitled to a remedy for unjust enrichment does not imply that there is aconstructive trust.
As I wrote in Rawluk, supra, for a constructive trust to arise, the plaintiff must establish a direct link to theproperty which is the subject of the trust by reason of the plaintiff’s contribution. This is the notion underlying the constructivetrust in Pettkus v. Becker, supra and Sorochan v. Sorochan, supra, as I understand those cases. It was also affirmed by LaForest,J. in Lac Minerals, supra. [29] In a yet more recent case from the Supreme Court, Justice Cote, in Moore v. Sweet, 2018 SCC 52, reiterated that a constructivetrust is a discretionary remedy requiring a proper equitable basis to justify its use.
At paras. 32 and 33 Justice Cote wrote: A constructive trust is a vehicle of equity through which one person is required by operation of law – regardless of any intention – to hold certain property for the benefit of another (Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada (4th ed. 2012), by D.W. M. Waters, M.R. Gillen andL.D. Smith, at p. 478). In Canada, it is understood primarily as a remedy, which may be imposed at a court’s discretion where goodconscience so requires.
As McLachlin, J. (as she then was) noted in Soulos: … under the broad umbrella of good conscience, constructive trusts are recognized both for wrongful acts like fraud and breach of dutyof loyalty, as well as to remedy unjust enrichment and corresponding deprivation, … Within these two broad categories, there is room for the law of constructive trust to develop and for greater precision to be attained, astime and experience may dictate. [Emphasis added: para 43.] What is therefore crucial to recognize is that a proper equitable basis must exist before the courts will impress certain propertywith a remedial constructive trust.
The cause of action in unjust enrichment may provide one such basis, so long as the plaintiffcan also establish that a monetary award is insufficient and that there is a link between his or her contributions and the disputed property(Peter v. Beblow, (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, at p. 997; Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 , [2011] 1 S.C.R.269, at paras. 50-51).
Absent this a plaintiff seeking the imposition of a remedial constructive trust must point to some other basis onwhich this remedy can be imposed, like breach of fiduciary duty. [Emphasis added] [30] When the facts of this case are applied there is no enrichment of the Applicants by the Respondents by virtue of a contributiontowards the purchase price of the property. As such, there is no corresponding deprivation suffered by the Respondents. On thecontrary, it is the Applicants who have suffered a deprivation.
They have assumed all the responsibility and financial risk associatedwith the purchase and on-going upkeep and maintenance of the property. The rent paid by the Respondents was insufficient to covereven the regular mortgage payments, let alone, the other costs associated with home ownership. [31] Since I have concluded there has been no enrichment of the Applicants at the expense of the Respondents, there is no juristic
reason to interfere with the Applicants rightful claim to full ownership nor any juristic reason to rule in favour of the Respondent’s unsubstantiated claims. [ 32 ] The Respondents’ claim based on unjust enrichment and constructive trust must therefore fail.
Issue 2: Whether the Respondents have a claim to ownership of the property based on contract? [ 33 ] I am reminded of the line in the movie where one of the actors says: “Show me the money!” If the Respondents hope to establish a claim to ownership based on contract, then they should produce something in writing or some exchange of letters, emails or messages that might possibly go towards establishing the basic requirements of a contract or the intent to enter into some sort of contract. No such evidence has been provided.
I can only conclude that no such contract exists. [ 34 ] The Respondents claim to ownership based on contract must therefore be denied. Issue 3: If the answer to Issues 1(a), (
b) and (
c) and Issue 2 is “No”, then what relief should be granted? [ 35 ] As previously indicated, the Applicants are seeking the following relief: a. A declaration that the Respondents have no legal or equitable interest in the Property; b. A declaration that the Respondents are tenants at the Property as defined in the Residential Tenancies Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 401 ; c. General, Special, and Punitive damages as a result of the Respondents’ continued occupation of the Property and the deprivation suffered by the Applicants; d.
An Order stipulating that the Respondents (and any other occupants) must provide vacant possession of the Property on a date deemed just and appropriate by the Court; and e. Costs. [ 36 ] The two declarations sought by the Applicants are granted. The Respondents have no legal or equitable interest in the property. They are, as they have always been, tenants as that word is defined in the Residential Tenancies Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 401 (as amended). [ 37 ] I am not persuaded to grant the Applicants’ request, however, for general damages based on trespass.
The Respondents were simply over-holding tenants since being provided with a Notice to Quit on September 8, 2018. They have continued to pay rent based on the arrangements that were in place since the Applicants first acquired ownership of the property back in January of 2008. It was perhaps a sweet deal for the Respondents , but given the familial relationship between the parties, it was not so one-sided as to amount to some form of exploitation or, dare I say, unjust enrichment by the Respondents to the deprivation of the Applicants. I say this while noting that
Section 4 (
a) of the Residential Tenancies Act indicates that when the relation of landlord and tenant exists in respect of residential premises, the “Overholding Tenants Act” does not apply. I am not suggesting it does. I am simply using the term “over- holding tenants” to describe the reality of the situation and not to rely on the provisions of that Act . [ 38 ] To award general or punitive damages would only, I think, exacerbate the hard feelings that now exist within this family.
As such, I refuse to order any. [ 39 ] I am prepared to hear from the parties, however, in regard to costs. [ 40 ] I am also prepared to order that the Respondents and anyone else residing at the property vacate the premises no later than Tuesday, March 31, 2020. When we were last together at the hearing on Monday, December 1, 2019, I urged Mr. Nelson not to wait until the date set to deliver my decision to begin the search for alternate accommodations. One should have been able to read into this that the outcome might not be in his and his wife’s favour.
I did not wish to order them to vacate during the Christmas/New Year period. [ 41 ] An additional two months and one week should be plenty of time for them to find a suitable alternative place to live, as well as, to afford time for their son, Owen, to apply to, once again, amend the terms of his release conditions pending trial. [ 42 ] They (when I say they, I mean the Respondents) will still be responsible for the payment of rent at the amount they have been paying since this matter was first commenced.
They are also responsible for the payment of all utilities while they remain in occupation of the premises as tenants. They shall also be responsible for any wilful damage that might be done to the premises, other than what one would expect to be the result of normal wear and tear. [ 43 ] I will now hear from the parties in respect to costs. [ 44 ] After hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants and from Mr. Nelson, I am prepared to order Costs payable by the Respondents to the Applicants in the amount of $5,000.00 which is to be paid within a period of six months from today’s date. McDougall, J.
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