LaMorre v. Kershaw, 2020 NSSC 108
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: LaMorre v. Kershaw , 2020 NSSC 108 Date: March 26 th , 2020 Docket: Hfx No. 467664 Hfx No. 491711 Registry: Halifax 2017 Hfx No. 467664 Between: Lisa Anne LaMorre Applicant and Becky Louise Kershaw and the Estate of Shayne Leigh Sutherland, Deceased Respondents 2019 Hfx No. 491711 Supreme Court of Nova Scotia Between: Ian Christopher LaMorre and Geoffrey Ryan LaMorre Applicants and Becky Louise Kershaw Respondent Library Heading Judge: The Honourable Chief Justice Deborah K. Smith Heard: March 9 th & 10 th , 2020 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Oral Decision: March 19 th , 2020 in Halifax, Nova Scotia
Subject: Unjust enrichment
Summary: In May 2002, Ms. LaMorre and Mr. Sutherland entered into an Agreement and Minutes of Settlement requiring Mr. Sutherland to maintain life and accidental death and dismemberment insurance in place through his employer for the benefit of his two sons. Ms. LaMorre was to be named trustee of the insurance proceeds until the boys reached the age of majority. The Agreement was incorporated into a Corollary Relief Judgment that was issued by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Family Division) on June 28, 2002. On April 15 th , 2009, Mr.
Sutherland executed a Beneficiary Designation Form revoking any previous beneficiary designations and appointing his common law spouse, Ms. Kershaw, as beneficiary of 50% of any insurance proceeds payable upon his death. His two sons were named equal beneficiaries of the remaining 50%. In addition, Mr. Sutherland appointed Ms. Kershaw trustee of the monies payable to the boys in the event that they were under the age of majority at the time the insurance funds became payable. Mr. Sutherland died on September 3 rd , 2011. As a result of his death, Ms.
Kershaw personally received $189,000.00 under his life and accidental death and dismemberment insurance policies. She also received the boys’ share of the proceeds to be held in trust. These funds were placed in a locked-in GIC for each child. At no time did Ms. Kershaw transfer any of the trust funds to Ms. LaMorre to help support the boys. Ms. LaMorre filed an Application in Court against Ms. Kershaw and the Estate of Mr. Sutherland for unjust enrichment. She eventually decided not to proceed with her claim against the Estate.
In addition, Ian and Geoffrey LaMorre brought a separate Application in Court against Ms. Kershaw also based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Issue: Was Ms. Kershaw unjustly enriched in the circumstances of this case? Result: The court conducted the analysis required for an unjust enrichment claim and concluded that Ms. Kershaw was unjustly enriched in relation to the $189,000.00 that she received personally. The court concluded that Ms. Kershaw was not unjustly enriched as result of being designated trustee of the boys’ share of the proceeds.
THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT'S DECISION. QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET. SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: LaMorre v. Kershaw , 2020 NSSC 108 Date: March 26 th , 2020 Docket: Hfx.No. 467664 Hfx . No. 491711 Registry: Halifax 2017 Hfx.No. 467664 Between: Lisa Anne LaMorre Applicant and Becky Louise Kershaw and the Estate of
Shayne Leigh Sutherland, Deceased Respondents 2019 Hfx.No. 491711 Supreme Court of Nova Scotia Between: Ian Christopher LaMorre and Geoffrey Ryan LaMorre Applicants and Becky Louise Kershaw Respondent Judge: The Honourable Chief Justice Deborah K. Smith Heard: March 9 th and 10 th , 2020 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Oral Decision: March 19 th , 2020 Counsel: Daniel S. Walker, for the Applicants Victor J. Ryan for Kenzie MacKinnon, QC, for the Respondent, Becky Louise Kershaw By the Court: [ 1 ] I have before me two applications. The first is brought by Lisa Anne LaMorre against Becky Louise Kershaw.
The second is brought by Ms. LaMorre’s sons, Ian Christopher LaMorre and Geoffrey Ryan LaMorre (collectively referred to as “the boys”) against Becky Louise Kershaw. In Ms. LaMorre’s application she also claimed against the Estate of her late former husband, Shayne Leigh Sutherland. Counsel for the Applicants has confirmed that Ms. LaMorre is no longer proceeding with her application against Mr. Sutherland's Estate. [ 2 ] Ms. LaMorre and Mr. Sutherland were married on June 8 th , 1996. They had two children, Ian and Geoffrey, who are twins and were born on September 11 th , 1998. Ms. LaMorre and Mr.
Sutherland separated on July 29 th , 1999. Divorce proceedings were commenced thereafter. Ms. LaMorre was represented in the divorce by Marguerite J. MacNeil. Mr. Sutherland was represented by Deborah I. Conrad. [ 3 ] In May 2002, Ms. LaMorre and Mr. Sutherland entered into an Agreement and Minutes of Settlement. Clause 3(
h) of the Agreement reads as follows: (
h) The Petitioner [Mr. Sutherland] agrees that the basic group term life insurance and the basic group term accidental death and dismemberment insurance which is in place through his employer, Aliant, shall remain in place for the benefit of Ian and Geoffrey, with the Respondent named as trustee of the insurance proceeds until the boys are of the age of majority. In the event that the Petitioner’s employment changes, he will obtain similar alternative coverage, if such coverage is available through his new employment.
In the event that similar life insurance is not available to the Petitioner through any new employment he obtains, then the Petitioner will make all reasonable efforts to obtain suitable and appropriate alternative life insurance, and provide the Respondent with notification thereof. If the Respondent seeks confirmation that insurance coverage remains in place, such written confirmation shall be provided by the Petitioner, but the Respondent shall not request confirmation more frequently than once annually. [ 4 ] The parties agree that at the time the Minutes of Settlement were signed, Mr.
Sutherland had group term life insurance coverage in the amount of $147,000.00 and group term accidental death and dismemberment insurance coverage in the amount of $147,000.00. Both policies were mandatory for Aliant employees and the coverage amount was equal to three times Mr. Sutherland’s annual salary. The coverage amounts were adjusted every January by Mr.
Sutherland’s employer to reflect any changes in salary. [ 5 ] The Agreement and Minutes of Settlement were attached to and incorporated into a Corollary Relief Judgment that was issued by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Family Division) on June 28 th , 2002. [ 6 ] In 2005, Mr. Sutherland commenced a romantic relationship with the Respondent, Ms. Kershaw. In July 2007, Ms. Kershaw and
Mr. Sutherland moved into a property that they purchased together in Lawrencetown, Nova Scotia. [ 7 ] According to Ms. Kershaw’s evidence, at some point after the purchase of the Lawrencetown property she and Mr. Sutherland agreed to name each other as beneficiaries of their respective life insurance policies. [ 8 ] On April 15 th , 2009, Mr. Sutherland signed a Beneficiary Designation Form relating to his life and accidental death and dismemberment insurance policies in place through his employer. With this form, he revoked any previous beneficiary designations and appointed Ms.
Kershaw as beneficiary of 50% of any insurance proceeds payable upon his death. Ian and Geoffrey were named equal beneficiaries of the remaining 50% (25% each). In addition, Mr. Sutherland appointed Ms. Kershaw as trustee of the monies payable to Ian and Geoffrey in the event that they were under the age of majority at the time the insurance funds became payable. Ms. LaMorre was named alternate trustee. [ 9 ] Ms. Kershaw had a $50,000.00 life insurance policy with Sun Life Financial. In June 2011, she named Mr. Sutherland sole beneficiary of this policy. [ 10 ] Unfortunately, Mr.
Sutherland died in a swimming accident on September 3 rd , 2011. The boys were minors at the time of his death. Mr. Sutherland was paying child support for Ian and Geoffrey in the amount of $1,100.00 per month at the time of his death. [ 11 ] Ms. LaMorre learned of Mr. Sutherland’s relationship with Ms. Kershaw after Mr. Sutherland’s passing. Shortly thereafter, she wrote to Ms. Kershaw sending her condolences and asking whether Mr. Sutherland had provided for the boys ongoing support. Ms. Kershaw was, understandably, emotional after Mr. Sutherland’s death.
Accordingly, she asked her sister, Linda Dawson, to correspond with Ms. LaMorre in relation to his estate. [ 12 ] Ms. Dawson emailed Ms. LaMorre approximately one week after Mr. Sutherland’s death indicating that she was unable to respond at that time to Ms. LaMorre’s inquiries and notifying her that Mr. Sutherland’s bank accounts had been closed. [ 13 ] On December 18 th , 2011, Ms. Kershaw wrote to Ms. LaMorre indicating that Ian and Geoffrey had been named [partial] beneficiaries of Mr. Sutherland’s life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment insurance and that as per Mr.
Sutherland’s wishes, the funds were being invested by her in trust for the boys. [ 14 ] Around the same time, Ms. LaMorre emailed Ms. Kershaw directly to explain the financial struggle that she was experiencing as a result of no longer receiving child support for the boys from Mr. Sutherland. [ 15 ] On December 23 rd , 2011, Ms. LaMorre emailed Ms. Dawson informing her that she was supposed to have been named trustee of the insurance proceeds and asking that Ms. Kershaw not invest the insurance money until Ms. LaMorre had heard from Ms. Kershaw. On January 3 rd , [2012] Ms. Dawson, on behalf of Ms.
Kershaw, emailed the following to Ms. LaMorre: ……. Legal counsel has been involved from the beginning, including being provided with a full copy of the divorce agreement, all divorce communications, and all beneficiary designations. Legal counsel advises that the Estate is governed by the beneficiary designations at the time of Shayne Sutherland’s passing. The Estate cannot circumvent this designation. The investments made for Ian & Geoffrey have been made in accordance with the beneficiary designation, and when the proceeds of the AD&D benefit are received, they too will be handled in the same manner.
The Estate has no choice in this matter. The Estate is and will continue handling the Estate’s affairs in the appropriate and legal manner. If challenged the Estate will defend itself from any such action, and in the event of an unsuccessful challenge by a claimant, the estate will be required to take appropriate action to recover any costs associated with having to defend itself. [ 16 ] On June 7 th , 2012, Ms. Kershaw received two cheques each in the amount of $47,462.82 representing Ian and Geoffrey’s share of Mr. Sutherland’s life insurance proceeds.
She later received two additional cheques each in the amount of $47,529.49 representing Ian and Geoffrey’s share of the proceeds from their father’s accidental death and dismemberment insurance. These funds were placed in a locked- in GIC for each child. At no time did Ms. Kershaw transfer any of the trust funds to Ms. LaMorre to help support the boys. [ 17 ] As a result of Mr. Sutherland’s death, Ms. Kershaw personally received $189,000.00 under his life and accidental death and dismemberment insurance policies. She also received the funds that were in a joint bank account that she held with Mr.
Sutherland (amount unknown); Mr. Sutherland’s interest in the property that they had purchased together in Lawrencetown, Nova Scotia in 2007; the commuted value of Mr. Sutherland’s pension in the amount of $431,749.96; and a CPP death benefit in the amount of $2,500.00. This death benefit was applied towards Mr. Sutherland’s funeral expenses. In addition, Ms. Kershaw receives a CPP survivors benefit in relation to Mr. Sutherland’s death which she says is close to but less than $600.00 per month. This benefit is indexed. [ 18 ] When Ian and Geoffrey turned 18 years of age, Ms.
Kershaw attempted to give the boys the money that she was holding in trust for them. In October 2016, the boys each received the sum of $100,638.68 from Ms. Kershaw. This represented the principal amount that she had invested, plus interest. However, since the age of majority in Nova Scotia is 19 years, the boys were unable to access these funds until the following year. [ 19 ] On August 31 st , 2017, Ms. LaMorre filed an Application in Court against Ms. Kershaw and the Estate of Mr. Sutherland. The claim against Ms. Kershaw was based on the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. As indicated previously, Ms.
LaMorre has decided not to proceed with her claim against the Estate, which, for the most part, appears to be impecunious.
[ 20 ] On September 6 th , 2019 Ian and Geoffrey LaMorre brought a separate Application in Court against Ms. Kershaw. Again, the claim was based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Notices of Contest were filed in response to both applications.
The matter was heard before me on March 9 th and 10 th , 2020. [ 21 ] In order to succeed in a claim for unjust enrichment the Applicants must establish (1) that the Respondent was enriched; (2) that the Applicants suffered a corresponding deprivation and (3) that the Respondent’s enrichment and the Applicants’ corresponding deprivation occurred in the absence of a juristic reason. As Cromwell J. noted in Kerr v.
Baranow , 2011 SCC 10 , “ this means that there is no reason in law or justice for the defendant’s retention of the benefit conferred by the plaintiff, making its retention ‘unjust’ in the circumstances of the case ” (¶40). [ 22 ] The juristic reason analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage requires the Applicants to demonstrate that the Respondent’s retention of the benefit at the Applicants’ expense cannot be justified on the basis of any of the established categories of juristic reason: a contract, a disposition of law, a donative intent or other valid common law, equitable, or statutory obligations.
If the Applicants successfully demonstrate that no category of juristic reason applies, a prima facie case is established and the analysis proceeds to the second stage. At this stage, the Respondent must establish some residual reason why the enrichment should be retained. Considerations such as the parties’ reasonable expectations and moral and policy-based arguments come into play at this stage of the analysis (see Moore v. Sweet , 2018 SCC 52 ). [ 23 ] In order to analyze the various claims for unjust enrichment, it is necessary for me to determine the nature and extent of Mr.
Sutherland’s obligations under clause 3(
h) of the parties’ Agreement and Minutes of Settlement. [ 24 ] The Applicants submit that this clause obliged Mr. Sutherland to maintain, for the benefit of the boys, the basic group term life insurance and the basic term accidental death and dismemberment insurance that he had in place with his employer at the time the Minutes of Settlement were entered into. Further, they submit, it obliged Mr. Sutherland to name Ms. LaMorre trustee. [ 25 ] The Respondent submits that clause 3(
h) of the Minutes of Settlement only obliged Mr. Sutherland to maintain basic group term life and accidental death and dismemberment insurance through his employer. Ms. Kershaw notes that the insurance regime maintained by Mr. Sutherland’s employer was changed in 2005 to reduce the mandatory coverage amount from three times annual salary to one times annual salary. As a result, she submits, Mr. Sutherland’s obligations pursuant to clause 3(
h) were reduced. According to Ms. Kershaw, Mr. Sutherland’s decision to maintain more coverage than the basic amount required by his employer entitled him to add her as a beneficiary. Ms. Kershaw also notes that clause 3(
h) does not state that the insurance proceeds will be for the “sole” benefit of Ian and Geoffrey. She submits that the intent of this clause was to provide suitable and appropriate insurance coverage for the benefit of the boys in the event of Mr. Sutherland’s death, not to dictate a specific amount of coverage that Mr. Sutherland was required to maintain. [ 26 ] Ian and Geoffrey were only three years of age at the time their parents executed the Agreement and Minutes of Settlement. Prior to entering into this Agreement, Ms. LaMorre’s counsel asked for the details of Mr. Sutherland’s insurance coverage.
She wrote the following to Mr. Sutherland’s counsel in a letter dated December 10 th , 2001: Related to the child support issue, is the question of life insurance coverage. We will require confirmation that Mr. Sutherland has coverage in place for the benefit of the children, with Ms. LaMorre named as trustee. I ask that you provide the details of coverage, and as long as it is adequate, then this should not be an issue. Obviously, if there is no coverage or inadequate coverage, this will have to be addressed, as Ms.
LaMorre’s disability income would not be sufficient to support both herself and the children. [ 27 ] In response, Mr. Sutherland’s lawyer forwarded a letter from Mr. Sutherland’s employer confirming that he had Basic Group Term Life Insurance in the amount of $147,000.00 and Basic Group Term Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance in the amount of $147,000.00. Both policies were said to be mandatory and were based on three times Mr.
Sutherland’s salary. [ 28 ] Reading the Minutes of Settlement as a whole, giving the words their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of the contract (including the age of the children and Ms. LaMorre’s disability), I cannot accept the Respondent’s argument that the parties intended for Mr. Sutherland to maintain the minimum amount of insurance coverage mandated by his employer.
The agreement entered into by the parties and incorporated into the Corollary Relief Judgment states that “the Petitioner agrees that the basic group term life insurance and the basic group term accidental death and dismemberment insurance which is in place through his employer, Aliant, shall remain in place for the benefit of Ian and Geoffrey, with the Respondent named as trustee of the insurance proceeds until the boys are the age of majority ……” It was the insurance that was in place through Mr. Sutherland’s employer that was to remain in place for the benefit of Ian and Geoffrey.
Not basic insurance or a basic policy. It was the basic policy which provided coverage in an amount equal to three times Mr. Sutherland’s annual salary that was to remain in place. That is the same amount of coverage that he maintained until his death. [ 29 ] I am not persuaded by Ms. Kershaw’s argument that the fact that clause 3(
h) did not say that Ian and Geoffrey would be the “sole” beneficiaries of the policies of insurance implies that they could be partial beneficiaries. I am satisfied that the Agreement obliged Mr. Sutherland to maintain the basic life and accidental death and dismemberment insurance that he had in place through his employer at the time the Agreement was entered into (three times his annual salary) and that this insurance was to remain in place for the benefit of the boys alone. Finally, Ms.
LaMorre was to be named trustee until the boys reached the age of majority. [ 30 ] I turn now to each of the applications before me. [ 31 ] As indicated previously, the Respondent received insurance proceeds personally as well as in her capacity as trustee for the boys. In my view, it is appropriate to analyze the two sets of funds separately. In addition, it is appropriate to analyze each application separately. I will consider Ms. LaMorre’s application first. [ 32 ] Ms. LaMorre submits that Ms.
Kershaw was unjustly enriched both in relation to the funds that she received personally and those that she received as trustee for the boys. I will deal first with the funds that Ms. Kershaw received personally in the amount of $189,000.00. [ 33 ] Ms. Kershaw acknowledges in her brief (at ¶ 54) that she was enriched by the insurance proceeds that she received personally as a
result of the Beneficiary Designation Form signed by Mr. Sutherland on April 15th, 2009. That element of the unjust enrichment test istherefore established. [34] That takes me to the question of whether Ms. LaMorre suffered a corresponding deprivation. Ms. LaMorre notes that her childsupport payments came to an end on Mr. Sutherland’s death and were not replaced by any payments from the insurance proceeds. She saysthat as a result, she went into significant debt to support the boys. Her evidence indicates that if Mr.
Sutherland had survived and continuedto make his child support payments in the amount of $1,100.00 per month from the time of his death until the boys turned 19, she wouldhave received approximately $92,400.00 in child support during that period. [35] Ms. Kershaw submits that any loss that Ms. LaMorre claims to have suffered is not sufficiently linked to Ms. Kershaw’s receipt ofthe funds to ground a claim in unjust enrichment. She notes that Ms. LaMorre had no personal entitlement to the insurance proceeds as theywere to be held in trust for the boys until they attained the age of majority. She says that Ms.
LaMorre cannot be found to have beendeprived of her children’s money. [36] In my view, the Respondent’s position fails to recognize the use of the funds that Ms. LaMorre could have made as trustee. [37] Clause 3(
h) of the parties’ agreement is not clear in relation to the use that Ms. LaMorre could make of the insurance proceeds asTrustee. I find that the purpose of the clause was to secure Ms. LaMorre’s child support payments. The insurance policies were to remainin place for the benefit of Ian and Geoffrey. Although the Agreement does not specify that Ms. LaMorre was entitled to use the funds forthe maintenance and support of the boys, that omission is not fatal. Had Ms. LaMorre been named trustee of the funds, as Mr.
Sutherlandwas contractually obliged to do, she could have applied any income earned on the funds for the maintenance, education or benefit of theboys pursuant to s. 30(1) of the Trustee Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 479. Further, as trustee she could have applied to the court to encroach uponthe capital for the boys’ maintenance (see, for example, Re Mason, (NS SC), [1946] 4 D.L.R. 299 (NSSC)), s.51 of theTrustee Act, supra, and the Variation of Trusts Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 486. Ms.
LaMorre’s corresponding deprivation was her inability touse, or apply to use, this $189,000.00 for the benefit of the boys during their infancy. [38] Counsel for Ms. Kershaw has, quite properly in my view, acknowledged that if I find that Mr. Sutherland was obliged to maintainall of his life and accidental death and dismemberment insurance for the benefit of Ian and Geoffrey, none of the existing categories ofjuristic reason would justify the Respondent’s retention of the enrichment. Accordingly, I will move to the second stage of the juristicreason analysis.
At this stage, the burden shifts to the Respondent to show why the enrichment should be retained. As indicatedpreviously, this is the stage at which the court should consider the parties’ reasonable expectations and public policy. [39] Based on the evidence before me, both Ms. LaMorre and Ms. Kershaw expected to receive the benefit of Mr. Sutherland’sinsurance proceeds. (Ms. LaMorre would receive it as trustee for the boys and would have the benefit of using the interest and applying touse the capital for the benefit of Ian and Geoffrey). [40] In the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision of Moore v.
Sweet, a husband and wife who had separated entered into an oralagreement under which the wife agreed to pay the husband’s life insurance premiums in return for the husband maintaining her asbeneficiary of the policy. Unbeknownst to the wife, the husband subsequently designated his new common-law spouse as the irrevocablebeneficiary of his insurance. Following the husband’s death, the wife filed an unjust enrichment claim against the common–law spouse.
Atthe second stage of the juristic reason analysis, the majority held that because the common-law spouse’s irrevocable beneficiary designationtook place after the husband and wife had entered into the oral agreement, her expectation to receive the funds could not take precedenceover the former wife’s prior contractual right to remain beneficiary (¶ 85). [41] In the case at bar, Ms. Kershaw was designated beneficiary of 50% of the proceeds of Mr. Sutherland’s insurance after Mr.Sutherland and Ms. LaMorre’s prior agreement that the proceeds would be held by Ms. LaMorre in trust for the boys. Ms.
Kershaw'sexpectation to receive the funds cannot take priority over Ms. LaMorre’s expectation in the circumstances of this case. [42] In addition, in my view, public policy dictates that Ms. Kershaw not be permitted to keep the funds. Spouses who enter intocontractual arrangements to secure the payment of child support should be held to those bargains. It would be improper to allow Mr.Sutherland’s designation of Ms. Kershaw as a 50% beneficiary to stand, in the face of his previous agreement to name Ms. LaMorre trusteeof these funds for the benefit of the boys. [43] Ms. Kershaw submits that Mr.
Sutherland was attempting to ensure that both his children and his common-law spouse would betaken care of in the event of his death. She suggests that in the circumstances of this case, it would not be unjust for she and the boys toshare the insurance proceeds. [44] This argument, in my view, fails to recognize that Mr. Sutherland was not in a position to name Ms. Kershaw a partial beneficiaryof his life and accidental death insurance in light of his contractual obligations under the Minutes of Settlement. Further, it must berecognized that Ms. Kershaw was well taken care of through the disposition of Mr.
Sutherland’s other assets, including his interest in theLawrencetown property and the commuted value of his pension in the amount of $431,749.96, all of which went to Ms. Kershaw. [45] Ms. Kershaw has not satisfied me, under the second stage of the juristic reason analysis, that she should retain the enrichment. [46] That takes me to the portion of the funds that Ms. Kershaw held in trust for the boys. In order to succeed in relation to this portionof the claim, Ms. LaMorre must satisfy me that Ms. Kershaw was enriched as a result of being trustee of the boys’ share of the insuranceproceeds. [47] Ms.
LaMorre submits that equity does not require that an enrichment have a monetary value – only that a "tangible benefit" passfrom one party to another (see Moore v. Sweet at ¶ 41). The Applicants suggest that the Respondent was enriched by the bestowal of powerand control on her in relation to the boys’ funds. They say that this power allowed Ms. Kershaw to deprive Ms. LaMorre of the use of themoney until the boys attained the age of majority. [48] While there is no doubt that Ms. Kershaw had control of the boys’ funds after Mr.
Sutherland’s death, and that some mightconsider this to be a "tangible benefit", I am not satisfied that it rises to the level of an enrichment for the purpose of an unjust enrichment
claim. [49] As Ms. LaMorre has not satisfied the first part of the unjust enrichment analysis, I need not consider this aspect of the claim anyfurther. [50] That takes me to the boys’ application. The boys claim that Ms. Kershaw was unjustly enriched as a result of the $189,000.00 thatshe personally received from Mr. Sutherland’s estate, as well as by the money that she held in trust for them. [51] As indicated above, I am not satisfied that the Respondent was enriched as a result of holding the funds in trust for Ian andGeoffrey.
Accordingly, this aspect of their application fails. [52] In relation to the $189,000.00 that Ms. Kershaw received personally, as indicated previously, she acknowledges that she wasenriched by these funds. In addition, in her brief, she acknowledges at ¶ 69 that if the court finds that the Agreement and Minutes ofSettlement entitled Ian and Geoffrey to the entirety of the life insurance proceeds, the boys were deprived of these funds. Accordingly, thesecond part of the unjust enrichment analysis is satisfied. [53] Again, Ms. Kershaw reasonably concedes that if I am satisfied that Mr.
Sutherland was obliged to maintain all of his life andaccidental death and dismemberment insurance for the benefit of the boys, none of the existing categories of juristic reason would justifyher retention of the funds. [54] For the same reasons that I set out in relation to Ms. LaMorre’s claim, I am not satisfied that Ms. Kershaw should retain theenrichment based on the second stage of the juristic reason analysis. [55] As noted by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Peel (Regional Municipality) v.
Canada, (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R.762 " At the heart of the doctrine of unjust enrichment … lies the notion of restoration of a benefit which justice does not permit one toretain" (p.788). [56] In my view, in the circumstances of this case, Ms. Kershaw has received a benefit which justice does not permit her to retain. Ifind, therefore, in favour of the Applicants. [57] The Applicants are not seeking the imposition of a constructive trust. Rather, they have requested an award of damages. Inparticular, they are claiming the sum of $210,572.00 which represents the sum of $189,000.00 plus a modest amount of interest.
Counselfor Ms. Kershaw has agreed that if the Applicants are successful, $210,572.00 is the appropriate figure for damages including interest. AnOrder will issue requiring the Respondent to pay to the Applicants the single sum of $210,572.00. [58] The Applicants have agreed that if they are successful in their applications, damages should be apportioned 48.9% to Ms. LaMorreand 51.1% to the boys (said share to be divided equally between Ian and Geoffrey). At the court’s request, the boys received independentlegal advice on this issue.
As the Applicants have all requested that the court apportion the damages as stated, this will form part of thecourt’s Order. Deborah K. Smith Chief Justice
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