R. v. Bonvie, 2020 NSSC 342
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: R. v. Bonvie, 2020 NSSC 342 Date: 20200130 Docket: Pictou , CRP No. 490133 Registry: Pictou Between: Her Majesty the Queen v. Shawn Daniel Bonvie Decision on
Section 278 Application Restriction on Publication: 486.4 and 278.9 Judge : The Honourable Justice Scott C. Norton Heard : January 24 th , 2020 in Pictou, Nova Scotia Counsel : T. William Gorman, for the Crown Nicole A. Rovers, for the Accused Carbo Kwan, for the Complainant By the Court: [ 1 ] This decision responds to an application by the accused for production of third-party records pursuant to s. 278.3(1) of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 . [ 2 ] The records sought are treatment records of a family physician pertaining to the Complainant, AMM.
AMM was represented by counsel at the application hearing and filed a written brief and provided the court with helpful submissions at the hearing. Helpful briefs were filed by the Crown and the accused in advance of the hearing. [ 3 ] At the outset, counsel for the parties and AMM all agreed that all procedural requirements had been met and there were no preliminary objections to my jurisdiction to hear the application. [ 4 ] With agreement of counsel the hearing proceeded as follows: 1. The hearing was held in camera as required by s. 278.4. 2.
Preliminary submissions were made on process and confirming that there were no procedural issues that prevented the court from hearing the application. 3. The person in possession or control of the records, Dr. Park, identified himself on the record and confirmed he had brought with him the records referred to in the notice of application and subpoena served on him. Dr. Park declined the court's invitation to participate further in the hearing and departed. 4. The two pages of records were placed in an envelope, sealed by the court clerk and marked as Exhibit #1. 5.
Submissions on the merits of the application were heard in the following order: 1. Applicant; 2. Person affected;
3. Crown; 4. Reply by Applicant. 6. The court reserved decision to conduct the Stage 1 analysis. 7. If any records satisfy the Stage 1 analysis, the court will break the seal on the package of records and conduct the Stage 2 analysis. 8. The court will issue a decision with reasons as to the Stage 1 and Stage 2 analyses and with proposed conditions and redactions of those documents, if any, to be produced as a result of the Stage 2 analysis. 9.
A copy of the decision and proposed production with any redactions will be provided to counsel for the person affected to seek further written submissions to be filed under seal by a date certain. 10. A copy of the decision and conditions without copies of the proposed production will be provided to the Crown and the accused to seek written submissions as to the conditions only to be filed under seal by a date certain. 11.
The court will then consider the further written submissions and amend the production, redactions, and/or conditions as it deems necessary and the final redacted records will be produced to the person affected, the Crown and the accused. The Facts [ 5 ] The accused stands charged on a single count indictment that on or about the 12 th day of October 2017 he committed a sexual assault on AMM contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code . [ 6 ] A preliminary hearing was held on July 4 th , 2019.
The affidavit of the accused sworn the 26 th day of August 2019 was filed in support of the application and attached to the affidavit were three pages excerpted from the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The complete transcript was attached to the written submissions of counsel for the accused in support of the application, as was a copy of the transcript of a video statement provided by AMM to the police on October 14 th , 2017.
No objection was taken to this material being before the court in this manner. [ 7 ] The Notice of Application for Production of Third-Party Records was filed on September 5 th , 2019. The Notice sought production of the following: 1. All records in the possession and/or control of the office of Dr. Thomas Park located at 808 East River Road, New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, B2G 3S3, relating to the complainant (AMM) and the allegation of sexual assault on October 12, 2017. In particular, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, these records should include: i.
Any narrative description/records of allegations made by (AMM) to Dr. Thomas Park about the alleged sexual assault by the Applicant herein and its surrounding circumstances; ii. Any narrative description/records of examination or treatment of (AMM) by Dr. Thomas Park as a result of allegations of sexual assault by the Applicant herein and its surrounding circumstances.
The Law [ 8 ] Sections 278.1 to 278.97 outline the constitutionally valid statutory scheme developed by the Parliament of Canada to balance the rights of an accused to a fair trial with the privacy interests of complainants and witnesses in sexual assault trials when determining if an accused person should have access to the private records of a complainant or witness. See R. v.
Mills , [1999] SCR 668. [ 9 ] There is a presumption that the records should not be disclosed to the accused except in accordance with the provisions of ss. 278.3 to 278.91 and accordingly, the burden is on the accused to rebut this presumption (s. 278.2). [ 10 ] In R. v. R.R.D.G. 2013 NSSC 371 , Justice Rosinski provided a very helpful list of questions the judge must ask in an application under s. 278.3 (at para. 29). I have repeated the questions below with my answers to the questions in the case before me: 1.
Has a complete and proper application, evidence, and brief been presented to the Court, and does the Court have jurisdiction over the offences per s. 278.3(3)? [I conclude that all these requirements are met.] 2. Have all interested parties received sufficient notice per s. 278.3(5)? [I have concluded that they have.] 3. Are each of the sought-after records a "record" as defined in s. 278.1? [No argument was made to the contrary and I am satisfied that they are.] 4.
Has the person affected, AMM, waived the application of ss. 278.3 to 278.91? [I have concluded that AMM has not made such a waiver and no argument was made to the contrary.] [ 11 ] With these preliminary questions answered, the court then must embark on what has been described in the jurisprudence as a two-stage process. At the first stage the court is asked to determine, based on the evidence filed in support of the application, whether the accused has satisfied the court that (s. 278.5(1)): a.
The records sought to be produced to the court are "likely relevant" to an issue at trial or the competency of a witness to testify? and
b. The production of the record is necessary in the interests of justice. [12]
Section 278.5(2) reads as follows:
(2) In determining whether to order the production of the record or part of the record for review pursuant to subsection (1), the judgeshall consider the salutary and deleterious effects of the determination on the accused's right to make a full answer and defence and onthe right to privacy, personal security and equality of the complainant or witness, as the case may be, and of any other person to whomthe record relates. In particular, the judge shall take the following factors into account: (
a) the extent to which the record is necessary for the accused to make a full answer and defence; (
b) the probative value of the record; (
c) the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the record; (
d) whether production of the record is based on a discriminatory belief or bias; (
e) the potential prejudice to the personal dignity and right to privacy of any person to whom the record relates; (
f) society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences; (
g) society's interest in encouraging the obtaining of treatment by complainants of sexual offences; and (
h) the effect of the determination on the integrity of the trial process. [13] If the trial judge determines that the records should be disclosed to the court following the Stage 1 analysis, the trial judge thenreviews the records to determined whether or not all or parts of the records should be disclosed to the accused and on what conditions. This decision is to take into account the same factors which guided the decision to produce the records to the court as set out in s.278.5(2). See R. v. R.E.W., 2009 NSSC 286 (at paras. 3-5). [14] In determining if the record is "likely relevant", s. 278.3(4) states as follows:
(4) Any one or more of the following assertions by the accused are not sufficient on their own to establish that the record is likelyrelevant to an issue at trial or to the competence of a witness to testify: (
a) that the record exists; (
b) that the record relates to medical or psychiatric treatment, therapy or counselling that the complainant or witness has received oris receiving; (
c) that the record relates to the incident that is the subject-matter of the proceedings; (
d) that the record may disclose a prior inconsistent statement of the complainant or witness; (
e) that the record may relate to the credibility of the complainant or witness; (
f) that the record may relate to the reliability of the testimony of the complainant or witness merely because the complainant orwitness has received or is receiving psychiatric treatment, therapy or counselling; (
g) that the record may reveal allegations of sexual abuse of the complainant by a person other than the accused; (
h) that the record relates to the sexual activity of the complainant with any person, including the accused; (
i) that the record relates to the presence or absence of a recent complaint; (
j) that the record relates to the complainant's sexual reputation; or (
k) that the record was made close in time to a complaint or to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge against theaccused. [15] This
section was interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mills, supra, as follows: 117
Section 278.3(4) lists a series of "assertions" that cannot "on their own" establish that a record is likely relevant. The respondentsubmits that on a plain reading, this provision prevents the accused from relying on the listed factors when attempting to establish thelikely relevance of the records. This, he argues, interferes with the right to make full answer and defence by restricting what the judgecan consider in determining whether the records must be produced to the defence.
The legislation raises the bar for production, heasserts, making it difficult if not impossible for the accused to meet the likely relevance test of ss. 278.5 and 278.7. The Respondentcontends that it is unconstitutional to exclude the assertions listed in s. 278.3(4) as irrelevant. 118 This submission forgets that when legislation is susceptible to more than one
interpretation, we must always choose theconstitutional reading. See Slaight, supra, at p. 1078. This mistake leads the respondent to overstate the purpose and effect of s. 278.3(4).As has frequently been held, its purpose is to prevent speculative and unmeritorious requests for production, R. v. Hurrie (1997), (BC SC), 12 C.R. (5th) 180 (B.C. S.C.) at paras. 16-17; Boudreau, supra, at para. 6; Regan, supra, at paras. 26-27; R. v.Stromner (1997), (AB CJ), 205 A.R. 385 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) at paras. 39-42; R. v. G. (J.F.) (June 20, 1997), Doc.Yellowknife CR 03132 (N.W.T. S.C.) at paras. 27-28. It does not entirely prevent an accused from relying on the factors listed, but
simply prevents reliance on bare "assertions" of the listed matters, where there is no other evidence and they stand "on their own". 119 As has frequently been noted, speculative myths, stereotypes, and generalized assumptions about sexual assault victims andclasses of records have too often in the past hindered the search for truth and imposed harsh and irrelevant burdens on complainants inprosecutions of sexual offences. See Seaboyer, supra, at p. 634.
The myths that a woman's testimony is unreliable unless she made acomplaint shortly after the event (recent complaint), or if she has had previous sexual relations, are but two of the more notoriousexamples of the speculation that in the past has passed for truth in this difficult area of human behaviour and the law. The notion thatconsultation with a psychiatrist is, by itself, an indication of untrustworthiness is a more recent, but equally invidious, example of such amyth.
The purpose of s. 278.3(4) is to prevent these and other myths from forming the entire basis of an otherwise unsubstantiated orderfor production of private records. 120 The purpose and wording of s. 278.3 does not prevent an accused from relying on the assertions set out in subsection 278.3(4)where there is an evidentiary or informational foundation to suggest that they may be related to likely relevance. (An exception is "recentcomplaint" which has been abolished by the jurisprudence and cannot be relied on in any event, quite apart from the section.) The sectionrequires only that the accused be able to point to case specific evidence or information to show that the record in issue is likely relevantto an issue at trial or the competence of a witness to testify, see Leipert, supra, at para. 21.
Conversely, where an accused does provideevidence or information to support an assertion listed in s. 278.3(4), this does not mean that likely relevance is made out. Section278.3(4) does not supplant the ultimate discretion of the trial judge.
Where any one of the listed assertions is made and supported by therequired evidentiary and informational foundation, the trial judge is the ultimate arbiter in deciding whether the likely relevancethreshold set out in s. 278.5 and 278.7 is met. [16] Accordingly, any assertion by the Applicant not supported by case specific evidence or information to show that the record inissue is likely relevant to an issue at trial or the competence of a witness to testify will be insufficient to support the application. [17] In R. v.
Martin, 2010 NSSC 199, Kennedy, CJSC discussed the test of likely relevance at the first stage as follows (paras. 19-21): [19] In R. v.
Mills, (SCC), 1999 CarswellAlta 1055 (S.C.C.), Justice McLachlin (as she then was) at para. 124states that "likely relevance" means that there is "a reasonable possibility that the information is logically probative to an issue at trial orthe competence of a witness to testify". [20] If so, the trial judge should order production of the records to consider at the second stage hearing. [21] A "reasonable possibility" that the information is logically probative to an issue at trial has been accepted now to mean thatthere is some case specific information which makes the identified information have some potential significance to the specific trial.
General assumptions and suppositions are insufficient and, typically, are characterized as fishing expeditions. As Justice Doherty put itin R. v. Batte, (ON CA), 2000 CarswellOnt 2113 (Ont.
C.A.), at paras. 72-75, it should be shown that the record maycontain information admissible in its own right as evidence going to the question of the accused committing the acts alleged against him,or be information which has some impeachment value, and which information is not already available to the Defence in some other form. [18] The fact that a record relates to the incident that is the subject matter of the proceedings is not enough to show that the record is"likely relevant".
Conjecture or speculation that such a record may be relevant is insufficient to override the privacy interest of theperson of affected) in the record. See R. v. Boudreau, [1998] O.J. No. 3526. Stage 1 Analysis [19] Taking into account the foregoing principles, I have conducted the Stage 1 analysis of the records sought. [20] The Applicant expressly denies that he is seeking any evidence regarding AMM's personal life or sexual history and is notrelying upon discriminatory or stereotypical assertions.
The Applicant seeks the records as being relevant (1) to the issues of whether thealleged assault caused injury; and (2) to the credibility of the Complainant as to her narrative of what transpired at the time of the allegedassault. [21] As to issue (1), injury, the Applicant points to the testimony of the Complainant at the preliminary hearing that she wasexamined by Dr. Park a week after the alleged assault and was told by the doctor that she had hemorrhoids. She then told him "whathappened" and he told her "it was probably because you sustained some injuries there".
She denied having any history of hemorrhoids. In cross-examination at the preliminary hearing AMM stated that Dr. Park conducted a pelvic exam and also "checked me from behind". [22] The Applicant admits that the Crown has disclosed the records of the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) program andthat those records disclose the observation of hemorrhoids; however, the Applicant says that the SANE records do not opine on thecausality of the hemorrhoids.
It was not until the testimony of the Complainant at the preliminary hearing that a cause and effectrelationship of the assault and hemorrhoids was disclosed to the Applicant. He argues that this provides a sufficient evidentiary basis forthe court to be satisfied that the Stage 1 threshold is passed. The Applicant further argues that medical evidence of injury resulting froman assault is part of the standard disclosure allowing the defendant to make full answer and defence. The Applicant says that theexistence or non-existence of such injury is also relevant to AMM's credibility and reliability as a witness.
Further, the Applicant arguesthat if Dr. Park's records differ from the SANE records that it would provide a basis for cross-examination of the SANE witnesses. [23] The Applicant refers to the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Batte (2000), (ON CA), 145CCC (3d) 449 at para. 76: The requirement that an accused be able to show that the statements contained in the record have some potential to provide addedinformation to the accused or some potential to impeach the credibility of the complainant is not an onerous one.
For example, in thiscase the appellant had the initial statement given to the police by D. S. D. before she commenced therapy. He also had a transcript of herlengthy examination in chief and cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry taken after she commenced therapy. Had counsel shown
material differences between the initial statement in the preliminary inquiry testimony, these differences coupled with the fact that the complainant spoke to a therapist about these matters between the giving of the statement and giving any evidence at the preliminary inquiry may have established that statement she made to the therapist touching on matters relevant to her credibility had potential impeachment value and were, therefore, likely relevant. [ 24 ] To be clear, the Applicant did not suggest to the court that Dr.
Park somehow influenced the Complainant's testimony at the preliminary hearing and the evidence supports no such inference. [ 25 ] As to issue (2), credibility, the Applicant refers the court to what he submits are discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of AMM at the preliminary inquiry and at the time she gave the video statement to the police. To the extent that any of the passages cited are inconsistent, the Applicant will have the ability to make that point to the court at the trial. There is however no clear discrepancy cited that relates to AMM's visit to Dr.
Park. [ 26 ] In oral argument, counsel for the Applicant conceded that the evidentiary basis is very weak for the argument that the narrative provided to Dr. Park by AMM should be produced because it would inform credibility. [ 27 ] Counsel for AMM submits that Batte , supra , clearly stated that there must be some connection between the inconsistencies in testimony and the third-party records, at para. 77: It will not, however, suffice to demonstrate no more than that the record contained a statement referable to a subject matter which would be relevant to the complainant's credibility.
The mere fact that a witness has said something in the past about a subject matter on which the witness may properly be cross-examined at trial does not give that prior statement any relevance. It gains relevance only if it is admissible in its own right or has some impeachment value.
In my view, the mere fact that a complainant said something about a matter which could be the subject of cross-examination at trial, does not raise a reasonable possibility that the complainant's statement will have some probative value in the assessment of her credibility. [ 28 ] I refer to the Crown brief where it refers to the statements of Doherty, J. stated in Batte , supra , at para. 71 : In my view, the mere fact that a complainant has spoken to a counsellor or doctor about the abuse or matters touching on the abuse does not make a record of those conversations likely relevant to a fact in issue or to a complainant's credibility. and at para. 72: I would hold that where confidential records are shown to contain statements made by a complainant to a therapist on matters potentially relevant to the complainant's credibility, those records will pass the likely relevance threshold only if there is some basis for concluding that the statements have some potential to provide the accused with some added information not already available to the defence or have some potential impeachment value.
To suggest that all statements made by a complainant are likely relevant is to forget the distinction drawn by the majority in O'Connor, between relevance for the purposes of determining the Crown's disclosure obligation and relevance for the purposes of determining when confidential records in the possession of third parties should be produced to a judge. [ 29 ] The reliability and credibility of the complainant are always material facts in issue. I again adopt the following quote from Doherty, J. in Batte , supra , at para. 75 : The mere assertion that a record is relevant to credibility is not enough.
An accused must point to some "case specific evidence or information" to justify that assertion. In my view, an accused must be able to point to something in the record adduced on the motion that suggests that the records contain information which is not already available to the defence or has potential impeachment value. [ 30 ] The Crown maintains that there is no likely relevance to the records of Dr. Park, having regard to the production of the SANE records by the Crown. The Crown submits that evidence of a physical exam of the Complainant is effectively already in the hands of the defence.
Finally, the Crown argues that the mere existence of a record does not make it "likely relevant". In
summary the Crown says the evidence in support of the motion falls short of the threshold and is squarely within the statutory prohibitions in s. 278.3(4). [ 31 ] The Complainant submits that the Applicant has not shown the necessity of the record to make full answer and defence. There is a high expectation of privacy with medical records and the Complainant should feel free to seek medical treatment and not expect that disclosures made in confidence to her treating physician will be unreasonably invaded. In
summary, she says that her privacy interest outweighs the defence right to full answer and defence in that the probative value of the records sought is low, while the privacy interest in medical records is high. [ 32 ] Having reviewed the evidence and submissions, I conclude that the material before the court does not satisfy the burden upon the Applicant to show the likely relevance of any narrative provided by AMM to Dr. Park.
The evidence did not go beyond the mere assertions that are deemed insufficient by s. 278.3(4). [ 33 ] The application for "any narrative description/records of allegations made by AMM to Dr. Thomas Park about the alleged sexual assault by the Applicant herein and its surrounding circumstances" is dismissed. [ 34 ] I now turn to the application for "any narrative description/records of examination or treatment of AMM by Dr.
Thomas Park as a result of allegations of sexual assault by the Applicant herein and its surrounding circumstances ". [ 35 ] I find on the record before me that the Applicant has shown the probative value of the records relating to the cause of the hemorrhoids is significant in that the SANE records record an observation, but do not speak to the causation issue. There is material value to records of what Dr. Park recorded about his observation of the cause of the hemorrhoids. [ 36 ] I am alert to AMM's right to privacy, personal security and equality.
I am especially alert to the high degree of privacy that should be attached to medical records relating to the medical consequences of the events complained of. It is for this reason that it is
important to distinguish the treatment records that relate to the narrow issue of the cause of the hemorrhoids from those which speak to the narrative of events. [ 37 ] I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the Applicant has met the burden of establishing that the records of Dr. Park on this narrow issue are "likely relevant". [ 38 ] Accordingly, I conclude that the accused has met the Stage 1 threshold and the records of Dr. Park will be reviewed by the court.
Stage 2 Analysis [ 39 ] To briefly repeat, the test at this stage is that the trial judge reviews the records that have passed Stage 1 scrutiny to determine whether all or parts of the records should be disclosed to the accused and on what conditions. This decision is to consider the same factors which guided the decision to produce the records to the court as set out in s. 278.7(2). [ 40 ] Having reviewed the records of Dr.
Park sealed in the envelope marked as Exhibit #1, I have concluded there are no records that should be produced to the accused as they are not likely relevant to an issue at trial or to the competency of a witness to testify and production of the records is not necessary in the interests of justice. [ 41 ] I have returned the records of Dr. Park to the envelope marked Exhibit #1 and have resealed the envelope. It will remain sealed in the court file pursuant to s. 278.7(6) which reads:
(6) Where the judge refuses to order the production of the record or part of the record to the accused, the record or part of the record shall, unless a court orders otherwise, be kept in a sealed package by the court until the later of the expiration of the time for any appeal and the completion of any appeal in the proceedings against the accused, whereupon the record or part of the record shall be returned to the person lawfully entitled to possession or control of it. [ 42 ] The application for "any narrative description/records of examination or treatment of AMM by Dr.
Thomas Park as a result of allegations of sexual assault by the Applicant herein and its surrounding circumstances" is dismissed. Norton J.
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