Ross (Re), 2020 NSSC 36
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY Citation: Ross (Re) , 2020 NSSC 36 Date: 20200128 Docket: Hfx No. 448494 Registry: Halifax In the Matter of Bankruptcy of Glenn Avery Ross (deceased) Judge: The Honourable Justice D. Timothy Gabriel Heard: September 30, 2019, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Counsel: Bruce D. Clarke, Q.C. and Leon S. Tovey for the Trustee Tim Hill, Q.C., for Respondent Estate, as represented by Carol Donalda Ross By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] Carol Donalda Ross is the widow of Glenn Avery Ross. Mr.
Ross died on October 7, 2018, before having fully complied with the terms of his Conditional Order of Discharge. He had received that discharge in September 2016. [ 2 ] At the time that Mr. and Mrs. Ross made their assignments in bankruptcy (in 2013) the Trustee had assessed their assets and concluded that there was no equity in the home available for distribution amongst the creditors. The Trustee wrote a letter to the mortgagee (the Toronto Dominion Bank, or "TD") releasing any interest in the Ross' real property located at 133 Nictaux Crescent, Lower Sackville, Nova Scotia ("the property").
The records at the Registry of Deeds were never altered to reflect the assignment in bankruptcy that had been made by the owners. The records continued to reflect that ostensible ownership of the property was held by Mr. and Mrs. Ross in joint tenancy. [ 3 ] In March 2019, approximately five months after Mr. Ross’ death, the Trustee became aware that there had been mortgage insurance on his life, and changed its position vis-à-vis the property. It contacted Mrs. Ross and told her that she was required to pay $39,709.15 if she wished to retain the property. She did so. The Trustee shortly thereafter contacted Mrs.
Ross again, telling her that there had been a miscalculation, and that she was required to pay an additional $9,200.00, if she wished to keep the property. [ 4 ] On April 12, 2019, the Trustee (MNP) filed a motion before the Registrar in Bankruptcy seeking to vary the Conditional Order of Discharge previously granted to Mr. Ross. The motion date was set for May 17, 2019. Mrs. Ross obtained counsel. The Trustee adjourned the motion, sine die . [ 5 ] MNP now moves for directions with respect to the equity in the property. In response, Mrs.
Ross seeks an order requiring the Trustee to return to her the $39,709.15 that she paid in March 2019. Background [ 6 ] Mr. and Mrs. Ross purchased the property in June 2011, obtaining at the same time a mortgage from TD Bank in the amount of $181,890.75. Mr. Ross also obtained critical illness and life insurance on the property, so that in the event of his illness or death the mortgage payments would either be covered, or the mortgage would be paid out, as the case may be. [ 7 ] On March 20, 2013, Mr. and Mrs. Ross made assignments in bankruptcy.
PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. (“PWC”) was appointed as Trustee of the estate. PWC's personal insolvency practice was later acquired by MNP, which subsequently became the Trustee in this matter.
[ 8 ] At the time of the assignment in bankruptcy, PWC had assessed the parties’ assets and concluded that there was no equity in the home available for distribution to the creditors. The Trustee provided TD with a letter dated May 9, 2013. This letter was not addressed to either Mr. or Mrs. Ross, but was copied to Mr. Ross.
It is reproduced in full below: Via facsimile May 09, 2013 TD Canada Trust 4720 Tahoe Blvd. 3 rd Floor Mississauga, ON L4W 5P2 Fax #1-866-280-0056 Re: In the matter of the bankruptcy of Glenn Avery Ross (AKA Glen Avery Ross) We are writing to confirm that PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., as Trustee in Bankruptcy of the above noted individual, does hereby release and disclaim any or all right, title, or interest in or to the following parcel(
s) of real property. • PID #451112 Land Titles Document # 98436752 We will not be taking any conservatory measures with respect to the property. Please note that the Trustee offers no opinion as to your position in relation to other parties who may have claims against the same property. We have recorded your claim as fully secured . Should you wish to file an unsecured claim , after realization, you may do so by advising us of the amount realized for your security.
In the event any surplus is realized by yourselves pursuant to a Power of Sale or Trustee’s Deed such surplus shall be payable to ourselves as Trustee and cannot be applied to any outstanding indebtedness not secured by the mortgage. Should you have any questions, please contact one of our Asset Team members at […] 7474. Yours truly, PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., Trustee of the Estate of Glenn Avery Ross, a bankrupt PwC Debt Solutions™ cc.
Glenn Ross [Emphasis in original] [ 9 ] The Rosses continued to make payments on the mortgage, and this culminated in TD’s agreement to allow them to renew the mortgage in April 2016, notwithstanding the fact that they were both still undischarged bankrupts at the time. The amount of the renewal was $168,567.61. On the same date as the mortgage renewal, Mr. Ross once again made application through TD insurance for life insurance (but this time, not critical illness insurance) to cover the renewal term.
[ 10 ] In January 2018, Mrs. Ross, having complied with the conditions of her Conditional Discharge Order, received her discharge. In October of that year her husband died unexpectedly. He still owed $7,000.00 under the terms of his Conditional Discharge Order. [ 11 ] Mrs. Ross filled out a "Form 21" and took it to the Registry of Deeds. Since the records reflected that she and Mr. Ross had been joint tenants, the Registrar amended the records to reflect the fact that the property now vested in her alone. [ 12 ] When it made the demands upon Mrs.
Ross in March 2019, the Trustee took the position that, when he filed his assignment, Mr. Ross had failed to disclose an asset, to wit , the existence of life insurance on the mortgage (with TD as the beneficiary) which would pay out the mortgage upon his death. [ 13 ] The Trustee continues: MNP therefore requested payment by Mr. Ross's deceased estate of $39,709.15 for the benefit of its creditors. The amount was paid by Mr. Ross's estate on March 5, 2019. However, MNP determined subsequently that an internal calculation error had initially understated the amount that should be paid for the benefit of Mr.
Ross's creditors; the amount due was actually $48,909.46. This amount was requested from the estate but Ms. Ross, as legal representative of Mr. Ross's deceased estate declined to pay the difference. ( Trustee's brief, p. 2 ) [ 14 ] Mrs. Ross takes the position that not only is she not required to pay the remaining $9,200.00 sought by the Trustee, she is entitled to a return of the $39,709.15 that she earlier paid while unrepresented, because the Trustee had had no right to demand it in the first place. [ 15 ] The Trustee brings this motion for directions to resolve the impasse.
Provision for such a motion is contained in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c. B-3 , (as amended) (“ BIA ”): 34 (1).
A trustee may apply to the court for directions in relation to any matter affecting the administration of the estate of a bankrupt and the court shall give in writing such directions, if any, as to it appear proper in the circumstances. [ 16 ] This is distinct from s. 187(5), which provides the following: Every court may review, rescind or vary any order made by it under its bankruptcy jurisdiction. [ 17 ] As pointed out in Re Cole , 2001 NSSC 203 : … while there is some authority for the proposition that s. 34(1) of the BIA is not intended to make the Court a “solicitor” for the trustee, giving advice to the trustee when the trustee is in doubt… In my view it is entirely appropriate for a trustee to make an application for directions in circumstances where the trustee is in real doubt as to the proper procedure to be followed… Indeed, where, as here, novel issues arise… it is my view that a trustee might well be considered negligent if he or she did not consent to such an application as this. … In my opinion, a trustee may apply ex parte for directions… [in] matters other than matters of substance affecting the rights of third parties.
However, where the rights of third parties are involved… the third party should be given notice and should be a participant in proceedings. Issues A. What is the status of Mr. Ross’ interest in the property? Is it part of the “property of the bankrupt” under s. 67 of the BIA and, therefore, divisible among his creditors? B. If no, should the Trustee be ordered to repay the $39,709.15 paid to it by Mrs. Ross pursuant to an improper demand. Discussion and Analysis A. What is the status of Mr. Ross’ interest in the property?
Is it part of the “property of the bankrupt” under s. 67 of the BIA and, therefore, divisible among his creditors? i. The law and the parties’ respective positions [ 18 ] The relevant portions of s. 67 of the BIA read as follows: 67 (1). The property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors shall not comprise (
b) any property that as against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under any laws applicable in the province within which the property is situated and within which the bankrupt resides; … but it shall comprise (
c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of the bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on the bankrupt
before their discharge , including any refund owing to the bankrupt under the Income Tax Act in respect of the calendar year — or the fiscal year of the bankrupt if it is different from the calendar year — in which the bankrupt became a bankrupt, except the portion that (
i) is not subject to the operation of this Act, (ii) Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act , is garnishable money that is payable to the bankrupt and is to be paid under the garnishee [and] (
d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit. [Emphasis added] [ 19 ] The office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy has issued Directive No.25R which provides for the following approach in relation to s. 67 : Except for property held in trust by the bankrupt or property exempt from execution or seizure, all property of the bankrupt, wherever situate at the date of bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on him or her before the discharge, is available for the creditors within the meaning of
section 67 of the Act. The Trustee must therefore take possession of the assets and realize upon them for the benefit of the estate unless: 1. the asset is specifically exempt from seizure or execution under the law; 2. a specific applicable jurisprudence renders the asset exempt; 3. a specific order has been obtained from the Court to exempt the asset; or 4. in the opinion of the Trustee, there would be no financial benefit to the estate as the cost of realization would exceed or equal the realizable value of the asset.
In such case, a document of explanation should be kept in the estate file. [ 20 ] The Trustee submits that while this directive is not binding upon the Court, it does supply context for the position that MNP has taken in this matter.
Although it proceeds to argue by analogy with respect to some of the decided authorities (which will be discussed shortly), the Trustee also admits: We are unaware of any case authority directly considering the appropriate treatment of equity in a real property owned by a bankrupt arising from the operation of a policy of insurance to pay out a mortgage on the death or disability of the bankrupt. [ 21 ] I observe that Mr. Ross' Conditional Discharge Order specifies what he needed to pay in order to receive his discharge. Mr.
Ross is now deceased, and this is not a motion to vary the order, in any event. [ 22 ] The Trustee, in its counsel's oral submissions to this Court, contends that there is no need to vary the order – Mr. Ross, if he were still alive, could receive his discharge upon payment of the balance of the amount specified in that order. However (it is further argued), what has to be done to fulfil the Conditional Discharge Order, and what has to be done so that Mrs.
Ross can own the full legal interest in the property, are two distinct questions. [ 23 ] This is because (the argument continues) pursuant to s. 67 of the BIA , the Trustee still owns the one half interest in the property that Mr. Ross owned when he made his assignment in 2013. Because Mr. Ross did not disclose the fact that the mortgage on the property was life insured, he did not make full disclosure. He did not mention this asset. [ 24 ] MNP extrapolates from this in two primary respects. First, it argues that the Trustee would have acted very differently had it known that the mortgage was insured.
Therefore, no representation (disclaimer of interest in the property) made by the Trustee in reliance upon anything less than full disclosure is binding upon it. Second, (and in any event) MNP argues there was no act of detrimental reliance by Mr. Ross upon PWC's release letter. [ 25 ] In the report of the Trustee, MNP limited, dated September 12, 2019, Tina M. Powell put it thus: 8. As Mr. Ross's interest in the property did vest with the Trustee upon filing of the assignment in bankruptcy, and where is Mr.
Ross had not been discharged at the time of his passing, we determined that the half interest of the property... constitutes property of a bankrupt, pursuant to section 67(1)(c)of the... [ BIA ]. 11. It was established that between Mr. Ross's surplus income obligation outlined above, and the amounts divisible amongst his creditors for non-exempt property, namely the bankruptcy estate's half interest in the property...
That there would be sufficient funds available to the estate to pay Ross's creditors in full, +5% interest per annum calculated from the date of assignment, as well as the prescribed fees under the ... [ BIA ]. [Emphasis added] [ 26 ] The Trustee refers to the relatively recent decision of MacRury (Re) , 2019 NSSC 146 , a decision by Registrar Balmanoukian. Therein, the Registrar noted: 22. Neither the Trustee nor counsel for the MacRury Estate cited In re Stokes , ex parte Mellish , [1919] 2 KB 256 . In that case, the timeline was as follows:
- December 13, 1879 -- debtor's affairs consigned to be liquidated by arrangement - January 23, 1880: Trustee appointed - October 21, 1881: debtor takes out life insurance policy, with proceeds payable to the estate, and pays the premiums - November 7, 1883 -- discharge of Trustee - November 13, 1883 -- discharge of debtor - July 26, 1917 -- debtor dies 23.
Horridge, J. held that, notwithstanding that the debtor passed long after his discharge, since the policy was held during the currency of the insolvency, it was an asset of the insolvent estate and the proceeds were then payable to the official receiver (as substitute for the discharged Trustee). 24 . Such an outcome may not be the case under the current Canadian regime, wherein the debtor died long after receiving his discharge. However, Stokes was considered and applied in Kelleher v. Meadows (1983), 48 CBR (NS) 311 (Man.
QB) on a timeline very similar to the case at bar: - November 19, 1980 - assignment in bankruptcy - July 1, 1981 -- bankrupt obtains life insurance policy through his work, without a designated beneficiary - July 3, 1981 -- bankrupt dies - March 19, 1982 -- discharge of bankrupt and of Trustee 25. The Trustee did not know of the policy; it was also unclear when the proceeds were paid.
Chief Justice Dewar stated: I find the life insurance proceeds to be proceeds of an asset acquired by the deceased bankrupt after the bankruptcy during the course of the administration (see In re Stokes , deceased, [1919] 2 KB 256 ). As such, they vested in the Trustee and are available to satisfy creditors whose claims were proved in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Trustee's lack of knowledge does not affect that result. 26.
It is therefore clear that the Court was speaking of proceeds of a policy that was property of the bankrupt (that is, either existing at the time of bankruptcy, or during the term of bankruptcy), whether that was known or unknown to the Trustee. 27. In law, there is no distinction between the policy in Kelleher , acquired during the currency of the bankruptcy, and the policy at bar, which existed at the time of the bankruptcy and continued during the bankruptcy . "Property of the bankrupt" includes both. [Emphasis added] [ 27 ] The Trustee also argues that its position is assisted by LePage (Re), 2016 ONCA 403 .
There, the motions judge had held at first instance that representations made by the Trustee, and relied upon by the bankrupt (to the effect that the Trustee intended to disclaim the property) gave rise to a promissory estoppel and precluded the Trustee from claiming the entire increase in value of the property. [ 28 ] In allowing the appeal and holding that promissory estoppel did not apply, the Court of Appeal in LePage said: 22 . In our view, Deloitte & Touche LLP v. Marino is distinguishable.
In that case, the bankrupt made mortgage and other payments after discharge relying on the Trustee's representations that no claim would be made against her home. As a discharged bankrupt, she was entitled to dispose of her property as she wished in accordance with the "fresh start" principle. 23. Mr. Lepage's situation was different. As an undischarged bankrupt, he remained subject to the rule that after-acquired property vested in the Trustee . Mr. Lepage was not entitled to retain any surplus income that exceeded his reasonable living expenses.
Having claimed the mortgage payments as reasonable living expenses, he was not entitled to be credited or reimbursed for those payments or to have them treated as other than after-acquired property that vested in the Trustee. 24. The Trustee asks us to comment on the guidance offered by the motion judge on how Trustees should deal with a property such as that at issue in this appeal. Obviously, the overarching duty of the Trustee to maximize the value of the estate governs. How that is best accomplished will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. 25.
If the Trustee decides to hold on to the property in the hope that its market value will rise, a practical way to cover ongoing costs of interest, insurance, taxes and maintenance must be found. In many if not most cases, that will not be possible and the Trustee will conclude that it is best to dispose of the property quickly or disclaim any interest in it.
We agree with the motion judge that if the bankrupt remains in the property or acquires it from the Trustee before discharge, subject to any order to the contrary, any increase in equity is after acquired property that accrues to the benefit of the estate. [Emphasis added] [ 29 ] The Trustee contends that Mr. Ross obtained benefit by getting to remain in the property following his bankruptcy, and that the amounts that he paid monthly on his mortgage (which it assumes without any evidence on the point, included the premiums for the mortgage life insurance policy) were contained in his reasonable living expenses.
It also points out that "... the policy of insurance was not payable to an exempt beneficiary under the Insurance Act – or even to Mr. Ross's estate [as in MacRury ] – but to a third party: TD."
[ 30 ] Counsel for Ms. Ross points out that LePage is distinguishable on several fronts, the most prominent of these being that the Trustee in LePage changed its position and decided to advance an interest in the property prior to discharge. The equity gain was therefore properly treated in that case as after-acquired property. In contrast, here the Trustee is raising the objection after the Conditional Discharge Order, which did not reference the relevant property. As for MacRury, counsel for Mrs.
Ross points out (among other things) that the life insurance policy in that case was an asset that was payable to the estate. In this case, the mortgage life insurance was payable to the lender. ii. Analysis [ 31 ] An arguably closer (although still obviously not exact) analogy exists in Wadden (re) , 2018 NSSC 217 . This was a case in which Mr. Wadden had been granted an order for conditional discharge in the amount of $12,071.00. Little equity existed in the home, which had been subject to a mortgage of approximately $51,000.00.
When the home later burned down, the Trustee was notified that there was a resulting insurance payment, and it applied for a variation of the discharge order under section 187(5) of the BIA . [ 32 ] McDougall, J. dismissed the application: 30. In exercising my discretion, I am guided by the decision of Mr. Justice John J. Gill of the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta where, at paras. 27 to 30, of Hazin (Re) , 2011 ABQB 197 , he stated: 27. Firstly, the issue of when is the time to address the issue of non-exempt equity. The comments of Master Funduk in the Re MacKay case are applicable here.
At paragraphs 100 and 101 he stated: 100. Regardless whether a bankrupt has gotten an absolute, suspended or conditional discharge nobody can later raise an issue about surplus equity in a house. The discharge is the latest time that issue is to be dealt with, if anyone wants to make that an issue. 101. If a conditional order is given requiring the bankrupt to pay for the surplus equity nobody can later ride the market, up or down, to revisit that. If the house value later goes up the Trustee and creditors cannot ask that the bankrupt now pay more.
If the house value later goes down the bankrupt cannot ask that he now pay less. 28. The latest time to raise an issue about surplus equity in a house is at the time of discharge. In this case it was in September, 2002 at the time of the discharge pursuant to the order of Registrar Breitkreuz . 29. Secondly, the issue of the doctrine of issue estoppel. The Court of Appeal in Ernst & Young Inc, supra , outlined the doctrine at paragraphs 29 to 30: 29. The doctrine of res judicata has two branches: issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel.
Issue estoppel precludes the litigation of an issue previously decided in another court proceeding, and cause of action estoppel precludes the litigation of a cause of action which was adjudged in a previous court proceeding: Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada , 2d ed. (Ontario: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2004) at 1 [ Res Judicata ]. We need not consider the applicability of cause of action estoppel because issue estoppel precludes Central Guaranty from attacking the validity of the trusts in this litigation. 30.
For issue estoppel to be successfully invoked, the issue must be the same as the one decided in the prior judicial decision, the prior judicial decision must have been final, and the parties to both proceedings must be the same, or their privies: Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79 , [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63 at para. 23 [Toronto]. 30. I find that the three requisite elements of issue estoppel are present in this case. [ 33 ] In Wadden , McDougall, J. also concluded that issue estoppel applied, and that the bankrupt was not liable to the Trustee for the additional amount sought.
He observed: 32. The Trustee, rightfully I might add, made the proper determination that there was no appreciable equity in the Bankrupt's house and property at the time the assignment in bankruptcy was made. The intervening event resulting in the complete destruction of the home did nothing to change that . 33. The fact that the house and contents were covered against loss by fire is to the benefit of the owner and the mortgage lender. 34. The owner simply seeks to be put back in the position he was in prior to the fire.
He has the right under the policy of insurance to be provided with funds to rebuild a house comparable to the one he lost. The insurers are also obliged to pay for contents destroyed in the fire, if not at replacement cost then at least in a reduced amount reflecting actual value. The coverage extends to not only the Bankrupt but also to his common-law spouse and the four children that make up their blended value. [Emphasis added] [ 34 ] With these principles in mind, I first consider that this case proceeded without cross examination of the Trustee or Mrs. Ross.
Aside from the usual bankruptcy documents, the court has available for its consideration the report of the Trustee, and the affidavit of Mrs. Ross dated May 14, 2019 (filed with the court on September 20, 2019). The court also has available the other extrinsic documents, including PWC's letter to TD Bank dated May 9, 2013. [ 35 ] Although, in effect, the Trustee points out that Mr. Ross's property vested with it for the benefit of the creditors upon the latter's assignment in bankruptcy, it acknowledges that PWC advised TD that it was releasing any claim to the property. The effect of Ms.
Ross's affidavit is that she and her husband took the May 9, 2013, letter to signify that"... The Trustee would not seek to realize upon our interest in the home as there was little or no equity at the time of bankruptcy." ( Affidavit, para. 11 )
[ 36 ] The Trustee argues that the release was given based on the information available regarding the value of the property and the amount owing on the mortgage at the time of the assignment. As noted, it points to LePage and argues that the later improvement in Mr. Ross's equity in the property as a result of the payments of the life insurance proceeds to TD should accrue to the benefit of his creditors. [ 37 ] With respect, this ignores the fact that the issue in LePage was different. It revolved around the trustee’s decision to change its mind and claim an interest in the real property prior to discharge.
It was able to treat the equity increase as an after acquired asset in that situation. However, whether the bankrupt has received an absolute, suspended or conditional discharge, the authorities are clear that the time of the discharge is the latest time that the issue is to be dealt with. Moreover, (and unlike MacRury ) this is not a case involving a freestanding life insurance policy. [ 38 ] Recall that in MacRury , the bankrupt died intestate after his discharge. The proceeds of a life insurance policy (of which he was unaware during his lifetime) were paid into his estate, not the bankruptcy estate.
The Court ruled that the insurance was an asset held (albeit, not paid) during the currency of the estate, prior to discharge. Therefore, even if the bankrupt was unaware of the policy of life insurance (a benefit provided by his employer) s. 67 of the BIA vested it in the Trustee as either “property of the bankrupt” at the time of his assignment.
If the policy had been acquired by the bankrupt after assignment, but before his discharge order , it would still have vested with the Trustee as “after acquired property”. [ 39 ] In this case, the proceeds were payable to a third party, and the asset (the property) in which equity increased as a result of that payment was one in which the Trustee had expressly released its interest. It had not revisited that release of interest prior to Mr. Ross’s conditional discharge order on September 16, 2016. [ 40 ] The trustee argues that it acted on incomplete information supplied by Mr.
Ross, who did not disclose all of his assets, because he didn’t disclose the existence of mortgage insurance. However, it is not obvious to me that a lay person such as Mr. Ross ought to have characterized "mortgage insurance" payable to TD in the event of his death as an asset distinct from the mortgage and the property. [ 41 ] Moreover, contrary to the thrust of the Trustee submissions, the existence of life insurance to cover the mortgage balance in the event of Mr. Ross’s death was not information that was "unavailable" to PWC (the Trustee that was in place when the assignment bankruptcy was made in 2013).
There has been no evidence provided as to any discussion between it and Mr. Ross at that time as to what constituted an "asset". [ 42 ] Faced with a circumstance that could hardly be considered unusual (which is to say, disclosure by a person making an assignment in bankruptcy of the existence of real property encumbered by a mortgage) there is no evidence that the question was ever put to Mr. Ross as to whether the mortgage was life insured.
This is extremely difficult to understand given the critical difference which the present Trustee asserts that the existence of such insurance would have made to the decision of its predecessor whether or not to release its interest in the property in favour of TD. (Parenthetically, there has been no evidence from PWC as to what (if any) difference this would have made to its decision at the time - in 2013.) [ 43 ] This is not a case of "if the Trustee doesn't ask, there is no onus on the bankrupt to disclose".
It is a case of a Trustee failing to ask (or, there being no evidence that the Trustee ever asked) a patently obvious question, one within its specialized field of expertise, and in circumstances where, to repeat, it is not obvious that Mr. Ross should have recognized mortgage insurance as an asset distinct from the mortgage and the property itself. At a minimum, one would expect this evidence to have been available to PWC both from TD and Mr. and Mrs.
Ross had the information been as important to the Trustee as has been argued, and had the Trustee performed its due diligence before releasing its interest in the property to the lender. [ 44 ] There is no evidence before me that the Trustee was even asked by the Rosses to release its interest in the home.
Whether it was or wasn’t asked to do so, it made a decision to disclaim its interest in the property less than two months after the assignment was made, and did not revisit that decision by the time of the discharge application on September 16, 2016. [ 45 ] Ericka Scott signed the letter on behalf of PWC on May 9, 2013. No evidence was provided by Ms. Scott or anyone else as to why PWC made the decision to do so. The Trustee characterizes the insurance payout as an increase in the value of the property, and on that basis seeks to revisit the valuation.
However, the circumstances that led to the alleged equity growth – the existence of mortgage life insurance – existed at the time of the discharge. It was entirely foreseeable that the mortgage might be insured in this way. [ 46 ] The Trustee goes on to argue that Wadden is distinguishable on the basis that, in that case, there was no real increase in the equity in the property. The bankrupt was merely put back in the position he would have been but for the fire. In this case it submits that life insurance paid out the mortgage, leaving the estate in a better position than while Mr.
Ross was alive. [ 47 ] With respect, I disagree. It is true that (in this case) the purpose of the insurance would have been to payout the mortgage, and that the surviving spouse would benefit by this. This, however, was merely an acceleration of the pay down (and payout) of the mortgage that would be expected to occur during the lifetime of the insured, depending upon how long he lived. Unlike life insurance proceeds which, if the policy is maintained, will inevitably be paid out at some point, a payout of life insurance proceeds when the beneficiary is the mortgagee, carries with it no such inevitability.
The mortgage balance may well be retired by the insured himself during his or her lifetime. [ 48 ] In the circumstances of this case, it was entirely foreseeable both at the time the Trustee issued its disclaimer letter, and at the time of the conditional discharge, that there would be a growth in equity in the property. Ideally, this would be because Mr. Ross lived long enough to pay it out. He died before that happened, and the proceeds were applied to pay it out, albeit earlier than if Mr.
Ross had not passed away. [ 49 ] We have earlier seen that in Wadden , McDougall, J. canvassed the authorities and concluded that the time of the discharge (whether it be absolute, suspended, or conditional) is the last time to raise an issue about surplus equity in the property.
In MacKay (cited in Wadden ), it was specifically pointed out that if the value of the home increases afterward, "nobody can later ride the market up... to revisit that." By characterizing the mortgage (life) insurance payout as an increase in the value of the property, in the circumstances, it appears that the Trustee is seeking to revisit the valuation and claim the benefit of subsequent growth (albeit, in equity, rather than in
market value necessarily). [ 50 ] During the period after the assignment in bankruptcy (and PWC's almost simultaneous release of its interest in the property) the Trustee (and the creditors) were spared the expense, among other things, of maintaining the property, paying the taxes, and securing the property, at least until its disposal could have been otherwise effected. The Trustee's primary concern at the time that it provided its release appears to have been the lack of equity in the property, at the time, which would have made the incurrence of such costs unreasonable. [ 51 ] In sum, PWC made a decision.
There is no evidence before me that its decision to disclaim any interest in the property in 2013 would have been affected by the existence of an asset whose only possible value was contingent upon Mr. Ross dying before the mortgage balance had been fully paid out by him, even though the successor Trustee, MNP, submits that such would have been the case. The paydown of the mortgage, and the consequent future growth in equity in the property, was to be expected.
The life insurance payable to TD simply accelerated that entirely predictable development. [ 52 ] The Trustee in the present case suggested that the continued vesting of the property in the Trustee by operation of law ( s. 67 of the BIA ), provides it with the right to change its position, given that there has been no absolute discharge. In my view, and quite apart from what has been said above, that contention is met by the existence of the "requisite elements of issue estoppel" ( Wadden , para. 31) in this case. [ 53 ] Consider that there was a clear representation to the deceased and Mrs.
Ross (albeit, via the copy of the letter to the third party lender TD) that the Trustee would not be seeking an interest in the property. No steps were taken to transfer or amend the records at the Registry of Deeds to reflect any ownership interest by the Trustee in the property. Both the TD Bank (when it allowed the Rosses to renew the mortgage in 2016) and the Rosses themselves, acted upon, and relied upon PWC’s word. [ 54 ] Moreover, at the time of the assignment in 2013, Mr. Ross had life and critical illness coverage on the mortgage. When the mortgage came up for renewal in April 2016, Mr.
Ross made application through TD insurance for life insurance, but not critical illness insurance, to cover the renewal term. [ 55 ] There is some force to the submission of counsel for Mrs. Ross that: ... With this in mind, Glenn and Carol mortgaged the property [in 2016] post assignment, and Glenn took out and paid for mortgage insurance to benefit his wife in the event of his death. Would Glenn have done so if he believed for a minute that he was simply providing for the Trustee?
The answer is too obvious to need expression... [ 56 ] The Trustee withdrew its application to vary the Conditional Discharge Order in April 2019. To allow the Trustee's contentions to prevail would be to allow, in effect, a variation of that order pursuant to a motion for directions. [ 57 ] Quite apart from everything else, the order created by the Court at the discharge hearing was a matter of discretion.
The court was obliged to consider the matter holistically, including those factors noted in Gwizd (Re) , [2017] BCJ No. 2209 (BCSC) , in the exercise of that discretion: It is well established, as per Nelson (Re), [1995] S.J. No 384 (Q.B.) , subject to the constraints of s.172 of the BIA , that the order crafted by the court at a discharge hearing is a matter of discretion. In exercising that discretion, the court must look at the whole matter before it in "the light of reason, common sense and humanity" and must seek to balance three things:
a) The interest of the rehabilitation of the bankrupt;
b) The interest of the creditors in being paid; and
c) The integrity of the bankruptcy process and the public's perception of it. [ 58 ] In my view, the Conditional Order of Discharge achieved that balance, and the public's perception of the integrity of the bankruptcy process would be compromised were I to allow the Trustee’s asserted ownership interest in the property to prevail in these circumstances. [ 59 ] My answer to the question posed by the first issue is therefore "no". B. If no, should the Trustee be ordered to repay the $39,709.15 paid to it by Mrs. Ross pursuant to an improper demand. [ 60 ] Ms.
Ross seeks to recover the $39,709.15 that she has already paid on account of the Trustee's demand. [ 61 ] A thorough treatment of the rule in E x Parte James is found in Bank of Montréal v. Grafikom Limited Partnership, [2009] 59 CBR (5th) 90 . As noted therein: 53. In Ex Parte James , money was voluntarily paid to a Trustee in bankruptcy by an execution creditor under mistake of law. While, at law, money paid under mistake of law could not be recovered, the court held that a Trustee of bankruptcy, as an officer of the court, ought to set an example.
It ordered the Trustee in bankruptcy to pay the money to the person really entitled to it. 54. In Ex Parte Simmonds (1885), 16 Q.B.D. 308 at 312, the court, in ordering the repayment of money paid to a Trustee in bankruptcy under mistake of law, explained the rationale for the rule in Ex Parte James : "although the Court will not prevent a litigant party from acting in this way, it will not act so itself, and it will not allow its own officer to act so." 55. A subsequent decision, Re Tyler, Ex p.
Official Receiver , [1907] 1 K.B. 865 held that the rule in Ex Parte James was a rule of general application, and not restricted to money paid under mistake of law. The court described the rule as a "prerogative of mercy reposing in the court to alleviate cases of unusual hardship in which a regard to the strict legal or equitable rights only would work a
manifest injustice. ...". There, the bankrupt had assigned an insurance policy on his own life as security. The wife of the bankrupt paid one premium on the bankrupt's life insurance policy before the commencement of the bankruptcy, and continued to pay the premiums on the insurance policy during the life of the bankrupt. The court, applying the principle in Ex Parte James , ordered the Trustee to repay the premiums paid by the wife. [ 62 ] The court in Grafikom went on to point out: 59. Counsel for BMO refers me to the discussion of the rule in Ex Parte James in L.W. Houlden, G.B. Morawetz & J.P.
Sarra, The 2009 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2008) ("Houlden & Morawetz"). At para. F31, Houlden & Morawetz indicates, citing a number of cases, some of which I refer to below, that three conditions must be met for the rule to apply in a bankruptcy context: (1) the bankrupt estate must be enriched or could be enriched at the expense of the person making the claim; (2) in most cases, the claimant must not be in a position to file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy; and (3) to allow the Trustee to retain the enrichment would be unfair and unjust.
Houlden & Morawetz also indicates that when the rule does apply, it applies only to the extent necessary to nullify the enrichment of the bankrupt estate and does not necessarily restore the claimant to the status quo ante. [ 63 ] I have concluded that the Trustee does not have an entitlement to the property. Mrs. Ross, therefore, had no obligation to the Trustee when the latter made its demand of her. It would be plainly unfair and unjust, in my view, for the Trustee to continue to retain the funds that Mrs.
Ross paid to it while unrepresented, less than six months after her husband’s death, pursuant to an improper demand made of her. They shall be forthwith returned to her. Conclusion [ 64 ] For the reasons outlined above, and in the circumstances of this case, I have concluded that the last day for the Trustee to have dealt with the equity in the property was the date that the hearing (which resulted in Mr. Ross’ conditional discharge) was held, namely, September 16, 2016. To allow the Trustee to demand, and retain the funds paid by Mrs.
Ross to the Trustee pursuant to that demand, in these circumstances, would be tantamount to allowing it to vary the Conditional Order of Discharge, under the auspices of a motion for directions. [ 65 ] Although the property did vest initially in the Trustee (at the time of the assignment) PWC disclaimed any interest in it. That disclaimer is not vitiated by MNP’s contentions (now) that PWC was unaware of the mortgage insurance, or that Mr.
Ross failed to disclose it. [ 66 ] Moreover, the Trustee is now estopped from claiming an interest in the property, and the rule in Ex Parte James will apply to require the Trustee to reimburse Mrs. Ross the amount of $39,709.15 previously paid by her. [ 67 ] Finally, failing agreement, I would invite short submissions from the parties as to costs within 30 days. Gabriel, J.
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