King (Hand Construction) v. Dileno, 2020 NSSC 39
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: King (Hand Construction) v. Dileno , 2020 NSSC 39 Date: 20200210 Docket: Hfx No. 485944 Registry: Halifax Between: Gerald Wayne King, c.o.b. Hand Construction Plaintiff v. Brian Dileno Defendant Judge: The Honourable Justice Ann E. Smith Heard: October 23, 2019, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Counsel: Geoffrey Saunders, for the Plaintiff Richard W. Norman, for the Defendant By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] The Defendant, Brian Dileno, owns lands at 363 Mill Cove, Shore Road, Hubbards, Nova Scotia (the “Property”).
The Plaintiff, Gerald Wayne King, carrying on business under the firm name and style of Hand Construction (“Wayne King” or “Hand Construction”) registered a builder’s lien against the Property in the amount of $96,212.19 on January 29, 2019 pursuant to the Nova Scotia Builder’s Lien Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 277 (the “ BLA ”). [ 2 ] The lien states that the work and materials were supplied “on or before the 1 st day of December 2018.” Mr. King commenced an action on the lien on March 11, 2019. [ 3 ] Mr. Dileno seeks an order vacating the lien pursuant to s. 29(4) of the BLA , primarily on the basis that Mr.
King abandoned work on the Property and registered the lien outside the appliable limitations period. Alternatively, he submits that s. 27 of the BLA applies, and Mr. King did not commence his action on the lien within the statutory limitation period. In response, Mr. King argues that s. 26 of the BLA applies and his action was commenced on time. Evidence on the Motion [ 4 ] The moving party, Brian Dileno, filed his own Affidavit as well as the Affidavit of Kelly McCann, an individual who worked on the Property. Wayne King filed his own Affidavit and was cross-examined on it during the hearing of the motion.
Brian Dileno also filed a response Affidavit. Issue [ 5 ] The sole issue for determination by this Court is whether the lien should be vacated. The Position of the Parties [ 6 ] Mr. Dileno says that the lien is invalid because it was registered outside the applicable limitation period. He claims that Mr. King abandoned work on the Property. Mr. Dileno says that the lien should be vacated. [ 7 ] Mr. King says that the lien was filed on time. He denies that he abandoned his work on the Property.
Facts [ 8 ] There are many facts not in dispute. Certain of the agreed key facts are as follows: 1. On September 30, 2017 Brian Dileno purchased the Property with the intent of adding an addition to the structure. The Property is in close proximity to Wayne King’s home. 2. Mr. King is a contractor and operates his business under the name “Hand Construction.” 3. Wayne King and Brian Dileno met in 2014 when Mr. Dileno was renting the Property which he subsequently purchased. 4. Mr. Dileno was aware that Mr. King had experience in home construction. 5.
In October 2017 Brian Dileno and Wayne King orally agreed that Mr. King would renovate Mr. Dileno’s house. There was no written contract. 6. After he inspected the Property, Wayne King discovered that it was damaged by wet and dry rot and had a large amount of mold. 7. Mr. King recommended a total replacement of the house to which Mr. Dileno agreed. The previous structure was to be demolished and a new house built. 8. Demolition of the house and site preparation began in December 2017. 9. On August 16, 2018, Mr. King was injured when he fell off the roof of the new house.
He was hospitalized for a time and was unable to work on the site for approximately nine weeks. 10. During that time Kelly McCann, a carpenter, who had been working with Mr. King on the new house construction, took on additional duties. 11. Mr. King returned to the Property in October 2018. [ 9 ] After Mr. King’s return to the Property the relationship between he and Mr. Dileno began to deteriorate for several reasons. Kelly McCann’s Evidence [ 10 ] Mr. McCann’s Affidavit evidence was that he was hired by Wayne King to do framing work for the construction of the new house. [ 11 ] Mr.
McCann’s evidence was that he ran his own business and that Mr. King hired him to help with the framing of the new house. Mr. King stated in his Affidavit that Kelly McCann was one of his “employees”, but on cross-examination, Mr. King agreed that Mr. McCann was also an independent tradesperson. [ 12 ] Mr. McCann’s Affidavit evidence describes, from his perspective, how matters proceeded on the house construction while Mr. King was injured and off work: 6. After his injury, Mr. King called me to his house where he was confined to the first floor.
He told me that the medication he was taking as a result of his injuries would make it difficult for him to continue with his pervious role. He suggested that he reduce his hourly rate and increase mine. The idea was that I would take more responsibility and he would provide direction relating to the job from his house. I was open to this idea, but Mr. King was not capable of providing this direction and he did not do so. … 8. As of at least early November 2018, I assumed the role of general contractor for work at Mr. Dileno’s property.
I called and brought subcontractors to site, got quotes from them, and engaged them to do the necessary work. I assumed this role because Mr. King had given it up, and it needed to be done. The house was not close to finished. 9. In early November 2018 Mr. King told me to separate his tools from the other tools on site. I did this. I took this to mean he was done with the job and would be picking up his tools later. 10. I worked on the site almost every day through November and December 2018. I did not see Mr. King doing any work or providing any services at the property in November or December 2018.
He did not provide any direction to me, or to my knowledge anyone else on site in November or December 2018. 11. I billed Mr. Dileno directly for my work from November 2018 onwards. Wayne King’s Evidence [ 13 ] Mr. King’s Affidavit evidence was that not long after returning to work in October 2018, he began to have issues receiving payment from Mr. Dileno. On cross-examination, Mr. King modified this evidence, saying that payment issues had started before he returned to the site. On November 18, 2018 Mr. King sent an email to Mr. Dileno advising him of the amounts he considered he was owed.
The email provides as follows:
From: Hand Construction wayne [email address omitted] Subject: Semi-final Invoice Dated: November 18, 2018 at 10:09 AM To: Brian Dileno bdileno [email address omitted] Dear Brian, Here are the final numbers on the hours that I am owed for. Whatever issues you may have will prove themselves out when a linear accounting is complete. I am confident that monies that were written to my name only replenished my bank after invoices had been paid. We are using labor and materials to compile the total capital cost. Overhead items have not been included. I am hoping we will reconcile that while you are here.
I would like to have a settlement arranged before December 1st, which includes the $20,000 I will take out of the seniors account now. Total amount: $46,229.00 including HST minus the $20,000 for a balance owing of $26,229.00. Thanks, Wayne King Hand Construction [ 14 ] Mr. King’s evidence was that by sending this email, he was not signally an intention to abandon or quit the job, but was merely attempting to recoup the amounts which he considered were outstanding at that point so that he could continue and complete the project. Mr. King agreed on cross-examination that he did not bill Mr.
Dileno after November 18 th , but his evidence was that he did work on the site but did not bill for it. Mr. King said that Mr. McCann thought he was not on the site because he worked during the day, and Mr. McCann worked at the site at night. Mr. King denied that he stopped directing the trades, insisting that the problem was lack of financing from Mr. Dileno. Mr. King’s evidence was that he believed Mr. McCann was working for him until late November or early December, 2018. [ 15 ] Mr. King said that his business, Hand Construction, received invoices for materials as late as November 30, 2018.
He specifically pointed to purchases from Lester D. Collicutt Lumber and Building Supplies (“Collicutt”). Mr. King’s evidence was that he permitted Mr. Dileno and possibly Mr. McCann to place orders on his Collicutt account. [ 16 ] Mr. King’s evidence was that on December 2, 2018 and again on December 4, 2018 he came to the Property “to obtain some of the tools which I had on site and to sort and organize excess lumber which needed to be returned.” Brian Dileno’s Evidence [ 17 ] Mr. Dileno’s evidence was that shortly after Mr.
King returned to the project in October 2018 there was a significant dispute about the design of a deck for the new house. Mr. Dileno ultimately chose a design suggested by Kelly McCann, rather than Mr. King’s preferred design. According to Mr. Dileno, this dispute culminated (later the same month) in Mr. King telling him that “my deck and my roof were ruining his health and that if we proceeded with Mr. McCann’s design, he was ‘finished’.” Mr. Dileno said that Mr. King subsequently “began to complain about this dispute to other individuals employed on site including Mr.
McCann” and that he “became increasingly agitated and belligerent both to Mr. McCann and myself.” [ 18 ] Mr. Dileno’s evidence was that on October 24, 2018, Mr. King did not attend a meeting with a building inspector dealing with the occupancy permit for the new house. Both Mr. Dileno and Mr. McCann described this meeting as “important.” Mr. McCann attended the meeting and took notes, and said he had expected Mr. King to be there. Mr. King’s evidence on cross-examination was that no one told him about the meeting and that was why he did not attend. [ 19 ] Mr.
Dileno’s evidence was that as of November he had paid Mr. King $253,382.50 “without a single invoice nor a proper accounting of the expenditures.” He said he paid Mr. King regularly, including $5,000 the day after receiving Mr. King’s November 18 th email. He said that there was no billing for work done after November 18, 2018, stating that Mr. King did no billable work after that date. [ 20 ] Mr. Dileno denied that “Mr. King supervised, controlled or directed work on the site in November or December 2018.” His evidence was that after Mr.
King failed to attend the meeting with the building inspector in October, the trades came to him for direction because Mr. King “was not directing them nor paying them”, forcing him “to assume the role of general contractor (with Mr. McCann’s assistance) because the winter season was about upon us.” Mr. Dileno stated that “through November and December 2018, I arranged for and paid for the completion of the plumbing and electrical work, the deck, the above-ground exterior siding (except under the deck) and the basement ceiling insulation.” Mr. Dileno’s evidence was that he was not aware of any work done by Mr.
King on site in November. [ 21 ] Mr. Dileno’s evidence was that the invoices received by Hand Construction in later November 2018 from Collicutt was for insulation for the basement ceiling that was ordered by Kelly McCann, which Collicutt billed to the Hand Construction account on the assumption that this was the correct account. Mr. Dileno’s evidence was that Mr. King refused to pay this bill because he had not authorized it, and Mr. Dileno paid it himself. [ 22 ] Mr. Dileno’s evidence was that on November 29, 2018 he met with a Collicutt manager, who gave him a statement on the Hand
Construction account that included unpaid bills as far back as August 2018. Mr. Dileno said that he paid these bills, and Collicuttforgave the interest. [23] In terms of Mr. King’s attendances at the Property on December 2nd and 4th, Mr. Dileno’s evidence was that Mr. King “arrivedunannounced at the Property, let himself into my basement, and gathered up his personal property.” Mr. Dileno’s December 4, 2018 Letter To Mr. King [24] Mr. Dileno sent a registered letter to Mr. King dated December 4, 2018. The letter provides, in part, as follows: Letter of Notice VIA REGISTERED MAIL Mr.
Wayne King Hand Construction [address omitted] Dear Wayne: The purpose of this letter is to inform you that I no longer consider you as my [sic] general contractor for the above property. You havewidely made it known to many that you no longer wish to be associated with the project. You have left it for me to complete the deck,siding, plumbing, electrical, flooring, interior baseboard and window trim, insulation of the basement, the hanging of the internal doors,and completion of the closets and bathroom fixtures. In addition, you have refused to pay bills due to a claim of non-payment of money I owe.
You have not provided me a proper accountingand justification of all expenses incurred for the construction - leaving me an incomplete understanding of the costs, their justification,and what is owed. [25] The letter goes on to refer to arrangements for the return of tools and equipment to Mr. King, and the recovery of keys andcertain other materials that were in Mr. King’s possession. Mr. Dileno concluded the letter by informing Mr.
King his further entry onthe Property without permission would be considered trespass, and that any communication “with those now directly under my employ”would be considered harassment. According to Mr. Dileno’s evidence, the purpose of the letter was “to be very clear with [Mr. King]that he was no longer welcome. He had abandoned the job long before my letter was sent.” [26] Mr. King’s evidence was that he regarded himself as the contractor on the site until he received the December 5, 2018 letter. He denied that he abandoned the project.
He noted that his scaffolding was still on the Property as of December 5th. Mr. Dilenoreferred to the scaffolding in his December 4, 2018 letter, stating that it was being used by an electrician, after which it would bereturned. Mr. Dileno’s evidence was that he returned the scaffolding to Mr. King in mid-December. Issue: Should the lien be vacated? Law and Analysis The test for vacating a lien [27] Mr. Dileno applies to have the lien vacated pursuant to s-s. 29(4) of the BLA.
Section 29 deals generally with the discharge of alien. Subsection (4) states:
(4) Upon application, the court or judge having jurisdiction to try an action to realize a lien, may allow security for or payment intocourt of the amount of the claim, and may thereupon order that the registration of the lien be vacated or may vacate the registration uponany other proper ground and a certificate of the order may be registered. [emphasis added] [28] The test on a motion to vacate a builder’s lien (under the then Mechanics’ Lien Act) was described by O’Hearn Co. Ct. J. inMcLanders Contractors Ltd. v. Eastern Flying Services Ltd. (1982), (NS SC), 55 N.S.R. (2d) 449, 1982 CarswellNS36 (Co. Ct.): 2.
The applicant is seeking to have the lien vacated not on the basis of payment into court, but on the ground that no lien exists. Insuch an application there is a heavy burden on the applicant to show that this is clearly the case and that the claim can safely be disposedof on a
summary application, whether original or interlocutory, of this nature. The application is in some respects analogous to anapplication for
summary judgment. The policy of the Mechanics’ Lien Act is to provide mechanics and builders and other people in theconstruction industry with an important security, which should not be taken away except on the clearest grounds. [emphasis added] [29] In McLanders, Judge O’Hearn vacated the lien on the basis of affidavit evidence and cross-examination, “not only on [the]affidavits but on the subject matter of the application generally” (para. 5). [30] However, subsequent case law has continued to emphasize the
summary nature of the proceeding, and the high standard to be
met. For example, Saunders J.A. stated the following in W. M. Fares & Associates Inc. v. 3035606 Nova Scotia Ltd., 2006 NSCA 120(N.S.C.A.): [10] And so it is plain to see that the party seeking to vacate a lien faces a significant evidentiary hurdle. There is a “heavy burden”on the applicant to demonstrate that the remedy is “clearly” deserved. Those who seek the effective and immediate protection which alien affords, must not be deprived of that important security “except on the clearest” of grounds. Those prerequisites - as Judge O’Hearnexplained - must inform a judge’s determination as to whether or not the claim can be “safely…disposed of on a
summaryapplication.”… [31] More recently, in Think Kitchen Cabinets Ltd. v. Harbourvista Apartments Ltd., 2014 NSSC 28 (N.S.S.C.) Moir J. emphasizedthat the motion to vacate a lien is a
summary one, and “may only be granted if Harbourvista has clearly established that there is nogenuine issue requiring a trial” (paras. 32 - 33). [32] In
summary, in order to vacate the lien this Court must be satisfied that Mr. Dileno has met the heavy burden of demonstratingthat the clearest of grounds exist to vacate the lien. Put another way, I must be satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. Abandonment [33] The ground advanced by Mr. Dileno for vacating the lien is expiry of the limitation period for filing a claim for lien. Section24 of the BLA sets out the time limits for registering a lien claim.
It states, in part: 24(1)A claim for lien by a contractor or subcontractor, in cases not otherwise provided for, may be registered before or during theperformance of the contract, or within sixty days after completion or abandonment thereof.
(2) A claim for lien for materials may be registered before or during the furnishing or placing thereof, or within sixty days after thefurnishing or placing of the last material so furnished or placed.
(3) A claim for lien for services may be registered at any time during the performance of the service or within sixty days after thecompletion of the service… [34] Mr. King registered the lien on January 29, 2019. The lien states that the work and materials were supplied on or beforeDecember 1, 2018. Mr. Dileno says that Mr. King abandoned the work by early November 2018. He says that there was no work ormaterials supplied after that date. As such, Mr. Dileno says that the lien was registered outside the applicable limitation period, and thecourt should vacate it under s. 29(4). [35] In W.M.
Fares & Associates Inc. (supra) Justice Saunders considered the meaning of “abandonment”. He said: [23] In my respectful opinion the chambers judge erred in two respects. First, she erred in concluding “that the contract wasabandoned” in the absence of any evidence of any such intention to abandon the project. The law is clear. The question of abandonmentor not is one of intention. In Dieleman Planer Co. Ltd. v.
Elizabeth Townhouses Ltd. (1974), (SCC), 3 N.R. 376; 48D.L.R. (3d) 635 (S.C.C.), a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, Judson, J., speaking for the court quoted with approval thefollowing statement of Seaton, J.A., in British Columbia Court of Appeal (1973, (BC CA), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 595): It is clear that work ceased, but in my view cessation of work and abandonment are not necessarily co-existent. In order to constituteabandonment a cessation of work would have to be permanent in the sense that it was not intended to carry the project to completion.
Work on this project ceased before 10th December but the evidence is clear that it was intended that work be resumed when the financialproblems had been overcome. It was likely that those problems would be overcome because the cost of completion was more than offsetby the funds remaining to be advanced on the mortgage. …. Those principles were followed by this court in Freeman & Sons Ltd. v. Neu, (1986) (NS CA), 73 N.S.R. (2d) 275. See as well R. F. Moote & Associates v.
Arrowhead Resort Ltd., (2002) 2002 NSSC 199, 207 N.S.R. (2d) 376. [24] I can find nothing in the record from which an intention on the part of the applicant to abandon the contract can be shown, orinferred. With respect, the references from the affidavit evidence to which Mr. MacNeil referred on behalf of the respondents inargument do not amount to such proof. On the contrary, they only serve to reiterate the respondents’ assertion as to the approximate timeof year they say the appellants stopped work. That is not at all the same as proving that the contract was abandoned.
In order toestablish abandonment there must be clear evidence of intention, which is utterly lacking in the record before the Chambers judge. [emphasis of Saunders J.A.] [36] Significantly, Saunders J.A. in W. M. Fares went on to hold that the chambers judge had erred by dealing with the application“in the face of a serious dispute as to material facts”: [25] Second, the Chambers judge erred in concluding that she could legitimately deal with this application in the face of a seriousdispute as to material facts.
The completely different factual positions asserted by counsel in their post-appeal written submissions standas stark proof that this case is entirely unsuited to resolution in a Chambers setting. Such diametrically opposed positions supportedsolely on the basis of affidavit evidence and upon which the affiants were not cross-examined, ought not to have been disposed ofsummarily. The positions of these parties deserved to be proved and challenged at a trial on the merits. See, for example Guarantee Co.of North America v.
Gordon Capital Corp., (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423 at 27; United Gulf Developments Ltd. v.Iskandar (2004), 2004 NSCA 35, 222 N.S.R. (2d) 137 at 9 and 15; and Oceanus Marine Inc. v. Saunders (1996), 1996 NSCA 139, 153 N.S.R. (2d) 267 at 7, 11 and 20.
… [28] In light of the diametrically opposed positions and the contradictory evidence contained in the record before the Chambers judgeit cannot be said the respondents satisfied their heavy burden of demonstrating that the appellant should be deprived of its importantsecurity on the clearest of grounds. On the contrary, this is a case that can only be resolved after a full trial on the merits. [37] The meaning of “abandonment” under s. 24(1) of the BLA was also considered in Think Kitchen Cabinets Ltd. v. HarbourvistaApartments Ltd. (supra) where Moir J. stated: [38] At para. 23 of W.M.
Fares, Justice Saunders said, “The law is clear. The question of abandonment or not is one of intention”. Hereferred to Dieleman Planer Co. Ltd. v. Elizabeth Townhouses Ltd. (1974), (SCC), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 635 (S.C.C.) inwhich Justice Judson approved of the following from the decision that was under appeal, (1973), (BC CA), 38 D.L.R.(3d) 595: It is clear that work ceased, but in my view cessation of work and abandonment are not necessarily co-existent.
In order to constituteabandonment a cessation of work would have to be permanent in the sense that it was not intended to carry the project to completion. [39] The authorities do not suggest that the question of intention is entirely subjective. Otherwise, a builder who repudiates theconstruction contract, but privately intends to continue with it, has not abandoned it within the meaning of s. 24(1). This can happen.
Forexample, a contractor who wishes to extract an amendment to the construction contract, or to settle a dispute about what is owing underit, might, at a sensitive moment, threaten to quit, might even stop working, in the hopes that the owner will agree to the amendment, orsettle the dispute, rather than live with the calamity of the contractor’s withdrawal at a sensitive moment. In such a case, the contractortakes a great risk because repudiation turns on communicated intention in the law of contracts, not the contractor’s private intent. [40] Abandonment under s. 24(1) and repudiation are not the same thing.
However, they can be closely related. A contractor’srepudiation and the owner’s acceptance of the repudiation “terminates further performance by either side”: G.H.L. Fridman, Q.C., TheLaw of Contract in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) at p. 621. A repudiated contract is abandoned in the sense thatfuture further performance is terminated. [38] Mr. Dileno refers to the comments of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Tervita Corporation v. ConCreate USL (GP) Inc., 2015ABCA 80 concerning “intent” to abandon: [14] The trial judge relied on Dieleman Planer Co. Ltd. v.
Elizabeth Townhouses Ltd., (SCC), [1975] 2 SCR 449. That decision does not, however, mandate a purely subjective approach to abandonment. It decides that a temporary cessation of work(for example, as a result of temporary financial problems of the owner) is not the same thing as a permanent abandonment of thecontract. Dieleman Planer implies that there can be an “abandonment” even if the contractor is ready, willing and able to do more work,if the work or the contract is permanently terminated. [15] A review on appeal discloses that the trial judge applied too narrow a legal test.
The test is when the lien claimant knew orshould have known that the other party would not complete the contract. Once it would have been obvious to a reasonable contractorthat the cessation of work caused by the receivership was not merely temporary, but represented a termination of the contract, thecontract was effectively “abandoned”. An abandonment can occur without a formal communication from the other parties that thecontract is terminated.
Here the insolvency of ConCreate, the actions of its receiver in blocking access to the site, the discussion with theCity about the possibility of doing the remaining work directly for the City, combined with the other surrounding factors, would cause areasonable person to conclude that the contract was terminated. Tervita acknowledged that in its email of July 23. The fact that the Cityof Calgary might enter into a new contract for the same work was irrelevant to the ability to file a lien for the work done under the firstcontract. [39] The evidence before this Court is clear that the project to build Mr.
Dileno’s new house was not running smoothly, at least fromthe time of Mr. King’s return to the site in October, 2018 after his injury. According to Mr. Dileno, the dispute originated in the deckdesign issue, while Mr. King maintained that there were ongoing payment problems, even before he was injured and stopped work fornine weeks. Mr. Dileno raises Mr. King’s non-appearance at the meeting with the building inspector on October 24, but there was noevidence to contradict Mr. King’s explanation that he did not attend the meeting because he was not informed of it. [40] In terms of Mr.
Dileno’s central claim that Mr. King had abandoned the project by early or mid-November 2018, Mr. Kingasserts that he had in fact been on the site during that time, including during the daytime when Mr. McCann would not have beenworking. Equipment belonging to Mr. King (scaffolding) was still on the site, and being used, in early December. [41] Abandonment is a question of intention. It is clear that there was a breakdown in communication between the parties by sometime in November, 2018. Whether this was rooted in payment problems or in Mr.
King’s apparent dissatisfaction with the project isdirectly in dispute, and it is clear that credibility will be a central issue if this matter proceeds to trial. [42] Being mindful of Justice Saunders’ comments in W. M. Fares (although admittedly there was cross-examination of Mr. Kingand not of any affiant in W. M. Fares) and of the high standard that must be met to summarily vacate a lien, in my view, this is not amatter which should be disposed of summarily. Mr. Dileno has not discharged the heavy burden which falls to him to summarily vacatethe lien.
The Alternative Argument - The Lien Expired Because Action Not Commenced in Time [43] Mr. Dileno also argues that the lien should be vacated pursuant to s. 27 of the BLA. [44] Sections 26(1) and 27 of the BLA state: Expiry of registered lien
26(1) Every lien for which a claim has been registered shall absolutely cease to exist on the expiration of one hundred and five days after the work or service has been completed or materials have been furnished or placed, or after the expiry of the period of credit, where such period is mentioned in the claim for lien registered, or in the cases provided for in subsection (5) of
Section 24 , on the expiration of thirty days from the registration of claim, unless in the meantime an action is commenced to realize the claim and a certificate thereof (Form
E) is registered in the registry of deeds in which the claim for lien was registered. … If no period of credit or period uncertain 27 If there is no period of credit, or if the date of the expiry of credit is not stated in the claim so registered, the lien shall cease to exist upon the expiration of ninety days after the work or service has been completed or materials furnished or placed, unless in the meantime an action is commenced and a certificate thereof registered as provided by
Section 26 . [emphasis added] [ 45 ] As noted earlier in this decision, Mr. King commenced the within action on March 11, 2019. Mr. Dileno argues that this is more than 90 days after Mr. King either abandoned the site in November or performed the last work on site on December 1, 2018, as alleged in the Statement of Claim. In either case, Mr. Dileno says the action was not commenced within the 90-day period contemplated by s. 27 . Mr. Dileno argues that s. 27 applies because the lien does not specify a period of credit. [ 46 ] Mr. King, however, submits that there is a conflict between ss. 26 and 27 .
According to counsel for Mr. King, s.26(1) (which provides for a 105-day period to commence action) contemplates situations where a period of credit is specified, as well as scenarios where it is not. Counsel for Mr. King suggests that if s. 26 applied only where a period of credit is specified, there would be no reason to refer to the provision of work, service, or materials.
Instead, counsel submits, s. 26 applies to all liens for which a claim is filed, and s. 27 is intended to prevent lien holders from “attempting to extend their deadline for filing a claim by relying on periods of [credit] not included in their Claim for Lien.” [ 47 ] Counsel for Mr. King submits that since statutory
interpretation is a question of law, this is an issue for trial. He cites Think Kitchen Cabinets , ( supra ) where Moir J said: [33] Therefore, Harbourvista’s motion to vacate TKC’s lien on the ground that it was too lately registered may only be granted if Harbourvista has clearly established that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. [34] If there is a genuine issue of law, it might be appropriate to leave it for trial or to determine it under Rule 12 - Question of Law.
If there is a genuine issue of fact that has to be determined in order to reach a conclusion about whether the claim was registered on time, then the question has to go to trial . On the other hand, the discretion to vacate on “any other proper ground” is legislated, and it cannot be ignored if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.
The legislative policy seems clear: a party ought not to be put to the expense of a trial of an issue not genuinely contestable. [emphasis added] [ 48 ] Neither counsel provided this Court with case law or authorities addressing the conflict, if there is one, between s. 26 and s. 27 of the BLA . Conclusion -Alternative Ground for Vacating Lien -
Section 27 of the BLA [ 49 ] I am not prepared to decide whether there is a conflict between s. 26 and s. 27, or determine which
section applies in the circumstances, having been provided with no case authorities or academic commentary. [ 50 ] Should either party wish to bring a motion pursuant to Rule 12 (Question of Law), I would entertain same. Conclusions and Costs [ 51 ] Mr. Dileno’s motion is dismissed with costs to Mr. King. If counsel cannot agree on costs, the Court will receive written submissions on costs within 30 days of the date of this decision. Smith, J.
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