Macfarlane v. BDO Canada Limited, 2020 NSSC 45
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: Macfarlane v. BDO Canada Limited , 2020 NSSC 45 Date: 20200130 Docket: Hfx. No. 490408 Registry: Halifax Between: Mark Daniel Macfarlane Appellant v. BDO Canada Limited Respondent Decision Judge: The Honourable Justice Robert W. Wright Heard: January 23, 2020 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Decision: January 30, 2020 Counsel: Appellant – self-represented Heather Wyse for the Respondent Wright, J. INTRODUCTION ( 1 ) This is an appeal by Mark Macfarlane, a bankrupt, from an order issued by the Registrar in Bankruptcy on July 8, 2019.
That order was made pursuant to a written decision rendered on June 24, 2019 which is reported as Re Macfarlane, 2019 NSSC 201 . ( 2 ) In that decision, the Registrar ordered that Mr. Macfarlane’s Absolute Discharge Order (“ADO”) dated June 1, 2018 be annulled, and that he pay to the trustee the sum of $9,162.50 before becoming eligible to make another application for a discharge. Mr. Macfarlane filed his Notice of Appeal from that Order on July 24, 2019 as a self represented litigant. FACTS ( 3 ) The material facts in this appeal are not in dispute. The chronology begins on August 4, 2016 when Mr.
Macfarlane made an Assignment in Bankruptcy further to which BDO Canada Limited (“BDO”) was appointed trustee. The file fell under the supervision of Mr. Jason Breeze, a Vice President of BDO. ( 4 ) The bankrupt’s Statement of Affairs listed, as virtually his only asset, a 2014 Ford Flex (“the vehicle”) having a black book value of $23,079. Mr. Macfarlane had purchased this vehicle through financing provided by TD Auto Finance (“TD”).
As part of that financing, a Purchase Money Security Interest (“PMSI”) was taken by TD pursuant to the Personal Property Security Act (“PPSA”) on February 14, 2015. ( 5 ) It was about a year and half later that Mr. Macfarlane made his assignment in bankruptcy on August 4, 2016. After that assignment was made, TD filed a proof of claim as a secured creditor with the trustee on September 9, 2016. ( 6 ) On September 19, 2016 the trustee disallowed TD’s secured claim for failure to properly record its security interest (by reason of its omission to include the borrower’s full name).
That disallowance was not appealed by TD whereby it was relegated to the status of an unsecured creditor. Hence, the vehicle became an asset of the estate in bankruptcy.
(7) The trustee then had two options. It could either take possession of the vehicle and sell it for the general benefit of creditors, or sellit to the bankrupt by entering into a Conditional Sales Contract. The latter option was ultimately chosen by the parties with the trusteethen having the vehicle appraised.
(8) On May 2, 2017 the trustee entered into a Conditional Sales Contract (“CSC”) with Mr. Macfarlane whereby he agreed to purchasethe vehicle from his estate in bankruptcy for $15,702 with monthly payments extending over a 36 month term. Under the CSC, as usualtitle was not to pass to the buyer until all the payments were made in full. The CSC also included the usual clause prohibiting the buyerfrom selling the vehicle (without the consent of the seller) until the purchase price was fully paid.
(9) Mr. Macfarlane made the required payments under the CSC from May, 2017 to August, 2018 totalling $7,040. Two months beforethat end date, however, on application by the trustee to this court, an absolute discharge order was granted by Justice Campbell on June1, 2018.
(10) On the day prior (May 31, 2018), Mr. Breeze on behalf of BDO sent an e-mail to Mr. Macfarlane confirming as they hadpreviously discussed that “The Conditional Sales Contract for the vehicle will continue in the normal course and payments thereunderwill not be a condition of your discharge. As with any Conditional Sales Contract, should you fail to make payments as agreed, thevehicle will be repossessed”.
(11) According to Mr. Breeze’s affidavit, it was in June of 2018 that Mr. Macfarlane made submissions to the trustee that he wasentitled to an exemption with respect to the vehicle under the PPSA, namely, the $6,500 exemption afforded under s.59(3)(
b) of that Actfor one vehicle required for employment purposes. The trustee disagreed with that assertion and provided Mr. Macfarlane with asummary of the relevant legislation and a copy of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision in VW Credit Canada Inc. v. Roberts2001 NSCA 42 , [2001] N.S.J. No. 84. The trustee’s position was that the exemption did not apply, having regard to s.59(7),because the vehicle was subject to a PMSI interest in favour of TD at the time the assignment in bankruptcy was made.
(12) To complete the chronology, on September 18, 2018 the trustee received correspondence from Mr. Macfarlane indicating that hewas no longer employed and requesting a three month payment deferral. Mr. Macfarlane’s submission was that he requested thisdeferral to allow him time to get resettled with the intention of ultimately negotiating a buyout from the trustee while claiming thevehicle exemption of $6,500 under the PPSA aforesaid. Mathematically, that still would have left a shortfall of $2162, as noted by theRegistrar in his decision, where the unpaid balance under the CSC then stood at $8662.50.
(13) The trustee was not receptive to Mr. Macfarlane’s request for a deferral unless it was acknowledged that the exemption did notapply. Mr. Macfarlane then indicated his intention to have the matter litigated.
(14) At that point, Mr. Macfarlane stopped making payments altogether and became incommunicado, failing to respond to the trustee’se-mails and notices requesting payment. With the assistance of a skip trace service, Mr. Macfarlane was located in Ontario. The trusteethen sought to repossess the vehicle through an agency in Toronto, only to learn that the vehicle had been sold at auction in Nova Scotiaon or about December 14, 2018 for the sum of $13,000. At that time, Mr. Macfarlane still owed $8,662.50 under the CSC, none ofwhich was paid from the sale proceeds of the vehicle.
(15) Mr. Macfarlane’s retention of these sale proceeds was enabled by the omission of the trustee to record its CSC security interestunder the PPSA of Nova Scotia. According to the affidavit of Mr. Breeze, the CSC was belatedly filed only under the PPSA of Ontarioin January of 2019 in the belief that the vehicle had been moved to that province.
(16) As a result, being unable to repossess the vehicle, the trustee filed an application on February 26, 2019 to annul the ADO,supported by an affidavit from Mr. Breeze, to which Mr. Macfarlane filed a purported defence pleading dated April 29, 2019. Thisdocument was in substance more in the nature of written argument than an actual pleading and the Registrar ultimately treated it as such. No affidavit was ever filed by Mr. Macfarlane on the application.
(17) By agreement, a hearing was held before the Registrar by teleconference on May 3, 2019. After a brief hearing at which bothparties were heard (producing a very short transcript) the Registrar reserved his decision which was delivered in written form on June 24th.
(18) Notwithstanding the request of the trustee (then self-represented) advanced in the oral submissions of Mr. Breeze that the ADO beannulled and that Mr. Macfarlane’s discharge from bankruptcy be made conditional upon payment of the balance owing under the CSC,the Registrar made a three-part order: 1. that the ADO be annulled; 2. that Mr. Macfarlane be required to pay the trustee the sum of $9,162.50 comprised of the balance owing under the CSC of$8,662.50 plus $500 in disbursements expended by the trustee in locating the vehicle; and 3. that Mr. Macfarlane be permitted to apply for a discharge in bankruptcy only upon making the specified payment.
(19) In making his decision, the Registrar made specific findings that Mr. Macfarlane was not entitled to claim the $6,500 exemptionfrom seizure under the PPSA, and also that Mr. Macfarlane had failed to perform the duties imposed on him by the Bankruptcy andInsolvency Act (“BIA”), thereby enabling the Registrar to annul the ADO. The Registrar also refused to issue an order that the dischargewould become absolute on compliance with the condition of payment.
(20) From the Registrar’s order (issued July 8, 2019), Mr. Macfarlane now appeals to this court requesting that the Registrar’s order ofannulment of the ADO be reversed, that the ADO be reinstated, and that the issue of the vehicle exemption under the PPSA be properlyresolved or dismissed. ISSUES
(21) The issues raised by the appellant in this appeal are aptly framed in the Respondent’s brief as follows: (
a) Did the Registrar err in finding that the Appellant was not entitled to a vehicle exemption pursuant to section 59(3)(
b) of the PPSA? (
b) Did the Registrar err in granting the annulment of the Appellant’s discharge on the basis that the Appellant failed to perform theduties imposed on him by the BIA? (
c) Did the Registrar err in allowing the Respondent to bring the motion for annulment in Nova Scotia as opposed to Ontario? (
d) Did the Registrar uphold the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness when hearing from the Appellant by telephone at thehearing on May 3, 2019? STANDARD OF REVIEW
(22) The standard of review to be applied by this Court on an appeal from a decision of the Registrar in Bankruptcy (as it pertains to thefirst three issues) is well-established in law. After a review of the legal authorities in the decision of this Court in G.W. HolmesTrucking
(1990) Ltd., (Re), [2005] N.S.J. No. 432, Justice Robertson summarized the standard of review as follows (in para. 14): Simply put all these cases stand for the principle that unless it is demonstrated on the part of the Registrar that he committed some errorof principle, some failure to take into account the proper factors or taking in account of improper factors which demonstratively lead to awrong conclusion or some error of law the Bankruptcy Judge should not on appeal interfere with the decision of the Registrar. Soaccordingly, the cases are pretty clear on this point. It is a true appeal. It is not a hearing de novo …
(23) Amongst the supporting authorities reviewed were the decision of Justice Saunders in Barrington and Vokey Ltd. (Bankrupt)(Re), (1997) (NS SC), 158 N.S.R. (2d) 391, a decision of the Ontario Bankruptcy court in Olympia & YorkDevelopments Ltd., (Re), (1998) 80 O.T.C. 369 and a passage from the well-known text by Holden & Morawetz on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada (3rd ed.) found at
section I31.
(24) Accordingly, Mr. Macfarlane as appellant must satisfy this court that the Registrar arrived at an incorrect result in law in decidingthe issues before him. It is not for this court to simply substitute its opinion unless satisfied that the Registrar erred in principle or in lawin the way that he has applied or exercised his discretionary power to annul the ADO.
(25) In considering the fourth issue above listed, the question for this Court is simply whether or not there was a denial of proceduralfairness or natural justice in the hearing before the Registrar. This is a question of law and as stated by the Nova Scotia Court of Appealin Wolfridge Farm Ltd. v. Bonang, 2016 NSCA 33, there is no standard of review analysis engaged when considering a claim of denialof natural justice or procedural fairness. As the court put it, “In other words, either there was a breach of principles of natural justice, orthere was not”.
( 26 ) I turn now to each of the four issues raised on this appeal, applying the foregoing principles of review. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS FIRST ISSUE - Appellant’s Claim for $6500 Vehicle Exemption under PPSA ( 27 ) The PPSA, by virtue of s.59(3)(b), creates an exemption from seizure by a secured party of one motor vehicle to the extent of $6500, provided that the vehicle is required by the debtor for employment purposes. The full text of that
section reads as follows: Subject to subsection (7), a debtor may claim the following items of collateral to be exempt from seizure by a secured party: … (
b) one motor vehicle having a realizable value of not more that six thousand five hundred dollars at the time the claim for exemption is made, or not more than any greater amount that may be prescribed, if the motor vehicle is required by the debtor in the course of and necessary to the debtor’s trade, profession or occupation or for transportation to a place of employment where public transportation facilities are not reasonably available; ( 28 ) However, the PPSA further provides in s.59(7) that the exemption does not apply to goods that are subject to a PMSI. The full text of that
section reads as follows: Clauses (3)(
a) to (
c) and subsections (4), (5) and (6) do not apply in relation to goods that are subject to a purchase money security interest held by the secured party against whom the claim to exemption is made. ( 29 ) The appellant contends that the Registrar erred in finding that he was not entitled to the vehicle exemption under these provisions.
He maintains that the exception under s.59(7) does not bar his claim to the exemption because the trustee disallowed the secured claim of TD under its PMSI for failure to properly record its security interest, as a result of which the vehicle became an asset of the bankrupt estate with TD being relegated to the status of an unsecured creditor. It is not disputed that Mr.
Macfarlane required the vehicle for employment purposes. ( 30 ) Inexplicably, after reciting amongst the background facts in his decision that the trustee had determined that the purported security interest in favour of TD was invalid and that the trustee had disallowed that security, the Registrar ultimately held that the vehicle exemption did not apply in this case with the misstatement that “where, as here, there is a properly perfected purchase money security interest”. Without going into any detailed analysis, the Registrar simply concluded that Mr.
Macfarlane was not entitled to the $6500 vehicle exemption in alignment with the stated position of the trustee based on the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s decision in VW Credit Canada Inc. v. Roberts , 2001 NSCA 42 . ( 31 ) In some respects, the facts of that case are different from those in the present case. The bankrupt had leased a motor vehicle from the appellant who likewise had failed to properly register its security interest under the PPSA. As a result, the trustee in bankruptcy disallowed the lessor’s claim as a secured creditor.
The bankrupt then claimed an exemption of $6500 for the vehicle under s.59(3) of the PPSA on the ground that it was used for employment purposes. That prompted an application by the lessor to determine whether its claim as a creditor, based on the lease, was valid against the bankrupt’s exemption up to $6500 (or against the $3000 exemption in the Judicature Act ). That application was not successful and the lessor appealed. ( 32 ) Even on those facts, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that the bankrupt was not entitled to the exemption against the holder of the PMSI.
It noted that the lessor had an unperfected PMSI which would nonetheless have entitled it to enforce its security by taking possession of the vehicle prior to the bankruptcy. The court reasoned that because the vehicle would not have been exempt from seizure at the time of the assignment in bankruptcy by virtue of the exception set out in s.59(7), it could not then become exempt after the assignment in bankruptcy was made.
In other words, the events of the bankruptcy did not bring the exemption into existence where none existed before the bankruptcy. ( 33 ) The extraction and application of these legal principles in the case at bar lead to the conclusion that the trustee’s disallowance of the secured claim of TD by reason of imperfect registration under the PPSA does not generate the vehicle exemption now claimed by the Appellant. ( 34 ) Beyond that, there is an entirely new dimension in this case which makes it somewhat unique from the other cases that have been referred to. That dimension is, of course, the fact that Mr.
Macfarlane entered into a CSC with the trustee during the course of his
bankruptcy, the payments under which were destined to be for the benefit of his creditors. In so doing, Mr. Macfarlane promised to pay the full purchase price of $15,702 over a 36 month term, all within the framework of the bankruptcy. After running into personal difficulties, he then defaulted in making those payments after some 16 months, then wrongfully sold the vehicle at auction without the trustee’s knowledge or consent (contrary to the terms of the CSC), thereby making the repossession or seizure of the vehicle impossible, and ultimately walked away with all the sale proceeds.
His claim to a vehicle exemption under the PPSA has been overtaken by these events and to state the obvious, he is not in a position to claim such an exemption against the trustee in relation to the CSC security instrument. ( 35 ) All in all, although the Registrar’s analysis on this issue was incomplete, I conclude that he made no error in law in finding that Mr. Macfarlane was not entitled to claim a vehicle exemption pursuant to s.59(3)(
b) of the PPSA. SECOND ISSUE - Annulment of the Absolute Discharge Order ( 36 ) After learning that the vehicle had been unilaterally sold by Mr. Macfarlane at auction in December of 2018 in disregard of his obligations under the CSC, and not being in a position to repossess the vehicle, the trustee made an application to the Registrar in bankruptcy to annul the ADO issued on June 1, 2018. The application was made pursuant to s.180(1) of the BIA which reads as follows: 180(1) Where a bankrupt after his discharge fails to perform the duties imposed on him by this Act, the court may, on application, annul his discharge. ( 37 )
Section 158 of the BIA in turn sets out the duties required to be fulfilled by a bankrupt. Among the various duties imposed in that section, the trustee relied on those specified in subsections (
k) and (
o) when appearing before the Registrar at the hearing of the application on May 3, 2019. Those subsections read as follows: (
k) aid to the utmost of his power in the realization of his property and the distribution of the proceeds among his creditors; … (
o) generally do all such acts and things in relation to his property and the distribution of the proceeds among his creditors as may be reasonably required by the trustee, or may be prescribed by the General Rules, or may be directed by the court by any special order made with reference to any particular case or made on the occasion of any special application by the trustee, or any creditor or person interested… ( 38 ) Mr.
Macfarlane contends that once the ADO was issued on June 1, 2018 he was no longer a bankrupt within the meaning of the BIA and was no longer subject to any of the statutory duties imposed by that Act. In support of his position, Mr. Macfarlane relied on the decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Re Briant , 2016 BCSC 1575 . Indeed, the court in that case held that the duties imposed on a bankrupt under s.158 , including subsection (o), only apply to those bankrupts who have not yet been discharged or are subject to a conditional discharge.
The judge considered that a plain reading of the obligations listed in s.158 , within the context of the BIA , strongly suggests that such obligations were intended to be performed by an individual after assignment into bankruptcy, but before discharge (see paras 61-62). ( 39 ) In reaching this conclusion, Justice Griffin acknowledged that she was taking an opposite view to the passages set out in Houlden & Morawetz on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada (4 th ed.) at H§70(3) and H§5 respectively which are here reproduced as follows: H§70(3) The discharge of a bankrupt is a discharge from provable claims or creditors, not from duties imposed on the bankrupt by the [Act].
The bankrupt must, even after his or her discharge, continue to perform the duties in s.158 . H§5 Even after a discharge from bankruptcy, the bankrupt must continue to perform the duties imposed by s.158 , and it the bankrupt fails to do so, the court may annul the discharge: s. 180(1) . ( 40 ) In its running commentary on this topic, the authors further state (at para H§70) as follows: Section 180(1) only applies where the bankrupt has received a discharge and has failed, after his or her discharge, to perform the duties imposed on a bankrupt by s.158.
The court will not on an application under s.180(1) consider matters that should have been raised at the time of the hearing of the application for discharge … Although the bankrupt has received his or her discharge, the trustee continues as trustee and the bankrupt, by virtue of s.180(1) is obligated to assist the trustee in performing the trustee’s duties …
A bankrupt’s duties under s.158 survive discharge and where a bankrupt after his or her discharge fails to perform the duties imposed on him or her, the court may, on application, annul the discharge. ( 41 ) Amongst the cases cited in support of these passages are three Nova Scotia decisions rendered by former Registrars in Bankruptcy in this province, namely, Leblanc (Re) , 2007 NSSC 18 , Lannigan (Re) 2008 NSSC 348 and Benigno (Re) , 1999 Carswell NS 380 .
In addition to these cases, I have also been referred by the respondent to the decision by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Sher (Re) , 1999 Carswell Ont 3344 which also adopts these passages, albeit in a different fact scenario. ( 42 ) In my view, the jurisprudence in these four cases aligns with the plain wording of s.180(1) of the BIA , under which the trustee’s application to annul was made. That
section speaks in terms of a failure of a bankrupt after his discharge to perform the duties imposed on him by the Act. This
section does not say, or imply, that the duties imposed on a bankrupt under the BIA come to an end upon the granting of an absolute discharge order. ( 43 ) In my view, the decision in Briant is out of step with the foregoing jurisprudence and I respectfully decline to follow it on the facts of the case before me. As of this date, I note that the Briant case has not since been judicially considered elsewhere in any reported cases. ( 44 ) In the present case, Mr. Macfarlane had a duty to honour his payment obligations to the trustee under the CSC.
He was further under a duty not to sell the vehicle without the trustee’s knowledge or consent. He certainly was not entitled to retain the sale proceeds from the vehicle to the prejudice of the creditors of his estate. ( 45 ) The Registrar concluded that these actions on the part of Mr. Macfarlane breached his duties to the trustee pursuant to s.158 (
k) and (
o) to aid in the realization of his property and the distribution of the proceeds among his creditors, and to perform all acts in relation to his property reasonably required by the trustee. I readily conclude that there was no error of law committed by the Registrar in making those findings.
He was thereby enabled to exercise his discretion to annul the ADO under the authority of s.180(1) of the BIA . ( 46 ) I would add that it may have been a preferable outcome for the Registrar to have supplanted the annulled ADO with a conditional discharge pertaining, of course, to payment of the outstanding balance under the CSC.
Not only did the Registrar express the opinion in his decision that the trustee should have sought a conditional order in the first place, rather than an absolute discharge, but it was only a conditional discharge which the trustee requested in making submissions at the annulment hearing. Be that as it may, as earlier stated it is not for this court to simply substitute its opinion unless satisfied that the Registrar erred in principle or in law in the way he exercised his discretionary power to annul the ADO.
I conclude that the Registrar made no error in principle or in law in so doing. ( 47 ) Before moving on to the third issue, I will say that I found the trustee’s e-mail to the bankrupt on May 31, 2018 to be troublesome. In that e-mail, sent the day before the ADO was granted, Mr. Breeze advised Mr. Macfarlane that the CSC for the vehicle would continue in the normal course and that payments thereunder would not be a condition of his discharge. He added that as with any conditional sales contract, on default of payment the vehicle would be repossessed. ( 48 ) That cryptic e-mail may well have been confusing to Mr.
Macfarlane. However, he well understood his payment obligations under the CSC and that those payments were destined for the benefit of the creditors of his estate which would continue to be administered by the trustee. Cryptic as it was, I conclude that this e-mail did not constitute a waiver by the trustee of its right to seek an annulment of the ADO under s.180(1) of the BIA upon subsequent breaches of duty by Mr. Macfarlane such as happened here. THIRD ISSUE – Change of Venue Request ( 49 ) Prior to the May 3, 2019 annulment hearing before the Registrar, Mr.
Macfarlane made a request to the trustee for a change of venue for the hearing to Ontario where he now lives. He understands that this e-mail request was then forwarded by the trustee to the Registrar. ( 50 ) This ground of appeal is a non-starter, however, because Mr. Macfarlane did not at any time present a motion to the Registrar for a change of venue. He acknowledges that he simply did not pursue that request such that it never ever came before the Registrar to be decided. Indeed, it is evident from the transcript of the hearing that a change of venue request was not even mentioned.
It is far too late now to raise this issue on the appeal before this court.
( 51 ) Although that is a complete answer to this ground of appeal, I would add that Mr. Macfarlane was not able to present any substantive grounds in his submissions that would have justified a change of venue to Ontario even if it had been raised in a timely way. FOURTH ISSUE - Procedural Fairness ( 52 ) Mr. Macfarlane argues that he was prejudiced at the May 3, 2019 hearing by teleconference by reason of poor audio quality over the telephone. ( 53 ) This ground of appeal can be disposed of by a reading of the transcript of that hearing. There were two occasions early on where Mr.
Macfarlane complained that he could not properly hear the proceedings. On both of those occasions, the Registrar rearranged the position of the microphones in his courtroom (the first time being a test run) and on both occasions, Mr. Macfarlane confirmed that he could then hear much better or quite a bit better. Thereafter, he seemed to have no difficulty in his verbal interactions with the Registrar and Mr. Breeze. ( 54 ) I conclude that this ground of appeal has no merit.
DISPOSITION ( 55 ) It follows from my analysis of each of the four issues raised by the appellant that this appeal must stand dismissed. ( 56 ) In its written submissions, the trustee has requested an award of costs should the appeal be decided in its favour. I decline to do so in the circumstances of this case. ( 57 ) As the Registrar put it in his decision, this matter was exacerbated and in some ways even triggered by the choice of the trustee to seek an Absolute Discharge Order rather than a Conditional Discharge Order.
In his view, it was an error by the trustee to seek an absolute discharge when there were duties outstanding under the CSC. That is a view shared by this court. ( 58 ) Beyond that, all indications are that the trustee omitted to register its CSC under the PPSA of Nova Scotia whereby it lost its right to repossess the vehicle after it was sold, and had to resort to a court application for annulment of the ADO. Finally, there is the matter of the cryptic e-mail advice given by Mr. Breeze to Mr.
Macfarlane which further muddied the waters about the effect of the ADO that was being sought. ( 59 ) None of this excuses Mr. Macfarlane’s conduct in unilaterally selling the vehicle to a third party without the trustee’s knowledge or consent after defaulting on his payment obligations under the CSC, and then retaining the entirety of the sale proceeds. However, it does form the basis of my decision to deny the trustee its costs of this appeal. ( 60 ) I will leave it to counsel for the trustee to prepare an Order dismissing this appeal without costs. J.
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