Jackson Estate v. Young, 2020 NSSC 5
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: Jackson Estate v. Young , 2020 NSSC 5 Date: 20200107 Docket: 478993 Registry: Pictou Between: Estate of Judith Marie Jackson , as represented by Laura Beth Kelly & Sarah Jillian Barnes in their capacities as Administrators of the Estate Applicant v. Bill Young Respondent Decision Judge: The Honourable Justice Glen G.
McDougall Heard: June 10, 2019, in Pictou, Nova Scotia Counsel: Daniel Boyle, for the Applicant Roseanne Skoke and Allison Kouzovnikov, for the Defendant Jeremy Smith, for the Attorney General of Nova Scotia By the Court: Background [ 1 ] Judith (“Judy”) Marie Jackson died intestate on August 26, 2017. At the time of her death, she was in a common law relationship with William (“Bill”) Young. She had two adult daughters – Laura Kelly and Sarah Barnes – from her marriage to Brian David Kelly. Ms. Jackson and Mr. Kelly divorced in 1999, with Ms.
Jackson retaining the matrimonial home at 327 Craig Road in Watervale, Nova Scotia. [ 2 ] The relationship between Judy Jackson and Bill Young began in about 2004. Several years later, Mr. Young moved in with Ms. Jackson at 327 Craig Road. Although they were engaged to be married in 2009, no wedding ever took place. [ 3 ] During her relationship with Mr. Young, Ms. Jackson dealt with various health problems, including bipolar depression, sciatica and hip pain. In 2015, she was diagnosed with melanoma. On August 7, 2017, Ms. Jackson was hospitalized and diagnosed with brain cancer.
She was subsequently moved to the palliative care unit where she passed away on August 26. [ 4 ] Following their mother’s death, Laura Kelly and Sarah Barnes applied for and were issued a grant of administration of their mother’s estate. On March 28, 2018, the property at 327 Craig Road was transferred to Ms. Kelly and Ms. Barnes as personal representatives of Ms. Jackson’s estate. Although Ms. Kelly and Ms. Barnes asked Mr. Young to vacate the home on numerous occasions, he has refused to leave. [ 5 ] On August 2, 2018, Ms. Kelly and Ms. Barnes, on behalf of Ms.
Jackson’s estate, filed an application in the Supreme Court for an order requiring Mr. Young to vacate the property, for occupation rent from August 2017 to the present, and for costs. Mr. Young filed a notice of contest and a notice of respondent’s claim on August 14, 2018. He also filed a notice of claim in Probate Court on the same date. In both proceedings, Mr. Young takes the position that he is a “spouse” for the purposes of the Intestate Succession Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 236 , and is therefore entitled to inherit Ms. Jackson’s property under that Act.
In the alternative, he says the exclusion of common law spouses under the Intestate Succession Act infringes s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . In the further alternative, Mr. Young submits that he has an equitable interest in the property under the doctrine of unjust enrichment or proprietary estoppel. Mr. Young seeks, among other things, an order that the property be transferred to him.
[ 6 ] Mr. Young filed a notice of constitutional question on February 19, 2019. Counsel for the Attorney General attended the hearing but took no position and offered no evidence on the constitutionality of the Intestate Succession Act . [ 7 ] This matter first came before Justice Murray in Chambers on August 16, 2018. In a written decision dated October 2, Murray J. ordered Mr. Young to grant access to the property, at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice, to the administrators for the purpose of carrying out their duties as personal representatives of the estate. Mr.
Young allowed Laura Kelly and her partner, David Hape, to access the property on October 13, 2018 . Mr. Young left the property while Ms. Kelly and Mr. Hape were present. While at the home, Ms. Kelly and Mr. Hape observed several marijuana plants and firearms. They called the RCMP and Mr. Young was arrested when he returned to the home. After appearing before a judge, Mr. Young was fined and placed on probation. He has not permitted Ms. Kelly or Ms. Barnes to return to the property since that time.
Issues [ 8 ] The issues on this application are: 1) Does the term “spouse” under the Intestate Succession Act include a common law spouse? 2) If not, does the exclusion of common law spouses from Nova Scotia’s intestate succession regime infringe s. 15(1) of the Charter ? 3) If not, does Mr. Young have an equitable interest in the property at 327 Craig Road pursuant to the doctrine of unjust enrichment or proprietary estoppel? 4) If not, should Mr. Young be ordered to vacate the property? 5) If Mr.
Young has no legal or equitable interest in the property, should he be ordered to pay occupation rent for the period of August 2017 to the date of judgment? The evidence [ 9 ] Before considering the issues, I will review the evidence. William “Bill” Young [ 10 ] Bill Young filed two affidavits and was cross-examined on them. Mr. Young is a 59-year-old carpenter. He has an adult daughter, Sophie Young, from a previous marriage. [ 11 ] Mr. Young met Judy Jackson in 2003. They began dating a year or two later.
At that time, he said, she was coming out of an abusive relationship and was living in her home in a remote rural area twenty minutes from town. Mr. Young said the home was “not in a great state of repair.” [ 12 ] Although Mr. Young stated in one of his affidavits that he moved into Ms. Jackson’s home at 327 Craig Road in 2003, he testified on cross-examination that it was closer to 2008. Prior to moving in with Ms. Jackson, Mr. Young had been living with his parents after selling his own house in Salt Springs so that he could afford to make child support payments. [ 13 ] In December 2009, Mr.
Young bought a ring and proposed to Ms. Jackson. They never married. He said they intended to get married “when things went right for us”, when they “both got all of our bills and stuff straightened out” and were in a stable financial position. [ 14 ] According to Mr. Young, he was Ms. Jackson’s confidant and provided for her emotional, psychological and financial wellbeing during their relationship. He said Ms. Jackson suffered ill health, and he provided her with love and care. He chauffeured her to medical appointments, pipe band practice and anywhere else she needed to go. Mr. Young said Ms.
Jackson loved playing bagpipes and was a member of the Pictou County Pipes Band. She often did public performances with the band, and her friends consisted primarily of the other members. [ 15 ] Mr. Young said that although most of the household bills were in Ms. Jackson’s name, he assisted her with paying them. Even though they had separate bank accounts, they “had a lot of dependence on each other” when it came to their finances. Mr. Young considered himself “equally responsible for all the debt and contributed to the payment of the mortgage, taxes, household expenses”. He and Ms.
Jackson usually declared themselves as common law spouses on their income tax returns, except for one year when they were advised to file as “single” to facilitate Ms. Jackson receiving her disability pension from the government. [ 16 ] Mr. Young stated that in 2006, Ms. Jackson obtained a Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program Grant of $15,681.00 for chimney repairs, a new roof, and to replace some doors. The roof began to sag immediately after it was put on, which Mr. Young attributed to weak rafters. The bow in the roof has never been fixed. [ 17 ] When Mr. Young came to live with Ms.
Jackson, the house was subject to a pre-existing mortgage. In September 2010, Ms. Jackson refinanced the property through the Royal Bank of Canada, borrowing $41,000 to renovate and repair the home and to discharge the earlier mortgage. Mr. Young acknowledged that Ms. Jackson refinanced the home in her name only. She applied for HomeProtector life and disability mortgage insurance. Ms. Jackson was approved for the life insurance but denied disability insurance due to her various health issues. When Ms. Jackson died, the insurer paid off the mortgage. [ 18 ] Mr. Young said that from 2013 to 2015, Ms.
Jackson had no income, and he withdrew the entirety of his retirement savings – approximately $26,000 – to cover their expenses. He stated that during the times that Ms. Jackson was ill, he made his “best efforts to provide financially for her and to maintain the mortgage and the debt”. In 2015, Ms. Jackson received disability benefit backpay in the amount of $32,378.94.
[ 19 ] Mr. Young gave evidence that in addition to providing financial support, he assisted with repairs and improvements to “our home”. He renovated two bedrooms in the home “about five or six years ago”. He said that both he and Ms. Jackson paid for these renovations. Mr. Young denied that David Hape, Laura Kelly’s partner, was substantially involved with the bedroom renovations. Mr. Hape only helped “a little bit, not much”. In addition to renovating the bedrooms, Mr. Young laid some used laminate flooring in the living room and in the hallway, repaired the flooring in the bathroom and replaced the toilet.
He replaced the refrigerator, stove, hot water tank and water tank over the course of his relationship with Ms. Jackson. [ 20 ] Mr. Young stated that he also worked hard on landscaping the exterior of the home, and chopped wood for heat in the winter. He denied that David Hape ever assisted him with cutting wood unless the wood was for Mr. Hape’s own use. [ 21 ] When asked why the bedrooms were renovated, Mr. Young said that one of the reasons was mould. There were also dead rats in the walls. Mould had been an issue since before Mr. Young moved into the home.
He explained that some insulation in the attic had gotten wet and had never been replaced. As a result, any time they painted over the mould, it came back. Mr. Young agreed that mould has returned to the renovated bedrooms, and it remains an issue throughout the home. He also acknowledged that the home is currently not insured and requires upgrades to the electrical and plumbing systems. He has not taken steps to remediate any of these issues and has no plans to do so until he knows whether he has the right to remain in the home. [ 22 ] Mr. Young’s evidence was that Ms.
Jackson and his daughter Sophie had a close mother-daughter relationship. Sophie stayed with him and Ms. Jackson every second weekend from the time she was 14 years of age until she became independent. She had a bedroom in the home and shared all holidays and special occasions with Mr. Young and Ms. Jackson. [ 23 ] According to Mr. Young, Ms. Jackson’s two daughters, Ms. Kelly and Ms. Barnes, were estranged from their mother. He said they rarely spent time with her during the ten years before her death. He described them as having “no meaningful relationship” with Ms. Jackson. He explained that Ms.
Kelly only contacted her mother when she wanted some of her medicinal marijuana, which Ms. Jackson had authorization to grow. As for Ms. Barnes, he said she kept her children away from Ms. Jackson. Mr. Young stated that neither daughter was around when Ms. Jackson was diagnosed with skin cancer in 2015. During her second bout with cancer, they only noticed that she was ill during the last month of her life. [ 24 ] When Ms. Jackson was hospitalized in August 2017, she named Mr. Young as substitute decision-maker.
After she died, he applied for and received the Canada Pension Death Benefit and the Canada Pension Widowers’ Allowance. He attempted to pay her funeral expenses but the funeral home director did not return his call. Mr. Young said he wanted to apply for administration of the estate but learned that he was not authorized to do so as a common law spouse. [ 25 ] In October 2018, Mr. Young was ordered by the court to allow Ms. Jackson’s daughters to attend the house to take inventory. Laura Kelly and her partner, David Hape, came to the home on October 13, 2018. Mr.
Young left the property while they were present, as had been agreed, but his daughter Sophie and her boyfriend stayed behind. Mr. Hape and Ms. Kelly went through the home, taking photos. When Mr. Young returned, he was arrested for improper storage of a firearm, production of marijuana and possession of marijuana. After two nights in custody, he attended court and was given a fine and placed on probation. [ 26 ] Mr. Young denied Ms. Kelly’s assertion that he threatened to burn down the house, or that he made reference to having a shotgun waiting behind the door for anyone who tried to take his home from him.
Sophie Young [ 27 ] Sophie Young is Bill Young’s daughter. She is 28 years old and has worked at Lawton’s Drug Store in Westville for the past five years. Ms. Young’s evidence is that she first met Judy Jackson when she was 12 years old. Ms. Young considered Ms. Jackson to be her stepmother. She spent every second weekend with her father and Ms. Jackson at 327 Craig Road, along with holidays and other special occasions. Ms. Young said that her father and Ms. Jackson lived together as husband and wife, and they referred to the house on Craig Road as “their” home. They did everything together as a couple. Ms.
Young went with her father to Peoples Jewellers in December 2009 and helped him pick out an engagement ring for Ms. Jackson. [ 28 ] Ms. Young witnessed her father maintaining the house and doing landscaping over the years. She saw her father shovel manure and help till the garden. He replaced a door that had been previously replaced with the money from the grant. Ms. Young did not actually see her father install the door, but there was a new door when she next visited. Ms.
Young did not know who paid for the door, but said her father “did a lot of carpentry and restoration work with a lot of different companies”, and might have salvaged it from one of his jobs. [ 29 ] Ms. Young said her father and Mr. Hape renovated two bedrooms. She did not see the work in progress, but only after completion. In addition, her father removed and replaced the subfloor in the bathroom and lifted the toilet because the joist underneath was getting weak and the seal “was going” on the toilet. Again, Ms. Young only saw the finished product. [ 30 ] Ms.
Young did not have a relationship with Judy Jackson’s daughters, as they did not spend much time at their mother’s home. According to Ms. Young, Sarah Barnes had not visited since her daughter was an infant. Ms. Young said she had witnessed Ms. Jackson calling Ms. Barnes at various times and inviting her to the house for Ms. Jackson’s birthday or for Easter, and that Ms. Jackson always ended up crying by the time she hung up the phone. Ms. Barnes never came. Ms. Young said Laura Kelly was present on only a few occasions during her time at 327 Craig Road. Ms.
Kelly’s son Jacob started coming to the house during the last two years before Ms. Jackson’s death. [ 31 ] Ms. Young agreed that Ms. Barnes texted her on August 8, 2017, to inform her that Ms. Jackson had been hospitalized. At that time, Ms. Young was caring for her stepfather who was also gravely ill. [ 32 ] Ms. Young was present on October 13, 2018, when Ms. Kelly and Mr. Hape came to 327 Craig Road to do the home inspection. They took videos of the house, and never mentioned any concerns to her about Mr. Young having five marijuana plants and several hunting rifles on the property.
[ 33 ] Ms. Young always considered 327 Craig Road to be her second home, and called it her “safe place”. She stated that Ms. Jackson always welcomed her and treated her as if she was her own daughter. Pictou County Pipes Band members [ 34 ] Mr. Young filed affidavits from five members of the Pictou County Pipes Band – Agnes Leadbetter, Donna MacKay, Jessie Elizabeth Langille, Joan Muise, and Mary Ellen Curley. None of the affiants were cross-examined. The affidavits all contain hearsay evidence, which I have disregarded. [ 35 ] Each of the affiants observed Mr. Young being kind, considerate and loving to Ms.
Jackson. They said Mr. Young and Ms. Jackson were together as a couple and were known in the community to be husband and wife. Mr. Young drove Ms. Jackson back and forth to band practice every week, and to parades and other special events. He accompanied Ms. Jackson along the parade route to support her and to be there in case she was tired or needed assistance. [ 36 ] Four of the affiants stated that when Ms. Jackson was in palliative care, Mr. Young welcomed the band members to spend time with her. They went as a group and also individually. These same affiants observed Mr.
Young to be loving and supportive toward Ms. Jackson until the very end of her life. [ 37 ] Mary Ellen Curley had been a friend of Ms. Jackson’s for four and a half summers prior to her death. She said she does not know Ms. Jackson’s daughters and had not observed them at any band events. Donna MacKay had been Ms. Jackson’s friend for five years, and also said that she does not know Ms. Jackson’s children. Agnes Leadbetter, who had known and been a friend to Ms. Jackson for almost forty years, said she met Ms. Jackson’s children for the first time when their mother was in palliative care.
Laura Kelly [ 38 ] Laura Kelly is Judy Jackson’s daughter and Sarah Barnes’s sister. She has one child, Jacob, with her common law partner, David Hape. [ 39 ] Ms. Kelly stated that her parents, Judy Jackson and Brian Kelly, purchased the home at 327 Craig Road in 1979 shortly after they were married. Ms. Kelly and her sister grew up in the home. When Ms. Jackson and Mr. Kelly divorced, Ms. Jackson retained the family home. She was the sole owner of the property from that time until her death. [ 40 ] Ms. Kelly stated that at the time of her mother’s death, Ms. Jackson had been living with Mr.
Young at 327 Craig Road. Mr. Young moved in with her mother in late 2004. [ 41 ] When Ms. Jackson died, she did not leave a will. Ms. Kelly and Ms. Barnes met with the Registrar of Probate and were advised that they were the legal heirs of their mother’s estate. Ms. Kelly and Ms. Barnes applied for a grant of administration, which was issued on March 22, 2018. Six days later, Ms. Jackson’s home was transferred to Ms. Kelly and Ms. Barnes as personal representatives of the estate. [ 42 ] According to Ms. Kelly, Ms. Barnes advised her that she texted Mr. Young on September 6, 2017. In the texts, Ms.
Barnes informed him about the outcome of their meeting with the Registrar, and their plans to apply to be joint administrators of their mother’s estate. Ms. Barnes told Mr. Young that they did not expect him to find a new place to live immediately and that they would like to figure things out with him in a reasonable manner. The text messages were attached as an exhibit to Ms. Kelly’s affidavit. Ms. Kelly said she went to 327 Craig Road a few days after those texts were sent and explained to Mr. Young that she and her sister were the sole beneficiaries of Ms.
Jackson’s estate and that, as her daughters, they were the next of kin. Mr. Young responded that he was the next of kin as their mother’s common law spouse. Mr. Young became visibly upset and, in a deep, yelling voice, stated that the house and all its contents were his and that no one was going to take what is his. According to Ms. Kelly, Mr. Young became increasingly upset and hostile, stating, “I will burn the house down before I let anyone else have it”. [ 43 ] Ms. Kelly disputed Mr. Young’s claim that she never spent time with her mother at 327 Craig Road.
On the contrary, she said, she and her partner David, and their son Jacob, regularly interacted with Ms. Jackson over the course of the last ten years of her life, including visiting her home, having her visit their home, and attending events like parades. Ms. Kelly filed various photographs as an exhibit to her affidavit which show her and her children spending time with Ms. Jackson on various occasions over the years. Ms. Kelly noted that she has not always owned a vehicle, and transportation sometimes dictated her ability to visit. [ 44 ] Ms.
Kelly acknowledged that, during her teenage years, her relationship with her mother had its ups and downs. When her parents divorced, Ms. Kelly was 14 years old and went to live with her father. Ms. Kelly agreed that her mother had mental health issues, including depression. She said that her relationship with her mother became closer, however, after her son Jacob was born. From that time forward, Ms. Kelly, her partner and Jacob spent every holiday with Ms. Jackson and Mr. Young. Ms. Kelly added that her relationship with her mother continued to grow closer after Ms.
Kelly underwent open-heart surgery in February 2013. She denied that she and her sister were not there for their mother during her fight with cancer. [ 45 ] According to Ms. Kelly, she never kept her son Jacob away from Ms. Jackson. Jacob frequently visited 327 Craig Road and assisted with baking, gardening and other yard work. He also had numerous sleepovers over the years, and helped Mr. Young paint Ms. Jackson’s bedroom in 2015. [ 46 ] Ms. Kelly knew Sophie Young to be Mr. Young’s daughter, but said she rarely ever saw her at 327 Craig Road when she and her family were there to visit Ms.
Jackson. [ 47 ] In response to the affidavits of the Pictou County Pipes Band members, Ms. Kelly stated that she attended her mother’s band practices on Tuesday evenings in the summer at Acadia Park in Westville regularly from 2013 to 2017, when she did not have to work. She also attended every July 1 parade in Westville. Ms. Kelly said she did not know all of her mother’s band friends, as the only time she would see them was at parades and concerts, and the ladies tended to go their separate ways after performances.
[ 48 ] With respect to the condition of the house at 327 Craig Road, Ms. Kelly said that when Mr. Young moved into the home, it was habitable but was starting to age. In 2006, Judy Jackson applied for and obtained grants to replace the roof, chimney, siding, back door and basement door. The work was completed by contractors. The only other significant renovations occurred in 2015, when Ms. Kelly’s partner Mr. Hape, their son Jacob, and Mr. Young renovated the bedrooms in the home. Also in 2015, Mr. Young installed a new toilet, and Frank Parker’s Plumbing installed a new water pump and hot water tank. Ms.
Kelly said she observed this work taking place, and that the renovations were necessitated by mould in the walls, a rat infestation, and general neglect of maintenance. She did not see Sophie Young at the home while the 2015 renovations were taking place. [ 49 ] Ms. Kelly acknowledged that she called the RCMP after she and Mr. Hape visited the property on October 13, 2018. She noticed firearm parts lying about unsecured, as well as evidence of marijuana plants being grown inside the house and in the yard outside the home.
She said she was concerned about drugs and firearms on the property, especially in light of Mr. Young’s previous threats to her about his willingness to use his firearms. [ 50 ] Ms. Kelly stated that as a result of her visit to the property in October 2018, she has numerous concerns about the maintenance and condition of the property. She is particularly concerned about the questionable condition of the electrical system and water entering the home through the roof, producing mould and causing damage to the kitchen ceiling. Ms.
Kelly filed numerous photographs taken on October 13, 2018, showing the condition of the property. [ 51 ] When asked about her plans for the house, Ms. Kelly said she intends to move into the home with her partner and son. She said her mother would have wanted Jacob to be taken care of and to have a place to live. David Hape [ 52 ] David Hape is Laura Kelly’s common law partner. Mr. Hape met Judy Jackson in 1998 through her then-partner, with whom she was in a relationship from approximately 1998 until 2003. Mr. Hape began a relationship with Laura Kelly in 2001, and Ms.
Kelly moved in with him the following year. The couple’s son Jacob was born in August 2004. Mr. Hape said Ms. Jackson met Jacob shortly after his birth. She had been accompanied by Bill Young, who Mr. Hape understood had recently moved in with her. Mr. Hape had not previously met Mr. Young. [ 53 ] Mr. Hape said that in 2006, Ms. Jackson obtained a government grant to replace the roof, siding, basement door, back door and chimney at 327 Craig Road. The work was completed by a contractor. Mr. Hape recounted a conversation that he had in August 2017 with Mr.
Young and Gordon Barnes, husband of Sarah Barnes, regarding the state of the home. Mr. Young commented that he had not assisted Ms. Jackson in obtaining the grant because it was early in his relationship with her and he did not feel that it was his place to step in. Mr. Hape said the conversation arose because of some concerns he had with the workmanship of the jobs completed using the grant funding. [ 54 ] According to Mr. Hape, beginning in 2007, he and Mr. Young would get firewood ready for winter at 327 Craig Road. They did this every year until the fall of 2016, and in 2012, Jacob began helping them.
Jacob frequently helped his grandmother with baking, gardening, mowing the lawn and cleaning up the yard. [ 55 ] Mr. Hape said that Ms. Jackson remortgaged her home in September 2010 but that no renovations took place at that time. In 2011, Mr. Hape said, their family dog had puppies and they gave one male and one female puppy to Ms. Jackson for companionship. [ 56 ] Mr. Hape stated that in or around May 2015, Ms. Jackson received a back payment for CPP disability pension. That same month, she purchased materials to renovate the bedroom off the kitchen at 327 Craig Road. Mr. Hape and Mr.
Young pulled out the old gyproc and insulation. They installed new insulation, gyproc and a new vapor-barrier. They also crack-filled, sanded, and painted the room, and laid new oilcloth flooring. Mr. Hape said the project took him and Mr. Young two weeks to complete. In July 2015, Ms. Jackson bought materials to renovate her bedroom and Mr. Hape and Mr. Young did the renovations on that room as well. Mr. Young and Jacob painted the room. Other than the bedroom renovations, Mr. Hape was aware that Mr. Young placed laminate flooring in the living room and installed a new toilet in the bathroom.
The only other plumbing work he was aware of at 327 Craig Road was the installation of a water pump and hot water tank by Frank Parker’s Plumbing in 2015. [ 57 ] Mr. Hape said that he has regularly attended 327 Craig Road since 1998, and the landscaping has changed very little in that time. The only significant change was the planting of eight Hosta bushes around the main yard and the removal of a few dead trees and brush. [ 58 ] Following Ms. Jackson’s passing, Mr. Hape says, he went to 327 Craig Road with Ms. Kelly and Jacob to speak with Mr. Young about Ms. Jackson’s bills and house affairs. Mr.
Young got angry and threatened Ms. Kelly and Sarah Barnes. That was the last time Mr. Hape saw Ms. Kelly speak to Mr. Young. [ 59 ] Mr. Hape’s evidence was that Ms. Kelly had a great relationship with her mother, and the relationship grew particularly close following February 2013 when Ms. Kelly had open heart surgery. He said that he and Ms. Kelly, and their son Jacob, had a close relationship with Ms. Jackson and Mr. Young, and frequently visited 327 Craig Road. They also had Ms. Jackson over to visit their home. They spent holidays together at 327 Craig Road or their home until Ms. Jackson’s passing.
In addition, Jacob had many sleepovers at his grandmother’s home over the years. [ 60 ] Mr. Hape said he is not well acquainted with Sophie Young, and he did not see her at 327 Craig Road when the bedroom renovations were underway. He had only seen her a few times and was not aware of her ever having lived at the home for any period. Mr. Hape was likewise unfamiliar with Ms. Jackson’s band friends. He and his family did not attend all of Ms. Jackson’s band events, but they did go to several of the big events over the years. [ 61 ] Mr. Hape accompanied Ms. Kelly to 327 Craig Road on October 13, 2018.
He described the house as being in a poorer state of repair than when Ms. Jackson died in August 2017. The house was dirty, had extensive mould growth and the kitchen ceiling was falling in. The roof was leaking, causing moisture damage inside the house. Mr. Hape said the house was not in such poor condition before Ms.
Jackson’s death and attributed the deterioration to neglect by Mr. Young. Sarah Barnes [ 62 ] Sarah Barnes is Judy Jackson’s daughter and Laura Kelly’s older sister. She has two children, Logan and Lily, with her husband, Gordon Barnes. [ 63 ] Ms. Barnes confirmed that she had a “strained relationship” with her mother at the time of her mother’s death. When her parents separated, but before they divorced, Ms. Barnes moved out of the home at 327 Craig Road and moved in with her grandparents. She was 17 years old at the time. [ 64 ] As an adult, Ms. Barnes did not visit 327 Craig Road often.
She said she did not approve of her mother and Bill Young’s “marijuana growth, use, and trafficking behaviours based out of the house”. She did not believe that her mother’s home was a safe or suitable environment for her children on a regular basis. Ms. Barnes did, however, visit Ms. Jackson’s home three or four times per year, mostly for holidays like Christmas or Ms. Jackson’s birthday. [ 65 ] Ms. Barnes denied Mr. Young’s allegation that she restricted her mother’s access to her grandchildren. Although she had concerns about her mother’s home, Ms. Jackson was always welcome to visit their home. Ms.
Barnes filed several photographs as an exhibit to her affidavit which show her and her children interacting with Ms. Jackson on various occasions over the years. [ 66 ] Ms. Barnes denied Mr. Young’s assertion that she had no meaningful relationship with Ms. Jackson. She said that it was not always easy for her to have a close relationship with her mother but that she made efforts, and at times chose to love her from a distance. This was due in part to her mother’s mental illness, which Ms. Barnes believed was diagnosed as bipolar depression a few years before Ms. Jackson’s death. According to Mr.
Barnes, this illness affected her mother’s behaviour and the things she said. Ms. Barnes described her mother’s
interpretation of their relationship as totally different from her own. [ 67 ] Ms. Barnes noted that Mr. Young was another reason for the distance between herself and her mother. It was awkward to interact with her mother in Mr. Young’s presence, as he was not welcoming to her or her family. [ 68 ] Ms. Barnes denied Mr. Young’s statement that she and Ms. Kelly were not around for Ms. Jackson’s final fight with cancer. She acknowledged that during her mother’s first bout of melanoma in 2015, she did not know many details about her situation because Ms. Jackson did not confide in her at that time.
During her mother’s second and final bout of cancer, however, Ms. Barnes and her sister were very supportive. Ms. Jackson contacted Ms. Barnes in July 2017 when she wasn’t feeling well, and Ms. Barnes took her mother to outpatient services. According to Ms. Barnes, she and her sister had to take over making decisions about their mother’s care because Mr. Young was not providing adequate care at that time. [ 69 ] After reviewing the photographs of 327 Craig Road taken by Ms. Kelly and Mr. Hape on October 13, 2018, Ms. Barnes became very concerned about the maintenance and poor condition of the property.
She is worried that the conditions of the home will only worsen, as they remain unaddressed by Mr. Young. Gordon Barnes [ 70 ] Gordon Barnes is Sarah Barnes’s husband, and was Judy Jackson’s son-in-law. Mr. Barnes met Sarah Barnes in 1998, and they have two children together. [ 71 ] Mr. Barnes said that Bill Young made visits to 327 Craig Road uncomfortable for him. On occasions when he went to the home with Sarah and their two children, Mr. Young rarely spoke to him and rarely interacted with Sarah and their children. He said that when they did interact, Mr.
Young was usually angry and ranting about people he disliked. [ 72 ] When Mr. Barnes went to 327 Craig Road with Sarah and their children, he generally observed Ms. Jackson and Mr. Young to be upset, and he did not believe this negativity was good for their family. They did visit as a family a few times per year, however, to mark special occasions, such as Christmases and occasionally Ms. Jackson’s birthday, as well as Halloween when the children were younger. Ms. Jackson also visited the Barnes’s home a few times per year and was always welcome. Mr.
Young was not always in attendance on those occasions. [ 73 ] Mr. Barnes said he has personally visited 327 Craig Road several times each year since 1998, and he has never noticed any improvements to the house above and beyond regular home repair and maintenance. In his view, the 2006 renovations and the 2015 bedroom renovations fell within that category. Mr. Barnes has not noticed evidence of any new landscaping. There was a small pre- existing garden, and a few bushes were planted over the years but Mr. Barnes did not observe any significant maintenance or improvements. [ 74 ] Mr.
Barnes said that he recalled a conversation with Mr. Young and David Hape about the state of the house at 327 Craig Road in August 2017. On that occasion, Mr. Young said he was not involved with preparation of paperwork or repairs funded by the 2006 government grant because it was early in his relationship with Ms. Jackson and he felt that it was not his place to get involved at that time because the house was not his. Findings of fact [ 75 ] Having considered all of the evidence in this matter, I make the following findings of fact. Bill Young and Judy Jackson met in 2003, and began dating about a year later.
At that time, Ms. Jackson’s house was in a state of significant disrepair. I find that Sophie Young began spending weekends at Ms. Jackson’s home before her father permanently moved in with Ms. Jackson. [ 76 ] Although Mr. Young estimated that he moved in with Ms. Jackson in 2008, the other evidence satisfies me that it was more likely in 2006 or early 2007, not long after Ms. Jackson obtained the government grant and renovations were completed on the home.
When Mr. Young moved in, mould was already an issue in the house. [77] In December 2009, Mr. Young proposed to Ms. Jackson and she accepted. They never married. Mr. Young said that they werewaiting for things to “go right”, to pay off their own bills and to get themselves into a better financial position before planning awedding. There is no other evidence on this point. Obviously we cannot know whether Ms. Jackson would have given the sameexplanation. [78] I accept the evidence that Mr. Young and Ms. Jackson lived as a couple and presented themselves that way.
They sharedhousehold duties like cooking, cleaning, and yard work. I find that Mr. Young did minor repairs to the home over the years, sometimesusing materials he salvaged from his construction jobs. I further find that he contributed to the replacement of several appliances,although the degree of his contribution is unclear. With respect to the bedroom renovations in 2015, I find that Mr. Young and DavidHape were equally involved. [79] The evidence of Mr. Young’s financial contributions to the relationship is scant.
Although he said that he contributed equally toexpenses, he offered no corroborating banking records or receipts. That said, the tax return information confirmed his testimony thatMs. Jackson had no income for the 2013 and 2014 tax years, and that in 2015, she received disability benefit backpay in the amount of$32,378.94. Mr. Young’s own tax documents support his evidence that he withdrew his retirement savings during the period that Ms.Jackson was not working. The 2013 documents show an RRSP withdrawal of $1,001.37. His 2014 tax return shows a RIF withdrawalof $17,999. In 2015, he withdrew $7,267.90. Mr.
Young said he used those funds to pay the mortgage and other expenses for himselfand Mr. Jackson, but there is no other evidence as to how those funds were used. In addition, there is evidence that Ms. Jacksonborrowed $41,000 when she remortgaged the property in 2010. Some of the funds appear to have been used to pay out a previousmortgage, but it is not clear how much. There is no evidence that Ms. Jackson used the remaining funds to renovate the property or tomake any other large purchases.
It is therefore not clear on the evidence whether she had access to any of these funds during the periodthat she was not earning an income. In any event, I accept that Mr. Young contributed somewhat to household expenses during hisrelationship with Ms. Jackson, and that his contributions increased during the period that Ms. Jackson was not earning an income. [80] I find that the relationship between Judy Jackson and Sarah Barnes was strained as a result of Ms. Jackson’s mental illness, herrelationship with Mr. Young, and the marijuana growth and use by Mr. Young and Ms. Jackson.
I find that Laura Kelly’s relationshipwith her mother was better than that of Ms. Barnes, but the two women were nevertheless not close. I find that Ms. Kelly overstated howoften she was at Ms. Jackson’s home or her band-related events. I accept Ms. Kelly’s evidence, however, that when she spoke to Mr.Young about her and Ms. Barnes being Ms. Jackson’s next of kin, he became angry and threatening. [81] I find that the condition of 327 Craig Road has deteriorated since Ms. Jackson’s death, and that any benefit to the propertyarising from the 2015 bedroom renovations has been lost due to neglect.
There is mould throughout the home. The electrical systemneeds to be upgraded and the roof needs to be repaired to prevent water from continuing to enter the home. I find that Mr. Young hasdone nothing to remediate these issues since he learned that Ms. Jackson’s daughters expected him to vacate the home. [82] Mr. Young argued that the evidence proves that Ms. Jackson intended for him to keep her home after her death. I find,however, that it is not possible to know what Ms. Jackson intended. It is true that she was in a common law relationship with Mr.
Youngfor about ten years, and that they supported each other emotionally and financially. In 2010, Ms. Jackson designated Mr. Young as herbeneficiary under a life insurance policy, and, on August 17, 2017, she named him as her substitute decision maker. It is also true,however, that, notwithstanding her 2015 cancer diagnosis, her hospitalization on August 7, 2017, and her subsequent transfer to palliativecare on August 17, Ms. Jackson took no steps to add Mr. Young to title on the property or to register their relationship as a domesticpartnership under the Vital Statistics Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 494.
Nor did she prepare a will that would have made her intentions known. Ms. Jackson and Mr. Young had each been previously married and divorced, and, as a result, had some understanding of matrimonialproperty rights. Although I accept that there were issues between Ms. Jackson and her daughters, it does not necessarily follow that shedid not want them to inherit on her death. At the end of the day, however, the issues raised in this proceeding can be decided withoutproof of Ms.
Jackson’s specific intentions. [83] I will move on to consider whether the word “spouse”, as it is used in the Intestate Succession Act, should be interpreted toinclude a common law spouse. The law of statutory
interpretation [84] The modern principle of statutory
interpretation is that “[t]he words of
an Act are to be read in their entire context and in theirgrammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (Rizzo& Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21). In Sparks v. Holland, 2019 NSCA 3, the Court ofAppeal noted that the modern principle can be broken down into three questions: [28] This Court typically asks three questions when applying the modern principle.
These questions derive from Professor RuthSullivan’s text, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Markham, On: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at pp. 9-10. [29] Ms. Sullivan’s questions have been applied in several cases, including Keizer v. Slauenwhite, 2012 NSCA 20, and morerecently, in Tibbetts. In
summary, the Sullivan questions are: 1. What is the meaning of the legislative text? 2. What did the Legislature intend? 3. What are the consequences of adopting a proposed
interpretation? [85] The court also highlighted the importance of a purposive analysis, under which the legislature’s purpose is considered at every
stage of
interpretation, including the initial determination of the text’s meaning (para. 43).
Interpretations that frustrate or defeat the legislature’s purpose are to be avoided if there is a plausible alternative (para. 44). The proper
interpretation of “spouse” [ 86 ] When a person dies without a will, their property is distributed according to the rules set out in the Intestate Succession Act . The Act lists the categories of heirs – those entitled to receive property – in order of priority, starting with the intestate’s “surviving spouse”. Under s. 4 of the Act, the surviving spouse is entitled to a preferential share of the estate: Surviving spouse 4
(1) If an intestate dies leaving a surviving spouse and issue, the intestate's estate, where the net value does not exceed fifty thousand dollars, shall go to the surviving spouse.
(2) Where the net value of the estate exceeds fifty thousand dollars, the surviving spouse is entitled to fifty thousand dollars and has a charge upon the estate for that sum with accrued interest from the date of the death of the intestate.
(3) In this Section, (a) "home" means a dwelling owned and occupied as the principal residence by the intestate at the date of death of the intestate and includes any land appurtenant thereto and all household goods and furnishings of the dwelling; (
b) the value of the home shall be the fair market value less any charges attaching thereto.
(4) Where the surviving spouse is entitled to fifty thousand dollars pursuant to subsection (2), the surviving spouse may elect to receive the home (
a) in lieu of the said fifty thousand dollars where the value of the home is in excess of fifty thousand dollars; or (
b) as part of the said fifty thousand dollars where the value of the home does not exceed fifty thousand dollars.
(5) The residue of the estate shall be divided among the surviving spouse and children in the manner following: (
a) if the intestate dies leaving a surviving spouse and one child, one half shall go to the surviving spouse; (
b) if the intestate dies leaving a surviving spouse and more than one child, one third shall go to the surviving spouse. … [ 87 ] The Intestate Succession Act does not define who qualifies as a “spouse” under the Act. Mr. Young submits that it should be interpreted to include an intestate’s common law spouse. The Estate argues that the word “spouse” refers only to a person who was legally married to the intestate. [ 88 ] The meaning of “spouse” for the purposes of the Intestate Succession Act has not been judicially considered in Nova Scotia. However, in Re Rideout Estate , [1995] N.S.J.
No. 130 (C.A.) , the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal considered whether a common law spouse qualified as a “spouse” under the Probate Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 359, for the purpose of determining who is entitled to administer an intestate’s estate. The court, per Clarke C.J.N.S., concluded that “spouse” must be given its ordinary meaning – a partner in legal marriage: 8
Section 21 of the Act states that the person first entitled to the administration of the estate of an intestate is "the surviving spouse". Neither "spouse" or "surviving spouse" is defined in the Probate Act . 9 Resort must be made to the
interpretation which developed through the common law being one who is married or the surviving member of a marriage relationship recognized as such by law. Barring legislation to the contrary, for the purposes of the Probate Act of this province, these words do not apply to persons who consider themselves married without the benefit of a marriage ceremony. As an aid, Black's Law Dictionary , Sixth Edition 1990, at p. 1402 defines spouse as: "One's husband or wife, and 'surviving spouse' is one of a married pair who outlive the other".
In our opinion the Legislature of Nova Scotia has not expanded the meaning of the words "spouse" and "surviving spouse" so far as the Probate Act is concerned. In other legislation in Nova Scotia, the Legislature has defined spouse to include a person with whom a relationship generally referred to as a common law partnership exists. Examples include: Family Maintenance Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 160, s. 2 (m); Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 231 , Sch. "A", s- s. 2 -B(2) and Pension Benefits Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 340, s. 2 (aj). Not so in the case of the Probate Act . 10 One of the maxims of statutory
interpretation is expressio unius est exclusio alterius . In Drieger on the Construction of Statutes , Third Edition, 1994, by Professor Ruth Sullivan, the author writes of the maxim at p. 168: An implied exclusion argument lies whenever there is reason to believe that if the legislature had meant to include a particular thing within the ambit of its legislation, it would have referred to that thing expressly. Because of this expectation, the legislature's failure to mention the thing becomes grounds for inferring that it was deliberately excluded. Although there is no express exclusion, exclusion is implied.
The force of the implication depends on the strength and legitimacy of the expectation of express reference. The better the reason for anticipating express reference to a thing, the more telling the silence of the legislature. 11 We are persuaded that by the inclusion of the words "spouse" and "surviving spouse" in the Probate Act , the Legislature cannot be taken to have intended a broader meaning or application than that which the words ordinarily mean. The words, by themselves, do not import an expanded meaning.
[ 89 ] The court went on to find that the exclusion of common law partners from the definition of spouse under the Act did not violate s. 15 of the Charter by creating a discriminatory distinction (para. 12). [ 90 ] Four years later, in 1999, the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia released its Final Report: Probate Reform in Nova Scotia (Halifax: LRCNS, 1999) The Commission’s recommendations for reform included: “Spouse” should be defined in probate legislation to include common law spouses, whether of the same or opposite sex.
The Intestate Succession Act should be amended to include common law spouses, whether of the same or opposite sex, in the scheme of distribution. Common law spouses should be entitled to appointment as administrator. [p. iii] Although a new Probate Act came into force the following year, it did not include the more expansive definition of “spouse” recommended by the Law Reform Commission. Nor did the legislature amend the Intestate Succession Act . [ 91 ] Whether a common law partner is a “spouse” for the purposes of intestacy legislation has been decided in at least one other jurisdiction. In Ferguson v.
Armbrust , 2000 SKQB 219 , [2000] S.J. No. 312, Scheibel J. considered an application from Ms. Ferguson for a declaration that she was the “spouse” of her deceased common law partner, Mr. Armbrust, under The Administration of Estates Act , 1998 , S.S. 1998, c. A-4.1 (“ AEA ”) and The Intestate Succession Act, 1996 , S.S. 1996, c. I-13.1 (“ ISA ”). In the alternative, Ms. Ferguson argued, the exclusion of common law spouses under both pieces of legislation was unconstitutional.
The Attorney General of Saskatchewan was present at the hearing and made limited representations supporting the applicant’s position that the word “spouse” in the Acts included common law spouses. The application was opposed by the deceased’s siblings, one of whom had applied for a grant of administration of her brother’s estate. [ 92 ] The chambers judge found the following facts. Ms. Ferguson and Mr. Armbrust met as teenagers in 1971, and, by 1986, they had become good friends. At some point between January and June of 1988, they began living together on Mr. Armbrust’s farm.
They continued to reside there together until his death in May 1999. During that time, they shared an exclusive, conjugal relationship and presented themselves as a couple. Although Ms. Ferguson and Mr. Armbrust kept their finances separate, the relationship was one of mutual support. They each contributed financially to the household and shared in the expenses of daily living. Ms. Ferguson contributed time, effort and financial support to the farm, while Mr. Armbrust provided her with vehicles and conveniences throughout their relationship. In addition, a quarter
section of land and various pieces of farm equipment were purchased after the couple began living together. On May 27, 1999, Mr. Armbrust died unexpectedly, leaving behind Ms. Ferguson and his three siblings as his closest relatives. He died intestate, leaving an estate of $977,838.25. [ 93 ] On the issue of whether “spouse” in the two Acts could be interpreted as including a common law partner, Scheibel J. referred to Winik v. Wilson Estate , (1999), 181 Sask. R. 11 (Q.B.) , another decision of the same court.
In that case, Dawson J. examined the definition of “spouse” to determine whether the applicant had standing to challenge the constitutional validity of the ISA . She concluded that the meaning of “spouse” in the ISA included only married spouses. Her decision was based in part on s. 20 of the ISA , which stated: 20 Where the spouse of an intestate has left the intestate and is living in adultery at the time of the intestate's death, the spouse takes no
part in the intestate's estate. Justice Dawson concluded that the legislature’s use of the word “adultery” in s. 20 – a concept associated only with married couples – rather than “infidelity”, demonstrated an intention to exclude common law partners from the category of spouse under the Act. [ 94 ] According to Justice Scheibel, Winik was distinguishable because “[a] constitutional challenge or
interpretation is significantly different than an application to determine the issue of standing to bring such a challenge” (para. 31). Furthermore, in his view, the legislature’s use of the word “adultery” did not necessarily mean that the Act applied only to married spouses: 35 Although the word "adultery", quite correctly, connotes that a marriage is required before adultery can be committed, the definition of that word is not the only factor to consider when the Court is interpreting the word "spouse" in the ISA . By concentrating on the word "adultery", the
section implies that the word "spouse" is limited to legally married spouses. However, s. 20 of the ISA is also capable of an alternative
interpretation. As counsel for the applicant submitted, s. 10 of The
Interpretation Act, 1995 suggests a "fair, large, and liberal construction and
interpretation" must be given to every enactment to "ensure the attainment of its objects." 36 In my view the entire ISA must be read so as to attain the objects of the legislation. 37 Thus in interpreting the meaning of the word "spouse" it is necessary to determine what object the legislation attempts to achieve. Although in a different context, counsel for Ms.
Sali submits that one of the goals of the ISA is to provide a reasonable approximation of the deceased's intention with respect to the distribution of his assets when his intention has not been expressed. 38 I agree that one of the objects of the legislation is to attempt to ascertain the deceased's intention at the time of his death. One component of this object is the exclusion of certain people from the division of the deceased's property. Under s. 20 of the ISA an unfaithful spouse who has left the intestate is not entitled to receive a share of the deceased's assets that she is otherwise entitled to.
This provision is based on the assumption that the deceased would not distribute his assets to a partner who has left the relationship and who has been unfaithful. 39 Having found that the purpose of the ISA is to prevent certain people from realizing the assets of the deceased, the court must next attempt to interpret the word "spouse" to attain this object. I find that s. 20 of the ISA should not be interpreted to exclude common-law spouses simply because they choose an alternative method of co-habitation that by definition can not be adulterous.
The focus of the provision is not on the particular configuration of the relationship, but instead on an approximation of the intentions of the intestate at the time of his death. The purpose and the object of the Act remain the same, notwithstanding the relationship between the deceased and his spouse. As a result, I find s. 20 can also be interpreted to include common-law spouses.
[95] Justice Scheibel set out two basic propositions underlying his conclusion that the word “spouse” in s. 20 was capable of morethan one
interpretation: 40 The inclusion of a common-law spouse within the meaning of the word "spouse" is based on two basic propositions. First, thefunctional similarities between a common-law spouse and a legally married spouse make it difficult to differentiate between the two. Acommon-law relationship is socially equivalent as well as functionally similar to a legal marriage. Thus, any reason for differentialtreatment would appear to be arbitrary when the object of the ISA is to aid in the distribution of the deceased's property.
Second, thereasonable expectations of the common-law spouse are the same as the legally married spouse. Both spouses expect to share in the assetsacquired during the relationship, regardless of the designation attached to the relationship. In an intestacy situation, the expectations of acommon-law spouse are also similar to those of a legally married spouse. Both spouses, given the choice before death, would likelyexclude their partner from the distribution of their assets if the partner was unfaithful. For these reasons I find that the word "spouse" ins. 20 of the ISA is capable of an
interpretation different from the one that is suggested by Dawson J. in Winik, supra. [96] Faced with two possible
interpretations, Scheibel J. held that only the more inclusive
interpretation of “spouse” accorded withCharter values: 41 After hearing all of the arguments and carefully analyzing the ISA as a whole, I find that "spouse" may reasonably be interpreted asbeing limited to legally married spouses or as including both legally married spouses and common-law spouses as the context requires.The question of law then becomes which
interpretation should prevail in the current legislation. 42 In these circumstances, the Court must adopt the
interpretation that best accords with Charter values and that maintains theconstitutional validity of the legislation. This principle was set out by Lamer J. (as he then was) in Slaight Communications Inc. v.Davidson, supra, and by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in R. v. Zundel (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 at 771 wherein shestates: ... These authorities confirm the following basic propositions: that the common law should develop in accordance with the values of theCharter (Salituro, supra, at p. 675), and that where a legislative provision, on a reasonable
interpretation of its history and on the plainreading of its text, is subject to two equally persuasive
interpretations, the Court should adopt that
interpretation which accords with theCharter and the values to which it gives expression .... 43 The
interpretation of "spouse" that best supports the constitutional validity of the AEA and the ISA and best accords with Chartervalues includes both legally married spouses and common-law spouses and I find that to be the definition of "spouse" in those Acts. [97] Having found that “spouse” in the ISA and the AEA should be interpreted to include common law spouses, Scheibel J. held thatthere was no Charter violation.
He went on to find in the alternative, however, that the exclusion of common law spouses from “spouse”in the Acts would infringe the applicant’s right to equality under s. 15 of the Charter, and that the infringement could not be justifiedunder s. 1. [98] The respondents appealed the chambers judge’s decision: 2001 SKCA 122, [2001] S.J. No. 703. Between the hearing and therelease of the Court of Appeal’s decision, the legislature amended the definition of “spouse” in the ISA to include common law spouses. The Court of Appeal overturned the chambers judge's decision with respect to the
interpretation of “spouse” for the purposes of the ISAand the AEA, but affirmed his ruling that exclusion of common law couples under these Acts was unconstitutional. The court, per BaydaC.J.S., summarized Ms. Ferguson’s position on the statutory
interpretation issue: 11 Ms. Ferguson's position, simply put, is this: a reasonable
interpretation of the legislative history of The Intestate Succession Act, 1996does not evince a clear intent over the years to exclude an unmarried cohabitant from taking the share of an intestate's estate that the Actand its predecessors designated should go to the intestate's "spouse". The object of the Act, it is argued, essentially is to provide astatutory will for an intestate and, as much as possible, reflect the distribution of his/her property that he/she would have made hadhe/she made a will.
The object, it is said, militates in favour of an unmarried cohabitant who not only cared for the intestate and providedfor his/her physical and emotional needs, but worked together in the relationship with a view to acquiring assets and maintaining ahousehold. Overarching these two factors is the notion that the term "spouse" should be construed in a contemporary context and withnotice of the fact that a substantial number of cohabiting partners in today's society do not undergo a legal form of marriage but arecontent to pursue their conjugal relationship on the strength of their mutual informal commitments.
All this, it is submitted on behalf ofMs. Ferguson, at the very least suggests that "spouse" is an ambiguous term. As such, the jurisprudence dictates that the term should begiven an
interpretation that does not conflict with the Charter. This leads to a conclusion that Ms. Ferguson and the deceased werespouses. This argument mirrors Mr. Young’s submission in the present application. [99] The Court of Appeal stated that the history of the ISA, the wording of its provisions, and the wording of certain provisions intwo related statutes passed by the legislature at the same session as the ISA all “raise obstacles” for Ms.
Ferguson’s argument (para. 12).Chief Justice Bayda wrote: 13 All of the predecessor Acts to The Intestate Succession Act, 1996 starting with The Devolution of Estates Act, 1907, S.S. c. 16 andcontinuing through to The Intestate Succession Act, 1965, R.S.S. c. 126, did not refer to a "spouse" but to a "widow", to a "husband" andto a "wife". It was not until The Intestate Succession Act, 1978, R.S.S. c.
I-13 was passed that the term "spouse" was introduced into theintestate succession legislation of this province. 14 Although the term "widow" was not defined in any of the Acts prior to 1978, there can be little doubt that the term meant the legallymarried wife of the deceased husband and did not include a woman to whom the intestate was not legally married but with whom he wasliving as her husband. This meaning is reinforced by ss. 19 and 20 in the 1965 Act and their counterparts in the earlier Acts: 19.
The estate of a woman dying intestate shall be distributed in the same proportions and in the same manner as the estate of a mandying, the word "husband" being substituted for "widow" . . .
20.(1)If a wife has left her husband and is living in adultery at the time of his death, she shall take no part of her husband's estate. (2 )If a husband has left his wife and is living in adultery at the time of her death, she shall take no part of his wife's estate. The definition of adultery is clear. Only a married person can commit adultery.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary , for example, defines adultery as follows: adul*tery 1: voluntary sexual intercourse between a married man and someone other than his wife or between a married woman and someone other than her husband. [ 100 ] The court explained that, from the outset of intestate succession legislation, the notion of “legitimacy” was of “paramount importance” in legislators’ minds (para. 15). Children born to unmarried parents were considered “illegitimate”, and could not inherit from their fathers.
The court noted that the illegitimacy of children was tied to the illegitimacy of the parents’ relationship: 16 This notion of "illegitimacy" of the children is directly connected to and springs from the notion of the "illegitimacy" of the parents' union. Only if the "illegitimacy" of the child was superceded or circumvented by a specific statutory provision was the "illegitimate" child entitled to benefit from the estate of the intestate parent.
There is nothing in any of the intestate succession legislation to indicate that this traditional principle requiring an express statutory provision to supercede or circumvent an "illegitimacy" was waived or overlooked in the case of the "illegitimacy" of the cohabiting partners' union .
We were not referred to, nor do I know of any Canadian case enunciating a principle that deviates from this conclusion. … [ Emphasis added ] [ 101 ] The court found no evidence of legislative intention to change the status of unmarried cohabiting partners in either the 1978 or the 1996 iterations of the ISA : 17 In 1978 The Intestate Succession Act was amended by deleting all references to a "widow", a "husband" and a "wife" (except for those in s. 15 as noted below) and substituting therefor the term "spouse".
Did that amendment in any way, for intestate succession purposes, change the status of unmarried cohabiting partners? In my view, there is nothing in the 1978 statute to suggest that it did. The 1978 statute was part of a general revision of the province's statutes and the change in question was of a "housekeeping" nature. The term "spouse" was not defined. There is nothing in the statute to suggest that the notion of "illegitimacy" as outlined above was being displaced or treated differently from the way it had been in the past.
On the contrary, the specific statutory provisions (with some "housecleaning") relating to "illegitimate" children were carried forward as were the provisions relating to the disentitlement by reason by reason of adultery on the part of the intestate's spouse. Additional evidence that the legislators intended the term "spouse" to mean a man and a woman who were legally married may be gleaned from s. 15 of the 1978 statute: 15.
No spouse shall be entitled to dower in the land of her deceased husband dying intestate, and no husband shall be entitled to an estate by the courtesy in the land of his deceased wife so dying. 18 The statute whose provisions are under scrutiny in these proceedings was passed, as noted, in 1996.
Apart from increasing the value of the benefits to which a spouse is entitled (occasioned primarily by the change in the value of currency since 1978), making slight changes to some of the wording (to conform to the style of contemporary draftsmanship), and deleting all reference to "illegitimate" children, the 1996 statute is virtually the same as the 1978 statute. (The reference to "illegitimate" children would have been redundant given s. 40 of The Children's Law Act , S.S. 1990-91, c.C-8.1 , whereby all distinctions between the status of a child born inside marriage and a child born outside marriage were abolished.) In view of that virtual sameness of the 1996 statute and the 1978 statute there is no reason to believe that the legislators had in mind a different meaning for the term "spouse" in the 1996 Act from the one they had for that term in the 1978 Act.
The fact that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was passed in 1982 does not help Ms. Ferguson's argument. On the contrary, if the legislators wanted the term "spouse" to mean something different in 1996, the intervention of the Charter in 1982 was all the more reason for the legislators to have explicitly provided for the term "spouse" to include cohabiting partners who were not legally married. This did not happen until 2001, after this appeal was heard.
The fact that it did happen in 2001 reinforces the argument that in 1996 the term "spouse" as contained in The Intestate Succession Act , 1996 refers only to a man and woman who were legally married. [ Emphasis added ] [ 102 ] The court found further support for the narrower
interpretation of “spouse” in other statutes also passed in 1996: 20 An examination of The Dependants' Relief Act, 1996 and The Wills Act, 1996 , both passed in 1996, further reinforces the argument that in 1996 the legislators did not intend the term spouse in The Intestate Succession Act , 1996 to include cohabiting parties not legally married.
A reading of the first two Acts together with The Intestate Succession Act, 1996 leads one to believe that the legislators made a deliberate distinction between, on the one hand, the duty that a deceased cohabiting partner who was not legally married to his/her partner had to maintain and support his/her partner after the former's death, and on the other hand, the legal entitlement of a surviving partner to benefit from the distribution of the deceased partner's property.
It is not an accident that The Dependants' Relief Act, 1996 , in essence a maintenance and support statute, makes provision for a deceased's cohabiting partner's maintenance, but the other two statutes, in essence statutes dealing with the distribution of a deceased person' property, do not. [ Emphasis added ] [ 103 ] For all of these reasons, the Court of Appeal concluded that Mr. Armbrust and Ms. Ferguson were not spouses for the purposes of The Intestate Succession Act , 1996 (para. 21).
It went on to find that the exclusion of common law spouses from the ISA violated the equality provisions contained in s. 15(1) of the Charter and could not be justified under s. 1 . [ 104 ] Counsel for Mr. Young argues that the court should disregard both the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s decision in Re Rideout and the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s decision in Ferguson with respect to the meaning of “spouse” because both courts failed to properly
apply Charter values at the statutory
interpretation stage. Counsel says the Ferguson appeal decision is “incoherent” because the courtadopted a narrow
interpretation of “spouse” that does not accord with Charter values – rather than a more inclusive
interpretation thatdoes – while also finding that the definition breached s. 15(1) of the Charter. She suggests that this result would not be possible ifCharter values were properly considered at the statutory
interpretation stage. Counsel relies on the statement by McLachlin J. (as shethen was), in R. v. Zundel (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 at 771, that was cited by Scheibel J. in the Ferguson lower courtdecision: ... These authorities confirm the following basic propositions: that the common law should develop in accordance with the values of theCharter (Salituro, supra, at p. 675), and that where a legislative provision, on a reasonable
interpretation of its history and on the plainreading of its text, is subject to two equally persuasive
interpretations, the Court should adopt that
interpretation which accords with theCharter and the values to which it gives expression .... [105] As this statement indicates, Charter values are only relevant where a legislative provision, based on a reasonable
interpretation ofits history and a plain reading of its text, is capable of two equally plausible
interpretations. In my view, the Nova Scotia Court ofAppeal in Re Rideout and the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Ferguson were not satisfied that the term “spouse” in the respectivestatutes was subject to two equally persuasive
interpretations. The Court of Appeal in Ferguson reviewed the history of the ISA and thewording of its provisions and, based primarily on those factors, concluded that “spouse” was subject to only one reasonableinterpretation. An examination of Nova Scotia’s legislation yields the same result. [106] As in Saskatchewan, the term “spouse” was a relatively recent introduction to intestacy legislation in Nova Scotia. All of thepredecessor Acts to the Intestate Succession Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 236, starting with
An Act Relating to Wills, Legacies and Executors,and for the Distribution of the Estates of Intestates, S.N.S. 1758, c. 11, through to the Intestate Succession Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 153, didnot refer to a “spouse”, but to a “widow”, a “husband” and a “wife”. While “widow” and “wife” were not defined in any of these earlierActs, the words were plainly intended to refer to the legally married wife of the deceased husband. The 1758 Act – the first intestacylegislation adopted in Nova Scotia – provided at s. XII: XII.
And be it further enacted, That when and so often as it shall happen that any Person dies Intestate, upon Application of the Widowor next of Kin to the Intestate, within Thirty Days after the Death of such Intestate, the said Judge of Probate shall grant Letters ofAdministration to such Widow or next of Kin … And upon due Hearing and Consideration thereof, (Debts, Funeral and just Expences ofall Sorts, being first allowed) the said Judge shall, and hereby is fully impowered, to order and make a just Distribution of theSurplusage, or remaining Goods and Estate, as well Real as Personal, in Manner following, That is to say, One Third Part of thePersonal Estate, to the Wife of the Intestate for ever, besides her Dower in the Houses and Lands during Life, where such Wifeshall not be otherwise Endowed before Marriage; and the said Judge, having appointed Guardians in Manner as hereafter may orshall be by Law prescribed for all Minors, shall then, out of all the Residue of such Real and Personal Estate, (
a) distribute two Shares ora double Portion to the Eldest Son then Surviving, (where there is no Issue of the First born, or of any other Elder Son) and theRemainder of such Residue equally to and amongst his other Children, and such as shall legally represent them; Provided that Childrenadvanced by Settlement or Portions not equal to the other Shares, shall have so much of the Surplusage, as shall make the Estate of all tobe equal, except the Eldest Son then Surviving (where there is no Issue of the First born, or of any other Elder Son) who shall have twoshares or a double Portion of the whole. [Italics in original.
Emphasis added] [107] At common law, married women were provided succession rights with respect to their husbands’ real property in the form of aright of dower. Dower entitled a wife to a life interest in one-third of the real property owned by her husband during the marriage. Thereference to the law of dower in the 1758 Act indicates that the words “widow” and “wife” were intended to refer to a woman who waslegally married to the intestate. This definition remained consistent through to the Intestate Succession Act, S.N.S. 1966, c. 8.
It was notuntil the adoption of that Act that a widow (or widower) was given a preferential share of the intestate’s estate in the amount of $25,000. Prior to that time, intestate succession legislation largely favoured the children of the intestate.
The comments of Attorney GeneralRichard Donahoe at the second reading of the Intestate Succession Bill confirm that the Act, like its predecessors, was intended to referonly to married spouses: This act, respecting the distribution of the Estates of Intestates, will replace the [Descent] of Property Act, and it means that theLegislature is providing a new and different distribution of the estate of a person who dies without a will. Thus giving what I believe tobe, a more favoured treatment to the surviving spouse.
Either the wife or the husband who survives, will, under this bill I think, be moregenerously treated than was the case. Certainly that is true in the estate of smaller amounts. [Emphasis added] [Nova Scotia House of Assembly, Hansard, 48th Gen. Ass. (31 March 1966) at 1941 (Hon.
Richard Donahoe)] [108] Further support for that conclusion was found at ss. 16 and 17 of the Act: 16 The estate of a woman dying intestate shall be distributed in the same proportions and in the same manner as the estate of a man sodying, the word “husband” being substituted for “widow”, the word “her” for “his”, the word “she” for “He” and the word “her” for“him” where such words respectively occur in sections 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11. 17(1) If a wife has left her husband and is living in adultery at the time of his death, she shall take no part of her husband’s estate underthis Act.
(2) If a husband has left his wife and is living in adultery at the time of her death, he shall take no part of his wife’s estate under thisAct. As the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal noted in Ferguson, only a married person can commit adultery.
[109] In 1975, the Intestate Succession Act was amended to increase the surviving spouse’s preferential share to $50,000, and to permitthe surviving spouse to elect to take the intestate’s home, even if the home’s value exceeded $50,000 (S.N.S. 1975, c. 61). Theamendments further provided that if the intestate had no children, the surviving spouse would inherit the entire estate.
During secondreading, the Premier highlighted the importance of the amendments to wives who, at that time, still had no entitlement to a share ofmatrimonial property on relationship breakdown or death: It is a relatively minor change in relation to what has to be undertaken to combat the longstanding injustices which run through our law,particularly our land law, in not recognizing adequately the contribution towards the accumulation of assets of a man that is made by awife, through her efforts either as a housewife or in some cases, where she works, actually to financial contribution. (Nova Scotia House of Assembly, Hansard, 51st Gen Assembly, 28 November 1975, at 2465 (Hon Gerald Regan). [110] The notion of “legitimacy” was as important to Nova Scotia legislators as to their Saskatchewan counterparts.
Pursuant to theDescent of Real and Personal Property Act, R.S.N.S. 1900, ch. 140, an intestate’s “issue” were defined as including all of his “lawfullineal descendants” (s. 1(1)). The same definition appeared in the Intestate Succession Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 153. The 1967 Act alsoprovided: Illegitimate child 15 For the purposes of this Act, an illegitimate child shall be treated as if the child were the legitimate child of the child’s mother.
In other words, an illegitimate child could inherit from its biological mother but not its biological father. [111] As part of the 1989 revision of statutes, the Intestate Succession Act was amended to remove most of the references to a "widow",a "husband", and a "wife" and to substitute "spouse" for each of those terms. There is no evidence, however, that the legislature intendedto broaden the definition of the term to include unmarried cohabiting partners or to otherwise displace the notion that these unions were“illegitimate”.
On the contrary, the Act continued to define “issue” as “lawful lineal descendants” (s. 2(b)), to prohibit illegitimatechildren from inheriting from their father’s estate (s. 16), and to disentitle adulterous wives and husbands from inheriting under the Act(s. 17).
Section 15 further reinforced that “spouse” in the 1989 Act was intended to refer to a married man or woman: Dower and curtesy 15 Subject to this Act, no widow is entitled to dower in the land of her deceased husband dying intestate, and no husband is entitled to anestate by curtesy in the land of his deceased wife so dying. [112] Also in 1989, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia held that the Intestate Succession Act’s stipulation that an illegitimate childcould not inherit from its biological father violated s. 15 of the Charter: Surette v. Harris Estate, (1989), (NS SC), 91N.S.R. (2d) 418 (S.C.).
In 1999, the provision was amended to read: For the purposes of this Act, an illegitimate child shall be treated as if the child were the legitimate child of the child’s mother or father. [113] This amendment did not eliminate the distinction between “illegitimate” and “legitimate” children, but merely changed howillegitimate children were to be treated for the purposes of the Act. [114] Also in 1999, as previously mentioned, the Law Reform Commission released its Final Report: Probate Reform in Nova Scotia.
In that report, the Commission recommended that “spouse” should be defined in probate legislation to include common law spouses, andthat the Intestate Succession Act should be amended to include common law spouses. In other words, the Law Reform Commissionrecognized that the Intestate Succession Act did not already apply to common law spouses.
Although the legislature adopted newprobate legislation the following year, it did not adopt the Commission’s recommendations, nor did it amend the Intestate SuccessionAct. [115] The legislature had a further opportunity to extend the Intestate Succession Act to common law couples in 2000, and, again,declined to do so. In Walsh v. Bona, (1999), (NS SC), 178 N.S.R. (2d) 151 (S.C.), the exclusion of common lawcouples from Nova Scotia’s Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275, was challenged as a violation of s. 15(1). JusticeHaliburton found that the exclusion was not discriminatory.
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that the exclusion wasdiscriminatory and was not justified under s. 1: 2000 NSCA 53. The Court of Appeal gave the legislature 12 months to remedy theunconstitutional exclusion. The Crown appealed the decision, but, in the meantime, the Nova Scotia government sought to create amethod by which unmarried couples could, if they wished, bring themselves within the scheme of matrimonial property. To that end, inNovember 2000, the government introduced
An Act to Comply with Certain Court Decisions and to Modernize and Reform Laws in theProvince, otherwise known as the Law Reform
(2000) Act. [116] The Law Reform
(2000) Act did two things. First, it amended the Family Maintenance Act, the Fatal Injuries Act, the Health Act,the Hospitals Act, the Income Tax Act, the Insurance Act, the Members’ Retiring Allowances Act, the Pension Benefits Act, and theProvincial Court Act to apply to a “common law partner”. Second, the Act allowed unmarried spouses of the opposite or the same sex toregister a domestic partnership pursuant to the Vital Statistics Act. Doing so gave common law partners the same rights and obligationsas a “spouse” under the statutes mentioned above, but a
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