Beals v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2020 NSSC 60
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: Beals v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2020 NSSC 60 Date: 2020 02 14 Docket: Hfx No. 479549 Registry: Halifax Between: Lionel Beals Applicant v.
The Attorney General of Nova Scotia Representing Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Nova Scotia and The Minister of Lands and Forestry Respondent Decision Judge: The Honourable Justice John Bodurtha Heard: January 22, 2019, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Decision: February 14, 2020 Counsel: Theresa Graham, for the Applicant Sheldon Choo, for the Respondent By the Court: [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review of a decision by the Ministry of Lands and Forestry denying Mr.
Beals’s application under the Land Titles Clarification Act , R.S.N.S., c. 250, for a certificate of claim in relation to 22 Simmonds Road in North Preston. [ 2 ] The parties agree that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Vavilov [ 3 ] Prior to releasing this decision, the Supreme Court of Canada released its administrative law decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 . The Vavilov decision was released together with Bell Canada v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2019 SCC 66 , on December 19, 2019.
Before delving further into the background of this application, it is necessary to review the Vavilov decision. [ 4 ] In Vavilov , the majority adopted a revised framework for determining the standard of review where a court reviews the merits of an administrative decision. The analysis begins with a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard in all cases.
The presumption can be rebutted in only two situations: (1) where the legislature has indicated that it intends a different standard or set of standards to apply; and (2) where the rule of law requires that the standard of correctness be applied. The majority also clarified the application of reasonableness review.
That clarification is relevant for our purposes. [ 5 ] The seven-person majority began its discussion of reasonableness by emphasizing that reasons “are the primary mechanism by which administrative decision makers show that their decisions are reasonable – both to the affected parties and to the reviewing courts”:
para. 81. They continued: [83]… [T]he focus of reasonableness review must be on the decision actually made by the decision maker, including both the decision maker’s reasoning process and the outcome. The role of courts in these circumstances is to review, and they are, at least as a general rule, to refrain from deciding the issue themselves.
Accordingly, a court applying the reasonableness standard does not ask what decision it would have made in place of that of the administrative decision maker, attempt to ascertain the “range” of possible conclusions that would have been open to the decision maker, conduct a de novo analysis or seek to determine the “correct” solution to the problem. The Federal Court of Appeal noted in Delios v.
Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 FCA 117 , 472 N.R. 171, that, “as reviewing judges, we do not make our own yardstick and then use that yardstick to measure what the administrator did”: at para. 28; see also Ryan , at paras. 50-51. Instead, the reviewing court must consider only whether the decision made by the administrative decision maker — including both the rationale for the decision and the outcome to which it led — was unreasonable. … [85] Developing an understanding of the reasoning that led to the administrative decision enables a reviewing court to assess whether the decision as a whole is reasonable.
As we will explain in greater detail below, a reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker. The reasonableness standard requires that a reviewing court defer to such a decision. [86] Attention to the decision maker’s reasons is part of how courts demonstrate respect for the decision-making process: see Dunsmuir , at paras. 47-49.
In Dunsmuir , this Court explicitly stated that the court conducting a reasonableness review is concerned with “the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes”: para. 47. Reasonableness, according to Dunsmuir , “is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process”, as well as “with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”: ibid.
In short, it is not enough for the outcome of a decision to be justifiable. Where reasons for a decision are required, the decision must also be justified, by way of those reasons, by the decision maker to those to whom the decision applies.
While some outcomes may be so at odds with the legal and factual context that they could never be supported by intelligible and rational reasoning, an otherwise reasonable outcome also cannot stand if it was reached on an improper basis. [87] This Court’s jurisprudence since Dunsmuir should not be understood as having shifted the focus of reasonableness review away from a concern with the reasoning process and toward a nearly exclusive focus on the outcome of the administrative decision under review.
Indeed, that a court conducting a reasonableness review properly considers both the outcome of the decision and the reasoning process that led to that outcome was recently reaffirmed in Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács , 2018 SCC 2 , [2018] 1 S.C.R. 6, at para. 12 . In that case, although the outcome of the decision at issue may not have been unreasonable in the circumstances, the decision was set aside because the outcome had been arrived at on the basis of an unreasonable chain of analysis. This approach is consistent with the direction in Dunsmuir that judicial review is concerned with both outcome and process.
To accept otherwise would undermine, rather than demonstrate respect toward, the institutional role of the administrative decision maker. [Emphasis added] [ 6 ] The majority reiterated that, notwithstanding the variety of decision makers and decisions that may be subjected to judicial review, reasonableness is a single standard that is shaped by context: see Vavilov , at paras. 88-89 .
The reasonableness of a decision will always depend on the constraints imposed by the legal and factual context: [90] The approach to reasonableness review that we articulate in these reasons accounts for the diversity of administrative decision making by recognizing that what is reasonable in a given situation will always depend on the constraints imposed by the legal and factual context of the particular decision under review. These contextual constraints dictate the limits and contours of the space in which the decision maker may act and the types of solutions it may adopt.
The fact that the contextual constraints operating on an administrative decision maker may vary from one decision to another does not pose a problem for the reasonableness standard, because each decision must be both justified by the administrative body and evaluated by reviewing courts in relation to its own particular context. [ 7 ] The formal reasons for a decision should be read in light of the record and with due sensitivity to the administrative setting in which they were given: [91] A reviewing court must bear in mind that the written reasons given by an administrative body must not be assessed against a standard of perfection.
That the reasons given for a decision do “not include all the arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the reviewing judge would have preferred” is not on its own a basis to set the decision aside: Newfoundland Nurses , at para. 16.
The review of an administrative decision can be divorced neither from the institutional context in which the decision was made nor from the history of the proceedings. [92] Administrative decision makers cannot always be expected to deploy the same array of legal techniques that might be expected of a lawyer or judge — nor will it always be necessary or even useful for them to do so. Instead, the concepts and language employed by administrative decision makers will often be highly specific to their fields of experience and expertise, and this may impact both the form and content of their reasons.
These differences are not necessarily a sign of an unreasonable decision — indeed, they may be indicative of a decision maker’s strength within its particular and specialized domain. “Administrative justice” will not always look like “judicial justice”, and reviewing courts must remain acutely aware of that fact. … [94] The reviewing court must also read the decision maker’s reasons in light of the history and context of the proceedings in which they were rendered.
For example, the reviewing court might consider the evidence before the decision maker, the submissions of the parties, publicly available policies or guidelines that informed the decision maker’s work, and past decisions of the relevant administrative body. This may explain an aspect of the decision maker’s reasoning process that is not apparent from the reasons themselves, or may reveal that an apparent shortcoming in the reasons is not, in fact, a failure of justification, intelligibility or transparency. Opposing parties
may have made concessions that had obviated the need for the decision maker to adjudicate on a particular issue; the decision maker may have followed a well-established line of administrative case law that no party had challenged during the proceedings; or an individual decision maker may have adopted an
interpretation set out in a public interpretive policy of the administrative body of which he or she is a member. [Emphasis added] [ 8 ] The principle that the exercise of public power must be justified, intelligible and transparent to the individuals subject to it must be kept in mind by reviewing courts: see Vavilov , at para. 95 . [ 9 ] The majority cautioned that the reviewing court must not fill in gaps in reasoning or otherwise fashion its own reasons to justify the administrative decision: [96] Where, even if the reasons given by an administrative decision maker for a decision are read with sensitivity to the institutional setting and in light of the record, they contain a fundamental gap or reveal that the decision is based on an unreasonable chain of analysis, it is not ordinarily appropriate for the reviewing court to fashion its own reasons in order to buttress the administrative decision.
Even if the outcome of the decision could be reasonable under different circumstances, it is not open to a reviewing court to disregard the flawed basis for a decision and substitute its own justification for the outcome: Delta Air Lines , at paras. 26-28. To allow a reviewing court to do so would be to allow an administrative decision maker to abdicate its responsibility to justify to the affected party, in a manner that is transparent and intelligible, the basis on which it arrived at a particular conclusion.
This would also amount to adopting an approach to reasonableness review focused solely on the outcome of a decision, to the exclusion of the rationale for that decision.
To the extent that cases such as Newfoundland Nurses and Alberta Teachers have been taken as suggesting otherwise, such a view is mistaken. [Emphasis added] [ 10 ] The majority explained that a reasonable decision is: (1) based on an internally coherent reasoning, and (2) justified in light of the legal and factual constraints that bear on the decision: see Vavilov , at paras. 99 and 101 . [ 11 ] With respect to the need for internally coherent reasoning, the majority wrote: [102] To be reasonable, a decision must be based on reasoning that is both rational and logical.
It follows that a failure in this respect may lead a reviewing court to conclude that a decision must be set aside. Reasonableness review is not a “line-by-line treasure hunt for error”: Irving Pulp & Paper , at para. 54, citing Newfoundland Nurses , at para. 14.
However, the reviewing court must be able to trace the decision maker’s reasoning without encountering any fatal flaws in its overarching logic, and it must be satisfied that “there is [a] line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived” : Ryan , at para. 55; Southam , at para. 56.
Reasons that “simply repeat statutory language, summarize arguments made, and then state a peremptory conclusion” will rarely assist a reviewing court in understanding the rationale underlying a decision and “are no substitute for statements of fact, analysis, inference and judgment”: R. A. Macdonald and D. Lametti, “Reasons for Decision in Administrative Law” (1990), 3 C.J.A.L.P. 123, at p. 139; see also Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 FC 750 , 27 Imm.
L.R. (4th) 151, at paras. 57-59 . … [104] Similarly, the internal rationality of a decision may be called into question if the reasons exhibit clear logical fallacies, such as circular reasoning, false dilemmas, unfounded generalizations or an absurd premise. This is not an invitation to hold administrative decision makers to the formalistic constraints and standards of academic logicians.
However, a reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that the decision maker’s reasoning “adds up”. [Emphasis added] [ 12 ] As to the need for the decision to be justified in light of the legal and factual constraints, the majority stated: [105] In addition to the need for internally coherent reasoning, a decision, to be reasonable, must be justified in relation to the constellation of law and facts that are relevant to the decision: Dunsmuir , at para. 47; Catalyst , at para. 13; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority , at para. 6.
Elements of the legal and factual contexts of a decision operate as constraints on the decision maker in the exercise of its delegated powers. [106] It is unnecessary to catalogue all of the legal or factual considerations that could constrain an administrative decision maker in a particular case. However, in the sections that follow, we discuss a number of elements that will generally be relevant in evaluating whether a given decision is reasonable, namely the governing statutory scheme; other relevant statutory or common law; the principles of statutory
interpretation; the evidence before the decision maker and facts of which the decision maker may take notice; the submissions of the parties; the past practices and decisions of the administrative body; and the potential impact of the decision on the individual to whom it applies. These elements are not a checklist for conducting reasonableness review, and they may vary in significance depending on the context.
They are offered merely to highlight some elements of the surrounding context that can cause a reviewing court to lose confidence in the outcome reached. [107] A reviewing court may find that a decision is unreasonable when examined against these contextual considerations.
These elements necessarily interact with one another: for example, a reasonable penalty for professional misconduct in a given case must be justified both with respect to the types of penalties prescribed by the relevant legislation and with respect to the nature of the underlying misconduct. [Emphasis added] [ 13 ] The majority reviewed each of the elements listed above. I will address only those applicable to the case before me. The first is the governing statutory scheme:
[108] Because administrative decision makers receive their powers by statute, the governing statutory scheme is likely to be the mostsalient aspect of the legal context relevant to a particular decision. That administrative decision makers play a role, along with courts, inelaborating the precise content of the administrative schemes they administer should not be taken to mean that administrative decisionmakers are permitted to disregard or rewrite the law as enacted by Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
Thus, for example, while anadministrative body may have considerable discretion in making a particular decision, that decision must ultimately comply “with therationale and purview of the statutory scheme under which it is adopted”: Catalyst, at paras. 15 and 25-28; see also Green, at para. 44. AsRand J. noted in Roncarelli v.
Duplessis, (SCC), [1959] S.C.R. 121, at p. 140, “there is no such thing as absolute anduntrammelled ‘discretion’”, and any exercise of discretion must accord with the purposes for which it was given: see also Congrégationdes témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine, at para. 7; Montréal (City) v. Montreal Port Authority, 2010 SCC 14, [2010] 1 S.C.R.427, at paras. 32-33; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority, at para. 6. Likewise, a decision must comport with any more specificconstraints imposed by the governing legislative scheme, such as the statutory
definitions, principles or formulas that prescribe theexercise of a discretion: see Montréal (City), at paras. 33 and 40-41; Canada (Attorney General) v. Almon Equipment Limited, 2010 FCA193, [2011] 4 F.C.R. 203, at paras. 38-40. The statutory scheme also informs the acceptable approaches to decision making: for example,where a decision maker is given wide discretion, it would be unreasonable for it to fetter that discretion: see Delta Air Lines, at para. 18. … [110] Whether an
interpretation is justified will depend on the context, including the language chosen by the legislature in describing thelimits and contours of the decision maker’s authority. If a legislature wishes to precisely circumscribe an administrative decision maker’spower in some respect, it can do so by using precise and narrow language and delineating the power in detail, thereby tightly constrainingthe decision maker’s ability to interpret the provision.
Conversely, where the legislature chooses to use broad, open-ended or highlyqualitative language — for example, “in the public interest” — it clearly contemplates that the decision maker is to have greater flexibilityin interpreting the meaning of such language. Other language will fall in the middle of this spectrum. All of this is to say that certainquestions relating to the scope of a decision maker’s authority may support more than one
interpretation, while other questions maysupport only one, depending upon the text by which the statutory grant of authority is made. What matters is whether, in the eyes of thereviewing court, the decision maker has properly justified its
interpretation of the statute in light of the surrounding context. It will, ofcourse, be impossible for an administrative decision maker to justify a decision that strays beyond the limits set by the statutory languageit is interpreting. [Emphasis added] [14] The next constraint is other statutory or common law: [111] It is evident that both statutory and common law will impose constraints on how and what an administrative decision maker canlawfully decide: see Dunsmuir, at paras. 47 and 74. For example, an administrative decision maker interpreting the scope of its regulation-making authority in order to exercise that authority cannot adopt an
interpretation that is inconsistent with applicable common lawprinciples regarding the nature of statutory powers: see Katz Group Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Health and Long Term Care), 2013 SCC 64,[2013] 3 S.C.R. 810, at paras. 45-48. Neither can a body instructed by legislation to determine what tax rate is applicable in accordancewith an existing tax system ignore that system and base its determination on a “fictitious” system it has arbitrarily created: Montréal(City), at para. 40.
Where a relationship is governed by private law, it would be unreasonable for a decision maker to ignore that law inadjudicating parties’ rights within that relationship: Dunsmuir, at para. 74. Similarly, where the governing statute specifies a standard thatis well known in law and in the jurisprudence, a reasonable decision will generally be one that is consistent with the establishedunderstanding of that standard: see, e.g., the discussion of “reasonable grounds to suspect” in Canada (Minister of Transport,Infrastructure and Communities) v.
Farwaha, 2014 FCA 56, [2015] 2 F.C.R. 1006, at paras. 93-98. [112] Any precedents on the issue before the administrative decision maker or on a similar issue will act as a constraint on what thedecision maker can reasonably decide. An administrative body’s decision may be unreasonable on the basis that the body failed to explainor justify a departure from a binding precedent in which the same provision had been interpreted.
Where, for example, there is a relevantcase in which a court considered a statutory provision, it would be unreasonable for an administrative decision maker to interpret or applythe provision without regard to that precedent. The decision maker would have to be able to explain why a different
interpretation ispreferable by, for example, explaining why the court’s
interpretation does not work in the administrative context: M. Biddulph,“Rethinking the Ramification of Reasonableness Review: Stare Decisis and Reasonableness Review on Questions of Law” (2018), 56Alta. L.R. 119, at p. 146.
There may be circumstances in which it is quite simply unreasonable for an administrative decision maker to failto apply or interpret a statutory provision in accordance with a binding precedent. … [113] That being said, administrative decision makers will not necessarily be required to apply equitable and common law principles inthe same manner as courts in order for their decisions to be reasonable. For example, it may be reasonable for a decision maker to adapt acommon law or equitable doctrine to its administrative context: see Nor-Man Regional Health Authority, at paras. 5-6, 44-45, 52, 54 and60.
Conversely, a decision maker that rigidly applies a common law doctrine without adapting it to the relevant administrative context maybe acting unreasonably: see Delta Air Lines, at paras. 16-17 and 30. In short, whether an administrative decision maker has actedreasonably in adapting a legal or equitable doctrine involves a highly context-specific determination. [Emphasis added] [15] Decision makers are also constrained by the principles of statutory
interpretation: [115] Matters of statutory
interpretation are not treated uniquely and, as with other questions of law, may be evaluated on areasonableness standard. Although the general approach to reasonableness review described above applies in such cases, we recognize thatit is necessary to provide additional guidance to reviewing courts on this point. This is because reviewing courts are accustomed toresolving questions of statutory
interpretation in a context in which the issue is before them at first instance or on appeal, and where theyare expected to perform their own independent analysis and come to their own conclusions. [116] Reasonableness review functions differently. Where reasonableness is the applicable standard on a question of statutoryinterpretation, the reviewing court does not undertake a de novo analysis of the question or “ask itself what the correct decision would
have been”: Ryan, at para. 50. Instead, just as it does when applying the reasonableness standard in reviewing questions of fact, discretionor policy, the court must examine the administrative decision as a whole, including the reasons provided by the decision maker and theoutcome that was reached. [117] A court interpreting a statutory provision does so by applying the “modern principle” of statutory
interpretation, that is, that thewords of a statute must be read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of theAct, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, atpara. 21, and Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 26, both quoting E. Driedger,Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87. Parliament and the provincial legislatures have also provided guidance by way ofstatutory rules that explicitly govern the
interpretation of statutes and regulations: see, e.g.,
Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21. [118] This Court has adopted the “modern principle” as the proper approach to statutory
interpretation, because legislative intent can beunderstood only by reading the language chosen by the legislature in light of the purpose of the provision and the entire relevant context:Sullivan, at pp. 7-8. Those who draft and enact statutes expect that questions about their meaning will be resolved by an analysis that hasregard to the text, context and purpose, regardless of whether the entity tasked with interpreting the law is a court or an administrativedecision maker.
An approach to reasonableness review that respects legislative intent must therefore assume that those who interpret thelaw — whether courts or administrative decision makers — will do so in a manner consistent with this principle of
interpretation. [Emphasis added] [16] A further consideration that may constrain a decision maker is the impact of the decision on the affected individual: [133] It is well established that individuals are entitled to greater procedural protection when the decision in question involves thepotential for significant personal impact or harm: Baker, at para. 25. However, this principle also has implications for how a courtconducts reasonableness review. Central to the necessity of adequate justification is the perspective of the individual or party over whomauthority is being exercised.
Where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided to thatindividual must reflect the stakes. The principle of responsive justification means that if a decision has particularly harsh consequences forthe affected individual, the decision maker must explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention.
This includes decisionswith consequences that threaten an individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood. [134] Moreover, concerns regarding arbitrariness will generally be more acute in cases where the consequences of the decision for theaffected party are particularly severe or harsh, and a failure to grapple with such consequences may well be unreasonable.
For example,this Court has held that the Immigration Appeal Division should, when exercising its equitable jurisdiction to stay a removal order underthe Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, consider the potential foreign hardship a deported person would face: Chieu v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84. [135] Many administrative decision makers are entrusted with an extraordinary degree of power over the lives of ordinary people,including the most vulnerable among us.
The corollary to that power is a heightened responsibility on the part of administrative decisionmakers to ensure that their reasons demonstrate that they have considered the consequences of a decision and that those consequences arejustified in light of the facts and law. [Emphasis added] [17] The majority concluded its comments on reasonableness by providing some guidance on how courts should treat existingadministrative law jurisprudence: [143] Given that this appeal and its companion cases involve a recalibration of the governing approach to the choice of standard ofreview analysis and a clarification of the proper application of the reasonableness standard, it will be necessary to briefly address how theexisting administrative law jurisprudence should be treated going forward.
These reasons set out a holistic revision of the framework fordetermining the applicable standard of review. A court seeking to determine what standard is appropriate in a case before it should look tothese reasons first in order to determine how this general framework applies to that case. Doing so may require the court to resolvesubsidiary questions on which past precedents will often continue to provide helpful guidance.
Indeed, much of the Court’s jurisprudence,such as cases concerning general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole or those relating to jurisdictionalboundaries between two or more administrative bodies, will continue to apply essentially without modification. On other issues, certaincases —including those on the effect of statutory appeal mechanisms, “true” questions of jurisdiction or the former contextual analysis —will necessarily have less precedential force.
As for cases that dictated how to conduct reasonableness review, they will often continue toprovide insight, but should be used carefully to ensure that their application is aligned in principle with these reasons. [Emphasis added] Further submissions as a result of Vavilov? [18] The recent release of the decisions in Vavilov and Bell Canada raised the following question – should the parties have been givenan opportunity to make submissions on their relevance for Mr. Beals’s application? In my view, the answer is no.
On December 20,2019, one day after it released Vavilov and Bell Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Canada Post Corp. v.Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2019 SCC 67. In that decision, the majority, per Rowe J., applied the reasonableness standard asclarified in Vavilov. Before beginning the analysis, Rowe J. noted: [24] This appeal was heard shortly after the Vavilov and Bell/NFL appeals (Bell Canada v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 66), inwhich the Court reconsidered and clarified the framework for determining the applicable standard of review as well as the application ofreasonableness review (“Vavilov framework”). The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal decisions in this appeal were taken (andthe submissions before this Court were made) under the “Dunsmuir framework” (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1S.C.R. 190). I apply the Vavilov framework in coming to my conclusion that the decision of the Appeals Officer was reasonable.
Nounfairness arises from this as the applicable standard of review and the result would have been the same under the Dunsmuir framework.
[25] Relying on the Dunsmuir framework, the parties agreed before this Court that the standard of review is reasonableness. Canada Post submitted that reasonableness “presumptively applies to an administrative decision-maker’s
interpretation of [their enabling] statute” (A.F., at para. 47, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 SCC 31 , [2018] 2 S.C.R. 230, at para. 27 , and Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács , 2018 SCC 2 , [2018] 1 S.C.R. 6, at para. 8 ). The standard of reasonableness was undisputed in the courts below, and I agree that under the Dunsmuir framework, the standard of review would be reasonableness. [Emphasis added] [ 19 ] The same is true here.
The parties to the application agreed that the standard of review is reasonableness, and, in my view, they would have put forward the same arguments under Vavilov as they did under Dunsmuir and the cases that followed it. In addition, the court’s decision would be the same under either framework. For these reasons, no unfairness arises from applying Vavilov to the application. The LTCA – Historical background [ 20 ] The Community Land Titles Clarification Act , the predecessor to the LTCA , was assented to on March 18, 1964. On second reading of the proposed legislation, the Honourable W. S.
Kennedy Jones stated: The purpose of this legislation is to provide a simpler and less expensive machinery for the clarification of titles within areas or communities. The second
section of the Act is the definition section, and therein the minister is defined as being the Minister of Lands and Forests, and I perhaps should point out that my particular interest in the preparation and presentation of the present legislation is as the chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Human Rights. The third
section of the bill provides that the Governor-in-Council may define an area for consideration under the Act, if there is a lack of development which can be traced to confusion or obscurity in titles. It further provides that the designation must be approved by the municipal authorities. The fourth
section of the Act sets forward the procedure to be followed by the minister, and under certain circumstances by a commissioner appointed under the Act. The final
section of the Act makes provision for any party who feels he has suffered because of the operation of the Act to make application to the Governor-in-Council for adjustment. This act will be of particular use in communities such as New Roads within the county of Halifax, and it has, of course, general application in many areas throughout the province. [Nova Scotia House of Assembly, Hansard, 48th Gen. Ass. (4 March 1964) at 887-888 (Hon. W. S.
Kennedy Jones)] These brief comments are the only contemporaneous information available as to the purpose of the legislation. [ 21 ] The current Land Titles Clarification Act contains many of the same provisions as the Community Land Titles Clarification Act . It is clear from Hansard that the Act was intended to provide a simpler and less expensive means for clarifying title in areas where “there is a lack of development which can be traced to confusion or obscurity in titles”. What is unclear from the debates, however, is how these areas came to exist. The only hint is in the comment by the Honourable W.S.
Kennedy Jones that his interest in the legislation was as chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Human Rights (the predecessor to the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission). The applicant attempted to fill in this information gap by including excerpts from various secondary sources in his brief. These sources include: (1) a Masters of Arts thesis submitted to Dalhousie University in 2006 by Erica Colter entitled A State of Affairs Most Uncommon: Black Nova Scotians and the Stanfield Government’s Interdepartmental Committee on Human Rights , 1959-1967; (2) an
article by Lindsay Van Dyk entitled Shaping a Community , Black Refugees in Nova Scotia , available on the Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 website; (3) a report prepared for the United Nations Human Rights Council by the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent setting out its findings following a visit to Canada in October 2016; and, (4) a report prepared by then Schulich School of Law student Angela Simmonds entitled This Land is Our Land: African Nova Scotian Voices from the Preston Area Speak up (August 19, 2014).
These sources discuss the experiences of black migrants who settled in Nova Scotia in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the continued impact of those experiences on subsequent generations of African Nova Scotians. Some also address how the LTCA has been implemented since its enactment. The respondent takes the position that these materials should not be considered by the court because they were not before the decision maker, nor were they the subject of a successful motion to admit fresh evidence.
At the same time, however, counsel for the respondent conceded during argument that “it would be important for the Minister to be aware and understand the circumstances with respect to individuals living in these land clarification areas, certainly”. [ 22 ] It is helpful to examine the contested sources more closely. In her Masters thesis, Ms. Colter explains that black settlers arrived in Nova Scotia in three main groups -- the Loyalists (1783-1785), the Maroons (1796), and the refugees of the War of 1812 (1813-1815).
These settlers arrived in Nova Scotia under the pretence of offers of generous land grants from the British government. Unlike their white counterparts who typically received at least 100 acres of fertile land, black families were given ten-acre lots of poor-quality land. That land was segregated from the lands given to white families. In addition, while white settlers were given deeds to their land, black settlers were given “tickets of location” and “licenses of occupation”.
Without legal title to their land, black settlers could not sell or mortgage their property, or legally pass it down to their descendants upon their death. Although a limited number of land titles were eventually issued in Preston, and some settlers were able to purchase land, most black families never attained clear title to their land. Lack of clear title and the segregated nature of their land triggered a cycle of poverty for African Nova Scotian families that persisted for generations: If blacks had attained legal ownership of their land, this would have afforded them a substantially helpful financial asset.
Without this asset, blacks held little collateral and therefore had great difficulty making financial advancements; while many whites turned their land grants into successful agricultural holdings and pursued other business interests, blacks struggled to survive. Such financial hardships
supported a cycle of poverty that soon included a failing or non-existent education system. Blacks seeking an education through secular schools were challenged by the Nova Scotia School Act of 1811 which virtually denied access of education to poor communities. The Act stated that the government would only fund a school after the community built a schoolhouse, hired a teacher, and raised a requisite amount of money. If these conditions were not first in place, the government would not provide the community with funds for the building costs or provide further, ongoing support for the school.
Most black communities were too poor to initiate such arrangements and therefore the members of the community could not access an education through this manner. An educated black community might have broken or eased this cycle of poverty, but unfortunately, most black regions could not end the cycle under these circumstances. Until 1954, issues of legal school segregation and discrimination persisted in Nova Scotia; certain black regions went years without schools as qualified teachers were not available or were not willing to accept the small salaries offered. [Colter, Erica.
A State of Affairs Most Uncommon: Black Nova Scotians and the Stanfield Government’s Interdepartmental Committee on Human Rights , 1959-1967 (Master of Arts, Dalhousie University, 2006), at pp. 19-20] [ 23 ] The isolated nature of rural black communities was accompanied by a lack of community development. Ms. Colter writes at p. 23: Life for black Nova Scotians by the 1960s, therefore, was still difficult, and blacks continued to face challenges similar to those faced by the early Loyalists, Maroons, and Refugees.
The mid twentieth century marked a turning point in black history, however, as black problems began to gain wider attention. Urban communities, such as Africville, had long been recognized as a dire problem, but black communities in Nova Scotia’s rural areas began to share Africville’s notoriety. Life was worse for rural blacks as their isolation had led them to be forgotten by urban dwellers and government officials. Blacks in both urban and rural areas tended to live closely together, but the urban-living blacks frequently lived in areas also inhabited by whites.
Black communities in rural areas were usually segregated and remote, and this isolation often was accompanied by an absence of typical community developments such as water, sewage, sanitation, garbage removal, road improvements, and other related services regularly provided in white or mixed communities. When blacks first arrived in the eighteenth century, the public’s initial response of benevolence and financial assistance was short-lived.
This attention waned, and black communities remained forgotten until the improved communication systems and better roads of the 1950s and 1960s, both initiatives of Stanfield’s government, uncovered the state of these remote communities and public interest and concern returned.
Stanfield recognized that, contrary to the long-held belief that black poverty was a black problem, “their problems have been exposed, and even more important, are recognized as problems of the whole community.” (citing Gwendolyn Shand, Adult Education Among the Negroes of Nova Scotia (Halifax: Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, 1961) at p. 3.) [ 24 ] In 1962, Premier Robert Stanfield created the Interdepartmental Committee on Human Rights (ICHR). It was charged with giving immediate attention to housing, education and employment issues faced by African Nova Scotians. Ms.
Colter reviewed the minutes of ICHR meetings as part of her research. In relation to land titles, she notes at p. 98: In the 1960s, blacks were encountering discrimination and confusion over land titles. Many blacks were without documentation proving ownership of their land, even though the land had stayed within a family for generations. Clear titles would have helped blacks who were in the midst of relocation and improvement projects; as well, proof of land ownership would have increased a black family’s livelihood.
Without a clear title, a family would be unable to sell or lease the land, or even to use the property as collateral to secure credit. Stanfield’s government recognized this concern, and one of the ICHR’s noteworthy accomplishments was its creation of the Community Land Titles Act on 18 March 1964. This Act was intended to facilitate the process by which Nova Scotians could apply to clear their land titles. … [ 25 ] The
article by Lindsay Van Dyk that is published on the Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 website contains similar historical information as the Colter thesis. The author describes the migration of people of African descent to Nova Scotia, starting in the late 1700s. In relation to land grants, she writes: Upon their arrival in Nova Scotia, the Black Refugees experienced many hardships. The government withheld land grants, an influx of white immigration increased competition for the few jobs available, and the rocky, infertile land proved difficult to cultivate.
Under these conditions, extreme poverty became a reality for many Black Refugees. … The Black Refugees settled in the rural areas around Halifax, with the largest communities established at Preston, Hammonds Plains and Beechville. Initially, the settlers were “well pleased and satisfied” at the prospect of having land to call their own. However, the government did not give the Black Refugees outright grants to the land, but rather tickets of location or licenses of occupation. This denied the Black Refugees the opportunity to own land or sell it for a profit.
The lots provided by the government were limited to ten acres and located on rocky, infertile soil. In these conditions, crops planted by the Black Refugees repeatedly failed. A series of devastating natural events made efforts to cultivate the land even more difficult. In 1815, entire fields were destroyed by hordes of mice that swept across Nova Scotia’s countryside. The following year became known as the “Year without a Summer,” as the ground stayed frozen until June and ten inches of snow fell that same month.
Even when the Black Refugees did achieve some success in producing crops, the long, cold winter seasons generally depleted their resources. Many Black Refugees were forced to rely on government assistance and private charity despite their best efforts to become independent. The white population of Nova Scotia resented the dependence of the Black Refugees and did not accept them as equal members of society.
Provincial authorities protested that the Refugees were “unfitted by nature to this climate, or to an association with the rest of His Majesty’s Colonists.” The general poverty of the Black Refugees was regarded as proof that the black population was more suited to slavery than freedom. … [Emphasis added] [ 26 ] The Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its mission to Canada contains the following references to land titles in Nova Scotia:
60. The Working Group is concerned about the lack of implementation of the Land Titles Clarification Act in Nova Scotia, which should assist people of African descent in obtaining titles to the lands on which they live. The Act was passed in Nova Scotia in 1963 to create a process to assist with the clarification of land title and land ownership issues for residents living in 13 specific communities in Nova Scotia. For historic and systemic reasons, there was a lack of land ownership documentation for the residents of those areas and communities, many of whom are African Nova Scotian.
The Act was intended to provide a simpler and inexpensive mechanism to obtain clarification of land titles. Under the Act, a certificate of title is issued to applicants who can show that they used and occupied the land claimed for at least 20 years. The process provides for notice to be given to the community and issues such as competing ownership claims and unsettled boundaries to be resolved before a certificate can be issued. 61. Civil society informed the Working Group that the system in place under the Act was not working as hoped.
The process is reportedly unjust and discriminatory, and many have had their claims rejected. Residents must bear the burden for submitting all the documentation, as well as the application, lawyer and surveyor fees necessary to have the land title clarified. In May 2015, the Department of Natural Resources, which is responsible for processing the applications, acknowledged that the process was unclear and stated they were attempting to pilot a project to assist residents in the community to obtain the title to their property.
It was recognized that there were financial and logistical hurdles for some residents wishing to obtain a certificate of title, as residents were responsible for all the costs of the process, include [ sic ] surveying and legal fees. However, an interdepartmental committee was currently considering various options for removing or reducing those barriers and providing support to African Nova Scotians to help them clarify titles to their properties. The Working Group emphasized that the Act must be implemented in collaboration with, and for the benefit of, the affected population group.
All resources should be made available, fees should be waived and remedies should be provided for any discriminatory policies relating to the process of granting a certificate of title. [ 27 ] The final source is This Land is Our Land: African Nova Scotian Voices from the Preston Area Speak up , a report prepared by then Schulich School of Law student Angela Simmonds. Ms.
Simmonds explains at p. 3 that the report contains the results from a series of interviews she conducted during the months of June, July and August 2014, with “African Nova Scotian community members who are well-informed of African Nova Scotian historical land ownership”. Interviews focused on three topics: 1. What are the historical challenges and barriers faced by African Nova Scotian people when dealing with land ownership; 2. In what ways has the Land Titles Clarification Act been used in the process to acquire title to land from government; and 3.
In what ways can we move forward to address future land ownership, acquisition and community education around the process of land ownership. [ 28 ] The report contains some of the same historical information on the migration of black families to Nova Scotia discussed in the other sources, obtained by the author from the Nova Scotia Archives website. Unlike the other sources, however, the report contains firsthand accounts from African Nova Scotians of their negative experiences dealing with government and the LTCA .
The only portion of the report relied on by the applicant in his brief relates to the reason that some community members do not believe in writing wills: During this process of interviewing members in the community I inquired about the lack of wills for some community members. Community members explained that elders in the community affiliate death with wills. To many in the community, wills represent death and with such strong religious beliefs and faith it is not something that is discussed in the home.
Culturally it is known that the land would go to the youngest child of the family or the child who was residing in the home when the parents pass away.
Without a will this becomes difficult and can result in conflict. [ 29 ] How is the Court to address this additional evidence that was not before the decision maker? [ 30 ] As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Vavilov , the court’s task when reviewing an administrative decision on the reasonableness standard is to determine whether the decision is based on internally coherent reasoning and is justified in relation to the legal and factual considerations that constrain the decision maker.
Those considerations include the governing statutory scheme, other relevant statutory or common law, and the principles of statutory
interpretation. With respect to the governing statutory scheme, even where a decision maker is given considerable discretion in making a particular decision, that decision must ultimately comply with the rationale and purview of the statutory scheme under which it is adopted. As to other relevant statutory or common law, s. 9(5) of the
Interpretation Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 235 reads: 9(5) Every enactment shall be deemed remedial and interpreted to insure the attainment of its objects by considering among other matters (
a) the occasion and necessity for the enactment; (
b) the circumstances existing at the time it was passed; (
c) the mischief to be remedied; (
d) the object to be attained; … [ 31 ] Finally, the modern principle of statutory
interpretation requires the decision maker to consider the words of
an Act in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of the legislature. As the majority stated in Vavilov , “[t]hose who draft and enact statutes expect that questions about their meaning will be resolved by an analysis that has regard to the text, context and purpose”: para. 118. [ 32 ] Accordingly, the legislature and applicants like Mr.
Beals are entitled to presume that the person making a decision about an application under the LTCA knows the occasion and necessity for the enactment, the circumstances existing at the time it was passed, the mischief to be remedied, and the object to be attained, without that information necessarily appearing in the record. On judicial review,
the court must also consider those factors, and others, that constrain the decision maker, in order to determine whether the decision is reasonable. [ 33 ] In many cases, information on the historical context of legislation will be available in the form of standard legislative history materials (commission reports, legislative background papers, committee reports, regulatory impact analysis statements, etc.). In this case, however, those materials do not exist.
The question, then, is whether the court can take judicial notice of, or otherwise rely on, certain facts contained in the materials submitted by the applicant. [ 34 ] In Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes , 6th ed. (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada, 2014), Ruth Sullivan discusses the use by courts of professional studies and scholarly publications to establish background facts. Although these comments are not made in the judicial review context, they are still useful for my analysis: §23.98 Introduction .
When it comes to technical matters outside the scope of judicial expertise, the courts require the assistance of expert testimony. With respect to matters of law or of general information, however, the courts may inform themselves by consulting scholarly or professional publications. In
interpretation cases the courts consult a wide variety of such publications including textbooks, monographs, studies, reports and articles. Scholarly materials sometimes form part of the legislative history of an enactment and may be admissible as evidence of the understanding on which the enactment was passed. More often, however, these materials are admitted as evidence of external context or as persuasive opinion on the interpretive issues facing the court. … … §23.100 Reliance on scholarly material as evidence of external context.
Courts often rely on scholarly or professional publications to help establish the background of legislation, that is, the historical, social, political, economic or institutional context in which the legislation was enacted and operates. … In Bank of Montreal v. Hall , the Supreme Court of Canada looked at a textbook on banking and a number of scholarly articles to determine the purpose of ss. 178 and 179 of the Bank Act . La Forest J. wrote: I turn next to a consideration of the historical circumstances behind the creation of this security interest.
For if the above remarks suffice to give a basic understanding of the operation of the s. 178 security interest, it is only in light of the historical record that one can appreciate the rationale for the creation of this particular security interest …. Having established the relevance of this record, La Forest J. turned to academic authorities to supply the necessary information. (pp. 700-701) [ 35 ] In relying on journal articles and a textbook, Justice La Forest did not refer to the doctrine of judicial notice.
This suggests that taking judicial notice of the facts contained in those sources may not always be necessary. Sullivan sets out the law in relation to judicial notice at pp. 652-654: §22.17 Proving external context. Although the importance of external context in
interpretation is recognized, getting the facts before the courts in a fair and reliable way is a concern. Historically, the courts have often relied on judicial notice, both formal and informal, for this purpose. When facts are judicially noticed, they are taken as established without having to be proved in the usual way. This does not mean that judges are prohibited from seeking assistance. Counsel may offer argument and refer the court to [a] wide range of authoritative sources, and judges may engage in private research. §22.18 The law of judicial notice was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Spence . Speaking for the Court, Binnie J. drew attention to the distinction between adjudicative facts (the facts at issue in a trial, facts that are dispositive of the case) and legislative or social facts (background facts, facts from which relevant inferences can be drawn). To take judicial notice of adjudicative facts, notice must be formal and the threshold test is high: Judicial notice dispenses with the need for proof of facts that are clearly uncontroversial or beyond reasonable dispute. Facts judicially noticed are not proved by evidence under oath. Nor are they tested by cross-examination.
Therefore, the threshold for judicial notice is strict: a court may properly take judicial notice of facts that are either: (1) so notorious or generally accepted as not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons; or (2) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy. These are the so-called Morgan criteria, adopted by the Court in R. v. Find . They are strict to ensure that neither party is treated unfairly.
At the other end of the spectrum are the numerous widely shared assumptions relied on in drawing inferences and forming judgments, including judgments of meaning, clarity, plausibility, reasonableness and the like. Judicial notice of facts in this category is informal and automatic, often unconscious. No one would think to challenge facts in this category; whether true or false, they are accepted as a matter of course. §22.19 Finally, there are facts that fall between these extremes, generally referred to as “social” or “legislative” facts. As stated by the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v.
King , “… [m]erely giving written material the title ‘social fact evidence’ or ‘legislative fact evidence’ does not automatically give it an imprimatur of validity.” The Court in Spence proposed the following criteria for admitting this category of evidence: [The] court ought to ask itself whether such “fact” would be accepted by reasonable people who have taken the trouble to inform themselves on the topic as not being the subject of reasonable dispute for the particular purpose for which it is to be used. [T]he closer the fact approaches the dispositive issue, the more the court ought to insist on compliance with the stricter Morgan criteria. [Emphasis in original] Binnie J. ends his analysis of judicial review [sic] with the following warning: …[I]n R. v.
Malmo-Levine , … a majority of our Court expressed a preference for social science evidence to be presented through an expert
witness who could be cross-examined as to the value and weight to be given to such studies and reports…. The suggestion that even legislative fact and social “facts” should be established by expert testimony rather than reliance on judicial notice was also made in cases as different from one another as Find , Moysa , Danson , … Symes v. Canada , … Waldick v. Malcolm , … Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital , … R. v. Penno , … and MacKay v. Manitoba ,… Litigants who disregard the suggestion proceed at some risk. §22.20 In statutory
interpretation disputes, the facts that constitute social or historical context occupy the middle ground between adjudicative facts at the one end and widely shared assumptions at the other. Under the Spence test, such facts should not be judicially noticed unless reasonable and well-informed people would accept them. In practice, much of the external context in statutory
interpretation is found in standard legislative history materials (commission reports, legislative background papers, committee reports, regulatory impact analysis statements, and the like). For the purpose of establishing the facts in the mind of the legislature when it enacted the relevant legislation, this material is probably as authoritative as it is possible to be. §22.21 Courts also rely on professional studies and scholarly publications to establish background facts, especially social science facts.
When such sources are used and the facts to be established are important, the Court’s advice to rely on expert testimony should probably be heeded. In Symes v. R. , for example, to assist in interpreting the Income Tax Act , the Federal Court received the sworn testimony of an expert in sociology who gave evidence of social developments involving women in the workplace. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop , similar evidence was received on the meaning of the expression “family status” in the Canadian Human Rights Act . [Emphasis added] [ 36 ] Returning to the secondary sources relied on by Mr.
Beals, the Van Dyk
article and the Colter thesis both appear to have been extensively researched, with each citing numerous primary and secondary sources, including a variety of materials from the Nova Scotia Archives, newspapers, theses, textbooks and journal articles.
In my view, if judicial notice is necessary, it would not be inconsistent with the court’s role on judicial review to take notice of the following facts from these sources that ought to have been known to the decision maker: • Many individuals of African descent who migrated to Nova Scotia during the late 18th and early 19th centuries experienced racism and discrimination upon arrival and after. • While the government of Nova Scotia often provided white settlers with 100 acres or more of fertile land, it gave black families ten-acre lots of rocky, infertile soil.
The land given to black families was segregated from that given to white families. • The government of Nova Scotia gave white settlers deeds to their land but did not give black settlers title to their land.
Instead, black settlers were given tickets of location or licenses of occupation. • Although a limited number of land titles were eventually issued in Preston, and some settlers were able to purchase land, most black settlers never attained clear title to their land. • Without legal title to their land, black settlers could not sell or mortgage their property, or legally pass it down to their descendants upon their death. • Lack of clear title and the segregated nature of their land triggered a cycle of poverty for black families that persisted for generations. • Black communities in rural areas were isolated and remote, lacking typical community developments such as water, sewage, sanitation, garbage removal, road improvements, and other related services regularly provided in white or mixed communities. • In 1962, Premier Robert Stanfield created the Interdepartmental Committee on Human Rights (ICHR). • The ICHR recognized the problems that lack of clear title posed for African Nova Scotians in rural communities and created the Community Land Titles Act . [ 37 ] In my view, each of these facts would be accepted by reasonable people who have taken the trouble to inform themselves on the topic as not being the subject of reasonable dispute.
Indeed, the respondent acknowledges at p. 4 of its brief that African Nova Scotians have faced discrimination in relation to land rights: In September 2017, the government announced an initiative to alleviate administrative, legislative, and financial barriers to clarification of land ownership and to address disparities and systemic discrimination that African Nova Scotians have faced in the enjoyment of their social, economic and cultural rights related to their land. [ 38 ] With respect to the remaining two sources – the UN report and the report prepared by Ms.
Simmonds, both sources raise relevance and hearsay concerns and I do not rely on them. Both documents contain the personal accounts of anonymous African Nova Scotians in North Preston (and other communities) of their experiences with government and the LTCA process. [ 39 ] In
summary, when reviewing a decision on the reasonableness standard, the court must consider whether the decision is justified in relation to the legal and factual considerations that constrain the decision maker, including the governing statutory scheme, other relevant statutory or common law, and the principles of statutory
interpretation. Both the
Interpretation Act and the modern principle of statutory
interpretation oblige the decision maker to consider the object and purpose of the Act. The decision maker is presumed to know the historical context of the legislation and the mischief it was intended to remedy. In this unusual situation where standard legislative history materials are unavailable or lacking in content, and the decision maker has not sought to file an affidavit setting out the relevant historical background, it would be unjust for the court to refuse to take notice of historical facts contained in extensively researched secondary sources that would not be contested by reasonable people who informed themselves on the topic. The LTCA – relevant statutory provisions
[ 40 ] The Land Registration Act , S.N.S. 2001, c. 6 , was enacted in 2001 and contained the following consequential amendment to the Land Titles Clarification Act : 2A This Act does not apply to a parcel registered pursuant to the Land Registration Act. 2001, c. 6, s. 114 . [ 41 ] Section 3(1) of the LTCA states: 3(1) Where the residents of an area of a municipality are in necessitous circumstances as a result of lack of property development in the area and where there appears to be confusion as to the ownership of land, the Governor in Council may designate the area as a land titles clarification area. … [ 42 ] There are currently 13 designated land titles clarification areas.
They are: 1. Cherry Brook, Halifax County; 2. Drumhead, Guysborough County; 3. East Preston, Halifax County; 4. Lincolnville, Guysborough County; 5. Little Dover, Guysborough County; 6. Little Lorraine, Cape Breton County; 7. Neils Harbour – New Haven, Victoria County; 8. New Road Settlement (North Preston), Halifax County; 9. Oldham, Halifax County; 10. Sampsons Cove – Little Anse, Richmond County; 11. Seals Harbour, Guysborough County; 12. Sunnyville, Guysborough County; and 13.
Terence Bay and Lower Prospect, Halifax County. [ 43 ] Under s. 4(1) of the LTCA , “[a] person who resides in the Province and claims to own land in a land titles clarification area may apply to the Minister for a certificate of claim in respect of a lot of land in the area which he claims to own”. The balance of s. 4 sets out the application requirements: 4(2) An application for a certificate of claim shall contain (
a) a description of the land sufficient to identify and distinguish it from all other lands; (
b) a concise statement of the facts on which the applicant bases his claim to ownership of the lot of land; and (
c) the names of the persons other than the applicant who have occupied the lot of land or who have at any time claimed ownership of the lot or any interest in it.
(3) An application for a certificate of claim shall be accompanied by: (
a) an abstract of the title to the lot of land showing all the records in the registry of deeds that affect or may affect title to the lot or any interest in it; (
b) a statutory declaration attesting to the history of the occupation of the lot of land so far as the same is known; and (
c) a statement showing the names of any person who holds any lien, judgment, mortgage or encumbrance or any other charge on the lot of land and the details thereof.
(4) The Minister may require the applicant to furnish any information that the Minister desires and may require the applicant to verify by affidavit or otherwise any information or material furnished or included in or accompanying the application. [ 44 ]
Section 5 deals with the issuance of a certificate of claim: 5
(1) When it appears from the application that the applicant is entitled to the lot of land, the Minister may issue a certificate of claim to the applicant.
(2) When the Minister cannot determine from the application that the applicant is entitled to the lot of land, he may appoint a barrister of the Supreme Court as a commissioner to examine the applicant's claim.
(3) A commissioner appointed by the Minister pursuant to subsection (2) shall have all the powers of a commissioner appointed under the Public Inquiries Act.
(4) When a commissioner examines the claim, he shall either recommend issuance of a certificate of claim or report his reasons for not making this recommendation.
(5) When a commissioner recommends issuance of a certificate of claim, the Minister may issue a certificate of claim without further inquiry.
(6) No certificate of claim shall be issued in respect of any lot of land unless any lien, judgment, mortgage, encumbrance or charge other than a lien for municipal taxes has been discharged or satisfied or unless the holder thereof consents in writing.
(7) When the Minister issues a certificate of claim, he shall file the same in the registry of deeds for the registration district in which the land is situate in the same manner as a deed of conveyance and shall forthwith cause notice thereof to be published in a newspaper having a circulation in the municipality in which the land is situate.
(8) When a certificate of claim is issued and filed in the registry of deeds and there are rates and taxes owing in respect of the lot of land described in the certificate, the applicant may apply to the council of the municipality for relief from the rates and taxes owed and the council may give a discharge of all or a portion of such rates or taxes either absolutely or on the condition that a certificate of title is subsequently granted. [Emphasis added] [ 45 ]
Section 6 provides for notice to a lienholder that he or she must take steps to realize on the lien within three months or it will be deemed to have been discharged: 6
(1) Where a lien affecting land for which an application for a certificate of claim has been made is registered in the registry of deeds and has been in effect for a period of two years or longer and no payment on account or written acknowledgement has been made within one year, the applicant for the certificate or some person on his behalf or the Minister or a person requested by him to do so may give written notice to the person having the lien, requesting him to take steps within three months after service of the notice to realize on the lien.
(2) A notice under subsection (1) may be served by: (
a) being delivered personally to the lienholder or, if the lienholder is a corporation, to its recognized agent; or (
b) registered post addressed to the lienholder's last known place of address, and a copy of the notice shall be filed in the registry of deeds.
(3) If the holder of the lien does not within three months after service of the notice upon him take steps for the enforcement of his lien, the lien shall be deemed to be discharged in relation to the land for which the certificate of claim is sought.
(4) Upon the filing in the registry of deeds of an affidavit or statutory declaration that the notice referred to in this
Section has been given in accordance with this
Section and that the holder of the lien has not within three months after service of the notice on him taken steps to enforce his lien, the lien shall cease to bind the land.
(5) In this Section, "lien" includes any judgment, mortgage, encumbrance or charge on land other than a lien for municipal taxes. … [Emphasis added] [ 46 ] Once a certificate of claim is issued, any person who claims to have an interest in the land or the holder of a lien, judgment, mortgage, encumbrance or any other charge over the property has 60 days to file a written notice of objection with the Minister: 7
(1) Any person who claims to have an interest in the lot of land described in a certificate of claim or who is the holder of a lien, judgment, mortgage, encumbrance or any other charge may within sixty days of the date of registration of the certificate file a written notice thereof with the Minister.
(2) Where a notice is not filed pursuant to subsection (1) within the time set out therein, the Minister may grant a certificate of title to the applicant.
(3) Where a notice is filed pursuant to subsection (1), the Minister shall deliver a copy of the notice to the applicant either by personal service or by prepaid registered mail. [ 47 ] Once a notice is filed, the person who claims an interest in the land must file a proceeding in the Supreme Court for a declaration that the interest claimed or the lien, judgment, mortgage, encumbrance or other charge is valid or a certificate of title will be granted: 7 (3A) A person who files a notice pursuant to subsection (1) may, within sixty days after filing the notice, commence a proceeding in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court for a declaration that the interest claimed in the notice or that the lien, judgment, mortgage, encumbrance or other charge referred to in the notice is valid. (3B) Where a proceeding is not commenced pursuant to subsection (3A), the Minister shall grant a certificate of title to the applicant. (3C) In a proceeding commenced pursuant to subsection (3A): (
a) the parties shall be each person who filed the notice pursuant to subsection (1) as plaintiff, the applicant for the certificate of claim as defendant and such other persons as the Court orders be joined as parties; (
b) the Court may
(
i) declare the interests of the parties, (ii) dismiss the proceeding, (iii) make such order as the Court deems just. (3D) After any proceeding commenced pursuant to subsection (3A) is finally disposed of, the Minister shall (
a) grant a certificate of title; (
b) revoke the certificate of claim; or (
c) grant a certificate of title subject to an interest in accordance with the decision of the Court. (3E) Where the Minister revokes a certificate of claim pursuant to subsection 3D [(3D)], the Minister shall file the revocation in the registry of deeds for the registration district in which the land is situate.
(4) When a certificate of revocation has been filed but the objection mentioned in any notice given pursuant to subsection (1) has been removed and sixty days have elapsed from the date the objection was removed, the Minister may grant a certificate of title to the applicant.
(5) When a certificate of title has been filed in the registry of deeds, title to the lot of land described in the certificate shall vest in the applicant named in the certificate in fee simple and such title shall be absolute and indefeasible but subject to any liens, judgments, mortgages, encumbrances or other charges or reservations, exceptions or other qualifications mentioned in the certificate. [Emphasis added] [ 48 ] Finally, s. 8 provides a mechanism for a person who has been adversely affected by the registration of a certificate of title to apply to the Minister for compensation: 8
(1) A person who claims to have been adversely affected by the effect of subsection 7(5) may apply to the Minister for compensation.
(2) The Minister shall make or cause to be made such independent investigation as is required in the opinion of the Minister to determine whether or not the applicant has been adversely affected.
(3) Where the independent investigation determines that the applicant has been adversely affected, the Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in Council and subject to subsection (4), pay to the applicant such compensation as the Minister considers fair in the circumstances.
(4) The compensation must not exceed the value of the land at the time the certificate of title was filed. [ 49 ] There are no regulations under the LTCA . The Department of Lands and Forestry (formerly the Department of Natural Resources) has, however, published a document entitled “Procedures for Making a Claim under the Land Titles Clarification Act for Ownership of Land in a Designated Area”. That document says the following about the application process: 2. The application must include: a.
A description of the claimed property (for example civic address, Parcel Identification Number (PID) from the land registry, Assessment Account Number (AAN) from your tax bill, location in relation to neighbouring properties); and b. A sketch accurately showing the location and the size of the parcel (acres or hectares). Including the names of your neighbours is helpful to locate the property. 3. Department of Natural Resources staff review the application to make sure that the location is inside one of the designated land titles clarification areas. The department also checks to see: a.
If the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act ; b. If all or a portion of the property is part of an existing claim area. If either of these situations apply, the department will let the claimant know that the claim cannot proceed. 4. If the application can proceed, the claimant will be asked to submit the following: a. Information to support the claim of ownership (use and occupation of the land to the exclusion of all others for at least 20 years): i.
Information from the claimant: The claimant should provide an explanation of how they have used the land, over what period of years, and what steps they have taken to let people in the community know that the land is theirs. ii.
Information from an impartial community member: The claimant should provide the name of at least one person in the community (neighbour or other community member, but not relatives) who can explain how the claimant has used and occupied the land, how long they have lived there or used the land, and what the people in the community know about the claimant’s land. … The statements from the claimant and their neighbours must be must prepared as sworn statements (statutory declaration) – given under oath. The help of a lawyer is advised for preparing the statutory declarations.
b. An abstract of title – this is a description of all the records in the land registry that affect (or may affect) the title to the land. The help of a title searcher or lawyer will be needed to complete this. c. Information on judgements and encumbrances - A statement providing information regarding any liens or mortgages or judgements or other encumbrances on the land must be provided. The help of a title searcher or lawyer will be needed to complete this. 5.
It is possible that a survey plan or a drawing prepared by a Nova Scotia Land Surveyor may be needed to prove where the land is located and to provide a legal description of the land. Land Services staff will tell the claimant if a plan of survey and metes and bounds description is needed to clearly identify the location of the land Review and Processing of Application 1. Land Services staff and a Department of Justice lawyer will review the documents and determine whether the information proves the claim. 2.
If it does, a Certificate of Claim is forwarded to the Minister of Natural resources for approval and signature. The document is then registered at the Land Registration Office in the county where the land is located. 3. The department publishes a notice of the registration in a local newspaper, to advise anyone who claims to have an interest in the land that they have 60 days to make a claim. 4. The department also sends the notice of registration to all adjoining/neighbouring land owners and parties who may have an interest in the land. 5.
If no one claims an interest in the land within the 60 days, the department prepares a Certificate of Title, which is signed by the Minister of Natural Resources. 6. If someone does submit a notice to the Minister of an interest in the land, the person has another 60 days to start a proceeding in the Supreme Court. The Court then determines the extent of everyone’s interests in the land. Background to the Beals’ application under the LTCA [ 50 ] In 1995, Thomas and Ruby Beals obtained a certificate of title pursuant to the LTCA for Lot 171 in North Preston, Nova Scotia.
The certificate of title provided: THIS CERTIFIES pursuant to the provisions of the Land Titles Clarification Act that the said Thomas Beals and Ruby Beals , husband and wife, as joint tenants and not tenants in common of North Preston are entitled to the lot of land within the Land Titles Clarification Area at New Road Settlement in the Municipality of the County of Halifax, described as follows: ALL that certain lot, piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being within the boundaries of the New Road Settlement Land Titles Clarification Area and designated as Lot 171 as shown outlined in red on the plan attached to and forming part of this Certifica
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