R. v. Gunter, 2020 NSSC 61
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: R. v. Gunter , 2020 NSSC 61 Date: 20200305 Docket: Hfx No. 493865 Registry: Halifax Between: Ronald Miles Gunter Appellant v. Her Majesty the Queen Respondent D E C I S I O N Judge: The Honourable Justice James L. Chipman Heard: February 26, 2020 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Decision: March 5, 2020 Counsel: James M. Violande, on behalf of the Appellant Cory J.H. Roberts and Daniel Boucher (law student), on behalf of the Respondent By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] On November 15, 2019, Mr. Gunter filed a Notice of
Summary Conviction Appeal appealing Provincial Court Judge Alanna Murphy’s October 21, 2019 oral decision. In her decision the trial judge convicted the Appellant of a s. 320.14 (1)(
b) Criminal Code offence; i.e. that he “did within two hours of ceasing to operate a conveyance [van], have blood alcohol concentration that is equal to or exceeds 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood”. In his Notice, Mr. Gunter states that “Her Honour erred in finding that…”: 1. the burden of proof in respect of the s. 8 Charter allegation was on the defence; 2. there was no s. 8 Charter breach; 3. there was no s. 9 Charter breach; 4. there was no s. 10(
b) Charter breach; 5. if she was incorrect on whether a breach of the appellant’s Charter rights occurred, the certificate of analysis would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter ; 6. the identity of the accused was proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and 7. any other grounds of appeal that may become apparent by the evidence. [ 2 ] The Appellant says that this Court should allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and enter an acquittal.
The Respondent submits that the appeal should be dismissed. [ 3 ] In advance of the May 2, 2019 trial, the Appellant filed Charter applications seeking exclusion of evidence he alleged was obtained by breaches of ss. 8, 9 and 10(b). The trial proceeded by way of a blended voir dire . In her decision the trial judge dismissed
the Charter applications. She accordingly allowed the certificate of the qualified technician into evidence and found the Appellant guiltyof the above offence. The Appellant was also charged with a s. 320.14(1)(
a) offence and at the end of the trial the Crown invited anacquittal on this offence, which the judge granted. Facts [4] The underlying facts separate this matter from most of the approved (alcohol) screening device (ASD) cases which are in thecontext of roadside stops. The circumstances of this January 31, 2019 incident involve a police officer following up on reports fromstore employees who suspected that a customer, the Appellant, drove away from the store while impaired by alcohol. The officer thentraced the Appellant’s van license plate number to a Burnside business.
Next, the officer drove to the business where he observed theparked van. He entered the business and encountered the Appellant at the front desk. After ten minutes of conversation and observationthe officer radioed for the ASD and ultimately read the Appellant the ASD demand. [5] The Appellant blew into the ASD and failed. He was then Charter cautioned and driven to the Halifax Regional PoliceBurnside detachment where he failed the breathalyzer. The remaining background may be distilled, as follows: • The Appellant was charged with impaired driving and over 80 mg contrary to
section 320.14(
a) and 320.14(
b) of the CriminalCode of Canada. • The Crown proceeded summarily. The Appellant gave notice seeking an exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of breaches ofhis sections 8, 9, 10(1) and 10(
b) Charter rights. • Charter briefs were filed by the Crown and Defence in advance of trial. The trial proceeded on May 29, 2019, by way of ablended voir dire. • The Crown called four witnesses: o Home Depot employee David Raines o Home Depot employee Mike Hewitt o Constable Derrick Meisner (the officer who brought the ASD to the Appellant’s place of business) o Constable Dusan Postolovic (the officer who interacted with the Appellant) • The Appellant did not call evidence. • The trial was completed with further submissions to be made in writing.
Following these submissions the judge invited commentfrom counsel on the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s decisions in R. v. Spin. • On October 21, 2019, Judge Murphy dismissed the Appellant’s Charter applications, allowed the certificate of qualifiedtechnician into evidence, and found the Appellant guilty of an offence contrary to
section 320.14(1)(
b) of the Criminal Code. • The Appellant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum penalties for the offence. Issues [6] The grounds of appeal pertain to the Charter analysis and the judge’s finding that the Crown proved beyond a reasonabledoubt the Appellant’s identity. I have re-worked the grounds into these issues for consideration: 1. Was the identity of the Appellant proven beyond a reasonable doubt? 2. Did the judge incorrectly determine that the Appellant had the burden of proof to demonstrate that his s. 8 Charter rightswere breached? 3. Did the judge err in determining that the Appellant’s ss. 8, 9 and 10(
b) Charter rights were not infringed? 4. Did the judge err in finding that if she was incorrect on whether a breach of the Appellant’s Charter rights occurred, that thecertificate of analysis would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter? Standard of Review [7] The question of whether the trial judge erred by finding that the identity of the Appellant was proven beyond a reasonabledoubt challenges the reasonableness of the trial judge’s decision. This is a question of law. Sitting as a
Summary Conviction AppealCourt (SCAC) I am entitled to review the trial evidence and to re-examine and re-weigh it to determine whether it is reasonably capableof supporting the trial judge’s conclusions (R. v. Coyle, 2004 NSSC 253 at para. 16; R. v. Nickerson, 1999 NSCA 168 , [1999]NSJ No. 210 (CA) at para, 6; R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15 at paras. 36 and 37). [8] The question of whether the trial judge reversed the burden of proof with respect to s. 8 of the Charter is clearly a question oflaw. The question for the SCAC is whether the decision at trial, when read as a whole, shows that the onus was incorrectly applied (R. v.Bush, 2010 ONCA 554, at para. 78).
[9] The trial judge’s findings of fact that formed the basis of her conclusion that there were no Charter breaches are entitled todeference absent “overriding and palpable error”. The application of the appropriate legal test to the facts and whether the factsconstitute Charter breaches is a question of law (R. v. Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35 at paras. 18 – 20; R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at para. 129). [10] The question as to whether evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter is a question of law.
Since thedetermination requires the trial judge to exercise some discretion, ‘considerable deference’ is owed to the judge’s s. 24(2) assessmentwhen the appropriate factors have been considered (R. v. Spin, 2014 NSCA at para. 41; R. v. Grant at para. 86; R. v. Beaulieu, 2010 SCC7 at para. 5). Issue 1: Was the identity of the Appellant proven beyond a reasonable doubt? [11] At the conclusion of the trial the Appellant moved for a directed verdict on identification. The Appellant submitted, “I don’tthink there’s any proof that a reasonable jury could convict, Your Honour, that Mr.
Gunter was the individual driving the motorvehicle”. Judge Murphy dismissed this, as follows: THE COURT: I think cumulatively, on the totality of all the evidence, I have more than in-doc identification. Clearly, if I hadjust in-doc identification, that would be an issue, I think, that may not survive a directed verdict application. This is an accumulation of evidence in relation to an individual who was seen sporting a particular type of uniform, and I thinkthere’s enough of a chronology and a tightness in the chronology in the events that happened that there is more than enough evidence toidentify Mr.
Gunter as the operator of the vehicle that was at Home Depot. So the directed verdict motion will fail. [12] In her decision delivered almost five months later the trial judge revisited identification, pointing out all of the evidence whichled her to conclude that there was no basis for a directed verdict. This evidence included: • The “in-doc” identification of Mr. Gunter by Mr. Raines, Mr. Hewitt and especially, Cst. Postolovic, whom the judge found, “hadsignificant face-to-face contact with Mr. Gunter over a couple of hours”. • Mr. Raines’ testimony providing a fairly detailed description of Mr. Gunter. • Mr.
Hewitt’s evidence of the steps he took to identify Mr. Gunter. • The fact that Mr. Gunter was the only person at the business when Cst. Postolovic attended there on January 31, 2019. [13] On balance, I agree with the trial judge that there was an abundance of evidence which led to Mr. Gunter being correctlyidentified as the operator of the Gunnebo van which was observed by Mr. Hewitt being driven in the Home Depot parking lot. Accordingly, I conclude that there was sufficient evidence to found the trial judge’s determination that the Appellant’s identity wasproven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issue 2: Did the judge incorrectly determine that the Appellant had the burden of proof to demonstrate that his s. 8 Charter rightswere breached? [14]
Section 8 of the Charter guarantees that everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. When apolice search is executed without a warrant, it is prima facie unreasonable (Hunter v. Southam Inc., (SCC), [1984] 2SCR 145 at para. 30). Accordingly, on the facts of this case, the Crown has the onus to prove that the warrantless search of theAppellant was reasonable. [15] The Appellant submits that the trial judge erred when she stated, as follows: 15 Any breach of the Charter must be established by the defence on the balance of probabilities.
It can be done by relying onCrown evidence and/or calling evidence of their own. In this instance, the defence is relying on the evidence of the Crown, and, mostspecifically, Cst. Postolovic. [16] The Crown acknowledges that given the above passage that the trial judge did reverse the burden of proof under s. 8 of theCharter; however, they submit that her misstatement of the law is not fatal when the entirety of her decision is examined.
For example,the Crown points out that the judge correctly applied the onus of proof when she ultimately found that the search was reasonable,pointing to this excerpt from the decision: The defence position is that Cst. Postolovic did not have grounds for reasonable suspicion to make a demand of Mr. Gunter to provide asample of his breath and to an approved screening device. My assessment of the evidence on its totality is that Cst.
Postolovic had reasonable grounds to suspect that there was alcohol in the bodyof the applicant. [17] From the above passage it is apparent that the judge was alive to the totality of the evidence. Earlier in her decision shespecifically recites evidence which is favourable to the Crown’s case: • To begin with, I can say that I found Cst.
Postolovic to be a very good witness. • In relation to the content of his evidence, no question he gave evidence which was favourable to the Crown…. • I found his explanation in relation to his calling the ASD before he had settled on suspicion believable, and I do believe it…. [18] The above is supportive of the Crown’s position on this issue. Whereas the Appellant simply says that the judge erred whenshe said, “any breach of the Charter must be established by the defence”, a fulsome analysis of the decision demonstrates that she
actually required the Crown to persuade her of the legality of the search. The judge is clear in her path of reasoning that the Crown’sevidence demonstrated that Cst. Postolovic had reasonable grounds. Put another way, at no time did she state that the Appellant failed todemonstrate there were no reasonable grounds. In the result, I dismiss the second ground of appeal as the judge did not err in law. Issue 3: Did the judge err in determining that the Appellant’s ss. 8, 9 and 10(
b) Charter rights were not infringed? [19] Once again s. 8 of the Charter pertains to unreasonable search or seizure.
Section 9 states that everyone has the right not to bearbitrarily detained or imprisoned.
Section 10(
b) states that everyone has the right on arrest or detention to retain and instruct counselwithout delay and to be informed of this right. [20]
Section 8 of the Charter has been interpreted to require police to have reasonable suspicion before making an ASD demand. Asearch will not breach s. 8 if it is authorized by a reasonable law and carried out reasonably (R. v. Collins, (SCC), [1987]1 SCR 265 at para 34). The search in question is authorized under s. 320.27(1)(
b) of the Criminal Code. It requires that the officerreasonably suspect that the person has alcohol in their body and that they drove in the preceding three hours. In this case, the demand isreasonable if the Crown demonstrates that Cst. Postolovic had the requisite reasonable suspicion. [21] In R. v. Orbanski (sub. nom R. v. Elias), 2005 SCC 37 the majority of the SCC held that while motorists are detained at theroadside so as to trigger s. 10(
b) rights, their s. 10(
b) rights are necessarily suspended. Speaking for the majority, Justice Charron foundthat such limits on the right to counsel are justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter, stating the following at para. 52: … In my view, it logically follows from Thomsen that a limit on the right to counsel is also prescribed during the roadside screeningtechniques utilized in these cases.
If a limit on the right to counsel is prescribed during compliance with a s. 254(2) [predecessor to s.320.27(1)(b)] demand for a sample for analysis in the roadside screening device, then the limit must necessarily be prescribed during thescreening measures preceding the demand, conducted with the very objective of determining whether there is a reasonable suspicionjustifying the demand.
Similarly, the limit must necessarily be prescribed during the screening measure that is the functional equivalentto the roadside screening device, namely, a technique conducted with the very objective of determining whether there are reasonable andprobable grounds justifying a s. 254(3) demand for a breath or blood sample. [22] Beginning at p. 34 of the 86 page transcribed decision the trial judge correctly recited Charter ss. 8, 9 and 10 and the relevantCriminal Code provisions. She continued by noting that Cst. Postolovic was “a very good witness”.
The trial judge elaborated that shefound his evidence to be “straightforward, measured and careful”. Judge Murphy says the content of his testimony caused her toconclude Cst. Postolovic was “a very conscientious officer, and fair… respectful and courteous in his dealings with Mr. Gunter”. Shewent on to state: I found his explanation in relation to his calling the ASD [approved screening device] before he had settled on suspicion believable, and Ido believe it in the context of the entirety of these events and the reason – and for the reasons that he gave.
It was rational and consistentwith other aspects of his evidence. [23] The Appellant submits that there were two breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights. He submits Cst. Postolovic did not have groundsto make a demand under s. 320.27(1) and that upon forming his grounds that he did not immediately make his demand. [24] Once again, Cst. Postolovic’s authority for making an approved screening device demand is found under s. 320.27(1)(
b) of theCriminal Code which states: Testing for presence of alcohol or drug 320.27
(1) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol or a drug in their body and that the personhas, within the preceding three hours, operated a conveyance, the peace officer may, by demand, require the person to comply with therequirements of either or both of paragraphs (
a) and (b) … … (
b) to immediately provide the samples of breath that, in the peace officer’s opinion, are necessary to enable a proper analysis to bemade by means of an approved screening device and to accompany the peace officer for that purpose; [25] The Appellant asserts that the evidence before the trial judge was insufficient for the Crown to prove on a balance ofprobabilities that Cst. Postolovic had reasonable grounds to suspect that Mr. Gunter had alcohol in his body. The Crown counters thatCst.
Postolovic’s testimony demonstrates objectively discernable facts such that his grounds met the reasonable suspicion standard. [26] A review of the trial transcript reveals Cst. Postolovic’s evidence was as follows in relation to his grounds: Cst. Dusan Postolovic, Direct Exam, by Ms. Kidd Q. So you spoke to Mr. Hewitt, and what information did he pass on to you? A. He passed on to me that another store employee had approached him, concerned that a customer, in that employee’sopinion, might’ve been drinking prior to attending the Home Depot. Or at least that’s what this individual, or Mr. Raines, had suspected.
And so he – Mr. Raines notified Mr. Hewitt who in turn told me about what happened. An then Mr. Hewitt told me that helocated the customer in question, essentially kept an eye on him and watched him drive away in what was believed to be a companyvehicle. And there is a photograph taken of that vehicle as it left by Mr. Hewitt which I looked at as well. Q. You mentioned you looked at a photograph?
A. Yes, that’s correct. I looked at the photograph of the work van which Mr. Hewitt referred to when providing me with a description of the vehicle as well as in-store surveillance of the customer in question. Q. Is that the extent of your interaction or conversation with Mr. Hewitt? A.
Yes, I – my main purpose for the – for talking to them is – is just obviously get a general idea of what had taken place and a confirmation of who the potential suspect is, what the suspect vehicle is, with the intent of locating this individual, first and foremost, and then at a later time, following up with – with both of them for a more detailed account of what took place. Q. Did you receive a description of either the suspect vehicle or the suspect themselves from Mr. Hewitt? A. Yes, I did. Q. Are you able to relay what he said to you? A. I can.
I would be able to do a bit better in terms of a description if I were allowed to refer to my notebook for notes. … A. So the vehicle in question was a white work van. The most prominent identifying feature of it was the logo/name, “Gunnebo” – I believe was G-U-N-N-E-B-O – written on the van. Mr. Hewitt provided me with a license plate at the time which he believed to be Charlie Delta November, I believe 306. And the description of the individual was essentially a Caucasian male of average build, about 5ʹ9ʺ in height, with some graying hair.
I also looked at the surveillance video of this individual and noted that he appeared to be wearing, like, a blue work coverall outfit, and was of average build, Caucasian male with salt and pepper graying hair potentially, and glasses. And that was the description that I obtained. Q. Was there any, I guess, any other information passed on from Mr. Hewitt to you at that time? A. Just that, in general terms, that – and I believe him, in speaking with Mr. Raines, was – the concern was just that Mr. Raines had smelled what he believed to be alcohol or liquor from this customer.
He wasn’t – he wasn’t able to say whether it was from the body of the person or from inside their mouth just because of the proximity. And this – and there’s a description of – that this individual was swaying slightly. But those were just the general pieces of information that were provided to me prior to me leaving Home Depot to look for the vehicle. … … In my initial interaction with Mr. Gunter I – I couldn’t smell any liquor coming from him as it was reported to me previously. What I was able to notice is just a flush red appearance in his face.
But I couldn’t get a smell of anything aside from the smell of, like, melted plastic and various oils. I attribute that in part to the fact that he was grinding pieces of – the inside of a drill case with – with some sort of grinding bit, and I – I image a lot of that smell was in part to that and also the general business being a safe business, I believe it was, and it was all – those – those were the – the majority of the smells I was facing and encountering. As well, that, you know, given the – the activity that Mr.
Gunter was doing, his overall behaviour and – and being able to manipulate the drill, I didn’t – I didn’t’ believe him to be impaired. … Q. So, after you made that request at, you said it was 1430 hours, for the approved screening device – and you acknowledge that that was before you formed your suspicion – what happened after you placed that request? A. I continued talking to Mr. Gunter to continue to see whether there was some reason why the initial report of Mr. Raines was the way it was.
I turned the conversation into just asking a general question of whether he had been drinking on that particular day or the day before. Given that it was the middle of a weekday and he was, appeared to me, at work, I wasn’t expecting him to say that he had been drinking prior to my arrival. And he did reply that he did have some – something to drink that night, but couldn’t recall exactly the amount or exactly when that drinking had taken place.
As my conversation progressed with him, I was able to determine, based on what he told me, that the last drink he said he had had was around midnight an that he was drinking rum. But aside from that, he – he couldn’t – he didn’t tell me a quantity that he had consumed or how long he had been drinking; just that that was when he finished his last drink. And he also confirmed that he was previously at Home Depot; that he had driven. Showed me the drill he had purchased on his trip to Home Depot.
And that was – at that time is when I developed my reasonable suspicion that he had driven with alcohol in his body. [ 27 ] The Appellant refers to two cases in support of these grounds of appeal; R. v. Schofield (2015), NSCA 5 at paras. 33 – 35 and R. v. Hansen (2010), ABPC 195 at para. 30. The latter is not controversial inasmuch as the Alberta Provincial Court Judge simply sets out guidelines for when reasonable grounds may be demonstrated. The former is binding and a helpful authority from our Court of Appeal.
Justice Fichaud’s decision provides these principles, albeit in the context of roadside screening, at paras. 33 – 35: 33 The question is - did the "totality of the circumstances" known to the officer at the time of the breath demand rationally support
the officer's belief? The officer may infer or deduce, draw on experience, and ascribe weights to factors. Parliament expects the officer to do this on the roadside according to a statutory timeline, while informed by the available circumstances, but without either the benefit of trial processes to test the accuracy of his or her belief or "the luxury of judicial reflection". The officer must identify the supporting circumstances at the voir dire . But the officer was not expected to apply the rules of evidence at the roadside. So the support may be based on hearsay.
The supporting connection must be reasonable at the time, but need not be proven correct at the later voir dire that considers s. 254(3). 34 The judge should not segregate the officer's criteria for piecemeal analysis, then banish each factor might have a stand-alone explanation. From the officer's roadside perspective, the factors may have had corroborative weights that together formed a sounder platform for an inference of impairment. The reductive approach denies that corroborative potential. As this Court recently said, of reasonable and probable grounds for a search warrant, ( R. v.
Liberatore , 2014 NSCA 109 , para. 27 ): The body of evidence isn't anatomized for a segregated analysis of each fragment. Viewed as a whole, its bits may be cross-confirmatory. 35 There is no minimum period of investigation, mandatory line of questioning or legally essential technique, such as a roadside screening. The judge should not focus on missing evidence.
Rather, the judge should consider whether the adduced evidence of circumstances known to the officer reasonably supported the officer's view. [ 28 ] When I review the officer’s testimony it is apparent he adduced evidence of a totality of circumstances which supported his view that the breath demand was warranted. In my view there was ample evidence (as demonstrated from the above trial excerpt) to back-up the trial judge’s decision that the demand was reasonable. [ 29 ] The Appellant asserts that upon forming his grounds Cst. Postolovic did not immediately make his demand.
The word “immediately” is taken from s. 320.27(1)(
b) of the Code . [ 30 ] The Appellant relies on another Alberta Provincial Court decision, R. v. Quong (2006), ABPC 111 for the proposition that, “[T]he demand must be made by the police officer as soon as he or she forms the opinion that there is alcohol in the body of the detained person”. Mr. Gunter asserts that the trial judge’s acceptance of Cst. Postolovic’s evidence that he did not form his grounds until after the ASD had arrived is unreasonable.
At paras. 75, 76 of his factum, he puts it this way: [75] Constable Postolovic was questioned about notes he had made in his notebook that indicated the explained the approved screen device was on his way and the process that would follow to Mr. Gunter. When questioned that he must have formed his grounds before the device arrived in order for him to note that he stated as follows: Q. Okay. So you must’ve developed your suspicion prior to 14:42 if you were explaining to him why the demand would be read, correct? A.
No, I was explaining to him that I had requested the ASD there and I explained to him, should my investigation take me down that road, what that investigation would look like. [76] It is Mr. Gunter’s position that Constable Postolovic’s explanation of his notes is simply not in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities. It is Mr. Gunter’s position that when he radioed for the device, he fully intended to make his demand. As such he should have made the demand immediately rather than waiting another 12 minutes.
It is his position that this invalidates the demand. [ 31 ] I will address this criticism by returning to the evidence and the trial judge’s findings. She found as a fact this timeline, which is backed up by the transcript of evidence: • A short time after 1 p.m. that care and control was established; • 2:20 p.m. – the officer arrived at Gunnebo; • 2:30 p.m. – he called for the ASD; • 2:39 p.m. – Cst. Meisner brought the ASD to Gunnebo; • 2:42 p.m. – Cst.
Postolovic formed his suspicion; • 2:44 p.m. – the sample and fail result was achieved. [ 32 ] The trial judge was satisfied that once the suspicion crystallized the demand was made immediately. She makes reference to “immediately” being defined similarly to “forthwith”. This is because the ASD demand was made under s. 320.27 (1) (
b) of the Criminal Code , which (as quoted above) provides that if a peace officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol in their body and has, within the preceding three hours operated a motor vehicle, the peace office may make the following demand: To immediately provide the samples of breath that, in the peace officer’s opinion, are necessary to enable a proper analysis to be made by means of an approved screening device…. [ 33 ] The predecessor to s. 320.27(1)(
b) was s. 254(2). The wording of s. 254(2) was the same except that the breath sample had to be provided “forthwith” rather than “immediately.” In my view, this is a distinction without a difference, because “forthwith” in s. 254(2) meant “immediately” ( R. v. Woods , [2005] SCR 205, para. 13). Therefore, the caselaw decided under s. 254(2) continues to apply under s. 320.27(1) (b). [ 34 ] At times Mr. Gunter also argued that he was arbitrarily detained prior to and following the provision of his samples into the ASD. Judge Murphy addressed this in the following way:
Cst. Postolovic entered a premises which, by his accounting, was open to the public for business. The accused remained seated behind the desk, as I understand the evidence, until such time as he was taken to the police station after being placed under arrest to provide a breath sample. As I understand the evidence, Cst. Postolovic told Mr. Gunter why he was at the business and was investigating a complaint of a suspected impaired driving from Home Depot. I accept that evidence. He did also, at the time, I accept the evidence, that Cst. Postolovic did not smell an alcoholic beverage. He did recognize, however, Mr.
Gunter from the photograph which he had in his possession which had been – a still photograph taken from surveillance video from the Home Depot. He did not, at that point, have a suspicion of alcohol in the body, according to this evidence. It has been well said at law in Thomsen , and other cases, that the typical case involving detention at roadside for the use of the screening device, the right to counsel denied does not result in the exclusion of the evidence afterward.
As was accepted in the case of Orbanski and Elias , the 2005 Supreme Court of Canada cases, these cases have accepted that there’s a great societal interest in screening of drivers of motor vehicles in an effort to limit the accidents which result in injury and death on our roads and highways. And that prefers the inclusion of evidence. [ 35 ] The trial judge continued by backing up her decision with several references to the leading Supreme Court of Canada decisions of Thomsen and Orbanski , the latter often referenced as Orbanski and Elias as these were companion cases heard at the same time. [ 36 ] In R. v.
Ackerman , 2014 NLCA 26 Justice Welsh, at paras. 12 – 16 provides a helpful review of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Orbanski : 12 The law is settled that, in an impaired driving case, where the police officer stops the vehicle in accordance with provincial legislation and identifies the individual who was driving, Charter requirements are satisfied if the right to counsel under
section 10(
b) is provided at the time of arrest ( R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias , supra ). However, Crown counsel submits that there are few cases addressing the same Charter issue when the vehicle has been parked and it was a person other than a police officer who saw the vehicle being driven. In view of the Crown's position, and in order to address any uncertainty, the issue of when an individual must be informed of the right to counsel in the circumstances of this case is a question of law on which I would grant leave to appeal. 13 The analysis begins with the principles discussed in Orbanski .
A review of the facts in the two situations sets the context within which the principles are established. 14 Mr. Orbanski was stopped after a police officer saw him driving in an erratic manner. The officer detected an odour of alcohol on Mr. Obanski's breath and asked him if he had been drinking. He said he had consumed one beer that night. The officer asked Mr. Orbanski to perform some sobriety tests. He was told that the tests were voluntary and that he could contact a lawyer. He was offered the use of a cellular phone. He was not informed about the availability of free legal assistance.
Having declined to call a lawyer, Mr. Orbanski was unable to perform the sobriety tests and was arrested. He was subsequently advised of his
section 10(
b) right to counsel. 15 Mr. Elias was stopped by the police in a random stop. The odour of alcohol was detected on his breath. When asked, he admitted that he had been drinking. The officer brought Mr. Elias to the police vehicle where a test on an approved screening device was administered. Upon registering a "fail", Mr. Elias was arrested for impaired driving and was informed of his
section 10(
b) right to counsel. 16 Regarding both cases, Charron J., for the majority, summarized: [31] The Crown conceded that Orbanski and Elias were each detained within the meaning of s. 10(
b) of the Charter when pulled over by the police. In my view, this concession was well founded. ... [32] Therefore, there is no issue that the s. 10(
b) right to counsel was triggered in each of these cases. It is also conceded on these appeals that neither Orbanski nor Elias was provided with his right to counsel during the period of detention at the roadside from the time they were pulled over by the police until the time of their arrest. [33] The s. 10(
b) right to counsel, however, is not absolute. It is subject, under s. 1 of the Charter , "to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". The analysis under s. 1 of the Charter involves two separate components: the proposed limit must be prescribed by law and, if it is, it must be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. ... [ 37 ] The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal goes on to note that Mr. Ackerman’s case is “slightly different” from the two situations in Orbanski as he was not pulled over while driving.
Indeed, Mr. Ackerman ventured out to his workplace parking lot to speak with the officer. The officer then asked questions and the Court of Appeal accepted that Mr. Ackerman was detained within the meaning of s. 10(
b) of the Charter . Since Mr. Ackerman was not provided with his right to counsel when he was initially detained, the Court proceeded with a s. 1 Charter analysis. I find the Appeal Court’s analysis helpful and on point at paras. 19 – 28. Justice Welsh then concluded with this analysis and disposition at paras. 29 - 33: 29 The same principles, with the same result, apply in this case. The fact that the erratic driving, together with information to identify the vehicle, was provided by a concerned citizen has no effect on the analysis.
It is clearly within the authority of the police to investigate potential offences reported by members of the public. 30 In this case, the police officer was undoubtedly acting within the lawful execution of her duties and responsibilities when she pursued an investigation into a suspected impaired driver based on the information supplied just minutes earlier by a concerned citizen. Significant detail was provided including the basis for the observer's concerns, the licence plate number and a description of the vehicle, and information that the vehicle had turned into a commercial parking lot.
The officer arrived at the scene within about ten minutes and
immediately located the parked vehicle. By that time she had already obtained the name of the registered owner of the vehicle and,without delay, took steps to locate him. The officer asked Mr. Ackerman if he had parked the car in the lot, to which he responded yes.He did not qualify his response by saying he had not driven the vehicle since the previous day having left it overnight in the parking lot.He gave no indication that he had not just been driving the vehicle, or that someone else had been driving it, with or without hispermission. The officer noticed the odour of alcohol on Mr.
Ackerman's breath and that his speech was slurred. While Mr. Ackermantestified at trial that he had not been driving the vehicle at the relevant time, the police officer was entitled to proceed on the basis of theinformation she had at the time of her investigation. 31 The officer formed the opinion, based on the collected information, that she had sufficient grounds for making a demand,pursuant to section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, requiring Mr. Ackerman to provide breath samples on an approved screening device.He registered a "fail". At that point the officer arrested Mr.
Ackerman, charged him with the impaired driving offence and advised himof his
section 10(
b) right to counsel. 32 Applying the principles set out in Orbanski, Mr. Ackerman's right to counsel under
section 10(
b) of the Charter was infringedwhen he was initially detained. However, that infringement was justified under
section 1 of the Charter given the nature of the offence,the circumstances surrounding the police officer's investigation, and the officer's action in advising Mr. Ackerman of his right to counselupon his arrest at the conclusion of the investigation phase. 33 It follows that the
summary conviction appeal judge did not err in upholding the trial judge's conclusion that Mr. Ackerman'ssection 10(
b) right to counsel was not breached in this case. [38] I adopt the above reasoning and find it applicable to this
summary conviction appeal. While there are some factual distinctions,I am driven to the same result. Although Mr. Akerman’s parking lot detention was briefer than Mr. Gunter’s office detention, the officerput a number of questions to him and one gets the sense that she may not have been found to be as fair, respectful or courteous as JudgeMurphy found Cst. Postolovic to have been. Applying the principles set out in Orbanski, Mr. Gunter’s right to counsel under s. 10(
b) ofthe Charter was infringed when he was initially detained a little after 2:20 p.m. at his office. However, that infringement was justifiedunder s. 1 given the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the police officer’s investigation, and given that Cst.Postolovic’s advised the Appellant of his arrest at the conclusion of the investigation phase. [39] From Cst. Postolovic’s evidence we know he arrived at the Gunnebo parking lot at 2:20 p.m. where upon he verified that thelicense plate number was indeed on the white Gunnebo van parked outside the office.
The trial judge found that from there the officerwalked into the office where he encountered Mr. Gunter at the front desk, and engaged him in conversation. At 2:30 p.m. the officerradioed for the ASD and this was brought into the office by Cst. Meisner at 2:39 p.m. Three minutes later Cst. Postolovic read the ASDdemand and this was within seconds of him having developed a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gunter had been driving while impaired. At 2:44 p.m. a fail was recorded and a minute later Cst. Postolovic arrested and Charter cautioned Mr.
Gunter. [40] The authority to detain drivers, to investigate impaired driving and to make an ASD demand is authorized by s. 320.27 of theCriminal Code, police statutory and common-law powers (Orbanski at paras. 41 – 44). There is no question that the Appellant wasdetained at the time Cst. Postolovic entered his business leading up to the point that the Appellant submitted to the ASD demand and wasarrested for impaired driving.
In all of the circumstances, I am of the view that the trial judge was correct in finding that this detentionwas not arbitrary and was authorized by law. [41] In dispensing with issue three I have determined that Judge Murphy’s thorough reasons show no errors in law. For the reasonsoutlined above, I agree with her decision that there were no Charter breaches.
Issue 4: Did the judge err in finding that if she was incorrect on whether a breach of the Appellant’s Charter rights occurred, that thecertificate of analysis would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter? [42] At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Murphy asked for written submissions with respect to our Court of Appeal’s two Spindecisions. R. v. Spin, 2011 NSCA 80 reviewed the question of what constitutes a detention within the meaning of s. 10(
b) at para. 54 byreferencing the majority judgment in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at paras. 28 and 30 – 32. [43] In Spin, 2011 our Court of Appeal went on to consider whether it could carry out a s. 24(2) Charter analysis at paras. 63 and 64: 63 There is no doubt that an appellate court has the requisite jurisdiction to carry out the analysis under s. 24(2) if new or additionalCharter violations are declared on appeal. (see for example: R. v. Grant, supra, R. v. Reddy, 2010 BCCA 11; R. v. Strilec, 2010 BCCA198; R. v. Caputo (1997), (ON CA), 114 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Squires, 2005 NLCA 51; R. v.
Chehil, 2009NSCA 111, R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8). If the record is adequate to do so, it is preferable that the appeal court perform the s. 24(2)analysis. However, there may well be instances where the record is deficient in some way that prevents or impedes a proper analysis. Inthose circumstances, the appropriate remedy is a new trial (see R. v. Timmons, 2011 NSCA 39). 64 I am reluctantly of the opinion that a new trial is the appropriate remedy. I will explain. The trial judge found no s. 10(b)violation. He erred in that conclusion.
Hence his s. 24(2) analysis only referred to the violation of s. 8 of the Charter. There are a myriadof factors that inform a proper analysis under s. 24(2). All the circumstances must be taken into account. The court is required toconsider the seriousness of the state conduct, the impact on the Charter-protected interests of the accused, and society's interest inadjudication of the case on its merits. [44] This case before me is obviously distinct from the above because Judge Murphy did, in the alternative, carry out a s. 24 (2)analysis. [45] In R. v.
Spin, 2014 NSCA 1 our Court of Appeal had cause to review the Crown’s appeal of Mr. Spin’s retrial. At the retrial,the Crown conceded Mr. Spin’s s. 10(
b) and s. 8 Charter rights had been violated but asked that the Certificate of Analysis be admitted. The trial judge excluded the Certificate of Analysis under s. 24(2) and thus there was no evidence on which Mr. Spin could beconvicted. In dismissing the appeal Justice Farrar reviewed the background at paras. 8 – 36. From this we see important distinctions
from the Appellant’s case as demonstrated by para. 13: 13 Constable Monteith had no difficulty in locating Mr. Spin. On arriving at Mr. Spin's mother's residence, Constable Monteithadvised Mr. Spin that he had to get a statement from him about the motor vehicle accident pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S.1989, c. 293. Mr. Spin testified that he felt obligated to give a statement due to Constable Monteith's comments.
At the original trial, thetrial judge found the statement was compelled by statute and it was not available for use by the Crown at the appellant's trial (as per R. v.White, (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417). The trial judge ordered the statement excluded on the basis that the admissionwould violate s. 7 of the Charter, the principle against self-incrimination. [46] From the above we know that Mr. Spin’s initial interaction with Cst. Monteith was at Mr. Spin’s mother’s house and that Mr.Spin testified. In this case the interaction between Cst. Postolovic and the Appellant was at his business, a public place.
Further, therecord confirms Mr. Gunter did not give evidence. [47] At para. 41 of the Spin, 2014 decision, Farrar, JA stated: 41 Where a trial judge has considered the proper factors pertaining to a s. 24(2) analysis and has not erred in principle, his or herultimate determination should be reviewed in terms of a deferential standard (R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, para.86). [48] At paras. 44 and 45 he went on to review the analytical framework governing the exclusion of evidence: 44 In R. v. Grant, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the analytical framework governing the exclusion of evidence.
Acourt must assess and balance the effect of admitting the evidence on society's confidence in the justice system having regard to threelines of inquiry: 1. the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct; 2. the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interest; and 3. society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits. 45 A court must determine whether, in all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justiceinto disrepute after conducting these three lines of inquiry (para.57-87). [49] Later in the decision Justice Farrar recited the trial judge’s review of Cst.
Monteith’s conduct and his evidence at paras. 75 – 77: 75 The trial judge had this to say about Constable Monteith's conduct when addressing this line of inquiry: [148] Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Charter is the core of the Charter as it relates to the criminal justice system. In this caseunfortunately, however, s. 8 and 10, which by necessity includes s. 9, were all but ignored by Cst. Monteith.
He had little theoretical orpractical knowledge of his role as a police officer as it relates to the approved screening device demand and how it is to be administeredand how such then has serious consequences for an accused when the same is not followed. 76 I agree with the trial judge's comments on Constable Monteith's conduct. To allow the admission of this evidence in light of thepolice conduct on the facts of this case would negatively impact the public's perception of the administration of justice. The Charter isdesigned to protect the rights of an accused.
Although it is not a matter of adding up the Charter breaches in doing an analysis under s.24(2), here we have multiple, inter-related breaches which ultimately led to obtaining the only evidence upon which Mr. Spin could beconvicted. 77 We also cannot ignore the finding, by the trial judge, of a lack of reliability and trustworthiness of Constable Monteith'sevidence. I refer, again, to the trial judge's comments on Constable Monteith's evidence: [123] In this case Cst. Monteith's evidence was, and I struggled with a word to characterize it, without being unduly harsh illogical inmany regards and very confusing.
That is not a term this Court uses lightly. Cst. Monteith had difficulty not only recalling what hetestified to in the first trial, but recalling what he testified to in earlier evidence the same day. Cst. Monteith was very difficult to followin his evidence. I had the entire transcript from this trial typed and still it took me numerous readings of his evidence to try to determineexactly what his specific answer was to many questions. Cst. Monteith had no ability to recall this specific case. This is a serious casefrom both the Crown and defence perspectives.
This officer clearly did not grasp that factor during his dealings with Mr. Spin, nor whenproviding evidence to the Court. ... [127] Cst. Monteith's evidence was very inconsistent and he was unable to recall even the simplest of details. His evidence was notreliable nor trustworthy. 78 To allow the admission of the evidence, in this case, would, in my view, be a serious affront to fundamental Charter rights. Itwould effectively condone a variety of serious Charter violations in a situation where the police evidence was unreliable.
Such a resultwould not instill confidence in the administration of justice and would seriously undermine its integrity. [50] I have already touched on what makes this SCAC case and the above situation markedly different. To reiterate, Judge Murphyfound Cst. Postolovic to be “a very good witness”. Her view of his evidence founded her well reasoned decision which found no Charterbreaches. The judge concluded by correctly noting that the ASD procedure has been held to be “non-invasive” and: Cst. Postolovic also did not have the benefit of being able to see Mr. Gunter walk as Mr. Gunter was seated beside a desk.
I do accept that at the point when Cst. Postolovic’s suspicion was crystallized, it was such that he felt he was able to give the – he
had a reasonable suspicion to give Mr. Gunter the ASD demand, that it was after the conversation that he had with being provided a partial drinking history by Mr. Gunter to the constable, and that it is clear that up to this point in time, Mr. Gunter had not been cautioned or given his right to counsel, but he had been made aware of what the officer was investigating. As I’ve stated, I have found Cst. Postolovic to be a credible witness. In relation to the timing of the incident, I find that his times are accurate and I accept his evidence as to the time when his suspicion crystallized.
I’m satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gunter had alcohol in his body and that Mr. Gunter had, within the preceding three hours, operated a conveyance. And, consequently, he could validly demand – make a demand that Mr. Gunter immediately provide the sample of breath that, in the peace officer’s opinion, was necessary to enable a proper analysis to be made by an approved screening device. [ 51 ] Having made the above determination, which I have found to be correct on the evidence adduced and in law, the trial judge embarked upon an alternative s. 24(2) analysis.
She correctly stepped through the three lines of inquiry (as outlined by Farrar, JA in Spin , 2014 at para. 44) and ended with this: After considering the three lines of inquiry, I conclude that even if there were breaches of the applicant’s Charter rights, the evidence of the results of the breath sample should not be excluded from evidence. Consequently, I’m satisfied that Cst.
Postolovic had the requisite reasonable grounds to demand the breath samples, and accordingly, the certificate will be admitted. [ 52 ] I note that considerable deference is owed to the trial judge’s s. 24(2) assessment when the appropriate factors have been considered. Judge Murphy’s detailed reasons demonstrate she indeed considered the appropriate factors and all of the circumstances. In the result, I would not disturb her s. 24(2) analysis. I dismiss this ground and confirm my dismissal of the entirety of the grounds of this appeal. Chipman, J.
Loading document…