Alan Joseph Bent carrying on business under the firm name v. style “AJ Bent Contracting”, 2020 NSSC 73
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: Bent (AJ Bent Contracting) v. Bernardi , 2020 NSSC 73 Date: 20200304 Docket: SAR No. 438483 Registry: Annapolis Royal Between: Alan Joseph Bent carrying on business under the firm name and style “AJ Bent Contracting” Plaintiff v. Linda Bernardi Defendant Judge: The Honourable Justice D.
Timothy Gabriel Heard: January 21, 2020, in Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia C ounsel: Hugh Robichaud, for the Plaintiff Bruce Gillis, Q.C., for the Defendant By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] The Plaintiff moves for an order extending the time for service of the “Notice of Alternative Claim” (sometimes referred to as the “Notice”) and Statement of Claim filed on April 22, 2015, upon the Defendant, Linda Bernardi. He brings his motion pursuant to Rule 4.04 of the Civil Procedure Rules (“ CPR ”).
He also applies for an order striking certain portions of the affidavit filed by the Defendant in response. [ 2 ] The Defendant’s position is that the motion is improperly framed. She says that it ought to be framed as a motion to renew the Notice and Statement of Claim, as it makes little sense for the Court to permit the Plaintiff to serve documents that have expired. In any event, she is opposed to either a renewal or extension of time being granted for the benefit of the Plaintiff. She also seeks to strike portions of the Plaintiff's affidavit. Ms.
Bernardi also requests security for costs if the court nonetheless permits the claim to proceed. Background [ 3 ] On January 15, 2015, Alan Joseph Bent, "carrying on business under the firm name and style of AJ Bent Contracting", filed a claim of lien upon the estate of the defendant, Linda Bernardi, in respect of her real property located at Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia, for carpentry work performed by himself for her benefit "including labour and materials provided with the last labour and materials furnished on January 9, 2015" ( Plaintiff's brief , November 28, 2019, para. 2).
The claim was ostensibly brought pursuant to the Builders Lien Act , RSN S 1989, C. 277 (“ BLA ” or "the Act "). Mr. Bent was represented by counsel at the time, albeit not his present counsel. The business name "AJ Bent Contracting" was not registered at the Company's Office until later (July 15, 2015). [ 4 ] Mr. Bent, through his counsel, next proceeded to file “a Notice of Alternative Claim” and a Statement of Claim, both on April 22, 2015. [ 5 ] The lien claim was vacated, however, by order of this Court dated May 5, 2015.
The Certificate of Lis Pendens required by s. 27 of the Act had not been filed within the requisite time frame. Mr. Bent alleges that he was impecunious, and that he consequently terminated the services of his (then) counsel around this time. [ 6 ] The next apparent court activity in relation to this matter occurred when (while unrepresented) he filed a Notice of Election to transfer the matter from Supreme Court to Small Claims Court. The hearing date was set for February 22, 2017. Mr. Gillis represented the Defendant (then and now).
The matter was adjourned to March 22, 2017, in an effort to provide the Plaintiff with an opportunity to obtain legal advice.
[ 7 ] Ultimately, the matter was not heard until April 18, 2017, at which time the adjudicator of the Small Claims Court determined that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter because both counsel had agreed: … in open court that Small Claims Court of Nova Scotia would not have the jurisdiction to make the ruling required pursuant to the provisions of the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules to determine if the proceeding in the Supreme Court was or should be dismissed pursuant to the provisions of the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules . [Adjudicator’s decision] [ 8 ] Mr.
Robichaud, who was now representing the Plaintiff, has stated (both in his brief, and in his personal affidavit dated September 26, 2018) that counsel for the defendant, Mr. Gillis, informed the adjudicator and himself at this time, that he would accept service of the necessary documents in this proceeding on behalf of the Defendant, Ms. Bernardi. It is unclear what had been served (and how it was served) upon Ms. Bernardi and/or her counsel to secure their attendance at Small Claims Court that night. [ 9 ] Anyway, the next day Mr. Gillis advised Mr. Robichaud that he was no longer representing the Defendant.
A "Notice of Intention to Act on One's Own" pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 33.07 , signed by Ms. Bernardi, was provided to Mr. Robichaud. [ 10 ] As required by the Rule, Ms. Bernardi provided her contact information in the Notice: The undersigned designates the following address: 5199 Shore Rd. West, Parker's Cove, Annapolis County, Nova Scotia Documents delivered to this address are considered received by the undersigned on delivery. Further contact information is available from the prothonotary. [ 11 ] Mr.
Robichaud's brief continues: [6] On May 31, 2017, after consulting a senior member of the local bar, I filed a motion seeking an Ex-Parte Order to renew the time period of the Notice of Action, Statement of Claim and Notice of Alternate Claim. On July 10, 2017, my office received correspondence from Norma J. Oliver, Deputy Prothonotary for the Annapolis Justice Centre, advising that a formal application under Rule 4.04 would be required to be filed seeking to renew the period of service for six months.
My client’s Ex Parte motion was rejected by the Court. [7] On October 8 th , 2018, my affidavit was stamped by the Annapolis Supreme Court in support of my Motion to extend the service time pursuant to Rule 4.04 and Rule 23 of the Civil Procedure Rules . On January 23 rd , 2019, I filed an Amended Ex-Parte Order along with the Affidavit of Mike Reid, process server, sworn January 16, 2019 in regards to Rule 4.04 of the Civil Procedure Rules . [8] On March 18, 2019, we received a “Notice of New Counsel” for the Defendant as she had previously discharged Mr. Gillis on March 29, 2017. Mr.
Gillis is now back on the file. The matter was adjourned for a hearing on September 9, 2019, to January 21, 2020. [9] On April 29, 2019, the Defendant swore an Affidavit claiming that the Plaintiff had made no effort to contact her or attempt to serve her the originating documents. The Plaintiff filed a sworn Affidavit stating otherwise and that the Defendant had the means to contact him and that no attempts to deal with this debt were ever made by the Defendant herein. Issues [ 12 ] The following issues are raised: A.
Is it a motion to extend the time for service of the Notice of Alternative Claim (and Statement of Claim), a motion to renew the Notice, or both, which is/are before the court? B. Is it possible to grant the Plaintiff’s motion(
s) as framed? C. If yes, should the Plaintiff’s motion(
s) be granted? [ 13 ] In the course of addressing these issues, each party’s motion to strike portions of the materials filed by the other, and the Defendant's motion for security for costs, will also be addressed. Discussion and Analysis A. Is it a motion to extend the time for service, a motion to renew the claim, or both, which is/are before the court? [ 14 ] This motion was initially commenced when the Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion as noted above. It was a motion to extend the time "for service of the Statement of Claim and Amended Notice of Motion on the defendant".
It referenced Civil Procedure Rule 4.04 . This ex parte motion was filed on October 2, 2018, and called for a court appearance on November 6, 2018. In support of the motion, the Plaintiff filed an affidavit dated September 26, 2018. [ 15 ] The ex parte motion was rejected by the Prothonotary on the basis that a formal application under Rule 4.04 would be required under the circumstances. On January 30, 2019, an "Amended Motion" was filed by the Plaintiff seeking an order "extending the time for service of the Notice of Alternative Claim and Statement of Claim filed on April 22, 2015" upon the Defendant.
An additional affidavit, that of Mike Reid (process server), dated January 16, 2019, was also filed at that time. [ 16 ] Service of the documentation with respect to this motion was effected upon Ms. Bernardi by registered mail at the address supplied in her “Notice of Intention to Act on One's Own”, which had been provided to counsel for the Plaintiff in 2017.
[ 17 ] Civil Procedure Rule 4.04 provides as follows: Expiry and renewal of a notice of action 4.04
(1) A notice of action, including a notice of action for debt, expires one year after the day it is filed, unless a defendant is notified of the action in accordance with Rule 31- Notice.
(2) A plaintiff may make a motion to renew a notice of action for a second year by filing a notice of motion no more than fourteen months after the day the notice of action is filed.
(3) The motion may be made ex parte , unless a judge orders otherwise.
(4) A notice of action that is renewed for a second year expires two years after the day it is filed.
(5) A judge may renew an expired notice of action more than fourteen months after the day the notice of action is filed only if the plaintiff satisfies the judge on either of the following: (
a) reasonable efforts were made to notify the defendant of the action by effecting personal service, service could not be effected personally, and the plaintiff will make a motion for a substituted method of giving notice as soon as possible; (
b) inadvertence led to the expiry, the plaintiff will suffer serious prejudice if the proceeding is terminated, and no defendant will suffer serious prejudice that cannot be compensated in costs as a result of the delay in notification. [ 18 ] Notwithstanding the fact that the relief sought in the Notice with respect to both the (initial) e x parte and Amended Motions could have been expressed much more clearly by the Plaintiff, the Defendant has sustained no prejudice with respect to her ability to defend the motion.
The Defendant has had full opportunity to provide both oral and written submissions upon the substance of what the Plaintiff seeks. As a consequence, I will treat this motion as one pursuant to CPR 4.04(5), to renew "an expired notice of action more than 14 months after the day the notice of action is filed". If the motion to renew is granted, of course, the documents could then be properly served upon the defendant. B. Is it possible to grant the Plaintiff’s motion(
s) as framed? i) “Notice of Alternative Claim” versus “Notice of Action” and/or “Notice of Action for Debt” [ 19 ] This claim, as it was originally conceived, was brought pursuant to the provisions of the Builders Lien Act . A perusal of CPR 4.02 reveals: Notice of action 4.02
(1) A person may start an action by filing a notice of action, unless one of the following applies: (
a) legislation requires the action to be started by filing a different document, such as the petition required by the Controverted Elections Act ; (
b) legislation, such as the Builders’ Lien Act , permits the action to be started by filing a statement of claim without a notice ; (
c) a creditor chooses to start the action by filing a notice of action for debt under Rule 4.03.
(2) The notice of action must include a statement of claim as part of the notice.
(3) The notice of action must contain a standard heading written in accordance with Rule 82 - Administration of Civil Proceedings, be entitled “Notice of Action”, be dated and signed, and include all of the following: (
a) notice that action has been started for relief described in the attached statement of claim; (
b) notice of the deadlines in Rule 31 - Notice for filing a defence; (
c) notice that the plaintiff may have default judgment against the defendant, unless the defendant files a notice of defence; (
d) a notice that the defendant may file a demand for notice, if the defendant does not defend the action but wishes to have further notice; (
e) a statement summarizing the effect of Rule 57 - Action for Damages Under $100,000, stating how it becomes applicable, and stating whether the action is within the Rule; (
f) a statement explaining how documents are filed and the requirement for immediate delivery to each party entitled to notice; (
g) if there is only one plaintiff, a designation of an address for delivery of documents to the plaintiff and, if there is more than one plaintiff, a designation of one address for delivery to all plaintiffs or a separate address for each plaintiff; (
h) an acknowledgement of the effect of delivery to the designated address and a statement that further contact information is available from the prothonotary; (
i) the place of trial designated by the plaintiff in accordance with Rule 47 Place of Trial or Hearing; (
j) the attached statement of claim.
(4) The statement of claim must notify the defendant of all the claims to be raised by the plaintiff at trial, conform with Rule 38 - Pleading, and include each of the following: (
a) a description of the parties; (
b) a concise statement of the material facts relied on by the plaintiff, but not argument or the evidence by which the material facts are to be proved; (
c) reference to legislation relied on by the plaintiff, if the material facts that make the legislation applicable have been stated; (
d) a concise statement of the remedies claimed, except costs.
(5) The notice of action may be in Form 4.02A, and the statement of claim may be in Form 4.02B. [emphasis added] [ 20 ] Rule 4.03 provides:
(1) A plaintiff who claims only on a debt, and who claims no interest, interest under an agreement that expressly provides for the payment of interest, or prejudgment interest under the Judicature Act may start an action by filing a notice of action for debt.
(2) A plaintiff who files a notice of action for debt may claim prejudgment interest under the Judicature Act at five percent a year calculated simply from the day the debt came due.
(3) A prothonotary may dismiss an action brought by notice of action for debt, if the prothonotary is satisfied the plaintiff makes a claim that is not based only on a debt, such as a claim based on an unliquidated demand.
(4) The notice of action for debt must be entitled "Notice of Action for Debt", otherwise include everything that is required in a notice of action, and provide each of the following additional statements: (
a) a statement of the amount sought on default judgment expressed as the amount of the debt calculated to a recent day, a claim for interest after that day such that the defendant and the prothonotary can calculate the amount from information in the notice including the statement of claim, the amount of Tariff D costs, and a claim for disbursements to be taxed; (
b) a statement that the prothonotary will dismiss the action, except the claim for taxed disbursements, if the defendant pays the amount sought for default judgment and delivers a receipt to the prothonotary; (
c) a statement that the claim for disbursements may be settled or taxed.
(5) The statement of claim in a notice of action for debt must notify the defendant of the basis for the claim in debt, conform with Rule 38 - Pleading, and include each of the following: (
a) a description of the parties; (
b) a concise statement of how the debt was incurred; (
c) a concise statement of how the debt came due; (
d) a statement of the rate and calculation of any interest claimed; (
e) a statement showing the calculation of the amount claimed, including principal, credits, interest, and the total; (
f) a statement showing how further interest is to be calculated to the date of judgment.
(6) The notice of action for debt may be in Form 4.03A, and the statement of claim may be in Form 4.03B. [ 21 ] At first blush, Rule 4.02(1) would appear to provide some comfort to the Plaintiff, given that his claim was originally brought pursuant to the Builders Lien Act . Some of the relevant provisions of that Act include: Contents of claim 19
(1) A claim for lien shall state (
a) the name and residence of the person claiming the lien, and of the owner of the property to be charged, or of the person whom the person claiming the lien, or his agent, believes to be the owner of the property proposed to be charged, and of the person for whom and on whose credit the work or service was, or is to be, done, or materials furnished or placed, and the time within which the same was, or is to be done, or furnished or placed; (
b) a short description of the work or service done, or to be done, or materials furnished or placed, or to be furnished or placed; (
c) the sum claimed as due or to become due; (
d) a description of the land or property to be charged; and (
e) the date of expiry of the period of credit, if any, agreed upon by the lien holder for payment for his work or service or materials, where credit has been given.
… Time for registering claim for lien 24
(1) A claim for lien by a contractor or subcontractor, in cases not otherwise provided for, may be registered before or during the performance of the contract, or within sixty days after the completion or abandonment thereof.
(2) A claim for lien for materials may be registered before or during the furnishing or placing thereof, or within sixty days after the furnishing or placing of the last material so furnished or placed.
(3) A claim for lien for services may be registered at any time during the performance of the service or within sixty days after the completion of the service.
(4) A claim for lien for wages may be registered at any time during the performance of the work for which such wages are claimed, or within sixty days after the last work is done for which the lien is claimed. … If no period of credit or period uncertain 27 If there is no period of credit, or if the date of the expiry of the period of credit is not stated in the claim so registered, the lien shall cease to exist upon the expiration of ninety days after the work or service has been completed or materials furnished or placed , unless in the meantime an action is commenced and a certificate thereof registered as provided by
Section 26. R.S., c. 277, s. 27; 2004, c. 14, s. 13 ; 2005, c. 8, s. 5 . [emphasis added] [ 22 ] Clearly, a claim of lien for registration dated January 15, 2015, was recorded on January 29, 2015, respecting Ms. Bernardi's property identified (at the proper Registry of Deeds for the region) as PID #05137757. The "Notice of Alternative Claim" and Statement of Claim were not filed with the court, however, until April 22, 2015.
The Certificate of Lis Pendens , required by virtue of the provisions of ss. 26 and 27 of the BLA , was consequently not obtained until April 22, 2015, and was filed on April 24, 2015, at the Registry of Deeds . There is no evidence that either the Notice or the Statement of Claim was ever served upon the defendant, then or now. [ 23 ] Paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim indicates that the last labour and materials supplied by the Plaintiff at the property occurred on January 9, 2015.
Therefore, in order to preserve the lien, an action was required to be started in the Supreme Court (and the corresponding Certificate of Lis Pendens filed at the Registry of Deeds) within 90 days, or April 10, 2015. ( BLA , s.27) [ 24 ] Had we been dealing with an otherwise valid lien claim (among other things, one which had been commenced within the statutorily prescribed timelines) such a "notice" would not have been required at all.
Section 34(7) of the BLA , provides: Action to enforce lien … 34(7) The statement of claim shall be served within one month after it is filed, but the court or judge having power to try the action may extend the time for service thereof. [ 25 ] However, on May 5, 2015, as noted earlier, present counsel for Ms. Bernardi appeared on an ex parte motion (pursuant to s. 29(5) of the BLA ) and obtained an order to vacate the claim of lien for registration which had been earlier filed against her property, on the basis of Mr. Bent's failure to file that certificate within the time provided by s. 27.
His in rem claim against Ms. Bernardi's estate had ceased to exist on April 10, 2015 (the subsequent Order of May 5, 2015 was merely declarative in that respect). His in personam claim against the Defendant remained extant. [ 26 ] The "Notice of Alternative Claim" filed with the court on April 22, 2015, referred to the action as one for "enforcement of the lien by sale and for a judgement for any deficiency". Were this the only relief claimed, the BLA provides that a "Notice of Action" as outlined in CPR 4.02 is not required, which is specifically noted in 4.02(1)(b).
However, and as noted above, the in rem remedy which the Plaintiff could have otherwise pursued had already been rendered unavailable to him on April 10, 2015, due to his failure to comply with s. 27 by that date. [ 27 ] The "Notice of Alternative Claim" filed with the court on April 22, 2015, also refers to the other remedy, the one which the Plaintiff continues to pursue: An alternative claim is made that you are personally liable to pay the entire amount due to the builder. Judgement is claimed against you personally, if the plaintiff chooses to withdraw the claim to with enforce the lien.
The alternative claim is made by filing this notice of alternative claim . [emphasis added] [ 28 ] As a consequence, the Notice prepared and filed by the Plaintiff, which he is seeking to “renew” (when viewed in the present context) is incongruous, among other things, in that it references an in rem remedy which was rendered inaccessible to him almost five years ago. [ 29 ] However, the “Notice of Alternative Claim” (although not entitled “Notice of Action for Debt” – per CPR 4.02(3) and 4.03(4)) does provide the particulars and basis for the Plaintiff's claim as to the money that he says he is owed, and contains enough of the other “mandatory contents” of a Notice of Action (as specified in CPR 4.02 and 4.03) to provide the Defendant with proper notice of what is
being claimed against her and why, if she were to be served with it. The references to the Claim of Lien in the Notice could easily be struck, if renewal under CPR 4.04(5) was otherwise considered to be appropriate. [ 30 ] In any event (and to segue briefly) the factors which I must consider under CPR 4.04 would be closely related (if not identical) to those which would have to be dealt with as a prerequisite to an application to extend the time for service of a Statement of Claim under s. 34(7) of the BLA . [ 31 ] Justice McDougall’s observations in Tam Hampson 20/20 Design Inc. v.
Kreuger-Naug, 2016 NSSC 217 support this view: 32. In other words, a plaintiff who asks the court to exercise its discretion to relieve it of the consequences that ordinarily flow from a failure to comply with the legislation must provide a reason capable of justifying that exercise of discretion. This burden is not a particularly heavy one. It could be met with evidence of: (1) a failure to serve despite reasonable efforts to track down the defendant, (2) oversight or inadvertence, or (3) illness or other temporary incapacity on the part of the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel.
This is not meant to be an exhaustive list. 33. Although the plaintiff asked the court to consider the prejudice it will suffer if the lien is vacated, the question of whether the failure to comply with s. 34(7) was for a valid reason is a threshold question, much like the question under Civil Procedure Rule 4.04(5) of whether a plaintiff's failure to serve a notice of action before its expiry was the result of inadvertence .
Rule 4.04(5) allows a judge to renew an expired notice of action more than fourteen months after it was filed only if one of two conditions are met: 4.04(5) A judge may renew an expired notice of action more than fourteen months after the day the notice of action is filed only if the plaintiff satisfies the judge on either of the following: (a)reasonable efforts were made to notify the defendant of the action by effecting personal service, service could not be effected personally, and the plaintiff will make a motion for a substituted method of giving notice as soon as possible; (b)inadvertence led to the expiry, the plaintiff will suffer serious prejudice if the proceeding is terminated, and no defendant will suffer serious prejudice that cannot be compensated in costs as a result of the delay in notification. … 35.
The same reasoning applies to a motion under the BLA for an extension of time for service. Evidence of the potential prejudice to the parties in the event that the lien is vacated, or the time for service extended, should inform the analysis, but only if the plaintiff has met the threshold of showing a valid reason for the failure to comply with s. 34(7) of the BLA . 36. The plaintiff in this case has offered no reason -- let alone a valid one -- for its failure to serve the defendants with the statement of claim within one month after it was filed.
The court should not be forced to speculate on the reasons for this failure. Nor does the plaintiff engender much sympathy in light of Mr. Conrad's efforts to facilitate service on his clients. In the circumstances, the court has little choice but to order the lien be vacated.
To do otherwise in the circumstances of this case, would divest s. 34(7) of any consequence or meaning. [emphasis added] [ 32 ] I will treat the “Notice of Alternative Claim”, in pith and substance, as a “Notice of Action” or a “Notice of Action for Debt”, for the purposes of consideration of this motion pursuant to CPR 4.04(5). (ii) Failure to register the name "AJ Bent Contracting" prior to starting the action. [ 33 ] In the Claim of Lien for Registration (dated January 15, 2015, and filed at the Registry of Deeds on January 29, 2015) and in the documents which were filed with the court on April 22, 2015 ("Notice of Alternative Claim" and Statement of Claim) the Plaintiff described himself as "carrying on business under the firm name and style of AJ Bent Contracting".
"AJ Bent Contracting" was not registered under the Partnership and Business Names Registration Act (" PBNRA "), until July 2015. [ 34 ] Section 3(1) of the PBNRA states: Certificate of registration required 3
(1) No person shall as partner carry out in whole or in
part in the Province any of the purposes or objects of the partnership or do any act, matter or thing as a partner, unless and until the partnership holds a certificate, called a certificate of registration, issued by the Registrar as hereinafter provided and unless the certificate of registration is in force. [ 35 ]
Section 2(ab) tells us that “partnership”, for the purposes of the PBNRA : ... includes a person who is engaged in business or otherwise for the purpose of gain and is not associated in partnership with any other person, but uses as his style in connection therewith some name or designation other than his own name or who, in such style, uses his own name with the addition of "and company" or some words or phrase indicating a plurality of persons ; [emphasis added] [ 36 ]
Section 20 continues: Condition for right of action by partnership 20 Unless and until a partnership holds a certificate of registration that is in force, the partnership or the members thereof shall not be capable of bringing or maintaining any action, suit or other proceeding in any court in the Province with respect to any contract made in
whole or in
part in the Province in connection with any of the purposes or objects of the partnership carried out in the Province whilst it did not hold a certificate of registration that was in force provided that in the event of a certificate of registration having been cancelled owing to the dissolution of the partnership, the members of such partnership shall be capable of bringing and maintaining an action, suit or other proceeding in any court in the Province with respect to any contract at any time made by the partnership in the same manner and as effectual to all intents and purposes as if this Act had not been passed.
R.S., c. 335, s. 20. [emphasis added] [ 37 ] The Defendant argues that as a consequence, "the Plaintiff, AJ Bent Contracting”, had no standing to commence an action in the Supreme Court on April 22, 2015, when he purported to file the Notice and Statement of Claim" ( defendant's brief , p. 3).
By extension, the argument continues, the claim was never validly brought in the first place, and that something which is void ab initio cannot be "renewed". [ 38 ] In fact, the Plaintiff used his own name in the designation of his business, albeit with the additional word "Contracting" (a name which does not suggest a “plurality of persons”) with his contact information. [ 39 ] I conclude that s. 20 of the PBNRA did not act as a bar to the commencement of his action in the Supreme Court in these circumstances, when the proceedings were initiated on April 22, 2015. [ 40 ] Nonetheless, the Plaintiff's motion must be denied.
I will explain why. C. Should the Plaintiff’s motion be granted? [ 41 ] The operative portion of CPR 4.04 is repeated for ease of reference: 4.04
(5) A judge may renew an expired notice of action more than fourteen months after the day the notice of action is filed only if the plaintiff satisfies the judge on either of the following: (
a) reasonable efforts were made to notify the defendant of the action by effecting personal service, service could not be effected personally, and the plaintiff will make a motion for a substituted method of giving notice as soon as possible; (
b) inadvertence led to the expiry, the plaintiff will suffer serious prejudice if the proceeding is terminated, and no defendant will suffer serious prejudice that cannot be compensated in costs as a result of the delay in notification. [emphasis added] [ 42 ] Recall that CPR 31 is referenced in CPR 4.04(1). The former stipulates that personal service is required unless some other form of service is authorized by the court (i.e. substituted service).
Putting the Plaintiff's case at its strongest, should he wish to renew, the motion to do so would have to have been made within 14 months of April 22, 2015, which is to say, on or by June 22, 2016. No such motion was brought, and so the provisions of CPR 4.04(5)(
a) and (
b) must be considered. [ 43 ] The Plaintiff carries the onus to establish that he falls within either 4.04(5)a or 4.04(5)b. He has failed to do either. (
i) CPR 4.04(5)a – Reasonable efforts to effect service upon the defendant? [ 44 ] In an apparent attempt to satisfy his onus under CPR 4.04(5)a, the Plaintiff has filed affidavits of Mike Reid dated January 16, 2019, and his own, dated July 25, 2019. The former is very brief and the entire text is set forth below: 1. I was retained by Randall Balcome, the Plaintiff’s previous solicitor in this matter, to serve the Defendant named herein with a Notice of Action and Statement of Claim together with a Statement of Alternate Claim in April of 2015. 2. I did attend as directed by Mr.
Balcome to service of these documents on the defendant, Linda Bernardi, at two properties, one in Deep Brook and the other in Parker’s Cove. I attended both locations on April 29, 2015. 3. I could not effect service at either of these locations. 4. I attended the Deep Brook property a second time to effect service on Ms. Bernardi. That attempt at service was unsuccessful as well. 5. I attach a copy of my account in this matter as Exhibit “A” to this Affidavit. 6. I have been provided with a copy of an invoice from Alan P. Sipley to Mr. Balcome by Hugh Robichaud for my review and comment.
Said invoice as attached as Exhibit “B” hereto. 7. I know that Alan P. Sipley was in the business of serving documents and did so for years in the Valley area of Nova Scotia. 8. I also know that Mr. Sipley has since died. 9. It is apparent from his invoice in this matter that he made two attempts at service upon Ms. Bernardi in Deep Brook on February 2 nd , and February 3 rd , 2015. 10. I make this Affidavit for no improper purpose. [ 45 ] There are many inadequacies with respect to this affidavit, hence the Defendant’s ancillary motion to strike portions both of it and of Mr. Bent’s affidavit.
I will content myself with reference to only the most obvious of these inadequacies.
[ 46 ] First, to describe the efforts to effect service set forth in Mr. Reid’s document as "sketchy" would be an understatement. Both "attempts" are said to have occurred on April 29, 2015. The scenes at which these attempts took place are described as "... two properties, one in Deep Brook and the other in Parker's Cove." [ 47 ] Second, there is no indication of any attempts having been made to effect service by anyone after April 29, 2015. [ 48 ] Third, there is, in Mr. Reid’s affidavit (para. 9), a reference to “attempts” at service having been made prior to this date.
These attempts were not, however, made by Mr. Reid personally, but rather by Mr. Sibley, who has "since died". Reference to Mr. Sibley's invoice, which is attached as Exhibit “B” to Mr. Reid's affidavit, would seem to indicate that these attempts were made on February 2 and 3, 2015. However, the body of Mr. Sibley’s invoice contains reference to a “service” having been effected upon the Defendant “at 473 Highway # 1 Deep, Brook, NS re-Alan Bent". It would appear, then, that these were not mere "attempts" at service upon Ms. Bernardi by Mr.
Sibley, but rather that actual service had been effected upon her. [ 49 ] But service of what? Mr. Sibley cannot tell us, and neither can Mr. Reid. Facially, it appears from the invoice that service of the claim of lien itself is what was effected upon Ms. Bernardi, on the dates mentioned in the Sibley invoice. [ 50 ] So, these cannot have been earlier “attempts” to effect service of the Notice of Alternative Claim and Statement of Claim upon her. Indeed, neither document was even in existence on February 2 and 3, 2015.
Neither party addressed this. [ 51 ] Fourth, no indication is given as to why service could not be effected upon Ms. Bernardi by Mr. Reid on April 29, 2015. [ 52 ] Fifth, what little is to be gleaned from Mr. Reid's affidavit is further obscured when considered alongside the affidavit of Mr. Bent. For example, Mr. Bent alleges: 7. THAT I gave instructions to Mr. Balcome to call me when Mr. Reid went to serve the Defendant and I could assist in locating her in Deep Brook. 8. THAT Randall Balcome retained Mike Reid, of Coldbrook, Kings County, Nova Scotia to serve the Defendant.
It was never my duty to serve the Respondent with any documents nor did I ever have any documents in my possession to serve Ms. Bernadi. 9. THAT the Defendant owes me money, but I do not know where her office is located now or at any time. 10. THAT the Lis Pendens in this matter (not dismissed as suggested by the Respondent) was vacated and the claim was never dismissed nor was the Alternative Claim. 11. THAT I never got a call from anyone.
On one occasion when one process server went and the Defendant was not there, I went to the house that same day and saw her peeking through the blinds as I was parked at the end of the driveway. [emphasis added] [ 53 ] Assuming that Mr. Sibley's invoice reflects the actual service of a claim of lien upon Ms. Bernardi in early February, 2015 at the address noted therein, was this one of the addresses to which Mr. Reid devoted his efforts in April of that year? If yes, why was it necessary for Mr. Bent, as he alleges (in para. 7 of his affidavit), to “assist” Mr. Reid as to how to locate her?
Also, what does para. 9 of Mr. Bent’s affidavit mean in the present context? [ 54 ] Sixth, why are no efforts to effect personal service after April 29, 2015 mentioned? [ 55 ] These points are not nearly exhaustive. They suffice, however, to illustrate why Mr. Bent has not come close to discharging his onus under CPR 4.04(5)a, which required him to satisfy this court that reasonable efforts had been made to notify the Defendant by effecting personal service. [ 56 ] And that was only the initial hurdle set out in CPR 4.04(5)a. Even if he had overcome it (as was noted earlier) he has not addressed why Mr.
Reid could not effect personal service. And even if it could be said that he had established that service could not be effected personally, he has not explained why an application for substituted service was not made a long time ago. [ 57 ] Finally, Mr. Bent gives no indication that, should the Court “renew” his notice, that he will “make a motion for a substituted method” of service as soon as possible (per 4.04(5)(a)). Indeed, if past history is any indicator, quite the opposite is to be inferred. (
v) CPR 4.04(5)b – Inadvertence [ 58 ] As to CPR 4.04(5)b, it first requires the moving party to establish that "inadvertence led to the expiry". As Campbell J. pointed out in Langdale v. Register.com Inc. , 2016 NSSC 171 : Rule 4.04(5)b required proof of "inadvertence". Inadvertence means carelessness. At some point a lack of action ceases to be inadvertent ... Rule 4.04(5) is a protection against oversights and mistakes and is not intended as a way to extend limitation periods.
Evidence of inadvertence has to relate to why the documents were not served in the first place. [ 59 ] There is no need to deal with the other requirements of CPR 4.04(5)b. This is clearly not a case of mere “inadvertence”. The Plaintiff has conceded that he is not relying on "inadvertence" in any event. (vi) Motions to strike and security for costs [ 60 ] In order to permit me to consider the Plaintiff's case at its strongest, I did not strike any of the impugned portions of the affidavits and/or other materials filed in support of his motion when I considered his motion to “renew”.
As such, I will not comment further upon each party’s motion to strike, nor will it be necessary for me to consider the Defendant's motion for security for costs, in
light of the result. Conclusion [ 61 ] The Plaintiff's motion is dismissed. The Defendant shall receive her costs in the amount of $2,000.00 including disbursements. Gabriel, J.
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