Qu v. Calvesbert, 2020 NSSC 83
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia FAMILY DIVISION Citation: Qu v. Calvesbert, 2020 NSSC 83 Date: 2020/02/28 Docket: 1201-068126/SFHD - 92661 Registry: Halifax Between: Hong (Emily) Qu Petitioner v. David Calvesbert Respondent LIBRARY HEADING Judge: The Honourable Justice Elizabeth Jollimore Heard: February 24 and 25, 2020
Summary: After teen-aged son moved to mother’s primary care in Ontario, she applied to vary existing order to have primary care and sole custody of 8-year old daughter. In absence of proven material change, application dismissed. Key words: Parenting, Joint custody, Primary care, Variation, Material change in circumstances Legislation : Divorce Act , R.S.C. 1985 (2 nd Supp.), c. 3, subsection 17(5) THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOESN’T FORM PART OF THE COURT’S DECISION. QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET . SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia FAMILY DIVISION Citation: Qu v. Calvesbert, 2020 NSSC 83 Date: 2020/02/28 Docket: 1201-068126/SFHD - 092661 Registry: Halifax Between:
Hong (Emily) Qu Petitioner v. David Calvesbert Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Elizabeth Jollimore Heard: February 24 and 25, 2020 Counsel: Kelsey E. Hudson for Emily QuDiana Musgrave for David Calvesbert By the Court: Introduction [1] Emily Qu wants to vary a consent order granted in the fall of 2016 so that 8-year old Alyssa will live primarily with her and she will have sole decision-making authority for Alyssa. The application is governed by
section 17 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 3. [2] The fall 2016 Variation Order placed Alyssa in David Calvesbert’s primary care and gave the parents joint custody. [3] Before I vary a parenting order, I must be satisfied that there’s been a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstancesof the child which has occurred since the date of the order being varied: Divorce Act, subsection 17(5).
In making any variation to aparenting order, I’m to consider only the best interests of the child as determined with regard to that change. [4] The threshold requirement of a material change was further developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Gordon v. Goertz, (SCC). At paragraph 13, then-Justice McLachlin was specific in identifying the three requirements that must be satisfiedbefore I can vary a parenting order.
The requirements are: 1. there must be a change in the condition, means, needs or circumstances of the child, or the ability of the parents to meet the child’sneeds; 2. the change must materially affect the child; and 3. the change was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made the initial order. [5] Alyssa’s brother, Dominik, moved to Ontario to live with Ms. Qu in February 2018. Ms. Qu says that this is a change in Alyssa’scircumstances. Mr.
Calvesbert doesn’t dispute that Dominik’s move is a change in Alyssa’s circumstances and that it was not foreseenand was not reasonably contemplated by the parties when they agreed on the terms of the fall 2016 Variation Order. [6] Dominik’s move meets the first and third requirements of Gordon v. Goertz, (SCC). [7] The second requirement is that the change must materially affect Alyssa. We focus on material change for three reasons. 1. First, all parenting applications, including variation applications, are determined on the basis of the child’s best interests.
A materialchange means the order is no longer in the child’s best interests and must be changed so that it is in the child’s best interests. 2. Second, identifying what the material change is allows me to formulate a new parenting arrangement that reflects the child’s bestinterests in the new circumstances. 3. If there is no material change, the current order is still in the child’s best interests and I have no authority to change the order.
[8] Only if the three threshold requirements are met may I embark on the fresh inquiry into Alyssa’s best interests: Gordon v. Goertz,paragraph 49, at point 2; Salah, 2014 NSCA 36 at paragraph 2. [9] The parties disagree whether Dominik’s move is a material change. Is Dominik’s move to Ontario a material change? [10] Ms. Qu has burden of proving the change is material. Decision-making (custody) [11] Ms. Qu wants to change both decision-making (custody) and Alyssa’s primary home. I’ll start with decision-making. [12] There is no connection between Dominik’s move and decision-making.
His move is not material as it relates to decision-making. [13] The parties’ antagonism toward each other and their hostile communications have been the context for parenting ever since theirseparation, so this is not a change. [14] Where there is no material change that relates to decision-making (custody) I must dismiss the request to change the parties’ jointcustody of Alyssa. They will continue to have joint custody.
Alyssa’s primary residence [15] In terms of Alyssa’s primary residence, neither party has offered me any case law where a sibling’s move has been held to be amaterial change or held not to be a material change. [16] Certainly, there are cases which say that siblings should be together. They speak of the desire for children to share theirchildhood.
Our Court of Appeal addressed this almost 50 years ago in Zinck, (1973) (NS CA), 6 NSR (2d) 622, atparagraph 11, where Chief Justice MacKeigan said: I do not think that this proposition [that siblings should not be separated] should be elevated to a principle or rule of law. It isundoubtedly desirable, if it can be accomplished, to keep children of a family together, so that they may share the affection and supportof each other and grow up with a sense of family solidarity.
This, however, is only one factor of the many that must be balanced andconsidered in determining what is in the best interest of the individual children respectively. [17] In a slightly different context from the one that faces me, Justice Gass dealt with a true mobility application under thethen-Maintenance and Custody Act in Hawboldt v. Melanson, 2008 NSSC 259. There was a material change in circumstances in thatcase, so Justice Gass was making her fresh inquiry into the children’s best interests. This inquiry includes considering the children’sviews.
She said it was clear that the 17-year old daughter was “anxious to make this move with her mother” while the 12-year old sonfelt it was for the judge to make the decision. [18] Justice Gass said that The separation of siblings in this situation is not as significant because Sarah, in many respects, appears to be on her way out the door inthat she has just one more year of school left and she is 17 years of age and is probably going to make her own decisions. [19] In other words, separating siblings was less of a concern because the older child was reaching an age where she might soon leavehome.
Ultimately, Justice Gass ordered that 12-year old Taylor remain in Nova Scotia and she allowed 17-year old Sarah to make herown decision. This is similar to the case before me. [20] Dominik is 16. He’ll turn 17 in 3 months. He’s likely in Grade 11 - extrapolating from Mr. Calvesbert’s most recent affidavit. Alyssa is 8. She’s in grade 3 and won’t turn 9 for another 7 months. I don’t know if Dominik will stay at his mother’s home after highschool. He wants to be a doctor so he will be going to university. It will be at least a decade before Alyssa is ready to leave home.
Because of Dominik’s stage in life, this is a situation where the separation of siblings is “not as significant”, to borrow Justice Gass’words. [21] Since her parents separated, Alyssa’s been in her father’s primary care. For the past few years, Alyssa’s household has includedher stepmother and her two stepsisters, age 19 and 21. Her stepsisters will remain home for the next few years. Alyssa has a close andaffectionate relationship with her stepsisters.
In Nova Scotia, Alyssa also has relationships with her paternal grandparents and her ownfriends. [22] When Alyssa goes to Ontario to visit her mother, she sees Dominik. They are also close, and they enjoy activities together. Dominik is very interested in gaming and has a room dedicated to this. There’s no evidence that Alyssa shares this interest. They shareother interests. Alyssa and Dominik have spent at least 4 weeks together in Ontario in 2018 and at least 5 weeks together in 2019. [23] In Ontario, Alyssa also sees her maternal grandparents who spend approximately 6 months of each year in Canada.
She has no“in person” contact with her stepfather’s family. [24] Alyssa likes to be active. With both her parents and their new partners, there are family activities. She refers to her stepparents,as well as her parents, using variations of mom and dad. Both parents involve their partners and, in Mr. Calvesbert’s case, Alyssa’sstepsisters, in Alyssa’s care. Dominik is also involved, when he and Alyssa are together. Ms. Qu says that if she and her husband everneed help, her parents have agreed to live with them for longer periods.
This is what families do: no one person is solely and whollyresponsible for bringing up a child.
[ 25 ] Alyssa has no difficulty at school. [ 26 ] Dominik’s move to Ontario is one change in Alyssa’s circumstances, but the majority of her circumstances are unchanged, and I have no evidence to show me that her best interests are no longer served by living in her father’s primary care. Dominik’s move to Ontario is not a material change in Alyssa’s circumstances. The existing order cannot be varied on this basis to permit Alyssa to move to Ontario. Are there other circumstances that constitute a material change? [ 27 ] In addition to arguing that Dominik’s move was a material change, Ms.
Qu expressed concerns about Alyssa’s health: her feet, yeast infections and bed bugs. • While Ms. Qu says that Alyssa’s feet have been slightly deformed since birth, she has never taken steps to have this addressed. This condition pre-dates the 2016 Variation Order so it is not a change. As well, while Mr. Calvesbert hasn’t taken Alyssa to a doctor to address it - neither has Ms. Qu. She has joint custody and is able to take Alyssa to a doctor if this was a concern. • While mention was made of multiple yeast infections, a close reading of the affidavits shows Ms.
Qu said, “in late 2017, she visited Alyssa in Halifax and noted that Alyssa suffered from another yeast infection”. The emphasis is mine. Ms. Qu doesn’t say how many yeast infections Alyssa has had and whether this problem pre-dates the last Variation Order. I don’t know if she’s had 2 or 20. The evidence doesn’t tell me if having a yeast infection is a new occurrence or if it is significant. • It’s alleged that “many times” when Alyssa visited in Ontario, she had bed bug bites. Mr. Calvesbert admits that bedbugs were a problem once and an exterminator was hired. He denies multiple infestations.
There’s no evidence, such as photographs, that helps me determine whether there was more than one infestation. I’m not told when this happened, though it was clearly after the 2016 Variation Order. [ 28 ] None of these concerns is clearly shown to be a material change: happening after the last order or of sufficient significance. [ 29 ] Because there’s no material change, I have no authority to vary any terms of the existing order. I dismiss Ms.
Qu’s variation application. [ 30 ] I certainly encourage the parents to act on their stated desire to increase the time Alyssa spends with her mother and brother in Ontario during March Breaks and the summers. ______________________________________ Elizabeth Jollimore, J.S.C. (F.D.) Halifax, Nova Scotia
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