R. v. Enns, 2020 NSSC 85
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: R. v. Enns , 2020 NSSC 85 Date: 20200304 Docket: CRH No. 482274 Registry: Halifax Between: Her Majesty the Queen v. Christopher Enns Publication Ban: Section 648(1) of the Criminal Code * Please note: This decision was provided to the parties in 2020, prior to the release of La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22 Judge: The Honourable Justice Joshua M.
Arnold Heard: February 4, 2020, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Counsel: Leonard MacKay and Scott Millar, for the Crown Jack Lloyd, for the Defence By the Court: Overview [ 1 ] Christopher Enns is awaiting a jury trial for possession of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking and related offences. His trial is set to commence on May 13, 2020. Mr. Enns has had a number of pre-trial voir dires for which written decisions have been delivered, but which are all subject to time-limited pre-trial publication bans in accordance with s. 648 of the Criminal Code .
The Federal Crown handling the matter shared some of the pre-trial decisions with other lawyers in his office who, in turn, have referred to them in other proceedings. Additional members of the Federal Crown office wish to rely on these decisions in other proceedings and have now asked for permission from this court. Mr. Enns objects to the pre-trial decisions being mentioned in other court proceedings while the s. 648 publication ban is in force.
Facts [ 2 ] The following decisions have been rendered in relation to pre-trial motions in this matter that are subject to mandatory publication bans in accordance with s. 648 of the Criminal Code : VD1, Vukelich Application, 2019 NSSC 207 ; VD3, Sections 8, 9, 10 and 24(2) Charter Application, 2019 NSSC 206 ; and VD5, Constitutional Challenge to Section 5(2) CDSA and the ACMPR , 2019 NSSC 323 . [ 3 ] On January 15, 2020, the Federal Crown sent the following email to the court and Mr. Enns:
Good afternoon Kelly, I have provided a copy of this decision to several of my colleagues, who have, in turn, filed same with the court in proceedings withsimilar applications pending. In fact, several courts had been waiting for the Enns decision to assist them in their proceedings. To date,due to the publication ban, these courts have not provided a copy of this Enns decision to defence. We have just heard that one suchjudge will not even consider the Enns decision in her deliberations, in light of the publication ban.
I am writing to ask that you check with Justice Arnold to see if he is opposed to the decision being provided to defence in theseproceedings, on the understanding that it will not be published. Kindly advise at your earliest convenience. [4] On January 16, 2020, the court wrote back to the parties and stated: Good morning Mr.
MacKay, Further to your email below, Justice Arnold would ask that you please provide authority with respect to having already distributed adecision under a publication ban as well as authority for your proposal with respect to further distributing a decision under a publicationban. [5] The Crown replied on January 24, 2020: This is further to the email exchange last week in relation to the distribution of the VD5 Decision (2019 NSSC 323). As mentioned, Ihave circulated this decision to other PPSC counsel for consideration in their files with similar applications pending.
PPSC would like tobe able to rely on this decision in those proceedings, but without offending the publication ban. The face of the decision indicates as follows: “Restriction on Publication:
Section 539 of the Criminal Code.” The email cover letterfrom your judicial assistant includes the following: * Please note this decision cannot be released for publishing until the conclusion of Mr. Enns’ jury trial as per the publication bancurrently in place. Presumably, the ban we are concerned with here is meant to protect the jury pool from any information that might impugn Mr. Enns, orotherwise jeopardize the fairness of the trial. This would be under the authority of s. 648 [in conjunction with s. 645(5) – see R v Stobbe,2011 MBQB 293 and R v Regan, 124 CCC (3d) 77, (NSSC)], or the common law.
I have received an email fromyour judicial assistant confirming that the ban in question is under s. 648. It is the Crown’s position that the distribution of the decision to the court and parties in other prosecutions does not amount topublishing, broadcasting or transmitting in a way that offends s. 648. We are not able to provide any authority directly on point, but theavailable case law supports the view that s. 648 is intended to prevent publishing, broadcasting and transmitting in a fashion that wouldmake the decision widely available to the public. Publication bans only restrict publication, not access.
Further, the Crown argues that the terms “published,” “broadcast” and “transmitted” can have several
interpretations, and that in thecontext of a publication ban (and rule of strict construction if necessary - see R v CBC, 2018 ABCA 391) it should be interpreted in a waythat allows for use in other court proceedings. It is the Crown’s position that the Enns decision can be used in other court proceedings, as long as the publication ban is noted. It wouldnot make sense for other courts to be deciding similar issues without the benefit of this decision. If Your Lordship does not agree, thenPPSC requests that a written publication ban be issued by the Court that would allow for such use.
If Your Lordship agrees that the decision can be used by PPSC as proposed, perhaps another copy of the decision can be forwarded bythe Court with the appropriate publication clearly indicated? [6] On February 4, 2020, a hearing was held in relation to this matter. No evidence was called and no relevant case law wasproduced by either party. Issues [7] Can a primary decision subject to a s. 648 publication ban be distributed to lawyers, litigants and courts in secondary matters? If so, what is the impact of the primary s. 648 publication ban? Legislation [8] Subsection 648(1) of the Criminal Code states: 648.
(1) After permission to separate is given to members of a jury under subsection 647(1), no information regarding any portion of thetrial at which the jury is not present shall be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way before the jury retires toconsider its verdict. Positions of the parties The Crown’s position [9] The Crown’s position is outlined in their correspondence of January 24, 2020, quoted above.
Mr. Enns’ Position [10] Mr. Enns says that the Crown cannot, and should not, have provided decisions that are subject to a s. 648 publication ban totheir colleagues or to other courts. He says that doing so has the potential to “pollute” the jury pool, since many material facts andfindings are referred to in those voir dire decisions. Mr. Enns provided the court with three cases R. v. Church of Scientology ofToronto, (1986), (ON SC), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. High Ct. J.); Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commissioner, PublicInquiries Act), (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97; and R. v. Millard and Smich, 2016 ONSC 3926.
Those three cases all dealtwith discretionary publication bans, not mandatory statutory bans, as we are dealing with in this case. [11] Mr. Enns says that the Crown should not have shared any of the publication banned decisions without prior approval andauthorization from the court. He also says that since several of the voir dire decisions discuss facts that will be in issue for the jury, andmany of the facts are notorious enough as to point to Mr.
Enns’ involvement, including the names of the witnesses he called on one ofthe voir dires, merely anonymizing his name would not provide a sufficient safeguard. [12] In many ways, without directly saying so, many of Mr. Enns’ arguments seem to equate his vision of a s. 648 publication banto an in camera (or private) hearing. James Rossiter describes “private hearings” as following in Law of Publication Bans, PrivateHearings and Sealing Orders (Thomson Reuters, loose-leaf), at
section 1.2.2: 1.2.2 — Private Hearings A private hearing is also known as a closed or in camera hearing. It is a hearing heard to the exclusion of the public, with the exclusioneither required by legislation or ordered by a judge. Exclusion ordered by a judge is sometimes called an exclusion order. Privatehearings are greater than publication bans in their incursion on the principle of openness and freedom of expression. A publication banrestricts publication; it does not restrict public attendance.
A private hearing restricts public attendance and, because the public cannotattend, it effectively impedes the public afterward from disclosing or discussing what occurred in the hearing. Private hearings have allthe positives and negatives of publication bans as identified above without their problem of efficacy, also discussed above. This is whatmakes private hearings especially attractive to some litigants seeking secrecy. An American website might circumvent a publication banbut it cannot get past a locked and guarded door. As with publication bans, private hearings can be mandatory or discretionary.
A mandatory private hearing means a judge has no choicein whether to hold the hearing in private. Child protection hearings in some jurisdictions provide an example of mandatory closedhearings. A discretionary exclusion order gives a judge a choice in whether to close court. A discretionary exclusion order may bestatutory or common law. An example of the former is section 486(1) of the Criminal Code, permitting a judge to close some or all of acriminal trial. A common law exclusion order is an order nowhere found in statute.
It is an order authorized at common law and grantedby a judge of a court with inherent jurisdiction. Vancouver Sun, Re provides an example of a common law exclusion order. The judge offirst instance held a judicial investigative hearing under
section 83.28 of the Criminal Code in a closed court even though there was nostatutory authority to close court. [13] To reiterate, we are dealing here exclusively with a s. 648 publication ban, not an in camera hearing, nor a discretionary ban. Analysis [14] Counsel have not provided me with any cases that address the scope of a s. 648 publication ban in these circumstances. Norwas the court able to locate any cases that would address this issue. [15] We are considering the scope of a mandatory publication ban, not an in camera hearing.
The public is permitted to attend ahearing protected by a s. 648 publication ban. Counsel and members of the public are permitted to discuss such a hearing outside of thecourtroom. A ban of this kind is specifically concerned with protecting fair trial rights during a jury trial.
Therefore, s. 648 provides fortime-limited publication ban that ends when “the jury retires to consider its verdict.” [16] Section 648(1) prohibits “information regarding any portion of the trial at which the jury is not present” from being “publishedin any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way before the jury retires to consider its verdict.” The Criminal Code provides nospecific
definitions of “publish” or “publication”, or of the related terms “transmit” or broadcast”, applicable to a s. 648 publication ban.
Rossiter defines “publication ban” as follows, at §1.2.1(1): “A publication ban is a statutory or judicial prohibition on disclosinginformation, usually in a publication or broadcast, which is the subject of the ban.” As to the scope of “information” covered by the ban,Rossiter writes that, “there has been no singular or uniform approach to interpreting the scope of section 648(1)”: Rossiter at 4.1.5(1)(a)(ii). [17] Whatever the proper scope of a publication ban under s. 648, I conclude the ban must minimally impair the workings of thecourts and the justice system.
Both the doctrines of judicial comity and stare decisis require that judges be aware of relevant precedentsin making their decisions. This may include decisions that are subject to publication bans, including bans under s. 648. There cannot beany restriction on judges’ ability to be made aware of such decisions.
It follows that counsel must be able to share such decisions withinoffices and must be able to put such decisions before the court, so that judges are able to rely on potentially binding precedent. [18] In relying on such decisions, other judges will, of course, be cognizant of the ban, and must render their own decisionsaccordingly.
Given that s. 648 prohibits publication of “information regarding any portion of the trial at which the jury is not present”,this would suggest that any secondary decision citing the primary decision which is subject to the ban would also be subject to the sameban, but that is a question to be addressed by any judge subsequently relying on the primary decision.
Conclusion [19] For the reasons above, I conclude that the distribution of a voir dire decision to other lawyers within the office of a lawyer inreceipt of the decision, and the sharing of the decision with the court and other litigants involved in the secondary proceeding, does notviolate the publication ban under s. 648. The parties and the court involved in the secondary proceeding must respect the s. 648
publication ban to preserve the fair trial rights in the primary proceeding. I add that this reasoning is limited to the ban under s. 648, which has the specific purpose of preserving the accused’s fair trial rights. Arnold, J.
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