R. v. Whitehouse, 2020 NSSC 87
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: R. v. Whitehouse , 2020 NSSC 87 Date: 2020-03-03 Docket: Bridgewater , No.CRBWT486301 Registry: Bridgewater Between: Her Majesty the Queen v. Shoden Whitehouse Restriction on Publication: s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code Judge: The Honourable Justice Mona Lynch Heard: February 4, 2020, in Bridgewater, Nova Scotia Written Decision: March 3, 2020 Counsel: Alan Ferrier, QC, for the Accused Alicia Kennedy and Sharon Goodwin, for the Crown Order restricting publication — sexual offences 486.4
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of (
a) any of the following offences: (
i) an offence under
section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or (ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (
i) if it occurred on or after that day; or (
b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a). By the Court: Background: [ 1 ] Shoden Whitehouse is charged with sexual assault of the complainant on September 23, 2017. He intends to make an application to admit evidence of sexual activity under s.276 and to admit records under s. 278 of the Criminal Code . The accused has, in his possession, communications between the complainant and himself and communications between the complainant and third parties.
The constitutional validity of the noted provisions will impact those applications. [ 2 ] The accused provided notice to the Attorney General of Canada, the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, the complainant and the Crown that he would be making an application for an order declaring s. 278.92(1) , s. 278.92(2) (
a) and (b), s. 278.94(2) and 278.94(3) of the Criminal Code inconsistent with
section 7 and 11(
d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and of no force and effect pursuant to section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . The Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Nova Scotia indicated that they would not participate in the application. The complainant was provided notice and counsel for the complainant indicated that the complainant would not apply for standing to participate in the Charter application. [ 3 ] The grounds put forward by the accused in the notice of application are: a.
The noted provisions of the Criminal Code grant the complainant the right to Notice and the right to participate as a party with counsel at a hearing or hearings to determine the admissibility of sexual activity and records under s. 276 and non-sexual records under s. 278.92. b. The Applicant argues that
Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms states: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. and s. 11(
d) which states: Any person charged with an offence has the right … (
d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; are infringed by giving the complainant a right to disclosure of records and areas of questioning before being examined and/or cross-examined. c. The Applicant further argues that such disclosure allows the complainant to prepare for trial with explanations of disclosed material or possible modification of her evidence before, or after having commenced, giving evidence. d.
The Applicant is in possession of sexual and non-sexual communications between the complainant and the Applicant and between the complainant and third parties which will be the subject of applications under Sections 276 and 278.92. There is other sexual activity between the complainant and the Applicant that will be the subject of an application under
Section 276. As such, the constitutional validity of the noted provisions will impact upon these applications. e. Such further and other ground as counsel may advise and this Honourable Court may permit. [ 4 ] Crown counsel and Defence counsel have both provided written and oral submissions as to whether the challenged provisions violate the accused’s Charter rights. There were no submissions made regarding s.1 of the Charter . Issues: [ 5 ] The accused set out five issues in his brief which can be reduced to the following three issues: a. Does the requirement that the accused bring an application disclosing evidence infringe ss. 7 and 11(
d) of the Charter ? b. Does the right of the complainant to participate in the hearing infringe ss. 7 and 11(
d) of the Charter ? c. Does the “expanded reach” of s. 276 violate ss. 7 and 11(
d) of the Charter ? Relevant Sections of the Criminal Code : [ 6 ] The sections of the Criminal Code relevant to this application are: 278.1 For the purposes of sections 278.2 to 278.92, record means any form of record that contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and includes medical, psychiatric, therapeutic,
counselling, education, employment, child welfare, adoption and social services records, personal journals and diaries, and records containing personal information the production or disclosure of which is protected by anyother Act of Parliament or a provincial legislature, but does not include records made by persons responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence.278.92
(1) Except in accordance with this section, no record relating to a complainant that is in the possession or control of the accused — and which the accused intends to adduce — shall be admitted in evidence in anyproceedings in respect of any of the following offences or in any proceedings in respect of two or more offences at least one of which is any of the following offences:(
a) an offence under
section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 170, 171, 172, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 286.1, 286.2 or 286.3; or(
b) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this paragraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in paragraph (
a) if it occurred on or after that day.
(2) The evidence is inadmissible unless the judge, provincial court judge or justice determines, in accordance with the procedures set out in sections 278.93 and 278.94,(
a) if the admissibility of the evidence is subject to
section 276, that the evidence meets the conditions set out in subsection 276(2) while taking into account the factors set out in subsection (3); or(
b) in any other case, that the evidence is relevant to an issue at trial and has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. 278.94 …
(2) The complainant is not a compellable witness at the hearing but may appear and make submissions.
(3) The judge shall, as soon as feasible, inform the complainant who participates in the hearing of their right to be represented by counsel. [7] The relevant Charter provisions are set out above in para. 3.Position of the Accused:[8] The accused submits that while important and significant changes were necessary in sexual assault matters and have been made over the last 40 years, Bill C-51 swings the pendulum too far in favour ofcomplainants.
Courts have found that text messages and Facebook messages between the complainant and the accused fall under the definition of record in s. 278.1, although such communications are incredibly relevantand probative to the charge the accused is facing. Text messages, emails and Facebook messages do not have the same high privacy interest as diaries or therapy records. The messages in question are not sexual in nature. [9] An accused would not be required to provide notice and there would not be a presumption of inadmissibility for evidence of a verbal conversation involving the complainant.
However, if that same conversationis reduced to writing, notice is required and there is a presumption that the evidence is inadmissible. Giving advance notice to the complainant of the records which will be used in cross-examination denies the accused theright to a fair trial. Whether the notice is given prior to trial or in the middle of cross-examination, delays will result and trials will be broken up. Neither is good for the accused or the complainant. [10] There should be no privacy interest in communications about the event charged, as the complainant gave up that privacy when she made the complaint.
The accused agrees that there can be a privacy interest inrecords in the possession of the accused, but messages and written conversations between the complainant and the accused or the complainant and third parties should not fall under the definition of record in s. 278.1. Avoluntary conversation between the complainant and the accused or the complainant and a third party do not have a privacy interest akin to therapy records.Position of the Crown:[11] The Crown submits that Bill C-51 is an incremental expansion of Bill C-46 which was under consideration in R. v. Mills, (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.
The accused’s submission is that theapplication of the law, not the law itself, is unconstitutional. In Mills, at para. 56, the court said if the legislation is amenable to two
interpretations, a court should choose the
interpretation that upholds the legislation asconstitutional. It is open to Parliament to codify the law in relation to records in the possession of the accused. If the accused is in doubt whether the messages in his possession fall within the definition of record under s.278.1, it is open to the accused to ask the trial judge to decide that before the trial, as was done in the case of R. v. W. M., 2019 ONSC 6535. [12] Bill C-51 does not require the accused to make premature disclosure. As in R. v.
Darrach, 2000 SCC 46, the accused is not forced to make an application at all and the right to make full answer and defence doesnot include the right to defend by ambush (para. 55). Complainants do not give up all of their privacy rights by making a complaint to the police. Analysis:[13] The onus is on the accused, on a balance of probabilities, to establish that the legislation is unconstitutional. The fact that it has not yet been determined whether the communications or messages in question arerecords under s. 278.1 does not make his claim premature.
As in Mills, the accused can establish that the legislation is unconstitutional in its general effects (para. 36). Also, as in Mills, the record contains sufficient factsto resolve the issues posed in the application.
Requiring the accused to provide the Crown with the communications he hopes to use in cross-examination of the complainant prior to a Charter challenge would defeat thepurpose of the challenge.[14] Bill C-51, which amended provisions in the Criminal Code, including the provisions challenged by the accused, came into effect on December 13, 2018.[15] In Mills the records provisions of the Criminal Code prior to the amendments in Bill C-51 were challenged. The court found that there was an apparent conflict among the Charter rights to full answer anddefence, privacy and equality (para.18).
The rights must be examined in a contextual manner to resolve conflicts and must be defined so that they do not conflict with each other (Mills, para. 21 and 61). Where thelegislation is subject to differing
interpretations a court will interpret the legislation in a constitutional manner where possible (Mills, para. 22). [16] Although Mills was dealing with records in the possession of third parties that the accused had not seen, the majority’s comments are applicable to this analysis. After considering the rights and principlesinvolved, the majority summed up their findings at para. 94:94 In
summary, the following broad considerations apply to the definition of the rights at stake in this appeal. The right of the accused to make full answer and defence is a core principle of fundamental justice, but itdoes not automatically entitle the accused to gain access to information contained in the private records of complainants and witnesses. Rather, the scope of the right to make full answer and defence must be determined inlight of privacy and equality rights of complainants and witnesses.
It is clear that the right to full answer and defence is not engaged where the accused seeks information that will only serve to distort the truth-seekingpurpose of a trial, and in such a situation, privacy and equality rights are paramount. On the other hand, where the information contained in a record directly bears on the right to make full answer and defence, privacyrights must yield to the need to avoid convicting the innocent.
Most cases, however, will not be so clear, and in assessing applications for production, courts must determine the weight to be granted to the interestsprotected by privacy and full answer and defence in the particular circumstances of each case. Full answer and defence will be more centrally implicated where the information contained in a record is part of the case tomeet or where its potential probative value is high.
A complainant’s privacy interest is very high where the confidential information contained in a record concerns the complainant’s personal identity or where theconfidentiality of the record is vital to protect a therapeutic relationship. [17] Some of the principles outlined in Mills are:a. Fundamental justice embraces more than the rights of the accused and an assessment of fairness of the trial process must be made from the point of view of fairness in the eyes of the community and the complainant;(para. 72)b.
The spectrum of interests reflected in the principles of fundamental justice highlights the need to avoid viewing any particular principle in isolation from the others; (para. 73)c. Where a therapeutic relationship is threatened by the disclosure of private records, security of the person and not just privacy is implicated; (para 85)d. Our justice system has always held that the threat of convicting an innocent individual strikes at the heart of the principles of fundamental justice; (para. 89) e.
An appreciation of equality dimensions of records production in cases concerning sexual violence highlights the need to balance privacy and full answer and defence in a manner that fully respects the privacyinterests of complainants; (para.91)f. The concerns highlight the need for an acute sensitivity to context when determining the content of the accused’s right to make full answer and defence, and its relationship to the complainant’s privacy right. (para93)[18] Constitutional
interpretation requires the court to apply the living tree doctrine, which acknowledges that
interpretations of the Constitution evolve over time, given shifts in the relevant legislative and socialcontext (R. v. Comeau, 2018 SCC 15, para. 33).a. Does the requirement that the accused bring an application disclosing evidence infringe ss. 7 and 11(
d) of the Charter?[19] The accused’s right to remain silent, right to make full answer and defence, presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial are all in issue in this application and are all principles of fundamental justice whichwill be analysed in the context of s. 7 (R. v. Darrach, 2000 SCC 46 , [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, para. 23)[20] Both parties agree that sexual violence continues to be a gendered crime and prosecution of sexual offences has been full of discriminatory, stereotypical and myth-filled practices.
The disagreement is whetherthe challenged provisions strike the appropriate balance or breach the accused’s rights.[21] Prior to Bill C-51 the Criminal Code contained no provisions to deal with the admissibility of records that were already in the possession of the accused. [22] The situation where records were in the possession of the accused was dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada in two cases, R. v. Osolin, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, 1993 CarswellBC 1274, and in R. v.
Shearing, 2002 SCC 58. [23] Here, the accused submits that the requirement to disclose the proposed evidence to the complainant violates his right to remain silent. The right to remain silent is a principle of fundamental justice, and it is aprotection that continues at trial (R. v. P.(M.B.) (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 555, 1994 CarswellOnt 1153, para.40). The right against self-incrimination is one of the cornerstones of our criminal law (R. v.Henry, 2005 SCC 76, at para. 2).
The defence, except in some instances such as expert evidence, business records, or where alibi evidence not disclosed may affect the weight given to the alibi, has no obligation todisclose evidence or any anticipated defence. The protection to the accused against self-incrimination is a fundamental principle of justice, and the presumption of innocence and the power imbalance between the state andthe accused are at the root of the principle (R. v. P.(M.B.), para. 38 and 39). [24] Certainly the accused has rights, however, it is not only the rights of the accused which have to be considered.
Societal interests and the complainant’s security, privacy and equality rights must be balanced with
the accused’s rights. The importance of all of the rights must be respected. The accused is not entitled to the most favourable procedures imagined (R. v. Lyons, (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309). [25] In Darrach, the accused challenged the constitutionality of the revamped s. 276 of the Criminal Code alleging that the exclusion of evidence violated his s. 7 and s. 11(
c) and s. 11(
d) rights. The court found thatthe accused’s rights were not violated. The legislation excluded misleading evidence, but preserved the accused’s right to present relevant evidence and so to make full answer and defence (para. 21). The legislation didnot compel the accused to testify, but required the accused to show that the evidence he sought to introduce was relevant (para. 22). The accused’s right to remain silent, right to fair trial and presumption of innocencewere not infringed.
The accused was not entitled to procedures that take only his interests into account, or to procedures that would distort the truth-seeking function of a trial (para. 24). [26] R. v.
Seaboyer, (SCC), 1991 CarswellOnt 1022, 1991 CarswellOnt 109, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, Mills and Darrach provide that the principles of protecting the integrity of the trial by excludingevidence that is misleading, protecting the rights of the accused, encouraging the reporting of sexual violence, protecting the security and privacy of witnesses have to be considered when evaluating the effects on theaccused.[27] The court in Mills found that a definition of record very similar to the one being considered here was not overly broad as it only applied to records for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (para. 99).
Before evidence from a record over which the complainant has a reasonable expectation of privacy can be admitted, it must be scrutinized by the court. As stated in Mills, the accused’s right must prevail where he or shewould be unable to make full answer and defence. The complainant’s privacy rights will be most at stake where the information in the record concerns an aspect of individual identity or where maintaining confidentialityis crucial to a trust-like relationship.
Between the two extremes there is a spectrum of possibilities to strike a balance between the rights (para. 89). [28] The accused is not required to testify in the hearing in relation to the records that are sought to be adduced in evidence. It must be shown that the evidence is relevant to an issue at trial and has significantprobative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. As in Darrach, the requirement to establish a legitimate use for the evidence does not compel theaccused to testify (para. 47).
The right to make full answer and defence does not include the right to defend by ambush, either with evidence of sexual activity or with evidence in records (para. 55). The tactical pressure totestify does not offend the principle against self-incrimination or the right to a fair trial (para. 50). [29] If the evidence which the accused seeks to adduce fits under the definition of record or under “sexual activity”, the accused must make the application in writing with detailed particulars of the evidence. Theaccused is choosing to make the application.
He is not compelled to provide the particulars if the evidence does not fit under the definition of sexual activity, under the definition of record or if he chooses not to adducethe evidence.
There is no legal compulsion for the accused to make the application. [30] The judge hearing the application must balance the rights of the accused, the rights of the complainant and important societal objectives.[31] The particulars of the messages are not before me and I am not deciding whether or not they can be adduced by the accused, whether they have significant probative value or whether they fit under the definitionof “record” in s. 278.1. The requirement that the accused disclose the detailed particulars of the evidence that he seeks to adduce does not infringe his s. 7 or 11(
d) rights. Does the right of the complainant to participate in the hearing infringe ss. 7 and 11(
d) of the Charter?:[32] The
summary for Bill C-51 in relation to the challenged provisions says:…It also modifies certain provisions of the Code relating to sexual assault in order to clarify their application and to provide a procedure applicable to the admissibility and use of a complainant’s record when in thepossession of the accused… The challenged provisions prohibit, except as set out in s. 278.92, the admission in evidence:(
a) of anything which falls under the definition of a record in 278.1 relating to the complainant;(
b) that in the possession of the accused and which the accused intends to adduce; and(
c) in any proceedings in respect the any of the offences listed (s. 278.92(1)).The evidence is inadmissible unless, in relation to s. 276, the judge determines that the evidence meets the conditions and factors in ss. 276(2) and (3). In relation to a record, the judge must find that the evidence isrelevant to an issue at trial and has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice (ss. 278.92(2)(
a) and (b)). The procedures to determineadmissibility include that the complainant is not compellable but may appear and make submissions and the judge has a duty to inform the complainant who participates in the hearing of the right to be represented bycounsel (ss. 294(2) and (3)).[33] The disclosure of the proposed evidence in records is not different than the disclosure of sexual activity evidence in s. 276. Disclosure of sexual activity evidence was necessary in the provisions considered inDarrach.
At the time of the Darrach decision the complainant did not have a right to appear and make submissions and the right to counsel. The Court assumed that the Crown would consult with the complainant afterthe Crown was provided the affidavit with detailed particulars of the evidence (para. 55). Under the new provisions in Bill C-51, the procedure for determining if evidence is admissible is the same under s. 276 and s.278.92 (s. 278.93 and s. 278.94). The right to participate and the right to counsel are the same.
Notably, the provisions do not provide a requirement for service of the application on the complainant prior to the hearing asit does for third party records. [34] As set out above, no single right or principle is absolute and trumps the others. Balancing is required in the context of the particular circumstances. While the complainant at a trial is a witness, complainants’rights and protections have been recognized by the courts for over 20 years. [35] The security of the person, privacy rights and equality rights are the complainant’s, not the Crown’s.
Allowing the person whose rights are affected the opportunity to appear, make submissions and be informedof the right to counsel is the only way to ensure the complainant’s rights are protected. The Crown and the complainant may have the same position in relation to the evidence, but they may not. The complainant’s rightsshould not be left to the Crown to protect. Complainants should be entitled to be present and make submissions regarding their security, privacy and equality rights.
Allowing complainants to be present to protect theirrights is the only way to have all of the information necessary to balance all of the rights.[36] Complainants do not give up their right to privacy by making a complaint to the police.
If that was the case, there would be no need for the complainant to expressly waive the process for producing the record asin s. 278.2(2).[37] The Standing Senate committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs said in their December 2012 report: Moreover, we see no logical reason to deny to individuals who have been sexually victimized by persons with access to their personal records the same legal protection of their privacy, security and equality rights affordedto other victims of sexual offences.Senate of Canada, Statutory Review on the Provisions and Operation of the Act to amend the Criminal Code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings), (Chair: The Honourable Robert W.
Runciman),December 2012.Sexual offences, particularly those involving children, are often committed by persons known to the complainant. A parent, stepparent, or other close relative may have access to, or possession of the complainant’smedical records, counselling records, child protection records, school records, etc.[38] Ensuring the rights of the complainant are protected does not unfairly prejudice the accused or breach his Charter rights. As said in R. v.
Barton, 2019 SCC 33, at para. 1:[1] We live in a time where myths, stereotypes, and sexual violence against women— particularly Indigenous women and sex workers — are tragically common. Our society has yet to come to grips with just howdeep-rooted these issues truly are and just how devastating their consequences can be. Without a doubt, eliminating myths, stereotypes, and sexual violence against women is one of the more pressing challenges we face asa society.
While serious efforts are being made by a range of actors to address and remedy these failings both within the criminal justice system and throughout Canadian society more broadly, this case attests to the factthat more needs to be done. Put simply, we can — and must — do better. [39] The complainant’s participation is limited. The complainant can participate in the hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence which may affect the complainant’s security, privacy and equality rights. The participation by the complainant does not violate the accused’s ss. 7 and 11(
d) rights.(
c) Does the “expanded reach” of s. 276 violate ss. 7 and 11(
d) of the Charter?:[40] The accused raises two concerns, one in relation to the cross-examination of the complainant and another in relation to the disruption and delay of trials.[41] The right to cross-examine is an essential component of the right to make full answer and defence and is fundamental to providing a fair trial to an accused (R. v. Osolin, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R.595, para. 25) The right of cross-examination is not unlimited (R. v.
R.V., 2019 SCC 41, para. 40) and the scope of cross-examination is determined by balancing the rights (R.V., para. 67).[42] As in Mills, the accused is not entitled to admit irrelevant information or distort the truth. He is not entitled to cross-examination by ambush. The accused raises concerns that the complainant will tailor herevidence to the evidence the accused seeks to adduce. In R. v.
O'Connor, (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, L’Heureux-Dubé J. says at para. 123:123 As I noted in Osolin, supra, at pp. 624-25, uninhibited disclosure of complainants' private lives indulges the discriminatory suspicion that women and children's reports of sexual victimization are uniquely likelyto be fabricated. Put another way, if there were an explicit requirement in the Code requiring corroboration before women or children could bring sexual assault charges, such a provision would raise serious concernsunder s. 15 of the Charter .
In my view, a legal system which devalues the evidence of complainants to sexual assault by de facto presuming their uncreditworthiness would raise similar concerns. It would not reflect, farless promote, “a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration” (Andrews v.
Law Society of British Columbia, (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at p. 171). (Emphasis in original)Complainants in sexual assault trials are not presumed to be lying and are not presumed to be unsavoury witnesses. [43] The accused has also submitted that providing the complainant with notice of the evidence along with the right to appear and to be informed of the right to be represented by counsel will delay and interrupt trials.
The accused suggests that providing notice prior to the trial will give the complainant the opportunity to deal with any inconsistencies between what she told the police and what is in the evidence that the accused seeks toadduce. Waiting to make an application during the cross-examination of the complainant will delay and interrupt the trial for the complainant to be given notice of the evidence and to have time to consult counsel. [44] It appears that one of the accused’s primary concerns is the
interpretation of the definition of record and whether the messages are captured by the definition of record. The
interpretation of “record” is a problemwith the application of the legislation and not the constitutionality of the legislation itself.[45] The concern the accused has as to whether the messages are records is better left to the determination by a judge after a hearing for that purpose. Whether the particular messages are records is not something thatcan be decided in the abstract. Some of the messages in the possession of the accused may have an expectation of privacy, while others may not.
[46] The test for admissibility is whether the significant probative value is substantially outweighed by prejudice. This gives the judge discretion to weigh the rights and interests. The pressure to testify at the voirdire is not a burden of proof or an evidentiary burden. The pressure is based on the desire to adduce the evidence at trial. The burden of proof is still on the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt (Darrach 50 and 51). Thepurpose of the hearing is to determine the admissibility of evidence, not defence disclosure.[47] I do not find that the expanded reach of s. 276 violates the rights of the accused.
Cases dealing with challenges to the provisions in Bill C-51:[48] Since Bill C-51 has come into force, there have been challenges to the constitutionality of some of the new provisions related to records. [49] The accused relies on the R v A.M., 2019 SKPC 46, case in which it was found that the effect of the challenged sections seriously limited an accused’s ability to effectively challenge the veracity of a complainantby using the records in his possession and that the accused’s s. 7 and 11(
d) Charter rights were infringed. The material in question was a diary and text messages written by the complainant. In arriving at the decision inA.M., the judge concluded that the material described in s. 278.92 did not necessarily have a sexual aspect or an aspect of sensitive personal information while the previous categories of restricted material related to pastsexual conduct or personal information with a high privacy interest (para. 9).
However, Bill C-51 includes “any communication made for a sexual purpose or whose content is of a sexual nature” in sexual activity and thedefinition of record specifically requires “personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy”, as it did prior to the amendments. There must still be a sexual aspect to sexual activity and a recordmust be personal information with an expectation of privacy. There was an inadequate balancing of the Charter rights of the complainant with the accused’s rights in A.M.
I do not find this case persuasive.[50] In R v Anderson, 2019 SKQB 304, the court found that s. 279.92(1), 279.92(2)(
b) and 278.94(2) of the Criminal Code violated the accused’s right to make full answer and defence, and the right to a fair trial. Thejudge found that any records with a high degree of privacy could be addressed in the manner set out in Shearing with a voir dire with the complainant and counsel present. The judge analyzed the rights of the complainantand the accused in reaching his conclusion. I do not find this case persuasive.
In the procedure set out in Shearing, the complainant would still have the right to know the evidence which the accused is seeking tointroduce and the right to participate in the hearing.[51] In R. v. C. C., 2019 ONSC 6449, the court was dealing with Facebook and other messages authored by the complainant. Crown and defence counsel agreed that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy inthe messages.
The court noted that the accused’s ability to adduce any document has always been subject to challenge; not all documents in the accused’s possession are subject to a s. 278.92 application, as they must meetthe definition of record; a record must contain personal information in which there is a privacy interest; if the accused does not have the record, he must apply to obtain it (para. 61). The court was not satisfied that therequired application, its timing and/or the role of the complainant violated the accused’s rights.
The court stated at para. 73: …From the perspective of a victim of a sexual offence, why should the use of a document in which a complainant has an otherwise constitutionally recognized privacy interest be treated differently where the defendant hasthat record?I agree with the analysis and finding in C.C.[52] The challenged provisions were also found not to infringe the accused’s Charter rights in R. v. A.C., 2019 ONSC 4270 , R. v. R.S., 2019 ONCJ 645 and R. v.
F.A., 2019 ONCJ 391.Procedure to Determine if Evidence Falls under Definition of Record:[53] If the accused is required to give the complainant notice of the evidence that he intends to use on cross-examination and it is found that the evidence does not fall under the definition of “sexual activity” or“record”, the accused will have unnecessarily given the evidence to the complainant. Here, the accused is unsure whether messages between the complainant and the accused or the complainant and third parties will befound to be sexual activity or a record. In such a situation the accused’s choices are: (
a) make a pre-trial application to admit the evidence and give details of the evidence to the complainant, or (
b) wait until cross-examination of the complainant and if there are perceived contradictions, make an application to adduce the evidence at that time. [54] If the application is made in the middle of cross-examination, the accused takes the risk that the application will not be allowed as the application was not disclosed at the pre-trial conference. If the application ispermitted to proceed, the trial process will be disrupted by an adjournment to allow notice to the complainant and consultation with counsel.
Accused persons will have their trial adjourned, and complainants will be left inthe middle of testifying during the adjournment. In R. v. Cody, 2017 CC 31, the court directed a proactive approach by all participants, including defence counsel, to prevent unnecessary delay (para. 36).[55] Sometimes the Crown seeks to adduce evidence of messages between the accused and the complainant. If the evidence falls under the definition of record, the complainant can waive the application of thesections (s. 278.2 (3) of the Criminal Code).
However, if the evidence is of other sexual activity there is no provision for complainants to waive their rights.[56] The solution in this case is for the accused to apply to the trial judge, prior to the actual application, to determine whether the evidence is evidence of sexual activity or which falls under the definition of record. This was done in R. v. M.S., 2019 ONCJ 670 , and R. v. Ekhtiari, 2019 ONCJ 774 .
The evidence is not given to the Crown or the complainant, as that would defeat the purpose of the application. [57] A judge determining whether a message authored by a complainant falls under the definition of record will have to consider the complainant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages.
The judge willconsider the accused’s concern that the same message delivered orally would not require the accused to go through the procedures in ss. 278.93 and 278.94 unless the message fell under the definition of sexual activity.Conclusion:[58] Prior to Bill C-51, the provisions dealing with records and other sexual activity were found not to violate Charter rights. I find that the accused has not shown that the changes in the challenged sections breachhis Charter rights.
Parliament has made amendments to what is included in sexual activity, a procedure for dealing with records already in the possession of the accused and to provide more meaningful participation bycomplainants in hearings that affect their rights. The court has an obligation to respectfully consider Parliament’s attempts to respond to complainants in criminal proceedings. I find that the means Parliament hasemployed to achieve their purpose do not violate the Charter. The legislation is not arbitrary, overbroad or grossly disproportionate.
The provisions strike the appropriate balance between the accused’s s. 7 and 11(d)rights and the complainant’s security, privacy and equality rights. Because the legislation in question did not infringe the accused’s Charter rights, there will be no s. 1 analysis. Lynch, J.
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