R v. S. L., 2020 NSSC 95
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: R v. S. L. , 2020 NSSC 95 Date: 20200129 Docket: Hfx No. 476672 Registry: Halifax Between: Her Majesty The Queen v. S. L. Defendant Restriction on Publication: 486.4 Judge: The Honourable Justice Patrick J. Murray Heard: November 11, 2019, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Oral Decision: January 29, 2020 Counsel: Alicia K. Kennedy for the Crown Stacey Gerrard for the Crown Thomas Singleton for S. L. Leora Lawson for S. L.
Section 486.4 - Order restricting publication — sexual offences 486.4
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of (
a) any of the following offences: (
i) an offence under
section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 346 or 347, (ii) an offence under
section 144 (rape), 145 (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) (assault with intent) of the Criminal Code ,
chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 4, 1983, or (iii) an offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 and 16) or
section 151 (seduction of a female between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code ,
chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; or (
b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in any of subparagraphs (a)(
i) to (iii). Mandatory order on application
(2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(
a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(
a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the complainant of the right to make an application for the order; and (
b) on application made by the complainant, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order. Child pornography
(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under
section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way. Limitation
(4) An order made under this
section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. Introduction [ 1 ] S. L. is charged that he committed a sexual assault on P. C. between October 31 and December 1, 2015, contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code . Mr. L. plead not guilty to this single count indictment on February 20, 2018. Background [ 2 ] The Complainant, P. C., and the Accused, S. L., were married in […], […], in 2008. In 2011 they moved to […], with their daughter.
They have another daughter who was born in […], where they settled and bought a house. Their children are currently aged […] and […]. [ 3 ] P. C. was born in […]. She moved to […] to study and eventually moved to […] where she met S. L., who had been an IT manager for a company there. P. C. had various interests, such as music and writing. She did not work from 2011 to 2014. She began employment in 2014 and was involved in care for seniors. She later started her own company. [ 4 ] S. L. was born in […].
The couple’s return to […] had to do with his father, who was not well or able to travel or see his grandchildren. The couple moved a couple of times, in […] and […], before purchasing a home in […], Nova Scotia, where they resided at the time of the alleged offence in 2015. [ 5 ] Mr. L. was employed in […] as an IT security manager. P. C testified he handled the whole move to […], including the passport and immigration issues. [ 6 ] Unfortunately, things did not go well with the move. P. C. said at first it was good. The parties separated in November 2014, but were not legally divorced.
They stayed together in the home but were not sharing a bed. P. C. said they did not wish to disrupt the children’s lives. [ 7 ] The parties were separated but still living together in 2015, 2016 and 2017. Eventually Mr. L. moved out in November 2017. He filed for divorce on October 3, 2017, almost two years after the alleged offence. Overview of the Alleged Offence [ 8 ] On the evening in question in November 2015, the parties had been entertaining friends of S. L. P. C. had consumed wine over the course of the evening. In his statement, S.
L. said she had a bottle and several glasses, while he had five or six beer and a glass of wine. P. C. testified that the evening went late and that when going to bed, she needed his help to climb the stairs. P. C. said she “felt extremely drunk” and was staggering up the stairs. She felt unusual. [ 9 ] The Complainant testified that while in the bathroom, Mr. L. forced her to perform oral sex on him without her consent. This was her last memory she said, until she woke the next morning. When she woke, she said, her rectum was sore, there was stinging when she urinated and there was blood coming from her rectum.
The Complainant testified that S. L. had anal sex with her while she was “too drunk” to undress herself. [ 10 ] Mr. L. voluntarily gave a statement to the police on November 16, 2017. It was taken by Det/Cst. Susan Mitchell. In it, S. L. denied he sexually assaulted P. C., or did anything with her without her consent. Contrary to the Complainant’s assertions, S. L. said the Complainant initiated oral sex while they were in the bathroom. He testified that from there, the parties went to the bedroom where they had further sex. At some point he said, things went “offline” and P.
C. began getting aggressive with her voice, asking him to penetrate her anally. He said he did not want to but felt threatened by her. He said he stopped when she fell asleep and could no longer harm him, about 40 seconds after she had been yelling at him, he said. [ 11 ] In his statement, S. L. claimed that P. C. had a low tolerance for alcohol, and that she became a completely different person when she was drinking. He said the parties had a volatile relationship, and that he had been the subject of abuse, shouting, spitting, and physical altercations with the Complainant.
He further said the parties were undergoing marital issues, and claimed the allegations arose shortly after he reported a domestic incident to the police in October 2017. [ 12 ] Mr. L. denied that he sexually assaulted his wife. He said he apologized in text messages because that is what couples do in order to move on. He said in his statement he did not want anything “bad” for P. C.
[ 13 ] A number of text messages were entered as Exhibit 1, after a voir dire . These involved an exchange between S. L. and P. C. related to the alleged incident. These texts were sent in 2017 and consist of 11 pages plus one screen shot (a photo), which is dated November 26, 2015. [ 14 ] I will now review the evidence in greater detail. Evidence of P. C. [ 15 ] The Complainant testified that she arrived home from work on the evening of the alleged assault by taxi, around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. Her husband, his friend, and his friend’s wife were already there.
She joined them and had a glass of wine which she poured herself. She thought it was Sauvignon Blanc. She had purchased two bottles of wine in expectation of company. She said it was a normal evening, they were entertaining, discussing music on the computer using YouTube and relaxing. She said Mr. L. kept refilling her glass. She could not recall whether she had dinner, but thought she did. She recalled that the friend’s wife had gone to bed early, and they said goodnight to his friend. She vaguely remembered going up the stairs, and that she needed help. She said she was staggering. S.
L. was walking behind her, helping her up the stairs. She recalled going to the bathroom but did not know how she got from there to the bedroom. She said she was sitting on the toilet to urinate when Mr. L. “shoved his penis in [her] mouth”. She was asked in cross- examination if she recalled what she did then and said she did not. She was asked if she recalled letting him do this, and replied, she only recalled him doing it, and everything else was very vague. She was asked if it was possible that she pulled him towards her, pulled down his underwear, and started performing oral sex on him.
She said, she did not recall that happening and did not believe it did happen. She also said it was not possible. She said she could not recall having sex, including anal sex, and that she did not remember going from the toilet to the bedroom. [ 16 ] P. C. said she had no memory after that until she awoke the next morning. When she woke up she was lying flat on her stomach, and was naked from the waist down. She had on the same “top” as she wore the night before. The rest of her clothes were on the floor in the bathroom. She said she felt funny and “not right”. She had a conversation with S.
L., which was confusing to her. She went to the bathroom and was in a lot of pain, felt stinging, and there was blood from her rectum. S. L. said words to the effect that they had had anal sex, “don’t you remember”, he told her. Later he told her, he only did it because she threatened to hit him, and that he “had the decency” to stop when she passed out. [ 17 ] P. C. said she had the next day off work. The friends were still there, in the in-law suite. She believed they had breakfast together, and that the friends left that day. She said she wanted to seek medical help but did not. She said S.
L. “belittled” the idea of getting medical help. [ 18 ] After this event, P. C. said, she and S. L. continued to live together, but not by her choice. Both of them continued looking after the children. Evidence of S. L. [ 19 ] S. L. gave a statement to the police at the time of his arrest. It was a full statement given under caution with Charter rights, including the right to counsel. He was questioned by Detective Sgt. Sue Mitchell. The statement was given voluntarily. [ 20 ] In the statement, S.
L. said he was not surprised to be there, that the Complainant had threatened various things, and specifically that if he did not accept what she offered regarding marital assets, this is what would happen. He said they had been discussing divorce for three years, that he had no access to a bank account, that she would not disclose her assets, and that she was not making credit card payments. He said that she would throw things and become violent. “She told me she would make my life miserable”, he said, “if I didn’t agree to her terms” and “she would make sure I got nothing”.
He said she threatened him with various charges. [ 21 ] S. L. said P. C. constantly lied to protect herself at whatever cost, and that she would yell and scare him, so he did what she said. “She fell asleep and I stopped”, he said. He said she apologized the next morning for being mean to him, and “we left it at that”, he said, but that when he filed for divorce she alleged that he had assaulted her 18 months before. [ 22 ] S. L. said in his statement that on the evening in question there had been two bottles of wine. He said he had one glass. He said P.
C. drank a bottle and few glasses that evening, and said that was typical of her consumption. He said he and his friends were having a drink and relaxing, after the children went to bed, and at the end of the evening he said to his friend, “I’m going to bed”. [ 23 ] With respect to the first incident, S. L. said in his statement that he was brushing his teeth and P. C. was “peeing, she pulled my underwear down and started giving me oral sex”. He said he did not ejaculate. He said from there they continued. He was asked by the officer, did you both agree to go to the bedroom? He said “Well, it just happened”.
He said they then walked toward the bed, undressed, and began having sex with him performing oral sex on her, and then they started “making love”, he said. At this point he noticed the door was slightly open and he got up to close it. He said, she then became aggressive and started yelling, and flipped over, saying “don’t fucking stop”. She then said, “do the other thing”, and he said, “we don’t have to do that”. He said her exact words were “fuck me in the ass”. [ 24 ] S.
L. said they discussed it the next day, and he said to her, “you were really violent, I wanted to close the door as the kids were next door, you yelled at me”. [ 25 ] S. L. was challenged by the interviewing officer, “so you’re in bed and being forced to do this?” “Not at the beginning”, he said. He said it was actually “quite nice”, “until she started getting really angry and sort of violent”. He was asked, “ok so you’re both consenting, you’re in the bathroom”. S. L. replied “But at no point did she tell me to stop”, on the contrary, he said, she was asking him to do things, “spank her, do it harder”.
He later said that he did not actually do it, that she fell asleep, and “I grabbed her from behind, I tried but she fell asleep”. He was asked by the officer was it within 5 minutes or so. He said, she was yelling and then she just fell asleep about 40 seconds later. He was asked about his description of her as a completely different person when drinking, and said “that’s an understatement”. Asked by the officer, “if she’s lying face down, how is she going to hit you?”, S. L. said it was her voice, that
“scream”, and that he was scared. He denied touching P. C. without her consent, insisting that “she made me do it”. [26] In addition, the following appears in his statement: Q: Okay, Okay. So she asked you to have anal sex with her? A: Yes. Q: She threatened you? A: Yes. Q: If you didn’t have anal sex, she would… A: She didn’t… Q: … physically hurt you? A: No, I felt I was going to get physically hurt? Q: Okay. A: She did not utter any threats that she would hit me. … Q: Right, okay. So, yeah, I guess obviously like your perception is certainly your reality.
But also I’m trying to understand because it’simportant if the words were there. So she never threatened you. A: I don’t… I don’t… she threatened me… she made me feel threatened. As far as actual threats, I don’t really remember… … Q: Yeah, so … and again, it’s kind of hard sometimes to even phrase the question but what I’m trying to grasp is how do you … like thisis happening and … the sex starts off as good and it’s consensual and you guys are both participating and I think you said that it was, youknow, was good. A: Yeah, it was.
Q: But then it moves kind of offline and you’re like, okay, she’s getting aggressive. A: Yes. Q: And you’re feeling threatened. A: Yes. Q: So how do you stay hard in that moment? A: That never quite occurred to me. … [27] S. L. was asked if P. C. had injuries, and he said he didn’t know of any, and that she did not see a doctor. He said P. C. didnot mention the soreness until months later. [28] At one point in the statement, S. L. said, regarding the marriage, that, he “just wanted to leave and asked for a bit of money todo that”. P.
C., in her evidence, said he would not leave, and she had offered him everything she had. Position of the Crown [29] The Crown submits that the offence of sexual assault is
an act of power, aggression, and control. According to the Crown,this was a relationship controlled by the Accused, S. L. (R v. V (K.B), (ON CA), [1992] O.J. No. 561) The Crownrefers to the evidence by the Complainant that S. L. took care of the immigration issues, and that she had no phone access, no bankaccount, and was isolated from her family. Her first job started in 2014. The Crown also says it can be inferred from P. C.’s evidencethat S. L. manipulated her into buying the home with his name on the deed. They were separated when it was purchased in July 2015.
He quit his job in October 2015. [30] It is important, the Crown says, to remember P. C.’s evidence about how the incident came to light. S. L. made a 911 callreporting that P. C. had contacted him via Facebook messaging in breach of an undertaking. The police confirmed receiving these calls. When they received the messages and saw the content, they asked P. C. if she wished to speak with Det/Cst.
Sue Mitchell. [31] Without detailing all of the submissions, essentially, the Crown’s position is that there is in both incidents (the bathroom andthe bedroom), sexual touching that would constitute an assault, based on the evidence of the Complainant, S. L.’s statement, andFacebook messages between them. The Crown says there are two things being admitted in the messages: (1) that S. L. knew howintoxicated P. C. was, and (2) that the events alleged happened.
[32] The Crown says, with respect to the first incident that the Complainant’s evidence is unchallenged that S. L. shoved his penisinto her mouth in the bathroom after helping her up the stairs. He knew her condition when he stood in front of her and forced her tohave oral sex. [33] P. C.’s evidence was that she woke up the next morning, lying on her stomach, naked from the waist down and experiencingpain, unable to recall how her clothes were removed. The Crown argues that in the text messages (p. 7), S.
L. admitted that analpenetration occurred. [34] The Crown submits the actus reus of the offence has been made out by these acts: (1) penetrating P. C.’s mouth with hispenis; and (2) penetrating her anus. The Crown submits that it has established that these acts were done without her consent. The Crownargues that P. C. did not have the capacity to consent, but even if she did have capacity, she did not consent, based on her evidence.
Thisis a subjective inquiry as to the Complainant’s state of mind. [35] The Crown further submits in terms of the requisite mens rea, that the Accused intended the consequences of his actions, wasaware that P. C. did not have the capacity to consent, and knew that she did not consent. The Crown says S. L. knew, or was reckless orwilfully blind, because by his own admission P. C. was too intoxicated, using the words “too drunk” in his messages (at p 8). [36] The Crown argues that the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent is not available to the Accused, because he did nottestify, R v Park, 2 S.C.R. 836.
The Crown disagrees that s. 273.2 is engaged. [37] Further, the Crown submits, a defence of “feeling threatened” is not legally available to Mr. L. because of s. 17 of theCriminal Code, the defence of compulsion by threats is currently not applicable where the offence is sexual assault. Defence counselhas indicated this is not being raised. [38] Quite apart from that provision, the Crown says, in his statement S. L. says he was scared, but yet he got up to lock the door,then continued on with the sexual activity, and stopped only when P. C. passed out. [39] This leaves, submits the Crown, P.
C.’s evidence, given in a forthright manner, and unshaken on cross-examination. [40] With respect to R v. W. (D.), (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, the Crown says it applies, but the Court mustdecide what weight will be accorded to the Accused’s statement because he did not testify. Position of the Defence [41] Referring to R v. Nyznik, 2017 ONCA 4392, and R v. Lifchus, (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, the Defencecorrectly states that the Accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. The burden is on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubtthat he committed the essential elements of the offence.
The Defence points to the importance of that principle to our system of justice asan enshrined right in a free and democratic society. While it is impossible to prove anything to a certainty, a court must in effect be“sure” that the accused committed the offence and that the Crown has discharged the burden, which is upon them and them alone. (Nyznik at para. 18) [42] The Defence also reminds the Court of the importance of WD in situations where the Accused testifies. The Accused’svoluntary statement is evidence from him in this trial.
Even though it was introduced by the Crown, the principles in WD still apply inassessing credibility. The Defence says the statement was tested aggressively by the investigating officer. It is not a simple
summarythat the Accused wrote himself. [43] The Defence notes that there is no expert evidence that could assist the Court in determining the effect of a given quantity orpercentage of alcohol on a person. There is as well no evidence of the size of the wine bottle that P. C. consumed. [44] The Defence refers to the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Al-Rawi, 2018 NSCA 10, and to Nyznik as they pertain to consentand the interaction of alcohol and drugs. The Defence says the main issues in this case are consent and capacity to consent.
Theycommend Al-Rawi to the Court, with its definition of capacity and operating mind, depending on the Court’s findings respecting the twoincidents. [45] The Defence says the Court must first determine if there was consent, and if it finds there was none, it then follows that theCourt must accept that the Complainant had the capacity to make that decision. [46] The Defence also says the Accused’s statement and texts must be taken in the proper context. For example, in his statement,S.
L. did not say he started sex in the bedroom without her consent, but actually meant without his consent (p. 49), according to theDefence. The Defence also says that in the text messages. S. L. does not admit to anal sex (p. 7), and that he does not say he served P. C.wine (p. 34). Law [47] A sexual assault under s. 271 is an assault (s. 265) committed in circumstances of a sexual nature, such as to violate the sexualintegrity of the victim. The mental element requires proof of general intent only. The essential elements are set out in s. 271. [48] The following
summary of the law of sexual assault, and the law governing the assessment of the evidence, is taken from R v.P.J.B., 2019 N.S.J. No. 166, a recent decision of Justice Chipman: Evidence of the Accused
[112] As acknowledged by the parties, Mr. B’s evidence must be considered through the W.(D.) lens, as explained by JusticeBourgeois in R. v. N.M., 2019 NSCA 4: 23 I agree with the appellant's view of the import of J.H.S., 2008 SCC 30 at para. 11. In R. v.
P.D.B., 2014 NBQB 213, JusticeFerguson helpfully explains the modification of W.(D.): [66] The test outlined by Cory J. in W. (D.) is as follows, although I have incorporated the second assessment element arising from J.H.S.that was not part of the original three W.D. credibility evaluation guidelines: First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit. Secondly, if you do not know whether to believe the accused or a competing witness, you must acquit. Thirdly, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in a reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.
Fourthly, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, that is that his or her evidence is rejected, you must askyourself whether, on the basis of the evidence that you accept you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guiltof the accused. Sexual Assault Law [113] A person commits a sexual assault when without the consent of another person, he or she applies force intentionally to that otherperson, directly or indirectly in circumstances of a sexual nature such that the sexual integrity of "the victim", is violated (see s. 265(1)(a)and
(2) Criminal Code). [114]
Section 273.1 of the Code provides the "meaning of consent", specific to a charge contrary to s. 271. Meaning of consent 273.1
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and subsection 265(3), consent means, for the purposes of sections 271, 272 and 273, the voluntaryagreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question. Where no consent obtained
(2) No consent is obtained, for the purposes of these sections where: (
a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the complainant (
b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity; (
c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority; (
d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity; or (
e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continueto engage in the activity. Subsection (2) not limiting
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be construed as limiting the circumstances in which no consent is obtained. 1992, c. 38, s. 1. Where belief in consent not a defence 273.2 It is not a defence to a charge under
section 271, 272 or 273 that the accused believed that the complainant consented to theactivity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, where (
a) the accused's belief arose from the accused's (
i) self-induced intoxication, or (ii) recklessness or wilful blindness; or (
b) the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that thecomplainant was consenting. [49] Section 265(3) further deals with situations where no consent is obtained. [50] In R v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33 , 2019 S.C.C. 33, it was held that there is no substitute for the complainant’s actualconsent to the sexual activity at the time it was occurring. [51] In R v. V (K.B), (ON CA), [1992] O.J.
No. 561, the court noted a number of factors to be considered,including body part touched, the nature of the contact, any words or gestures, including threats, that accompany the conduct, and theaccused’s intent or purpose. Sexual assault does not require sexual gratification. Actus Reus and Mens Rea
[52] A conviction for sexual assault requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of two basic elements, that the accused committed theactus reus and that he had the necessary mens rea. The actus reus of sexual assault is unwanted sexual touching. The mens rea is theintention to touch, knowing of, or being reckless of or wilfully blind to, a lack of consent, either by words or actions, from the personbeing touched [53] In R v.
Ewanchuk, 1999 SCC 711, the Supreme Court of Canada reinforced the necessity of focussing on the subjective stateof mind of the complainant to determine whether he or she did not consent to the sexual touching. A Complainant must have thecapacity to consent to the sexual activity in question. In addition to being able to appreciate the nature and quality of the sexual activityin question, and the identity of the person with whom it is engaged, the Complainant must be capable of understanding that she can agreeor decline to participate in the sexual activity in question. [54] In R v.
Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, the Court held that when assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact shouldconsider other possible theories and other reasonable possibilities which are inconsistent with guilt. [55] A gap in the evidence may result in inferences other than guilt. But those inferences must be reasonable given the evidence,and the absence of evidence, assessed logically and in light of human experience and common sense, and not on speculation. [56] There are “differences between the meaning of consent under the actus reus and mens rea”.
Under mens rea the issue iswhether the Accused believed that the Complainant communicated consent. Under the actus reus, the only question is whether theComplainant was subjectively consenting in her mind. The Complainant is not required to communicate her lack of consent or herrevocation of consent for the actus reus to be established. [57] The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held in Al-Rawi that there was ample circumstantial evidence that would permit theinference to be drawn that the Complainant did not voluntarily agree or lacked the capacity to do so. Either would suffice to establish theactus reus.
Analysis [58] R v. Nyzik provides useful guidance in this matter. That case indicated that in sexual assault cases there is often nocorroboration for a material point in a complainant’s evidence. The Crown has pointed out that under
section 274 of the Criminal Code,corroboration is not necessary to make a finding of guilt in certain offences, including s. 271. [59] In terms of assessing credibility. In R v. Jackson, 2019 NSSC 202, Justice Brothers referred to Baker-Warren v. Dinault,2009 NSSC 59, and some of the factors that may assist a Court, in assessing credibility:
a) What were the inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness’ evidence, which include internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistentstatements, inconsistencies between the witness’ testimony, and the documentary evidence, and the testimony of other witnesses: Re:Novak Estate, 2008 NSSC 283 (S.C.);
b) Did the witness have an interest in the outcome or was he/she personally connected to either party;
c) Did the witness have a motive to deceive;
d) Did the witness have the ability to observe the factual matters about which he/she testified;
e) Did the witness have a sufficient power of recollection to provide the court with an accurate account;
f) Is the testimony in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical and informed person would find reasonablegiven the particular place and conditions: Faryna v. Chorney (BC CA), [1952] 2 D.L.R 354;
g) Was there an internal consistency and logical flow to the evidence;
h) Was the evidence provided in a candid and straight forward manner, or was the witness evasive, strategic, hesitant, or biased; and
i) Where appropriate, was the witness capable of making an admission against interest, or was the witness self-serving? [60] Frailties or inconsistencies in a witness’s testimony are often important in assessing credibility and reliability. In this case, theCrown submits that P. C.’s testimony has held up and has few if any, frailties. There were some memory lapses, these alleged eventshaving occurred in 2015. She said, for example, “It is not very clear to me anymore”, when questioned in cross-examination aboutwhether S.
L. “steadied” her while she was sitting during the alleged incident in the washroom. [61] The Crown submits that the manner by which the charges came about also supports the Complainant’s credibility. It was thepolice who raised concerns with her upon reading the texts. It was not her who sought them out. [62] Key aspects in terms of credibility (and reliability) are the amount of alcohol ingested by P. C. and its effects. For example,she said in one of the text messages, “I was so drunk I could hardly undress myself”.
Her state of intoxication was acknowledged by S.L. in the messages he sent, as shown in Exhibit #1. [63] Counsel have acknowledged that consent and capacity are the main issues. In R v. Jensen, (1996) (ONCA), 106 C.C.C. (3d) 430, Justice Marc Rosenberg thought it prudent to keep the analysis of these issues separate so as to avoid“blurring the lines”. Each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Each case presents its own issues. [64] In Al-Rawi, Beveridge J.A. spoke about the “minimal capacity” required to give consent.
In Jensen for example, a significantdegree of intoxication did not result in incapacity. In this case the Defence has made the point that there is no expert evidence. Notoxicologist was called to discuss the amount of alcohol consumed, the degree of inebriation, and its effects on a particular witness.
[65] In Al-Rawi, our Court of Appeal dealt extensively with consent and capacity to consent. Crown and Defence counsel haveboth referred extensively to it in their submissions. At paragraphs 67- 74 Justice Beveridge provided helpful guidance to trial judges incase such as this: 67. In cases where consent and capacity to consent are live issues, the trial judge must determine if it has been established beyond areasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent, or lacked the capacity to consent. As detailed above, these inquiries are entirelysubjective. 68. In R. v.
Hutchinson, supra, the majority reasons penned by McLachlin C.J. and Cromwell J. helpfully suggest a two stepapproach. First, determine if the complainant consented, or at least, is there a reasonable doubt that she did not. If there is doubt that shedid not consent, determine if her consent was vitiated: [4] The Criminal Code sets out a two-step process for analyzing consent to sexual activity. The first step is to determine whether theevidence establishes that there was no "voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question" under s.273.1(1).
If the complainant consented, or her conduct raises a reasonable doubt about the lack of consent, the second step is to considerwhether there are any circumstances that may vitiate her apparent consent. Section 265(3) defines a series of conditions under which thelaw deems an absence of consent, notwithstanding the complainant's ostensible consent or participation: Ewanchuk, at para. 36. Section273.1(2) also lists conditions under which no consent is obtained. For example, no consent is obtained in circumstances of coercion (s.265(3)(
a) and (b)), fraud (s. 265(3)(c)), or abuse of trust or authority (ss. 265(3)(
d) and 273.1(2) (c)). 69. Difficulties present where the complainant, due to the ingestion of drugs or alcohol, truly has little or even no memory of theevent. Absent direct evidence from a complainant that subjectively she did not consent, the judge or jury frequently must rely oncircumstantial evidence to determine the absence of consent. 70.
Where a complainant testifies that she has no memory of the sexual activity in question, the Crown routinely asks: "Would youhave consented?" Despite the potential to discount the typically negative response as speculation, the answer is usually received intoevidence, and depending on the reasons, may or may not have a bearing on the determination if consent or capacity to consent wereabsent. ... 71. In any event, a trial judge is required to consider all of the evidence adduced at trial and direct his or her mind to making thenecessary findings of fact or mixed law and fact presented by the issues to be decided.
In doing so, the judge must not start with anypresumptions that certain types of witnesses are inherently credible or reliable, nor must the judge employ stereotypical myths or flawedassumptions. 72. There is, of course, the legal presumption that any accused is innocent of the accusation that he or she faces. This legalpresumption can only be displaced by reliable and credible evidence that establishes beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essentialelements of the offence or offences charged. 73.
A trier of fact is not to assess each piece of evidence individually on a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (R. v. Morin, (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345). Rather, the trier of fact must take into consideration all of the circumstantial evidencerelevant to any particular element. 74. When the evidence is entirely circumstantial, the judge must again consider all of the evidence.
If after considering thatevidence, existence of the elements is the only reasonable or rational inference, the trier of fact should draw the inference that theelements, and hence guilt, have been established beyond a reasonable doubt (see R. v. Villaroman, supra at para. 41). If there are otherreasonable or rational explanations inconsistent with guilt, the inference must not be drawn and the accused acquitted. [66] To this I would add Justice Duncan’s words in R v. Smalley, 2019 NSSC 32: 242. Each case presents its own unique challenges to assessments of credibility and reliability.
While there may often be commonfeatures such as the involvement of alcohol and relative youth, it would be wrong to generalize when sorting through the details oftestimony taken years later, about events that take far shorter time to occur than is present questioning about them. In particular, it is notpermissible to make assumptions based on what might be the societal expectations of behavior – each person’s conduct must be assessedon the basis of what they did during the events that constitute the subject matter of the alleged offences.
This case exemplifies theimportance of these core principles. [67] In the present case the Complainant’s last memory was of the toilet incident. The Crown argues this was just before she“blacked out”. According to the Accused’s statement the Complainant did not immediately black out but was fully participating in sex. She was “in the mood” and asked to have anal sex. S. L. says P. C. was the aggressor. The Accused in his statement said, “I tried to dowhat she asked.” This was after she performed oral sex on him, which he said she initiated. [68] There is a wide discrepancy, in the accounts given by P. C. and S.
L. By S. L.’s account P. C. was aggressively demanding inher “tone” to the point where he “felt threatened”. P. C. had no memory of the events in the bedroom. She had no memory of any sexthere at all, let alone anal penetration. [69] Obviously, the burden is on the Crown and the Court must not simply choose a version of events or make this a credibilitycontest, thus losing sight of the Crown’s burden. The Crown must meet their burden to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. [70] In respect of the burden of proof I have said that WD applies.
In this case the Crown says the Court must consider whetherthe lack of cross-examination of Mr. L. affects the weight to be accorded to his evidence. The Defence submits that Det/Sgt. Mitchellchallenged the Accused during the interview and taking of his statement. She asked probing questions. This was not simply a matter ofhim telling a story. The Court has been given no authority for this proposition by the Crown. The Court is aware that S. L. was notcross-examined. It is also aware that Det/Sgt. Mitchell conducted a thorough interview. A number of the questions she asked wereprobing. As such I will consider Mr.
L.’s statement in the context of all the evidence at trial and assign it weight as appropriate in the
course of my decision. [ 71 ] That said, I find there are some inconsistencies or points of confusion in the Accused’s statement. For example, he said at one point that there was “no insertion of penis”, but also said he “pushed but it did not go in”. He was asked if he started sex “without consent”, to which he replied “yes”, but later said there was consent. In his statement at page 50, he told the officer: Q: Did you touch her without her consent? A: No. contrary, she asked me to do those things. Q: Did you have anal sex with her without her consent? A: No.
Q: Okay, so how do we… like how do I believe… who do I believe and how and why? A: I don’t know. Q: Like give me… A: I have nothing against my wife, I have no reason to lie. [ 72 ] S. L. said in his text messages “I never did anything you did not ask.” [ 73 ] The Defence does not agree with the Crown that S. L. admitted that anal sex took place. Generally, the Defence says the messages should have little influence. [ 74 ] The Crown submits the text messages support their position with respect to the incident in the bedroom. In those messages, S.
L. states several times that he had the decency to stop because she passed out, that she threatened to hit him, so he tried, but then stopped because she was too drunk and that he was sorry it happened but he did not go ahead with it.
He said he did not put his penis all the way in, stopping when she fell asleep and would not hit him for not having sex with her. [ 75 ] The Accused said in his statement words to the effect of, “I’m not telling you it happened, I’m telling you it didn’t happen the way she said it did”. [ 76 ] At the end of the day, I am satisfied on the evidence there was sexual touching in both incidents. In order for the Crown to establish the actus reus of sexual assault in these circumstances, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that P. C. did not consent to the sexual touching or lacked the capacity to do so.
As the Court of Appeal said at paragraph 94 of Al-Rawi : 94. There was ample circumstantial evidence that would permit the inference to be drawn that either the Complainant did not voluntarily agree or lacked the capacity to do so. Either would suffice to establish the actus reus . [ 77 ] The Criminal Code contains provisions deeming sexual activity to have been without consent in certain circumstances.
Section 273.1 (2) (
b) states that no consent is obtained where “the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity”. At paragraph 22 of Nyznik , Justice Molloy discussed capacity to consent in the context of intoxication: [22] Although an unconscious person is by definition incapable of consenting to sexual activity, the same is not the case for a person who is intoxicated by alcohol or drugs. There will be times when a person is so impaired by alcohol and/or drugs that he or she is incapable of consenting.
Whether or not that state of incapacity has been reached is a factual finding to be made in the circumstances of each case.
The fact that a complainant does not remember engaging in sexual acts, or has a complete blackout of the time in question, is not the same thing as lacking mental capacity to consent. [ 78 ] At paragraph 66 of Al-Rawi , Justice Beveridge described the analysis for capacity to consent: [66] Therefore a complainant lacks to requisite capacity to consent if the Crown establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that, for whatever reason, the complainant did not have an operating mind capable of : 1. appreciating the nature and quality of the sexual activity; or 2. knowing the identity of the person or persons wishing to engage in the sexual activity; or 3.
Understanding she could agree to decline to engage in, or to continue, the sexual activity. [ 79 ] In the present case there are two incidents of sexual touching, which have been set out earlier. In the first the Complainant alleges the Accused “shoved his penis” in her mouth without her consent. In the second she alleges that he had among other acts, anal intercourse with her while she was blacked out or asleep. She has no memory of this incident. Her last memory was the first incident. P. C. testified that she experienced physical symptoms that made it clear to her that Mr.
L. had anal intercourse with her. [ 80 ] By her own admission, P. C.’s level of intoxication was high to the extent that she needed help climbing the stairs to the bathroom. She had no memory of going from the bathroom to the bedroom. She vaguely remembered S. L. helping her up the stairs. By his account, she had approximately a bottle and several glasses of wine to drink. [ 81 ] P. C. remembered sitting on the toilet to urinate and then Mr. L shoving his penis into her mouth. On cross she said it was not possible that she pulled him toward her.
She said everything else was very vague, but this was her last memory until she awoke the next morning.
[ 82 ] In respect of the second, incident Mr. L. stated that he tried to have anal sex with P. C., but then stopped, when she passed out. In his statement, he said she fell asleep. In the text messages he said “passed out.” [ 83 ] In this case as in many others, there are no witnesses as to what transpired between P. C. and S. L. in their home in November 2015. The Court is therefore left to consider their evidence, which is at odds on the key points. There is no question that they engaged in sexual activity and the critical question is whether or not P. C. did so by consent. She said S.
L. forced himself upon her, while she was intoxicated, and while she was passed out and lacked capacity to consent. S. L. said P. C. led the way by initiating and controlling their sexual activity in an aggressive tone. [ 84 ] In turning my mind to these issues and the findings to be made I must not start with any presumptions that certain types of witnesses are inherently credible or reliable, nor may I employ stereotyped myths or flawed assumptions. [ 85 ] It is my view, based on R v. G.
F. , 2019 ONCA 493 , at paragraphs 48 and 49 , that it is open to me to make alternative findings with respect to consent and capacity to consent, if the circumstances of the case warrant that approach. [48] It is difficult to apply the idea of capacity to an absence of a subjective state of mind. Recall that the Crown need not prove that the complainant made a conscious decision to refuse sexual contact, for which an operating mind might be required: J.A . , at para. 37.
Rather, the Crown is required to prove the absence of consent by reference to the complainant’s subjective internal state of mind: Ewanchuk , at paras. 25-27. Where it is proven that the complainant did not affirmatively consent to sexual touching, it may serve no purpose to inquire further to assess whether, had he or she consented, he or she would have had the capacity to do so, although in some cases a trier may elect to make alternative findings.
In any case, the analysis should not be blurred between the two separate issues, consent and capacity to consent. … [49] This is not to say that the factual circumstances of, for example, intoxication may not be relevant to both whether there was subjective consent and to incapacity to consent. In the present case, for example, the Crown argued that the complainant’s profuse vomiting made it unlikely she would have consented to sexual contact.
The same vomiting, was relevant to the degree of consumption of alcohol and the effect it may have had on her capacity to consent. [ 86 ] In addition, as is well accepted, I may accept part of or none of a witness’s testimony. I will repeat that I must be mindful of the guidance in WD with respect to the evidence and the burden of proof in a criminal case. Decision [ 87 ] Having carefully considered all of the evidence, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Complainant, P. C., did not consent to the sexual activity that evening at the time it was occurring.
I concur with the Crown that there are few frailties in her evidence, and I accept her evidence that subjectively, she did not consent to the sexual touching that occurred within the meaning of consent as defined in the Criminal Code . s. 273.1(1) [ 88 ] With respect to the Accused’s evidence, I have applied and considered WD . I do not accept his evidence, nor does it leave me with a reasonable doubt. On the whole of the evidence, I do not accept that it was P. C. and not S. L., who initiated the oral sex.
I accept her evidence that he forced his penis into her mouth. [ 89 ] The Complainant had recollection, a minimal understanding required to form an internal subjective belief in her mind at the time of the oral sex. It is important to note the Complainant said at trial she would not have consented and, in fact, did not consent to either incident. [ 90 ] With respect to the activity in the bedroom, P.
C. had no memory of it and the evidence indicates she went to sleep and lost consciousness. [ 91 ] In addition, the particular facts of this case warrant the Court’s consideration of whether the Complainant had the capacity to consent, especially as it pertains to the second incident in the bedroom. Under the Criminal Code no consent is obtained where the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity. s. 273.1(2) . I find that P. C. did not have the capacity to consent to the sexual activity, as that is addressed in Al-Rawi at paragraph 66 .
The evidence suggests that her recollections were vague just prior to her last memory, which was the “shoving” in the bathroom. I find with respect to what occurred in the bedroom that the Complainant did not have the ability to choose whether to agree to or decline the sexual activity. Indeed, none of the three components of an operating mind would have been present, based on the evidence I have heard. [ 92 ] Turning to the mens rea , I am satisfied that S. L. knew that P. C. was not communicating consent.
He knew how much alcohol she had to drink and I find that he knew that she needed help when they were going upstairs, and I accept her evidence that he did so. [ 93 ] I have carefully considered the Accused’s evidence that, from his perception of events, P. C. was the aggressor, and that he feared being hit, as he alleged in his text messages in Exhibit 1 and his statement. In this regard, I note the Complainant’s evidence that he also told her this when she confronted him the next morning about what had happened.
She said first he had a weird smile on his face and said, “we finally did it”, and was asking her if she remembered doing it. She did not and said the whole conversation was confusing. [ 94 ] S. L.’s claims do not amount to a legal defence (see s. 17 of the Criminal Code ) but more to the point, I have concluded on all the evidence that he was in control of the situation, in locking the door, and deciding, he said, to stop within 40 seconds of her allegedly yelling. P. C. was unconscious at the time. [ 95 ] I have considered whether the level of intoxication of the Complainant has impacted or distorted her
interpretation of events that evening. As stated, I am satisfied her evidence was given in a forthright matter, without embellishment or misrepresentation and I concluded that she was attempting to be honest with the Court. When she could not recall, she said so. Her evidence held up well in cross-examination by experienced defence counsel. Her evidence of bodily functions and physical symptoms of stinging, bleeding,
tearing, and of not feeling “right”, was compelling. Her evidence was both credible and reliable. [ 96 ] Having looked closely at the statement and carefully reviewing the text messages I have noted near the end on the bottom of page 12, S. L. said, “I served you alcohol”, which is what P. C. said he did that evening. [ 97 ] In
summary, I have concluded from the evidence that P. C. did not consent to the first incident and could not consent to the second. I am satisfied the Crown has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. L. had the mens rea to commit the offence. Motive to lie [ 98 ] I have also considered whether the Complainant had reason to fabricate her testimony, as S. L. alleged, to gain advantage, for example, in the division of marital assets. S. L. in his statement talked at length about this, and about her stating that if he did not agree to her terms, she would make sure he got nothing.
First, he said she threatened him with charges and then he said she implied she would charge him. [ 99 ] I have considered the Accused’s assertions in the context of all the evidence, I do not find that it impacted the Complainant’s credibility, or raised a reasonable doubt about his guilt. Honest but Mistaken Belief in Consent, s. 273.1. [ 100 ] The Crown submits the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent is not available to the Accused in this case. The Defence submitted the main issues were consent and capacity to consent.
S.L is not obligated to raise any defence as he has no burden. [ 101 ] For this defence to succeed, I must have a reasonable doubt that the Accused honestly believed that the Complainant consented to the sexual contact. The Accused must honestly believe that the Complainant was through her words or actions affirmatively communicating her consent to the sexual contact.
I do not accept or find that is the case on the evidence before me, with respect to either incident. [ 102 ] Furthermore, the crown has established the mens rea and as such proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused was reckless or willfully blind to the lack of consent by the Complainant. [ 103 ] I therefore concur with the Crown that s. 273.2 of the Criminal Code is not engaged. [ 104 ] On the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has established that the Accused, Mr. L, did commit a sexual assault on the evening in question, contrary to
section 271 of the Criminal Code . [ 105 ] This concludes my decision. Murray, J.
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